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ELCANO VS HILL ( L-24803)

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake."

Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, Marvin Hill, with who he was living and
getting subsistence, for the same killing based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the
civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a
parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of
his marriage.

A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the
motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal by the spouses Elcano.

ISSUES:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

HELD:

PRESENT CIVIL ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY ACQUITTAL

Separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of
the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607:

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.

Second, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."

Third, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed,
and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has
grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a
crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code.

Article 2177 reads:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Therefore, under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
article forestalls a double recovery.”

We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, we here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

ARTICLE 2180 MAY STILL APPLIED

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus, “emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.

According to Manresa, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to
it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without
their consent.

Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

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