Analytical Marxism: The Race

for Respectability

Tim Nickel

ABSTRACT: In recent years a perspective known as Analytical

Marxism has come to the forefront of Marxist thought. This
perspective considers Marxism to be a useful tradition, but one that
is haunted by a number of theoretical and methodological flaws.
This new perspective claims to have corrected these "flaws"
through its methodology, particularly the usage of methodological
individualism, rational choice models, and game theory, as well as a
new analysis of exploitation and class formation. The purpose of
this paper is to survey and evaluate the works of Analytical Marxists
and their critics in these areas.

Marxism is dead. So we are told. It has shown itself to be morally,

and economically bankrupt: it justified the gulag, the
politically,
Soviet-Nazi pact; it provided the foundation of totalitarianism, the
decimation of the peasantry, the denial of civil rights to its working
class and oppressed nations, as well as armed invasions of its
colonies of Eastern Europe; through its advocacy of planning, it
promoted proverbial inefficiency, waste, shortages and low stan-
dards of living. The bankruptcy of Marxism as ideology spells its
death as science ... The scourge of Marxism has finally been laid to
rest (Burawoy, 1990:7).
But is this actually the death of Marxism? True, &dquo;communist&dquo; parties
and societies have fallen apart across the world, but is this the deathknell
of Marxism? The renewed resurgence in Marxist research and theoretical
growth would seem to answer with a no. As Burawoy (1990:9) has noted:
What we are witnessing ... is not the death of Marxism but the
death of its most degenerate branch [Soviet Marxism or Stalinism].

Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306.I owe a great

debt of thanks to Larry Reynolds and Alice Littlefield for their help on this paper and every-
thing else, and to Larry Isaac, Lawrence Hazelrigg, Jim Fendrich, Larry Christiansen, M.A.
Shader, Jamie Miller and other participants in the Political Economy Brown Bag Series at
Florida State University for their comments, suggestions, and support.

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Or to put it another way, we are witnessing the liberation of Marx-

ism from forces which have often distorted and stunted its growth.
The winds of glasnost may spread the seed of new revitalized
Marxisms.

Hence, the death of Marxism pronounced by the pundits of the powerful

may actually be its rebirth.
Before this optimism turns to blind faith, it must be asked, just what is
being done in Marxism today? What is the dominant branch of Marxism?
A review of the literature would seem to point to &dquo;Analytical Marxism&dquo;
(hereafter abbreviated as &dquo;AM&dquo;). As Wright (1989:45) argues:
[W]ork by Analytical Marxists is increasingly appearing in publica-
tions around the world oriented towards progressive audiences
outside of the academy. Analytical Marxist ideas are beginning to
have an influence on public discussions on the left, and Analytical
Marxist work has been translated into 13 languages. In more
academic terms, a number of publications have appeared containing
extended critiques of Analytical Marxism, which is also an indica-
tion that it is becoming more influential. At a more institutional
level, several of the central advocates of Analytical Marxism have
gained positions [of] considerable importance within their universi-
ties.

Although this statement is written by a self-proclaimed Analytical

Marxist, it does capture the general growth of Analytical Marxism. It is
also necessary to understand that today &dquo;universities are important
centers of Marxist theory and activism in many parts of the capitalist
world&dquo; (Anderson and Thompson, 1988:215). This indicates that Analyti-
cal Marxism, whose locus is in the university, will have an important
impact on Marxism, for better or worse.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, a survey of the works of
AM will be presented. AM contains a variety of perspectives, and, like
Marxism in general, is divided concerning important questions, problems,
and such.l But, despite these differences, a dominant thrust or orienta-
tion has developed within AM, a thrust represented by two interrelated
issues: methodological individualism (and its correlates, rational choice
theory and game theory) and the development of a theory of exploitation
and class based on property relations and grounded in methodological
individualism. So, rather than concentrate on the differences in AM, this
paper will focus on three issues: (1) a methodology - particularly the use
of game-theoretic models as set forth by Jon Elster; (2) the analysis of
exploitation and class, especially the work of John Roemer; and (3) a
discussion of the transition to socialism.
These areas are chosen because they have received disproportionate
attention from individuals who identify themselves as Analytical Marx-

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 83

ists. These three areas are also key elements of &dquo;traditional&dquo; Marxist
thought and are thus useful for demonstrating the differences between
the &dquo;two Marxisms.&dquo; Furthermore, AM’s perspective on these three
issues has received a great deal of criticism. The work of Bronner (1990),
Howard and King (1989), Kieve (1986), Smith (1989), Wood (1989) and
others have indicated that AM is critically flawed both in its methodology
and in its analyses. In the latter part of the paper, a survey of these criti-
cisms and a synthesis of their most important arguments regarding the
three main issues will be presented.

Methods, Models, and Muddle

Just what is it that distinguishes AM from &dquo;traditional&dquo; Marxism?
Analytical Marxists typically claim it is their adherence to a careful and
detailed methodology. For AM, methodology is the important issue. AM
rejects the claims of a distinctive Marxist methodology (Elster 1985;
Przeworski 1985a; Carling 1986; Wright 1989). Traditional Marxist
methodology is seen as a &dquo;functionalist sociology, reinforced by the
Hegelian tradition&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:453). Marxist research, according to
Elster, has thus &dquo;acquired an apparently powerful theory that in fact
encourages lazy and frictionless thinking&dquo; (1982b:453). Others within
AM do not even recognize a &dquo;specific form of Marxist logic or explana-
tion&dquo; (Roemer, 1986c:191). Therefore, Marxist methodology must be
attacked and revamped. This attack is two-pronged and consists of AM’s
commitment to &dquo;scientificity&dquo; and &dquo;intentional explanation.&dquo;
As a study of society, Marxism should have a methodology that &dquo;ought
to be just good scientific methodology&dquo; (Wright, 1989:40). This, of
course, raises the question of just what is &dquo;good scientific methodology.&dquo;
What this means, as &dquo;[virtually all the proponents of this tendency
agree,&dquo; is that &dquo;Marxism must justify itself as a (social) science&dquo;
(Bronner, 1990:243). The criteria used to justify Marxism as science are
none other than the criteria of conventional social science. AM agrees
&dquo;to accept the epistemological assumptions [of bourgeois science] and so
agree to adjudicate all theoretical claims by the standards of a ’neutral’
and ’objective’ (social) science&dquo; (Bronner, 1990:250).
Two implications follow from this perspective on science. First, it
places a great importance upon &dquo;systematic empirical research.&dquo; Most
Analytical Marxists &dquo;feel that an essential element in the elaboration of
theories is the systematic confrontation with empirical research [and]
affirm the conventional scientific view that theoretical advances depend
in part on their engagement with relevant data from empirical research&dquo;
(Wright, 1989:42). This in turn leads to the view that Analytical Marxists
should revise their theoretical standings in light of the data that their
methodology brings out. It is true that much of the work done in AM has

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84

undergone a number of changes, but I’m not sure this justifies Wright’s
(1989:42-43) claim that
one of the striking properties of the work of Analytical Marxists is
the extent to which they take seriously the problem of revising their
own theoretical positions in the light of debate and criticism ...
The commitment to science, therefore, means that Analytical
Marxists treat their arguments as needing to be continually
subjected to criticism and revision rather than as constituting
definitive embodiments of &dquo;truth.&dquo;

As some have noted (see Wood, 1989), the criticism AM most readily
responds to has come almost entirely from within AM. Little has been
done in response to the outside criticisms of AM.2
The second implication of the AM perspective deals with the &dquo;careful
conceptualization&dquo; and &dquo;elaboration of explicit models&dquo; by AM. What
this means, as we shall soon see, is providing new - more conventional -
bourgeois definitions of the concepts developed in Marxism. This move
to a more &dquo;scientific&dquo; approach is seen as the very strength of AM. If all
of social science applies the same method, methodological disputes are
no longer relevant; instead, one can turn to a discussion of the substan-
tive issues at hand.
So far there appears to be little weight in this critique of Marxism. If
AM believes that Marxists, and at the very least Marx, were and are not
concerned with grounding their work in the &dquo;empirical world&dquo; and with
providing a careful definition of concepts and models, then they have
read very little of the Marxist literature and have apparently missed the
proverbial boat.
The second critique of Marxist methodology is based on AM’s search
for micro-foundations. From this perspective, Marxism is seen as part of
&dquo;a deliberate thrust to impose the monopoly of the economic method
over all study of society&dquo; (Przeworski, 1985a:379). The challenge here is
to provide micro-foundations or &dquo;to provide an explanation of individual
acts under particular conditions&dquo; (1985a:381). AM sees Marxism as reluc-
tant to provide such an explanation. As Przeworski (1985a:382) states:

The peculiar predicament is that Marxists were never completely

prepared to embrace ... the psychological explanation adopted by
functionalist sociology or explanations based on Freudian theories
of personality ... By and large, Marxists were satisfied with the
intuitive belief that people act out their class position.
For AM, theory must be grounded in the actions of the individual. No
longer any given
can individual’s preferences, desires, or attitudes be
explained by his/her position as a proletarian or capitalist.
Instead, a perspective that goes &dquo;to the center of Marxist theory of
collective action and thus of history&dquo; (Przeworski, 1985a:382) is needed

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 85

... one that adopts &dquo;a mixed causal-intentional explanation - the inten-
tional understanding of the individual actions and causal explanation of
their interaction&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:463). Such a focus is &dquo;methodological
individualism&dquo; and its &dquo;tools par excellence are rational choice models
[and especially] ... game theory&dquo; (Roemer,1986c:192).
Methodological Individualism
Methodological individualism is the core of AM, and at this core is the
imperative that &dquo;there shall be no explanation at a level above that of the
individual unit&dquo; (Lebowitz, 1988:199). As defined by Elster (1985:5),
methodological individualism is
the doctrine that all social phenomena - their structure and their
change - are in principle explicable in ways that only involve indi-
viduals - their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their
actions. To go from social institutions and aggregate patterns of
behavior to individuals is the same kind of operation as going from
cells to molecules.
The macro is left to the micro, and any explanation that is not gener-
ated from individual behaviors is considered inadequate (Lebowitz,
1988:199). This, of course, attacks methodological collectivism which is
identified as the type of research done by more conventional Marxists.
Methodological collectivism &dquo;assumes that there are supra-individual
entities that are prior to individuals in the explanatory order. Explana-
tion proceeds from the laws either of self-regulation or of development of
these larger entities, while individual actions are derived from the aggre-
gate pattern&dquo; (Elster, 1985:6). The tools and models used by Marxists
must be discarded and new, more &dquo;scientific&dquo; ones must be adopted. Such
a model or tool is the rational choice model.

Rational Choice Models

A characteristic of AM is the heavy use of rational choice models and

more specifically of game theory or game theoretic models. Rational
choice is one of the oldest traditions in the social sciences, and it is often
traced back to Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. During the last 30 years
rational choice theory has been widely disseminated, and a host of differ-
ent hypotheses, in a variety of social sciences, have been put forward
under its banner (Hechter et al., 1990:2). Still, there are common
elements in all rational choice approaches. These can be summarized as:
1. The preference hypothesis: Individuals act in order to attain
preferred ends.

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86

2. The constraint hypothesis: Constraints and opportunities also

affect actions by influencing the probability that actors’ preferred
ends can be attained. These constraints derive either from resources
under an individual’s control ... or from social institutions to which
the individuals are subject.

3. The utility maximization hypothesis: Subject to extant

constraints, individuals choose the course of action, among those
that are available to them, that realizes to the greatest extent their
most preferred ends (Hechter et al., 1990:3).
These hypotheses underlie all models constructed with rational choice
theory in the social sciences, including AM’s models.
Five different implications follow from these assumptions. First, &dquo;All
kinds of preferences may serve as explanatory variables&dquo; (Hechter et
al.:1990:3). Individuals may have a variety of preferences; they may signify
&dquo;the material benefit received by the actor&dquo; or &dquo;everything in the situa-
tion of value to the actor&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:464). In other words, anything
can be defined as a preference. Second, &dquo;all kinds of constraints and

opportunities may be explanatory variables&dquo; (Hechter et al., 1990:4).

Income, laws, norms, intellectual ability and such all act as constraints or
opportunities.3 Third, &dquo;subjective assessments of constraints are the
direct determinants of action&dquo; (Hechter et al., 1990:4). Thus, individuals
act on the basis of the perceived rewards or punishments and not on the
&dquo;objective probability&dquo; of rewards or punishments. Fourth, &dquo;the relative
contribution of constraints and preferences to the explanation of individ-
ual behavior and social outcomes is principally an empirical, and not a
theoretical, issue&dquo; (Hechter et al., 1990:4). By empirically examining the
subject’s assessment of the constraints, we can discover just what
constraints exist. And fifth, &dquo;individual actors do not calculate their costs
and benefits, but act as if they calculated them&dquo; (Hechter et al., 1990:4).
Rational choice does not outline the processes through which individuals
determine their decisions; rather it assumes that individuals choose the
most rational and advantageous option available (Hechter et al., 1990 :2-
5).
The basic assumptions of this model, as defined by AM, are: &dquo;(1) that
structural constraints do not completely determine the actions taken by
individuals in a society; and (2) that within the feasible set of actions
compatible with all the constraints, individuals choose those they believe
will bring the best results&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:464). These basic premises
provide the foundation for the tool &dquo;par excellence&dquo; of Analytical Marx-
ist methodology: game theory.

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 87

Game Theory
According to game theory, social life involves a number of players or
actors, and proceeds by each choosing a strategy to employ or an action
to adopt. But when choosing a strategy or action, each actor must take
into account those strategies that the other actors may choose. To select
a strategy, the actor &dquo;has to foresee their [the other actor’s] decision,

knowing that they are trying to foresee his&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:464). After all
have selected their strategies, each obtains a reward on the basis of that
choice and the choices of others. Narrowly, this reward &dquo;signifies the
material benefit received by each actor&dquo;; broadly, &dquo;it covers everything in
the situation of value to the actor, including (possibly) the rewards to
other actors&dquo; (1982b:464). Thus, game theory is &dquo;the tool for capturing
three sets of inter-dependencies that pervade social life.... The reward of
each [individual] depends on the choice of all.... The reward of each
depends on the rewards of all.... The choice of each depends on the
choice of all&dquo; (Elster, 1986a:207). However, this claim cannot be made
without explicitly outlining some further aspects of game theory.
First, all actors are seen as rational and each actor knows that the
others are rational. Game theory rests on this &dquo;symmetry assumption&dquo; of
rationality. Without it, game theory, rational choice theory, and method-
ological individualism would come crashing down. AM does not deny the
existence of irrationality; rather, it is just avoided. They do this through a
methodological device in which all individuals are treated as though they
are rational even if they are not.
Another aspect of game theory is the problem of infinite regression. If
all the rational actors act on the bases of what others may be doing, then
it is possible to have a situation where each individual enters a &dquo;I think
that he thinks that I think ... &dquo; loop (Elster, 1982b:465). Game theory
nips this loop in the bud by introducing the concept of equilibrium, or
the &dquo;set of choices that are best-replies to each other&dquo; (Elster, 1986a:207)
-
the &dquo;set of strategies toward which rational actors ... will ...
converge&dquo; (1982b:465). An &dquo;equilibrium point&dquo; is such that &dquo;the strategy
of each actor is optimal vis-a-vis those of the others&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:465)
and is considered a &dquo;solution&dquo; to the game. If only one equilibrium point
exists, then it will automatically emerge; if a number of points are avail-
able, then &dquo;the solution will be the one that is collectively optimal&dquo;
(1982b:465).
This concept of equilibrium allows for the creation of a &dquo;game solu-
tion typology&dquo;; two basic types exist: &dquo;non-cooperative&dquo; and &dquo;coopera-
tive.&dquo; In the non-cooperative case, &dquo;the equilibrium point will emerge
through implicit coordination by rational agents&dquo; (Elster, 1986a:207).
Cooperative solutions are those in which &dquo;agents ... explicitly agree to
coordinate their choices&dquo; (1986a:207). These latter types are of question-
able value to Analytical Marxists, because cooperative solutions are

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88

predicated on the existence of some sort of &dquo;supra-individual&dquo; entity to

enforce the cooperation. Non-cooperative solutions are logically prior to
cooperative ones on the basis of methodological individualism. As Elster
puts it, &dquo;Assuming that the actors will arrive at a cooperative solution is
much like assuming that a functional need will create its own fulfillment&dquo;
(Elster, 1982b:466). Analytical Marxists should avoid using cooperative
models, as they posit pre-existing constraints upon the actors; rather they
should focus on non-cooperative solutions.
However, the use of non-cooperative models proves highly problem-
atic ; social life is predicated upon institutions and norms that provide the
structure or enforcement for cooperative solutions. To avoid this prob-
lem, the non-cooperative model is abstracted. By abstracting social life
into its &dquo;pure&dquo; non-cooperative typology, it allows AM to remain true to
the maxim that no explanation will be made above the level of the indi-
vidual. This is not seen as problematic; in fact, this abstraction - and the
concomitant move from the empirical world - is seen as the strength of
game theory. It is seen as very useful for &dquo;illuminating the nature of social
interaction and in creating more discriminating categories of sociological
analysis&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:477). At some point, the argument goes, this
level of abstraction will be passed by, and &dquo;Game Theory will increasingly
help us to understand social and historical problems&dquo; (Elster, 1982b:477).
Game theory will become grounded in the empirical world.
The proof of such claims must lie in the application of this methodol-
ogy. Or, to borrow a saying, the proof is in the pudding. Or better yet, the
proof is in the praxis, and what better place to start than an analysis of
&dquo;applied methodology&dquo; in the work of the &dquo;founding father&dquo; of AM, John
Roemer.

Exploitation and Class Formation

Probably the most hailed work in AM is that of John Roemer on
exploitation and social class. Roemer’s approach has been characterized
as &dquo;generating class relations and the capital relationship from exchanges
between differently endowed individuals in a competitive setting&dquo; (Elster,
1985:7). These works employ a game theoretic model and methodological
individualism in the construction of a new theory of exploitation.
But why a new theory of exploitation? Roemer disputes the worth of
traditional Marxist conceptions or definitions. He argues that Marx’s
conception of exploitation in the Labor Theory of Value is contrived,
historically inadequate, and theoretically unsound. In the first case,
Roemer argues, Marx was confronted by the transition from feudal soci-
ety - &dquo;characterized by bondage and ... corvee and demense labor&dquo;
(Roemer, 1986b:81) - that had a coercive institution of labor exchange,
to one under capitalist production that has a non-coercive system of
extraction. In Roemer’s (1986b:82) words, &dquo;[t]he riddle for Marx was how

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 89

to explain the systematic expropriation of surplus product (beyond

subsistence requirements of the workers) by one class, that is by one side
of the market, when the institution for labor exchange is not coercive.&dquo;
To answer this riddle, Roemer argues, Marx constructs the Labor Theory
of Value. This explains how exploitation occurs in capitalism and is seen
as providing the foundation for a general theory of exploitation. Thus
Roemer (1982b:281) sees that
Marxian exploitation is defined as the expropriation of surplus
labor, where the definition of surplus labor depends on the labor
theory of value. Surplus labor is the excess of time labored by the
worker over the amount of labor embodied in the bundle of goods
the worker consumes, under the assumption that his entire wage is
spent on that bundle. Thus, exploitation is said to exist because the
amount of dead labor the worker can command through purchasing
commodities with his income is less than the amount of labor he
expends in production. If A is an exploited agent, then another
agent B is said to exploit A if the surplus labor performed by A is
embodied in goods which B appropriates.

But, according to Roemer (1986b:81-83), this is a contrived tool for

explaining exploitation in capitalism and is not based on the micro-foun-

dations of society. Therefore, this explanation is inadequate for general-
izing to non-capitalist societies as well as for use in analyzing capitalist
societies.
Roemer shows this to be true by demonstrating the historical inade-
quacy of this theory through an application of it to &dquo;socialism.&dquo; Accord-
ing to Marx, there should be no exploitation in socialism; but is this the
case? Roemer (1982a:3) answers &dquo;no&dquo; and notes that &dquo;[t]he general
expectation of Marxists had been that the annihilation of an economic
system based on private ownership of the means of production would
bring about a society which would be an unqualified improvement over
capitalism.&dquo; The elimination of private ownership of the means of
production should eliminate exploitation, but this is not the case. Marx’s
theory of exploitation is historically inadequate and therefore must be
fundamentally flawed.
That flaw, Roemer argues, lies in the very use of the Labor Theory of
Value for identifying exploitation. Roemer (1982b:282) asks why expro-
priation of surplus labor should be seen as exploitative:
The neoclassical economist, and bourgeois thinker more generally,
will object that the worker who owns no means of production
himself is trading his labor power for access to the means of
production owned by another. Both gain from the trade ... the
trade of labor power for access to capital or entrepreneurial skill is
a quid pro quo, and should therefore not be viewed as exploitative.

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 90

How can a Marxist reply to such an objection with only the surplus
value concept of exploitation? According to Roemer, she or he cannot. A
Marxist must fall back on the claim &dquo;that the ownership of capital by the
capitalist is unjust in the first place&dquo; (1982b:282). This is an unacceptable
situation for a rigorous scientist such as Roemer because &dquo;[flrom the
formal point of view ... invoking aspects of property relations is ad hoc if
one adheres to the labor-theory-of-value definition of exploitation: if

property relations must be invoked, they should either be built into the
definition or implied by it&dquo; (Roemer, 1982a:282-283). This perceived
inadequacy of the Labor Theory of Value makes it necessary to develop a
new theory of exploitation.
This theory must not be based in the Labor Theory of Value, instead
the locus of exploitation lies in property relations, or the distribution of
assets or endowments. The approach being taken here is

an attempt identify the &dquo;key moment&dquo; in class exploitation by

to
taking [the] point of departure nothing more than individuals
as

possessed of different endowments and showing how unequal

distribution of the relevant assets necessarily produces unfair
results ... without a direct transfer of labour from exploiter to
exploited (Wood, 1989:45).
But just what constitutes exploitation under such a definition? As
Roemer (1986b:102) notes, &dquo;In virtually every society or economy, there
is inequality. Yet not all inequality is viewed by a society as exploitative,
or unjust.&dquo; For example, in the past, slavery was not seen as exploitation
nor was the peasantry seen as exploited; today many do not see the

relationship between proletariat and capitalist as exploitative. Exploita-

tion occurs when one &dquo;coalition&dquo; or &dquo;agent&dquo; would be seen as &dquo;better off’
under a different system of property relations. Therefore:

[Wlhen one says that A is exploiting B one is conceiving of an

...

alternative arrangement of some sort under which A would be worse

off and B better off than at present. The alternative arrangement
embodies one’s notion of what is ethically preferable and nonex-
ploitative : and so, if A is better off and B worse off than in the ethi-
cally preferable alternative, that constitutes exploitation (Roemer,
1982b:285).
Exploitation occurs when one conceives of an alternative, more &dquo;ethical&dquo;
distribution of the original endowments of property.
This can be formally defined by specifying the &dquo;game&dquo; played by the
coalitions or agents in the economy. The &dquo;game&dquo; is designated by the
different specifications of initial property relations and &dquo;what any partic-
ular coalition can achieve on its own if it withdraws from the economy&dquo;
(Roemer, 1986b:103) if it takes with it the original property endowments.
This is formalized by identifying the &dquo;core of a game.&dquo; The core &dquo;is that

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 91

set of income distributions for which no coalition is exploited&dquo;

(1986b:103) - a situation in which no coalition would benefit by with-
drawing from the game and all benefit by participating in that particular
arrangement. It is the equilibrium point or solution to the game. Under
such a situation, exploitation cannot be said to exist. To identify exploita-
tion, a set of &dquo;withdrawal rules&dquo; must be specified in each game. If a
coalition can do better by withdrawing from the game, then that coalition
is considered exploited; the coalition would be better off under an alter-
native arrangement. Using such a model it becomes possible to differen-
tiate between feudal, capitalist, and socialist exploitation by changing the
various &dquo;cores&dquo; and &dquo;withdrawal rule&dquo; specifications, an impossible task
using the surplus labor theory. Stated in Roemer’s formal terms:
(1) If S were to withdraw from the society, endowed with its per
capita share of society’s alienable property (that is, produced and
nonproduced goods), and with its own labor and skills, then S
would be worse off (in terms of income and leisure) than it is at the
present allocation;
(2) If S’ were to withdraw under the same conditions, then S’
would be worse off (in terms of income and leisure) than it is at
present;
(3) If S were to withdraw from society with its own endowments
(not its per capita share), then S’ would be worse off than at
present (Roemer, 1982b:285).4
Under this definition, S is the exploited and S’ is the exploiter.
To prove this new theory of exploitation - and to initially construct it
-

Roemer presents a number of different models based upon different

&dquo;types&dquo; of economies. Using his models, Roemer demonstrates that the
Marxian theory is incapable of adequately identifying exploitation, while
his new theory is successful. In particular, Roemer identifies two funda-
mental problems with utilizing the Marxist theory: 1) Surplus labor
extraction can occur without exploitation; and, 2) Exploitation can occur
without surplus labor extraction. Given these failures of the Marxist
perspective and the success of the Roemerian one, Roemer (1982b:311)
generalizes his findings as follows:
[I]t is distribution of the means of production which is the cause of
exploitation ... Indeed, the same relations of production, of one
agent hiring another and earning profits from his labor, can be
either exploitative or not, depending on the underlying distribution
of productive assets ... It is even possible to generate exploitation
with no relationship in production between producers. Exploitation
can be mediated entirely through the trade of produced goods.

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The focus onexploitation by Marxists must be abandoned; the impor-

tant factor is the inequality in the distribution of endowments. As Roe-
mer (1986d:274-275) argues, &dquo;exploitation theory, in the general case, is
misconceived ... the proper Marxian claim, I think, is for equality in the
distribution of productive assets, not for the elimination of exploitation.&dquo;
So in response to the question, &dquo;Should Marxists be interested in
exploitation?,&dquo; Roemer answers that &dquo;exploitation is a domicile that we
need no longer maintain: it has provided a home for raising a vigorous
family, who now must move on&dquo; (1986d:262). The new domicile must
view exploitation as &dquo;an injustice in the distribution of income resulting
from a distribution of endowments which is unjust&dquo; (Roemer, 1986c:199).
Exploitation is simply inequality and is dispensable.
Class Formation

Given this new AM view, what implications are there for understand-

ing the formation of classes? AM identifies a problem with the Marxist

ideas on class formation; class is treated as a given from which to begin
the analysis (Przeworski, 1985b:97). What is needed is a view grounded in
rational choice theory, where &dquo;individuals face choices, and one choice
might be to become a worker&dquo; (1985b:96). Class becomes &dquo;dependent
upon a ’structure of choices,’ [and] not simply a reflex of production rela-
tions alone&dquo; (Wood, 1989:51). To understand the Analytical Marxist
position on this question, class must be broken into two stages: assets or
initial property endowments and rational choice. The initial endowments
provide the rational individual with the framework to rationally choose a
class position.
As an example, Przeworski (1982, 1985b) develops a &dquo;Mrs. Jones.&dquo;
Mrs. Jones is a worker but why is she a worker? She has a variety of
options available to her. &dquo;After all, she owns land, which she can perhaps
sell; she is married to a machinist, who can perhaps work overtime; and
she has, or will have, an accountant son, who might help her set up a
resale shop&dquo; (Przeworski, 1985b:97). So, why a worker? Because given
these initial property endowments, her consumption patterns, and pref-
erence for labor time, it is the best choice; it is the optimizing strategy or
fulfills the utility maximization hypothesis. Mrs. Jones is a worker
because, given her property endowments, it is the most rational option.
This can be generalized to form Roemer’s Class Exploitation Correspon-
dence Principle; basically, those with low endowments will choose to sell
their labor and become exploited while those with high endowments will
choose to hire labor and thus be exploiters.
So, like Marx, class is tied to the analysis of exploitation, but given the
differences in definitions of exploitation, what does this mean for AM’s
model of class struggle? What type of class structure will be conceptual-
ized by AM? Wright takes this definition of exploitation and builds a

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 93

class structure model. This model is, of course, based on the view that
property relations define classes; class structure &dquo;constitutes the basic
mechanism for distributing access to resources in a society&dquo; (Wright,
1985:28). Classes are thus divided into &dquo;distributional groups (defined in
terms of the distribution of assets)&dquo; and include the bourgeoisie, the
small employers, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. The first
three have access to the means of production in some way or another.
The proletariat, which has no access to the means of production, is
further broken down into eight subdivisions on the basis of ownership of
other assets such as skill and organization. These include the expert
managers, expert supervisors, expert nonmanagers, semicredentialed
managers, semicredentialed supervisors, semicredentialed workers,
uncredentialed managers, and uncredentialed supervisors. Wright
provides a model for the rational choice of actors with unequal property
endowments; it shows the most rational choice for an individual with a
certain initial endowment.

The Transition to Socialism

Marxism is not a theory that is primarily concerned with just under-

standing society; it is also concerned with the transformation of society.
But what of AM? Is socialism understood in a similar manner? Socialism
is presented as an ethical ideal, an alternative arrangement that is ethi-
cally and morally just in comparison with capitalism. This is the logical
conclusion of the Analytical Marxist view of class and exploitation. Indi-
viduals rationally choose class, so socialism, too, must be a rational
choice. The question this raises is when will socialism be chosen or
&dquo;under what conditions would anyone living under a particular organiza-
tion of society rationally opt for an alternative&dquo; (Przeworski, 1982:289).
This has already been defined by Roemer as the withdrawal rule; the
transition to socialism is predicated upon the working class being better
off under an alternative arrangement. But is socialism a necessarily better
arrangement? Socialism may not be in the rational interest of the work-
ing class because the material benefits may be dwarfed by the cost of the
transition from one regime to another (at least within a certain specific
time frame such as a generation). We also have, according to Przeworski
(1986:188), &dquo;every reason to expect that capitalism will continue to offer
an opportunity to improve material conditions ... while conditions for
socialism continue to rot. This is why dreams of a utopia cannot be a
substitute for the struggle to make capitalism more efficient and more
humane.&dquo; Socialism is an unfeasible and irrational strategy. Instead of
advocating a transition to socialism, the political strategy of Marxists
should be one of reform politics, in the tradition of the social democratic
compromise, a compromise that &dquo;allows capitalists to retain a certain
portion of profits in return for an agreement that they will invest another

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94

portion for the continued improvement of working-class welfare&dquo;

(Roemer, 1986a:5). Concern should be oriented around reforming capi-
talism because, as Przeworski (1986:188) argues: &dquo;Poverty and oppression
are here, and they will not be alleviated by the possibility of a better
future. The struggle for improving capitalism is as essential as ever
before. But we should not confuse this struggle with the quest for social-
ism&dquo; (emphasis added). Revolution should not be a concern of Marxist
analysis.

Critique of Analytical Marxism

As a perspective, AM offers a &dquo;new&dquo; methodology in methodological
individualism and rational choice models and a new framework in game
theory, all of which are intended to provide an understanding of the
micro-foundations of social behavior. AM provides a new analysis of
exploitation and class based
its methodology, an analysis that claims
on
to correct the failures of the traditional Marxist analysis and furnish a
more powerful tool for understanding exploitation and class. Lastly, with
these new analyses in hand, AM does away with the traditional Marxist
notion of the transition from capitalism to socialism and offers one based
upon its method and analysis of exploitation and class. But, one must ask,
is the perspective offered by AM a sound one and are the analyses devel-
oped using this framework sound?

Methodological Critique
A number of criticisms of the AM methodology exist and Analytical
Marxists, themselves, identify three common critiques of their method:
&dquo;First, rational choice theory takes the desires and preferences of the
agents as given.... Secondly, rational-choice models of behavior do not
yield uniquely determined predictions in all cases.... Thirdly, people do
not always behave rationally&dquo; (Elster, 1986a:209). In the first case,
Analytical Marxists want to outline how desires and preferences are
constructed, but they have not provided any theory of preference forma-
tion. Instead AM simply assumes that desires and preferences exist and
that individuals act on the bases of these preferences. When criticized for
the lack of such a theory, Analytical Marxists do not deny the importance
and even the necessity of such a theory, but they do claim that this
critique is unimportant, particularly since &dquo;neither Marxism nor any
other social theory has gone very far towards a theory of endogenous
preference formation&dquo; (Elster, 1986a:209). The desire to have an even
deeper reductionist explanation does not invalidate their research and
analysis &dquo;at a less fundamental level&dquo; (Elster, 1986a:209).
The second criticism is blunted by stating that &dquo;rational-choice expla-
nation needs in general a supplement of causal explanation&dquo; (Elster,

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 95

1986a:209). Not all games have non-cooperative solutions or a rational

basis for choosing a strategy. A larger scale explanation of causality is
necessary in these cases; again micro-foundations are no longer sufficient
for explanation. Finally, the critique of irrationality is written off for the
methodological reasons discussed above. According to AM, one cannot
study people unless &dquo;one assumes that they are by and large rational&dquo;
(Elster, 1986a:210). .

The methodology itself contains some rather obvious contradictions.

Analytical Marxists claim they search for the micro-foundations of social
life, but then assume desires and preferences simply &dquo;exist.&dquo; Criticism of
this argument only leads to their claim that no one has a good &dquo;theory of
endogenous preference&dquo; and that the search for deeper levels of reduc-
tion should not invalidate their &dquo;analysis at a less fundamental level.&dquo;
Where are the micro-foundations? Nor does this method provide the
causal principles for constraints placed upon the rational actors. AM
appeals to a higher authority for this analysis. Again, where are the
micro-foundations? Furthermore, abstraction and empiricism go hand in
hand for AM. Abstract models are constructed to apply to the empirical
world, but where do these models come from? Apparently not from
empirical observation, because the Analytical Marxists want the original,
non-cooperative model. So we have a model grounded in abstract,
analytical thinking applied to the concrete, real world. Where are the
micro-foundations?
While each of these critiques is valid, each is written off by AM as a
possible weakness of the perspective. The strengths, they claim, far out-
weigh any such weaknesses. An even more thoroughgoing critique lies in
the very conceptions of methodological individualism, rationality, and
abstraction. The focus on individualism, rationality, and abstraction all
pose fundamental problems. First, why the focus on individuals? Why is it
necessary to explain &dquo;aggregate realities&dquo; by a reduction to the individ-
ual ? Is it even possible? As Levine (1986:724-725) argues, such a reduc-
tion may not be appropriate because

Islocieties are collections of individuals, just as individuals are

collections of cells; and social phenomena are effects of individuals’
actions in much the way that individuals’ actions are the effects of
the behaviors of the cells that compose individuals. It is clear,
however, at least for individuals’ actions, that ontological reducibil-
ity (decomposability without remainder) does not entail explana-
tory reducibility. The best explanation for individuals’ actions need
not make essential reference to behavior at the cellular level.
World War II was, in the sense in question, just an aggregation
of subatomic particles in motion. But knowing all there is to know
about these subatomic particles would not help us, in all likelihood,
in knowing, say, the causes of World War II.

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 96

A reduction to the individual level will, in many cases, actually reduce the
level of understanding of social phenomena. For example, the compara-
tive historical method

based upon comparisons of societies in which some phenomenon

occurs with societies otherwise very similar in which it is absent,

provides information on causes independently of whether it is

supplemented by the investigation of individual actions ... would
be more involved and less elegant if reformulated in accordance
with methodological individualism (Howard and King, 1989:406).
The same holds true when examining economic phenomena. There
exist structures or requirements for the functioning of a particular econ-
omy and its reproduction, and these can be studied to discover what is
happening in the economy without the &dquo;need to investigate the behavior
or motivation of individuals&dquo; (Howard and King, 1989:406).
Furthermore, if we were to take methodological individualism to its
reductionist conclusion, then we would have to assume that &dquo;all social
theory ... must be considered ’second best’ status, to be improved only by
absorption into the biological sciences&dquo; (Howard and King, 1989:405).
Such sciences are not appropriate for understanding the questions of
social life.
Nor is individualism itself a universal trait; rather, it arose as a conse-
quence of capitalist society. But AM, like the &dquo;prophets of the eighteenth
century,&dquo; see the individual &dquo;not as an historical result, but as a starting
point of history; not as something evolving in the course of history, but
posited by nature, because for them this individual was in conformity with
nature, in keeping with their idea of human nature&dquo; (Marx, 1970b:188).
But how can a focus on individual behavior account for the rise of those
institutions that actually fostered the development of individualism? As
Kieve (1986:567) has argued:

[F]ocusing on individual behavior under the conditions of free-

market relations and exchange cannot account for the development
of the institutions of bourgeois production, based on inequality,
exploitation, and domination and subordination: the premises of a
free-market exchange system based on individual rational-choice
behavior can only lead to the reproduction of those very premises
(emphasis added).
The emphasis on individualism may be misplaced and may actually
prevent one from posing important questions about structure or organi-
zation.
The same claim can be made of rationality. What is rational? Ratio-
nality is defined only by the historical conditions present. Rationality in a
capitalist society - self-interest, greed, inequality - would not be consid-
ered rational in a feudal or socialist society. AM overlooks the changing

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 97

nature of ideas and their social construction. Thus &dquo;rational-choice

modeling is incapable of adequately describing or explaining the actions
of different groups or individuals who do not share the same Weltan-
schauung or who have different conceptions of what counts as rational
behavior&dquo; (Kieve, 1986:568). The only way behavior can be viewed, using
a rational choice model, is through the eyes of the viewer.
And what about the &dquo;unabashed commitment&dquo; to abstraction? This
further removes such a methodology from the &dquo;real world.&dquo; Real social
processes are simplified - i.e., abstracted to fit the proper method and
then the conclusions of the &dquo;empirical study&dquo; are applied to the real
world.
What does this say about AM’s claims to having established a method-
ology that provides the microfoundations for all society? Very little; AM
has only provided the micro-foundations for an abstracted and biased
world. Their claims to science and empiricism have actually removed
them from the realms of science and empirical work; they have adopted
an ideology from which to work. AM cannot challenge these central

concepts or &dquo;assumptions of bourgeois life&dquo; or question their universal-

ity ; in fact, AM must &dquo;avoid questions regarding both the historical
mutability of those sociohistorical values the [capitalist] system seeks to
render absolute as well as the critical need to resist them&dquo; (Bronner,
1990:255). This rigid and uncritical mind-set &dquo;is actually the necessary
prerequisite to make [individuals’] actions comprehensible in game-theo-
retical terms&dquo; (Bronner, 1990:255). The methodology of AM can only
lead to a remaking of Marxist thought that mirrors neo-classical, bour-
geois thought. So despite their claims of a rigorous and scientific method,
the Analytical Marxists have done nothing more than fall into the trap of
uncritically adopting the ideas of the ruling class as well as providing
quite a methodological muddle.
Criticism of Roemer’s Exploitation Theory 5
What do the failures of the Analytical Marxist method mean for the
various analyses that employ it? Or despite the inherent flaws of method-
ological individualism, rational choice models and game theory, does AM
provide us with a practical and useful analysis?
I think not. As Smith (1989) argues, Roemer’s analysis suffers not only
from using a faulty method, but his objections to the Marxist theory of
exploitation - upon which his theory is constructed - are misguided.
Roemer’s claim that Marxist exploitation cannot stand alone completely
misunderstands the notion of &dquo;systematic dialectical theories.&dquo; As Smith
(1989:334) puts it, &dquo;In dialectical theories no category can ever stand
alone; every category receives its meaning only in terms of its systematic
place within the theory as a whole.&dquo; Exploitation for Marx does not occur
apart from a structure wherein the distribution of productive resources is

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98

presupposed. When viewing exploitation from this perspective it is

placed in a system (under capitalist production) where the laborer
controls none of the productive forces. The laborer exists in a situation
where he/she has no choice but to &dquo;dispose of his labour-power as his
own commodity ... he has no other commodity for sale, is short of every-

thing necessary for the realization of his labour-power&dquo; (Marx,

1970a:169). A structure of the distribution of endowments has been
posited explicitly or dialectically sublated - by Marx (Smith, 1989;
-

Kieve, 1986).
The second objection raised by Roemer also misses the mark. When
he argues that a non-exploitative situation is deemed exploitative by a
Marxist definition, Roemer uses a model based on an egalitarian distribu-
tion of resources. But the Marxist notion is predicated upon an inegali-
tarian distribution; exploitation, for Marx, &dquo;refers to a fundamentally
inegalitarian distribution of production resources&dquo; (Smith, 1989:336).
Part of the problem for Roemer appears to be a confusion over Marx’s
meaning of the term exploitation. A technical or primary definition of
economic exploitation can be differentiated from secondary exploitation
or unfair treatment. Primary exploitation exists

when a class or category of nonproducers is able to appropriate

systematically all or part of the product of those who perform the
actual labor. Under this conception, [not] all forms of social
oppression constitute economic exploitation in themselves. Rather,
exploitation depends on specific relations of production, those in
which nonproducers can effectively control access of direct produc-
ers to some or all of the means of production (Littlefield, 1978 :495-
496).
The model presented by Roemer to justify his objection does not fit this
definition of exploitation and therefore is singularly inapplicable to the
Marxist concept of exploitation.
Roemer is again inaccurate in regarding Marxist exploitation as
unable to deal with a situation in which no surplus labor is extracted but
exploitation occurs. A &dquo;credit market model&dquo; is used to justify this. Marx
was fully aware that there could be exploitation - in a broad sense of the
term - through a credit market, but this form of exploitation was not
(and is not) the primary form of exploitation within a capitalist society.
As (Marx, 1978:609) notes:
It is still more irrelevant to drag the lending of houses ... into this
discussion. That the working class is also swindled in this form, and
to an enormous extent, is self-evident; but ... this is secondary
exploitation, which runs parallel to the primary exploitation process
taking place in the production process itself.

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 99

The focus by Marx on surplus value is not because it is the only possi-
ble form of exploitation, but because of the uniqueness, pervasiveness,
and centrality, of this form of appropriation within capitalism (Smith,
1989:336-337).
Finally, exploitation in the Marxist sense involves &dquo;labor power as a
commodity&dquo; within a structure where one coalition does not have access
to the means of production. This means that individuals within this coali-
tion are forced to sell their labor power to survive. The model
constructed by Roemer to show that the notion of exploitation is
dispensable is not predicated upon this specification. In Roemer’s
models, a coalition may be poor but still maintains control over a suffi-
cient amount of productive resources to insure subsistence. Smith
(1989:339) provides an excellent example:
Imagine a relatively large capitalist firm whose extremely rich
managers have purchased it through a leveraged buyout. Investors
possessing relatively small amounts of capital then purchase shares
in the firm. Assume further that the managers are hard working
while the investors are coupon clippers, able to live off the divi-
dends sent to them. In Roemer’s sense of the term the (capitalist)
investors therefore &dquo;exploit&dquo; the (capitalist) managers.

This, in no way, is the sense of exploitation presented by Marx.

Exploitation does not involve inequalities among the capitalist class or
even the working class. Rather, as Smith (1989:339) notes, exploitation is
a term to describe the relation between these two classes: &dquo;It is not any
old inequality in the distribution of productive resources that concerned
Marx, but inequalities that define intcr-class relations. And it was not any
old transfers of surplus labor that interested Marx, but transfers that
define inter-class relations.&dquo; Roemer’s construction of a new theory of
exploitation based upon the alleged failures of the traditional Marxist
theory is predicated upon fallacious objections.
But this is not the only flaw in the development of this new theory.
The constructions of Roemer’s models, Kieve (1986) argues, are funda-
mentally flawed. In his first models, Roemer claims to have constructed a
&dquo;pre-capitalist subsistence&dquo; model, but these models function &dquo;on the
basis of exchange value, a fully monetarized commodity-producing
exchange economy, [and] necessary surplus labor time&dquo; (Kieve,
1986:561). The models are constructed on all the conditions necessary for
capitalism. Roemer then removes any troublesome aspects like surplus
value, surplus labor, capitalist class relations, and accumulation (Kieve,
1986:561) to come to his conclusions. It is &dquo;No wonder ... Roemer is
able to make the ’startling’ and ’heretical’ discovery that ... exploitation
can be derived independently of the labor theory of value!&dquo; (Kieve,

1986:561). The abstract methodology of AM has provided an erroneous

conclusion.6

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 100

A further methodological problem is found in Roemer’s approach.

Exploitation canonly be defined in terms outside the structure of the
given society: &dquo;This is inherent in the very nature of the game-theoretic
model, because its premises require the specification and comparison of
alternative procedural rules and the (quantitative) distribution or alloca-
tion of goods (or the tradeoff between wages and leisure)&dquo; (Kieve,
1986:563-564). Exploitation is removed from &dquo;an historically specific and
qualitative condition&dquo; found in the very nature of a society and placed
into a situation where it &dquo;can only be defined from outside its specific
social parameters&dquo; (Kieve, 1986:564). The fault of this approach is easily
demonstrated by applying the method. For example, if we construct a
game that is feudal in nature, the withdrawal rules are such that

&dquo;nonexploitative allocations are the private-ownership&dquo; found in a free

exchange market. The feudal serf is exploited because of feudal bondage.
By withdrawing from the game, the serf would take with him or her both
labor and land; the serf would be better off (less labor time worked) and
the feudal lord worse off. However, such a withdrawal is only hypotheti-
cally possible. This withdrawal entails that the serf knows she or he will
be better off under a different system and has the wherewithal to estab-
lish this new system, a rather bizarre imagery of historical process. But
this is the imagery that must follow from the basic premise of rational
choice and game theory. Remember, &dquo;all social phenomena - their struc-
ture and their change - are in principle explicable in ways that only
involve individuals - their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their
actions&dquo; (Elster, 1985:5) and &dquo;within the feasible set of actions ...
individuals choose those they believe will bring the best results&dquo; (Elster,
1982b:464). The serf must know what capitalism is and then rationally
choose it as an alternative arrangement. In this way, exploitation is
removed from the &dquo;concrete conditions&dquo; by AM and redefined to fit &dquo;the
premises of deductive rational choice analysis&dquo; at the cost of having no
grounding in &dquo;concrete social reality&dquo; (Kieve, 1986:564).
So what we have with Roemer’s analysis of exploitation is an analysis
constructed upon the basis of erroneous objections to the traditional
Marxist analysis.7 But, while Roemer’s objections fail to hold water when
examined, even more condemning to this analysis is its usage of game
theory and its high level of abstraction. Both remove the analysis from
any real relations between people that may or may not be exploitative. In
Roemer’s artificial, yet &dquo;scientific,&dquo; world there exists &dquo;an omniscient,
rational ’economic man.’ How is the evolution and origin of such a
calculating being to be explained? It is Marxism sans history, sans institu-
tions, sans humans, sans tears&dquo; (Hodgson, 1989:436). Roemer’s analysis
of exploitation is itself contrived, historically inadequate, and theoreti-
cally unsound.

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 101

Criticism of Class Model 8

Given the faults of Analytical Marxist method and analysis of exploita-
tion, one might immediately consider its analysis of class to be flawed as
well. Such a conclusion would not be in error. AM’s analysis of class is
highly problematic. The claim that classes are chosen is preposterous.
How is choice itself structured? As Wood (1989:50) points out,
there is little in the model itself for the social construction of
room

choice, for the many ways in which individual choices are structured
not only by the social conditions of self-preservation and self-
reproduction, by the determinate range of viable options made
available within any system of social relations, but also by the
complex mechanisms which operate to reproduce the system itself,
including its cultural and ideological supports and their effects in
the shaping of preferences.
AM is based upon determining the choices made by individuals, but there
is no discussion of how those choices are made possible.
Taking this point further, AM is unable or unwilling to address the
fact that their
model must begin anew with every isolated individual. It cannot
accommodate the simple proposition that choices made available to
any single individual, or to a limited number, may not be available
to all, even with relevant preferences and the necessary &dquo;assets,&dquo; as
the &dquo;choice&dquo; of any particular &dquo;optimizing strategy&dquo; by some indi-
viduals may make it less readily available to others or less economi-
cally viable in a competitive market (Wood, 1989:50).
An &dquo;equilibrium point&dquo; may not exist (especially if different agents have
different levels of &dquo;power&dquo; or ability to enforce their choice). Focusing
upon abstracted and isolated individuals prevents AM from noticing the
possibility that &dquo;the appropriation of surplus constitutes the very basis
for renewed exploitation because it reinforces the control of the
exploiters and the dependence of the exploited&dquo; (Littlefield, 1978:496).
Neither the social relations involved with class nor their effect upon
choice can be understood with the model presented by AM. Class is
treated as a place or space which can be occupied by the freely choosing
individual.
Where are the micro-foundations for class? AM cannot provide an
explanation for why individuals choose a certain class - beyond the claim
that it is the most rational choice - nor can it provide an understanding
of the interplay between classes. This results from its focus on abstract
individuals and abstract situations in the name of rigor and science. This
fault, self-critiqued by Przeworski, is &dquo;the idea that society is a collection
of undifferentiated and unrelated individuals&dquo; (1985a:393). AM’s analysis

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102

of class &dquo;has no basis for existence and there’s no point of entry ... [it]
never describes or analyzes the concrete relations in which real individu-
als are embedded&dquo; (Burawoy, 1987:80). Without a grounding in the
concrete relations between individuals, AM is doomed to failure, no
matter how sophisticated and formal its models.
Consider once again Przeworski’s Mrs. Jones. Is she a typical worker in
the real world? Do workers own land, have another individual who can
support them, or have the ability (both in capital and knowledge) to start
a business? Even the most simple empirical study would lead one to
answer no. So why is this done by Analytical Marxists? Because their
model demands it; the dice have been loaded because &dquo;the whole model
depends upon the analytic centrality of exceptional cases&dquo; (Wood,
1989:52). Any and all imaginable possibilities are, &dquo;no matter how excep-
tional... given the analytic weight of choices available to all individuals&dquo;
(Wood, 1989:52). Not only does the privileged Mrs. Jones choose her
class position, but the whole model of class formation &dquo;is constructed on
the assumptions of this privileged condition&dquo; (Wood, 1989:52).
This model also assumes that alternative means of survival are avail-
able. But again the availability of such options is largely determined by
the &dquo;dominant conditions of ... production in any given class regime&dquo;
(Wood, 1989:55). The options - such as &dquo;begging, street-vending, busk-
ing, living on welfare, relying on family support, or even leaving the
working class to become self-employed&dquo; - are grounded in the class rela-
tions of the given society, since &dquo;the welfare system and unemployment
benefits in a capitalist system are determined by the logic of capitalist
exploitation&dquo; (Wood, 1989:55). By positing class as an individual choice,
AM cannot account for the development of available choices. &dquo;Choice
availability&dquo; is predicated upon the class structure.
Where does this leave the model of class structure constructed by
Wright? In the realm of conventional class theory. The focus on individ-
ual choice and distributional assets removes the collective and qualitative
aspects found in Marxist class models. Class becomes equated with
income differentials and occupational groups. Class becomes a quantita-
tive gradient of wealth and prestige. Wright has presented a model of
class that cannot be differentiated from conventional stratification theo-
ries (see Meiksins, 1986 and 1989; Carchedi, 1989; and Kamolnick, 1988).

Criticism of Socialist Transition

With all these faults of the Analytical Marxist perspective, it should
not be surprising that its analysis of the transition to socialism is also
impaired. AM’s conception of socialism has one very important and
fundamental flaw. By positing socialism as an ethical and rational choice,
AM has basically made the claim that we must &dquo;overthrow bourgeois
society by means of bourgeois values&dquo; (Kieve, 1986:575). &dquo;Ethical&dquo; and

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 103

&dquo;rational&dquo; are defined by bourgeois society - and AM is unable to

examine the origins of rationality - thus the socialism of AM can only
reflect bourgeois society. Socialism becomes only a quantitative change -
a more fair and just (or &dquo;kinder and gentler&dquo;) capitalism - and not a

qualitative restructuring of society. Analytical Marxists can make no

other claim because &dquo;to do so would involve denying the very premises
upon which rational choice theory is based, i.e., the capitalist market
itself (Kieve, 1986:575). Under such conditions it is no surprise that,
when examining the rationality of workers choosing socialism, &dquo;one
would find oneself in the position of being faced with a structurally, logi-
cally, and ’rationally’ predetermined choice in favor of capitalism and
against socialism&dquo; (Kieve, 1986:575). A rational choice analysis examines
the &dquo;attitudes, values, norms, preferences of specific individuals,&dquo; but
these are not the source of the contradictions in a capitalistic society. The
source of the contradictions lies in the very structure of the productive

process and the social relations of the society. These cannot be reduced
to isolated individuals -

nor can these be accounted for by AM.

AM has severed any possibility for a transition from an unethical and
unjust capitalism to an ethical and just socialism. AM is incapable of
offering the possibility for a qualitatively different socialist society; in
fact, AM is incapable of offering any alternative to a capitalist society.
The revolutionary practice of Marxist theory has been cast aside for a
reformist solution.

Conclusion

Analytical Marxism promises much: the micro-foundations for the

traditional concepts of Marxism, the tools with which we can discover
these foundations, and a more systematic and scientific conceptualization
of Marxist concepts. All in all, AM promises us a better and brighter
Marxism. But in all of these promises it fails us. Methodological individ-
ualism presents no micro-foundations for class or exploitation besides
those of an abstract, biased, and inapplicable nature. The tools of
methodological individualism provide no great insights to the questions
posed by Marxism and only serve to mystify the issues. The work on
exploitation and class offers no new, systematic conceptualizations;
instead, it gives us conventional, bourgeois ideology under the guise of
Marxist theory. In fact, the whole of AM seems little more than a justifi-
cation for a capitalist society. As Kieve (1986:577) argues:
All itsmajor concepts as well as its premises concerning the nature
and structure of society, are derived from, determined by, and
reflect the sphere of exchange relations, or the market ... any
theory or method that grounds itself in that sphere can provide
nothing more than a descriptive reflection of such one-sided and,

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 104

therefore, distorted social relations. This leaves us with a theory or

explanation of society that is equally ideological and distorted.

AM is not Marxism because it not only reflects (and reifies) bourgeois
society, but it also removes any semblance of revolutionary change. This
&dquo;revolutionary objective is what above all distinguishes Marxism from
other conceptions of social transformation and without it there is no
Marxism&dquo; (Wood, 1986:12). In fact, given its reformist approach, AM
would be best described as anti-Marxist.9 Yet, this lack of revolutionary
objective appears to be its very appeal to those in academia; perhaps this
&dquo;approach makes it possible to evade crucial questions concerning ethical
judgement and the character of socialist aims in a period plagued by post-
structuralist relativism and an overwhelming conservative reaction&dquo;
(Bronner, 1990:245). AM, in the final analysis, offers neither critical
insight into our society nor opportunities for transforming it. The aim of
AM seems to be merely &dquo;more elegant taxonomies and more elegant
agendas&dquo; for those &dquo;who feel they must publish books and articles in
respectable places&dquo; (Anderson and Thompson, 1988:228). Analytical
Marxism is nothing more than a politically safe race for respectability and
a retreat from class.
But given the predominance of Analytical Marxism in the field, what
does this say about the future of Marxism? If the most dominant school
of Marxism is anti-Marxist, what can we say about the general state of
Marxism? Are we witnessing the &dquo;liberation of Marxism&dquo; or is Marxism
being relegated to the dustbin of history? Considering the strength of
capital today and the weakness or even absence of an organized left in the
western world, the opening of new markets in Eastern Europe, and the
predominance of conservative ideology, Marxism has come upon hard
times. But signing its death warrant would be premature. Marxism is part
and parcel of capitalism; it was born as a result of capitalism and will only
die with the death of capitalism. Marxism &dquo;will remain, we can be sure of
that ... its promises will live on as long as there is capitalism. Capitalism
continually generates problems for which it has no solutions. So, the
death ... of Marxism comes only with the death of capitalism&dquo; (Burawoy,
1990:19).
Notes

1. Initially AM developed as an attempt to revitalize the Marxist tradition and rid it of

what was seen as "a range of methodological and metatheoretical commitments that seri-
ously undermined its explanatory potential" (Wright, 1989:37). With such a broad purpose
"[t]he substantive concerns of this collection of people are quite wide ranging — including
issues such as class structure, the theory of history, the problem of ideology, normative
political theory, basic concepts of Marxian economics, social democracy and electoral poli-
tics, economic crises, trade unions, and the state. Theoretically, there is considerable inter-
nal disagreement over virtually all issues within this group" (Wright, 1989:38).
2. In fact, some have suggested (Amariglio et al., 1989) that the claims to analytical rigor
and science made by AM are actually an attempt to "camouflage the retreat from Marxian

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 105

theory" that AM represents, and to "play on the cultural prejudices and fears regarding a
scientific tradition" (1989:416). One writer in the AM camp actually "anticipates that an
accusation of blasphemy might be raised against him" (1989:416). Such claims, Amariglio et
al. indicate, lead us to think of "the debates which have historically occurred between a
church hierarchy, representing the forces of ignorance and ’faith,’ and the spokespersons for
various scientific breakthroughs (e.g., Galileo), representing the forces of knowledge, ratio-
nality, and so forth" (1989:416).
3. This implication, of course, smacks of a "blame the victim" orientation. By placing the
source of constraints and opportunities at the individual level, the individual is made fully

responsible for his or her own predicament and social organization is absolved of any blame.
As Kieve notes, "where choice is exclusively stressed, so, too, must be its correlates respon-
sibility and blame" (1986:567).
4. It should be noted that this "formal conceptualization" of exploitation is that of capi-
talistic exploitation (Roemer, 1982a:285). Although many models constructed by Roemer
are intended to be non-capitalistic, he still applies this definition of exploitation to them.
Furthermore, this third condition has recently been dropped by Roemer as being ad hoc. It
is still used in certain situations to demonstrate that particular cases that fit conditions (1)
and (2), such as invalids, should not be considered as exploiters (Roemer, 1986b:103-104).
5. In this section I draw heavily from the work of Kieve (1986) and Smith (1989).
6. In actuality this conclusion was already contained within the premises of the model.
7. Or perhaps beyond just erroneous objections, as it is not clear that Roemer is
addressing Marx’s argument but, instead, something that sounds vaguely Marxist.
8. This section of criticism is based upon the work of Wood (1989).
9. It should be noted that reform and revolution are not incompatible for Marx, but are
actually two sides of the same coin. However, AM wipes clean one face of the coin
(revolution) while stressing the other (reform).

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