An Argument in "De officiis"

Author(s): Robert R. Wellman

Source: The Classical Journal, Vol. 60, No. 6 (Mar., 1965), pp. 271-272
Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and South, Inc. (CAMWS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3294287
Accessed: 16-09-2017 17:17 UTC

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 THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 271

cited,
the O.E.D. the first including
user ofthejug,
apparently
jug,curious one
seem
that since
to have been a trifle wisdom is the
unsure ofhighest
the virtue, and
precis
word he was using, for
since it deals he
with the gives
knowledge in
of things
"Garden of Laurel"humantheand divine, it follows that
sequence duties
"Dug,
dug, lug, lug . . derived
. with from social obligations are
Chuck, Chucmore
Chuck." important than others:
In classical tradition, the wryneck was
associated with love because of its use in Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam
ocp~cav Graeci vocant-prudentiam enim, quam
charms (cf. jinx) to recover unfaithful
Graeci cpQ6vlnov dicunt, aliam quandam intellegi-
lovers. Aeschylus uses ivyya in a speech
mus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarum-
of Xerxes in the Persians (989) to mean
que scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem
a desire or longing stronger than thatdixi,
in- rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia,
in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas
dicated by itc~o.2 Additionally, the et societas inter ipsos, ea si maxima est, ut est
etiological tale of the origin of the bird was certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur
that "Ivy was a nymph who by a spell officium, id est maximum.
seduced Zeus and was turned by Hera into
the wryneck.3 In the Loeb edition, Walter Miller, the
The word is deeply enmeshed in sexual translator, notes about the argument
connotations and I believe it reasonable to (pp.156-7, n.a):
assume that Eliot, a poet alive to theCicero is guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows
possibilities of words and well educated from
in his premises, (1) some one virtue is the
the lore of Greece, was aware of this andhighest virtue, and (2) the duties derived from
saw in the English jug an interestingthe highest virtues are the highest duties, and if
(3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then it can
parallel that would add one more modula-
only follow that the duties derived from wisdom
tion, one more flicker of ambiguity, toare
a the highest duties. But Cicero throws in a
poem so rich in hidden allusions. (And
fourth premise that the "bonds of union between
gods and men and the relations of man to man"
that jig-a-jig was English slang for sexual
are derived from wisdom, and therewith side-
intercourse was one more piece of luck.4)
tracks wisdom and gives the duties derived from
HOWARD MCCORD the social instinct the place from which wisdom
has been shunted.
Washington State University

I suggest that Miller has misinterpreted

Cicero's intention in the argument. Cicero's
initial assertion reads: "Placet igitur aptiora
esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communi-
tate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducan-
AN ARGUMENT IN DE OFFICIIS tur. . . ." To claim that duties derived
from the social instinct are more in ac-
cordance with Nature, however, is not to
NEAR THE END of Book 1 of De officiis
affirm they are necessarily the "highest."
(1.43: 153), Cicero claims that when a
Pure contemplation is in many, although
conflict arises among the duties derived
not all, respects divorced from the practical
from the four sources of moral rectitude,
life of action; and insofar as this breach
those derived from the social instinct
occurs, man turns away from the bonds
(communitas) take precedence. In support
of this contention several arguments are him to his fellow man and to Nature
joining
generally. Thus we need not criticize
2H. J. Rose, A commentary on the surviving plays of
Aeschylus, Amsterdam 1957, p.158.
Cicero for fallacious reasoning: the duties
3A. S. F. Gow, JHS 54 (1934) 3. derived from wisdom may very well be the
4Eric Partridge, A dictionary of slang and uncon-
ventional English, New York 1961. "highest," albeit those unconnected with

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 272 MARCH 1965

communitas are not "in accordance with duties derived from the social instinct are
Nature." closer to Nature if there are any derivable
duties dealing with the relationships of
An earlier passage adds cogency to this
interpretation and suggests the way inmen and gods. In line with the ancient
which Cicero intends to use the argument.
philosophical tradition, Cicero defines wis-
dom as the science of human and divine
At 1.6:19 Cicero informs us that it is con-
trary to moral duty to spend too much things. But this obviously includes within
time in purely theoretical pursuits "cuiusits sphere the study of the union between
studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra of- gods and men and the society of men.
ficium est." Rather, "virtutis enim lausSince this latter subject is linked with
omnis in actione consistit .... " To perhaps
communitas, it follows that duties derived
update Cicero's meaning, the conception from social obligation are more in accord-
of duty is moral only as it refers to man in
ance with Nature. This conclusion is war-
relationship with other men and, presum- ranted, not because Cicero "throws in a
ably, with the gods; science and learning
fourth premise," but because the union
unrelated to these concerns is not immoral
between gods and men and the society of
but amoral, and the duties derived there-
men is by definition part of the science of
from fall outside the scope of communitas.
human and divine things.
From this line of reasoning it follows
ROBERT R. WELLMAN
that the first source of moral rectitude,
knowledge, will support the claim thatUniversity of Massachusetts

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