BELGICA VS OCHOA (November 19, 2013)

Nature Consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65

Parties Belgica, Alcantara and Nepomuceno, as citizens and taxpayers, petitioners

(see Procedural Antecedents below. Note: the event that triggered the filing of the complaints is the COA report finding
irregularities in the Pork Barrel System – see discussion under Controversies)
Ochoa, as Executive Secretary, respondent

(also, then Pres. Aquino, Senate President, Speaker of the House, DBM Secretary)
Disputed Matter Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System: 1) Congressional Pork Barrel; 2) Presidential Pork Barrel
Antecedents In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds [as used in VI(25), par. 6]
of Members of the Legislature.

General: When is a fund classified as “Pok Barrel”? – When there is post-enactment legislator participation (in the form of
consultations or determination of projects, etc; take note of the legislator’s participation when reading the evolution of Pork
Barrel). Normally after enactment, the role of Congress ceases and the law is placed in the hands of the Executive for
implementation of the law. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. Pork barrels are appropriations,
appropriations are laws. The legislature takes part in the execution in the form of prior consultation with the Congress on the
projects where such funds will be used.
CONGRESSIONAL a. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972)
PORK BARREL - Act 3044 Public Works Act of 1922: considered as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel”” in the
(CPB) Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator
approval.
- Sec. 3 thereof: provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x
subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
- 1950: post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area
of project identification. For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress.
b. Martial Law Era (1972-1986)
- Support for Local Development Project (SLDP): item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
- Started the practice of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators.
- Started the expansion of coverage of projects, not just public works:
 Hard projects: public works, ie. infrastructures
 Soft projects: non-public works projects, e.g. education, health and livelihood
c. Corazon Aquino Administration (1986-1992)
- “Mindanao Development Fund”; "Visayas Development Fund”: lump-sum appropriations development projects in
the VisMin region.
- “Countrywide Development Fund” (CDF)
 to allow similar appropriations for Luzon Congress
  integrated in the 1990 GAA
d. Ramos Administration (1992-1998)
- Express statement: release of CDF was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities
identified by, among others, individual legislators.
- 1993 CDF: first time allocation for Vice President
- 1997 CDF: implementing agency must submit a list of projects with the DMB which will be the basis of releasing
funds
- Other forms of CPB: reportedly inserted into the GAA (called “Congressional Insertions” or “CIs”), requiring
prior consultation with the legislative e.g.
 Education (DepEd) School Building Fund,
 Congressional Initiative Allocations,
 Public Works Fund,
 El Niño Fund,
 Poverty Alleviation Fund
e. Estrada Administration (1998-2001)
- CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by 3 separate forms of CIs, required prior consultation with members
of the Congress:
 Food Security Program Fund
 Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund
 Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund
- 2000: Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA – required prior consultation with the
representative of the Disctrict
f. Arroyo Administration (2001-2010)
- 2002-2010 PDAF Articles: release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or LGUs, without further
qualifications. Silent as to the allocation to specific legislators, and participation in the projects.
- 2003 DPWH and DepEd Budgets: required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of
implementation
- It was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of NGOs in the implementation of
government projects were introduced
g. Aquino Administration
- 2011: PDAF Article: express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-
President; provision on realignment of funds
 Representatives: 70M (40M for “hard projects”; 30M for “soft projects”)
 Senators: 200M (100M for “hard projects”; 100M for “soft projects”)
- 2012-2013 PDAF Articles
 included priority list requirement – projects and beneficiaries determined by the design of the implementing
agency. But in practice, it is still the legislative who chooses and identifies the project in the list
 VP allocation deleted
  LGUs are identified as implementing agencies (2013)
 Legislators may have projects outside their districts provided with consent of the representative of that
district and with endorsement from Speaker of the House
PRESIDENTIAL a. Malampaya Funds
PORK BARREL - Special fund created by PD 910 issued by Marcos
(Malampaya Fund; - For the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth
Presidential Social - Named after energy-related activities in the government in Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
Fund) “Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project”
b. Presidential Social Fund
- Created by PD 1869 (PAGCOR’s charter)
- Special funding facility managed by the Presidential Management Staff to provide direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget
- It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR
CONTROVERSIES - 1996: First controversy when Romeo Candazo, the Marikina City representative alleged irregularities and kickbacks
IN THE pervasive in the use of Pork Barrel Funds
PHILIPPINES - 2004: Concerned citizen sought to nullity Pork Barrel but dismissed for lack of evidence
- July 2013: NBI, upon the appearance of 6 whistle-blowers, started to probe on the allegations of government loses
(about P10 Billion in 10 years) arising from ghost projects coursed through no less than 20 dummy NGOs, the
ultimate recipient of funds being Janet Lim Napoles (JLN). The investigations resulted to the filing of charges to
legislators for crimes of Plunder, Malversation, Direct Bribery and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Recommended also were complaint charges to their representatives, heads, other officials, implementing
agencies and several Presidents of dummy NGOs.
- August 2013: COA released a report on the propriety of releases of: 1) PDAF during the last 3 years of Arroyo
regime (2007-2009); 2) Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) by the DBM. It covered P8 Billion
and P32 Billion of PDAF and VILP. Irregularities were found, among others:
 Funds released in excess of appropriations/allocations
 Projects were outside legislative district of the representatives
 Infrastructures constructed on private lots not turned over to the government
 No proper endorsement and assessment of implementing agencies
 The NGOs implement, not the implementing agencies. NGOs receive the funds
 No appropriation for transfer of funds to said NGOs
 Selection of NGOs not in compliance with laws
 NGOs themselves were questionable
 For Presidential Pork Barrel, Malampaya fund supposedly for Agrarian Reform went to dummy NGO
PROCEDURAL - August 2013: Alcantara (SJS President) sought to declare Pork Barrel System unconstitutional; and stop Congress
ANTECEDENTS from further related legislation
- September 2013: Belgica, et al sought to declare Pork Barrel System unconstitutional; TRO to enjoin release of
remaining funds; and release to COA and public details of fund use from 2003-2013
 - September 2013: Nepomuceno sought to declare Pork Barrel System unconstitutional; and stop releasing funds to
legislators
- The Court issued a TRO to prevent release of: 1) remaining PDAF; 2) Malampaya Funds
- This is a consolidated petition above-mentioned:
Issues Decision
I. PROCEDURAL: Requisites of Judicial Review
a. Is there are actual case or Yes. Given the antagonistic positions of the parties.
controversy?
b. Is the controversy ripe for Yes. The challenged funds are currently existing
adjudication? and operational. There exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
This is true notwithstanding the President’s
declaration that he had already abolished PDAF
because the Executive branch has no constitutional
authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
c. Assuming the case is moot, Yes.
will the Court still decide on 1. Petitioners allege grave violations of the
the matter? Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the
principles of separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local
autonomy.
2. The coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the government‘s own recognition that
reforms are needed “to address the
reported abuses of the PDAF”
demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse
Doctrine
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
controversy is one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished
or performed by either branch…
By constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by:
1. Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the
2. Court, through a declaration of
unconstitutionality.
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
1. There is a grave violation of the
Constitution;
2. The exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is
involved;
3. When the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public;
4. The case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Issues
d. Is the matter a political
question?
e. Do petitioners have locus
standi?
f. Is the Court barred to decide
on the matter by virtue of res
judicata in relation to its prior
rulings on Philcosa and
LAMP?
Decision Doctrine
which only underscores the importance of
the matter.
3. The CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will
be issued by her office in connection with
the findings made in the CoA Report.
Definitive ruling is need so that
government may be guided on the proper
utilization of public funds. Also for
guidance of public, the bench and the bar.
4. The issue is capable of repetition as
magnified by the history of the Pork Barrel
system. The same dog will just resurface wearing a
different collar.
No. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork A political question refers to “those questions
Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
wisdom of the political branches of government by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself regard to which full discretionary authority has
has commanded the Court to act upon. Acting of been delegated to the Legislature or executive
the case is not just an exercise of the judicial power branch of the Government. It is concerned with
of review but a constitutionally mandated duty issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
upon the Court. of a particular measure”
Yes. A person has standing of he is injuriously
1. As taxpayers, they possess the requisite affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
standing to question the validity of the operation of statute or ordinance.
existing "Pork Barrel System" under which
the taxes they pay have been and continue
to be utilized.
2. As citizens, petitioners have equally
fulfilled the standing requirement given that
the issues they have raised may be classified
as matters of transcendental importance, or
of paramount public interest.
No. The res judicata principle states that a judgment on
1. Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved the merits in a previous case rendered by a court
constitutional challenges against the 1994 of competent jurisdiction would bind a
CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, subsequent case if, between the first and second
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader
Issues
g. Is the Court barred to decide
on the matter by virtue of stare
decisis in relation to its prior
rulings on Philcosa and
LAMP?
Decision Doctrine
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork actions, there exists an identity of parties, of
Barrel System.” subject matter, and of causes of action.
2. LAMP is a dismissal based on procedural
technicality, not ono the merits.
No. The stare decisis principles evokes a general rule
1. Philconsa resolution was a limited that a conclusion reached in one case should be
response to a separation of powers doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts
problem, specifically on the propriety of are substantially the same, even though the
conferring post-enactment identification parties may be different. It proceeds from the
authority to Members of Congress. The first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
present cases call for a more holistic countervailing considerations, like cases ought
examination of (a) the inter-relation to be decided alike.
between the CDF and PDAF Articles
comprising the “Pork Barrel System” and
(b) the intra-relation of post-enactment
measures within the CDF or PDAF Article,
including not just project identification but
also to the areas of fund release and
realignment.
2. The complexity of issues and broader legal
analyses can be considered a powerful
countervailing reason against the
application of stare decisis.
3. There are serious constitutional
inconsistencies in the Philconsa decision
that the Court seeks to remedy. Philconsa
ruled that the power to identify projects is
only an aspect of power of appropriation,
constitutionally lodged in the Congress, but:
- The power is with Congress, not the
individual legislators
- The power should be exercised within
the ambit of lawmaking, thus, only up
to the passage of the GAA, not after
- The project identifications, being
expressed in the GAA cannot be merely
recommendatory
Issues Decision
4. Abakada case has effectively overturned
Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment
legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle.
5. Again, LAMP is dismissed on procedural
grounds.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: Congressional Pork Barrel
a. Does the CPB transgress the principle Yes.
of separation of powers? 1. The “Pork Barrel System” accords to the
Congress impermissible post-enactment
authority in the form of:
a. Project identification: proram menu allows
individual legislators to identify PDAF
projects within those listed in the menu;
legislator may choose from the list
provided by the implementing agencies;
legislators are allowed to identify
projects outside of their district upon
concurrence of concerned disctrict rep.;
project revisions shall be approved by
Congress committees, among others
b. Fund release: requires endorsements of
Senate and House committees
c. Fund realignment: same with fund release;
concerned departments, e.g. DPWH,
DILG, DA, DepEd may approve
realignments upon concurrence of
concerned legislator.
Doctrine
The principle of separation of powers refers to
the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. By
constitutional design “each department has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere.” Legislative cannot execute or construe
law; Executive cannot make or construe law;
Judiciary cannot make or execute laws.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional (ABAKADA case). Informal
practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
There is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible:
1. interference with and/or
2. assumption of another department‘s
functions.
The restriction on legislative participation in post-
enactment measures is limited to enforcement
(which is a function of the Executive). Thus, it
may still exercise its oversight function as a
Issues
b. Does the CPB violate the Non-
delegability of Legislative Power?
Decision
Yes.
The power of appropriation is vested exclusively in
the Congress, by grating the individual legislator
personal lump-sum appropriations, which they are
able to apply to chosen projects and beneficiaries,
constitutes invalid delegation of the power of
appropriation.
The power of appropriation must be exercised by
the Congress as a body, delegation of the power
to individual members is violation of the
constitutional principle on non-delegability of
legislative powers.
Doctrine
means of checks and balances. These oversight
functions are limited to [PERMISSIBLE POST-
ENACTMETN CONGRESSIONAL
MEASURES]:
1. scrutiny based primarily on Congress’
power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it,
its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of
its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of
confirmation (question hour) [VI(22)];
and
2. investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation [VI(21)].
Legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
the body (not the individual legislators) to which
the Constitution has conferred the same.
The constitution vests the legislative power
exclusively upon the:
1. Congress, acting as a bicameral body
2. People, through the process of initiative
and referendum
Exemptions to non-delegation [DELAGABLE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS]:
1. Delegation to local governments, with
respect to purely local matters
2. Constitutionally permissible delegation to
the President in exercising powers to
carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency;
fix (subject to restrictions as Congress
may impose), tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
Issues
c. Does the CPB violate the
principle of Checks and Balances?
d. Does the CPB violate the
principle of Accountability?
Decision
Yes.
1. The post-enactment identification feature impairs
the President’s veto power. The PDAF fund is
presented as a collective amount in the
GAA. After passage, this will be allocated
to the individual legislators, allowing
appropriation of said amounts upon their
own discretion. This effectively creates a
budget within a budget that impairs the
President’s veto power since the allocations
are made after the GAA is passed.
2. Lump-sum appropriation is constitutionally flawed.
The lump-sum amount would be treated as
a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending. This setup connotes
that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation
for further determination and, therefore,
does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s
power of item veto.
Partially.
1. Post-enactment features dilute
congressional oversight and violate Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Doctrine
dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national
development program of the
Government.
3. Limited or subordinate legislation
authority to implementing agencies,
which must be limited to rule-making to:
a. Supplementary rule-making: filling up
the details of the law for its
enforcement
b. Contingent rule-making: ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual
operation
The Constitution provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. Each
department, though separated is not absolutely
independent with respect to each other.
An example is the President’s veto power,
expressed in VI(7) of the Constitution.
Relevantly, under par. 2,
The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
The power of veto is essentially a legislative
act resting upon a variety of policy goals,
imposition of financial restrictions upon the
Congress, and fortifying its role in the
budgetary process.
Public office is a public trust [XI(1)], is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality
of government should exercise their official
functions only in accordance with the principles
Issues
e. Does the CPB allow perpetuation
of political dynasties?
f. Does the CPB violate the policy
of local autonomy?
Decision Doctrine
(prohibition on financial interests), thus of the Constitution which embodies the
impairing public accountability. Conduct of parameters of the people‘s trust. This is closely
oversight would be tainted as said correlated with accountability.
legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they
themselves participate.
2. Post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF
would not per se allow him to perpetuate
himself in office. Use of PDAF for re-
election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
3. The process of impeachment largely
borders on the domain of politics and does
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
System’s intrinsic constitutionality. It is an
improper subject of judicial assessment
Not within court’s jurisdiction; speculative Article II, Sec. 26 is not self-executing.
Yes. The State’s policy on local autonomy is
1. The PDAF is operated in a way that is not principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
germane to its declared purpose of making Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987
equal the unequal. It is granted by virtue of Constitution, and RA 7160 or the Local
office, clearly without genuine Government Code of 1991.
consideration of specific paramaters such as
the location, degree of development of the
localities represented. Thus, a representative
of a highly urbanized area received the same
amount of Pork Barrel as that of an
underdeveloped area. What intensifies the
contention is that even the Vice President,
who does not represent a particular region
is granted the same.
2. The Pork Barrel System encroaches on the functions
of the LDC. Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are
Issues
III. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: Presidential Pork Barrel (PPB)
a. Is the PPB an invalid appropriation
since they do not have the “primary
and specific” purpose of authorizing
the release of public funds from the
National Treasury?
Decision Doctrine
essentially geared towards managing local
affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a
body.
No. An appropriation made by law under the
1. The Constitution does not mandate that a contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
specific form be observed for there to be a 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law:
valid appropriation only that it should be 1. sets apart a determinate or determinable
made by law. It may be made through: amount of money; and
a. Annual laws, e.g. GAA 2. allocates the same for a particular public
b. Special provisions of laws of general or purpose.
special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public
purposes. Such as the subject decrees,
to wit: PD 910, Sec. 8; and PD 1869 (as
amended), Sec. 12

By contrast, 2013 PDAF is not a valid

b. Does the PBB constitute an invalid
delegation of legislative powers?
appropriation because the real appropriation
happened not at the inclusion of the lump-sum
amount in the GAA but at the post-enactment
determinations made by individual legislators which
occurs outside of the law.
Yes.
1. Malampaya Funds. The phrase “and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s
authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
The fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making
are adequate are:
1. Completeness test. A law is complete
when it sets forth the policy to be
executed by the delegate.
2. Sufficient standard test. A law lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the
Issues Decision
2. Presidential Social Fund. PD 1993 amended
the original PD 1869 setting forth the
purpose of the fund as:
a. to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and
b. to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
Doctrine
delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must
- specify the limits of the delegate‘s
authority,
- announce the legislative policy, and
- identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented.248

(b) is proper as it fixes the standard and

limits of the delegated power; but (a)
should be stricken down as the term
priority infrastructure development
is not defined in the law and gives the
President the discretion in determining
what these should be.