G.R. No.
L-23638 October 12, 1967 On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and
PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Jose D. Villena for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-
R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last
will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the
probate.
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba,
now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the
probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and
Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia,
all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed
oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition
were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the
proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the
major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent
in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this
Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases
G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by
decision of June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly
executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and
revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the
properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or
new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be
considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court
overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate
of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of
implied revocation at the opportune time."
On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz
as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the
estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.
1
For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion
of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944,
subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter
under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of
1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of
the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of
sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the
will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the
same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that
contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal
revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because
the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance.
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.
In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues:
(a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the
will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the
order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel
invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c)
whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly
revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent
on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing
the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to
resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their
opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand
is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montañano
vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs.
Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final and
appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such
order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution
on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as
otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts.
This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly
enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special
proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was
not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence,
the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the
evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged
against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.
questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and
hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by
the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from
subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the
original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the
revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or
legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98
Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public
policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes,
which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and
right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a
custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and
imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non
sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether
or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the
defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of
the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) . . . .
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to
the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again
belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract,
the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the
reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the
right of repurchase;
xxx xxx xxx
It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the
quoted provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the testator. As
pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869 of the Civil Code
(Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743) —
Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este,
despues de legar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u
oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a la
presuncion de que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que el
legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse esa voluntad, es
necesario que medien actos del testador que la indiquen. Si la perdida
del derecho sobre la cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del
testador, el legado podraquedar sin efecto, mas no en virtud del
numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre actos voluntarios de
enajenacion por parte del mismo testador.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or
departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930
testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself,
appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision
annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court
in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620,
promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by
respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it
even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the
testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had
ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure
therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts
below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies,
if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the
annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that
it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential
relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of
Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-
5618 and L-5620).
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage
implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and
intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either,
that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.
True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of
the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the
contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola
(Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract"
can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be
maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were
avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the
revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the same
thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on
account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue
influence in no way differs from one made through violence or
intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real
intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that
could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and
Fernandez. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960
ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN
DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.
E. A. Beltran for appellant.
E. P. Villar for appellees.
R. F. Aviado for Trustee Bank.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 9226, denying appellant's petition
therein as hereafter discussed.
2
Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal
may be narrated as follows:
Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
9.0 — En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios
nom brados por mi, seran beneficiarios o sea parasan los
legados a favor solamente de los descendientes y ascendientes
legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges.
10.0 — Transcurridos diez o quince años despues de mi muerte
todas mispropiedades, muebles o inmuebles, derechos y
ventajosos, pueden proceder a la venta de todos dando
preferencia a los legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran
mil pesos (P1,000) para los cuartrohijos de mi difunto hermano
Fabian, todos los gastos y reservando una cantidad suficiente y
bein calcumada para sufrugar se distriburia a las siguientes
personas que aun vuiven, o a sus descendientes legitimos:
A Isabel M. de Santiago — cincuente por ciento
(50%)
Los hijos de Domingo Legarda — treinta por ciente
(30%)
Filomena Diaz — diez por ciento (10%)
Nestor M. Santiago — diez por ciento (10%)
On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil,
together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No.
894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the
administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the
estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee Bank of
the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children,
Milagros Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children,
and Onesima D. Belen, single.
On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special
Proceedings No. 9226, contending that the amount that would have
appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be
divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as
the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other
words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera.
The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out
Onesima's petition. More specifically, the court said:
After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D.
Belen on March 19, 1958, wherein it is prayed that the trustee
Bank of the Philippine Island be directed to deliver to her "one-
half of whatever share is due to the deceased Filomena Diaz as
legatee in the will and codicil of the deceased testator Benigno
Diaz y Heredia, subject of trusteeship in these proceedings,"
this Court of the resolution of September 28, 1959, in which
resolution the following was declared:
"That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of
the proceeds of the sale of the properties covered in
paragraph 10 of the codicil aforesaid does not and
should not from part of her estate; it pertains to her
legitimate descendants; and
"That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be
distributed not only between her children, Milagros Belen
de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen, but also among her
other legitimate descendants, if any,
for descendientes include not only children but also
grandchildren, etc., and in this connection. it is not amiss
to observe that one may be a descendant and not yet not be
an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a
descendant.
From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that (1)
the Court below was in error in holding that its former resolution of September
16, 1955 had been affirmed by our decision of February 28, 1958 in the case of
Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera, G.R. No. L-10164 Feb. 28, 1958; and (2) that
the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be
interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee
Filomena Diaz. In the present case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and
Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the seven grandchildren of said legatee.
As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial court's
interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz has not been
affirmed in our previous decision (G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal of that judgment
will show that this Court left the issue open at the time, contenting itself with
pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of the estate of Folimena Diaz
was not the proper party to the raise the particular issue.
As the actual meaning of the provision —
El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus
descendientes legitimos,
it is undeniable that but this cluase the testator ordained a simple substitution
(sustitucion vulgar) with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. This form of
substitution authorized by the first poart of Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art.
778 of the Code of 1889):
Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for
two or more heirs.
The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes legitimos"
refer conjointly to all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the
legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants nearest in degree?
Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the
relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be
therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de
Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, grand children of
the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis,
appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889):
A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its
application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not
those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended
to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him,
because, as Manresa observes, —
la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar
este favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al
 mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la sanger y de la familia
(6 Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72).
But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest)
obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another
person (the legatee) and noot of the testator . There is no logical reason in
this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of
intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for
each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest
relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of
them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by anology? There are
various reasons against this. The most important one is that under this
article, as recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889,
the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation
does not operate. Castan, in his monograph "El derecho de representacion
y mecanimos jurididos afines en la sucesion testamentaria" (Reus, 1942),
says on this question (Pp. 13, 14, 15):
En el subgrupo ibericio de Europia y America predomina,
aunque haya ex excepciones, cuando menos en principio, no
tiene cabida en la sucesion testamentaria. Asi, por ejemplo, lo
establece la doctrina cientifica en Portugal y en la Argentina y
lo ha sancionado la jurisprudencia en Cuba.
En igual sentido, en la doctrina española es opinion general
que el derecho de representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no
tiene lugar mas que en la sucesion intestada, y en la
testamentaria en la parte refernte a las legitimas. MUCIUS
SCAEVOLA juzga que la reopresentacion, atraida por la
herencia legitima, es repelida por la testada, y apunta, como
razon de ello, la de que "la primera descansa en la ley de la
sangre, en el parentesco con su consiguiente atributo de linea y
grado, elementos propios o indispensabnles para la
repretascion , en tanto que l asegunda se basa exclusivamente
en la voluntad del testador, elemento diverso, en la orderen
legal, al de la naturaleza o de la sandre". Y el maestro DE
DIEGO, con orientacion anologa, piensa que como el titulo de
la sucesion testada es de origen voluntario y caracter
personalismo, es evidente que no hay terminos habiles para el
derecho de representacion: los llamamientos son individuales y
la premoriencia del instituido, como su incapacidad, aniquilan
la institucion.
In the second place, the history of Article 751 (of the 1889 Code) shown
that the right of representation was deliberately suppressed. Says Castan
(op. cit., 24):
En nuestra Patria opino GARCIA GOYENA que debia tener a
los parientos mas representacion aun cuando el testator llame
abiertamente la voluntad del testador, debe "observarse el
orden de la sucesion legitima, al que se presume que en todo lo
demas quiso atemperase. Poe ello, el art. 562 Proyecto de 1851
quedo redactadso asi: "La disposicion hecha simple y
generalmente a favor de los parientes del testador, se entiende
hecha en favor de los mas proximos en grado ; pero habra
lugar al derecho de representacion con todos sus efectos, con
arreglo al tittulo siguiento".
3
Con poco acierto, a nuestro juicio, los autores del vigente
Codigo han suprimido esta salvedad del Proyecto del 51, y con
ello han instaurado una norma rigida, distanciada de lo que
exige la equidad y de lo que suelen establecer los Codiogos
extranjeros. Los commentaristas convienen en que la supresion
ha sido intencionada, y por consiguiente el proposito del
legaslador es que en esta clase de llamamientos no se da el
derecho, de representacion. Dice Manresa que el art. 751 "tiene
por favorecidos con tal institucion, no a los parientes de mejor
derecho, sino a los mas proximos en grado y, por lo tanto, los
de primer grado excluiran a los de segundo y asi sucesivamente,
toda vez que la art. 915". La misma interpretacion dan al
articulo de referencia NAVARRO AMANDI, MUCIUS
SCAEVOLA, SANCHEZ ROMAN y VALVERDE.
The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz
the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited
to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether.
This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame
clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto
hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of
"descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to us indicating clearly that
he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms.
Observe that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor
Santiago and Isabel M. de Santiago, the testator, does not even use the
description "sus hijos o descendientes," but only "descendientes".
It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean the nearest
descendant but with the right of representation in favor of the more distant
relatives. Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to provide a series of
successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the
original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant
descendants should enjoy the right of representation as in intestate
succession. But to arrive at such conclusion, we must declare that the
testator had:.
(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs
and co-legatees, as established for testamentary successions by Articles
10016 (old Art. 982) and 1019, and intended to replace such accretion with
representation;
ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place
in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance,
or to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator or
renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1019. The heirs to whom the petition goes by the right of
accretion take it in the same proportion that they inherit.
(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765
of the Code of 1889) providing that:
Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in
equal parts,
which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;
(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in the
free part should be filed according to the rules of accretion or substitution (not
representation); and in default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator's
own heirs intestate:
ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion
does not take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no
substitute has been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the
testator, who shall receive it with the same charges and obligations.
There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of
succession in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered
inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any other
supporting circumstances, we deem expression "o a sus desecendientes
legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal
provisions heretofore quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such
intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so.
It is interesting to note that even under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the courts are
divided on the question whether a bequest to "relatives" or "issue," made in
general terms, gives rise to succession per capita or per stripes. In Wyeth, et al.,
vs. Crane, 174 N.E. 871, the Supreme Court of Illinois said;
The meaning of the word "descendants", when used in a will or deed
to designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has
been frequently considered and decided by the Court of England and
the United States. They established rule in England from an early date
was that the word "descendants" or the word "issued" unexplained by
anything in the context of the instrument, means all persons
descending lineally from another, to the remotest degree, and includes
persons descended, even though their parents are living, and that such
descendants take per capita stripes.
The courts of this country are divided on the question of whether in
case of a gift or conveyance to "descendants" or "issue", children take
concurrently with their parents. The so- called English rule has been
adhered to in New York, New Jersey, and Tenessee. . . . On the other
hand, the courts of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and South
Carolina have held that, in case of a gift or conveyance to
descendants or issue, unexplained by anything in the context of
instrument, children do not take currently with their parents.
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the
proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class
or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in
consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should
be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant..
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA,
guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
 RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma
Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574,
promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed
their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27,
1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument
before the court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on November
17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992
of the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate
children? Invited to discuss as amici curiaeduring the hearing were the
following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C.
Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and
Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as
follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses
Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married
Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti
and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the
only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970;
Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his
mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal
heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin
or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked
with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by
right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate
child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
4
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old
Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil
Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not
merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain
successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has
given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never
before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that
time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as
compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5
in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact.
These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to
illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil
Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by
petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent
their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in
point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the
preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit
by right of representation and if any one of them should have
died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall
be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should
survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead,
the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by
right of representation. (940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding
articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right
of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)
Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by
petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled
to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that
"the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article
992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article
992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of
illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."'
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7
Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are
based on Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable
to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the
consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez,
et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94
Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and
Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to
succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a
legitimate child himself is already abrogated by the amendments made by the
Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain
substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever
with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the
said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction •f Article 943 of
the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to
clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While
the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate
children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the
right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented
is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an
illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may
represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his
illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only
his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of
the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on
the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much
applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial,
did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural
parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate).
It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to
be still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also find support from other civilists. We quote:
 In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation
was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so
that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate
child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art.
992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990,
995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and
998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections
on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume
4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no
phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to
comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139
Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision,
Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners
herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
RESTITUTA
Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is
not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the
law does not make a distinction prevents us from making
one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados
por los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de
otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por
proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales.
(cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in (RTC) of San Carlos City, dismissing for lack of cause of action the
a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by
5
any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law
intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with
the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive
or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case
at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and
illegitimates. which goes back very far in legal history, have
been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has
not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children
on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987
(EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate
and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the
sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It
would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only
those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by
law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed.,
vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben
Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is
the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the
sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the
exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and
the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125485. September 13, 2004]
LEONARDO, assisted by JOSE T. RAMOS, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and TEODORO SEBASTIAN, VICENTE
SEBASTIAN, CORAZON SEBASTIAN, assisted by ANDRES
MARCELO; PEDAD SEBASTIAN, HEIRS OF EDUVIGIS
SEBASTIAN, namely: EDUARDO S. TENORLAS, ABELARDO J.
TENORLAS, ADELA S. and SOLEDAD S. TENORLAS, represented
by EDUARDO S. TENORLAS, and HEIRS OF DOMINADOR,
namely: NAPOLEON SEBASTIAN, RUPERTO SEBASTIAN,
ADORACION SEBASTIAN, PRISCILLA SEBASTIAN, LITA
SEBASTIAN, TITA SEBASTIAN and GLORIA SEBASTIAN,
represented by NAPOLEON SEBASTIAN; EVELYN SEBASTIAN;
AURORA SEBASTIAN; and JULIETA SEBASTIAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
which in turn affirmed the judgment[2] of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court
complaint filed by petitioner against private respondents for declaration of
nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Sebastian and
Tomasina Paul.
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late
spouses Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro,
Victor, Corazon, Piedad, as well as the late Eduvigis and Dominador, all
surnamed Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose
Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo.
In an action to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian before Branch 57, RTC of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, petitioner alleged that, on June 24, 1988, at around 5:00
p.m., private respondent Corazon Sebastian and her niece Julieta Sebastian, and
a certain Bitang, came to petitioners house to persuade her to sign a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before
signing the document, petitioner allegedly insisted that they wait for her husband
Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which was written in English.
Petitioner, however, proceeded to sign the document even without her husband
and without reading the document, on the assurance of private respondent
Corazon Sebastian that petitioners share as a legitimate daughter of Tomasina
Paul was provided for in the extrajudicial partition. Petitioner then asked private
respondent Corazon and her companions to wait for her husband so he could
read the document. When petitioners husband arrived, however, private
respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy of the
document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to
secure a copy and read the contents thereof.
Petitioner refuted[3] private respondents claim that they were the
legitimate children and sole heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul. Despite
the (de facto) separation of petitioners father Balbino Leonardo and Tomasina
Paul, the latter remained the lawful wife of Balbino. Petitioner maintained that
no joint settlement of the estate of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul could be
effected since what existed between them was co-ownership, not conjugal
partnership. They were never married to each other. The extrajudicial partition
was therefore unlawful and illegal.
Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated because she was
deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement. She further denied having
appeared before Judge Juan Austria of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on July 27, 1988 to acknowledge the execution of the
extrajudicial partition.
Private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim,[4] raised the
defense of lack of cause of action. They insisted that the document in question
was valid and binding between the parties. According to them, on July 27, 1988,
they personally appeared before Judge Austria of the MTC of Urbiztondo, who
read and explained the contents of the document which all of them, including
petitioner, voluntarily signed.
Private respondents contended that their declaration that they were
legitimate children of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul did not affect the
validity of the extrajudicial partition. Petitioners act of signing the document
estopped her to deny or question its validity. They moreover averred that the
action filed by petitioner was incompatible with her complaint. Considering that
petitioner claimed vitiation of consent, the proper action was annulment and not
declaration of nullity of the instrument.
On July 27, 1989, petitioner filed an amended complaint[5] to include
parties to the extrajudicial partition who were not named as defendants in the
original complaint.
 During the August 23, 1990 pre-trial conference,[6] no amicable
settlement was reached and the parties agreed that the only issue to be
resolved was whether petitioners consent to the extrajudicial partition was
voluntarily given.
In a decision dated February 22, 1993, the RTC of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan rendered a decision[7] dismissing the complaint as well as the
counterclaim. The court a quo ruled that the element of duress or fraud
that vitiates consent was not established and that the proper action was the
reformation of the instrument, not the declaration of nullity of the
extrajudicial settlement of estate. By way of obiter dictum, the trial court
stated that, being a legitimate child, petitioner was entitled to one-half (or
19,282.5 sq.m.) of Tomasina Pauls estate as her legitime. The 7,671.75
square meters allotted to her in the assailed extrajudicial partition was
therefore less than her correct share as provided by law.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court in its May 23, 1996 decision.[8] Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by
petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily.
We hold that it was not.
The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms
of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is
the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause
which constitutes the contract.[9] The area of agreement must extend to
all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.[10]
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it
should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it
refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence
in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue
influence; and spontaneity by fraud.[11]
In determining the effect of an alleged error, the courts must
consider both the objective and subjective aspects of the case which is the
intellectual capacity of the person who committed the mistake.[12]
Mistake, on the other hand, in order to invalidate consent should
refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to
those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to
enter into the contract.[13]
According to the late civil law authority, Arturo M. Tolentino, the
(old) rule that a party is presumed to know the import of a document to
which he affixes his signature and is bound thereby, has been altered by
Art. 1332 of the Civil Code. The provision states that [w]hen one of the
Q: While you were there is your house at barangay Angatel, Urbiztondo,
parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood
by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract
A: On June 24, 1988, I was in our house because I got sick, sir.
must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
Q: What happened?
Article 1332 was a provision taken from american law,
necessitated by the fact that there continues to be a fair number of people
A: When the time was about 5:00 oclock, I was awaken by my daughter-
in this country without the benefit of a good education or documents have
been written in English or Spanish.[14] The provision was intended to
protect a party to a contract disadvantaged by illiteracy, ignorance, mental
Q: What
weakness or some other handicap. It contemplates a situation wherein a
A: I let them come in, sir.
6
contract is entered into but the consent of one of the contracting parties
Q:isDid they come in?
vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other.[15] A: Yes, sir.
Thus, in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read Q:
andWho was the companion of your half sister Corazon Sebastian when she
fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms arrived in your house?
thereof have been fully explained to the former.[16] Where a party is
unable to read, and he expressly pleads in his reply that he signedA: theJulita Sebastian and her daughter Bitang, sir.
voucher in question without knowing (its) contents which have not been Q: And who is this Julita Sebastian to you?
explained to him, this plea is tantamount to one of mistake or fraud in the
execution of the voucher or receipt in question and the burden is shiftedA:toShe is my niece, sir.
the other party to show that the former fully understood the contents ofQ:theAnd then when they got inside the house, what happened?
document; and if he fails to prove this, the presumption of mistake (ifA: notI asked them their purpose, sir.
fraud) stands unrebutted and controlling.[17]
Q: Did they tell you their purpose?
Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud are voidable.[18] These A: I asked their purpose in coming to our house and they told me, I came here
circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of which impairs the because I have a partition executed so that the share of each one of us will
freedom, intelligence, spontaneity and voluntariness of the party in giving be given, she said sir.
consent to the agreement. In determining whether consent is vitiatedQ:byDid you see that document?
any of the circumstances mentioned in Art. 1330 of the Civil Code, courts
A: Yes, sir.
are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances in a given
case and in deciding in favor of what they believe actually occurred, ATTY. L. TULAGAN
considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship andQ: theDid you read the document?
conduct of the parties at the time of making the contract and subsequent
thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private A: No, sir because I was waiting for my husband to have that document read or
writing.[19] translated to me because I could not understand, sir.
Although under Art. 1332 there exists a presumption of mistakeQ:orWhat could you not understand?
error accorded by the law to those who have not had the benefit of a goodA: I can not understand English, sir.
education, one who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a
Q: But anyway, can you read?
contract must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence,
not merely by preponderance of evidence.[20] Hence, even as the burden A: Yes, sir in Pangasinan.
of proof shifts to the defendants to rebut the presumption of mistake,Q: theNow, that document which according to you was brought by your half sister
plaintiff who alleges such mistake (or fraud) must show that his personal Corazon Sebastian, what happened to that document?
circumstances warrant the application of Art. 1332.
A: Corazon Sebastian request(ed) me to sign, sir.
In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of
petitioner was not sufficiently rebutted by private respondents. Private Q: Did you sign immediately?
respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial A: Yes, sir, because according to her, all my shares were embodied in that
settlement of estate was explained in a language known to the document as a legal daughter.[21]
petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only Petitioners wish to wait for her husband, Jose T. Ramos, to explain to her
finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and
the contents of the document in the Pangasinan dialect was a reasonable and
spontaneous consent without having the document, which was in English, prudent act that showed her uncertainty over what was written. Due to her
explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect. She stated in open court that she limited educational attainment, she could not understand the document in
did not understand English. Her testimony, translated into English, was as
English. She wanted to seek assistance from her husband who was then out of
follows: the house. However, due to the misrepresentation, deception and undue pressure
of her half-sister Corazon Sebastian, petitioner signed the document. Corazon
Pangasinan, what happened? assured petitioner that she would receive her legitimate share in the estate of
their late mother.
Later on, when petitioners husband examined the extrajudicial partition
agreement, he found out that petitioner was deprived of her full legitime. Under
the law, petitioners share should have been one-half of her mothers estate,
in-law, Rita Ramos, and told me that my half sister Corazon would comprising a total area of 19,282.50 square meters. Under the defective
like to tell us something, sir. extrajudicial settlement of estate, however, petitioner was to receive only
did you do? 7,671.75 square meters. This was a substantial mistake clearly prejudicial to the
substantive interests of petitioner in her mothers estate. There is no doubt that,
given her lack of education, petitioner is protected by Art. 1332 of the Civil
 Code. There is reason to believe that, had the provisions of the
extrajudicial agreement been explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect,
she would not have consented to the significant and unreasonable
diminution of her rights.
MTC Judge Austria, the officer who notarized the extrajudicial
settlement, stated that he explained the contents to all the parties
concerned. Granting arguendo, however, that Judge Austria did indeed
explain the provisions of the agreement to them, the records do not reflect
that he explained it to petitioner in a language or dialect known to her.
Judge Austria never stated in his testimony before the court a quo what
language or dialect he used in explaining the contents of the document to
the parties.[22] Significantly, he was not even certain if the parties to the
agreement were present during the notarization of the document:
TTY. TULAGAN
Reflected upon all the pages of this Exhibit 1 are numerous signatures,
two of whom belongs (sic) to Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo
Sebastian Tenorlas.
TTY. D. TULAGAN
ontinuing)
e Philippines on July, 1989, will you please educate us now Judge
Austria on this document?
TTY. O. DE GUZMAN
at will be improper, your Honor.
OURT
hat is the question, you repeat the question.
TERPRETER:
flected upon all the pages of this Exhibit 1 are numerous signatures,
two of whom belongs (sic) to Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo
Sebastian Tenorlas, in your just concluded testimony, you said that
everyone of them appeared with you, we have here a documented
evidence coming from the Department of Justice, Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, Manila, certifying that Piedad Paul
Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian Tenorlas did not arrive in the
Philippines or departed from the Philippines on July, 1998, will
you please educate us now Judge Austria on this document?
TTY. O. DE GUZMAN:
our Honor please, before the witness answer, may we examine the
certification first and may we state for the record that the month of
July, 1998 does not specify any date.
TTY. L. TULAGAN:
ly.
TTY. O. DE GUZMAN:
ut not a particular date, for the record.
TTY. L. TULAGAN:
For the whole month of July, no departure and no arrival. This is a
certificate from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. I do not know
7
about this, as a matter of fact, I do not even know this person
personally
WITNESS:
Somebody that kind of name appeared before me.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
Q: Since you do not know everybody from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan it is
possible that another person appeared and signed for that name?
A: Yes, possible.[23]
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is
controlling, having remained unrebutted by private respondents. The
evidence proving that the document was not fully explained to petitioner in
a language known to her, given her low educational attainment, remained
uncontradicted by private respondents. We find that, in the light of the
circumstances presented by the testimonies of the witnesses for both
parties, the consent of petitioner was invalidated by a substantial mistake
or error, rendering the agreement voidable. The extrajudicial partition
between private respondents and petitioner should therefore be annulled
and set aside on the ground of mistake.
In Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[24] we ruled
that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent, even if
the act complained of is committed by a third party without the connivance
or complicity of one of the contracting parties. We found that a substantial
mistake arose from the employment of fraud or misrepresentation. The
plaintiff in that case was a 70-year-old unschooled and unlettered woman
who signed an unauthorized loan obtained by a third party on her behalf.
The Court annulled the contract due to a substantial mistake which
invalidated her consent.
By the same reasoning, if it is one of the contracting parties who
commits the fraud or misrepresentation, such contract may all the more be
annulled due to substantial mistake.
In Remalante v. Tibe,[25] this Court ruled that misrepresentation to
an illiterate woman who did not know how to read and write, nor
understand English, is fraudulent. Thus, the deed of sale was considered
vitiated with substantial error and fraud. This Court further held:[26]
Since it has been established by uncontradicted evidence that the plaintiff
is practically unschooled and illiterate, not knowing how to read, write and
understand the English language in which Exhibit 22 was drafted, it would
have been incumbent upon the defendant to show that the terms there of
have been fully explained to the plaintiff. The evidence is entirely lacking
at this point, and the lack of it is fatal to the cause of the defendant for his
failure to discharge the burden of proof.
Generally, the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law and not issues of
fact.[27] This rule, however, is inapplicable in cases such as the one at bar
where the factual findings complained of are absolutely devoid of support
in the records or the assailed judgment of the appellate court is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[28] Thus, this case is an exception to the general
rule on the conclusiveness of facts, the evidence pointing to no other
conclusion but the existence of vitiated consent, given the diminished
intellectual capacity of the petitioner and the misrepresentation of private
respondent Corazon Sebastian on the contents of the extrajudicial partition.
Private respondents also maintain that petitioner has no cause of action
since the remedy that should be pursued is an action for annulment and not for
declaration of nullity. Private respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of this
petition on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Before ruling on this procedural matter, a distinction between an action
for annulment and one for declaration of nullity of an agreement is called for.
An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated
by lack of legal capacity of one of the contracting parties, or by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.[29] By its very nature,
annulment contemplates a contract which is voidable, that is, valid until
annulled. Such contract is binding on all the contracting parties until annulled
and set aside by a court of law. It may be ratified. An action for annulment of
contract has a four-year prescriptive period.[30]
On the other hand, an action for declaration of nullity of contract
presupposes a void contract or one where all of the requisites prescribed by law
for contracts are present but the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, prohibited by law or
declared by law to be void.[31] Such contract as a rule produces no legal and
binding effect even if it is not set aside by direct legal action. Neither may it be
ratified. An action for the declaration of nullity of contract is imprescriptible.[32]
The petitioners pleading was for the declaration of nullity of the
extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, this did not necessarily mean the
automatic dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Granting that the action filed by petitioner was incompatible with her
allegations, it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine
the nature of the action.[33] The court should grant the relief warranted by the
allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.[34] In this case, the
allegations in the pleading and the evidence adduced point to no other remedy
but to annul the extrajudicial settlement of estate because of vitiated consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 1996
is hereby REVERSED. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Tomasina
Paul and Jose Sebastian is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO
SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-
appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate
estate of Pedro Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan,
his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his
marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters
of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow
Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario
Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in
the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta
Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda
by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in
most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito
and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there
being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was
necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was
better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor
Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within
sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of
the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and
to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their
respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code,
he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the
conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows:
1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand,
claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of
the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words,
Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is
hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the
deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta
Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the
remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty.
Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow
as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court.
Two questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion
to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable.
And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How
shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only
survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from
an order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate
on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased
survives the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth
of the hereditary estate. ... .
8
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the
other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants
are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same
share as that of each of the children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and
unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of
the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and
the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996
should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision
on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child,
inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes
the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary
Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or
Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot
rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892
merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the
legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent
of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should
get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if
the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall
apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's
contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm
the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter
on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our
colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as
having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow
survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal
parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child
surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of
the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the
surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or
descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural
can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this
case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these
propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply
when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888)
should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b)
Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the
widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in
intestate.
A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural
include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied)
: "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving
spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to
apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in
"children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not
include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate
children and descendants ... .
ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to
one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the
only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The
inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art.
888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888
includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half,
and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied
now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or
inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or
widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so
wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by
testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance
that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was
taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where
the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the
second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception),
Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both
situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are
not called upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we
are bound to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO
CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance
with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8,
1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three
children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic
(Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda
Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso
(Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children,
Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I).
Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also
died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the
plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also
died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs
Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving
her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also
on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of
her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo
Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959,
Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the
defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her
father Geronimo Almanza.
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns
the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described
five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother,
Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of
1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the
E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the
9
W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the
year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.
31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo
Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of
San Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area
of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E.
by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of
Geronimo Almanza; First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and properties left by Maura Bagsic.
having an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to
Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon,
Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's
and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to
Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura
Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same,
in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza; the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time
Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of
San Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having
heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to
the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. the defendants.
Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the name of Cristeta Almanza; and the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in
Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of
(
bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in
R
heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena,
(Ibaba) byo Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23,
Covered byl Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00. 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty
l fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are
o (
delivered to
R the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time
, this decision
e shall have become final.
p With costscagainst the defendants.
p SO ORDERED.o
. r
City of Sand Pablo, September 21, 1962.
2
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A
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,
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From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the
substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and
execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession,
that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the
subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided
portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A,
B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in
his possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of
Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial
court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by
Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the
course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested
defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of
Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April
14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites
10
Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065
survivors be brothers and sisters B of the full blood, they shall inherit in (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
equal shares," and he concludesAwith the rule that the relatives nearest in 610).
degree excludes the more distantUones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code) The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by
T
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces
Felipa Bagsic was not raised asIan issue in the trial court. It was even the of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is
S as clearly shown in the transcript of the
subject of stipulation of the parties based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in
T
stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945,
A thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly
established in the trial court and Jthat the only issue left for determination is We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
a purely legal question involving u the correct application of the law and jurisprudence.
jurisprudence on the matter, hence d the appellate court certified this case to
g ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Us.
e G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil
Code are applicable to the admitted R facts of the case at bar. These Articles MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
provide: e SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
c BAUTISTA, petitioners,
Art. 975. When
o children of one or more brothers or vs.
sisters of rtile deceased survive, they shall inherit THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by
from the latter
d by representation, if they survive with her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they SAYSON, respondents.
shall inherit
o in equal portions."
Art. 1006.n Should brothers and sisters of the full
blood survive together with brothers and sisters of CRUZ, J.:
A the former shall be entitled to a share
the half blood, At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to
double thatp of the latter. inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them
p that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
Art. 1008.eChildren of brothers and sisters of the half
blood shall a succeed per capita or per stirpes, in The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
accordancel with the rules laid down for brothers and
sisters of the full blood. Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
surviving spouse, Article 1003p of the New Civil Code provides that March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
collateral relatives shall succeed . to the entire estate of the deceased. It properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
husband and all her ascendants had 4 died ahead of her, she is succeeded by
the surviving collateral relatives,7 namely the daughter of her sister of full On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting
of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil
blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional
entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris- rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that
"nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased." time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The
whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's
exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis
1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the
sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of of practically the same evidence.
half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships
with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated
March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by
her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three
children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez
dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the
legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R.
No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.
12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that
Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari.
Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it
disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent
law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the
exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The
birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent
provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who
cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one
Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child
that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The
petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the
ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the
time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that
Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and
executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners
11
were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal
the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In
fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN
(10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth
of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps
petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or
rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not
one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of
an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the
adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is
valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not
having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for
adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge
to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their
action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the
issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional
facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in
a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases
where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec.
75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and
the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be
considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination
of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of
kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it
essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact
be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were
not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court
to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of
no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial
courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila
was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The
affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never
offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth
certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we
ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the
present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned
in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed
by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does
not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their
adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased
couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in
acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his
love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone
from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:
 Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction
of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one who the person
represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus
the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent
her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has
the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate
estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of
the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
12
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May
21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific
performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on
August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant,
executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which was
attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of
around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three
(3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on
condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision
of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses in
connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the
aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by
the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused
to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the
aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to
comply with his obligation under the extrajudicial partition agreement and
to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial
partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void
with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of
Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in
the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had
disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of
the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the
subdivided estate. The answer contained a counterclaim wherein the
defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold her share in the estate
for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void
insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of
the proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that
the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition agreement be
declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that
the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.
On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19,
1965, declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the
counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following
stipulation of facts:
1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the
"Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963,
which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit
"I" for the defendant, which partition agreement was marked as
Annex "A" in the complaint;
2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-
mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the
distribution of the in question for the heirs of Pelagia de la
Cruz; however the parties further agree that several lots in the
said land have been sold by some of the co-heirs, and there are
houses several houses constructed therein and residents therein;
3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed
Administrator and In-charge of the development and
subdivision of the land in question, as provided for in the
aforementioned extrajudicial partition agreement;
4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd
paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the
defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly
constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;
5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the
deceased Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and
predecessor in interest of the land which was the subject matter of the
extra-judicial partition agreement;
6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz;
7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October
16, 1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as
Exhibit "2" for tap defendant; and
8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the
niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la
Cruz died on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the
defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant,
being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising
in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz;
hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the
defendant "to perform his obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-
29561 as described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement"
(meaning, apparently, that the defendant should develop the subdivision because
said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00 as
attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to
the following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is
estopped from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the
agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual
damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting
the relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that
the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement,
was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-
appellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece
of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935,
thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a
heir of the decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee
being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from
the latter by right of representation.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in
the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of
the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be
of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest
in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the
right of representation when it properly takes place.
... .
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs.
Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and
not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the
latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is
excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does
not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and
sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the
father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz
are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant.
Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the
inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and
participation in the extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to
bring the present action is concerned? They did not confer upon her the
right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts,
was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the
said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
therein in representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of
the agreement is herein quoted, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married
to Anastasia de la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to
Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual
Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and
Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in
representation of our mother, MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, ...,
do hereby by these presents, mutually, voluntarily and
amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the
property left by the deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and
adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent portions of
the estate in the following manner ... .
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties
thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee
was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not
13
being such a heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to
Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be
a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the
deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir,
when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of
the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void
(De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee
could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms
enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against
defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17
Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public
policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos.
16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221). In Ramiro vs. Graño, et al., 54
Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
No estoppel arises where the representation or
conduct the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which there
is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is
that the acts and declarations of a party based upon
an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not
estop him to assert the same, especially where every
fact known to the party sought to be estopped is
equally well known to the party setting up the
estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)
And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148,
February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees
are estopped to raise the question of ownership of
the properties involved because the widow herself,
during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the
assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an
extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
properties. But the very authorities cited by
appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the
actor must have knowledge of the facts and be
apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence without
knowledge works no estoppel. ... .
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be
sustained in view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore,
actual or compensatory damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil
Code). Here, no proof of such damages was presented inasmuch as the
case was decided on a stipulation of facts and no evidence was adduced
before the trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged
that plaintiff-appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of
P10,000.00, and claims that he is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by
right of reversion. It will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had been declared in
default on defendant-appellant's counterclaim; but the latter did not present any
evidence to prove the material allegation therein — more specifically, the
alleged sale of the former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That no such
evidence had been adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted
the case for the resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which,
unfortunately, did not make any mention of the alleged sale; and neither had
defendant made any offer or move to introduce the necessary evidence to that
effect for the consideration and evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's
having been declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all
the allegations in his counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted
the relief prayed for by him. We find no merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment by default.—if the defendant fails
to answer within the time specified in these rules, the court
shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such
failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the
court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and
render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint
and the facts proven may warrant. This provision applies
where no answer is made to a counterclaim, crossclaim or
third-party complaint within the period provided in this
rule.
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court
said:
Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the
judgment by default against a defendant who has neither
appeared nor filed his answer does not imply a waiver of
rights except that of being heard and of presenting
evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the
defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff,
because the codal section requires the latter to adduce his
evidence in support of his allegations as an indispensable
condition before final judgment could be given in his
favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the
defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support
in the law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed
for. ... .
Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties
that said plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by
virtue of the extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:
(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691
sq. m. as described in the Technical Description to be
adjudicated to Diego delos Santos, married to Anastacia
dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos, married to Regina
Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual
Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and
Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota, in co-
ownership, share and share alike.
Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his
contention that the lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim
and, consequently, in not sentencing appellee to turn over to him his
corresponding share of said portion received by appellee under the void
partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and
took possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by
virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate
successor in the inheritance (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of
course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee to a bona
fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations of the
counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount
to defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such
sale for the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the
counterclaim has not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has
it been supported by evidence which appellant should have presented in
the lower court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is
absolved from any ability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on
appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or
reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she has received
under the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has
not already been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance against
plaintiff-appellee.
G.R. No. 153736 August 12, 2010
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by:
ROSARIO SESPEÑE and their Children, namely: NICANOR S.
TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA T. SEGOVIA,
NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON, NABIGAIL T. TAAY, NAZARENE T.
MONTALVO, NORGEL S. TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON,
SILVESTRE S. TUMBOKON, NORA T. MILCZAREK, NONITA T.
CARPIO, NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and NINFA T.
SOLIDUM, Petitioners,
vs.
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE
MAGTANUM, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The question presented in this appeal is whether the ruling in a criminal
prosecution for qualified theft (involving coconut fruits) bound the
complainant (petitioners herein) and the accused (respondents herein) on
the issue of ownership of the land, which was brought up as a defense, as
to preclude the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA)
from adjudicating the same issue in a civil case filed prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the criminal case.
Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel
of land with an area of 12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barangay Buenavista (formerly Barangay San Isidro, in the Municipality
of Ibajay, Province of Aklan. The land – planted to rice, corn, and
coconuts – was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespeñe
(Alejandra), who had had two marriages. The first marriage was to
Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband
was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom
14
she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo
Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by
Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased
Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles; hence, Crisanto Miralles was
Alejandra’s grandson.
The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial
after Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe (petitioners)
asserted their right in it by virtue of their purchase of it from Cresenciana
Inog, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles.
The tug-of-war over the property between the petitioners and the
respondents first led to the commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses
Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and
others not parties herein, namely: Rosendo Magtanum, Antonio
Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them with stealing coconut fruits
from the land subject of the present case.1 The criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2269, was assigned to Branch III of the erstwhile Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Aklan.2
After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as
charged in its decision dated June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed
(C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed their conviction on
February 19, 1975, whereby the CA rejected respondent Apolonia’s
defense of ownership of the land.3
In the meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to the CA’s rendition of
its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced this suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages
against the respondents in the CFI. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No.
240 and entitled Spouses Nicanor P. Tumbokon and Rosario S. Sespeñe v.
Apolonia G. Legaspi, Jesus Legaspi, Alejandra Legaspi, Primo Legaspi,
Jose Legaspi, and Paulina S. de Magtanum, was assigned also to Branch
III of the CFI, and involved the same parcel of land from where the
coconut fruits subject of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal Case No.
2269 had been taken.
On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI
following the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act,4 rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners herein, holding and
disposing thus:
After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs were able to establish that plaintiff Rosario Sespeñe Tumbokon
purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog on December 31,
1959 (Exh. "C"). Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land by purchase
from Victor Miralles on June 19, 1957 (Exh. "B"). Seven (7) years before,
on May 8, 1950, the land was mortgaged by Victor Miralles to
Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto de Retro (Exh. "A"), and
from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in continuous and peaceful
possession of the land in question. xxx
xxxx
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the
plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners, and
entitled to the possession of the parcel of land of 12,480 square
meters in area, declared in the name of plaintiff Rosario S.
Tumbokon, under Tax Declaration No. 29220, situated in Barangay
Buenavista (formerly San Isidro), Ibajay, Aklan;
2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land in
question, and restore and deliver the possession thereof to the
plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the
defendants.
SO ORDERED.5
The respondents appealed to the CA.
On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the
complaint,6 opining and ruling thus:
The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the admitted primal
owner Alejandra Sespeñe through her supposed sale of it to her son-in-law
Victor Miralles, who sold this to Cresenciana Inog, and who in turn sold it to the
appellees. In the process, they presented the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "B",
June 19, 1957) executed by Victor Miralles in favor of Cresenciana Inog but
wherein it is provided in the said instrument that:
That this parcel of land abovementioned was inherited from the deceased
Alejandra Sespeñe, by the party of the First Part being the sole heir of the said
Alejandra Sespeñe, having no other brothers or sisters.
This claim of being the sole heir is obviously false and erroneous for Alejandra
Sespeñe had more than one intestate heir, and Victor Miralles as a mere son-in-
law could not be one of them.
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim
that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespeñe. This
supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is
likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard
particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who
were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof
that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an
owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even
adverted to.
The testimonial evidence of the appellants as to ownership, the sale and
possession is inadequate, with even the appellant Nicanor Tumbokon stating
that:
Q Did you come to know before you purchase (sic) the property from
whom did V. Miralles acquired (sic) the land?
A No, sir.
xxx
Q And you did not come to know out (sic) and why V. Miralles came
to possess the land under litigation before it was sold to C. Inog?
A All I was informed was V. Miralles became automatically the heir
of A. Sespeñe after the death of the wife which is the only daughter of
A. Sespeñe.
 Q How did you know that V. Miralles became automatically
the heir of the land after the death of his wife?
A He is the only son-in-law. (TSN, pp. 2-3, Feb. 26, 1974;
emphasis supplied)
While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of
the lot for a while, this was not as owner but as mere
Administrator as was clearly appearing in tax declaration no.
21714 ("Exhs. "J", "1").The corroboration in this by Lourdes
Macawili (TSN, June 7, 1973) does not help the appellees
(herein petitioners) any for she never knew the source of the
property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto Miralles
succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the son of Victor
Miralles and the husband of the said Cresenciana Inog, the
supposed buyer, owner and possessor of the land in question
from 1950-1957, and yet Crisanto Miralles could only say:
Q Are there improvements on the land in question?
A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the land in
question.(TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973; emphasis supplied)]
These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession
were shams, and are further demolished by the following
testimonies:
Q After the death of Alejandra Sespeñe who inherited this land
in question?
A Apolonia.
Q At present who is in possession of the land in question?
A Apolonia Legaspi.
Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took possession of the
land up to the present do you know if anybody interrupted her
possession?
A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Tañ-an Vda. de Franco, p. 7, Nov. 24,
1977)
xxx
Q Now, since when did you know the land in question?
A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN; Crispina
Taladtad, p. 3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74 yrs. old at the time
of this testimony]).
xxx
Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi been in
possession of the land in question?
A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when I was
been (sic) invited there to work up to the present she is in
possession of the land.
Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you know if
Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the land in question?
A Never.
Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon and his
wife Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do you know if this
15
Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario have ever possessed
and usufructed this land under litigation?
A No, sir.
Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor Miralles,
do you know if Victor Miralles had ever possessed this under
litigation?
A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied)
Thus neither do We buy the appellee’s contention that ownership of the
disputed land was acquired by their predecessors-in-interest thru lapse of
time. Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the concept of owner,
and they have not been able to prove even mere possession.
As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove that they were
the owners of the lot and that they were being unlawfully deprived of their
possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence
that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of
evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the
plaintiff or complainant has to prove this affirmative allegations in the
complaint and the defendant or the respondent has to prove the affirmative
allegation in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim.(AKELCO vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, Jan 25,2000)
But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must also prove the
allegations to support their prayer to declare the litigated lot the exclusive
property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S.
Magtanum; (Answer, p. 6, record). Apolonia Legaspi however is only one
of the putative intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespeñe, the other being
Crisanto Miralles who stands in the stead of Ciriaca, his predeceased
mother and other daughter of the decedent. But then no judgment can be
made as to their successional rights for Crisanto Miralles was never
impleaded. Neither is there a proof that can convince that Paulina S.
Magtanum who is merely a niece of the decedent, should also be declared
a co-owner of the inherited lot.
Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the holding that the
appellees (petitioners) are not the owners and therefore not entitled to the
recovery of the litigated lot.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and in its place judgment is rendered DISMISSING the Complaint.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The issues to be resolved are the following:
1. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV 45672
reversing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 240 was
supported by law and the evidence on record;
2. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR
affirming the decision of the CFI of Aklan in Criminal Case
No. 2269 had the effect of res judicata on the issue of
ownership of the land involved in Civil Case No. 240,
considering that such land was the same land involved in
Criminal Case No. 2269.
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A
Reversal by the CA was supported
by law and the evidence on record
The CA correctly found that the petitioners’ claim of ownership could not be
legally and factually sustained.
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that
Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners’
immediate predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer
ownership. He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law
(as the husband of Ciriaca, one of Alejandra’s two daughters). Thus, the
statement in the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor
Miralles and Cresenciana Inog, to the effect that the "parcel of land was inherited
from the deceased Alejandra Sespeñe" by Victor Miralles "being the sole heir of
the said Alejandra Sespeñe, having no other brothers or sisters," was outrightly
false.
Secondly, a decedent’s compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part
of the decedent’s estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887,
Civil Code, viz:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
(807a)
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent
Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter
succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had
predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she
were living or if she could have inherited.8 Herein, the representative (Crisanto
Miralles) was called to the succession by law and not by the person represented
(Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca. 9
The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor
Tumbokon to the effect that he had been informed that Victor Miralles had
"bec[o]me automatically the heir" of Alejandra "after the death of his wife," the
wife being "the only daughter" and he "the only son-in-law" a plain irrelevancy.
Thirdly, Victor Miralles’ supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale
from Alejandra had no competent factual support in the records. For one,
the oral sale was incompatible with the petitioners’ anchor claim that he
had acquired the land by inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the evidence
that the petitioners adduced on the oral sale was insufficient and
incredible, warranting the CA’s rejection of the oral sale under the
following terms:
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory
claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespeñe.
This supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned.
And it is likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of
the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the
sale made, who were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too
of documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and
performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax
receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.10
With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as
an heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog
was ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally
acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the petitioners.
B applicable, because the causes of action in the civil and the criminal
Bar by res judicata is not applicable.
The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had
already determined the issue of ownership of the land; and that such
ruling in the criminal case barred the issue of ownership in the civil case
under the doctrine ofres judicata.
The submission has no merit.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.11 The doctrine of res
judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age,
and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public
that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject
once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the
doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence,
and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common
law: the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of
the State that there should be an end to litigation – reipublicae ut sit finis
litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed
twice for one and the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa. A contrary doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet
to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the
litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquillity and happiness.12
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and
matters determined in the previous suit.13 The foundation principle upon
which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so
16
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate.14
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity
of the subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.151avvph!1
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by
prior judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar
to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action; the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also
known as the rule of auter action pendant, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the
effect of preclusion of issues only.16
Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not
actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for
the recovery of ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the
criminal action was to determine whether the act of the respondents of
taking the coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed land
constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the
legal ownership of the land, but in the latter, the legal ownership of the
land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or innocence was not
dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be
guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he were the owner of the land.
Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners
themselves commenced both actions, and fully and directly participated in
the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the
CA to determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence
presented in the civil action applied only to the petitioners, who should not
be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil action after the CA had ruled
adversely against them.
Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to
exceptions, such as where there is a change in the applicable legal context,
or to avoid inequitable administration of justice.17 Applying the doctrine
of conclusiveness of judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the
respondents who have rightly relied on the civil case, not on the criminal
case, to settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for recovery
of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of the
property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in
the criminal case was only the response to the respondents having raised
the ownership as a matter of defense.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the
decision rendered on May 15, 2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION
G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.
GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals which ruled that the trial court, in an action for quieting of title, did
not act in excess of jurisdiction when it issued an order for the segregation of
property, after the finality of its decision.
The facts show that the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left
their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and
Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in Mambaling, Cebu City identified as Lot No.
2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658. Upon the demise of
the Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been divided among their
children with each child having a share of 36.50 square meters. However, the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square
meters of Gregorio's share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriaco's share and 12.17
square meters of Abundio's share thereby giving her a total area of 97.43 square
meters, including her own share of 36.50 square meters. It turned out, however,
that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private respondent in this case, also
purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50 square meters from
Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from Gregorio "through Laurencia," 12.17
square meters from Abundio also "through Laurencia" and 36.50 square meters
from Marcelino or a total area of Laurencia" and 36.50 square meters from
Marcelino or a total area of 121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property. 2
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters of
the property) later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and
damages against private respondent Nique. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-7038 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9 presided by Judge
Benigno G. Gaviola. In due course, the lower court rendered a decision on
November 27, 1990 disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, dismissing the
complaint filed by plaintiff against defendant, and on the
Counterclaim and prayer of defendant in its Answer, the
Court hereby declares defendant as the owner in fee
simple of the share of plaintiff Laurencia Alejandrino and
the shares of Marcelino, Gregorio and Abundio, all
surnamed Alejandrino, of the parcel of land known as Lot
No. 2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
19658 which 4 shares totals an area of 146 square meters
more or less; and the Court further Orders plaintiff to:
1. Vacate the premises subject of the
complaint and surrender the property
 to defendant to the extent of
the 4 shares aforementioned;
2. Pay the defendant the
amount of P15,000.00 as
litigation and necessary
expenses; the sum of
P10,000.00 as reimbursement
for attorney's fees; the sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3. Plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R.
CV No. 33433 but later withdrew the same. 4 On April 13, 1992, the
Court of Appeals considered the appeal withdrawn in accordance with
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 5
Meanwhile, herein petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino filed on May 5, 1992
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch VII, a complaint for
redemption and recovery of properties with damages against private
respondent Nique that was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11673.
Adelino B. Sitoy, Laurencia's counsel in Civil Case No. CEB-7038, filed
Civil Case No. CEB-11673 for petitioner Mauricia.
The amended complaint in the latter case dated May 17, 1992 alleged that
private respondent Nique never notified petitioner Mauricia of the
purchase of 121.67 square meters of the undivided Lot No. 2798 nor did
he give petitioner Mauricia the preemptive right to buy the area as a co-
owner of the same lot. As such co-owner, petitioner Mauricia manifested
her willingness to deposit with the court the amount of P29,777.78, the
acquisition cost of the portion purchased by private respondent Nique.
Petitioner Mauricia also alleged that she demanded from private
respondent the area of around 24.34 square meters that the latter had
"unduly, baselessly and maliciously claimed as his own but which, as part
of Lot No. 2798, actually belongs to her." The amended complaint prayed
that petitioner Mauricia be allowed to redeem the area of 121.67 square
meters under the redemption price of P29,777.78 and that private
respondent Nique be ordered to execute the necessary documents for the
redemption and the eventual transfer of certificate of title to her. The
amended complaint further prayed for the return to petitioner Mauricia of
the 24.34-square-meter portion of the lot and for damages amounting to
P115,000 and attorney's fees of P30,000.
On August 2, 1993, the lower court granted the motion to admit the
amended complaint and forthwith ordered the defendant therein to file an
amended answer.
In Civil Case No. CEB-7038 in the meantime, private respondent filed a
motion for the segregation of the 146-square-meter portion of the property
that had been declared by the trial court as his own by virtue of purchase.
On May 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order the pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
ORDER
17
For resolution is a "Motion to Order Segregation of
146 Square Meters In Lot No. 2798" dated January
15, 1993 filed by defendant and the "Opposition"
thereto dated February 2, 1992 by plaintiff. Movant-
defendant also filed a rejoinder dated February 15,
1993 to the Opposition.
After going over the allegations in the motion, the
opposition thereto and the rejoinder as well as the
records of the case, particularly the decision
rendered by this Court and the Order dated October
28, 1992, denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by plaintiffs and allowing the issuance of a writ
of execution, the Court is inclined to Grant the
instant motion.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition thereto, the Court makes the following
observation:
1. Plaintiff (oppositor) has a total share of 146 square meters.
This is admitted by her in her complaint (par. 4 thereof). In the
decision rendered by this Court, this share now belongs to
defendant movant by way of sale. The decision of this Court
has long become final.
2. The total area of the land is 219 sq. meters (par. 2 of
complaint), thus, the share of Mauricia Alejandrino is only 73
square meters.
3. As early as June 10, 1983, Mauricia Alejandrino and
Laurencia Alejandrino had entered into an "Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate" whereby they agreed to divide the land
subject of this case with Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146
square meters in the frontage and Mauricia Alejandrino owning
75 square meters in the back portion (Exh. '16', Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, par. 1) (emphasis supplied), and that the
parties assure each other and their successor in interest that a
right of way of two meters is granted to each party by the other
permanently (Exh. '16', par. 2). This partition is signed by the
parties and their witnesses. Although not notarized, it is
certainly valid as between the parties, Maurecia (sic)
Alejandrino, being an immediate party, may not renege on this.
4. Since the share of defendant Licerio P. Nique is specifically
known to be 146 square meters, and that its location shall be on
the "frontage" of the property while the 73 square meters of
Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino shall be at the back portion, then,
the Court cannot see its way clear, why the 146 sq. meters share
of defendant may not be segregated.
5. The contention by oppositor that the "segregation of
defendant's share of 146 sq. meters from Lot No. 2798 was not
decreed in the judgment" is a rather narrow way of looking at
the judgment. Paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the
judgment by this Court, Orders plaintiff to "vacate the premises
subject of the complaint and surrender the property to defendant
to the extent of the 4 shares aforementioned." The 4 shares of
Laurencia Alejandrino of 146 sq. meters can be segregated
because Laurencia and Maurecia had already executed an
extrajudicial partition indicating where their respective shares shall be
located (Exh. '16'). To deny the segregation is to make the decision of
this Court just about valueless is not altogether useless. The matter of
allowing the segregation should be read into the decision.
The bottomline is still that plaintiff Laurencia, despite the fact that the
decision of this Court had long become final; and despite the fact that
she even withdraw (sic) her appeal, she still is enjoying the fruits of
the property to the exclusion of the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the motion. The defendant
Licerio Nique may proceed to segregate his 2146 (sic) sq. meters
from Lot No. 2798 covered by TCT. No. 19658, by having the same
surveyed by a competent Geodetic Engineer, at the expense of
movant-defendant.
SO ORDERED. 6
Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction filed before the Court of Appeals. In due course, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in a Decision promulgated on August
25, 1993.
The Court of Appeals stated that, in issuing the questioned order of May 6, 1993,
the respondent court was merely performing its job of seeing to it that "execution
of a final judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the
decision." It ratiocinated thus:
. . . . In ordering the segregation of the 146 square meters, respondent
Judge correctly referred to the text of the decision to ascertain which
portion of the land covered by TCT No. 19658 was actually sold by
Laurencia Alejandrino (sister of herein petitioner Mauricia) to private
respondent Nique. The respondent Judge did not err in relying upon
Exhibit '16', the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, dated June 10,
1983, mentioned in page 3 of the Decision. Pertinent portion of
Exhibit '6' reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, the above-named parties-heirs hereby
stipulates (sic), declare and agree as follows:
1. That the parties have agreed to divide the parcel of land with
Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the frontage and
Mauricia Alejandrino 73 square meters in the back portions;
2. That the parties mutually and reciprocally assure each other and
their successor of interest (sic) that a right of way of two meters is
granted to each party to the other permanently. (emphasis supplied,
Annex '1', Comment, p. 65, Rollo).
duly signed by herein petitioner and witnessed by private respondent
Nique. It readily reveals that when Laurencia subsequently sold her
shares to herein private respondent, per the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated October 29, 1986 (Exhs. 'B' and '10'), the parties must have
referred to the 146 square meters in the frontage described in said
document, Exhibit '16'. Laurencia had no authority to sell more, or,
less, than that agreed upon in the extrajudicial settlement between her
and herein petitioner Mauricia. Insofar as the latter is concerned, she
is estopped from claiming that said extrajudicial settlement was a
fatally defective instrument because it was not notarized nor
 published. What is important is that private respondent
personally knew about Laurencia and Mauricia's agreement
because he was a witness to said agreement and he relied upon
it when he purchased the 146 square meters from Laurencia.
It cannot be validly claimed by petitioner that she was deprived
of her property without due process of law considering that
private respondent is merely segregating the portion of the land
actually sold to him by Laurencia Alejandrino and it does not
affect the 73 square meters that properly pertain to petitioner.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that where there is
ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion of a decision the court may clarify such ambiguity by
an amendment even after the judgment had become final, and
for this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the
parties, the court's finding of facts and conclusions of law as
expressed in the body of the decision (Republic Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc., et al., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., 152 SCRA 309). The assailed order, in effect, clarifies the
exact location of the 146 square meters pursuant to Exhibit
'16'. Respondent court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction.
Hence, writs of certiorari and prohibition do not lie in this
case. 7
Petitioner Mauricia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' decision. However, on February 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals
denied the same for lack of merit "there being no new ground or
compelling reason that justifies a reconsideration" of its Decision. 8
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals, contending that the lower court acted
beyond its jurisdiction in ordering the segregation of the property bought
by private respondent as the same was not decreed in its judgment, which
had long become final and executory. Petitioner argues thatpartition of
the property cannot be effected because private respondent is also a
defendant in Civil Case No. CEB-11673. She asserts that Exhibit 16, the
extrajudicial settlement of estate referred to in the questioned order of the
lower court, was not discussed in the decision of the lower court and even
if it were, she could not be bound thereby considering that she was not a
party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. She questions the validity of
the deed of extrajudicial settlement because it was not notarized or
published.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent alleges that although
petitioner was not a party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-7038, she is
estopped from questioning the decision in that case and filing the instant
petition because she had "knowledge of the existence of said case"
where res judicata had set in. He adds that the instant petition was filed in
violation of Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping "in that the Petitioner
in the instant petition whose counsel is also the counsel of plaintiff-
appellant Laurencia Alejandrino in CA-G.R. CV No. . . ., had filed a civil
action — Civil Case No. CEB-11673 . . . for "REDEMPTION &
RECOVERY OF PROPERTIES WITH DAMAGES", which is presently
pending before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City." He
asserts that the lower court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or commit
grave abuse of discretion in granting his motion for segregation of the 146
square meters of the land involved that rightfully belonged to him in
18
accordance with the decision of the lower court. He charges counsel for
petitioner with exhibiting "unethical conduct and practice" in appearing as
counsel for petitioner in Civil Case No. CEB-11673 after he had appeared
for complainant Laurencia in CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 or Civil Case No.
CEB-7038.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate issue that needs
determination is whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property,
Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party.
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.
Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. 9 Each co-owner of property which is
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division
is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same. 10
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, 11 the law
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance,
alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by
Article 1088 that provides:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling
her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had
not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated
as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code
providing that an alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership, the Court said:
. . . (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-
indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the
other co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate
the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary
rule that "no one can give what he does not have" (Nemo dat quod non habet).
Thus, we held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 78178, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 738, 745), viz:
. . . since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other
co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the
sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common
from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it. 2
The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in that case had
become final and executory with Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal. When
private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the
property that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent was in effect calling
for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the estate
of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially,
(2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of
administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third
person designated by the testator. 13
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for
quieting of title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the property
of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an
extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial
settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for
the order for segregation of the property sold to private respondent. Petitioner
Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence
of notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
On extrajudicial settlement of estate, Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action for partition. . . . .
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of
making it a public document 14 that can bind third parties. However,
this formal requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive
provision of the Civil Code that states:
 Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end
to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right
in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to
indivision among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be
evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the
property regardless of the form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her
intention to terminate the co-owner by selling her share to private
respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the
estate reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to
physically divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of
their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to
settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no
hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document. In this
regard, Tolentino subscribes to that opinion when he states as follows:
. . . . We believe, however, that the public instrument is not
essential to the validity of the partition. This is not one of those
contracts in which form is of the essence. The public
instrument is necessary only for the registration of the contract,
but not for its validity. The validity of an oral contract among
the heirs, terminating the co-ownership, has been recognized
by the Supreme Court in a decision . . . (where) that tribunal
said: "An agreement among the heirs that a certain lot should
be sold and its proceeds paid to one of them is a valid oral
contract, and the same has the force of law between the parties
from and after the original assent thereto, and no one of them
may withdraw or oppose its execution without the consent of
all".
In a still later case, the Supreme Court held that "partition
among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them
is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property by the
heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and
receiving the inheritance." Hence, the court concluded, "it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an oral
agreement for distribution of the estate among themselves." 15
The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia
evidence their intention to partition the property. It delineates what
portion of the property belongs to each other. That it was not notarized is
immaterial in view of Mauricia's admission that she did execute the deed
of extrajudicial settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only
mentioned the existence of such document in its decision in Civil Case
No. CEB-7028. That document was formally offered in evidence and the
court is deemed to have duly considered 16 it in deciding the case. the
case. The court has in its favor the presumption of regularity of the
performance of its task that has not been rebutted by petitioner Mauricia.
Neither may the fact that the other heirs of the Alejandrino spouses,
19
named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco and Abundio did not participate in the
extrajudicial settlement of estate affect its validity. In her amended
complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia herself
admitted having acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of her
brothers.
On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted her
rights over portions she had acquired from her brothers to private
respondent Nique. The sale was made after the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate that private respondent himself
witnessed. The extrajudicial settlement of estate having constituted a
partition of the property, Laurencia validly transferred ownership over the
specific front portion of the property with an area of 146 square meters.
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order
for the segregation of the property. In so doing, it was merely reiterating
the partition of the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister Laurencia
that was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. The
order may likewise be deemed as a clarification of its decision that had
become final and executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper
execution of the decision be rendered futile.
The Court finds no merit in the issue of forum shopping raised by private
respondent. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other. 17 Because the judgment in Civil Case No.
CEB-7028 is already final and executory, the existence of res judicata is
determinative of whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For
the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a
decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject
matter and causes of action. 18 The fourth element is not present in this
case. The parties are not identical because petitioner was not impleaded in
Civil Case No. CEB-7028. While the subject matter may be the same
property, of the Alejandrino spouses, the causes of action are different.
Civil. Case No. CEB-7028 is an action for quieting of title and damages
while Civil Case No. CEB-11673 is for redemption and recovery of
properties.
It appears moreover, that private respondent's argument on forum shopping
is anchored on the fact that counsel for both plaintiffs in those two cases is
one and the same, thereby implying that the same counsel merely wanted
to prevail in the second case after having failed to do so in the first. The
records show, however, that Laurencia executed an affidavit 19 consenting
to the appearance of her counsel in any case that petitioner Mauricia might
file against private respondent. She affirmed in that affidavit that she could
be included even as a defendant in any case that petitioner Mauricia would
file because she "fully agree(d)" with whatever cause of action Mauricia
would have against private respondent. Such a statement can hardly
constitute a proper basis for a finding of forum shopping, much less
evidence of misconduct on the part of counsel. As noted earlier, the two
cases have different causes of action and the two plaintiffs who would
have conflicting claims under the facts of the case actually presented a
united stand against private respondent. If there is any charge that could be
leveled against counsel, it is his lack of thoroughness in pursuing the
action for quieting of title. As counsel for plaintiff therein, he could have
impleaded petitioner Mauricia knowing fully well her interest in the
property involved in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. However, such an
omission is not a sufficient ground for administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133345 March 9, 2000
JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES
MAESTRADO-LAVIÑA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C.
ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S.
SANTOS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 133324 March 9, 2000
JOSEFA CHAVES MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES
ABAYA, petitioners,
vs.
JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S.
SANTOS, respondents.
DE LEON, JR. J.:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dated November 28, 1997 declaring Lot
No. 5872, located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, as common property of
the heirs of the deceased spouses, Ramon and Rosario Chaves, and ordering its
equal division among all the co-owners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Cagayan de Oro City, which
dismissed petitioners' action against the private respondents for Quieting of Title
over the said lot.
The pertinent facts are the following:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the
contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of 57.601 square
meters, however, is still registered in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon
and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and
1944, respectively. They were survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen
Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa,
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated intestate
proceedings 3 in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was appointed
administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the estates was made
and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition. Thus, they filed an
action for partition 4 before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.
The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as
receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision approving the project of
partition. However, the records of said case are missing and although
respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a copy of said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No.
3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of
coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a)
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa;
and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all
located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an
aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally between petitioners
(a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His
share was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of
Salvador's father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and
effected, receiver Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said
heirs in accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion
sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence,
one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other half to
Amparo.1âwphi1.nêt
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the following
documents: (1) the inventory of properties of the estate submitted to the
court in the proceedings for the settlement of said estate; (2) the project of
partition submitted to the court for approval; (3) the properties receiver
Hernando Roa had taken possession of, which he listed in the
"Constancia" submitted to the court; and (4) the court order approving the
partition. Decedent Ramon Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from Felomino
Bautista, Sr. but he subsequently delivered it to the spouses Hernando
Roa and Amparo Chaves-Roa. 5 It was thereafter delivered to petitioners
during the actual partition in 1956, and petitioners have been in
possession of the same since then.
As to the omission of Lot No. 5872 in the inventory and project of
partition, the parties offer different explanations. Respondents claim that
due to the series of involving the said lot, the heirs were unsure if it
belonged to the decedents' estate at all. As a result they deferred its
inclusion in the inventory of the properties of the estate as well as its
distribution pending the investigation of its status. In fact, administrator
Angel Chaves filed a motion in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate to include the said lot in the inventory but the court did not act on it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that the omission was inadvertent and
the inaction of the court on the motion was due to the compromise
agreement entered into by the heirs. 6
Petitioners' thesis consists of the existence of an oral partition agreement
entered into by all heirs soon after the death of their parents. The
proposed project of partition was allegedly based on it but the court's
order of partition failed to embody such oral agreement due to the
omission of Lot No. 5872. For some reason, however, the actual partition
of the estate conformed to the alleged oral agreement.
Petitioners claim that they failed to notice the non-inclusion of Lot No.
5872 in the court's order. They only realized such fact after the death in
1976 of Silvino Maestrado, the husband of petitioner Josefa. They
discovered among Silvino's belongings, the partition order and found out
that Lot No 5872 was not included therein. 7
In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quitclaim to confirm
the alleged or a agreement. On August 16, 1977, Angel, Concepcion and
Ramon signed a notarized quitclaim in favor of petitioners. Amparo was
unable to sign because she had an accident and had passed away on the
following day. It was her heirs who signed a similarly worded and
notarized quitclaim on September 8, 1977. 8
20
Respondents dispute the voluntariness of their consent or the consent of
their predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims. Ramon claims to have been
betrayed by his lawyer, Francisco Velez, who is the son-in-law of
petitioner Josefa Maestrado. He allegedly signed the quitclaim without
reading it because his lawyer had already read it. He believed that since his
lawyer was protecting his interest, it was all right to sign it after hearing no
objections from said lawyer. On the other hand, Angel signed the
quitclaim "out of respect" for petitioners. On the other hand, Concepcion
signed because she was misled by alleged misrepresentations in the
"Whereas Clauses" of the quitclaim to the effect that the lot was
inadvertently omitted and not deliberately omitted due to doubts on its
status. 9
Six (6) years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents discovered
that Lot No. 5872 is still in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and
Rosario Chaves. Thus, on October 14, 1983, respondent Ramon Chaves,
sole heir of Salvador Chaves, and respondent Jesus Roa, son of Amparo
Chaves-Roa, wrote a letter to their uncle Angel Chaves to inform him of
that said property which they claim to belong to the estate of their
deceased grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the concerned heirs.
Hence, they requested Angel Chaves to distribute and deliver it to the
heirs. 10 On October 24, 1983, respondent Natividad Santos, daughter
and attorney-in-fact of Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores, also wrote a
similar letter to Angel Chaves. On December 1, 1983, Angel Chaves
transmitted the said letters to petitioner Carmen Abaya and requested her
to respond.
In response, petitioners filed, on December 22, 1983, an action for
Quieting of Title 11 against respondents in the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro. On April 10, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision in
favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of these facts, the court therefore considers the
property, Lot 5872 still common property. Consequently, the
property must be divided in six (6) parts, there being six heirs.
But since the group of Jesus Roa already quitclaimed in favor
of plaintiffs and the same is true with Angel Chaves, the
defendants Natividad Santos and Ramon Chaves shall receive
one-sixth (1/6) each out of Lot 5872 and the balance will be
divided equally by the plaintiffs Josefa-Chaves-Maestrado
represented by her daughters and the other half to Carmen
Chaves-Abaya.
With no other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a Decision,
promulgated on November 28, 1997, sustained the said Decision of the
trial court, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision
dated April 10, 1995 subject of the appeal, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
On May 29, 1998, petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Lavina, in substitution of her
deceased mother Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, fled a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court. 12 Petitioner Carmen Chaves-abaya also filed her
own petition for review on certiorari on June 1, 1998. 13 Since the two
petitions involve the same facts and issues, we decided in a Resolution 14 to
consolidate the said cases.
Petitioner Maestrado-Lavina assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL
COMMON PROPERTY, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY
NULLIFYING THE VERBAL PARTITION AGREEMENT
REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE CHILDREN/HEIRS
OF DECEDENTS RAMON AND ROSARIO CHAVES WAY
BACK IN 1956;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL
COMMON PROPERTY UPON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
SIGNATURES OF RESPONDENTS ON THE DULY NOTARIZED
QUITCLAIMS WERE OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT, ON THE BASIS ALONE OF THE CLAIMS
THAT (A) RAMON CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM
WITHOUT READING IT; AND THAT (B) ANGEL CHAVES
SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM OUT OF RESPECT, THERE WAS
FRAUD AS WOULD VITIATE RESPONDENTS CONSENT TO
THE QUITCLAIMS;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
NO CAPACITY TO SUE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE OR
REMOVAL OF CLOUD THEREON ON THE BASIS ALONE
THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE REGISTERED OWNERS
OF LOT 5872;
V. IT BEING UNDISPUTED THAT THE FACTS GIVING RISE
TO CLOUD ON JOSEFA'S AND CARMEN'S OWNERSHIP OVER
LOT 5872 SURFACED ONLY IN 1983 AND PETITIONERS
FILED THE CORRESPONDING ACTION TO QUIET TITLE OR
REMOVE CLOUD THEREON ALSO IN 1983, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF
LACHES. 15
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya, on the other hand, assigns the following
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS FRAUD IN OBTAINING THE
CONSENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON P. CHAVES
AND CONCEPCION CHAVES SANVICTORES, THE MOTHER
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT NATIVIDAD SANTOS, TO THE
DEEDS OF QUITCLAIM;
 II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE
WAS NOT BROUGHT BY THE PERSON IN WHOSE
NAME THE TITLE IS ISSUED;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF
LACHES FOR HAVING SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS FOR
MORE THAN 25 YEARS. 16
We grant the consolidated petitions, the same being impressed with merit.
First. Petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title.
Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real
property may bring such action and "title" here does not necessarily
denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the
suit. 17 Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in
possession of the property being litigated, such action is
imprescriptible. 18 One who is in actual possession of a land, claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right because his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the
courts to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his
title. 19
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held,
nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable
where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by
law. 20 Thus, laches does not apply in this case because petitioners'
possession of the subject lot has rendered their right to bring an action for
quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches.
Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to
constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid
injustice. 21Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on
one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would
result in a clearly inequitable situation. 22
In the case at bench, the cloud on petitioners' title to the subject property
came about only on December 1, 1983 when Angel Chaves transmitted
respondents' letters to petitioners, while petitioners' action was filed on
December 22, 1983. Clearly, no laches could set in under the
circumstances since petitioners were prompt and vigilant in protecting
their rights.
Second. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners' ownership over
said lot was acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the
deceased spouses' heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on
August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the
partition of the decedents' estate, was not presented by either party
thereto. The existence of the oral partition together with the said
quitclaims is the bone of contention in this case. It appeared, however,
that the actual partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral
21
partition despite a contrary court order. Despite claims of private
respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly delivered to the petitioners,
nothing was done to rectify it for a period of twenty-seven (27) years from
1983.
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of
partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can
make sense out of the actual partition of the properties of the estate despite
claims that a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition,
petitioners were not in possession of Lot. No. 5872 but for some reason or
another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual
partition of the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one
among the heirs questioned petitioners' possession of or ownership over
said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral
agreement of partition among the said heirs and the distribution of the
properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In any event, the
parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no such move was
done until 1983.
A possessor or real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless
the adverse claimant establishes a better right. 23 In the instant case it is
the petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established
a superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. 24 If may be effected
extra-judicially by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed
before the register of deeds. 25
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive
nor an inherent element of a contract of partition. 26 Since registration
serves as constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs
is valid if no creditors are affected. 27 Moreover, even the requirement of
a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to
partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering
that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of
ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir. 28
Nevertheless, respondent court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is still
common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario
Chaves because the TCT covering the said property is still registered in the
name of the said deceased spouses. unfortunately, respondent court was
oblivious to the doctrine that the act of registration of a voluntary
instrument is the operative act which conveys or affects registered land
insofar as third persons are concerned. Hence, even without registration,
the contract is still valid as between the parties. 29 In fact, it has been
recently held and reiterated by this Court that neither a Transfer Certificate
of Title nor a subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an oral
partition. 30
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the
oral partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and
distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral
partition.. No one among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years.
Final. The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of petitioners
are not vitiated by fraud.1âwphi1 Hence, they are valid.
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims
confirmed such prior oral agreement as well as the petitioners' title of ownership
over the subject Lot No. 5872. More importantly, independent of such oral
partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are valid contracts of waiver of
property rights.
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the instant case, is
protected by law 31 and the courts are not quick to interfere with such freedom
unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order. 32 Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the
relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their existence and intent to
relinquish them. 33 The intent to waive rights must be clearly and convincingly
shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent is the act of a party, such act
should be manifestly consistent and indicative of an intent to voluntarily
relinquish a particular right such that no other reasonable explanation of his
conduct is possible. 34
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and
September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs signatures thereon have no other
significance but their conformity thereto resulting in a valid waiver of property
rights. 35 Herein respondents quite belatedly and vainly attempted to invoke
alleged fraud in the execution of the said quitclaims but we are not convinced. In
other words, the said quitclaims being duly notarized and acknowledged before a
notary public, deserve full credence and are valid and enforceable in the absence
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 36 In the case at bench, it is our
view and we hold that the execution of the said quitclaims was not fraudulent.
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination,
manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to lead another party into
error. 37 The deceit employed must be serious. It must be sufficient to impress
or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the
circumstances of each case. 38Silence or concealment, by itself, does not
constitute fraud, unless there is a special duty to disclose certain
facts. 39Moreover, the bare existence of confidential relation between the
parties, standing alone, does not raise the presumption of fraud. 40
Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is an essential
cause that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the annulment of a
contract. 41 Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts would be indulging in
speculations and surmises. 42 It must be established by clear and convincing
evidence but it was not so in the case at bench. A mere preponderance of
evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 43
The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at bench are not the kind
of fraud contemplated by law. On the contrary, they constitute mere carelessness
in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We have consistently denied
relief to a party who seeks to avoid the performance of an obligation voluntarily
assumed because they turned out to be disastrous or unwise contracts,
even if there was a mistake of law or fact. 44Moreover, we do not set
aside contracts merely because solicitation, importunity, argument,
persuasion or appeal to affection were used to obtain the consent of the
other party. 45
In a nutshell, the quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September 8,
1977 in the case at bench are valid, duly confirmed and undeniably
established the title of ownership of the petitioners over the subject Lot
No. 5872.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 28, 1997, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners' action praying for the
quieting of their title of ownership over Lot No. 5872, located in
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro, is granted. Costs against
respondents.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108580 December 29, 1998
CLARITA P. HERMOSO and VICTORIA P.
HERMOSO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CEFERINO C. PALAGANAS,
AZUCENA R. PALAGANAS and DR. AMANDA C.
PALAGANAS, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision dated July 24, 1992 1 of
the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision dated February 15,
1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in an action for legal
redemption instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioners was likewise denied by the
respondent court in its resolution dated December 22, 1992. 2
There is not much dispute about the background facts, thus we quote with
favor the factual antecedents as summarized by the Court of Appeals, to
wit:
Emilio Hermoso, now deceased, and plaintiff Clarita Hermoso,
were husband and wife whose union was blessed with the
following children: Rogelio, Victoria (another plaintiff-
appellee), Agustinito and Danilo Ciriaco, all surnamed
Hermoso (the latter two being third party defendants-
appellees). Emilio Hermoso died on June 22, 1957, leaving as
his surviving heirs, his wife Clarita, and the four above-named
children. Among the properties left by Emilio Hermoso is an
undivided one-third portion of a parcel of land, the whole of
which consisting of 7,842 square meters, more or less, is now
covered by OCT No. 0-1054 (M) issued in 1983, situated at
Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
22
The property was originally owned by Agrifina Francia and the
ownership thereof was transmitted upon her death to her three
(3) children, to wit: Isidro, Consolacion, and Emilio (herein
appellees' predecessor-in-interest) in the proportion of one-third
(1/3) each. Consolacion Hermoso, married to Manuel Cruz,
later bought the one-third (1/3) undivided share of her brother,
Isidro Hermoso. Thus, as indicated in OCT No. 0-1054 (M),
Consolacion Hermoso owns two-thirds (2/3) thereof and the
remaining one-third (1/3) is in the name of the Heirs of Emilio
Hermoso [Exhibit 'A'].
On May 29, 1974, the Heirs of Emilio Hermoso
executed a duly notarized ["Agreement" Exh. "1-
A"], the pertinent portion of which reads, as follows:
2. That it is hereby agreed that for the convenience of all parties
the following shall be observed in the partition of the above-
mentioned properties; that the share of CLARITA P. CARIN
shall in all cases be adjacent to the properties adjudicated to
CONSOLACION HERMOSO CRUZ; then following by the
shares pertaining to DANILO CIRIACO HERMOSO,
VICTORINA P. HERMOSO, ROGELIO P. HERMOSO and
AGUSTINITO P. HERMOSO, respectively, except in the
partition of the parcel of land situated in Calvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which is the subject of the DEED OF
EXCHANGE above-mentioned, in which case the share
pertaining to CLARITA P. CARIN shall be adjacent to
the stonewall that segregates the share of CONSOLACION
HERMOSO CRUZ, then followed by the shares pertaining to
ROGELIO P. HERMOSO, DANILO CIRIANO HERMOSO,
VICTORINA P. HERMOSO, and AGUSTINITO P.
HERMOSO, at the extreme end, respectively. [Emphasis and
underscoring Ours].
Sometime in July, 1979, third party defendants-
appellees Agustinito Hermoso and Danilo Hermoso
('Hermoso brothers' for brevity) offered to sell their
respective shares to the land in dispute to one
Benjamin Palaganas, brother of appellees Ceferino
Palaganas and Amanda Palaganas, who are old
family acquaintances of the Hermosos since the
lifetime of their late landlord, Don Marcos Hermoso.
Upon being shown a copy of the duly notarized
"Agreement" [Exh. "1-A"], Ben Palaganas, together
with the Hermoso brothers, approached Atty. Ireneo
E. Guardiano concerning the preparation of a
contract of sale, with the latter noting that the shares
offered for sale are separated by the share of
Victoria Hermoso; hence, it would be more feasible
for Danilo Ciriaco to execute a deed of exchange
with his sister, Victoria [TSN, 29 October 1986, p.
8]. A "Deed if Exchange" [Exh. "11"] was thereafter
drawn and signed by Danilo Ciriaco Hermoso but
the same was not however signed by Victoria
Hermoso.
Nonetheless, this transaction did not materialize for the
reasons that Clarita Carin subsequently offered to redeem
the shares sold by her children by returning the amount
already received by her son, Agustinito. By reason of their
good relations and it appearing that the sale was made
without the knowledge and consent of Clarita Carin, Ben
Palaganas accepted the offer without suspiration.
In the month of October of the same year, Agustinito, then
reviewing for the Bar Examinations, and Danilo, in dire
need of money, for the second time offered to sell their
respective shares to Ben Palaganas who acted for and in
behalf of his brother, Dr. Ceferino Palaganas, and sister,
Dr. Amanda Palaganas (Palaganases, for brevity), this time
giving assurance that their mother (Clarita Carin) had
already consented to the transaction and that they could
convince their sister, Victoria, to finally agree to an
exchange of shares with Danilo. Elated with this
development, the Palaganases even offered a higher price
[P500,000.00] for the sale.
Thus, with these assurances, the parties executed on
January 30, 1980 a duly notarized "Deed of Absolute Sale
Over Two Undivided Shares To A Parcel of Land" (Annex
"B", Plaintiffs-Appellees; Exhibit 2, Appellants) with the
Hermoso brothers receiving P300,000.00 upon the
execution of the contract, P100,000.00 to be paid upon the
eviction of the squatters/tenants thereon, and the balance
of P100,000.00 to be paid upon the issuance of title in the
name of the vendees.
Upon the commencement of the present action (October 8,
1984), the Hermoso brothers have already received a total
amount of P401,500.00 with the last condition — transfer
of title — not having been yet fulfilled.
Contrary to the assurances made by the Hermoso brothers,
plaintiffs-appellees allegedly came to have known of the
transaction only sometime between May, 1983 and
January, 1984 (Complaint, par. 8 in relation to TSN, 21
Nov. 1984, p. 32, Victoria Hermoso). Thereafter,
plaintiffs-appellees allegedly made arrangements to
negotiate for the redemption of the shares sold by the
Hermoso brothers. This time however, the Palaganases
were not so open to the idea of the offered repurchase for
the value of the property in dispute had considerably
increased and that they have already set foothold on said
property by reason of their investments and the plans made
for its development. Furthermore, they relied upon the
assurances made by the Hermoso brothers that the
transaction is known to Clarita Carin and Victoria
Hermoso. 3
Consequently, considering the adamant refusal of the private respondents to
resell the disputed lots, petitioners on October 8, 1984 filed a complaint for legal
redemption before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 7, Malolos, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants
third-party plaintiffs from proceeding with the construction of the building
thereon. The trial court issued the writ prayed for. After trial on the
merits, the court a quo issued its decision dated February 15, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
and third-party defendants as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants to allow the redemption of the
shares sold to them by their vendors, the third party defendants
herein, and upon payment of the amount of Four Hundred One
Thousand Five Hundred (P401,500.00) Pesos, to surrender the
possession of the portion of the land covered by OCT No. 0-
1054 (N), together with whatever improvement they have
constructed on the property, to the plaintiffs;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos by way of actual
damages to cover the transportation expenses of the plaintiffs
from Cebu to Malolos and back and also attorney's fees in the
amount of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos which
plaintiffs have paid or are bound to pay their counsel;
3. Ordering the third party defendants to pay the defendants,
damages by way of legal interest in the amount computed at
the rate of twelve (12%) percent of the P401,500.00 which
shall commence from the date of the filing of the complaint on
October 8, 1984 until the said amount of P401,500.00 shall
have been completely paid to the defendants by the said
plaintiffs.
Costs against the defendants. 4
On appeal, the issues were simplified by the respondent court as follows:
1. Whether or not the property in dispute is still co-owned or
has actually been partitioned thereby terminating the co-
ownership;
2. If otherwise, whether or not the plaintiffs-appellees could
still exercise the rights of redemption.
The respondent court disagreed with the findings of the trial court and
was of the view "that laws and jurisprudence favor the appellants, hence
we reverse." The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment
appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new
one is entered dismissing the Complaint and
ordering Third-Party Defendants to pay on the
Third Party Complaint, the Third Party Plaintiffs
the amount of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
The parties shall bear their respective costs. 5
In this petition for review, Clarita P. Hermoso, now Clarita Carin after her
remarriage, and her daughter Victoria P. Hermoso, raise the following
grounds:
I.
23
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
AGREEING WITH THE HOLDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE AGREEMENT,
MARKED AS EXHIBIT "1-A," IS NOT A DEED
OF PARTITION BUT IS A MERE SCHEME AS
TO HOW TO PARTITION THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION WHICH IS TEMPORARY IN
CHARACTER AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE AT
ANY TIME AND IS NULL AND VOID AS FAR
AS PETITIONER VICTORIA P. HERMOSO IS
CONCERNED BECAUSE SHE WAS STILL A
MINOR WHEN SAID AGREEMENT WAS
EXECUTED AND HER CO-PETITIONER
CLARITA P. HERMOSO HAD NO AUTHORITY
TO SIGN SAID AGREEMENT IN HER BEHALF;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION WAS STILL UNDIVIDED AND WAS
STILL UNDER CO-OWNERSHIP DESPITE THE
EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT MARKED
AS EXHIBIT "1-A" BECAUSE CONSOLACION
HERMOSO, CO-OWNER OF 2/3 OF SAID
PROPERTY, WAS NOT A PARTY TO SAID
AGREEMENT;
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
COUNTING THE DATE WHEN THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED FROM
THE TIME THE PETITIONERS MADE A
FORMAL OFFER TO REDEEM INSTEAD OF
FROM THE TIME THE PETITIONERS STARTED
NEGOTIATING FOR THE REDEMPTION OF
THE TWO UNDIVIDED SHARES AFTER THEY
WERE CERTAIN THAT SAID UNDIVIDED
SHARES WERE SOLD TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS. 6
The trial and appellate courts disagreed as to the interpretation to be given
to the agreements and contracts and to the notice of sale involved in this
case.
In the trial court, petitioners posited the theory that the disputed land is still
under co-ownership. On the basis of the same documentary evidence, the
private respondents contend that what the two brothers sold was already
definite since partition had already been effected.
The first two (2) grounds for this petition refer to the nature of the land
sold to the respondents. The question is: Was it still under co-ownership or
had it already been partitioned and divided among the co-owners?
In finding that the parcel of land covered and described in OCT No. O-
1054 (M) had not been divided or partitioned among the co-owners, the
trial court said:
In fact, there is no division yet between the spouses, Manuel Cruz and
Consolacion Hermoso Cruz on one hand and the Heirs of Emilio
Hermoso on the other. This fact of co-ownership is easily discernible
in the title itself which has not yet been cancelled, and therefore still
subsisting.
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as
amended, in the name of said spouses. Manuel C. Cruz and
Consolacion Hermoso; and heirs of Emilio Hermoso, namely: Clarita
Pajo, Victoria Hermoso, Rogelio Hermoso, Agustinito Hermoso, and
Danilo Hermoso as their exclusive property, —
The documents relating to the shares of the third party defendants
readily show this fact of co-ownership. Thus, in the untitled
instrument introduced by the defendants marked as Exhibit 3 which is
an agreement to sell purportedly bearing the date October 10, 1979
signed by the Hermoso brothers, Agustinito and Danilo and stating
how the P500,000.00 consideration of the sale shall be paid, what was
referred to have been sold were the shares, rights and interests over
the land of the said vendors. This document states, among others:
That we have agreed to transfer and convey unto spouses Dr.
Ceferino C. Palaganas and Azucena R. Palaganas, both of legal age,
Filipinos and with residence and postal address at Bañga.
Meycauayan, Bulacan all our shares, rights and interests over the
aboved escribed parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances
under the following terms and conditions . . . Cf. Exhibit 3, def.,
emphasis supplied.
The document signed by the two brothers on January 30, 1980 was
obviously prepared at the instances of Ben Palagas. Acknowledged
before Notary Public Irineo Guardiano whose advise was sought by
Ben Palaganas, its title is immediately revealing, as it is titled "Deed
of Absolute Sale Over Two Undivided Shares to a Parcel of Land"
Cf. Exhibit C. pl., Exhibit 2, def., underlining supplied. It is also
stated in this document that what was sold by the Hermoso brothers
were "shares, rights and interests over the above-described parcel of
land" (which obviously refers to the land in question).
It is significant to note that in the deed of sale marked as Exhibit 2,
defendant, the area of the shares of the vendors, the Hermoso brothers
were not specified. What was mentioned on the matter of area is that
of the whole parcel which is 7,829 square meters. If there was a
partition or separation of the portions of the whole land assigned to
the owners named in the title, the parcels conveyed could have been
described with their specified metes and bounds.
There was no subdivision plan presented by the defendants. In fact,
there was none as yet executed by a duly licensed geodetic engineer
on that registered land. Ben Palaganas who was then dealing with the
Hermoso brothers, the named vendors in the document, is a highly
educated man. As he had testified, he is an accountant by profession
and he had served as head of a department of the Central Bank until
his retirement from the government. In the opinion of this court, he
knew all along that what he or his principals were buying at the time
were the undivided shares, participation and interests of the vendors
to the land. His claim later in court that the shares of the vendors
could already be identified and segregated is difficult to believe. If his
 claim were true, Ben Palaganas with his experience and
educational background could have easily managed to
executed the proper document as a basis of an ultimate
issuance of title in the name of the vendees. The document
which he relied upon which is Exhibit 1-A as the basis for his
conclusion that the Hermoso brothers were selling definite
parcels of land is belied by the recitals of the documents he
himself introduced to the court, viz. Exhibits 2 and 3. The
document, Exhibit 1-A, if at all, could at best be considered as
a scheme how the land could be divided in the future among
the heirs of Emilio Hermoso. Temporary in nature and subject
to the conformity of the 2 sets of co-owners to the land, the
spouses Manuel Cruz and Consolacion Hermoso Cruz had not
participated in its execution. As it was, there was no sound
basis for Ben Palaganas or his principals to have assumed that
Exhibit 1-A could be enforced against the spouses Manuel
Cruz and Consolacion Cruz and other third persons. 7
In overturning the aforequoted opinion of the trial court, the respondent
court said that:
In ascertaining whether the community still subsists, or that it
had already been extinguished by partition among the co-
owners, it is not a mandatory requirement that the property co-
owned had been determined with unmistakable definiteness
and clarity, as where the property has been given a technical
description after proper geodetic survey; it is only required that
the shares are properly determinable and the proper
arrangements thereof identifiable, as when nothing is left for
the co-owners to do but to actually occupy the portion
pertaining to their share without any dispute arising over the
extent of their respective shares and the respective position of
the parcels they are entitled to occupy.
Although OCT No. 0-1054 (M) reveals on its face
the existence of co-ownership between Consolacion
Hermoso-Cruz and the Heirs of Emilio Hermoso,
the fact that the shares are separated by
a stonewall (Cf. Exh. 1-A) unmistakably reveals the
determinate or determinable character of the
property described under said certificate of title.
The court a quo subscribed to the theory that
Exhibit 1-A is merely a "scheme [of] how the land
could be divided in the future among the heirs of
Emilio Hermoso." (g.v., Decision, p. 5) Be that as it
may, there is nothing more left to be done but the
actual subdivision of the properly by a duly licensed
geodetic engineer prior to the actual titling of their
respective shares. The corresponding shares of each
of the heirs of Emilio Hermoso is not in dispute —
one-fifth each; and their proper respective
arrangements, one after another, had likewise been
included under Exhibit 1-A. 8
24
We agree with the trial court's findings that the records show co-ownership
of undivided property instead of definite portions of land having been
assigned and separately owned by each of the co-owners.
It should be stressed that it was Ben Palaganas, the vendee, who prepared
the Deed of Sale. The private respondents never had a hand in the
preparation of the document, even if the purchase was made in their
behalf. The document states that it is a "Deed of Absolute Sale Over Two
Undivided Shares to a Parcel of Land." 9 Ben Palaganas who prepared the
deed of sale, knew and intended that the transaction was over "Two
Undivided Shares" of land. After all, as observed by the trial court, Ben
Palaganas was an accountant and was, prior to retirement from government
service, the head of a department in the Central Bank. Again, we quote the
trial court on this point, thus:
In the opinion of this court, he knew all along that
what he or his principals were buying at the time
were the undivided shares, participation and interests
of the vendors to the land. His claim later in court
that the shares of the vendors could already be
identified and segregated is difficult to believe. If his
claim were true, Ben Palaganas with his experience
and educational background could have easily
managed to execute the proper document as a basis
of an ultimate issuance of title in the name of the
vendees. The document which he relied upon which
is Exhibit 1-A as the basis for his conclusion that the
Hermoso brothers were selling definite parcels of
land is belied by the recitals of the documents he
himself introduced to the court, viz., Exhibits 2 and
3. 10
Ben Palaganas' understanding and interpretation must necessarily prevail
over that of the private respondents' who were not present during the
transaction and whose claims are colored by self-interest. In fact, the same
document refers to the brothers as co-owners of undivided shares in the
disputed property. 11
It is plain from the deed of sale of two undivided shares that the absence of
a clear partition among the heirs of Emilio Hermoso complemented the
similar absence of a division of properties between the heirs and their aunt
Consolacion Hermoso Cruz. Two of the heirs were selling shares of
undivided property which in turn was also an undivided portion of a much
larger undivided inheritance.
The alleged documents of exchange presented by the respondents to show
a partition with Consolacion would, to our mind, fall under the same
category as the "1994 Agreement" among the heirs of Emilio Hermoso, as
we shall hereinafter discuss.
The allegation about Consolacion having segregated and having given her
2/3 share of the inheritance viz-a-viz the 1/3 share of the heirs of Emilio
Hermoso is belied by the letter sent by husband Manuel Cruz in August
1981 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan which intimated his desire to buy
the property of his co-owners in his capacity as such. 12 The spouses
Cruz wanted to buy properties which they heard had been alienated by
their co-owners.
The absence of a deed of partition between Consolacion on the one hand, and the
heirs of Emilio on the other, is bolstered by the fact that the registered ownership
is that of the original owner over the entire property.
The deed of sale executed by the Hermoso brothers on January 30, 1980,
referred to undivided shares. Prior to the execution of this document, the
Hermoso brothers were parties to a non-notarized certification dated October 10,
1979, 13 acknowledging the receipt of P25,000.00 from the respondents, and
wherein they were described as co-owners with the petitioners. 14
The second paragraph of the certification states that "We have agreed to sell,
transfer and convey unto the spouses Dr. Ceferino C. Palaganas and Azucena R.
Palaganas. . . all our shares, rights and interests over the above-described parcel
of land . . . ." 15 Note that the vendors who have described themselves as "co-
owners" agreed merely to sell their shares, rights and interests over the land.
They were not "selling" but were "agreeing to sell." They did not sell a specific
portion of land but sold "shares, rights and interests." It is to be further noted that
as late as 1979 and 1980, Ben Palaganas and the Hermoso brothers, the parties to
the deeds of sale, were in complete agreement that there was a co-ownership.
The basis for the opinion of the respondent court that the co-ownership had been
terminated and the property was subdivided is the document dated May 24, 1974
denominated "Agreement," executed by the heirs of Emilio Hermoso. The
pertinent portion of the agreement, which has been earlier cited and for
emphasis, is reproduced hereunder runs as follows:
2. That it is hereby agreed that for the convenience of all parties the
following shall be observed in the partition of the above-mentioned
properties: that the share of CLARITA P. CARIN shall in all cases be
adjacent to the properties adjudicated to CONSOLACION
HERMOSO CRUZ; then followed by the shares pertaining to
DANILO CIRIACO HERMOSO, VICTORINA P. HERMOSO,
ROGELIO P. HERMOSO and AGUSTINITO P. HERMOSO,
respectively, except in the partition of the parcel of land situated in
Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which is the subject of the DEED
OF EXCHANGE above-mentioned, in which case the share
pertaining to CLARITA P. CARIN shall be adjacent to
the stonewall that segregates the share of CONSOLACION
HERMOSO CRUZ, then followed by the shares pertaining to
ROGELIO P. HERMOSO, DANILO CIRIACO HERMOSO,
VICTORINIA P. HERMOSO, and AGUSTINITO P. HERMOSO, at
the extreme end, respectively.
We agree with the trial court that this Agreement was merely a scheme as to how
the land would be subdivided in the future among the heirs. The owner of two-
thirds (2/3) of the property, Consolacion Hermoso, was not a party to the
agreement. As a majority owner of the undivided property, she could have
demanded and insisted on getting the particular portions which the respondent
court ruled had already been segregated in favor of the two vendors-brothers.
The agreement among the heirs of Emilio Hermoso as to shares following one
another in a specific order cannot be binding on the co-owner who owns 2/3 of
the entire parcel but who was not a signatory or party to the document.
The reference to a stonewall separating the shares of Consolacion Hermoso Cruz
from the share of Clarita Carin and the use thereof as reference point should not
be taken to mean that thereby a partition was effected among the heirs. The
statement of the Heirs of Emilio Hermoso that the 2/3 portion of the co-owner in
relation to the heirs of Emilio shall be adjacent to that of Clarita Carin
followed by the shares of Rogelio, Danilo, Victorina and Agustinito is a
statement of a desire on how the land should be subdivided. It cannot be
said that it is a kind of division or partition of property which clearly
terminates co-ownership. The statement of Agustinito of an assignment of
shares cited by the respondent court was more of an expression on how a
future partition should be effected. In fact, the word "positions" was used
in addition to shares.
The documents evidencing the deed of sale are more authoritative in
determining the existence of co-ownership. The May 29, 1974
"Agreement" could not have been a partition or division of co-owned
properties because five and six years later, as can be gleaned from the
October 10, 1979 certification and from the January 13, 1980 Deed of
Sale Over Two Undivided Shares To A Parcel of Land, both Ben
Palaganas who prepared the documents as vendee, and the brothers
Agustinito and Danilo who signed as vendors, were definite about the
property being under co-ownership. As late as August, 1981, Manuel
Cruz, the husband of Consolacion, described the parties as "co-owners."
The private respondents, to buttress their stance that the standards of
concrete determinability and identifiability have been met in the case at
bar, cited the case of De la Cruz v. Cruz. 16 We have read the case,
regrettably the standards are not present. In De la Cruz, the northern half
of the property was assigned to the plaintiff and the southern half to the
defendant. In which case, such a division is concrete and definite, which
is not so in this case. Here, the majority co-owner, Consolacion Hermoso,
was not even consulted and the mention of names following one another
was apparently only a statement of who are the co-owners-heirs. It was
not a formal division or partition of the bigger property still to be validly
partitioned with Consolacion, owner of two-thirds (2/3) and later, among
the co-heirs who owned the remaining one-third (1/3). It is only a
statement of a future action to be taken. We, therefore, rule that the lot in
question is still undivided property owned in common by the co-heirs.
The second issue herein refers to the timeliness of exercising the right of
legal redemption. The petitioners question the respondent court's ruling
that the right had already prescribed when they exercised legal
redemption.
The law apropos to this case is Article 1623 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry
of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of
adjoining owners.
An identical provision governing co-heirs is found in Article 1088 of the
Civil Code, quoted hereunder:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
25
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period
of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor.
It is to be noted that Article 1623 stresses the need for notice in writing in
three other species of legal redemption namely: (1) redemption in a case
where the share of all the other co-owners or any of them are sold to a
third person; 17 (2) redemption by owners of adjoining lands when a
piece of rural land not exceeding one hectare in area is alienated; 18 and
(3) redemption by owners of adjoining lands in the sale of a piece of an
urban land so small and so situated that the portion thereof cannot be used
for any practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought
merely for speculation. 19
In all the above-cited provisions of law, the interpretation thereof always
tilts in favor of the redemptioner and against the vendee. The purpose is to
reduce the number of participants until the community is terminated, being
a hindrance to the development and better administration of the
property. 20 Thus, we agree with the trial court when it said:
The purpose of Article 1067 (of the old Civil Code,
now Article 1088 of the present Civil Code) is to
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership,
if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be
undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and
in a position to repurchase the share sold (De Jesus
vs. Manglapus, 81 Phil 144). While there should no
question that an heir may dispose his right before
partition (Rivero vs. Serrano (CA) 46 O.G. 642;
Wenceslao vs. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906. Hernaez vs
Hernaez, 32 Phil. 214), a co-heir would have had to
pay only the price for which the vendee acquired it
(Hernaez vs. Hernaez,
Ibid.) 21
It is a one-way street. It is always in favor of the redemptioner since he can
compel the vendee to sell to him but he cannot be compelled by the vendee
to buy the alienated property.
In this case, the land has not been validly partitioned between Consolacion
Hermoso, who owns 2/3 and the heirs of Emilio Hermoso who 1/3
regardless of the sentiments of Consolacion on the land in dispute may
later have been. There has been no subsequent distribution among the co-
heirs of their specific shares. But even granting that the heirs divided the
properties owned in common in the May 29, 1974 Agreement, the right of
legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Code, would still subsist in
their capacity as co-owners. For, it a co-owner has offered to redeem the
land within the period fixed by law, he has complied with the law. He may
bring the action to enforce the redemption after every offer has been
rejected. This is exactly the situation in this case.
The respondent court found that the petitioners already had notice of the
sale in January 1984. Considering that the letter, 22 coursed through Atty.
Sandico, offering to redeem the property was made only in September
1984, the appellate court was of the view that the action to enforce
redemption had prescribed. A perusal of the record, however, shows that
after Ben Palaganas had confirmed the transaction, the petitioners confronted the
two brothers who were compelled to admit they have sold their shares. The
vendor-brothers never took the initiative of informing their co-heirs in writing
that they have alienated their shares. As found by the trial court, the petitioners
immediately started negotiations with Ben Palaganas to redeem the alienated
share. At this time, the payment for the shares had not yet been completed
neither by Ben Palaganas nor by the private respondents.
The observation of the trial court on this issue is enlightening, thus:
It is evident from the evidence in the record that the
vendors, i.e., the Hermoso brothers, Agustinito and Danilo
had not notified in writing or even verbally their co-heirs
which include the plaintiffs herein before or during the
execution of the sale of their shares to Ben Palaganas or
the defendants. The transaction of these two brothers had
with Ben Palaganas was kept out of the knowledge of their
mother and sister, the plaintiffs herein. Their need for
funds must have been urgent and it was obvious that their
mother if advised what they intended to do with the land
could have objected to it. This reaction from the plaintiffs
was easily expected because when Agustinito Hermoso
sold his share to Ben Palaganas in July 1979, the same was
aborted by the plaintiff, Clarita Carin. On this regard,
Agustinito Hermoso, one of the two third party defendants
testified:
Q — Did you inform your mother and sister about the sale of these
properties?
A — During that time?
Q — Yes.
A — I did not.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. GARCIA:
Q — Do you know when, for the first time, did your mother and your
sister came to know of this sale?
A — Personally, I do not know when they came upon that
knowledge.
(TSN, 5-22-86, pp. 10-11).
ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q — Did you ever consult your mother or your sister of your desire
to sell the property?
A — No, sir.
Q — Why not?
A — Because I personally believe that what we were selling then
were but our right to the said property.
Q — How about your brother Danilo Hermoso, did he inform your
mother and sister about the sale of the property?
xxx xxx xxx
A — Danilo Hermoso, my brother, told me that he did not inform our
mother and our sister about his desire to sell his share on the property.
 (TSN, 5-21-87, pp. 12-13 & 15).
ATTY. OSORIO:
Q — How about the second sale which included the share of
your brother?
A — No, we did not inform our mother regarding our desire to
sell our respective properties, sir.
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code is applicable in the
instant case. But whether it is under this article or
Article 1623 of same Code, the period of 30 days
has not began to run.
When the plaintiffs had become certain after Ben
Palaganas had confirmed the transaction that there
was such a sale covering the shares of the third
party defendants (tsn, 6-19-86, pp. 20-21) sometime
in 1984, the vendors had to admit to the herein
plaintiffs the fact of sale. Plaintiffs immediately
started negotiations with Ben Palaganas to redeem
the shares sold by the vendors. Ben Palaganas or the
defendants after all, had not completely paid the
whole consideration of the sale by that time. Ben
Palaganas did not want to give money anymore to
the vendors as the amounts already paid had
amounted to P401,500.00 (see footnote of Ben
Palaganas in Exhibit 10). The several payments
made to the vendors are evidenced by Exhibits 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Ben Palaganas acting for
himself or for the defendants refused the offer of
the plaintiffs to redeem the land, claiming that the
rights to the land of his principals to the vendors'
shares to the land was already established. The
formal demand to redeem was sent by the plaintiffs
through counsel to the defendants (Exhibit B, p.
203, record). Still the defendants did not respond
accordingly. They had instead constructed a
building within the land covered by the title and in a
place therein, relying on the temporary scheme of
partition marked as Exhibit 1-a. To the plaintiffs,
there was no other recourse except to go to court.
And they did by filing this complaint on October 4,
1984 with the court. 23
Ben Palaganas confirmed the offer to redeem. When questioned why the
private respondents agreed to the return of the sold shares in 1979 but
refused to do so in 1980, this witness waxed sentimental and gave a
lengthy narration of the debt of gratitude his family owed to the Hermoso
family. Ben Palaganas related that the patriarch Marcos Hermoso allowed
the Palaganas clan to build their house on his land and to stay there for 27
years without paying rent. And, when three sons and one daughter of the
Palaganases were in medical school, and the family ran out of funds,
Marcos Hermoso extended financial assistance without interest and
payable only when the Palaganases could afford to pay. Out of respect for
the Hermoso family, Ben Palaganas related, the private respondents
agreed to the cancellation of the 1979 sale. However, in 1984 when the
26
offer to redeem the share sold in 1980 was made, the Palaganas clan no
longer wanted to resell the property. Considering that over the intervening
years, they had paid on a piecemeal basis the amount of P400,000.00 to the
two brothers and out of "self-respect" refused to agree to the redemption.
But since the property purchased had already increased in value not only
"self-respect" but apparently self-interest had entered the picture.
It was error for the respondent court to rule that the right of the petitioner
to redeem the alienated share had long prescribed. This finding fails to take
into account that the period of legal redemption is not a prescriptive
period. It is a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of
redemption. It is a period set by law to restrict the right of the person
exercising the right of legal redemption. 24 It is not one of prescription.
The written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code was enacted
to remove all doubts and uncertainty that the alienation may not be
definite. 25 The co-owners must know with certainty the circumstances
of the sale by his co-owners and the terms and the validity of the
alienation. Only after said knowledge is the co-owner required to exercise
the right of redemption given to him by law.
While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it does not state
any particular form thereof, so long as the reasons for a written notice are
present. The records of the case show that the sale of the brothers' share
was deliberately hidden from the petitioners. For sometime after the sale,
the petitioners were ignorant about its execution. When they somehow
heard rumors about it, they had to take one step after another to find out if
the information was true.
It is to be noted that in the case at bar, not only were the petitioners
intentionally kept in the dark for several years but even after knowledge of
the act of the two brothers, they still had difficulty in ascertaining and
confirming its veracity. Far from giving the notice required by law or
giving information on the history and details of the sale, Agustinito and
Danilo gave the petitioners the run-around until the brothers were
practically forced to admit it and the petitioners immediately went to see
Ben Palaganas. In their dialogue with Ben Palaganas, petitioners offered to
redeem the property, but this time, unlike the first, the offer was rejected.
When the petitioners offered to redeem within the period fixed by law,
they complied with the condition precedent to the exercise of their right.
The filing of an action to enforce the redemption is not the determining
point in time. In Conejero, supra, this Court ruled that a consignation of
the tendered price is not necessary as long as a valid tender is
present. 26 However, the offer to redeem is indispensable. Considering
the indignation and the wrath of the petitioners directed at the two brothers
for their acts of alienating an undivided portion of the property, despite the
earlier redemption of the sale sold in 1979, there can be no question about
the willingness and capability of the petitioners to buy back the shares sold
in 1980.
In applying Article 1623 of the Civil Code on the exercise of legal
redemption to certain facts, the interpretation must be in favor of justice
and equity. 27 This Court explained — ". . . . We test a law by its result.
A law should not be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice . . . . There
are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to
apply them in slavish obedience to their language."
Whether it is the vendees who will prevail as in the Alonzo doctrine, or the
redemptioners as in this case, the righting of justice is the key to the resolution of
the issues.
The standards and conditions of legal redemption provided under Article 1623 of
the Civil Code have not been met in this petition. Furthermore, there is the fact
that justice and equity, as the law provides, are also on the side of the petitioners.
As we said, the righting of an injustice is the key to the resolution of this case
and thus would be the end result of our decision.
The two brothers, Agustinito and Danilo Hermoso, were still students when they
sold their shares in their inheritance. In 1979, Agustinito was already a
graduating student of law. According to the trial court, it was "sometime in
October of that year, he and his younger brother Danilo separately needed cash
which there could not easily secure from their mother, Clarita Carin, one of the
plaintiffs herein." 28 However, if they were strapped of cash, considering that
their allowances were insufficient for their needs, they could have pleaded with
their mother for additional funds instead of selling the still undivided property
without her knowledge and against her known will. They knew that their mother
was against the very idea of selling a portion of the undivided property
considering that Consolacion Hermoso cancelled the prior sale made by them in
July 1979 by redeeming the property. From the records, one gets the impression
that the two brothers, Agustinito and Danilo, were irresponsible and self-
centered, failing to consider the wishes of their mother.
Ben Palaganas, who represented the respondents in a transaction, admitted a debt
of gratitude to the Hermoso family. Yet, apparently he took advantage of the
situation. Through several years he doled out funds in installments to the two
brothers in partial payment of the disputed property until the indebtedness had
reached an amount that Agustinito and Danilo had no other recourse but to sell
their inheritance and practically compelled them to execute the deed of sale in
dispute.
Again, we reiterate the salient fact that Clarita Carin, their mother, and Victoria
Hermoso, their sister, were kept in the dark about the sale. Considering the
factual background of this case, the honorable and expected step for the
Palaganas was to inform the petitioners about the action taken by Agustinito and
Danilo. Instead, as the record reveals the parties to the sale concealed the
transaction from petitioners for four (4) years. It was only after hearing rumors
about the sale when petitioners started to investigate and search for evidence to
confirm their hear say acknowledge about the transaction. Even then, the two
brothers and the Palaganases gave them a hard time.
The Palaganas clan knew all along the strong feelings of the petitioners against
the alienation of share in the still undivided property. This was their second
attempt to buy the property. As a matter of fact, they knew that in 1979 when the
land was first sold, the petitioners immediately took steps to cancel the sale upon
discovery thereof. In 1980, the private respondents and Ben Palaganas still did
exactly what the petitioners vigorously opposed and did not want to happen.
They also hid the sale from the petitioners until confronted with facts that they
could no longer hide or deny. The impressions of the trial judge is worth quoting
hereunder thus:
It is obvious that the acts of Ben Palaganas or his principals would be
considered as done in bad faith. Ben Palaganas should not be allowed
to say that he had relied merely on the impressions given by the
 vendors, the Hermoso brothers. Aside from what was obvious
in the documents executed by the Hermoso brothers, he should
have inquire nor verified said impressions made by the vendors
from the plaintiffs or any of the co-owners to the property. The
evidence in the record shows that it was their intense desire to
own a property in the place where the land is located because
of the business potentials thereat stated herein above. They did
not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family because
they did not want to, what with their experience with the first
transaction affecting the share of the third party defendant,
Agustinito Hermoso which took place only in July, 1979 a few
months earlier to the transaction in question. 29
There can be no doubt that the Palaganas clan were in bad faith at the time
they bought the disputed property from the Hermoso brothers. We cannot
thus close our eyes to the injustice which would befall the petitioners
considering that this is not the first time that they have expressed their
desire to redeem the property sold by the Hermoso brothers. Under the
circumstances, it is just and equitable to rule in favor of the exercise of
legal redemption.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals should be,
as it is hereby, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 15, 1990 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112260 June 30, 1997
JOVITA YAP ANCOG, and GREGORIO YAP, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO DIEZ, and CARIDAD
YAP, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-CR. No. CV-19650, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial
Court 2 of Bohol of an action for partition of a parcel of land which
petitioners had filed.
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property
of the spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio Yap
died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children,
petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private
respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs.
In 1954 and again 1958, Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of
Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated
on its Original Certificate of Title No. 622. When Rosario Diez applied
again for a loan to the bank, offering the land in question as security, the
bank's lawyer, Atty. Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an
extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means of
facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted
and on April 4, 1961, Atty. de la Serna prepared an extrajudicial
settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner Gregorio Yap,
Jr., then only 15 years old, signed. The document was notarized by Atty.
de la Serna on April 12, 1961. As a result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411) was issued on April
27
13, 1961. On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage
on the land, the loan was approved by the bank.
Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. In 1985, she
brought an ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's husband
and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land
for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned
that private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in Davao, of their mother's plan to sell
the land. On June 6, 1985, they filed this action for partition in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
3094. As private respondent Caridad Yap was unwilling to join in the
action against their mother, Caridad was impleaded as a defendant.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and
therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument they did not
really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but
only to enable her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover
expenses for Caridad's school fees and for household repairs.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated:
1. That the parcel of land in question originally
belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses
Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
2. That Gregorio Yap, Jr. is the legitimate child of
spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
3. That Gregorio Yap is not a party in the execution
of the Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate dated
April 4, 1961;
4. That all the encumbrances found in TCT No.
(3447) T-2411 which is now marked as Exh. C for
the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the defendants as Entry
No. 6719, 6720, 11561 and 11562 are admitted by
the plaintiffs subject to the condition that the Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate dated April 4, 1961,
was made by the parties that the same was only for
the purpose of securing a loan with the Philippine
National Bank. 3
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' action. It
dismissed petitioners' claim that the extrajudicial settlement was simulated
and held it was voluntarily signed by the parties. Observing that even
without the need of having title in her name Rosario Diez was able to
obtain a loan using the land in question as collateral, the court held that the
extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated for the purpose of
enabling her to obtain another loan. Petitioners failed to overcome the
presumptive validity of the extrajudicial settlement as a public instrument.
The court instead found that petitioner Ancog had waived her right to the
land, as shown by the fact that on February 28, 1975, 4 petitioner's
husband, Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent
Diez. Furthermore, when the spouses Ancog applied for a loan to the
Development Bank of the Philippines using the land in question as
collateral, they accepted an appointment from Rosario Diez as the latter's
attorney-in-fact. 5
The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed. The
registration of the land under private respondent Rosario Diez's name amounted
to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore, petitioners had ten (10) years
from April 13, 1961 within which to bring an action to recover their share in the
property. While it is true that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at the
time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, his claim, according to the court,
was barred by laches.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the extrajudicial
settlement and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the case. The appellate
court emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated
in order to obtain a loan, as the new loan was merely "in addition to" a previous
one which private respondent Diez had been able to obtain even without an
extrajudicial settlement. Neither did petitioners adduce evidence to prove that an
extrajudicial settlement was indeed required in order to obtain the additional
loan. The appellate court held that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's
educational attainment (Master of Arts and Bachelor of Laws), it was
improbable that she would sign the settlement if she did not mean it to be such.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT RULING THAT THE
CONTESTED EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT (EXHIBIT "B")
IS NOT A SIMULATED ONE;
II. IN BLOATING THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF
PETITIONER JOVITA YAP ANCOG AND USING THE SAME AS
ARGUMENT AGAINST HER CLAIM THAT SAID EXHIBIT "B"
WAS INDEED A SIMULATED DOCUMENT;
III. IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT
PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR PARTITION HAS PRESCRIBED;
IV. IN RULING THAT PETITIONER GREGORIO YAP, JR., ONE
OF THE CO-OWNERS OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY, HAD
LOST HIS RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY THROUGH
PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.
We hold that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly acted in
upholding the extrajudicial settlement but erred in ruling that petitioner Gregorio
Yap, Jr. was barred by laches from recovering his share in the property in
question.
To begin with, it is settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive upon the parties and are not reviewable by this Court when they are
an affirmation of the findings of the trial court. 6 In this case, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found no evidence to show that the extrajudicial settlement
was required to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan from the
Bank of Calape. Petitioners merely claimed that the extrajudicial settlement was
demanded by the bank.
To the contrary, that the heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and Caridad Yap) meant the
extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective is shown by the fact that Rosario
Diez performed acts of dominion over the entire Land, beginning with its
registration, without any objection from them. Instead, petitioner Jovita Ancog
agreed to lease the land from her mother, private respondent Rosario Diez, and
accepted from her a special power of attorney to use the land in question as
collateral for a loan she was applying from the DBP. Indeed it was private
respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order to secure the release
of the property from mortgage.
Petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog contends that she could not have waived her was informed by Jovita Ancog of their mother's effort to sell the property,
share in the land because she is landless. For that matter, private Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim cannot be considered barred either by
respondent Caridad Yap is also landless, but she signed the prescription or by laches.
agreement. 7 She testified that she did so out of filial devotion to her WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
mother. the MODIFICATION that this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Thus, what the record of this case reveals is the intention of Jovita Ancog Court for the determination of the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.
and Caridad Yap to cede their interest in the land to their mother Rosario SO ORDERED.
Diez. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to
acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code, 8 every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a
partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any
other transaction.
We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim
of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches. In accordance with
Rule 74, §1 9 of the Rules of Court, as he did not take part in the partition,
he is not bound by the settlement. 10 It is uncontroverted that, at the time
the extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor.
For this reason, he was not included or even informed of the partition.
Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diez's name created an
implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
When land passes by succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
another, a trust is established by implication of law
for the benefit of the true owner.
In the case of O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 11 Art. 1451 was held as creating a
resulting trust, which is founded on the presumed intention of the parties.
As a general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be
the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and
circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is
sought to be established. 12 In this case, the records disclose that the
intention of the parties to the extrajudicial settlement was to establish a
trust in favor of petitioner Yap, Jr. to the extent of his share. Rosario Diez
testified that she did not claim the entire property, 13 while Atty. de la
Serna added that the partition only involved the shares of the three
participants. 14
A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10
years from the time the trust is repudiated. 15 Although the registration of
the land in private respondent Diez's name operated as a constructive
notice of her claim of ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of
repudiation adverse to petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in
the property was precisely not included by the parties in the partition.
Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had been informed of her
exclusive claim over the entire property before 1985 when he was notified
by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog of their mother's plan to sell the
property. 16
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the
trust must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui
que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the
rule that the prescriptive period should be counted from the date of
issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of
reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree. 17 Since the action
brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he
28