Boos: Reviews 313

Locke, Wesley, and the Method of English Romanticism

by Richard E. Brantley
Gainsville: University.Ir of Florida Press, 1934. 300 pages. $30.00. ISBN:
0-3130-0733-6

The Evangelical movement in eigl'iteenth-centuryr England engendered

complex changes in English and, to a lesser degree, American culture.
The dissemination of theological, philosophical, and historical writings
published by the Methodist presses and the religious instruction given
by itinerant Methodist ministers altered the intellectual and spiritual at-
titudes of generations of English men and women. However, Methodism
had a dark side, an irrational undercurrent that was acute disturbing.
“Enthusiasm” became a svnonvm for eaascerbated religious sensibility
and persecutive, self-induced mania. In his Annotations to Spareheim's
Dbsemations on insanity, William Blake succinctly describes the religious
crisis of his great precursor, William Cowper, and the ”Methodistic”
elements of his religious mania:

Methodism 5: p. 154. Cowper came to me E: said. O that I were

insane always I will never rest. Can you not make me trulyr insane.
I will never rest till I am so. G that in the bosom of God I was hid.
You retain health 3: vet are as mad as any of us all—over us all—
mad as a refuge from unbelief—from Bacon Newton 3:. Locke

This brief quotation from Blake encapsulates the theological and

epistemological interests of the splendid new book by Richard E. Brantley,
Locke. Wesley, and the Method of English Romanticism. William
Cowper's ghastlyr manic-depression was said to be related to his
Evangelical-Calvinistic piety, a religious faith that was the result of his
close association with the Evangelical Reverend John Newton and
Cowper's response to the great Methodist minister, George Whitefield.
Newton's eloquent apologia, refuting these widely,Ir held beliefs, is germ
mane to this discussion but it is evident that Newton’s stern defense of
his actions did not modifyr the prevailing view of the cause of Cowper’s
insanity. Blake associated Methodism with irrational or suprarational
spiritual experience, and in this ”visionary” conversation with Cowper,
Blake delineates the apparent dichotomy.Ir between faith and empirical
reasoning in English culture that Brantley discusses in Locke, Wesley,
and the Method of English Romanticism. Brantley views Wesley as a
314 HUNTINGTDH
HUHTIHÜTÜH Liseaxv ousxrev

mediator between the interioriaed, revelatory faith of the Methodists and

the empirical epistemology-psychology of Locke. Brantley's sensitive
1it'li'esley’s reconciliation of this dualism to support his
analysis describes 1lr'll'esley's
"revisionist” position in this minutely detailed, persuasive book.
In the polemical orientation of the book, Brantley convincingly argues
that Wesley's theology is fundamentally philosophical and demonstrates
Wesley’s emphasis on the fusion of the intuitional and experiential nature
of religious conviction. Wesley, aware of the complex epistemological
behveen Locke and his “adversaries", John Norris, David
arguments between
Hume, Bishop Berkeley, steadfastly defended the validity of Locke’s
epistemological beliefs: ideas are derived from sensory perception and
the causes of sensation, the mind actively correlates the ideas to form
concepts and, through inductive and deductive ratiocination, the mind
solves the problems presented to it. ”Rational empiricism” became a
desideratum for Wesley, a kind of sensory validation of spiritual
conversion.

I argue, at any rate, that Locke's rational empiricism [i.e., his

epistemology of sense perception attended by induction and deduc-
tion] directly informs the religious “epistemology” whereby Wesley
claimed the saving faith he felt was his. Perception, distinct from
sense alone, serves to signal the mental, rational element of Locke’s
epistemology. (13}

Brantley simplifies Locke's complex arguments without oversimplif~

ing the attendant problem; Locke was never completely satisfied with
his philosophical arguments that denied innate ideas, and both Locke and
1|Wesley struggled to formulate a philosophical language that could con-
vey the nature of religious revelation. His summary of Wesley’s empirico-
theological position is incisively direct.

He [Wesley] was constructively skeptical; and it will also be argued

that though he cannot any more than Locke be described as pluralistic
and irreligious, though he was certainly not any more than Locke
monistic, and though he was not even conceivably either materialic
or pessimistic, he was somehow sensationalistic and empiricist and
at the same time free~willist, religious, optimistic, idealistic, intellec-
tualistic, and generally reasonable though never quite rationalistic.
{15)
Wesley has been termed a ”syncretist” and there was an eclectic range
of influences on Wesley's religious thought. Wesley's assimilation of
disparate religious beliefs and his religious toleration are among his most
 soox reviews 315

enduring qualities, and the fact that Wesley was never completely con-
tent with relying on a priori experience or a posteriori experience for his
belief in Spiritual conversion, the ineffable experience of religious
transcendence, is of considerable importance to Brantley's discussion.
Wesley was an ardent believer in an “Arminian” God of forgiveness and
divine, universal redemption and grace. Yet 1it'vlesley's sympathies with
the Calvinist Jonathan Edwards, who also read deeply in Locke and Sir
Isaac Newton, reveals 1liliesley's trust in individualistic spiritual interpreta-
tion and the validity of that interpretation. Wesley's freedom from the
sectarian prejudice that so permeated eighteenth-century English life is
evidence of his religious toleration. Nothing is more representative of
Wesley than his comment that he ”agreed to disagree” with fellow
Methodist, the Calvinist George Whitefield.
The third chapter of the book, "Wesley’s Intellectual Influence”, is a
further elucidation of Brantley’s thesis. Brantley correlates the various
publications by Wesley on philosophical speculation, focusing on one
of Wesley's earliest editorial works. Locke’s devoted follower and
apologist, Peter Browne, published The Procedure, Extent, and Limits
of Human Understanding in 13723: two years later, Wesley abridged the
Procedure and supervised its publication by the Methodist presses. There
is insufficient space to discuss Wesley’s genius as an "editor-anthologist”a
Wesley may have been unequaled in this capacity—but Brantley repeatedly
demonstrates the paradigmatic aspect of Wesley's editorial methodology
in the Procedure and shows how this edition, Wesley’s first effort at abridg-
ment, anticipates his famous editions of the Cambridge Platonists, Milton’s
Paradise Lost, Edward Young’s Night Thoughts, and the works of many
Puritan and Protestant thinkers. By editing Browne’s work, Wesley
developed a comprehensive understanding of Locke and evolved his own
individual reading of Locke, using Browne's work as substantiation for
the philosophical basis of his ideas about the language of spiritual
experience.

Browne's view of the Essay, then, was meant to inform their

spiritual experience. It is true that when his [Wesley’s] preachers
heard him read The Procedure he told them it was “in most points
far clearer and more judicious than Mr. Lockets [Essay], as well as
designed to advance a better cause” [Curnock, 4:192]; . . . To show
the Essay's commensurability with orthodox religion was undoubted"
ly part of his purpose in promoting The Procedure. (1131)

Brantley is never tendentious in his arguments and his book is extremely

well documented. Nevertheless, he may be overstating the influence that
Wesley had on language. Brantley describes Wesley's effect on language
31E- Huurmorou Lissasr ouasrse

as a turning away from metaphorical, figurative language to the more

literal language of spiritual experience: ”[Wesleyl admires ’plain'
words . . . which relate to the thing signified directly and with as little
figurativeness as possible" (53}. Actually. the turning away from
metaphorical language to non-metaphorical language began in the previous
century due to the influence of thinkers such as Thomas Sprat. John Tillot-
son. Joseph Glanvill. and other early theorists on language. In Gulliver's
Travels. Jonathan Swift effectively satiriaes some of these theories.
Brantley suggests that Wesley formulated a spiritual basis for analogistic
interpretation. The eighteenth—century tendency towards analogistic think-
ing has been well discussed by Earl Miner. Paul I. Korshin. and in a seminal
article by Victor Harris; it detracts from Brantley’s thesis that he does
not extend his argument to discuss the influence of Wesley’s analogistic
empiricism on historiography. typology, allegory. and most significant-
ly. prophecy.
The esegetical enterprise of the book focuses on the central poems of
the High Romantics, excluding the poetry of Byron. Brantley's sensitive
readings of Wordsworth's Prelude, his sonnets. ”Tintern Abbey” and.
most crucially. the ”lntimations Ode” reflect Brantley’s lifetime of intense
preoccupation with Wordsworth’s most intricate poetic utterances.
Brantley incorporates the landmark criticism of Geoffrey Hartman in his
discussion but he does ignore or understate the importance of pertinent.
recent Wordsworth criticism. Frances Ferguson‘s controversial book on
Wordsworth’s language and James Averill’s recent reading of Words-
worth’s agonistic tendencies in his poetry would have provided a dialec-
tical framework for Brantley’s interpretations. Notwithstanding this
criticism. the chapter on Wordsworth is the culmination of Brantley's
critical methodology and will be an enduring achievement.
The chapters on Shelley and Keats are influenced by the critical eat-
aminations of Earl Wasserman. lack Stillinger. and Stuart Sperry. com-
prising a modification of Brantley’s epistemologically oriented criticism.
Brantley addresses the problem of Keats' and Shelley’s attitude towards
the noumenal world and their reactions to the physical universe. He il-
lustrates the religious consequences of these problems of conceptualization:

“The deep truth is imageless” is a line from Prometheus Unbound

that [like “the intense inane" from that work] may indeed be in-
tended to convey the ineffability of the noumenon. and may even
reflect [at several removes] the Cartesian distrust of sense experience
as an avenue to truth. but the closest parallel to this quintessential
distillation of Shelley’s thought, perhaps. or at least to the last verse
paragraph of ‘Mont Blanc.” is the almost more Brownean than
Wesleyan realisation that, though the spiritual realm cannot be linked
 soox sevrsws 31?

metaphorically with the world of nature, it can be hinted at, in

language, through analogy. {130)

To assent to and affirm—without qualification—Brantley's interpreta-

tion of Shelley's poetry would deny much of the received opinion of
Shelley, particularly in Brantley's reading of Shelley's masterpiece,
“Adonais.” If he had included Stuart Curran's critical study of Shelley's
syncretic methods and Richard Cronin's examination of Shelley's theories
of poetic interaction, there would have been a better foundation for
Brantley's overarching thesis.
Although the chapter on Coleridge is by no means unsatisfactory, his
discussion is abbreviated and does not delve into the prose works of Col-
eridge. Brantley’s sensitive readings of the “Aeolian Harp” and “This Lime-
Tree Bower My Prison” and his speculation on the religious language
of the other Conversation poems is worth reproducing: “This idiom of
the graces, I think, is the most central indication of how much the
Wesleyan language of experience helped Coleridge in his effort at once
to celebrate his visionary moments and to distinguish them from solip-
sism" (16F). Brantley's point is certainly debatable but the persuasiveness
of his argument is based on a shrewd analysis of Coleridge's background
in English empirical philosophy, and he admirably demonstrates Col-
eridge's indebtedness to the British empiricists. Cine would expect that
the discussion of the poetry would lead to a discussion of the prose but
he elected not to extend his discussion to Coleridge's central prose works.
His overriding concern for the epistemological basis and theological com-
plexities in Coleridge’s poetry would have greatly benefited from an ex"
amination of the Biographia Literaria, the Aids to Reflection, and other
prose works where we see Coleridge selfconsciously synthesizing various
critical theories on language and theology. Coleridge’s belief that the im-
agination can mediate between man’s experiential religious faith and the
demands of internal revelation is an aspect of Coleridge that deserves
further study. It is interesting to note the evolution of Coleridge studies
in this decade. Jerome Christensen’s Coleridge's Blessed Machine of
Language and Timothy Cortigan's Coleridge, Language and Criticism have
renewed scholarly interest in Coleridge as a fundamentally English thinker.
Through the efforts of Brantley, Christensen, and Corrigan, Coleridge
can now be judged in his role as articulate spokesman for the empirical
tradition rather than the inveterate plagiariaer of Kant and the von
Schlegels.
To summarize Brantley's governing thesis, we should examine his
recapitulatory statement: ”Not only, then, have i established for Wesleyan
studies an interdiscipline by which criticism of 1l’liesley’s language facilitates
the broadest possible view of his thought, but I have also shown that
313 Hourlnoron Lisaaav ouaarsatr

his thought and expression counterpoint, and largely account for, the
poets' languages of philosophy and faith” (202). John Wesley was born
in HOS, the year before the death of John Locke, and lived to the age
of 33, dying in 1791, the year William Wordsworth began composing
his Descriptive Sketches. Wesley should be seen as the transitional figure
in the eighteenth century, bridging the gap between the Age of Pope and
the Romantic period. In this period of turmoil and revolution, Wesley
never lost his faith and conviction in theology or the epistemological posi-
tion that religious expression could be stated in clear, distinct prose and
poetry. Corollary to this thought is one aspect of Wesley that is easy
to underestimate: Wesley was a student of literature, philosophy, and
the fine arts. All of his long life, Wesley maintained an interest in language
and the relationship of poetry to religious faith. For Wesley, poetry
modified language and provided a content for the expression of religious
faith. The last notation in Wesley's journal states that he was disappointed
that he was unable to meet with William Cowper, a writer he had long
admired. Brantley perceptively analyzes the intricacies of the philosophical
thought of 1Wilesley and establishes the reciprocal relationship between
Wesley's Methodist faith and poetic creation in the eighteenth century.
Brantley’s work is a triumph of interdisciplinary research and justifiably
deserves the recent award from the MLA Conference on Christianity and
Literature that states in part: "This work is a significant contribution to
knowledge. . . . The Conference is pleased to honor a book which not
only reflects high standards of scholarship but represents a significant
dialogue between Christian theology and literature.” Brantley’s book
demonstrates that historical criticism is opening new avenues to the study
of Romantic thought.
John C. Viilalobos
Glendale College