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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO,


respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2] granting the application for land
registration of the respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed
with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land,
Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They
claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their
application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and
Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;[4]

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)


dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of
title covering the Subject Lots;[7]

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office


(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in
the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons
and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to
Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition
to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12] All owners of the land
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the
Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on
the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
located.[14] Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999[15]
and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16]

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default,[17]
with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The
respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from
the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over
Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment,
dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of
Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the
appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been
classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are within
the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription and
that Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject
parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same
and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21,
1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had
occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be reckoned only
from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable
and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report
dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private
ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled
to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals
to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless
should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the
concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration
of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a
quo.[20]

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12
June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to
25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession
required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June
1963, per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-
year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where
this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain
must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants.
Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for
registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a
single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels
of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or
applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the
proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for
land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is
void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Jurisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons
different from those presented by petitioner Republic.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to
hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were
not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and
separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was
fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application
for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited
sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and
hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.

The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the following situations:
(1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the
parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application for registration
of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province.[25] The
Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two
applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and
individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court
refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property
Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for
registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action
and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and
David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to
hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.[27]
Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an
implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon
the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action);
and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also
to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by
the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the
MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before
it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the
fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of
misjoinder only before this Court.

B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the
Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land
registration court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has
discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from
assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[29]

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the
Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing;
and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following
manner:

1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration
Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the
land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the
requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such
requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is
essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court
expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed


mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as
by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated
as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein
may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be
owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.[31]

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03
September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official
Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in
The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province
and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more
than three months after the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would
already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The
Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was
already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose
respondents application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the
MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from
contesting respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may be
issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September
1999.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment,
dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents
Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated
02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both
null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

II

Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the
judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed
with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to
resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land.

Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the
Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase
from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent
Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in
the concept of an owner since 1950.[32]

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the


Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545
of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25,
1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part
of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the
person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35]

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and
mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.[36] It explicitly
enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:

(1) For homestead settlement;


(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or


(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act
because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode.[38] Since
respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred
that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete
title over the Subject Lots.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144
hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in


open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of
the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable
and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the
Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into
ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents
could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous
supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property
Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November
2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any
other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject
Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23
September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by
extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil
Code.[42]

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and
the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is
confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in
the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to
register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents
may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial
confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration
Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming
any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an
application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or
claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act.[44]

Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the
substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural
requirements under the Property Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply
in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public
domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law[45] that
must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory
construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia
specialibus non derogant.[46]

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The
Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999,
and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application
for registration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Tinga, J., out of the country.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44057 February 27, 1937

JOSE H. GUEVARRA, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
ANANIAS LAICO, provincial sheriff of Laguna,
CARLOS YOUNG, NEWLAND BALDWIN and ADELE C. BALDWIN, under the firm
name of The Estates, respondents-appellees.

Juan S. Rustia for appellant.


Ramon Diokno for appellees.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

In civil case No. 794 of the justice of the peace court of the municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, wherein the herein respondents Carlos Young, Newland Baldwin, and Adele C.
Baldwin, as sublessors, doing business under the firm name of The Tunasan Estates, were
plaintiffs, and the herein petitioner Jose H. Guevarra, as sublessee, was defendant, judgment was
rendered, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, condemning the defendant to vacate lot No. 298-A of The Tunasan
Estates; to pay the sum of P61,38 as rents due on the premises with legal interest from the
date of the filing of this complaint; the sum of P30.69 equivalent to 50 per cent of the rent
due and unpaid as penalty for non-payment and costs of this action.

As the above-named defendant had not appealed from said judgment, it became final and
executory. On January 17, 1935, upon petition of said plaintiffs, a writ of execution (Exhibit A),
addressed to the herein respondent provincial sheriff of Laguna, was issued, ordering him,
among other things, as follows:

Wherefore, you are hereby commanded to cause the defendant immediately to vacate said
property and to restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs. You are likewise commanded
to collect from him the rents, damages and costs, in the above-stated amount, together
with your fees for the service of this execution, and upon failure of the defendant to pay
for them, you shall attach the personal property of said defendant, except such as is
exempt from execution, and sell the same in the manner provided by law in such cases,
until you obtain an amount equal to that of the judgment, plus the costs of the suit, and
the corresponding interest thereon from the date of the judgment, aside from your lawful
fees on this execution, turning over the amount so collected by you to the plaintiffs in this
case, excluding your lawful fees on the execution.

On January 18, 1935, said provincial sheriff of Laguna required the therein defendant and herein
petitioner Jose H. Gueverra to remove his house from the residential lot No. 298-A of The
Tunasan Estates, situated in the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, giving him until
January 24, 1935, to do so, and warning him that, should he fail to comply therewith, said sheriff
would be compelled to do so himself (Exhibit B).

On January 22, 1935, the attorney for the petitioner wrote to the respondent sheriff asking him
what steps he proposed to take in compliance with said writ of execution Exhibit C.

On the 23d of said month and year, said sheriff answered the attorney for the petitioner saying
that he would follow the practice usually observed in the service of writs of execution of the
same nature and that he would eject the defendant and execution debtor Jose H. Guevarra from
the residential lot No. 298-A of The Tunasan Estates, described in the writ of execution in
question, remove the latter's house therefrom and collect the various amounts and fees mentioned
in said writ of execution (Exhibit D).
On January 26, 1935, the attorney for the petitioner again wrote to the respondent sheriff telling
him that in view of the vagueness of the terms of the writ of execution as to the manner of
compliance therewith, he should consult the competent court in regard thereto. (Exhibit E.)

On January 31, 1935, the respondent sheriff answered said attorney telling him among other
things, the following: "Inasmuch as the size and construction of the defendant's house are such
that it is impossible to remove it from the lot without tearing it down, the house not being
portable except certain parts thereof, consequently, said house will necessarily have to be
demolished." (Exhibit F.)

In view of the foregoing answer, the herein petitioner Jose H. Guevarra, on February 7, 1935,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction,
now under consideration, against Ananias Lacio, provincial sheriff of Laguna, Carlos Young,
Newland Baldwin and Adele C. Baldwin, doing business under the firm name of the Tunasan
Estates. Said petition was docketed as civil case No. 6113 of said court. It prayed for the
insurance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to become final and permanent after the
corresponding proceedings and hearing, ordering the respondent sheriff to leave the petitioner in
the peaceful possession and enjoyment of his right of ownership of said house belonging to him,
with the costs to the respondents, alleging that the demolition of the house was neither ordered in
the writ of execution nor authorized by law.

On said date, February 7, 1935, the Court of First Instance of Laguna, then presided over by the
Honorable Fernando Jugo, granted the petition and ordered the issuance of the corresponding
writ of preliminary injunction, after filing a bond of P100.

In answer to the petition, the respondent sheriff Ananias Laico, in his pleading of February 18,
1935, denied each and every one of the facts stated therein and, as a special defense, alleged,
among other things, as follows:

(c) The only interest of the respondents in the subject matter of the petitioner's
application consists in his earnest desire to show that, in attempting to comply with said
writ of execution the delivery of possession of the land described therein as lot No. 298-A
of The Tunasan Estates, he has acted under the sincere and honest conviction on his part
that said wit of execution included the removal from the land not only of the person of
the defendant but also of his house of mixed materials constructed thereon, which is also
the same interpretation given thereof by the plaintiffs and execution creditors in said civil
case No. 794, who, from January 17, 1935, requested the respondent sheriff to turn over
to them the possession of said land in accordance with said interpretation, that is, first
removing thereof mixed materials constructed thereon, as an indispensable prerequisite to
restitution of possession of the land to the plaintiffs.

Answering, in turn, said petition, the respondents Carlos Young, Newland Baldwin and Adele C.
Baldwin, in their pleading of March 20, 1935, denied each and every one of the facts alleged
therein, and set up a special defense with a counterclaim praying that the petitioner be ordered to
pay the sum of P1,000 as damages, plus the sum of P61.38 as annual rent from January 1, 1935,
until the petitioner turns over the possession of the property, in accordance with the judgment
rendered in civil case No. 794 of the justice of the peace court of San Pedro, Laguna, with the
costs.

The petitioner Jose H. Guevarra, replying to said counterclaim, denied each and every one of
facts alleged therein.

After due trial and hearing of the evidence presented by the respective parties, the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, then presided over by the Honorable Sotero Rodas, rendered judgment on
June 19, 1935, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

Consequently, the court orders the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in this case, holding that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for in his
complaint and ordering him to pay to he defendants 'The Tunasan Estates' the sum of
P5.12 monthly form the date until full restitution of possession thereof is made to said
defendants, with the costs.
The petitioner interposed the present appeal from the said judgment, assigning the following
alleged errors as committed by the court a quo, to wit:

1. In not holding that by virtue of the writ of ejectment under the terms prescribed in
section 85 of the Codes of Civil Procedure, the sheriff, process server or any other
person, has neither right nor authority to demolish or destroy the house of the appellant,
as execution debtor in the writ of ejectment.

2. In not declaring the writ of preliminary injunction, previously issued, permanent and
final, in dismissing the complaint with costs, and in ordering the petitioner to pay P5.12
monthly, as compensation for the occupation of the premises.

3. In denying the new trial applied for and in not providing for the opinion for the
assessment and compensation of the value of the house in question.

The first question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not said court erred "in not holding
that by virtue of the writ of ejectment under the terms prescribed in section 85 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the sheriff, process server or any other person, has neither right nor authority to
demolish or destroy the house of the appellant, as execution debtor in the writ of ejectment."

While the present case was pending decision in this court, Commonwealth Act No. 89 was
enacted on October 26, 1936, section 1 of which reads as follows:

SECTION. 1. The provincial sheriff, in executing the decision, of a competent court in


ejectment cases, shall not destroy, demolish, or remove the improvements constructed or
planted by the defendant or his agent or servant on the premises, unless expressly
authorized by the court. The court may authorized the provincial sheriff to do so, upon
petition of the plaintiff or his attorney, after due hearing, and upon the failure of the
defendant to remove the aforesaid improvements within a reasonable time after being so
ordered by the court.

The above-quoted legal provision prohibits the sheriff, executing a decision in an ejectment case,
from destroying demolishing or removing the improvements constructed by the defendant and
execution debtor or his agent, unless, upon petition of the plaintiff or his attorney and after due
hearing, it so authorized by the court, upon failure of the defendant after having been so ordered
by said court.

In view of the new law, which is procedural in nature and, therefore, with a retroactive effect
(Enrile vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 36 Phil., 574; Hosana vs. Diomano and Diomano,
56 Phil., 741), the respondents sheriff cannot carry out the demolition of the petitioner's house
construed by him on the lot in question.

With respect to the counterclaim set up by the respondent Carlos Young, Newland Baldwin and
Adele C. Baldwin, section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes no distinction between a
simple complaint and a complaint praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, in
authorizing the defendant to set forth by answer all the facts constituting his defense and the
counterclaim he may have, whatever their nature, provided they are in favor of all the substantial
defendants and against all the substantial plaintiffs in the action, as required by section 96 of said
Code. The counterclaim under consideration herein is in favor of the substantial defendants and
execution creditors Carlos Young, Newland Baldwin and Adele C. Baldwin, the other defendant
Ananias Lacio, as provincial sheriff of Laguna, being a mere process server, and against the
substantial plaintiff, the herein petitioner, Jose H. Guevarra. A preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy and it may be issued by a court only in an action pending before it or before an
inferior tribunal (section 163, Act No. 190). Therefore, the judgment rendered in favor of said
respondents, upon their counterclaim, is in accordance with law and the result of the evidence.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed in so far as it order the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued which is made permanent, and it is affirmed in all other respects,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO DE CASTRO,

BRION,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and

Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences.

xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in


Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not
been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia
or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have
means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their
own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are
very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business
transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even
dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is
the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal
law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.

- Hernando De Soto1[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and
entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts,
was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the
Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own
circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide
cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our
public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the
endemic problems.
I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration


covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2[2] situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that
he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City,
Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.4[4] Apart from
presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco,
testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-
two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco
to Malabanan.5[5]

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the
testimony given by Mr. Velazco.6[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present
any evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.7[7]

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration


and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-
04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8[8] reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots
as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15
March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation
of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9[9]

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;10[10] hence, it
was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely
on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11[11] which was handed down just four months prior to
Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is
actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of
hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12[12] and on 11 November 2008, the
case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain


may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree


may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either


because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their


names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?13[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit
is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in
Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the
OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12
June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,15[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16[16] and Republic v. Imperial

Credit Corporation,17[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of

Appeals.18[18]

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure
converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the
property had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster their
argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties.19[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of
properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands.
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of
possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under
the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can
run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The
President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.21[21]

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.22[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest


have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law
was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073.
First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be
registered.23[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than
only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same
as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1)
that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-


interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to
persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems
to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.
It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to
perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public
Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of
by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions
declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership
of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure
for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration
under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No.
9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of
the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons
from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.24[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to
acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it
is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable


character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12,
1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.25[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt


petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and
even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely


requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as
it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly
limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible
under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are
obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due
to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly
overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of
argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26[26] the


Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as
obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession
on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is
not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being
that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been
in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to
which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now
settled in favor of Naguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of


Appeals27[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule
between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28[28] which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and
disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is


alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November


25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the
Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and


Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able


to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that
this is one of them.29[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after
the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed
nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference
was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent
seeks to belittle.

III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by


prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we
did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as
material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did
not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil


Code.[30[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31[31]] With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private
lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession
being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence
definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that
we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which
provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral
lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary
prescription of ten (10) years,32[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.33[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,34[34] as well

as just title.35[35]

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons
who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The
Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of
private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question
that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings
over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.36[36] Yet if we ascertain
the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-
year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands
through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of


the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest


have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis
supplied)37[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the
date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration
filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it
applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is
completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith.

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law
on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a
material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and
how it did under the Civil Code.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to
or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite
thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title,
without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning
of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38[38]
similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now
sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled
those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the
rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact
which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription,
as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand
on our part in the case of Section 14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging
to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.39[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or
any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article
1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the
same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article
420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands
already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or
occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared
alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change
the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to
amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example.


Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations
Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the
law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro
Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the
military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40[40] which in turn is authorized to own, hold

and/or administer them.41[41] The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps,

in whole or in part.42[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands
subject thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties.43[43]

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become
alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law
itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.44[44] Such purpose can be tied to
either public service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding
their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to
a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the
public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a
duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive
period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose
of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application
for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as
public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and
justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section
14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.
Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of
the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession,
while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep.
Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code,
while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded
on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply
as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is
just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by
the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to
interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent
exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code,
is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that
[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires
possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood
faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527,
and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45[45] provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article
1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46[46]

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument
is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before
the completion of the required period of possession.47[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when
it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from
whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary


prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property
has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial
property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods
prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil
Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens
system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.48[48]

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the
acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a
period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act49[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable
public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did
not preclude such registration.50[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil
Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51[51]

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person


acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten
(10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There
is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations
they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence
that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling
cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected
by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a


phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-
called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal
system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap.
Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free
patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of
said properties.52[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if
not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable
limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and
made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation
by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about
the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate
into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It
could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code
itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of
that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and
livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

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