Defence and Security Policy of the Turkish Republic
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
Turkey’s national security policies are determined by the Na-
tional Security Council which is composed of the President
of the Republic, the Government and the commanders of the
Turkish Armed Forces. This composition reveals the role of the
military in politics and policy-making in Turkey. However, the
military is involved not only in policy-making related to security
and defence issues but also the country’s politics in general.
This is due to the fact that military has always played a key role
in Turkish politics, from the very foundation of the Republic, be-
cause its founding cadre was the military elite (Bilgin, 2005).
Later in Turkish history, the military governed the country on
two occasions following the 1960 and 1980 military coups.
This interventionist role of the military is closely related to its
definition of national security and its national security policy.
Bilgin defines the elements of national security in the Republi-
can era as “fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory”
and “geographical determinism” (2005, p. 183). The Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs identifies security as a concept con-
nected with “ensuring the survival of the population; protecting
territorial integrity and preserving the basic identity of a na-
tion”. Furthermore, the Ministry points out Turkey’s geopoliti-
cal location at the junction of the world’s complex and unstable
regions, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus,
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea region. This geographi-
cal position is the main determinant of the national security
and defence policy of the country.
Turkish security and defence policy has historically been one
of regional cooperation, contribution to peace and security in
its region, alliance with international and regional organisa-
tions, and being an element of power and stabilisation in its
region (Turkish General Staff). The regional cooperation initia-
tives include the Balkan Entente of 1934 with Greece, Yugo-
slavia and Romania, the Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and
Afghanistan in 1937, the Balkan Pact of 1954 with Greece
and Yugoslavia, and the Baghdad Pact with Britain, Iran, Iraq
and Pakistan in 1955.
During the Cold War, NATO membership determined the
security and defence policy of Turkey. In this period, Turkey
guarded the southern part of the Alliance against the Warsaw
Pact and took part in NATO missions and operations, which
are outlined below.
The end of the Cold War was a turning point in terms of
security discourse in the world as a whole. This is also the
case for Turkey. Turkey’s security concerns turned into “inter-
nal threats” rather than the “external threats” (Cizre, 2004, p.
108). In 1992, separatism and terrorism were Turkey’s main
security worries while in the National Security Policy Document
of 1997, the internal threats were clearly identified as “re-
gressive Islamism and Kurdish separatism” (Bilgin, 2005).
Another important element of Turkish security and defence
policy is related to the increasing numbers of asylum seekers
and refugees in the world. Turkey functions as a transit country
for many refugees and asylum seekers. Thus, they constitute
a security concern for Turkey as the country bordering the EU.
To ensure the security of the country and of the asylum seek-
ers and refugees, Turkey cooperates with non-governmental
organisations and international agencies such as the UNHCR
(Kirişçi 2001, 2002, cited in Bilgin 2005, p. 179).
In Turkey’s process of accession into the European Union,
the role of the military in Turkish society and politics has been
criticised in the EU reports (Cizre, 2004). It was argued that
the military’s extensive role and intervention in Turkish politics
are major challenges to democratisation in the country. In re-
sponse to the EU reports, some progress has been achieved
by decreasing the military’s power to a certain extent. For
example, the State Security Courts were abolished and the
emergency rule in the south-eastern region of Turkey was abol-
ished. Moreover, defence expenditures in Turkey as a percent-
age of GDP decreased from 3.2 in the 1995-1999 period to
1.8 in the year 2009 (NATO Press Release, 2010). However,
there are still measures that need to be taken according to
the EU analysis of the Turkish political and military system.
TURKEY AND NATO
Turkey joined NATO in 1952, two years after Turkey sent sol-
diers to the Korean War to fight together with the US and
South Korea. Thenceforth, NATO has been the cornerstone
of Turkish defence and security policy. Moreover, Turkey has a
crucial place in NATO as the country with the second largest
army in the organisation after the US and because Turkey has
a strategically vital location between the Balkans, the Middle
East, Eurasia and the Caucasus.
During the Cold War, Turkey, as a NATO ally, protected the
southern flank of the Alliance. After the Cold War, Turkey, like
all the other countries, had to restructure its defence and
security policy. Yet, NATO continues to be an important actor
under the new security conditions.
241
 GRAPH 1: DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE TABLE I. TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION
Country Profile: Turkey

OF GDP IN TURKEY (%) IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 2010

3.5 Mission Organisation Total troops

ISAF (Afghanistan) NATO 1,799

KFOR (Kosovo) NATO 479

3.0
UNIFIL (Lebanon) UN 472

EUFOR-Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina) EU 246

2.5 Eulex Kosovo EU 63

MINUSTAH (Haiti) UN 41

UNMIS (Sudan) UN 26
2.0
UNMIL (Liberia) UN 25

UNMIT (Timor-Leste) UN 23

MONUSCO (Dem. Rep. of the Congo) UN 16

1.5
Source: NATO Press Release June 2010 UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire) UN 14
Produced by: CIDOB
UNAMID (Sudan-Darfur) UN 11
1.0 OMIK (Kosovo) OSCE 7

EUPM-BiH (Bosnia-Herzegovina) EU 2

UNAMA (Afghanistan) UN 1
0.5
UNMIK (Kosovo) UN 1

TOTAL TROOPS 3,226

0.0
Sources:
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/www.nato.int/ www.consilium.europa.
1985-

1990-

1995-

2000-
1989

1994

1999

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

eu/showpage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN /www.operationspaix.net
Produced by: CIDOB

Turkey has been taking active part in peacekeeping missions
of both the United Nations and NATO. According to data from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more than ten thousand per-
sonnel, observers, and advisors have served in peace-keeping
operations in various regions of the world. Turkey took part in
UN missions in Iran, Iraq and Kuwait as an observer. Addition-
ally, a Turkish force of 300 personnel participated in a UN mis-
sion in Somalia. Moreover, Turkey has participated in NATO,
UN and EU missions in the Balkans since 1995. Turkey was
active in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR operations in the Balkans.
At present, Turkey is part of the KFOR operation, which is
CIDOB International Yearbook 2011
Turkey supports NATO not only in operations and missions
but also in terms of policy, which is to say that Turkey sup-
ports NATO’s partnerships with the UN and the EU, its en-
largement process and open-door policy, the NATO-Russia
Council, and NATO-Ukraine cooperation (Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs).
TURKEY AND THE US
After the Second World War, with its rise as a global power
the US became Turkey’s number one military and strategic
partner. After Turkey’s joining NATO in 1952, Turkish-Amer-

a NATO intervention in the conflicts in Kosovo. 504 Turkish
personnel serve in this operation. Another operation in which
Turkey has taken part is ISAF (International Security Assistance
Force) in Afghanistan which was initiated with a UN Security
Council decision in 2001 and whose leadership which passed
to NATO in 2003. The objective of the operation is to ensure se-
curity and peace in the country by assisting the Afghan Govern-
ment. Turkey commanded the operation between June 2002
and February 2003 before NATO assumed the ISAF leadership,
and again between February and August 2005. Furthermore,
Turkey contributed to ISAF by heading many other important po-
sitions, by providing personnel and giving financial support. One
last important mission Turkey undertakes within NATO is the
Training Mission in Iraq, which aimed at assisting the security
forces of Iraq through training. As of January 2011, around
2,350 personnel are taking part in NATO-led operations and
training missions (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
ican military relations have always been intertwined with
NATO operations and missions.
The beginning of the partnership can be dated back to the
military and economic aid that Turkey received with Truman
Doctrine in 1947, and NATO membership extended and
deepened the military bonds. Turkish military bases were
particularly used in monitoring and surveillance of the former
Soviet Union, while today they are used as an arsenal and
departure point for responding to emergency situations and
crises in the Middle East. Until 1960 U2 spy planes were tak-
ing off from the Adana İncirlik Airbase, which is 56 km from
the Mediterranean Sea. İncirlik Air Base is still a very impor-
tant support point for the operations in Northern Iraq and in
the Middle East region. Pirinçlik Airbase in Diyarbakır, which
is located in the southeast of Turkey, was also NATO’s fron-
tier post for monitoring the Soviet Union until it was closed
down in 1997.

242

Military relations were smooth and intensive except for the
four-year American embargo in 1975, after the opium cri-
ses and Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus. After 9/11, a new
“struggle against terrorism” dimension was added to Turkish-
American military relations. Turkey had an important strategic
partnership role in the Bush Administration’s “Greater Middle
East Initiative” as both a Muslim country and democratic role
model for the other countries in the region.
In 2003, Turkish-American relations were shaken because
of the Turkish refusal to permit American troops to cross into
northern Iraq through its territory. In 2006, a “Strategic Vision
Document” was signed between the US and Turkey, underlining
the importance of the military partnership in the fight against
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons,
problem-solving, peacekeeping and energy security (Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
TURKEY AND THE EU COMMON SECURITY
AND DEFENCE POLICY
A Common Foreign and Security Policy was set as an objective
for the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. A
significant element of this policy was the European Security and
Defence Policy, which was revised in the Treaty of Amsterdam,
in the Treaty of Nice and most recently in the Treaty of Lisbon
(2009). With these actions, the EU displayed its aim to be not
only an economic and political power but also a military power
(Çayhan, 2003). However, this aim is still compatible with NATO,
which has always been the main defence and security organisa-
tion in Europe. The EU Security and Defence Policy refers to EU-
led crisis management operations, both military and civilian.
Turkey is pivotal for EU Security and Defence Policy because
of its geostrategic location; it has the second largest army
within NATO, and the Turkish army has considerable experi-
ence in peacekeeping operations and missions in various parts
of the world. Similarly, taking part in EU Security and Defence
Policy is important for Turkey, which has been an active mem-
ber of NATO and a country in the process of acceding to EU
membership.
Turkey’s relations with the EU in military, defence and security
terms date back to 1992 when Turkey became an associate
member of the Western European Union, which is the defence
component of the EU. The Western European Union could use
NATO assets and to this end, membership of non-EU NATO
members was seen as useful for obtaining approval for the use
of NATO assets. Conditions of participation of the non-EU allies
in the European Security and Defence Policy were defined in
the Ankara Document which was endorsed by the EU in 2002
at the Brussels Summit. This paved the way for a NATO-EU
strategic partnership, which was reconfirmed during the NATO
Istanbul Summit in 2004. Crisis management, the fight against
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation
in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus are some of
the areas where this partnership could work. Another outcome
of the NATO Summit in Istanbul was the EU-led operation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR-ALTHEA), to which Turkish troops
have been contributing. Moreover, Turkey has participated in
EU operations and missions in Macedonia and the Congo (Turk-
ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Despite Turkey’s participation
Defence and Security Policy of the Turkish Republic
in the EU Security and Defence Policy, there is opposition from
within the EU, mainly from Cyprus and Greece, against Turkey’s
cooperation with the European Defence Agency and Turkey’s
presence in EU Security and Defence Policy in general. In re-
sponse to this opposition, the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010
openly declared that the participation of non-EU NATO member
countries such as Turkey in the EU Common Security and De-
fence Policy is inevitable.
TURKEY AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPE-
RATION INITIATIVES
In addition to NATO, UN and EU operations and missions,
Turkey also participates in regional cooperation mechanisms.
There are three important regional security initiatives of which
Turkey is a member: the South-Eastern Europe Defence Min-
isterial Process (SDEM), the Multinational Peace Force South-
East Europe (MPFSEE) and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation
Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR).
SDEM was founded in 1996. The members of the initiative
are Turkey, the USA, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Slov-
enia, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na, Serbia and Montenegro. Moldova and Georgia participate
as observers. The activities of the initiative include border se-
curity, the fight against terrorism, cooperation in the defence
industry and the South-eastern Europe simulation net. Turkey
was the head of the SDEM Coordination Committee between
2003 and 2005.
One of the most significant initiatives of the SDEM is the Mul-
tinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE) which was
established in 1998. The aim of this initiative is to contribute
to the security of the Europe-Atlantic area and to build peace-
ful relations with the neighbours in south-eastern Europe. The
members are Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedo-
nia, Romania and Ukraine.
The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR)
is a mechanism of cooperation established in 2001 by the
countries which share the Black Sea coast. It was brought into
being to maintain peace and order in the region and with a view
to regional cooperation activities.
ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE IN
TURKEY
The President of the Republic of Turkey is the Supreme Com-
mander of the Turkish Army. The Council of Ministers is an-
swerable to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on matters
of National Security. However, authority rests with the National
Assembly for the declarations of war, sending troops abroad,
or allowing foreign troops to be stationed in Turkey. The Min-
istry of National Defence is authorised to implement security
policies as decided by the Council of Ministers. The Chief of the
General Staff is appointed by the President and is responsible
to the Prime Minister. The Chief of the General Staff is respon-
sible for the overall command of the Armed Forces, prepara-
tion of the Army for war, and conducting military operations.
In addition, there is the National Security Council consisting of
the President, the Prime Minister, various Ministers and the
commanding officers. The council meets every two months in
order to discuss national security issues.
243
Country Profile: Turkey
Moreover, it is the responsibility of the Minister of the Inte-
rior to secure public peace. The police in urban areas, the gen-
darmerie in rural areas, and the coastguard at sea are tasked
for policing and public security by the Minister of the Interior.
The National Security Council
The National Security Council was founded in 1983 in accord-
ance with Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution. It consists of
the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Chief
of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, the Minister of
Justice, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of the
Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of
Land, Naval and Air Forces, and the General Commander of
the Gendarmerie. The President is the head of the Council.
The National Security Council delivers advisory opinions to the
Council of Ministers on the designation, establishment and
implementation of the national security policy and providing
the necessary coordination. According to Article 117 of the
1982 Constitution, the Council of Ministers is responsible be-
fore the Turkish Grand National Assembly for ensuring security
and training and preparing the Turkish Armed Forces to the
protect the country.
The National Security Council meets every two months.
When necessary, it can meet on the proposal of the Prime
Minister or with a call from the President of the Republic. The
General Secretary of the Council can attend the meetings but
cannot vote.
The Turkish Armed Forces
Turkey has the second largest army in NATO after the US. As
one of the eight member countries in which the mandatory
military service exists, the greater part of the army consists
of conscripts. Turkey’s military manpower was estimated at
514,000 by 2008.1 All males between the ages of 19 and
41 are obliged to do 15 months of military service. University
graduates do their military service for 12 months as reserve
officers or for 6 months as privates.
Turkey announced a motivated military modernisation pro-
gramme in 1996. It aimed at acquiring high-technology
equipment; upgrading older systems; producing home-grown
military equipment and becoming increasingly self-sufficient in
CIDOB International Yearbook 2011
terms of military technologies (Hen-Toy, 2004).
The Turkish army is comprised of Land Forces, Naval Forces
and Air Forces. As part of the internal security forces the
General Command of Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Com-
mand are affiliated with the Ministry of Interior Affairs in times
of peace; whereas in times of war, the Gendarmerie comes
under the Land Forces Command and the Coast Guard falls
under the Naval Forces Command.
Land Forces
The land forces had 402,000 active personnel by 2008 (FRD,
2008). It is the second largest army in NATO and the fifth larg-
est in the world. The structure of the land forces consists of 4
Field Armies, 9 Army Corps, 1 Infantry Division, 2 Mechanised
Infantry Divisions, 1 Armoured Division, 1 Training Division, 11
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Brigades, 16 Mechanised Infan-
try Brigades, 9 Armoured Brigades, 5 Commando Brigades,
244
1 Army Aviation Brigade, 2 Artillery Brigades, 5 Training Bri-
gades and Humanitarian Aid Brigade. These units are organ-
ised as four Field Armies, a Logistics Command and a Training
and Doctrine Command.2
Gendarmerie
The Gendarmerie General Command is responsible for the
maintenance of safety and public order. It is subordinated to
the General Staff in matters related to training and education
in connection with the Armed Forces, and to the Ministry of
Interior in matters related to the performance of the safety and
public order duties. However, the General Commander of Gen-
darmerie is responsible to the Ministry of Interior.3 The area of
duty and responsibility of the Gendarmerie covers mostly rural
zones outside the Police duty zone. These zones comprise 92%
of the total area of Turkey. The Gendarmerie is responsible for
maintaining safety and public order in these zones.
Naval Forces
In 2008, the naval forces had 48,600 active personnel (FRD,
2008). The Navy consists of 13 Submarines, 18 Frigates, 6
Corvettes, 20 Mine Sweepers/Hunters and 24 Assault Boats.
These come under the Fleet Command, the Northern Sea Area
Command, the Southern Sea Area Command and the Naval
Training and Education Command. Moreover, an Amphibious Ma-
rines Brigade, several commando detachments and two special
operations forces, the Underwater Attack and Underwater De-
fence, are maintained as Marines and Special Operations Units.
Coast Guard
The Turkish Coast Guard Command is responsible for enforcing
national and international laws and ensuring the safety of life
and property within its area of maritime jurisdiction.4 Like the
Gendarmerie, it is responsible to Ministry of the Interior during
times of peace.
Air Forces
The Air Force consisted of 60,100 active personnel by 2008
(FRD, 2008). In terms of its force structure, the Turkish Air
Force consists of 17 Combat Squadrons, 1 Reconnaissance
Squadron, 1 Tanker Squadron, 5 Transportation Squadrons,
3 Search and Rescue Squadrons and 10 Training Squadrons.
These units are organised as two Air Force Commands: the
Air Training Command and the Air Logistics Command. By April
2011, the Turkish Air Forces had 1,049 aircrafts. This fleet
size ranks second in NATO after the US Air Force. The Turkish
Air Force also has the highest number of F-16 jet fighters after
the USA. The Turkish Air Force fighter jets can participate in
international operations and exercises on all continents of the
world and have long-range in-flight refuelling capability.
Ministry of the Interior and the Police
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for internal security,
public peace and the organisation of civil protection. The Nation-
al Police, the General Directorate of Civil Defence, the General
Command of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard are under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior in times of peace. The
National Police force is organised as a Central Directorate and

81 Local Directorates, one in every province. The total number
of personnel of the Turkish National Police was 229,965 by
2010. Only two years previously it had been under 210,000
and it is expected to reach 250,000 in a few years.5
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES
Turkey’s main security concerns, which have remained unre-
solved for decades, can be identified as the armed conflict with
the PKK as an internal security issue, and disputes over Cyprus
and the Aegean Sea as external security issues.
Armed Conflict with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
Although there were several Kurdish rebellions since the first
years of the Republic (Ergil, 2000), the armed conflict with
PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is the most recent and longest
lasting. In the heated political climate of the 1970s there were
several Kurdish political organisations, most of which were un-
armed. However, with the iron-fist policy following the 1980
coup d’état almost all were abolished.
The establishment of the PKK was declared in 1978 by Ab-
dullah Öcalan and some members of his circle. In the period
after the coup d’état, in particular, the group became stronger.
Many members of former Kurdish groups who were subjected
to harsh torture in the prisons during the years of the military
regime joined PKK after they were released.
The PKK made its first attacks on Turkey in 1984. After the
first attacks, the President Turgut Özal called them “a bunch
of marauders” (Akyol, 1998). However, in the following decade
the conflict burgeoned into a civil war between the security
forces of Turkey and armed PKK militants. During this war Tur-
key entered Iraqi territory on several occasions, the joint death
toll rose to over 40,000,6 most of the eastern and south-east-
ern Anatolian cities were placed under state-of-emergency law,
thousands of people were deported from their home towns,
and there were countless human rights violations. The conflict
went into a new phase after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan
in Kenya by the CIA. In the first five years of the 2000s, the
GRAPH 2: ORGANISATION OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES
The Chief of
the General
Staff
Land Naval
Forces Forces
Gendarmerie
Coast Guard
Forces
Source: Turkish General Staff. http://www.tsk.tr/1_TSK_HAKKINDA/1_5_Savunma_Organizasyonu/savunma_organizasyonu.htm
Defence and Security Policy of the Turkish Republic
PKK cut down its attacks and tried to gain legitimisation in the
international arena. Armed clashes started again in 2004 and
are still continuing.
During this time the PKK changed its policy from the aim
of establishing a separate Kurdish state to achieving confed-
eration within Turkish borders with recognition of the Kurdish
identity through social and civil reforms. The Republic of Tur-
key has also changed its policy towards the Kurdish people.
Turkey denied the existence of a Kurdish population in 1980s
and 1990s. However, in 2000s various cultural rights were
guaranteed.
Currently, the PKK has been in a state of inaction for one
year. Although Turkey has never directly and legally contacted
PKK, the National Intelligence Organisation of Turkey is known
to be in contact with Öcalan and PKK commanders, and a
democratic solution is being sought for the Kurdish issue and
the disarmament of the PKK.
The Cyprus Dispute
Until 1960 Cyprus belonged to the United Kingdom and was
not an issue for Turkey, which was waiting the appearance of
the possibility that the UK would surrender the island. Towards
the end of the 1950s Greeks in the island declared their will to
unite with the Greek motherland, while Turkish people wanted
the island to be divided into Greek and Turkish parts. After
conferences between the United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece and
the representatives of the Turkish and Greek communities in
Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus was declared in 1960.
Shortly after the new establishment of the new Republic,
there was an outbreak of violence between the two communi-
ties in the island. In 1964, Turkey attempted to intervene in
the island and was stopped by a harshly worded letter from the
US President Lyndon B. Johnson. However, the intercommunal
violence on the island continued and after a coup d’état in the
island supported by the Greek junta, Turkey launched a military
invasion of the island in 1974. Following this operation, The US
declared an embargo on Turkey.
Prime
Minister
Minister of
National
Security
Air Forces
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245
Country Profile: Turkey

Although the Greek military junta collapsed shortly after the
invasion, nothing was achieved in the negotiations between
Greece and Turkey from 1974 to 1980 and the possibility of war
between two countries increased after more than 50 years of
peace (Coufoudakis 1985). In 1980, the coup d’état ushered in
a military regime in Turkey. In 1983, Turkish Cypriots unilaterally
declared independence. However, the Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus was not recognised by the international community.
After 1983, several series of meetings were held between
sides. Nevertheless, no progress could be achieved. Finally,
on 24 April 2004 a plan drafted by the UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan with a view to resolving the conflict was put to the
vote by a referendum held in both parts of the island. The Turk-
ish community accepted the plan with 65% ‘Yes’ votes, while
the Greek community rejected it with 75% ‘No’ votes.
On 1 May 2004 Cyprus joined the European Union without
having resolved the dispute in the island. Negotiations between
Greek and Turkish leaders in the island have been continuing
but nothing has been achieved yet. Moreover, since 2006
eight chapters of the negotiations between Turkey and the EU
for Turkey’s joining the EU have been frozen because Turkey
has not opened its ports to ships from Cyprus.
Aegean Dispute with Greece
The Aegean Dispute between Turkey and Greece has four di-
mensions which are all interrelated (Pratt and Schofield 1996).
These are the disputes over territorial waters, the continental
shelf, air space jurisdiction and militarisation of the islands.
Territorial waters
Currently, territorial waters in the Aegean Sea extend six
nautical miles (nm) for both Turkey and Greece. However, in
accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Greece claims its right to extend its territorial waters to
12 nm. Turkey is not a party to the convention and claims that
the convention is not binding for itself and, furthermore, 12nm
is the maximum to which territorial sea can be extended any-
where, and that this is unsuitable in the Aegean Sea which is
a semi-enclosed sea. On 9 June 1995, Turkey declared that
unilateral action by Greece would constitute a casus belli.
CIDOB International Yearbook 2011
Airspace jurisdiction
In 1952 the International Civil Aviation Organisation gave the
authority over the Aegean Sea to Greece up to Turkish National
Airspace. However, during the Cyprus crisis in 1974 Turkey
issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) stating that all aircraft ap-
proaching Turkish airspace should report their route and flight
plan to Turkey. Greece then declared Aegean airspace to be
unsafe (Pratt and Schofield 1996). In 1980, both Turkey and
Greece withdrew their NOTAMs. Nevertheless, the flights of
Turkish military aircraft over the 10nm airspace and outside
of 6nm are still a problem (anadolu.eu). Dog fights between
the jets continue and there have been several air crashes over
the years.
Militarisation of the islands
Many of the islands in the Aegean Sea are demilitarised in
accordance to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. However, during
the 1974 Cyprus crisis Greece remilitarised some of these
islands referring to its right to self-defence under the terms of
the UN Charter (Pratt and Schofield 1996). Subsequently, in
1975, Turkey established the Aegean Army against the pos-
sible attacks from the Greek islands. The Aegean Army is the
only army of Turkey that is not assigned to NATO.
Although the problems in the Aegean Sea between Turkey
and Greece have not yet been resolved, in recent years, espe-
cially with the acceleration of Turkey’s EU accession process
relations between the two countries have strengthened and
the problems have shelved with a view to their being resolved
in the EU.

The continental shelf

When Greece discovered oil off the coast of Thasos Island in
the Northern Aegean Sea in 1973, Turkey declared explora-
tion rights in the eastern Aegean and published a map indi-
cating the borders of Turkey’s continental shelf rights (Pratt
and Schofield 1996). The continental shelf has been a major
cause of dispute between Greece and Turkey ever since. Tur-
key argues that the Aegean seabed is a prolongation of the
Anatolian land mass (Moustakis 1999). On the other hand,
Greece claims that the Greek islands should be taken into con-
sideration and the Greek continental shelf should be extended
to the median line between the Greek islands and Turkey in
such a way that the Greek continental shelf would occupy most
of the Aegean. In 1976, the dispute brought two countries to
the brink of armed conflict and Greece appealed to the UN
Security Council and International Court of Justice. However,
the dispute could not be resolved.

246
 Defence and Security Policy of the Turkish Republic
Notes Pratt, M., and Clive Schofield. (1996) “The Imia/Kardak
Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea”. IBRU Boundary and Secu-
1. http://www.globalfirepower.com/active-military-manpow- rity Bulletin, pp. 62-69.
er.asp, retrieved on 6 May 2011

2. http://www.tsk.tr/, retrieved on 6 May 2011 Web sites and other sources

3. http://www.jandarma.tsk.tr/, retrieved on 7 May 2011 “Active Military Manpower”, http://www.globalfirepower.

com/active-military-manpower.asp
4. http://www.sgk.tsk.tr/, retrieved on 7 May 2011
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