G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993
" Josefa is not the owner
JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et
al., respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Case involves the question of ownership over a
piece of land acquired by a husband while
living with a paramour and after having
deserted his lawful wife and children. The
property had been bought by the husband on
installment basis prior to the effectivity of the
Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as
the questioned conveyance by him to his
common law spouse, has ensued during the
latter Code's regime.
FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday
on 27 July 1927. On 1946, he left the conjugal
home, and he forthwith started to live instead with
Josefa Rivera with whom he had a child (petitioner
Josephone Belcodero). On 23 August 1949, Alayo
purchased a parcel of land on installment basis
from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he
indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R.
Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06
October 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena
Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the
lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The
final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena
Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. A few days later,
or on 09 November 1959, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa
R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing”. Alayo died
on 11 march 1967. About three years later, or on
17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine
executed a document of extrajudicial partition and
sale of the lot in question, which was there
described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and
deceased Alayo. On 30 October 1980, Juliana
Oday and her three legitimate children filed with
the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the
property, trial court ruled in their favour and CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the property in question belongs
exclusively to Juliana Oday and her three
legitimate children
HELD/RATIO: The property was still part of the
conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate
wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code
(Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article
1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
simply because the title is in her name, she
recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years
after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine
executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and
sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest
in the property in what may be described as her
share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo.
NOTE: There were two other less related issues in
the case (1) whether prescriptive period for an
action seeking a reconveyance of the property has
passed; and (2) whether there is “new evidence”
and therefore a need for a new trial. The court
held: (1) NO, prescriptive period is 10 yrs (Art 1144,
CC) and since the property involved in this case is
a realty titled under the Torrens System, the
prescriptive period is to be counted from the time
the transaction affecting the property is registered
with the corresponding issuance of a new
certificate of title; (2) NO, as CA said, the “new
evidence” referred to is not new.
[G.R. No. 111547. January 27, 1997]
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO
ESTONINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA
HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA,
REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO,
MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA,
and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of
SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who
has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia.
Santiago already died when this controversy arose.
Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case
against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an
attachment over the land. While the case was
pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the
lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents
here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable
judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was
sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the
name of Estonina. Atayan however filed a
complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the
TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land. The
RTC said that the land was presumed to be
conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of
the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate
estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC
ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that
Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%.
Both parties appealed. The CA modified the
judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It
held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and
Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the property exclusive or conjugal?
(2) What’s the real share of Estonina and
Atayan?
HELD/RULING:
(1) Property is the exclusive share of the
deceased Santiago
(2) 10% and 90%, respectively.
SC affirms CA. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition for the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. Here,
Estonino failed to present any proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title
which was issued during the marriage. The TCT
does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of
the property.
Acquisition of property and registration of title are
two different acts. Registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already existing. Thus, the
property is the exclusive property of the deceased
Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory
heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the
Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction
was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia
consisting of 10% of the lot.
Quiao v Quiao
FACTS:
 Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring
the legal separation, awarding the custody of their
3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.
 Brigido’s share was forfeited in favor of the
common children because he is the offending
spouse (bad faith)
 Petitioner filed for a Motion for Clarification 9
months after the promulgation of the decision
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits
Earned”.
 RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT
EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties
of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.”
 It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any
share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles
63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute
community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested
rights over ½ of the properties in the conjugal
partnership.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the
conjugal partnership of gains the same with
the computation of “net profits” earned in the
absolute community?
Held:
1. – NCC shall govern since it was the law
operative when the two got married. Default rule in
NCC is that in absence of marriage settlement, the
system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern the property
relations between the husband and wife. However,
Art. 129 shall be applicable in the case insofar as
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned (this is allowed bec. FC
can take retroactive effect as long as it won’t impair
vested rights).
2. NO. The petitioner did not acquire vested rights
under Art 143 of the Civil Code. While one may not
be deprived of his vested rights, he may lose the
same as long as there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was accorded his right to due process as
shown by the proceedings held in the lower court.
3. NO.
When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the wife
become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings
into the marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage form the common mass of the couple’s
properties. And when the couple’s marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is
divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into
a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the
wife place in common fund the fruits of
their separate property and income from their work
or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
by either spouse during the marriage.” From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and
her own property and debts. The law does not
intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts
or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the case at bar, it was already established by the
trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties thus there is nothing to return to any of
them.
Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty
party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code.
ORPIANO vs TOMAS (2013; DEL CASTILLO, J.)
FACTS: Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano
(Estrella) is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano
(Alejandro). Part of their conjugal estate is an
809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-23468
(the lot). In 1979 Estrella was declared an absent
spouse, and Alejandro was granted the authority to
sell the lot. On March 19, 1996, Alejandro sold the
lot on installment basis to the Tomas Spouses
(respondents), the very same day a title was
issued in the name of the Tomas Spouses. They
had until December to complete paying for the land.
On Oct 28, 1996 Alejandro filed a case at the QC
RTC, seeking collection of the amount unpaid by
the Tomas spouses, with damages. While the case
was still pending Alejandro passed away, his heirs,
including Estrella were substituted in his stead in
the case. Estrella moved to amend the complaint to
one for annulment of sale and cancellation of title,
but the court denied her motion. She moved to be
dropped as a party plantiff but was also denied.
On June 11, 2005 Estrella filed a case for
annulment of sale and cancellation of title against
the Tomas Spouses, claiming the declaration of
absence and Alejandro’s authority to sell the lot are
null and void. The Tomas spouses prayed for the
dismissal thereof on the ground of forum shopping.
RTC ruled in favour of the Tomas spouses and
dismissed the annulment (of sale) case. CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUES: Whether there was forum shopping
HELD/RATIO: YES. Although the Court believes
that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to
trifle with judicial processes, and was acting in
good faith in initiating the annulment case, still
the said case should be dismissed because it
produces the same effect which the rule on
forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. If
the collection case is not dismissed and it, together
with the annulment case, proceeds to finality, not
only do we have a possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered; an unfair situation, as
envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise
where after having paid the balance of the price as
ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of
the TCT and return of the property could be
decreed by the annulment court.
Court says that“the absence of the consent of one
(spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.”
However while Estrella is raring to file the
annulment case, she has to first cause the
dismissal of the collection case because she was
by necessity substituted therein by virtue of her
being Alejandro’s heir; but the collection court
nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward such
end. There exists a just cause for her to be
dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case so
that she may institute and maintain the annulment
case without violating the rule against forum
shopping. Estrella had the right to maintain the
annulment case as a measure of protecting her
conjugal share (but the issue of whether the sale
should be annulled is a different matter altogether).
Despite all these reasons, Estrella is still not
allowed to take prodecural short cuts.
NOTES: In case ma’am asks, a summary of the
parties’ contentions:
Estrella argues that were merely substituted in the
case as his heirs by operation of law; thus, she
should not be bound by the collection case. She
further adds that there is obviously no identity of
parties, cause of action, or reliefs prayed for
between the collection and annulment cases; the
two involve absolutely opposite reliefs. She
stresses the fact that she is seeking annulment of
the sale with respect only to her conjugal share,
and not those of her co-heirs.
Tomas spouses emphasize that the rule prohibiting
forum shopping precisely seeks to avoid the
situation where the two courts – the collection court
and the annulment court – might render two
separate and contradictory decisions. If the
annulment case is allowed to proceed, then it could
result in a judgment declaring the sale null and void,
just as a decision in the collection case could be
issued ordering them to pay the balance of the
price, which is tantamount to a declaration that the
sale is valid.
[G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003]
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO,
MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER V. MIAT,
petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: Father of two children, Moises, widower
(wife died in 1978), originally intended his two
properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque
for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter
for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the
original agreement upon return to the Philippines in
1984.
Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother,
Cerefino Miat, who said testified the original
agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons.
This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises’
wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the
Philippines.
The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was
paid for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977
to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on
the latter date and title was secured under Moises
name as widower.
Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on
the property with their wives and paid its realty
taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and
his wife, however, left the property in August 1985
for personal reasons.
February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of
his wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro
(VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s
neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to
VC. A thirty thousand peso downpayment was
made by godmother to Moises for her son.
April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of
the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial
payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by
Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of
assignment in favor of his brother because “he had
lots of work to do and the title was already in
Romeo’s possession.”
Downpayment information corroborated by
Virgilio Miat (brother of Moises) and Pedro
Miranda (who worked with Moises in two
hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but
Alexander later said that he did not consider
the money to be a downpayment but a
personal debt due to Romeo.
Romeo had possession of the title because he
borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the
land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran
into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for
P30,000.00 the Paco property to parents of
petitioner VC.
December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC
Manila to discuss status of Paco property. On the
16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed
Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC
by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5,
1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC
admitted that the title of the property was with
Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of
Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son.
Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and
compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed of
conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1)
Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his
brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by
Moises, (3) dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim
and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both
parties appealed to the CA which modified the
decision by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was
nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute
a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants to
pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner).
VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital.
Although petitioners allege that property was paid
for by Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife
had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the
grounds of the new Civil Code (which was
applicable because marriage was celebrated
before FC):
Art 153 (1) -
“The following are conjugal partnership
property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during
the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses; x x x.”
Records show that property was acquired by
onerous title during the marriage out of the
common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New
Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This
article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The
presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear.
In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s
reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and
Concordia bought the Paco property during their
marriage — Moises did not bring it into their
marriage, hence it has to be considered as
conjugal.
(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and
his sons involving the said property is valid.
Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in
(a) latter of the father to his sons (the one which
stated that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the
testimony (see above) of Moises’ brother, Ceferino,
and the oral agreement between the brothers to
divide the property between themselves (attested
to by extended Family members).
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo
and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of
Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly,
Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00)
pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the
purchase of his share in the Paco property.
Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat
and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the
sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were
intensely questioned by petitioners’ counsel.
(3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith.
Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC:
“In the case at bench, the said spouses have
actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-
appellant. The most protuberant index that they
are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale,
Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the
supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with
Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to
Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if
Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told
Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over
the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and
assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew
Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo
then insisted that he is the owner of the property.
“Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in
possession of the property, they being neighbors.
A purchaser who was fully aware of another
person’s possession of the lot he purchased
cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent
purchaser for value.”
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v
DAVID
15 MARCH 2010
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo
DOCTRINE | Presumption of conjugality of
property
FACTS
1. 1957 – marriage of Manuel and Martha
David
2. 1970 – spouses acquired 602 m2 in White
Plains, transfer certificate of title registered
under “Martha married to Manuel etc”
3. 1995 – Martha sold property to Titan
Construction, discovered by Manuel in the
same year
4. 1996 – Manuel filed a complaint for
annulment of contract and reconveyance
5. Titan claimed to be a buyer in good faith,
relying on a special power of attorney
Manuel signed allowing Martha to dispose
of the property
 6. Manuel claimed that the special power of
attorney was forged
7. RTC DECISION: annulled sale to Titan,
ordered reconveyance, declared that:
a. Being named under “Martha
married to Manuel” did not negate
the conjugal nature of the
property
b. Special power of attorney was
forged
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the property is Martha’s
paraphernal property or the spouses’
conjugal property
RULING
1. Property is conjugal, sale is void
a. Civil Code applies to this case, as
marriage was celebrated prior to
FC
b. Even if Manuel is unable to show
that he had income to help pay for
the property, it is assumed that
the property was acquired by both
spouses conjugally
c. Conjugal properties require
consent of both spouses prior to
sale
IMANI v METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY
17 NOVEMBER 2010
Ponente: Justice Nachura
DOCTRINE | Presumption of conjugality of
property is held only when property is sufficiently
proven to have been acquired during marriage
FACTS
8. 1981 – petitioner and co-sureties signed a
Continuing Suretyship Agreement with
Metrobank, binding themselves to pay any
indebtedness incurred by CP Dazo
Tannery Inc (CPDTI), not exceeding 6M
9. CPDTI acquired loans of 100k and 63k,
the payment of which the sureties
defaulted
10. RTC: ordered sureties to pay Metrobank
11. CA: dismissed appeal
12. RTC: order of execution, with sherriff
levying Imani’s property which was sold at
public auction to Metrobank
13. Petitioner argued that property was
conjugal, and cannot be used to levy
indebtedness of CPDTI, and cannot be
sold at public auction
14. RTC denied Metrobank’s motion for Imani
spouses to surrender their owner’s copy of
the TCT for the property, granted spouses
motion to cancel sale of property
15. CA reversed the decision of RTC
ISSUES
2. Whether or not the property is conjugal
RULING
2. Property is not conjugal, CA decision
affirmed
a. Party claiming property is
conjugal must show proof that the
property was acquired during
marriage
b. Petitioner merely presented
affidavits showing the payments
she and husband made on the
property; rules on evidence
dismiss this as hearsay unless
affiants were presented as
witnesses
c. Photocopies of the checks had no
probative value either
d. Title being registered under the
name of “Evangelina Dazo-Imani
married to Sina Imani” is not
enough proof that property was
acquired during marriage
DEWARA v LAMELA
11 APRIL 2011
Ponente: Justice Nachura
DOCTRINE | Presumption of conjugality of
property overturned only by proper evidence
FACTS
16. Eduardo Dewara and Elenita Dewara
married before the FC took effect,
 separated in fact because Elenita worked
in California, Eduardo in Bacolod
17. 1985 – Eduardo, while driving jeep, hit
Lamela, who filed and won a case of
serious physical injuries against Eduardo
18. Court ordered Eduardo to pay 62k as civil
indemnity and 10k as moral damages
19. Eduardo could not pay so the sheriff levied
a parcel of land registered under Elenita’s
name, which was bought by Lamela at a
public auction
20. Elenita’s attorney-in-fact
(tangina siya na) claimed
that land was paraphernal property of
Elenita and could not be used to pay for
personal liabilities of her husband
21. Respondents claim that property was
conjugal as it was bought using Eduardo’s
money, Elenita being a simple housewife
at the time of purchase of the land
22. RTC declared property as paraphernal
and ruled in favor of the petitioner, tracing
the ownership of the property to Elenita’s
grandfather, Exequiel Magallanes, and
was sold to her by her father and her aunt
for a much lower price, indicating that it
was a donation to Elenita alone
23. CA reversed the decision, claiming that
Eduardo and Elenita acquired the property
during their marriage
ISSUES
3. Whether or not the property is conjugal
RULING
3. Property is not conjugal, CA decision
affirmed
a. Registration under the name of
one spouse alone does not prove
that property is not conjugal
b. Separation-in-fact without judicial
approval, does not affect conjugal
nature of property
c. Elenita was unable to show that
property was sold to her as a
donation, as she failed to show
evidence that her payment was
much less than the value of the
property
d. Gross disparity in price does not
affect the contract of sale, may
merely signify a defect in consent
e. Despite conjugal nature, property
may not necessarily be used to
pay for the liabilities of one
spouse – said spouse must first
be shown to have no property of
his own, only in such a case can
the conjugal property be used
G.R. No. L-16991 March 31, 1964
ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
DOCTRINE: All properties acquired during the
marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160,
Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not
conclusive but merely rebuttable.
FACTS: Spouses Laperals instituted a case for
recovery of a sum of money against spouses
Katigbak (husband) and Kalaw (wife). Trial court
found for the Laperals. About a month after this
decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint
against her husband Katigbak, for "judicial
separation of property and separate administration".
The Laperals instituted another complaint seeking
among other things, annulment of the proceedings
for "judicial separation of property and separate
administration," to enforce the judgment on the
fruits of Kalaw's paraphernal property, and to
secure a ruling declaring the real property as
conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. TC and,
later on, SC dismissed the complaint.
In conclusion we hold that while
the fruits of the paraphernal
property of Kalaw are not liable
for the enforcement of the
obligations contracted by
Katigbak, nevertheless, the
conjugal properties
are.1äwphï1.ñët
The background facts for the decision are as
follows:
Spouses Ramon Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were
married in 1938 and neither of them had brought
properties unto the marriage. Ramon's occupation
was that of Asst. Atty. of the Bank of the Phil.
Islands wherein his monthly salary P200.00. TThe
property in question was registered in the name of
"Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, married to Ramon
Katigbak" only two years after marriage. The court
is led to believe that, as Evelina declares, her
mother Pura Villanueva was the one that had
bought property for her and had placed it only in
her name. Ramon Katigbak, in the same year 1939,
that is, long before the spouses had come to the
parting of ways, made a manifestation that he had
no interest in the properties.
ISSUE: The issue is whether or not the property
disputed, for the reason that it was acquired during
the marriage, is conjugal.
HELD: Court rules in favor of Katigbak and Kalaw.
There is no denying that all properties acquired
during the marriage are, by law, presumed
conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption,
however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable,
("unless it be proved that the property belongs
exclusively to the husband or the wife.")
The deed to the disputed land is in the name of the
wife. At the time of its purchase, the property was
already of such substantial value as admittedly, the
husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy,
considering that singular source of income then
was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila
Bank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the
defendant herein testified, and was believe by the
trial court, that the purchase price was furnish by
her mother so she could buy the property for
herself. Furthermore, it was established during the
trial that it was a practice of defendant's parents to
so provide their children with money to purchase
realties for themselves.
Francisco vs CA, 1998
Ponente: Quisumbing
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent
Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second
marriage. Private respondents Conchita
Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio
Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first
marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on
February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a
residential house and lot, and an apartment house,
all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite,
Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a
house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez,
Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties
were administered by Eusebio until he was
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart
disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to
administer them. Petitioner also claims that private
respondents succeeded in convincing their father
to sign a general power of attorney which
authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments situated
in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for
damages and for annulment of said general power
of attorney, and thereby enjoining its
enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared
as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In
due course, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of private respondents. It held that the
petitioner failed to adduce proof that said
properties were acquired during the existence of
the second conjugal partnership, or that they
pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively
to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: WoN the appellate court committed
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling
that the properties are not conjugal but the capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Held: No error.
FC cannot be invoked without impairing vested
rights, hence, New Civil Code will be used to
resolve the issue at hand,
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.” However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. In
this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample
evidence to show that the properties which she
claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her
marriage with Eusebio.
Regarding land Rizal—petitioner failed to refute the
testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same
from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even
admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage
the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor
only as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior
or subsequent to his second marriage is
inconsequential. The property should be regarded
as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant
to Article 148 of the New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse
prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage,
is considered his or her separate
property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
properties acquired gratuitously and include those
acquired by either spouse during the marriage by
inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence,
even if it be assumed that Eusebio’s acquisition by
succession of the land took place during his
second marriage, the land would still be his
“exclusive property” because it was acquired by
him, “during the marriage, by lucrative title.”
Regarding sari-sari store, etc—the fact that one is
the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the
issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal
or not.
Regarding property in Rizal—the fact that the land
was registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco,
married to Teresita Francisco”, is no proof that the
property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.
*Insofar as the administration of the subject
properties is concerned, it follows that Eusebio
shall retain control thereof considering that the
assets are exclusively his capital. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that the properties are
conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them
inasmuch as Eusebio is not
incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of
petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is
not suffering from serious illness so as to impair his
fitness to administer his properties. That he is
handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a
bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when
petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their
occasional quarrels, did not render him, in the
Court’s view, incapacitated to perform acts of
administration over his own properties.
Veloso vs Martinez, 1914
*Dapat may kasamang dispute over land, but
because defendant withdrew her appeal over the
recovery of the land, recovery of jewelry na lang
yung mode. Yung land, lower court found na
plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of it
yadayada.
Issue: “The only question remaining, therefore, for
this court to decide is as to the ownership and right
of possession of said jewels.”
Facts:
It is admitted that the jewels in question, before the
possession of the same was given to the plaintiff,
belonged to the defendant personally and that she
had inherited the same from her mother. The
defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of
Domingo Franco, and after the death of her
husband she was appointed administratrix of his
estate.
A short time before the death of Domingo Franco
he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500
and gave as security for the payment of said sum
the jewelry described in the complaint.
The jewelry was contained in a box which remains
closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano
Veloso. The document further admits that the key
shall remain in possession of Domingo Franco.
After the death of Domingo Franco it appears that
said jewelry was found in the same “caja” and that
the key was in the possession of the defendant.
From the facts, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff
ever obtained the actual possession of the jewelry.
His possession, however, seems to be admitted by
the defendant in the present action. So far as the
record shows the jewelry was in the same box
where it was found at the time of the execution and
delivery of said Exhibit C and that the defendant
still has the key to said box.
During the trial the plaintiff attempted to show that
the jewels in question were pawned to him by
Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and
consent of the defendant. The defendant positively
denies that she knew that her husband had
pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem
the same by paying the amount due. No
explanation is contained in the record why the
jewels were placed in said box (presumably a
money safe).
Held: The Court finds that the defendant is entitled
to the possession of said jewels, or to their value,
amounting to P6,000.
In view of the fact that the record shows that
the jewels were the sole and separate property
of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in
the absence of further proof, we must presume
that they constituted a part of her paraphernal
property. As such paraphernal property she
exercised dominion over the same. (Article
1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control
and management of the same, until and unless
she had delivered it to her husband, before a
notary public, with the intent that the husband
might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil
Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had
ever delivered the same to her husband, in any
manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she
could not be deprived of the same by any act of her
husband, without her consent, and without
compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code
above cited.
Berciles vs GSIS, 1984
Ponente: Guerrero
Nature: Petition for certiorari
Facts:
Judge Pascual G. Berciles of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu died in office on August 21, 1979
at the age of sixty-six years, death caused by
“cardiac arrest due to cerebral vascular accident.”
Having served the government for more than 34
years, 26 years in the judiciary, the late Judge
Berciles was eligible for retirement so that his heirs
were entitled to survivors benefits amounting to
P311,460.00.
Other benefits accruing to the heirs of the
deceased consist of the unpaid
salary, the money value of his terminal leave and r
epresentation and
transportation allowances, computed at P60,817.5
2, and the return of retirement premiums paid by
the retiree in the amount of P9,700.00 to be paid
by the GSIS.
Such benefits are now being claimed by two
families, both of whom claim to be the deceased’s
lawful heirs:
Illuminada Ponce Berciles
(petitioner) and the legitimate children filed for survi
vors benefits which was duly supported by the
required documents (i.e. marriage certificate)
Flor Fuentebella, who also claims to be married to
Berciles. The natural child and the
illegitimate children also filed the same claim.
As proof of her marriage to Berciles, the ff. were
presented:
-Flor claimed that their marriage certificate
was destroyed due to the
war. Instead, she presented sworn statements of ot
her people attesting to her marriage to Berciles
-For the children, a baptismal certificate
and certifications that the birth certificates of the
other children were destroyed due to the war.
-Family pictures, letters from Berciles
The retirement
benefits were then decided by GSIS to be distribut
ed among the heirs in the ff. manner:
77/134 – for his widow
10/134 – for his 4 legitimate children
5/134 – for his acknowledged natural child
4/134 – for his 3 illegitimate children
Both families appealed the GSIS decision. Hence
this petition.
Issue: Validity of the GSIS decision contained in its
Resolution No. 43,
finding private respondent Pascual Voltaire
Berciles as an acknowledged
natural child of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles
and the other
private respondents, namely Maria Luisa Berciles
Villareal, Mercy
Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate
children of the
deceased, and thus, upon this finding, disposed
the retirement benefits
in the manner and proportion set forth in said
resolution after
considering said benefits as partly conjugal and
partly exclusive.
Held: In fine, We hold and rule that the respondent
GSIS committed grave abuse
of discretion in approving Resolution No. 431 which
adopted the erroneous recommendation of the
Committee on Claims Settlement, a
recommendation which has no legal or factual
basis to stand on.
Accordingly, the disposition made by respondent
GSIS of the retirement
benefits due the heirs of the late Judge Pascual G.
Berciles is consequently erroneous and not in
accordance with law. Petitioners are the lawful
heirs entitled to the distribution of the benefits
which shall accrue to the estate of the deceased
Judge Berciles and will be distributed among the
petitioners as his legal heirs in accordance with the
law on intestate succession.
*Pano nila nalaman na petitioners yung lawful
heirs? 
Judge’s alleged marriage to Flor Fuentebella
was not sufficiently proved and
therefore the children begotten with her are
either natural or illegitimate
children depending on whether they have been bor
n before or after the marriage with Iluminada
Ponce.
 -We have examined carefully this birth
certificate and We find that the same is not signed
by either the father or the mother. The
mere certificate by the registrar
without the signature of the father is not proof of vol
untary acknowledgment on his part.
-As to the baptismal certificate, the rule is
that although the baptismal record of a natural child
describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in
the preparation of the record the decedent had no
intervention, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary r
ecognition of parentage.
IN SHORT: Although illegitimate kiddies are
entitled to support and successional rights, there
must be admission or recognition of paternity of
child! In this case, wala.
How the Court divided the shiz:
According to Article 996 of the New Civil Code
which provides that “If a
widow or Widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same
share as that of each of
the children,” and Article 980 which provides that
“The children of
the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares,” the retirement
benefits shall be
distributed equally to the five (5) heirs: Iluminada
Ponce Berciles,
Ilona Berciles Alvarez, Ellery P. Berciles, England
P. Berciles and Ione
P. Berciles.
As to the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00,
the same is presumed
conjugal property, there being no proof that the
premiums were paid from
the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article
160, New Civil
Code). Such being the case, one-half of the
amount belongs to the wife
as her property in the conjugal partnership and the
other half shall go
to the estate of the deceased Judge which shall in
turn be distributed
to his legal heirs.--> parang ito lang yung part na
may relation sa CPG. O_O
With respect to the terminal leave pay, unpaid
salary and allowances
accruing to the deceased, since petitioners are the
only lawful heirs of
the deceased Judge, only they are entitled to share
thereto.
*Acquired by redemption/exchange
AMALIA PLATA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V; BENITO
MACROHON, Sheriff of Quezon City and The
Spouses CESAREA E. VILLANUEVA and
GREGORIO LEAÑO respondent 1964
Ponente: JBL Reyes
Nature: Writ of certiorari against CFI of Rizal
Facts:
In 1954, Amalia Plata purchased a parcel of land in
Caloocan, Rizal, for which the Provincial Register
of Deeds issued Torrens Certificate of Title in her
name. On February 1958, she sold the property to
one Celso Saldaña who obtained TCT therefor; but
on September 1958, Saldaña resold the same
property to Amalia Plata, and a new certificate of
Title was issued to the her.
On the same day, Plata, in consideration of a loan
of P3,000, mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva
married to Gregorio Leaño, the identical property
and its improvements "of which the mortgagor
declares to be hers as the absolute owner thereof."
The mortgage was also signed by Plata’s husband,
Gaudencio Begosa, as co-mortgagor.
For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was
extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, and sold
on 12 April 1960 to the mortgagee as the highest
bidder; on 13 May 1961, the Sheriff issued a final
deed of sale on the strength of which the Register
of Deeds issued the buyer TCT.
Subsequently, the respondent, Villanueva, sued
Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer and
obtained final judgment against him. A writ of
execution was duly issued, but Amalia Plata
resisted all efforts to eject her from the property,
and she filed a third party claim, averring
ownership of the property. Upon motion of the
judgment creditors, the CFI cited both Begosa and
Plata for contempt.
Issue: WoN Plata is bound by the detainer
judgment against her husband, Begosa.
Argument ni Plata: She says was never lawfully
married to Begosa, and that she had acquired the
property while still single, and was in possession
thereof when the Sheriff of Rizal attempted to
enforce the writ of ejectment.
Counter-argument: Respondent Villanueva and her
husband maintain, on the other hand, that Plata
had repeatedly acknowledged being married to
Begosa; that she had lived with him openly as his
wife, and their marriage is presumed, ergo she is to
be deemed bound by the judgment against the
latter.
SC: No, Plata is not bound by detainer judgment!
Evidence of marriage between Plata and Begosa is
weak. Despite the well-known presumption that
persons openly living together as husband and
wife are legally married to each other, STILL, the
respondents Villanueva could not ignore the
paraphernal character of the property in question,
which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata
while still single, as shown by TCT of Rizal (Art.
148 of the New Civil Code).
The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso
Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several
months afterward of the same property, did not
transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property,
there being no proof that the money paid to
Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds
(Civ. Code, Art 153). The deed of mortgage in
favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites
that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in
question. It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed
the mortgage as a co-mortgagor; but by itself alone
that circumstance would not suffice to convert the
land into conjugal property, considering that it was
paraphernal in origin.
Since the property was paraphernal, and the
creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact
being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain
that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived
from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer
judgment against the husband alone cannot bind
nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal,
which by law she holds and administers
independently, and which she may even encumber
or alienate without his knowledge or consent (Civ.
Code, Arts. 136. 137, 140). Hence, as she was not
made party defendant in the eviction suit, the
petitioner-wife could validly ignore the judgment of
eviction against her husband, and it was no
contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ
of execution was not lawful against her.
LAURENA v CA
FACTS:
Darlene Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Laurena
(respondent) were married on December 1983.
1993- Darlene filed for declaration of nullity of
marriage against respondent. Petitioner alleged
respondent gave priority to the needs of his
parents, would come home past midnight and even
tried to convert her to his religion. Jesse stopped
support since 1990 and abandoned the conjugal
home and stopped supporting the children.
Petitioner prayed for dissolution of CPG, custody of
children and support of 25k monthly.
1997- RTC denied the petition for nullity but
dissolving the CPG and declaring that all
propertiesare conjugal. CA affirmed with
modification ruling of RTC. CA rejected the
argument of respondent that CPG must not be
dissolved because marriage was not declared null
and void. CA excluded other properties that are not
conjugal in nature because it belonged to the
respondent's parents.
ISSUE: WON properties excluded by the CA are
conjugal?
HELD: No. CA is correct is exluding properties that
are registered in the name of respondent's parents.
CA excluded ancestral house and lot in Batangas.
The property at Batangas, although "sold" to
respondent are still his parents because it was
proven that it was merely an accommodation so
that Darlene can acquire loan at the BSP using
properties as collateral. The gas station was
managed by Jesse as atty in fact of his mother.
Duplex house however is conjugal as there is no
proof to provide otherwise that it was obtained
through the income of Jeddah Caltex Station.
*Declaration of nullity cannot be issued because of
failure to show the seriousness of the incapacity.
MANOTOK V CA
FACTS:
Manotok Realty is registered owner of a parcel of
land in the city of Manila. It acquired property by
Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting being the
highest bidder in a sale by the Probate Court.
Manotok subdivided it, but cannot take possession
of the same becuase the whole area is occupied by
several houses among which is Felipe Carillo.
Carillo contends he got the property from deed of
assignment by Delfin Dayrit which acquired the
property from Tambunting by virtue of a contract of
Sale in installment basis. Dayrit failed to pay,
Carillo took over the payment but spouse of Clara
refused to accept any payment. Dayrit conveyed
the lot to Carillo.
RTC ordered Carillo to vacate the property. CA
modified RTC decision declaring Carillo as a
builder in good faith.
Manotok maintains that Carillo is not bcause at the
time of the execution of the deed of assignment of
Dayrit to Carillo, the land was already registered
under Manotok Realty.
ISSUE: WON refusal of the husband of Clara
Tambunting to accept payment of the land in
question makes the respondent, Carillo a
possessor in good faith?
HELD: No.
Agreement between Dayrit and Tambuntin had a
specific clause which provides that "if for some
reason or other the purchaser cannot pay a certain
installment on the date agreed upon, it is hereby
agreed that said purchases will be given maximum
limit of 2 months' grace period, after which property
will revert back to original owner".
The act of registration served as notice to the
whole world and the title issued in favor of
petitioner made his ownership conclusive upon and
against all persons including Dayrit.
Further, Carillo did not even bother to inquire about
the certificate of title covering the lot in question to
verify who was the real owner therof.
ONG V CA
FACTS:
1961- Ramon Ong filed a complaint against
Arsenio Camino to annul action sale of a parcel of
land allegedly owned conjugally by Ramon and
Teodoro Ong.
Said auction was done bec. of judgment rendered
in favor of Francisco Boix, ordering Teodora Ong to
pay the former 2.8l.
Teodora Ong had her own logging business. The
loan from Francisco Boix was secured by her for
the same. Teodora defaulted, Boix sued her and
won. Sherriff Arsenio Camino levied on the
property under the sole name of Teodora Ong in a
tax declaration.
RTC denied motion of Ramon. CA affirmed
decision of RTC.
ISSUE: WON auction sale of the property in
dispute is null and void because of its conjugal
nature which the wife cannot legally bind?
HELD: No. The lot is paraphernal. The mere use of
the surname of the husband in the tax declaration
of the subject property is not sufficient proof to hold
that said property was acquired during the
marriage and is therefore conjugal.
It is not properly proved that the property was
acquired during the marriage. PNB v CA "When
the property is registered in the name of the
spouse and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, there is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to
said spouse".
Further, even if the property is conjugal, it may still
be levied upon since the profits of the business of
the wife redounds to the benefit of the family.
DELA PENA V AVILA
FACTS:
May 1996- Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila a
loan in the sum of 250k which was payable on or
before July 7, 1996. Antonia mortgaged the
property.
1997- Antonia executed Deed of Sale over the
property in favor of Gemma Avila for 600k. Avila
became the owner of the property.
November 1997- Gemma used the said property
as collateral in favor of Far East bank to secure
loan of 1.2M.
March 1998- Antonia filed Affidavit of Adverse
Claim, stating that she was the lawful owner of the
property in the name of Gemma and that the Deed
of Abs. Sale between her and Gemma was
simulated.
Gemma failed to pay the loan. Far East caused for
the foreclosure of the property, it was auction and
Far East bought it as the highest bidder.
May 1998- Antonia filed annulment of deed of sale
against Gemma stating as ground that the sale
was not consented by her husband Antegono who
had already died.
RTC found property to be conjugal in nature and
the DOAS issued for Gemma was void. CA
reversed the decision. The property was
paraphernal in nature for failure of Antonia to
properly present evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property is conjugal
and therefore the DOAS between Gemma and
Antonia void?
HELD: No. Article 160 of the Civil Code--> all
property of marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless proven that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or the wife. Proof of
acquisition (when the property was acquired) is
a necessary condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal partnership
Case at bar, dela Peñas did not even come close
to proving that subject property was acquired
during the marriage. The record is bereft of any
evidence from which the actual date of acquisition
of realty can be ascertained.
Registration of Pedra, married to _____ is merely
descriptive and does not sufficiently establish
conjugal nature of the property.
DOAS between Antonia and Gemma is therefore
valid, Far East claim of the property can now be
given due course.
Villanueva v. CA and Heirs of Eusebia Retuya
GR No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Carpio, J.
Petition for review on certiorari to reverse CA
decision
Facts:
 1926: Eusebia and Nicolas Retuya
married, 5 children, acquired 22 real
properties in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu
o Nicolas co-owner of parcel of land
in Mandaue, inherited from
parents and hereditary shares of
8 parcels of land in Mandaue
 Land earned income
from coconuts + lease
 1945: Nicolas stopped living with his
legitimate family, cohabited with Pacita
o Pacita no more occupation (full
time kabit) and no properties of
her own
o had illegitimate son, Procopio
 1985: Nicolas suffered stroke, can’t walk
and talk anymore, kabits madamot.
 1988: Eusebia filed complaint against her
Nicolas, Pacita, and Procopio for
reconveyance of several properties which
she claims are her conjugal properties
with Nicolas
 1994: RTC in favor of Eusebia; solid
evidence which proved that subject
properties were acquired during her
marriage with Nicolas; Pacita failed to
prove they were paraphernal
o Eusebia as sole administrator,
defendants to turnover all
proceeds/income of conjugal
properties and to reconvey land in
Mandaue to Eusebia and Nicolas
 1997: CA upheld RTC ruling
Issue: WoN the subject properties are conjugal
properties of Eusebia and Nicolas
Held: Yes
 FC provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were
married before its effectivity
o FC shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before
FC without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired under the
CC or other laws (FC 105)
 If properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal
o Proved by tax declarations
covering subject properties and
unrebutted testimony of Eusebia’s
witnesses
 Even if tax declarations
are just under Nicolas’
name alone, the
presumption that it
belongs to conjugal
property remains (FC
116)
o Burden of proof to prove it is
exclusive property rests on the
party asserting it
 Evidence shown was not
clear and convincing
 WoN a property is conjugal is determined
by law and not by will of one of the
spouses
o Nicolas misrepresented his civil
status as single to exclude
Eusebia from her lawful share in
the conjugal property is not
allowed by law!
 Even if Pacita had financial capacity, she
failed to prove that she bought Lot 152
 with her own money or even contributed to
acquire it
o Reliance on FC 148 is misplaced.
Must prove “actual joint
contribution” by both live-in
partners before the property
becomes co-owned by them in
proportion to their contribution
 Cohabitation of a spouse with another
person, even for a long period of time,
does not sever the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Mendoza v. Reyes and CA
GR No. L-31618, August 17, 1983
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Review on certiorari of CA decision
Facts:
 1915: Ponciano and Julia Reyes married
 1947: 2 parcels of land were bought from
JM Tuason & Co. on installment basis
o Always no money so borrow from
Rehabilitation Finance Corp
(RFC)
 1948: Spouses jointly obtained loan of
P12,000 from RFC “to complete
construction of one-storey residential
building in QC”
 1952: Spouses secured additional loan of
P8,000 “to pay balance of the lot herein
offered as additional security and to defray
the expenses incurred in the repairs of the
building”
 Spouses were able to build a house and
later on a camarin/chapel as promised to
RFC
o Camarin leased to school, later to
the Spouses Mendoza who
converted it to a movie house
o Received good rentals for the
building, but failed to pay
seasonably their obligations to the
RFC (became DBP) for extension
of 5 years
 1961: Wife sold 2 parcels of land while her
husband was absent attending his farm in
Pampanga. They were living separately
and not in speaking terms.
 Ponciano filed complaint with CFI Rizal for
the annulment of a DoS of 2 parcels of
land with improvements, executed by his
wife as vendor, and Spouses Mendoza as
vendees.
o Lands are conjugal properties
sold without his knowledge or
consent
o CFI declared lands as exclusive
and paraphernal properties of
wife
 CA reversed CFI
Issue: WoN properties in question are conjugal
properties of Ponciano and Julia
Held: Yes, disputed properties were acquired by
onerous title during the marriage using funds that
came from loans obtained by the spouses.
 That which is acquired by onerous title
during marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be
for partnership, or for only one of the
spouses is part of the conjugal partnership
property (CC 153)
 All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband and wife for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership are liabilities of the
partnership (CC 161)
 All property of marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife (CC 160)
Petitions for review on certiorari are denied for lack
of merit. Judgment of CA affirmed.
Ros and Aguete v. PNB
GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011
Carpio, J.
Petition for review of CA decision
Facts:
 1954: Joe Ros and Estrella Aguete
married
 1968: Spouses acquired parcel of land in
Laoag
 1974: Husband mortgaged land for a loan
of P115,000 from PNB
o Loan remained outstanding upon
maturity so PNB executed
extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, selling the land to
the highest bidder, PNB Laoag
 1978: Land was not redeemed within 1
year so the property was registered under
PNB
 1983: Spouses filed complaint for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) and all legal proceedings against
PNB before CFI Ilocos Norte
 o Wife claimed she had no
knowledge of the loan obtained
by her husband nor she
consented to the mortgage on the
conjugal property
o Signature affixed on the
documents was forged
o The loan did not redound to the
benefit of the family
 2001: RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner
spouses, wife did not sign the document,
so husband couldn’t encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership
without his wife’s consent. Deed of REM
declared NAV.
 2005: CA reversed RTC, granted PNB’s
appeal. RTC concluded forgery without
adequate proof. Even if wife didn’t give
consent, loan still redounded to the benefit
of the family since records revealed it was
used for expansion of the family’s
business. Debt is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.
Issue: WoN loan obtained by the husband
redounded to the benefit of the family
Held: Yes, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family and must be chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
 CC was applicable law at the time of the
marriage, so property is considered part of
CPG.
 Not disputed that property was acquired
during marriage
 Husband cannot alienate or encumber any
conjugal real property without the
express/implied consent of the wife.
o CC 173 allows wife to question
husband’s encumbrance of the
property, but court will not
guarantee that contract will be
voidable.
o In present case, we follow CA’s
conclusion that the wife gave her
consent
 Mere denial cannot
disprove the execution of
a notarized document
 Husband admitted to
forging wife’s signature
 Debts contracted by the husband for and
in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family cannot be deemed to
be his exclusive and private debts.
o Application for loan shows that it
would be used exclusively “for
additional working capital of buy
and sell of garlic and virginia
tobacco”
 Part of “obligations for
the benefit of the
conjugal partnership”
o Benefit to the family is apparent at
the signing of the contract
o No actual benefit has to be
proved, immaterial WoN business
fails/succeeds
Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed.
G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY
JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO
JOVELLANOS, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H.
JOVELLANOS, respondents.
FACTS: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered
into a lease and conditional sale agreement of a
property. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was still
married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three
children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died
on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel
married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy
Jovellanos (daughter from the first wife) and her
husband built a house on the back portion of the
premises. On January 8, 1975, with the lease
amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to
Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on
the next day, the latter donated to herein
petitioners (children from 1st wife) the lot and
bungalow. On September 8, 1985, Daniel
Jovellanos died.
Second wife (respondent) Annette H. Jovellanos
claimed that the property was acquired by Daniel
while their marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of
the deed of absolute sale dated January 8, 1975,
and thus formed part of the conjugal partnership of
the second marriage. Petitioners, on the other
hand, contend that the property was acquired by
their parents during the existence of the first
marriage under their lease and conditional sale
agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the first or the second
marriage
HELD: The property belongs to the second
marriage.
The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife
is specifically denominated as a "Lease and
Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of
twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel
had only the right of possession over the
property. The lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon
delivery, however, the ownership may still be with
the seller until full payment of the price is made, if
there is stipulation to this effect.
His monthly payments were made in the concept of
rentals, but with the agreement that if he faithfully
complied with all the stipulations in the contract the
same would in effect be considered as amortization
payments to be applied to the predetermined price
of the said property. He consequently acquired
ownership thereof only upon full payment of the
said amount.
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law, and, under the
contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not
possess or enjoy such rights of ownership. The
deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, only after full payment of the rentals.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale,
full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos.
Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to
Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said
second wife.
The lower courts correctly ordered that
reimbursements should be made to the children of
the first marriage in line with the pertinent provision
of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or
owners upon liquidation of the partnership."
G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009
SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA,
petitioners,
vs.
ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and
VILMA B. DELEON, respondents.
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon,
then single, and PHHC entered into a Conditional
Contract to Sell for the purchase of a lot. On April
24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the
lot, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Subsequently,
Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the lot to his sister,
Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa, petitioners
herein. The Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974
(Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and
signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996,
Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the
Deed of Sale. Danilo and Vilma (children of
Bonifacio) filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect
their rights over the subject property, as well as, a
reconveyance suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land purchased
belongs to the conjugal property
HELD: The subject property is the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or the
wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not even
necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. Only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise
the presumption that the property is conjugal. In
the case at bar, the title to the property in question
only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the
purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full
payment was made more than two (2) years after
his marriage to Anita. Since, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage, the
ownership is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.
Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was
Bonifacio’s exclusive property, since it was
registered solely in his name, is untenable. The
mere registration of a property in the name of one
spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What
is material is the time when the property was
acquired.
The Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence
of the husband alienating or encumbering any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. The sale by the husband of
property belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the consent of the wife is void ab initio,
absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated,
under civil interdiction, or like causes.
The sale of one-half of the conjugal property
without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior
to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is
inchoate, a mere expectancy. Therefore, even on
the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion
of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still
theoretically void, for the right of the husband or
the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
As a matter of fairness and equity, the share of
Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership
should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by
the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no
person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.
G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO
CARLOS, respondents.
FACTS: The residential lot in question was
previously in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married
to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989,
Eliseo mortgaged the property, with Erlinda’s
consent, to GSIS.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Erlinda
to Francisco (petitioner) on April 30, 1992 for
consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24,
1993, the spouses filed a complaint for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming
that there was no sale but only a mortgage
transaction. The Ramirez spouses alleged that
Francisco granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be
secured by a mortgage on the property. Francisco
gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the
GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a document
purporting to be the mortgage contract. Francisco
promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when
Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS
mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit
signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights
to the subject property. With the P200,000.00
advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel
the GSIS mortgage and subsequently, Erlinda
surrendered to Francisco the clean TCT No. 1427,
but returned Eliseo’s affidavit, unsigned. Since
Eliseo’s affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner
refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to
cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda
return the P200,000.00 advance. Since Erlinda
could not return the P200,000.00 advance because
it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, Francisco
kept the title; and in 1993, the spouses discovered
that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the
petitioner’s name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their
name.
RESPONDENT’S VERSION: There was a valid
contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents
sold the subject property to him after he refused
their offer to mortgage the subject property
because they lacked paying capacity. The sale was
with the implied promise to repurchase within one
year,[13] during which period (from May 1, 1992 to
April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the
subject property for a monthly rental of P500.00.
When the respondents failed to repurchase the
subject property within the one-year period despite
notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name
on July 14, 1993. He then filed an ejectment case
against them sixteen days before the filing of the
RTC case for annulment of the deed of absolute
sale.
In the RTC, the spouses presented the results of
the scientific examination showing that their
signatures were forgeries.
PETITIONERS’ VERSION: They introduced
evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject
property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name;
the residential lot was part of land owned Erlinda’s
parents.
ISSUE: (1) whether the subject property is
paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2) whether the
contract between the parties was a sale or an
equitable mortgage.
HELD: As a general rule, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Properties acquired by gratuitous title
by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be
excluded from the community property and be the
exclusive property of each spouse.The residential
lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal
property.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a
portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly
salary deductions. Considering the P136,500.00
amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of the
residential lot is considerably more than
theP60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through
monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject
property remained the exclusive paraphernal
property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with
the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the
transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding
that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of
attorney and affidavit were forgeries was
immaterial.

(2) For the presumption of an equitable mortgage

to arise under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, two
(2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties
entered into a contract denominated as a contract
of sale; and, (b) that their intention was to secure
an existing debt by way of a mortgage.

The contract is an equitable mortgage. That the

petitioner advanced the sum of P200,000.00 to
Erlinda is undisputed. This advance, in fact,
prompted the latter to transfer the subject property
to the petitioner. Thus, before the respondents can
recover the subject property, they must first return
the amount of P200,000.00 to the petitioner, plus
legal interest of 12% per annum, computed from
April 30, 1992.