SCIR Fall 2018 Edition

Southern California
International Review
Volume 8, Number 2 • Fall 2018
Southern California International Review
scir.org
Staff
Editor-in-Chief:
Anna Lipscomb
Editors:
Nicholas Tinoco
Abhiram Reddy
Connor Chapkis
Lisa De Ràfols
Loleï Brenot
The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual print

and online journal of interdisciplinary scholarship in the field of interna-
tional studies generously funded by the School of International Relations
at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would
like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.
Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between
theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.
SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates
with valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.
Copyright © 2018 Southern California International Review.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form without the express written consent of the Southern California International
Review.
Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily
represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.
ISSN: 1545-2611
In a time of rising duality on the domestic and international stages, we
dedicate this edition of SCIR to the forces adding new perspectives at this
crossroads in history.
Contents
1. Chinese Migrants in Cape Town’s Local Retail Economy 11

Cheryl Yau
2. The Competition Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in South Asia 40

Examining Recruitment Strategies by Terrorist Organizations, the Creation
of the Terrorist ‘Career Fair,’ and the Role of Foreign Fighters in Global Wars
Wardah Malik
3. The Rocky Road to Interdependence 52

Ireland, Switzerland, and the Survival of Military Neutrality in the Liberal
World Order
Tárlach Russell
4. To Nuclearize, or Not to Nuclearize 80

Tracing the South Korean Nuclear Debate from 2016 to the 3rd Inter-Korean
Summit
Daniel Jacinto
Editor’s Note:
Dear Reader,
It is with great pleasure that I introduce to you the sixteenth edition of the Southern California
International Review (SCIR). This semester’s issue continues our mission of providing a
platform for undergraduate scholars of international affairs to deliver their work to a larger,
global audience.
We were incredibly fortunate to have dozens of submissions for this issue. Our editors spent
staunch hours examining undergraduate research from all across the country and throughout
the world. Of the many impressive submissions, the following four were outstanding for
their original ideas and fresh perspectives on globalization topics. As you read this journal,
you will understand why.
In the creation of this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative of the support of the University
of Southern California’s School of International Relations. Director Patrick James, Associate
Director Linda Cole, and the rest of the faculty and staff give us the guidance we need to
steadily grow. I also extend our thanks to Ms. Robin Friedheim for her generous scholarship
that provides the foundation upon which our endeavor thrives.
As our world leaders attempt to maneuver a rapidly changing and increasingly divisive
international political system, we recognize the forces offering new perspectives. This theme
resonates throughout the articles in this edition. The first article takes a look at the networks
developed by the Chinese migrant diaspora community in Cape Town, South Africa. The
next article analyzes the recruitment strategies of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda and argues
that a rational competition exists between the two. Another article delves into Ireland and
Switzerland’s pursuit of military neutrality and examines their relations with international
organizations. Finally, the fourth article traces the developments in the South Korean nuclear
debate in light of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula over the past few years.
I would like to thank you, the reader, since without you, we are nothing. Remember, the
content of this journal is just one part of a much larger dialogue.
Please read, ponder, explore and enjoy.
Warm regards,
Anna Lipscomb
Editor-in-Chief
Chinese Migrants in Cape Town's
Local Retail Economy
Cheryl Yau
Since the turn of the century, there has been a significant increase of Chinese migrants in
South Africa, and more broadly, in Africa. Many migrants enter into the wholesale and
retail sector, and are at the heart of importing and marketing made-in-China goods to the
local African population through ‘China shops’. Through ethnographic interviews and site
observations, I find that Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in the retail space largely rely on
relationships with other Chinese people for their economic and social needs. Such interactions
are guided by the contours of well-documented divides in the multi-layered diaspora space
of Cape Town, and a guardedness arising from business competition. Nonetheless, there is a
sense of collegiality which is best observed in ‘Chinatown malls’. The key modes of interaction
between Chinese migrant shopkeepers and Africans are in the shop as employer-employee
and as owner-customer. However, ‘China shops’ can be very different types of social and
cultural spaces depending on the adopted business model. An examination of the interactions
and networks of Chinese migrant small shopkeepers largely reveal bonding social capital,
though there are also informal spaces of bridging and linking social capital.
1. Introduction
On the back of growing Chinese political and economic clout in Africa, there has
been a significant increase of scholarship around the China-South Africa, or more gener-
ally the South-South, relationship. However, most of this literature focuses on state or cor-
poration-level actors and macro-level impacts, while independent migrants and local-level
community impacts are relatively under-researched. Nonetheless, this is a key trend to
reckon with: Park reviewed multiple data sources and concluded that there were between
580,000 to 800,000 Chinese on the African continent in the mid-2000s, approximately
half of whom are based in South Africa.1 This is a considerable increase from estimates
that ranged between 100,000 to 150,000 in the early 2000s. Besides contract labor, many of
these new migrants become ‘entrepreneurs’ and enter the retail or wholesale sector, find-
ing a niche in low-end consumer and household goods.2 This group of migrants—Chinese
migrants in the consumer retail space— are the focus of this research project. Specifically,
through ethnographic interviews and site observations, I seek to understand the ways in
1 Yoon Jung Park, “Chinese Migration in Africa,” SAIIA Occasional Paper, no. 24 (February 2009): 1-17.
2 Emmanuel M.M. Kuang, “The New Chinese Migration Flows to Africa,” Social Science Information 47, no. 4 (2008): 643-659.
Cheryl Yau is a senior at Pomona College, double majoring in International

Relations and Economics, and minoring in Asian Studies.
12 Cheryl Yau
which Chinese migrant shopkeepers in Cape Town interact, cooperate, or compete with
other Chinese migrants and with local Africans.3 This is fundamentally about the nature
of migrant networks and relationships, and will be in conversation with the literature on
ethnic economies and social capital.
This focus addresses the paucity of studies focusing on the internal dynamics and
cross-cultural interactions of the Chinese migrant diaspora. Pieterse notes that most social
capital research on migrants overtly focuses on cultural boundaries.4 Although cultural
boundaries exist, they should not be reified as migrant communities do not usually oper-
ate in complete silo. The focus on Cape Town reflects where I was based and is interesting
considering the complexity of the diasporic space arising from the rich history of Chinese
migration into Cape Town.5,6 Besides contributing to a fuller understanding of migrant
social and economic lives and adding to the growing body of ethnographic studies on the
nature and impact of entrepreneurial Chinese migrant activities on the continent, this
project also hopes to serve two additional purpose. First, the media and politicians often
construct images of a monolithic neo-colonizing Chinese state (of which migrants are
conflated with, or seen as subservient to) and the powerless, exploited African; uncover-
ing areas of competition and cooperation within/without goes towards challenging these
myth of a united Chinese front and the inert African.7,8,9 Second, social capital has been
associated with many outcomes, from economic competitiveness to happiness and rooted-
ness in a community.10 An understanding of the migrants’ social relationships and capital
will support research tangents pertaining to the future prospects of Chinese migrants in
South Africa.
This paper is structured as follows. First, I will review the relevant literature on
Chinese migration to Africa and on entrepreneurial Chinese migrant activity on the con-
tinent. Next, I will describe my methodology and ethics. Last, I will present my findings
and discuss them in relation to the literature, with concluding remarks.
3 Chinese is defined as an ethnicity in this paper; as such references to the ‘Chinese’ can include those from outside of Main-
land China. Local Africans broadly refer to the non-Chinese in the host community, who may or may not be South African by
nationality.
4 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Social Capital and Migration: Beyond Ethnic Economies,” Ethnicities 3, no. 1 (2003): 29-58.
5 Karen L. Harris, “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos 40, no. 1 (2014): 133-153.
6 Melanie Yap, Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1996).
7 Tu T. Huynh, “China Town Malls in South Africa in the 21st Century: Ethnic Chinatowns or Chinese State Projects?” Asian
and Pacific Migration Journal 27, no. 1 (2018): 28-54.
8 Katy N. Lam, “Chinese Adaptations: African Agency, Fragmented Community and Social Capital Creation in Ghana,” Jour-
nal of Current Chinese Affairs 44, no. 1 (2015): 9-41.
9 Yoon Jung Park, “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” African
Studies Review 56, no. 1 (2013): 131-153.
10 Robert Putnam, “Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences,” Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2, no. 1 (2001):
41-51.
Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Chinese Migrants in Cape Town's Local Retail Economy 13
2. Literature Review
Chinese Migration to Africa/South Africa
The 21st century saw a notable increase in migration flows from China to Africa.
Park Yoon Jung, who leads the Chinese in Africa/Africans in China International Research
Working Group (CA/AC IRWG), systematically outlines the failures of existing scholarship
to unpack these migration flows: migration and overseas Chinese studies tend to focus on
South-North or East-West trajectories, while China-Africa scholars often side line migrants
as agents of globalization and development in favor of looking at macro-level actors and
trends.11 Mohan and Tan-Mullins, and Mohan and Kale concur, noting there has been a
disproportionate focus on “globalization from above,” such as on state projects, bilateral
aid, and macro-economic statistics, but fewer attempts to study the everyday linkages in
“globalization from below”, of which migrants are a key agent.12,13 This is due in part to the
difficulty of obtaining accurate statistical data on Chinese migration into African countries.
Park reviewed multiple data sources and concludes there were between 580,000 to 800,000
Chinese on the African continent in the mid-2000s, approximately half of whom are based
in South Africa.14 This is a considerable increase from estimates that ranged between
100,000 to 150,000 in the early 2000s. She also notes that while the bulk of the migrants
come from the traditional sending regions of Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian, there has
been an increasing diversity in geographical origin. Although data on Chinese migration
into Africa tends to be unreliable, there are two undisputed facts that serve our purpose:
(i) the migration flow has expanded dramatically over the past decade, and (ii) the largest
diaspora is found in South Africa.
In this scholarship space, Kuang did key work in establishing contemporary mi-
grant typologies, which has been corroborated by a multitude of ethnographic studies by
scholars such as Merli and Park.15,16,17 The two principal groups of new Chinese migrants
in Africa include: the labor migrants, usually on temporary contracts tied to commod-
ity and infrastructure projects realized by big Chinese enterprises, and the entrepreneurial
migrants who are mostly traders and merchants at the heart of importing and marketing
11 Park, “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa.”

12 Giles Mohan and May Tan-Mullins, “Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Frame-
work,” The European Journal of Development Research 21, no. 4 (2009): 588-605.
13 Giles Mohan and Dinar Kale, "The Invisible Hand of South-South Globalization: Chinese Migrants in Africa," A Report for
the Rockefeller Foundation prepared by The Development Policy and Practice Department, The Open University, Milton Keynes,
MK7 6AA, UK (2007).
14 Park, “Chinese migration in Africa.”
15 Kuang, “The New Chinese Migration Flows to Africa.”
16 M. Giovanna Merli, Ashton Verdery, Ted Mouw, and Jing Li, “Sampling Migrants from their Social Networks: The Demog-
raphy and Social Organization of Chinese Migrants in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,” Migration Studies 4, no. 2 (2016): 182-214.
17 Yoon Jung Park and Anna Ying Chen, “Recent Chinese Migrants in Small Towns of Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Revue
européenne des migrations internationales 25, no. 1 (2009): 25-44.

14 Cheryl Yau
Chinese-made goods in Africa. The latter group of migrants are also typically referred to
as ‘free’ or ‘independent’ migrants, in a nod to the autonomy of the Chinese diaspora from
the Chinese state.18,19 Given the research focus on Chinese shopkeepers, the entrepreneurial
migration flow will be the most relevant framework.
I next move from continent-level trends to specifically focus on Chinese migra-
tion in South Africa. South Africa is host to the largest and oldest Chinese diaspora on
the continent and there is a need to historicize the patterns of Chinese migration into the
country. There have been three distinct movements of free Chinese immigrants into South
Africa: independent migrants with the mining boom in the late 19th to mid-20th century,
industrialists from Taiwan in the 1970s to 1990s, and traders from Mainland China from
the 1990s into the present.20,21,22 The first group of migrants and their descendants, a com-
munity of about 10,000, are largely rooted in South Africa, and have worked their way into a
hard-won middle class respectability.23 The second group comprised a capital-owning class,
who were lured with investment incentives to set up factories in Apartheid South Africa.
However, with the switch in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1998 and the
removal of said incentives, this community has since dwindled to about 6,000 from a peak
of 30,000.24 The third and current movement is by far the largest and most diverse group of
migrants in profile, class, and geographical origin. This independent migration flow largely
overlaps with the entrepreneurial migration flow outlined above, with many of the migrants
entering the wholesale or retail trade.25 A study of Chinese-run shops is hence also about
the economic place of the current third wave migration flow in South Africa and how they
relate to their predecessors. Within this third group, there is also a documented divide on
the basis of origin provinces, which is often layered over class and education differences.
Specifically, migrants from the Fujian province, who largely arrived post-2000, tend to be
poorer and less educated than the migrants who arrived before them.26 As an ethnic group,
Park argues that regardless of period of arrival, the Chinese occupy an “in-between status”
in South African society, where a Black-White racial dichotomy dominates.27
18 Tu T. Huynh, Yoon Jung Park, and Anna Ying Chen, “Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980s to Pres-
ent,” African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): 286-306.
19 Conal G.Y. Ho, “The “Doing” and “Undoing” of Community: Chinese Networks in Ghana,” China aktuell 3 (2008): 45-76.
20 Yoon Jung Park, A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa (Lexington Books, 2008).
21 Darryl Accone, All Under Heaven: The Story of a Chinese Family in South Africa (Cape Town: New Africa Books, 2004).
22 Yap, Colour, Confusion and Concessions.
23 Park, A Matter of Honour.
24 Janet Wilhelm, “The Chinese communities in South Africa,” in State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006, ed. Sakhela
Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Jessica Lutchman (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006), 350-368.
25 Huynh, Park, and Chen, “Faces of China.”
26 Fenglan Chen, “Chinatown in Johannesburg - A Social Survey,” The China Monitor 61 (April 2011): 8-11.
27 Yoon Jung Park, “Liminal Spaces: Ethnic Chinese in the Borderlands of Southern Africa,” in Migration and Agency in a
Globalizing World, ed. Scarlett Cornelissen and Yoichi Mine (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018), 91-113.

Chinese Entrepreneurial Migration

There has been a growing body of ethnographic studies published in recent years
on the nature and impact of entrepreneurial Chinese migrant activities on the continent.
This includes research in Cape Verde by Haugen and Carling, Ghana by Giese and Thiel,
and Ho, Namibia by Dobler, Kenya by Gadzala, Senegal by Dittgen, and Mali by Bourdarias,
and Kernen and Vulliet. Prominent scholars focused on South Africa include Hyunh, Park
and Chen, and Dittgen. In these studies, certain themes repeatedly emerge, enabling us to
piece together a working picture of this group of migrants. First, a sketch of the general
profile of these entrepreneur migrants at the continent level: while increasingly diverse in
their class and education background, entering the retail and wholesale trade is often their
best economic option as they may lack the qualifications or the language ability to enter the
wage labor market, and they often have direct connections with wholesale or factory sup-
pliers in China which enable them to price-compete effectively.28,29 They tend to import and
market competitively-priced consumer goods to the local population, ranging from plastic
products to clothing and household appliances. As such, they commonly broaden access
to consumer goods and power a secondary resale market.30,31,32 Past research centered on
South Africa largely corroborates these phenomena, with Laribee noting that there is a rela-
tively smaller segment of entrepreneurs who would import and sell Chinese staple cultural
Figure 1. China–Africa trade, 2002–2016. Based on data Figure 2. China–South Africa trade, 2000–2016. Based
from UN Comtrade 2017, figures reported by China. on data from UN Comtrade 2017, figures reported by
Graph produced by China-Africa Research Initiative. China.
28 Dirk Kohnert, "Are Chinese in Africa More Innovative than Africans," Comparing Cultures of Innovation of Chinese and
Nigerian entrepreneurial migrants, Hamburg: GIGA-Working Papers 140 (2010).
29 Mohan and Kale, "The Invisible Hand of South-South Globalization.”
30 Romain Dittgen, “From isolation to integration? A study of Chinese retailers in Dakar,” SAIIA Occasional Paper, no. 57
(March 2010): 1-14.
31 Park and Chen, “Recent Chinese Migrants in Small Towns of Post-Apartheid South Africa.”
32 Jørgen Carling and Heidi Haugen, "How an African outpost is filled with Chinese shops," in unpublished paper presented at
the Fifth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, Denmark, 2004.

16 Cheryl Yau
products and services, such as Chinese tea.33 This surge in entrepreneurial migration is also
reflected in the steady increase in exports from China to Africa and South Africa, as seen
in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. Nonetheless, it must be noted that Chinese traders are not
entirely responsible for this surge, and that African traders are also increasingly importing
directly from China.34,35
Spatially, these entrepreneurial activities manifest in the form of ‘China shops’,
and are often sufficiently ubiquitous that they will be seen as a separate category or genre of
shops.36,37 Furthermore, several larger African cities, such as Johannesburg, Casablanca, Ac-
cra, and Yaoundé have become home to ‘China malls’—large congregations of such ‘China
shops’ which mainly engage in wholesale activity and which serve regional markets.38 In
Cape Town, there are four ‘China malls’; however, only one engages in wholesale activity,
while the other three are branded as ‘Chinatowns’—large complexes of ‘China shops’ selling
to the everyday consumer. Huynh argues that the use of ‘Chinatown’ represents a departure
from usual naming conventions, and should be seen as a deliberate attempt by ethnic Chi-
nese entrepreneurs to reclaim a global symbol of otherness.39 Characterizations of ‘China-
town’ are diverse and constantly evolving in the literature, from being spaces of vice to sites
of ethnic tourism, and places of ethnic solidarity and social capital.40,41 The emergence of
‘Chinatown malls’ in Cape Town should be seen as more than just an economic phenom-
enon, but as spaces of Chinese identity-making in a Global South context. The geographical
spread of these ‘China shops’ is also substantial: due to market saturation, Chinese migrants
33 Rachel Laribee, “The China Shop Phenomenon: Trade Supply Within the Chinese Diaspora in South Africa,” Africa Spec-
trum, (2008): 353-370.
34 Michal Lyons, Alison Brown, and Zhigang Li. “The ‘Third Tier’ of Globalization: African Traders in Guangzhou.” City 12,
no. 2 (2008): 196-206.
35 Yang Yang, "African Traders in Guangzhou," Globalization from Below (2012): 154-170.
36 Yanyin Zi, “China Shop Businesses in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community,” Botswana
Journal of African Studies 29, no. 1 (2015): 32-49.
37 Dittgen, “From isolation to integration?”
38 Tanya Zack, “‘Jeppe’—Where Low-End Globalisation, Ethnic Entrepreneurialism and the Arrival City Meet,” Urban Forum
26, no. 2 (June 2015): 131-150.
39 Tu T. Huynh, “China Town Malls in South Africa in the 21st Century: Ethnic Chinatowns or Chinese State Projects?” Asian
and Pacific Migration Journal 27, no. 1 (2018): 28-54.
40 Alejandro Portes, Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, and William J. Haller, “Transnational Entrepreneurs: An Alternative Form of
Immigrant Economic Adaptation,” American Sociological Review (2002): 278-298.
41 Ivan Light, “From Vice District to Tourist Attraction: The Moral Career of American Chinatowns, 1880-1940,” Pacific
Historical Review 43, no. 3 (1974): 367-394.

have been increasingly expanding into more countries and into rural areas.42,43,44 For in-
stance, Park and Chen found that there is at least one ‘China shop’ in every small town in
the province of Free State, South Africa.45 Due to the geographical extensiveness and posi-
tioning of ‘China shops’, they often serve as key platforms of interaction between ordinary
Africans and Chinese, and hence have a direct impact on local African perceptions of the
‘Chinese presence’ in their country.46,47
While broad continent-level trends are important, we must be cautious to not
homogenize this group of traders. Local histories and socio-economic dynamics play a
significant part in determining the settlement patterns and activities of Chinese migrants.
The impact and local perception of Chinese entrepreneurial activities are also varied and
uneven across, and even within, different countries.48 Some have welcomed cheaper access
to consumer goods and job creation, while others criticize the low quality, lack of link-
ages, and displacement of local traders.49,50 Kernen and Vulliet note that pre-existing mar-
ket conditions determine the market impact of Chinese traders, while Park documents the
significantly different perceptions of the Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho, positing that
market impact is a function of party politics and economy size.51,52 In South Africa, most of
the scholarly attention is given to Johannesburg, and there is no study focused on Chinese
shopkeepers in Cape Town yet. While the Chinese community is smaller in Cape Town
than in Johannesburg, it is still one of the largest concentrations of the diaspora on the con-
tinent, and has a rich history of Chinese migration.53,54
Competition/Cooperation: Interactions within and without
42 Ana Deumert and Nkululeko Mabandla, “‘Every Day a New Shop Pops Up’–South Africa's ‘New’ Chinese Diaspora and the
Multilingual Transformation of Rural Towns: A First Study of Chinese Migration and Language Contact in Rural South Africa,”
English Today 29, no. 1 (2013): 44-52.
43 Laribee, “The China Shop Phenomenon.”
44 Heidi Ø. Haugen and Jørgen Carling, “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora: The Surge of Baihuo Business in an African
City,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 639-662.
46 Romain Dittgen, “Features of Modernity, Development and ‘Orientalism’: Reading Johannesburg through its ‘Chinese’
Urban Spaces,” Journal of Southern African Studies 43, no. 5 (2017): 979-996.
47 Kohnert, "Are Chinese in Africa More Innovative than Africans."
49 Nina Sylvanus, “Chinese Devils, the Global Market, and the Declining Power of Togo’s Nana-Benzes,” African Studies
Review 56, no. 1 (2013): 65-80.
51 Antoine Kernen and Benoît Vulliet, “Chinese Small-Business Owners and Traders in Mali and Senegal,” Afrique contempo-
raine, no. 4 (2008): 69-94.
52 Park, “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa.”
53 Harris. “Paper Trail.”
54 Yap, Colour, Confusion and Concessions.

18 Cheryl Yau
A growing body of work under “transaction cost economics” looks at how business
cooperation between co-ethnics in foreign contexts, or across international boundaries is
a rational response to external circumstances: participation in dense social and business
networks (usually based on common cultural norms and knowledge) helps to reduce the
information and contract enforcement costs involved in transactions, particular in more
opaque business environments.55,56 For instance, the fear of being blacklisted by the entire
ethnic network would serve to deter opportunistic behavior. Some scholars further argue
that high levels of intra-ethnic cooperation are found among the ethnic Chinese communi-
ty specifically, due to a common socialization to a Confucian code of ethics that emphasizes
mutual aid and reciprocity among kinsmen and the practice of guanxi, where economic
relationships are rooted in close social relationships defined by trust and long-term mutual
benefits.57,58,59 This is empirically supported by scholars of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast
Asia, who attribute the economic success of the early Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast
Asia to embedded patterns of business—where labor, contracts and inputs are sourced from
members of the same ethnic or racial group.60,61
While we have a theoretical basis to expect that the Chinese diaspora in Cape
Town will work closely together, ethnographic studies of Chinese migrants in Africa do not
lend consistent support to a reality of high intra-ethnic cooperation. Dobler, Haugen and
Carling, and Bourdarias, who did research in Namibia, Cape Verde, and Mali respective-
ly, found that the increasing saturation of economies by incoming Chinese entrepreneurs
who compete in the same market space have led to social stratification and an atmosphere
fraught with suspicion where some Chinese shopkeepers may choose to limit their interac-
tions with other members of the Chinese community.62,63,64 Zi goes as far as to claim that
55 Eric A. Posner, “The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,” The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review 63, no. 1 (1996): 133-197.
56 Jack L. Carr and Janet T. Landa, “The Economics of Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion,” The Journal of Legal Studies 12,
no. 1 (1983): 135-156.
57 Janet T. Landa, “A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law,”
The Journal of Legal Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 349-362.
58 Alexsandra Gadzala, “Survival of the Fittest? Kenya's Jua Kali and Chinese Businesses,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3,
no. 2 (2009): 202-220.
59 Xiao-Ping Chen and Chao C. Chen, “On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process Model of Guanxi Development,”
Asia Pacific Journal of Management 21, no. 3 (2004): 305-324.
60 Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, “The Internationalization of Ethnic Chinese Business Firms from Southeast Asia: Strategies,
Processes and Competitive Advantage,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23, no. 1 (1999): 88-102.
61 Murray L. Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs are Creating a
New Economic Superpower in Asia (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
62 Gregor Dobler, “Chinese Shops and the Formation of a Chinese Expatriate Community in Namibia,” The China Quarterly,
no. 199 (September 2009): 707–727.
63 Haugen and Carling, “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora
64 Francoise Bourdarias, “Chinese Migrants and Society in Mali: Local Constructions of Globalization,” African and Asian
Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): 269-285.

“the competitive business environment has turned Chinese merchants into rivals” in Bo-
tswana.65 Regarding South Africa specifically, Willemse argues that Chinese entrepreneurs
in Johannesburg rely heavily on guanxi networks with other Chinese people to reduce cost
and maintain a competitive advantage, such as through access to credit and greater ac-
countability in the stock procurement process.66 While Harrison, Moyo, and Yang concur
that the majority of Chinese traders operate within an ethnic cluster economy, they also
note that there was a complex mix of conﬂict, competition, and collaboration among the
Chinese community, where interviewees frequently referred to intra-Chinese tension and
were generally evasive about their place of residence.67 Two main sources of tension in Jo-
hannesburg are the increased business competition that is driving profits to unsustainably
low levels, and inter-regional prejudices which have been excited by the growing influx of
migrants from Fujian province.68,69,70 Significant levels of business competition were also
found in the small towns of South Africa.71,72
Most of the literature on migrant-local interactions can be divided into three main
types of relationships: significant economic relationships as business partners or patrons,
employer-employee relationships, and social relationships with local actors. On the first
type of interaction, Haugen takes a larger view and looks at more general areas of com-
plementarity and competition between the Chinese and Africans: an example of comple-
mentarity is inter-ethnic trading ventures where the Chinese partner manages the stock
procurement process from China, while the African partner manages the market demand
and builds a network of potential buyers of Chinese exports.73,74 In acknowledgment of
the literature on transaction cost economics, he notes that inter-ethnic cooperation often
entails higher risk than cooperation within ethnic groups; this elevated risk is not necessar-
ily associated with ethnicity, but with the lack of informal and formal institutions through
which sanctions can be applied in the case of a breach of trust. Lam and Dobler also record
65 Zi, “China Shop Businesses in Gaborone, Botswana,” 46.

66 Lodene Willemse, “The Role of Economic Factors and Guanxi Networks in the Success of Chinese Shops in Johannesburg,
South Africa,” Urban Forum 25, no. 1 (March 2014): 105-123.
67 Philip Harrison, Khangelani Moyo, and Yan Yang, “Strategy and Tactics: Chinese Immigrants and Diasporic Spaces in
Johannesburg, South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 38, no. 4 (2012): 899-925.
68 Romain Dittgen, “Features of Modernity, Development and ‘Orientalism.’”
69 Edwin Lin, "’Big Fish in a Small Pond’: Chinese Migrant Shopkeepers in South Africa," International Migration Review 48,
no. 1 (2014): 181-215.
70 Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, “Strategy and Tactics.”
71 Deumert and Mabandla, “‘Every Day a New Shop Pops Up’–South Africa's ‘New’ Chinese Diaspora and the Multilingual
Transformation of Rural Towns.”
73 Heidi Ø. Haugen, “Chinese Exports to Africa: Competition, Complementarity and Cooperation Between Micro-Level Ac-
tors,” Forum for Development Studies 38, no. 2 (2011): 157-176.
74 Mathilde Dupre and Weijing Shi, "La présence chinoise en Afrique de l’Ouest: le cas du Mali et du Bénin," Document de
travail 69 (2008).

20 Cheryl Yau
examples of Chinese and non-Chinese partnerships in Ghana and Namibia respectively,

where entrepreneurs maintain mutually beneficial relationships with local actors who can
provide them political and administrative protection.75,76 In terms of labor relations be-
tween the Chinese employer and local African employee, most literature including that
by Zi, Giese and Thiel, and Gadzala documents a situation of friction and conflict, though
some scholars such as Lam and Haugen and Carling have identified successful managerial
adaptations by more established Chinese merchants.77,78,79,80,81 Common challenges include
cultural differences in work ethic—where Chinese traders would find their local workers to
be lazy and unreliable, local employees would gripe about the long hours, low pay and lack
of gifts, the language barrier, and low trust exacerbated by theft. Johannesburg-based stud-
ies by Willemse and Harrison reveal similar patterns and concerns.82,83 On social relation-
ships between local Africans and ethnic Chinese migrants, some scholars have found that
Chinese tend to keep to themselves due to the poor security environment and corruption
in South Africa.84,85 Harrison, Moyo, and Yang found the degree of inter-ethnic interaction
is highly contingent on many different variables such as length of stay, English proficiency,
educational background, gender, age cohort, place of origin in China, and the long-term
plans of the migrant.86 Dittgen corroborates this, noting that more recent immigrants in
Johannesburg tend to be more socially isolated due to poorer English skills and savviness in
navigating the security situation.87
3. Methodology
The bulk of my data comes from ethnographic semi-structured interviews and
site observations (lasting between two to four hours each) at four different Chinese-run
shops in Cape Town. There is a sampling of shops from both inside and outside of ‘China-
town’ enclaves and of shop owners of varying provincial origin and length of time spent in
75 Lam, “Chinese Adaptations.”

76 Dobler, “Chinese Shops and the Formation of a Chinese Expatriate Community in Namibia.”
77 Zi, “China Shop Businesses in Gaborone, Botswana.”
78 Karsten Giese and Alena Thiel, “The Vulnerable Other — Distorted Equity in Chinese-Ghanaian Employment Relations,”
Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 6 (2012): 1101-1120.
79 Gadzala, “Survival of the Fittest?”
81 Haugen and Carling, “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora.”
82 Willemse, “The Role of Economic Factors and Guanxi Networks in the Success of Chinese Shops in Johannesburg, South
Africa.”
84 Lin, "’Big Fish in a Small Pond.’”
87 Romain Dittgen, “Features of Modernity, Development and ‘Orientalism.’”

South Africa. Brief shop and owner profiles can be found in Table 1 and Table 2 respec-
tively.
No. Sector Location Product Offerings Main Clientele

#1 Asian Outside of Asian cooking ingredients, 80% Asian, 20% lo-
Grocer Chinatown mainly imported from cal (mainly White)
Taiwan; Freshly prepared
Asian snacks
#2 Asian Outside of Asian cooking ingredi- 80% local (mainly
Grocer Chinatown ents; Cultural trinkets and White), 20% Asian
clothing
#3 Asian Chinatown Asian cooking ingredi- 80% local (mixed),
Grocer ents, Make-up, Some local 20% Asian
snacks
#4 Party/ Chinatown Decorative material; Cards, Almost entirely lo-

Events gifts, games; Accessories cal (mixed)
Merchan-
dise
Table 1: Shop Profiles
No. Owner(s) Origin Region Year of Brief Backgroud

Arrival
#1 Mr. A Taiwan* 1991 Mr. A came to South Africa to attend
boarding school with his brothers.
His family in Taiwan is in the same
line of business. He has previously
opened a restaurant. His wife joined
him in South Africa 7 years ago, and
they have two sons, who will be at-
tending school in South Africa. He is
a South African citizen.
#2 Mr. B Jiangsu 2013 Mr. B came to South Africa with his
wife and two sons to take over this
shop (own capital). He was previ-
ously a chef and restaurant owner
in Jiangsu. He plans to stay in South
Africa in the medium term, but is
also consider re-migration to other
countries (USA, UK, Australia)

22 Cheryl Yau
#3 Ms. C Fujian 2005 Ms. C arrived to work at an aunt’s

fashion shop in Kimberley (for a
year), before opening her own fash-
ion shop for 5 years (with borrowed
capital). She then returned to China
briefly for 2 years, before coming to
Cape Town. In the 5 years in Cape
Town, she has dabbled in the fashion,
Asian restaurant and Asian grocer
business. She currently runs the shop
with her husband, and has a 4- year-
old child.
Mr. C Guangdong 2007 Husband of Ms. C, and chef by
training. Background information
collected was not complete.
#4 Mr. D Fujian 2006 Mr. D arrived in South Africa to
work for someone from his home-
town in Bloemfontein (for 2 years)
before opening a local supermarket
(with borrowed capital). He closed
the shop due to a poor security envi-
ronment and moved to Cape Town to
open a fashion shop. He then moved
into the party/events merchandise
space, opening a shop in 2014, and
another shop in 2016. He has a semi-
arranged marriage with someone
from his hometown; his wife runs the
second shop, and they have two chil-
dren (whom they intend to school in
China).
Table 2: Shop Owner Profiles
The interview was divided into two sections. In the first half, I collected basic
and contextual information on the profile of the migrant and the business model of the
shop. In the second half, I aimed to map the shopkeeper’s economic and social interac-
tions by asking semi-structured questions about their relations with key groups of people
(business partners, employees, customers, close friends, other Chinese people, local
African people), and by incorporating more structured activities, adapted from the World
Bank Social Capital Assessment Tool and Nan Lin’s Position Generator. The former is a
structured questionnaire that asks about group membership, networks, civic engagement
and group norms, while the latter looks at the presence (or absence) of acquaintances of
specific occupational groups in one’s network. Both structured activities are commonly
used in the measurement of social capital, where social capital is conceptualized as a
group attribute—for instance, trust, norms and exercise of sanctions—that is available to
all members of a group, and which better enables transaction and collective action, or as
an individual attribute embedded within specific members of one’s network but which is

accessible to other member of a group, such as information and social support.88 I found
them to be relevant as an examination of the social interactions and networks of migrants
is also a practice in uncovering the nature of the social capital they possess. Specifically, I
was interested to find out if migrants possess bonding, bridging and/or linking social capi-
tal. Bonding social capital comprise trusting and supportive relations within homogenous
groups, bridging social capital describes relations between individuals who are dissimilar
with regards to social identity while linking social capital arises from relationships with
power or resource differentials.89
During my site observation, I focused on the product offerings, customer traffic,
the racial demographic of the clientele (Asian/White/Black), and the modes of interac-
tion between owner, employees, and customer. All of the conversations took place in their
shop, where I would usually interview the shop owner as they ran the cashier. Most of the
shop owners would not want to leave their position at the cashier, but would be happy to
spend their time conversing with me at the cashier. I also conversed with paying clients
at the cashier if that was an appropriate course of action. All of the interviews except one
were conducted entirely in Mandarin.
All interviewees gave informed voluntary consent—verbal, and in signature—to
participate in the study without compensation, where I promised anonymity, the removal
of all identifying information, and the option of withdrawal at any point. I explained my
research purpose and process both verbally and in print, in their language of choice (Eng-
lish or Mandarin Chinese). Five interviews were conducted, and one was audio-recorded.
Field notes were recorded on the spot. It is important to note that I was a Singaporean
exchange student of ethnic Chinese heritage with fluency in both English and Mandarin.
I believe that this worked in my favor, as I could reap the benefits of cultural and language
familiarity, while avoiding the suspicion that the community may have towards other mi-
grants from Mainland China (who they may suspect have ulterior motives). While some
were initially guarded towards me, they all eventually warmed up after I established my
credentials as a student at the University of Cape Town and as a Singaporean.
4. Findings and Discussion

Shops as Social Spaces
As discussed in the literature review, past studies by other scholars have en-
abled us to piece together the general business model of Chinese-run retail shops. The
basic model is focused on low-end cheap consumer and household goods that have been
imported from China, with the main customer segment being lower-income, price-
88 Ester Villalonga-Olives and Ichiro Kawachi, “The Measurement of Social Capital,” Gaceta sanitaria 29, no. 1 (2015): 62-64.
89 Michael Woolcock and Anne T. Sweetser, “Bright Ideas: Social Capital—The Bonds That Connect,” ADB Review 34, no. 2
(2002).

24 Cheryl Yau
conscious locals.90,91,92 I found this business model functioning in Cape Town as well. This
model is not product-specific: in their ten odd years in South Africa, both Mr. D and Ms.
C have had past business ventures involving other product types, ranging from general
merchandise to clothing and foodstuff. In some sense, they are making a living off knowl-
edge of a process (and access to a Chinese-dominated trading infrastructure), and not of a
product.
However, I found that in Cape Town, there are two variants of this import-and-
retail based model. The first model (Model A) is the tried and tested business model
outlined above, where migrant entrepreneurs compete on the basis of low prices and
market to low-income or price conscious consumers—which is what Shop #4 and most
shops in Chinatown complexes are based on. In the second model (Model B), the shop
targets a niche market, either middle- to high-income local South Africans who are look-
ing to learn more about East Asian culture and foods, or the East Asian diaspora. This
aligns with the typology of ‘China shops’ outlined by Laribee.93 Shops #1 and #2 adopt
this model, with the former focusing more on a local White clientele, and the latter on the
Asian diaspora. While in Shop #1, I was told by a customer—a White South African—that
she had “just bought the new Jamie Oliver cookbook, and more than half of the recipes
require miso (a paste commonly used in Japanese cooking).” Another customer, likewise
a White South African, was preparing to “make dim sum from scratch for dinner” that
night with her partner and was picking up the necessary ingredients from the store. The
point of entry into the second model is usually food, though the shops may also stock
other cultural items like cheongsams (Chinese traditional clothing) and little cultural
trinkets. In this model, price competitiveness is not as important as product offering
or customer service—after all, Asian groceries are usually more expensive than normal
groceries from chain supermarkets. As such, while the process may be similar, this second
model is fundamentally different in its value proposition and customer segment. Mr. B is
very aware of this fact, noting that he is “doing a different kind of business,” and that his
customers are not that concerned about price and “do not ask for a discount.” This model
may be a phenomenon specific to South Africa on the continent due to the relative pros-
perity of a segment of her people—which gives rise to the niche population segment who
is able to afford experimenting with more expensive cultural foods—and the large size of
the Chinese diaspora. Park and Alden note that there is also a thriving economy in Johan-
nesburg which primarily services the Chinese ethnic community.94
91 Yoon Jung Park, “Chinese migration in Africa,” SAIIA Occasional Paper, no. 24 (February 2009): pp. 1-17.
92 Haugen and Carling, “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora.”
94 Yoon Jung Park and Christopher Alden, "'Upstairs' and 'Downstairs' Dimensions of China and the Chinese in South Africa,"
State of the nation: South Africa 2013 (2012): 643-662.

These two models are largely mutually exclusive due to their spatial dimension.
There are three Chinatowns in Cape Town, and they have all been branded as sites of bar-
gain prices—a branding that is very aligned with the first, but not the second model.95 As
Mr. B, who runs a shop with his main customer segment being White folks says, “my shop
will not survive in Chinatown as they will not go there, just like how if you shop at Wool-
worths, you will not go to Shoprite” (Woolworths and Shoprite are two large chain grocery
stores in South Africa, catering to a higher-income and lower-income clientele respec-
tively). This may explain why Mr. and Ms. C are struggling with their business: setting up
an Asian grocer which sells cultural food ingredients is fundamentally incompatible to the
clientele that patronizes Chinatown. As Ms. C puts it, “we are making enough to survive,
but business is not that good.” She also noted that they tried to target the niche market of
Asian consumers but was unsuccessful, as products moved too slowly and expired before
they finished selling. I also noticed they have branched out into selling non-food items
(like make-up), and have chosen to carry a significant range of cheap snacks and drinks
(under R20), in effect trying to straddle a mixed model to reconcile product and location.
Nonetheless, Mr. B who runs an Asian grocer outside of the Chinatown has unexpect-
edly created a space that has successful elements of both models. While his main (and
intended) business is to target the White ‘cultural’ market, he has unexpectedly powered a
secondary trade in resale of Beijing sorghum alcohol, peddled by Black petty street trad-
ers. Over the course of four hours of site observations, I noted seven individuals or groups
coming in to buy this alcohol in varying degrees of ‘bulk’ (in 750ml to 2 litre bottles),
with expenditure ranging from R250-R700. Mr D. also noted that these are mostly regular
customers, who come every three to four days, for this one specific purpose. The product
appeal is presumably in its ‘value for money’, which makes it more similar to products
marketed under the first model: at R170 for 2 litres of alcohol with a 50%+ alcohol by
volume (ABV), it is cheaper (and possibly, more palatable) than most standard spirits.
Consequentially, because of their different value propositions and customer
segments, the shops are very different kinds of social spaces, both in terms of shopkeeper-
customer relations, and shopkeeper-employee relations. All four shops hire Black em-
ployees (a mix of South Africans, and African migrants). In my site observations, I noted
that Model A shops (Shops #3 and #4) are more transactional spaces, where conversations
between shop owners and customers are often limited to asking about price, or a specific
product. Despite so, shop owners are comparatively quick to defer to local employees. Mr.
D, who runs the party/event merchandise shop in Chinatown, defers immediately all the
time (regardless of the question) while Ms. C, only tries to answer simple questions. An
interaction that repeated itself in similar forms multiple times in my two hours in Shop #4
95 T. Tu Huynh, "‘It's Not Copyrighted,’ Looking West for Authenticity: Historical Chinatowns and China Town Malls in South
Africa," China Media Research 11, no. 1 (2015).

26 Cheryl Yau
would go like this:

Customer: “Do you have this in another colour?”
Mr. D: (calls out) “Anna (employee’s name), can you help the customer”
Ms. C notes that such an interaction, where Chinese shopkeepers display an obvious lack
of interest in communicating with customers, is a feature of most shops in the Chinatown,
and that she personally tries to smile or be more conscious of her tone. Ms. C and Mr. D
also shared stories about unpleasant exchanges with local customers. Ms. C recounted an
incident from her previous fashion business where a customer insisted on a refund—rais-
ing a ruckus, and even taking away her card machine— despite having “clearly worn the
dress”. Although this incident happened three years ago, she said she remembers it clearly
and that it took “an emotional toll on her”. She also noted that there has been “more and
more unreasonable customers”, and an increasing frequency of such incidents had led
the Chinatown mall management to enter talks with the local police to agree on a refund
policy in the recent period. This was corroborated by Mr. D, who further noted that such
customers often mobilize anti-foreigner and anti-Chinese rhetoric.
In contrast, Model B shops (Shops #1 and #2) feature greater and more posi-
tive owner-customer interaction, and the Chinese shop owners are less dependent on
employees for customer service: Mr. B tries to answer queries to the best of his language
ability, and Mr. A can manage all interactions perfectly. Mr. A and Mr. B are also more
conscious of the social environment of their shop. Mr. B says that he would remind any
visiting (Chinese) friends to keep their voices down so as to create a conducive shopping
environment. He is always on the phone, and some clients call ahead before arriving. Mr.
A is very particular about the face of the shop, and detailed to me his recruitment process
and challenges for the front cashier. While research by Zi and Giese and Thiel suggest
that many Chinese shopkeepers are concerned about cashier staffing, Mr. A’s concerns
extended beyond finding someone who was reliable and trustworthy, but also someone
who could interact well with his customers.96,97 He also noted that they are “many ethnic-
based organizations”,98 numbering in the dozens, and he tries not to actively associate
himself with any of them groups so as to allow the shop to be a “neutral space” for all East
Asians (his main clientele). In both shops, it is common to hear owner and customers
exchange greetings and share about their day. Such exchanges take place in both English
and Mandarin, depending on the customer. Many customers are regulars, and some have

97 Giese and Thiel, “The Vulnerable Other.”
98 It is estimated that there are more than 120 different Chinese associations in South Africa, though most are active in the
Johannesburg area. See Park and Rugunanan (2010).

become their friends—a stark contrast from how Ms. C and Mr. D spoke of their custom-
ers. However, it is important to note that Shops #1 and #2 are not just social spaces, but
also cultural spaces—people come here to speak Mandarin/Taiwanese, or to learn more
about East Asian culture. One customer in Shop #2, who I was later told would regularly
come by to buy a snack and drink and stay to converse, asked Mr. B if he would be willing
to teach him Mandarin. As Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller point out, Chinatown in Western
societies have, at different points in time and space, cycled through being spaces of ethnic
exchange, and as spaces of ethnic solidarity; however, in Cape Town, it is these small
niche shops that play this role, and not necessarily the spaces that have been branded as
‘Chinatown’.99
Interactions with Local Africans

The key mode of interaction between Chinese migrant shop owners and non-
Chinese South Africans seem to be in the context of shop owner-customer and employer-
employee. As reported in Table 3, none of my interviewees listed non-Chinese people as
their close friends, or reported participation in mixed-demographic organizations—with
the exception of Mr. A, who grew up and was educated in South Africa since elementary
school and is the only migrant in the study that falls into the second migration wave into
South Africa. It is noteworthy that this is also true of the two shopkeepers who have been
in South Africa for upwards of 10 years. It is not simply the length of time that matters,
but the experience of having grown up and educated in South Africa that catalyzes social
interactions with local South Africans. Mr. A concurs, noting that most of his close friends
are former classmates. As a group in this study, third wave migrants have very limited
bridging social capital, and are also limited in the range of occupations to which they have
access (since Chinese people tend to occupy similar jobs). However, both Mr. C and Mr. D
were upfront in stating that they have no desire to form intra-ethnic relationships, citing
significant language and cultural differences.
Further, one of the only modes of interaction between Chinese shopkeepers and
local Africans—as employers and employees—is also often seen as a challenging relation-
ship that needs to be managed. It is noteworthy though, that all shops featured in this
study, and most of the other ‘China shops’ I visited, hire non-Asian labor. I summarize
the nature and challenges of their relationship with labor in Table 4, which largely coheres
with the reviewed literature on Chinese-local labor relations by Zi, Giese and Thiel, and
Gadzala. Recurring sentiments include the difficulty of hiring reliable, hardworking and
trustworthy labor—with exception of Mr. D, none of them would allow their employees
99 Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller, “Transnational Entrepreneurs.”

28 Cheryl Yau
to handle the cashier. Mr. A, in particularly, had very poor experiences with labor man-
agement: he claims that his ex-restaurant employee sued him on a fabricated case, but
still won, and that “local Black Africans can decide their own hours as if they were the
boss.” Clearly, the relationship between the Chinese and the local African is not as one-
dimensional as the media and politicians often portray, and power can be exerted both
ways.100,101
No. Owner(s) Associated Orga- Personal Network General Appraisal

nizations
#1 Mr. A Alumni Asso- Closest friends are Active social life, largely
(1991) ciation [mainly his ex-classmates, outside of formal groups.
White South who are White Used to go out “almost ev-
Africans] South Africans, ery day” with is ex-class-
occupying a range mates before his children
Taiwan Liaison of occupations were born.
Office [Chinese] (carpenter, dentist,
Chinese Founda- martial artist).
tion [Chinese]
#2 Mr. B Citizen’s Centre Listed an ex-chef Claims that his life
(2013) [Chinese] colleague, still based revolves around his shop
in China, and a and his family, and that he
Jiangsu Trader’s Chinese tour guide, actively tries to distance
Association [Chi- based in South himself from groups,
nese] Africa (met through though his wife is far more
Chinese Embassy the Citizen’s Centre) active.
[Chinese] as his close friends
#3 Ms. C Church [Chinese] Closest personal
(2005) network are rela-
Dance Troupe tives and peers from
[Chinese] Fujian. Did not
Citizen’s Centre specifically list.
[Chinese]
Mr. C Citizen’s Centre Listed closest Personal network is large-
(2007) [Chinese] friends are all ethni- ly separate from wife’s,
cally Chinese, and on the basis that they are
mainly relatives from different hometowns
and/or in the res-
taurant industry.
#4 Mr. D Dragon Dance Closest personal Claims that his life
(2006) Troupe [Chinese] network are rela- revolves around his shop
tives and peers from and his family, and is bor-
Citizen’s Centre Fujian. Declined to ing. Fear of going out at
[Chinese] specifically list. night.
Table 3: Shop Owners and their Social Networks and Groups. *Year of arrival in brackets.


No. Sector Employee Demographics and Relations

#1 Asian Grocer 5 Black staff; 3 women, 2 men. All from Zimbabwe,
who they find have a “better work ethic than lazy
Black South Africans”. They are trying to hire an
Asian to man the cashier/do customer service. Labor
management is their largest challenge; Mr. A was
previously sued by one of his staff in his restaurant
business.
#2 Asian Grocer 3 Black female staff. South Africans, who have all
worked for upwards of 5 years (before Mr. B took
over from the previous owner). Mr. B is the only
person who did not quote labor management as a
key challenge, though he believes that the greatest
security threat will arise from an ‘insider job’.
#3 Asian Grocer 2 Black staff; 1 female South African; 1 male non-
South African (nationality not revealed). Claims that
Black staff tends to be ‘unclean’ (petty stealing) and
less responsible than Chinese staff.
#4 Party/Events Merchandise 3 Black female staff. South African. He pays one of
them more as the ‘head’, and only communicates di-
rectly with that staff. He claims that the workers have
“no loyalty” and tend to come and go as they please.
Table 4: Employee Demographics and Relations by Shop
In the context of shop owner-customer and employer-employee interaction, we

have detailed above how different business models require different levels of interaction
with customers, and by extension with employees. There is a spectrum of modes of inter-
actions, ranging from transactional to full engagement, and different levels of deference
to local Black staff in serving customers. However, the choice of business model may not
be an endogenous factor, and a possible future research paper (with a larger sample size)
should consider if the profile of migrant who enter these different business models are
different to begin with. Language ability is an obvious candidate; however, it is not deter-
ministic: Mr. B came to South Africa with rudimentary English ability, but forced himself
to learn and actively interact with his customers. Migrant motivation, and whether they
intend to remain in South Africa for the medium to long-term is another factor to con-
sider.102 As Harrison, Moyo, and Yang conclude, the choice of activities Chinese migrant
choose to engage in is diverse and a function of a multitude of factors.103
Local South Africans do not feature as key economic partners (as opposed to the
situation in Mali, Namibia, and Ghana in the literature). However, some of the key chal-
lenges detailed by interviewees could possibly be better managed by a local partner e.g.
102 Chen, “Chinatown in Johannesburg - A Social Survey.”


30 Cheryl Yau
labor management, anti-foreign hostility. This may also be an issue of scale—the focus of
the research is on shops of the smallest scale, who operate mostly sole proprietor simple
business models, where the benefit of a local-foreign partnership model may not outweigh
the increased risk involved with working with a non co-ethnic.104 There is still collabora-
tion in smaller, less significant ways, for instance as secondary suppliers, or as large clients
(usually restaurant purchasers). Mr. A also has a friend working in the food magazine
industry, who helped with publicizing Asian recipes and his shop—though he is also an
exception rather than the norm in the extensiveness of his local connections.
Navigating the Chinese Diaspora

Intra-Chinese relationships are very important to the business model of all my
interviewees. All my interviewees plug into a very Chinese-dominated infrastructure:
their main suppliers are Chinese, and they keep track of supply movements through
WeChat, a Chinese-developed and dominated social media platform. Willemse and Chen
documented a similar situation in Johannesburg.105,106 This likely coheres with the theory
of transaction cost economics: working with other Chinese reduces both transaction cost
(removal of language barriers, for example, in negotiating lease) and contract enforcement
cost (socialization into overlapping networks deters opportunistic behaviour). Collabora-
tion with other Chinese also reduces the risk of being embroiled into legal conflict. As Mr.
A notes, the Chinese party will “definitely lose if they go to court” to a White/Black South
African, assumedly due to the liminal and outsider status of the Chinese.107 This is espe-
cially significant coming from Mr. A, who is a South African citizen and who grew up/
have been in South Africa for 28 years; if he is conscious about his contract vulnerability
in a partnership with a local non-Chinese South African, this feeling must be significantly
pronounced among recent migrants with less language and cultural familiarity. Mr. C also
euphemistically notes that other Chinese people will be more “flexible” to their challenges,
a possible reference to circumventing of issues of legal documentation. This is a very real
possibility, in light of the recent raid (May 2018) of undocumented Chinese immigrants
on Sable Square Chinatown.
As presented in Table 3, all interviewees but one listed co-ethnics as their clos-
est friends in their personal network, and everyone primarily reported participation in
ethnic-based organizations—demonstrating the importance of intra-Chinese relationships
in the social sphere too. However, these organizational spaces and personal networks are
104 Heidi Ø. Haugen, “Chinese Exports to Africa.”

105 Willemse, “The Role of Economic Factors and Guanxi Networks in the Success of Chinese Shops in Johannesburg, South
Africa.”
107 Park, “Liminal Spaces.”

often divided on the basis of origin province, or at least migrant waves, layered against
the backdrop of the multi-generational, diverse communities of Chinese in South Afri-
ca.108 The Mainland China and Taiwan divide is an obvious cleavage given the fraught
political relationship between the two entities: organizations, in particular, tend to have
institutional affiliation with the China Embassy or the Taiwan Liaison Office. For instance,
the Citizen’s Centre and Chinese Foundation is affiliated to the China Embassy and the
Taiwan Liaison Office respectively. An interesting anecdotal example of cleavages in the
Chinese community by hometown can be found in the story of Mr. and Ms. C: although
they are husband and wife, Mr. C and Ms. C run in different personal social networks
because they come from different provinces (Guangdong and Fujian respectively). Admit-
tedly, the dominance of the hometown may be more pronounced for those who come
from the traditional-sending regions because they have a lot of family and peers here.109
Mr. B further notes: “the Taiwanese [second group] and the Old Chinese [first group] tend
to be closer—for instance, the history of the Chinese School/Community Centre dates
back to far before most of us [third group of immigrants] arrived”. He also consistently
spoke about the ‘Fujian’ migrants as a separate group: while criticizing Jiangsu people
(specifically those from Shanghai) as being too self-arrogant, he has at multiple times
in our conversation asserted that he is ‘different’ from the Fujian migrants. This divide
between migrants from the Fujian province and migrants from the (typically richer) prov-
inces is also identified by Harrison, Moyo, Yang, and Chen among Chinese migrants in
Johannesburg.110,111 Nonetheless, these divisions—particularly at the individual level—are
not hard and fast. Most report that they do not discriminate on the basis of origin prov-
ince in their casual daily social interaction, and none of my interviewees reported intense
tension between Fujian and non-Fujian migrants—a situation that has been documented
in other African contexts.112,113
There are also informal spaces of mixing which promote interaction across the
entire diaspora. Shop #1, which caters largely to an Asian clientele, is a great example of
such a space. Mr. A says that his shop is a space of information seeking, where more recent
migrants would seek advice on navigating life in South Africa (e.g. on choice of hospitals
and schools) or seek his help with English-to-Mandarin translation. I also walked in on
Mr. B having an extensive conversation where he was very frank about business operation
costs and profits, with another ethnic Chinese man, who I later learned is Taiwanese—an-
109 Lin, "‘Big Fish in a Small Pond.’”
113 Tu T. Huynh, Yoon Jung Park, and Anna Ying Chen, “Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980s to
Present,” African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): 286-306.

32 Cheryl Yau
other example of significant interaction across documented divisions in the community.

Further, interviewees were generally not evasive about their place of residence, or more
sensitive questions pertaining to profits or economic organization, indicating a possibly
more relaxed environment among the Chinese in Cape Town than what previous studies
found in Namibia, Botswana, and Johannesburg.114,115,116 However, this is also a large claim
to make, which would benefit from further scrutiny in a study with a larger sample that
looks at a greater diversity of scales and sectors of shops.
At the same time, even though intra-Chinese relationships dominate both the
economic and social sphere, they are mostly two separate streams of relationships and
social interactions are not servile to economic relations. My interviewees are not too
concerned about building networks to improve their business, and participation in social
groups and organizations, if any, are more geared towards recreation (e.g. dragon dance,
eating out, church). Professional associations do exist, but they do not seem to be priori-
tized. This seems to indicate a weak guanxi culture—the basis of which is the intertwining
of economic and social relationships—in this business environment. Mr. B talked at length
about this, noting that part of the reason for migration is to escape the toxic guanxi busi-
ness culture in Jiangsu, where there is always a need to buttress up to, or entertain other
people socially for his restaurant business. In Cape Town, he found his economic relations
with other Chinese people occur in more institutionalized and less personalized ways.
It should be noted this could also be a function of the scale of the business model under
study, where its small scale presumably implies lower barriers to entry (guanxi relation-
ships usually facilitate some form of exclusive access).
Last, we turn to look at the level of competition in the business environment.
Many scholars including Bourdarias, Dobler, and Laribee have identified increased busi-
ness competitions between Chinese migrant retailers as a key source of tension, which has
impacted the degree of social interaction within the community.117,118,119 In this context,
the Chinatown malls are a particularly noteworthy space: it is a site of intense competi-
tion, where shops carrying near-similar products are geographically proximate. However,
in my site observation, I found that Chinatown is also a space of collegiality where shop-
keepers display a shared understanding of each other’s situation. While I was at Shop #3,
I noticed other ethnic Chinese shopkeepers (or possibly, employees) would come to buy
drinks and banter, or borrow the heater. Ms. C also told me she had helped to watch the
114 Gregor Dobler, "From Scotch Whisky to Chinese Sneakers: International Commodity Flows and New Trade Networks in
Oshikango, Namibia," Africa 78, no. 3 (2008): 410-432.
117 Bourdarias, “Chinese Migrants and Society in Mali.”
118 Dobler, "From Scotch Whisky to Chinese Sneakers."

shop across from hers for almost a month and a half when the owner had to return home
to attend a family funeral. Mr. D, whose shop is in a front (and hence better) location also
claims that he will not lower his prices to out-compete those at the back as “everyone is
just trying to eke out a living”. When I enquired about the possibility of a price war hap-
pening within Chinatown, he dismissively noted that “we all know what the cost price of
the goods are, and we will not push it down to make a loss.”. However, there is a limit to
the help provided: for instance, Ms. C was unable to assist with stock replenishing when
she helped her shop neighbour look over his shop, and she referenced cases of conflict
over price-setting. Among both Chinatown and non-Chinatown shop owners, it is also
not uncommon to hear the sentiment that “one cannot be too careful with other Chinese
people,” and Ms. C quotes the church as the “only place where she can completely let her
guard down.” This likely explains why many of the shopkeepers were quite guarded when I
was initially snooping around (before formally introducing myself).
5. Conclusion
In this study, I found that ethnic Chinese migrant shopkeepers in Cape Town
have extensive and significant interactions with other Chinese people—whether to sustain
their economic lives, or in their social networks. Chinese retailers plug into a Chinese-
dominated infrastructure to obtain their supplies, and at times, their shop leases, and this
is likely due to the lowered transaction cost from dealing with a co-ethnic, particularly in
a legal environment which is perceived to disadvantage the Chinese. This lower transac-
tion cost is also a reflection of the social capital that the Chinese community possess as
a whole, in the form of trust, norms or exercise of sanctions. Social interactions within
the Chinese community are guided by the contours of well-documented divides in the
multi-layered diaspora space of South Africa, and a guardedness that arises from busi-
ness competition. This is consistent with the reviewed literature by Harrison and Park and
Chen. However, I also find that such tensions co-exist with an empathy-driven collegiality;
and this dynamic is best observed in the ‘Chinatown malls’. If as Huynh argues, that the
‘Chinatown malls’ in Cape Town should be seen as spaces of Chinese identity-making in
a Global South context, it does indeed depart from the Western-dominated literature on
Chinatown to be a space with a curious mix of both solidarity and guardedness.120
The key modes of interaction between recent Chinese migrant shopkeepers
and Africans are in the shop, as employer-employee and as owner-customer. However,
spatially determined business models give rise to different kinds of social spaces within
the shop, which configure these interactions differently. Broadly speaking, shop owners
who compete on the basis of low prices and market to price-conscious everyday consum-
ers tend to have more transactional relationships with customers, and defer more to local
120 Tu T. Huynh, “China Town Malls in South Africa in the 21st Century.”

34 Cheryl Yau
Black staff in serving customers, while shop owners who market cultural goods to a niche
market tend to have deeper and more positive engagements with their customers. Except
for Mr. A, Chinese migrants in this study seem to have relatively low levels of bridging and
linking social capital, shopkeepers selling to a niche market seem to have more opportu-
nities to build social capital through their shop. Given that these shops also cater to the
East Asian diaspora, they serve as informal spaces of bonding and linking capital within
the Chinese community. Management of a Black workforce is a predominant concern of
most interviewees, who cite difficulties with hiring reliable and trustworthy labor. African
employees evidently display some agency in the employer-employee relationship, which
challenges constructions of the passive, powerless African.

Works Cited
Accone, Darryl. All Under Heaven: The Story of a Chinese Family in South Africa. Cape
Town: New Africa Books, 2004.
Alden, Chris. “China in Africa.” Survival, 47, no. 3 (2005): 147-164. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00396330500248086
Broadman, Harry G. Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier. Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank, 2006.
Brautigam, Deborah. The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009.
Bourdarias, Francoise. “Chinese Migrants and Society in Mali: Local Constructions of Glo-
balization.” African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): 269-285.
Carling, Jørgen, and Heidi Haugen. "How an African outpost is filled with Chinese shops."
In unpublished paper presented at the Fifth International Conference of the Interna-
tional Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, Denmark. 2004.
Carr, Jack L., and Janet T. Landa. “The Economics of Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion.”
The Journal of Legal Studies 12, no. 1 (1983): 135-156.
Chen, Xiao-Ping, and Chao C. Chen. “On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process
Model of Guanxi Development.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 21, no. 3 (2004):
305-324.
Chen, Fenglan. “Chinatown in Johannesburg - A Social Survey.” The China Monitor 61
(April 2011): 8-11.
Deumert, Ana, and Nkululeko Mabandla. “‘Every Day a New Shop Pops Up’–South Africa's
‘New’ Chinese Diaspora and the Multilingual Transformation of Rural Towns: A First
Study of Chinese Migration and Language Contact in Rural South Africa.” English
Today 29, no. 1 (2013): 44-52.
Dittgen, Romain. “From isolation to integration? A study of Chinese retailers in Dakar.”
SAIIA Occasional Paper, no. 57 (March 2010): 1-14.
Dittgen, Romain. “Features of Modernity, Development and ‘Orientalism’: Reading Johan-
nesburg through its ‘Chinese’ Urban Spaces.” Journal of Southern African Studies 43,
no. 5 (2017): 979-996.
Dobler, Gregor. "From Scotch whisky to Chinese sneakers: international commodity flows
and new trade networks in Oshikango, Namibia." Africa 78, no. 3 (2008): 410-432.
Dobler, Gregor. “Chinese Shops and the Formation of a Chinese Expatriate Community in
Namibia.” The China Quarterly, no. 199 (September 2009): 707–727.

36 Cheryl Yau
Dupré, Mathilde, and Weijing Shi. "La présence chinoise en Afrique de l’Ouest: le cas du
Mali et du Bénin." Document de travail 69 (2008).
Gadzala, Alexsandra. “Survival of the Fittest? Kenya's Jua Kali and Chinese Businesses.”
Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 2 (2009): 202-220.
Giese, Karsten and Alena Thiel. “The Vulnerable Other — Distorted Equity in Chinese-
Ghanaian Employment Relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 6 (2012): 1101-
1120.
Harris, Karen L. “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933).” Kronos 40,
no. 1 (2014): 133-153.
Harrison, Philip, Khangelani Moyo, and Yan Yang. “Strategy and Tactics: Chinese Immi-
grants and Diasporic Spaces in Johannesburg, South Africa.” Journal of Southern Afri-
can Studies 38, no. 4 (2012): 899-925.
Haugen, Heidi Ø., and Jørgen Carling. “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora: The Surge of
Baihuo Business in an African City.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 639-
662.
Haugen, Heidi Ø. “Chinese Exports to Africa: Competition, Complementarity and Coop-
eration Between Micro-Level Actors.” Forum for Development Studies 38, no. 2 (2011):
157-176.
Ho, Conal G.Y. “The “Doing” and “Undoing” of Community: Chinese Networks in Ghana.”
China aktuell 3 (2008): 45-76.
Huynh, Tu T., Yoon Jung Park, and Anna Ying Chen. “Faces of China: New Chinese Mi-
grants in South Africa, 1980s to Present.” African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010):
286-306.
Huynh, T. Tu. "" It's Not Copyrighted," Looking West for Authenticity: Historical China-
towns and China Town Malls in South Africa." China Media Research 11, no. 1 (2015).
Huynh, Tu T. “China Town Malls in South Africa in the 21st Century: Ethnic Chinatowns
or Chinese State Projects?” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 27, no. 1 (2018): 28-54.
Kernen, Antoine, and Benoît Vulliet. “Chinese Small-Business Owners and Traders in Mali
and Senegal.” Afrique contemporaine, no. 4 (2008): 69-94.
Kohnert, Dirk. "Are Chinese in Africa More Innovative than Africans." Comparing Cul-
tures of Innovation of Chinese and Nigerian Entrepreneurial Migrants. Hamburg:
GIGA-Working Papers 140 (2010).
Kuang, Emmanuel M.M., “The New Chinese Migration Flows to Africa.” Social Science
Information 47, no. 4 (2008): 643-659.

Lam, Katy N. “Chinese Adaptations: African Agency, Fragmented Community and Social
Capital Creation in Ghana.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44, no. 1 (2015): 9-41.
Landa, Janet T. “A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Insti-
tutional Alternative to Contract Law.” The Journal of Legal Studies 10, no. 2 (1981):
349-362.
Laribee, Rachel. “The China Shop Phenomenon: Trade Supply Within the Chinese Dias-
pora in South Africa.” Africa Spectrum, (2008): 353-370.
Light, Ivan. “From Vice District to Tourist Attraction: The Moral Career of American Chi-
natowns, 1880-1940.” Pacific Historical Review 43, no. 3 (1974): 367-394.
Lin, Edwin. "“Big Fish in a Small Pond”: Chinese Migrant Shopkeepers in South Africa."
International Migration Review 48, no. 1 (2014): 181-215.
Lyons, Michal, Alison Brown, and Zhigang Li. “The ‘Third Tier’ of Globalization: African
Traders in Guangzhou.” City 12, no. 2 (2008): 196-206.
Merli, M. Giovanna, Ashton Verdery, Ted Mouw, and Jing Li. “Sampling Migrants from
their Social Networks: The Demography and Social Organization of Chinese Migrants
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.” Migration Studies 4, no. 2 (2016): 182-214.
Mohan, Giles, and May Tan-Mullins. “Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of Devel-
opment? An Analytical Framework.” The European Journal of Development Research
21, no. 4 (2009): 588-605.
Mohan, Giles, and Dinar Kale. "The Invisible Hand of South-South Globalization: Chinese
Migrants in Africa." A Report for the Rockefeller Foundation prepared by The Devel-
opment Policy and Practice Department, The Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7
6AA, UK (2007).
Park, Yoon Jung. A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa. Lexington Books,
2008.
Park, Yoon Jung. “Chinese migration in Africa.” SAIIA Occasional Paper, no. 24 (February
2009): pp. 1-17.
Park, Yoon Jung, and Anna Ying Chen. “Recent Chinese Migrants in Small Towns of Post-
Apartheid South Africa.” Revue européenne des migrations internationales 25, no. 1
(2009): 25-44.
Park, Yoon Jung, and Pragna Rugunanan. "Visible and vulnerable: Asian migrant commu-
nities in South Africa." Available at: www. s-an t. co. za/downloads/.../13_Visible_and_
Vulnerable. pdf.(Accessed on October 05, 2011.) (2010).

38 Cheryl Yau
Park, Yoon Jung, and Christopher Alden. "Upstairs” and “Downstairs” Dimensions of Chi-
na and the Chinese in South Africa." State of the nation: South Africa 2013 (2012):
643-662.
Park, Yoon Jung. “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other”
and the Role of Memory.” African Studies Review 56, no. 1 (2013): 131-153.
Park, Yoon Jung. “Liminal Spaces: Ethnic Chinese in the Borderlands of Southern Africa.”
In Migration and Agency in a Globalizing World, edited by Scarlett Cornelissen and
Yoichi Mine, 91-113. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018.
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. “Social Capital and Migration: Beyond Ethnic Economies.” Eth-
nicities 3, no. 1 (2003): 29-58.
Portes, Alejandro, Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, and William J. Haller. “Transnational Entrepre-
neurs: An Alternative Form of Immigrant Economic Adaptation.” American Sociologi-
cal Review (2002): 278-298.
Posner, Eric A. “The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions
on Collective Action.” The University of Chicago Law Review 63, no. 1 (1996): 133-197.
Putnam, Robert. “Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences.” Canadian Journal of
Policy Research 2, no. 1 (2001): 41-51
Sylvanus, Nina. “Chinese Devils, the Global Market, and the Declining Power of Togo’s
Nana-Benzes.” African Studies Review 56, no. 1 (2013): 65-80.
Villalonga-Olives, Ester, and Ichiro Kawachi. “The Measurement of Social Capital.” Gaceta
sanitaria 29, no. 1 (2015): 62-64.
Weidenbaum, Murray L., and Samuel Hughes. The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chi-
nese Entrepreneurs are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia. New York: Si-
mon & Schuster, 1996.
Wilhelm, Janet. “The Chinese communities in South Africa.” In State of the Nation: South
Africa 2005-2006, edited by Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Jes-
sica Lutchman, 350-368. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006.
Willemse, Lodene. “The Role of Economic Factors and Guanxi Networks in the Success of
Chinese Shops in Johannesburg, South Africa.” Urban Forum 25, no. 1 (March 2014):
105-123.
Woolcock, Michael, and Anne T. Sweetser. “Bright Ideas: Social Capital—The Bonds That
Connect.” ADB Review 34, no. 2 (2002).
Yang, Yang. "African Traders in Guangzhou." Globalization from Below (2012): 154-170.

Yap, Melanie. Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South
Africa. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996.
Yeung, Henry Wai-Chung. “The Internationalization of Ethnic Chinese Business Firms
from Southeast Asia: Strategies, Processes and Competitive Advantage.” International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23, no. 1 (1999): 88-102.
Zack, Tanya. “‘Jeppe’—Where Low-End Globalisation, Ethnic Entrepreneurialism and the
Arrival City Meet.” Urban Forum 26, no. 2 (June 2015): 131-150.
Zi, Yanyin. “China Shop Businesses in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with
the Local Community.” Botswana Journal of African Studies 29, no. 1 (2015): 32-49.

The Competition Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in
South Asia
Examining Recruitment Strategies by Terrorist Organizations, the Creation
of a Terrorist 'Career Fair,' and the Role of Foreign Fighters in Global Wars
Wardah Malik
Political scientists and researchers of conflict studies have historically argued that terrorists
are non-state actors who act without regard for other players in the international system.
This paper, however, analyzes the behavior of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to demonstrate
that a rational competition exists between the two. Specifically, terrorists learn from each
other and compete to recruit new members, creating a ‘career fair’ model. Said model and
other recruitment strategies are explained through case studies of India and Pakistan.
The Jihadi-Salafi movements of Al-Qaeda and, more recently, Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) emphasize the need for a jihad (armed struggle) against presumed enemies.
Despite significant operational differences, Al-Qaeda and ISIS both advertise Islam globally
to Sunni Muslims in order to build their individual enterprises. Al-Qaeda’s & ISIS’s active
appropriation of Islamic values to market their ideologies in order to recruit followers has
exacerbated material competition between them. Thus, which group has the more popular
or marketable form of terrorist ideology? This paper addresses this material and ideological
competition to determine how terrorist groups evolve and surpass each other in terms of
recruiting fighters. By examining the recruiting techniques of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in South
Asia, I argue that ISIS has gained an advertising advantage over Al-Qaeda through its use
of technology, mainly via social media, and its free-form participation tactics. The core of
my argument relies on both organizations rationally competing in a “career fair” model to
recruit foreign fighters.
This paper is organized into three main sections. First, I will comment on the existing
global competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS and connect it to the career fair theory. This
section breaks down the theory into three main points: Al-Qaeda operates like a franchise;
IS operates like a freelancer; and Al-Qaeda has the first-innovator disadvantage, whereby
ISIS learns from Al-Qaeda’s mistakes in order to fortify its own organization. Second, by
analyzing recruitment in Kashmir, I will demonstrate the operational differences between
Al-Qaeda and ISIS to depict how Islam and other advertising techniques are utilized in the
South Asian fighter market. In doing so, I determine which is the prevailing terrorist orga-
Wardah Malik is a senior at the University of Toronto: Saint George studying

International Relations, Political Science, and History.
The Competition Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in South Asia 41
nization in the region. Using my findings from the second section, the final section will lay
out my two-point thesis and elaborate on ISIS’s superior recruitment abilities. To conclude,
I will briefly analyze how mutually destructive conflicts within Islamic terrorism influence
and aid in developing possible general counterterrorism strategies. My career fair theory
is especially useful in this section because it demonstrates the ability of non-state actors to
adapt to resource pressures and, thus, bolsters existing literature on terrorists as rational
actors.
1. The 'Career Fair' of Islamic Terrorism
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Al-Qaeda has adopted a franchising strategy to in-
crease its global outreach and ensure its survival in the ‘War on Terror.’1 Accordingly, Al-
Qaeda has further promoted one of its core tenets: a degree of cooperation and ideological
kinship between jihadists is crucial to undermine a common enemy.2 In his 1996 Declara-
tion of War, Osama Bin Laden identified this enemy and called upon the ummah, or entire
Muslim community, to “expel the American(s)—the greatest enemy or kufr [non-believer]
out of the Muslim lands.”3 In 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s successor, echoed this
goal in his General Guidelines for Jihad: “the purpose of [a unified front] targeting America
is to bleed her to death.”4 This blend of religious rhetoric and anti-American propaganda is
Al-Qaeda’s brand name which is enforced in all its franchises.
In North Africa, Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) became
the Islamic Maghreb (Al-Qaeda IM) by agreeing to implement Al-Qaeda’s version of Sharia
law in the region.5 Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of the Islamic Maghreb, outlined the
group’s purpose as: “the same [global jihad] goals of Al-Qaeda the mother.”6 Essentially, Al-
Qaeda merges with regional terrorists and provides them with financial support and repu-
tation in exchange for incorporating Al-Qaeda’s ideology into their acts of terrorism and
terrorist ideology.7 This systematic absorption of terrorist startups is an outcome of gradual
and intense advertising. Here, Al-Qaeda’s brand name is key in making jihadists, their con-
sumers, aware of their inadequacies and basic desires. In the case of Al-Qaeda IM, Zawa-
hiri, Bin Laden’s successor, claimed the merger was an outcome of the two groups sharing
1 Brian Fishman, “Using the Mistakes of al Qaedas Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies,” The Annals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science, (2008): 46-54.
2 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 31.
3 Ibid., 31.
4 Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists (Washington, DC: RAND Corpora-
tion, 2014): 14.
5 Barak Mendelsohn, The Al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016).
6 Ibid., 19.
7 Ibid.

42 Wardah Malik
similar grievances against the West.8 Zawahiri rationally exploited these grievances and
combined them with a religious purpose by advertising the thawab (spiritual rewards) asso-
ciated with Al-Qaeda’s struggle against American non-believers.9 In this sense, Al-Qaeda is
successful in transforming the identity of its consumers or making them buy into a concept
that may or may not be fully present. However, a central question nevertheless exists: Can
broad religious and anti-West hatred sustain two groups that do not share the same narrow
goals? For Al-Qaeda, the preservation of its franchise system relies upon a shift of identity.
For example, GSPC became AQIM by swearing loyalty and agreeing to forgo local interests
for the sake of an international struggle.10 Here, Al-Qaeda demonstrated the desperation of
terrorists when the threat of extinction and a shortage of manpower is apparent.
ISIS began as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda and its origin shapes its competition with its
parent organization.11 Initially, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ISIS’s leader, aimed to preserve the
autonomy of his jihad as he detested inferior status of any kind.12 However, after heavy
financial compensation and series of negotiations with Bin Laden, Zarqawi’s group (Taw-
hid wal Jihad) became Al-QaedaI in 2004.13 The quid pro quo exchange was apparent: Bin
Laden gained a strategic ally in a key territory and Zarqawi received the resources necessary
to increase the efficiency of his training camps.14 Nonetheless, tension persisted and both
leaders argued over which enemy their jihad was addressing. Zarqawi never fully “bought-
into” Al-Qaeda’s brand. He viewed jihad not as an attack on America but as a struggle
against regional Shia-led or apostate regimes.15 As early as 2005, Al-Qaeda’s core urged
Al-QaedaI not to slaughter Shiites, a plea that was useless.16 In order to legitimize his cause,
Zarqawi argued that intense sectarian violence was the sole means to establish power.17 As
the civilian death toll escalated, Al-Qaeda began to distance itself from Al-QaedaI claiming
that, unlike Al-QaedaI, its conservative jihad “had morals” and that “it was forbidden to kill
women, children, elderly people.”18 Refusing to abstain from killing civilians, Al-QaedaI
formulated its own brand of terrorism around an extreme interpretation of Islamic rule.19
In 2011, the Syrian civil war provided Zarqawi the opportunity to demonstrate the power
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
11 Jones, A Persistent Threat.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Mark S. Hamm and Ramón Spaaij, Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017).
17 Hamm and Spaaij, Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism.
18 Strindberg and Wärn, Islamism, 15.

of his brand by enacting widespread violence.20 Violence became both a marketable and a
performative tool that not only garnered popular support but also elevated the threat and
global image of Islamic terrorism. The ambitions of Iraqi fighters grew exponentially after
2011 and by 2013 various jihadists consolidated local power to become the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria.21
Similar to Al-Qaeda, ISIS’s ideology is a distorted interpretation of Islam and religion
is employed to market the group’s agenda.22 However, ISIS differs from Al-Qaeda as it has
a more aggressive approach towards non-Sunni Muslims and advocates for harsher pun-
ishment against those who oppose its ideology.23 Essentially, ISIS aims to purify the Is-
lamic world not by networking or franchising, but by establishing its own quasi-state (i.e., a
caliphate).24 For ISIS, membership into the caliphate requires controlling all Muslim states
and territories, opposing puppet regimes, and making Islam highly globalized.25 Thus, ISIS
embraces a lone-wolf approach to terrorism—one that is not explicitly restricted to a geo-
graphic space.26 Essentially, ISIS’s strategy is a combination of pursuing extreme violence
and establishing a caliphate. Unlike Al-Qaeda, ISIS does not enforce its brand through a
hierarchy but rather through encouraging its followers to adopt a freelancer role. A free-
lancer is a person acting in ISIS’s name but without explicit direction from someone in the
organization, taking it upon themselves to carry out an attack which ISIS then takes credit
for. This freelancing strategy has propelled ISIS’s brand because it increases the frequency
of violence. Whereas Al-Qaeda engages in more symbolic attacks such as 9/11 and the 1998
U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, ISIS operates on more low cost, inclusive,
and spontaneous approach to terrorism.27 The success of this strategy will be further ad-
dressed in section two with the case of Kashmir.
The competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS reveals the fractionalization of the broad-
er jihadist movement. The two organizations differ fundamentally on whom they claim
their enemy to be and which strategies to employ when branding, recruiting, and making
their message appealing to the masses. Arguably, ISIS has usurped Al-Qaeda with its more
evolved and inclusive recruitment approach. This power shift can be attributed to the fact
that Al-Qaeda has the first-innovator disadvantage. In my theory, Al-Qaeda is at a disad-
vantage simply because it is the first Islamic terrorist entrepreneur. As it predates ISIS, it
was inevitable that ISIS would go on to improve on and further develop Al-Qaeda strategy.
20 Strindberg and Wärn, Islamism.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Mendelsohn, The Al-Qaeda Franchise.

44 Wardah Malik
IS has reformulated Al-Qaeda’s strategies to strengthen its own organization by: (1) using
Al-Qaeda’s successes as its own; (2) using brutality for publicity purposes such as Al-Qaeda;
and (3) involving younger fighters and increasing its turnover rate to ensure that the group
remains committed and radicalized.
ISIS uses Al-Qaeda’s success as its own, not in the literal sense of claiming responsibil-
ity for Al-Qaeda’s past actions, but by benefiting from the momentum and fear that Al-Qa-
eda successfully created in the West. Following 9/11, a consensus emerged that Al-Qaeda
was a lawless non-state actor that would pursue extreme means to advocate its anti-West
sentiment.28 This perception bolstered the ‘clash of civilization’ logic—a binary concept that
posits that foreign ideology is bound to become radical and ignite conflict.29 Over time,
Al-Qaeda’s symbolic attacks, Bin Laden archetype as the Muslim villain, and interactions
with cultures that differed from the West developed an environment of constant trepida-
tion of the unknown. Thus, when IS formally emerged, its presence was situated amongst
pre-existing assumptions that Al-Qaeda triggered. Accordingly, the West and U.S. counter-
terrorism agencies labeled it as a credible threat and the next “other” to the international
security agenda.30 Essentially, the reputation Al-Qaeda has built over decades was further
appropriated by ISIS which fueled the Western perception that ISIS was the new face of
“radical [anti-West] evil.”31 In my theory, this translates to IS benefiting from Al-Qaeda’s
brand image in order to further its popularity and recruitment tactics.
As a result of these developments, ISIS extended the fear that Al-Qaeda developed
by featuring innovative violence and brutality against Westerners. For example, the 2014
beheading of journalist James Foley triggered an international response and exposed ISIS’s
brand of extreme violence.32 As previously mentioned, Al-Qaeda has chastised ISIS for its
brutality and advocates a more controlled proselytization that does not seclude communi-
ties by converting them.33 This option is not supported by ISIS because the group relies on
the performance of violence in order to expand its global image and rally youth fighters.34
ISIS’s ability to mobilize youth and retain fervor reveals its superiority over Al-Qaeda.
ISIS markets specifically to disenfranchised youth through social media and modern tech-
nologies.35 Furthermore, ISIS has provided an alternative career pathway to youth who hold
28 Hatem N. Akil, The Visual Divide between Islam and the West: Image Perception within Cross-Cultural Context (New York,
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 146.
32 Ibid.
33 Strindberg and Wärn, Islamism, 15.
34 Akil, The Visual Divide between Islam and the West.
35 Ibid.

grudges toward the West, such as displaced people from past conflicts.36 The indoctrination
of the recruited youth is also continuous and concerned with building a community struc-
ture.37 As a result, ISIS becomes emotionally rewarding because it provides a social services
system and a sense of in-group belonging on the basis of religion. Once youth become
dependent on this community, they willingly fight to preserve it, or find themselves unable
to leave it.
2. How Al-Qaeda and ISIS Operate in South Asia: Kashmir
In 2014, Zawahiri announced Al-Qaeda’s newest affiliate as Al-Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS).38 The merger was largely interpreted by security analysts as a way for
Al-Qaeda to preserve its Pakistani tribal safe havens against ISIS’s infiltration (Mendelsohn,
2016). Once again, the competition and fear of being replaced motivated Al-Qaeda to ra-
tionally franchise and outsource fighters. This fear is most apparent in Kashmir, a disputed
territory that both Pakistan and India have vested interests in. This lack of clear authority
and governance structures have provided jihadists an opportunity to assert themselves in
that society, resembling the case of the Syrian civil war.39 In this section, I will outline how
Al-Qaeda and ISIS capitalize on instability to create advertising approaches in Kashmir
whilst also taking into account the role of Pakistan and India in facilitating or degrading
terrorist activity.
Dozens of Islamist groups have established power in Kashmir, however most of them do
not have indigenous roots.40 The majority of fighters are divided under the auspices of seven
primary groups, three of which have been directly tied to Bin Laden’s transnational terrorist
network: Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen.41 LeT is
particularly significant because it shares Al-Qaeda’s goal of establishing theocratic order by
exploiting ethnic tensions in Kashmir and targeting India.42 In order to establish a network,
Al-Qaeda marketed its brand to LeT and other religious fundamentalists as a pro-Islamic,
liberating, and anti-Hindu organization.43 The techniques employed to circulate this brand
included: integrating Al-Qaeda representatives into the conflict such as the leader of LeT,
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who was also bin Laden’s confidant) and using written propagan-
da tools to circulate its mission.44 Eventually, LeT internalized foreign propaganda and be-
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
39 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst & Company, 2002).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda.

46 Wardah Malik
gan circulating its own pro-Al-Qaeda message.45 In a pamphlet entitled “Why Are We Wag-
ing Jihad?,” the group outlined how establishing an alliance with Al-Qaeda was the most
effective way restore historic Islamic rule over India.46 Here, the aforementioned exchange
system between Al-Qaeda’s core and franchise is formed. This exchange is defined by LeT
providing refuge to Al-Qaeda’s senior militants—the most notable being Abu Zubaydah,
Bin Laden’s senior lieutenant—in exchange for financial compensation.47 This mutually-
beneficial relationship has become increasingly complicated with local interests affecting
the priorities of LeT.48 Rather than solely using religion as a mobilization tool, LeT is now
placing a greater emphasis on ethnic tensions between India and Pakistan, a move that will
force LeT to prioritize its relationship with Pakistan over Al-Qaeda.
According to the Indian government, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency has
played an active role in funding and training LeT terrorists to target India and generate a
pro-Pakistan stance in Kashmir.49 In 2008, LeT’s Abu Jindal was responsible for killing 166
people in Mumbai, which he declared retribution for Muslims against India.50 The sponsor-
ing of terrorists by Pakistan provides jihadists with a level of legitimacy that Al-Qaeda can-
not replicate. Thus, there has been a greater movement of Kashmiri Islamist groups relying
on Pakistan and detaching themselves from Al-Qaeda’s global aims.51 Essentially, LeT has
dismissed Al-Qaeda and opted for a more advantageous exchange with Pakistan. In this
relationship, Pakistan uses jihad as a facet of its defense policy and LeT uses Pakistan’s state
legitimacy to avoid legal prosecution.52 LeT, thus, is another example of Al-Qaeda’s struc-
tural weakness in reconciling local interests and the broader global jihad.
Therefore, the recent franchise of AQIS is highly vulnerable and represents an unsus-
tainable act of desperation on the part of Al-Qaeda.53 This is because ethnic identities and
the nationalist Pakistan/India divide are prioritized over religious affiliations. Historically,
nationalist sentiments in the subcontinent typically override religious motivations; terror-
ists have internalized this mentality and act according to their social identity.54 This explains
why AQIS recruits have mainly been Pakistani or Bengali Muslims who are part of the
majority in their states.55 Alternatively, Indian Muslims, as part of a securitized minority,
45 Arif Jamal, Call for Transnational Jihad: Lashkar-e-Taiba 1985-2014 (New Delhi: Kautilya, 2015).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda.
50 Jamal, Call for Transnational Jihad.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
54 Amira Jadoon, An Idea or a Threat? Islamic State Jammu & Kashmir (2018, February 9).
55 Ibid.

are more reluctant or do not have the same incentives to express their grievances through
terrorist networks.56 Thus, ISIS’s freelance approach is better suited to the Indian Subconti-
nent because it provides flexibility and inclusivity without formal attachment to a particular
organization. ISIS, in general, is more rational than Al-Qaeda because it is able to benefit
from Kashmir’s instability without becoming embroiled in regional politics. This allows it to
build on Al-Qaeda’s liberation and vision of restoring historic Islamic rule without explicit-
ly establishing representation in the region. Here, ISIS is learning from Al-Qaeda’s mistakes
to formulate a global agenda that diminishes the highly nationalist rhetoric in Kashmir.
ISIS’s presence in Kashmir emerged with political demonstrators waving the caliph-
ate flag at various public rallies. This support quickly turned violent and by late 2017 IS
began claiming the actions of a ‘lone wolf ’ terrorists.57 Notably, Mugees Ahmed Mir, a man
believed to have been radicalized by ISIS’s online propaganda, carried out an unexpected
attack at Srinagar’s government office with the intent of deposing the “puppet regime.”58
Mir’s case demonstrates how propaganda is especially useful in expanding ISIS’s influence
beyond geographical confinements, overcoming regionalism, and encouraging spontane-
ous terrorism. Specifically, online propaganda and the use of social media has elevated
ISIS’s presence in the subcontinent.59 Chatrooms and online streaming services provide the
means for efficient and low-cost radicalization.60
Furthermore, ISIS makes highly region-specific propaganda that is more effective in
recruiting because it is able to pinpoint grievances and make quick remarks on current
events. In Kashmir, the media group ‘Al-Qaraar’ urges Muslims to separate from India and
Pakistan and violently demand their right to a universal caliphate:
“Do not leave the Hindustani, Pakistani, Arab and non-Arab tawaghit (tyrants)
and their armies in a condition to be able to breathe or powerful enough to
defend themselves; ambush them, confront them, and be intense and tough in
fighting with them. Hence, when troops come face to face, then cut off their
heads and cut off every joint of them.”61
This quote succinctly describes ISIS’s brand but also demonstrates how the organization
asserts itself by creating a community that aims to surpass and counter the state. Naturally,
Muslim Kashmiris feel animosity towards Hindus and mobilizing hate towards India is
quite simple.62 The complicated mission of ISIS is to convince Muslims that Pakistan is also
their enemy.
56 Ibid.
57 Jadoon, An Idea or a Threat?
58 Ibid.
59 Laura Scaife, Social Networks as the New Frontier of Terrorism: #Terror (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).
60 Ibid
61 Bharti Jain, IS asks Kashmiris to Behead Indian Troops (2017, December 12).
62 Ibid.

48 Wardah Malik
Unlike LeT, ISIS perceives Pakistan to be an apostate regime and a hindrance to the
global caliphate.63 Thus, ISIS regularly publishes hate speech in its online magazine (Dabiq)
in order to arouse anti-Pakistan sentiment amongst Kashmiri Muslims. In an article titled
“Realities of Jihad in Kashmir and Role of Pakistani Agencies,” ISIS outlines how the success
of Pakistan has been at the expense of Kashmir in order to disprove the notion that Pakistan
is an ally.64 The article concludes by arguing that LeT and other Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups
are merely Pakistan’s “agents or puppets” and are insincere in their liberation of Kashmir.65
True liberation, ISIS suggests, is aligning with a broader Islamic community that denounces
statehood.
To reiterate, this propaganda is circulated via social media through a targeted approach.
In Kashmir, ISIS has recognized its unpopularity amongst the older militant generation.
Therefore, majority of its recruitment policies and advertising is geared towards tech-savvy
youth who are unsatisfied with the status quo but have not aligned with an Islamist group.66
By recognizing this demographic, ISIS has formulated its messages around themes of Pan-
Islamism or anti-Pakistan and has coordinated violent attacks through digital chatrooms.67
3. The Islamic State's Upper Hand in the 'Career Fair'
The use of social media gives ISIS leverage over Al-Qaeda in recruiting younger, en-
thused, and not yet disillusioned fighters.68 The leaders of each organization reflect this
generational gap: Al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri is believed to be sixty-three years old, whereas ISIS’s
Baghdadi is around forty-three years old.69 The older leaders of Al-Qaeda’s core rely on
outdated communication, which can be attributed to Al-Qaeda’s first-innovator disadvan-
tage.70 At the height of Al-Qaeda’s popularity, the internet was a luxury and not accessible
to aggrieved potential terrorists.71 In contrast, ISIS inherited power during the age of smart-
phones, Facebook, viral videos, and more, using them to its advantage.72 Furthermore, ISIS’s
messages are not always top-down but rather are highly inclusive and encourage the par-
ticipation of the masses; essentially making terrorism an interactive, social, and celebrated
act.73 ISIS content is kept updated and relevant to its demographic.74 For example, in the

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Scaife, Social Networks as the New Frontier of Terrorism.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.

case of Kashmir, videos are edited to include popular music, and are meant to be enjoyed.75
Al-Qaeda’s videos, on the other hand, often feature an aged man quoting lengthy Qur’anic
verses.76 Naturally, youth looking for adventure or vengeance are more attracted to ISIS’s
videos.
Another attractive feature of ISIS’s recruitment is that those radicalized by videos or
songs do not necessarily have to join ISIS or one of its subgroups. Instead, individuals can
contribute as ‘lone wolves.’77 For example, Mehdi Biswas was an Indian office worker by day
and operated an ISIS Twitter handle in the evenings.78 Biswas urged jihadists in India to kill
police officers on behalf of ISIS and one of his 17,000 followers became embolden enough
to carry out the request.79 Similarly, in May 2015, an IS-linked terror module was raided
in Madhya Pradesh.80 The module was under the instruction of Syrian jihadists and was
instructing young men to prepare an explosives and assassinate Hindu nationalist leaders.81
Both Indian cases demonstrate how ISIS uses social media to inspire violence and succeeds
in carrying out violence without having a formal chain of command.
4. How Islamist Competition Affects Counterterrorism
For now, ISIS has the upper-hand in the competition.82 Unlike Al-Qaeda, it has win-
ning attributes: the adoption of a freelance approach, the effective usage of social media,
and the presentation of a unified Islamic vision that does not succumb to regional interests.
However, this trajectory may be temporary and ISIS may be the stepping stone to a more
evolved terrorist organization. The lesson for counter-terrorism is to recognize how the
pressures from competition force terrorist organizations to rationally evolve in order to
survive. Another issue is that younger recruits have embraced ISIS and perceive it to be a
beneficial communal structure. This integration could have severe ramifications for state
security. Hence, counterterrorism strategies should remain focused on negating ISIS’s so-
cial value, especially among younger populations, through counter-narratives that identify
and expose how ISIS is not acting out of altruism, but is rather a selfish, or rational, epis-
temically motivated actor in the international system.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS and determined
that ISIS as a “brand” is more popular than Al-Qaeda because it is innovative with its use
76 Scaife, Social Networks as the New Frontier of Terrorism.
78 Adil Rasheed, ISIS: Race to Armageddon (New Delhi: VIJ Books India, 2015).
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.

50 Wardah Malik
of social media and free-form participation tactics. This argument is illustrated through the
case of Kashmir by depicting how terrorists compete for influence in areas of conflict or
instability. The research I have conducted supplements existing literature on the rationality
of terrorists. If terrorists are understood as rational, then possible counterterrorism efforts
should focus on deconstructing the notion that jihadists are fighting for a moral cause when
in actuality they are self-serving individuals.

Works Cited
Akil, Hatem N. The Visual Divide between Islam and the West: Image Perception within
Cross-Cultural Context. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Fishman, Brian. “Using the Mistakes of al Qaedas Franchises to Undermine Its Strate-
gies.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 no. 1
(2008): 46-54. doi:10.1177/0002716208316650
Gerges, Fawaz A. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. London: Hurst & Com-
pany.
Hamm, Mark S., and Ramón F. Spaaij. Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2017.
Jadoon, Amira. (2018, February 9). “An Idea or a Threat? Islamic State Jammu & Kashmir.”
Last modified February 9, 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/idea-threat-islamic-state-jam-
mu-kashmir/
Jain, Bharti. “IS Asks Kashmiris to Behead Indian Troops.” Times of India, December 12,
2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/is-asks-kashmiris-to-behead-indi-
an-troops/articleshow/62030366.cms
Jamal, Arif. Call for Transnational Jihad: Lashkar-e-Taiba 1985-2014. New Delhi: Kautilya,
2015.
Jones, Seth G. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists.
Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2014.
Mendelsohn, Barak. The Al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and its Conse-
quences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Rasheed, Adil. ISIS: Race to Armageddon. New Delhi: VIJ Books India, 2015.
Scaife, Laura. Social Networks as the New Frontier of Terrorism: #Terror. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2017.
Strindberg, Anders, and Mats Wärn. Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance.
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

The Rocky Road to Interdependence
Ireland, Switzerland, and the Survival of Military Neutrality in the
Liberal World Order
Tárlach Russell
Interdependence has been the dominating cornerstone of foreign-policy decision-

making since 1945, in particular in defense and security policy via international
organizations. Some states, however, do not surrender their defense and security pol-
icies to international actors or interact in great power politics. Ireland and Switzer-
land are two such states, seeking to be neutral actors in military affairs. Both located
in continental Europe but with varying relationships with international organiza-
tions, they are the pilots of this study where I consider why states do not coalesce
to the mold of Western, liberal democratic norms surrounding the construction
of defense and security policy. I seek to explore this by examining the importance
of direct democracy in both countries, as well as analyzing their relationship with
three notable international security organizations: the European Union, the United
Nations, and NATO. In this way we can test both case studies against a theoretical
conception of neutrality.
1. Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the world has become increasingly interdepen-
dent with the spread of both regional and global institutions that seek to foster coopera-
tion between states. States must no longer rely exclusively on their own power to ensure
their survival. This paper will focus on international security organizations (ISOs): institu-
tions formally organized with central command structures involving more than two states
that focus on or have provisions for dealing with military security concerns, security being
‘the threat, use and control of military force’.1
This paper will examine the following question: what is the impact of ISOs on the
military neutrality of neutral states who become members of ISOs? Importantly, this does
not include bilateral relations with other states. I ask this in order to understand how mili-
tary neutrality has survived despite being the antithesis of the liberal world order, which
encourages security interdependence. I will answer by first clearing conceptual debates
through the examination of contemporary international security arrangements, neutrality
1 Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991): 211-39, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/2600471.
Tárlach russell is a class of 2018 student from the London School of Economics
and Political Science's Department of International Relations. He is now undertak-
ing a postgraduate degree in the London School of Economics and Political Science's
Department of International History.
The Rocky Road to Interdependence 53
in international relations and the theoretical assumptions of expected consequences for neu-
tral states who join ISOs. This will be followed by two case studies: Ireland and Switzerland,
two states with varying degree of involvement within ISOs and differing degrees of consid-
eration for their neutrality from within the international system. These two states’ relation-
ships with the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) will be examined. It is important to determine whether a state’s
neutral identity is imposed from above by foreign policy elites or is the result of a direct ex-
pression of popular opinion from below.
Analysis of this issue is key due to the heightened discourse around the neutral status of
both countries. These countries serve as excellent case studies because both possess domes-
tic conditions that reflect the orthodoxy of the western liberal international order, as they
both cooperate in international organizations on non-security issues. In December 2017,
the Irish government hastily passed bill to become a member of the EU’s new Permanent
Security Cooperation (PESCO) program, which could have future ramifications for Ireland’s
neutral status, according to opponents.2 In Switzerland, the government formally withdrew
a long-standing application to accede to the EU in 2016. This application had been frozen
for several years, and Switzerland was unable to join the European Economic Area (EEA) in
1992 due to public pressure. Since then, successive Swiss governments have failed to resur-
rect the possibility of membership. Despite government enthusiasm in both countries for a
more integrated foreign policy, both citizenries have opposed such moves in referenda and
fought to retain their neutral identity.
In looking at recent events that have re-invigorated the debate over neutrality, there is a
new aspect which has not been thoroughly investigated since the rise of liberal thinking in
the mid-twentieth century: how neutral states are affected by international security organi-
zations. My intention is to take a realist worldview to look at how a neutral state’s military
sovereignty could be impinged by joining particular organizations. Before addressing the
two main empirical studies, I will spell out the current international security arrangements
and provide a comprehensive definition of neutrality to clarify what will be discussed. Such
elaboration is necessary in order to evaluate the two case studies more effectively.
2. Current International Security Arrangements

Cooperation in this study refers to bilateral interactions between states and ISOs in the
security sector. Cooperation and interdependence have been the dominant themes of se-
curity efforts since 1945. Belgium, a neutral state since 1839, had seen such a stance unable
to protect them twice (in 1914 and 1940) from German aggression. Belgium abandoned its
2 Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan, “PESCO is not about peace, it is about preparing for EU wars,” Irish Examiner, March 20,
2018, https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/views/analysis/pesco-is-not-about-peace-it-is-about-preparing-for-eu-
wars-833488.html

54 Tárlach Russell
neutrality after 1945 and threw its lot in with NATO as a founding member in 1949. In an an-
archic system, liberalism sees transnational governance as required for ‘shaping state prefer-
ences’ and policy choices instead of engaging in traditional balance of power politics.3 This is
particularly true in an era of superpowers with defense budgets and military capabilities far
and above what other states can even dream of mustering. Therefore, one can see why states
throw themselves behind the efforts of superpowers to ‘secure’ different parts of the world.
When looking at ISOs, one must differentiate between two of the main organizational
arrangements that shape them: collective security and collective defense. Collective security
aims to create security between sovereign states with no explicit enemy other than threats
to international peace and security.4 Any member state of these organizations can be sub-
ject to enforcement action should their aggression pose a threat to another member state.
Alternatively, a collective defense system ‘is an arrangement, usually formalized by a treaty
and organization, among participant states that commit support in defense of a member
state if it is attacked by another state outside the organization’.5 Within such arrangements,
the enemy is the ‘other,’ a state from outside the defense arrangement which targets a state
within it.
3. Differentiating Neutrality, Neutralism and Non-Aligned in IR
Neutrality refers to a nation-state at a time of war as opposed to a firm foreign
policy stance. Neutralism refers to a permanent foreign policy directive that maintains
a state’s neutrality even in peacetime. In wartime, the rights and duties of neutral pow-
ers were laid out in the Hague Convention of 1907. The crux of neutrality is laid out in
the first two articles of the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in case of War on Land: the territory of neutral powers is inviolable; and that
belligerents are forbidden from moving troops or convoys of munitions or supplies of war
across the territory of a neutral power.6
Despite international treaties holding up the rights of neutral powers in wartime,
there is little in international law that respects a neutral state in peacetime. In academia,
minimal work conceptualizes neutrality beyond what is drawn upon in international law.
However, Low-Beer does address the nature of the legitimacy of a state’s neutrality. He ar-
gues that a state can declare itself neutral, but that is merely a self-assessment as opposed
to an assessment of that status by other states. Therefore, being ‘neutral’ means different
3 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav M. Zubok, International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
4 Stefan Aleksovski, Biljana Avramovska, and Oliver Bakreshi, “‘Collective Security – The Role of International Organiza-
tions – Implications in International Security Order,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 27 (2014): 274-82, http://
www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/5080.
5 Ibid., 275.
6 Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land (Hague Convention)
1907, (Article 1 and 2), opened for signature 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910.

things to different states. 7

Neutrality has been understudied by contemporary scholars because it is ‘seen
as a relic from the Cold War.’8 During the Cold War, interpretations and conceptions of
neutrality were focused around the realist paradigm which dominated the field of inter-
national relations at the time. Therefore neutrality was seen as ‘the rational calculation of
a small state’s interests in the state-centered, unfriendly, self-help environment.’9 In this
paper, I seek to revive the study of neutrality by looking at the liberal shift in international
relations since the end of the Cold War and examine how the concept has survived.
I differentiate between neutralism and neutrality because the Hague Convention of
1907 refers only to neutrality in times of war. In times of peace, neutralism is an appropriate
alternative term.10,11 There are three main faces of neutralism in international relations: as
a way to avoid involvement in war, as an end in itself to promote oneself as moral, and as a
comfort blanket whereby others pay the costs of security. 12
These three conceptions of neutralism all subscribe to differing theories of international
relations: avoiding involvement in war can be seen from a defensive realist perspective. The
major assumption of this theory is that states seek to survive at all costs. In order to ensure
its survival, a state can pursue policies ranging from isolationism as a means to avoid con-
frontation to armed neutrality which seeks to maximize one’s capabilities and deter potential
aggressors.
The second face of neutralism is as an end in itself to promote a moral purpose.
Finnemore and Sikkink define norms as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors
with a given identity (‘norm entrepreneurs’ must have a positive projection in order to be
successful).13 In this case, the norm is neutralism and how it can be a positive moral force
for promoting other peaceful norms held by a state.
7 Francis Low-Beer, “The Concept of Neutralism,” The American Political Science Review 58, no. 2 (1964): 383-91, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/1952869.
8 Laurent Goetschel, “Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 2 (1999): 115-39, http://journals.
sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00108369921961807.
9 Neal G. Jesse, “Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective,” International Politi-
cal Science Review 27, no. 1 (2006): 7-28, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512106058624.
10 Mervyn O’Driscoll, “Multilateralism: From ‘Plato’s Cave’ to the European Community: 1945-73,” in Irish Foreign Policy,
ed. Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012) 36-53.
11 For the further duration of this paper, neutrality and neutralism will both be used but within the confines of their defini-
tions instead of being merely interchangeable. When discussing neutrality, I will be talking about states in wartime. In contrast,
neutralism will refer to states during peacetime.
12 Paul Keatinge, “Making Sense of Irish Foreign Policy,” in Irish Foreign Policy, ed. Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Ken-
nedy and Ben Tonra, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012): vii-xvii.
13 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organiza-
tion 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361.

56 Tárlach Russell
The final face of neutralism is a negative interpretation, whereby a state can ‘free ride’
because other member states of an institution carry the bulk of the cost of collective se-
curity.14 This refers to hegemonic stability theory, whereby a hegemon establishes an in-
ternational order that promotes its own interests. 15,16 In order to maintain that order, the
hegemon will overpay for public goods, therefore allowing other states to ‘free ride’ on the
back of the hegemon’s disproportionate contribution. This conception is also appropriate in
situations whereby a state’s geography means another state may have to take responsibility
for their defense to ensure their own security.
On top of differentiating between neutralism and neutrality, note the distinction be-
tween de facto and de jure. In the case of a neutral status being internationally recognized,
these two parameters are particularly important. De facto neutrality would relate to a state
which practices neutrality in wartime, but is not legally bound to the policy.17 Similarly, de
facto neutralism will refer to a self-confessed neutral state not legally bound to that status. In
contrast, de jure neutrality or neutralism is where that neutral status is legally recognized but
may not exist in practice. This is the conceptual dilemma I seek to overcome in this study: by
looking at the legal and empirical status of being militarily neutral, I will shed light on how
de facto and de jure interpretations of being neutral impact a state’s relationship with ISOs.
With a coherent conception of neutralism and neutrality, it is imperative to examine
these ideas from the framework of ISOs in order to see whether these organizations are ex-
pected to undermine a state’s neutral stance. In the next chapter, I will have a brief look at
what would be expected to occur to a state’s foreign policy in light of joining an ISO from
the main theoretical positions.
4. Theoretical Expectations of International Security Organizations

Theoretical expectations will be assessed from realist, rationalist institutionalist, and
constructivist institutionalist perspectives. The first institutional theory I will look at is real-
ism. Realists would argue the rules of international organizations reflect self-interest based
on the distribution of power so they require a hegemon to disproportionately bear the costs
of cooperation due to the nature of a self-help anarchical system. For realists, there are two
potential implications for militarily neutral states should they join ISOs: conform to the
rules of the hegemon and surrender military sovereignty. This would more likely be during
14 A notable example of ‘free riding’ is within NATO. The Economist (2017) found that in 2006 the USA contributed 3.6%
of its GDP towards Defence. Conversely, only six other NATO member states reached the 2% target that all NATO members
agreed to that same year.
15 Mark S. Sheetz and Michael Mastanduno, “Debating the Unipolar Moment,” International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 168-
74, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539361.
16 In the post-Cold War era, the hegemon responsible for global security institutions is the United States.
17 Ireland during the Second World War would be a notable example: while provisions were made for the state to ensure state
survival, there was never any legislation passed to explicitly keep Ireland out of the war.

a period of hegemonic rivalry like the Cold War, when a hegemon is seeking a collective
security alliance to protect against outside attacks. In order to avail of collective defensive
mechanisms in such circumstances, one must be prepared to accept the doctrine of ‘an
attack on one is an attack on all.’ Therefore a neutral stance in wartime would be impossible.
Alternatively, they could ‘free ride’ on the back of the hegemon’s efforts to maintain their
support, which may not alter their neutral status.
The second theory to account for is rationalist institutionalism. Rationalists, like real-
ists, acknowledge international anarchy and the state as the primary actor in international
relations.18 However, Abbott and Snidal argue the most powerful states use international
organizations to advance their own interests as well as to induce the participation of weaker
states. 19 Therefore, they argue that international organizations fulfill two functions: central-
ization and independence.20 For neutral states, rationalists assume some space for ISOs to
facilitate and tolerate military neutralism because the purpose of an organization in the first
place is to allow for cooperation.21 On the other hand, the idea that the most powerful states
would use international organizations to induce weaker states makes the assumption that
weaker states may have to surrender their military sovereignty, and therefore neutralism, in
order to participate in ISOs. This would be particularly true in collective defense organiza-
tions. The impact is dependent upon two variables: the degree of centralization within dif-
ferent organizational provisions, as well as language contained within international treaties
which could dictate a state’s defense policy, even when not desired.
The final theory of international organizations I will examine is constructivist institu-
tionalism. The key assumption of constructivism as a whole is that organizations change state
behavior via a process of socialization.22 Johnston argues that organizations will form and
change state preferences as ‘newcomers become incorporated into patterns of interaction.’23
These norms are mostly directed at newcomers, in order for them to embrace organizational
preferences. The constructivist expectation is that neutral states would not join these secu-
rity organizations because their neutralism would be the target of institutional pressures to
conform and identify with the interdependent defensive culture of the non-neutral member
18 Volker Rittberger, “Theories of International Organizations,” in International Organization, ed. Volker Rittberger, Bern-
hard Zangl and Andreas Kruck, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 15-34.
19 Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3-32. www.jstor.org/stable/174551.
20 This allows for decision-makers to be independent from state actors in making decisions.
21 In the European Union, for instance, the new Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), according to Shepherd (2015),
allows ‘a group of willing and able states to voluntarily integrate further to enhance their military capabilities, even if other
states did not wish to do so’.
22 Alistair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no.
4 (2001): 487-515, http://www.jstor.org/stable/309605.
23 Ibid., 494.

58 Tárlach Russell
states. Why would neutral states join ISOs if constructivism explained international orga-
nizations? A state, as would be expected, becomes identified with an alternative defensive
system and could end up adapting it, given that constructivists make little provision for why
states may not conform to the norms of an organization. For neutral states to join these se-
curity organizations, one of two things would be expected: for the state’s neutrality to not be
deep-rooted, or for a new government or regime wishing to change the direction of a state’s
foreign policy. For neutral states, their preference may be changed in security organizations
as they ‘socialize’ into an organization whereby the preferred identification of defense policy
is collectivized. This results in an altering of the state’s neutral identity, which will be looked
at in the case studies.
Having considered all three theories of international organizations, there are a host of
possible implications for neutral states who join ISOs. These will be summarized in the fol-
lowing table.
Table 1: Assumed Implications of neutral states joining international security organiza-
tions from different theoretical perspectives.
Theory Assumed Implications
Realism • Unipolarity: neutral states are not forced to entirely surrender
military sovereignty because security arrangements, if any, will
be collective security so as to maximize the hegemon’s security
• Bipolarity: ISOs would be collective defense mechanisms. Iden-
tification with one camp will result in one’s security policy being
not only sympathetic, but tailored, by the superpower within
their bloc. The chance of war means a state within a security
organization cannot possibly remain neutral.
Rational • The impact is dependent upon two variables: the degree of
Institutionalism centralization within different organizational provisions, as well
as language contained within international treaties which could
dictate a state’s defense policy, even when not desired.
• Some ISOs can have alternative partnerships that neutral states
can join in order to foster cooperation in other fields than secu-
rity. Giving up military neutralism is a choice for the state, not
for the organization.
• Cooperation and full membership in a highly centralized organi-
zation could result in a collective defense Treaty, where an attack
on one is classed as an attack on all. In this case, military neutral-
ity would be infeasible.

Constructivist • Preference can be changed in security organizations as neutral

Institutionalism states ‘socialize’ into an organization whereby the preferred iden-
tification of defense policy is collectivized.
• Domestically, neutralism as part of a state’s national identity
means the populace are reluctant for the state to relinquish their
neutral status.
The question one may pose in such a situation is why neutral states would join ISOs
when they know it can put their neutral stance in danger. I believe this is a matter for for-
eign policy analysis and evaluating each state’s actions independent of the actions of others.
To analyze the case of an individual state, one must ‘develop an appreciation for the layered
complexity of international politics and to grapple with competing sources of influence.’24
In this way, it may be possible to spot trends from analyzing individual cases as to why neu-
tral states have differing levels of engagement with international security organizations. The
remainder of the paper will look at Irish and Swiss involvement with international security
organizations to measure the impact these relationships have had on their respective neu-
tral statuses.
5. Switzerland: The Model of Neutrality

Of the two case studies, Switzerland is an obvious starting point. Its neutral status is
considered the most orthodox of the cases examined because despite the participation of
other European states in security institutions, Switzerland continues to refrain from in-
volvement.25 Switzerland was the first country in the world to have its neutral stance rec-
ognized internationally at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic wars. In
wartime, Switzerland sought armed neutrality as early as 1647 to resist foreign aggressors.26
To achieve this, Switzerland has pursued a policy of armed neutrality. In line with my three
conceptions of neutralism, Switzerland has historically followed the line of non-belliger-
ency. This has been retained so effectively by Switzerland’s tendency to not become a full
member state of ISOs.
According to Low-Beer’s definition, neutralism must be recognized in both the domes-
tic and international systems. Swiss neutralism has been successful in gaining recognition in
both spheres for two reasons. Firstly, the idea of neutralism has been part of the Swiss iden-
tity for centuries.27 The Swiss sought not to become involved in conflicts that could spill into
24 Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, eds. Foreign Policy Analysis, (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), https://www.
taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315442471.
25 Kate Morris and Timothy White, “Neutrality and the European Union: The Case of Switzerland,” Journal of Law and
Conflict Resolution 3, no. 7 (2011): 104-11, https://academicjournals.org/journal/JLCR/article-abstract/5E227687720.
26 Edouard Brunner, “The Swiss Approach,” in Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutral and
Non-Aligned States, ed. Michael H. Haltzel and Joseph Kruzel, (Cambridge: Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1989):
283-85.
27 Ibid., 284.

60 Tárlach Russell
the domestic sphere between the German, French, or Italian sympathizers. Therefore, the
Swiss people largely accept this neutralism without question. Secondly, Switzerland has em-
barked upon an interpretation of neutralism known as ‘armed neutrality.’ After 1815, Swiss
armed neutralism has focused on ‘preventative mobilizations and a deterrent posture’.28
Since 1815, this has protected Switzerland from foreign attack.
The objective of Swiss armed neutrality historically has been for Switzerland to avoid
external dependence. Due to this, Switzerland has never relied on ISOs to ensure their own
survival. Swiss neutralism was actually desirable for European powers after 1815 because
‘any antagonists’ domination of Switzerland would not have been tolerated due to the coun-
try’s strategic importance.’29 Switzerland has been successful in protecting its neutralism on
its own accord and largely maintains a policy of nonparticipation in ISOs, but it still main-
tains some degree of engagement with them.
Switzerland and the European Union

There is an entirely logical reason for Switzerland not to engage with the European
Union’s attempts to foster military integration in Europe. From a constructivist institution-
alist perspective, ‘military integration is driven by the political will to foster a supranational
identity’.30This would challenge Switzerland’s historic neutral identity which has been used
as a way to unite what otherwise is a diverse set of people, with German, French, and Italian-
speaking regions.31 This explains why Swiss voters failed to ratify Swiss membership of the
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1992. The EEC was primarily a single market,
which Switzerland had a free trade agreement with since 1972.
Therefore one must look closer at the identification of Swiss neutrality to determine the
reluctance to interact even with organizations whose primary concern is not security issues.
Per the Swiss conception of neutrality, a permanently neutral state must aim at a policy
which avoids any obligations in peacetime that might in the case of war prevent it from
following the rules of neutrality law.32 Hence, ‘neutrality required abstention from military
28 Marc R. DeVore and Armin Stähli, “From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century.”
in Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 1 (2011): 1-26, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02003.x.
29 Dietrich Schindler, “Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community.” Ameri-
can University of International Law Review 14, no. 1 (1998): 155-70, http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol14/
iss1/9/.
30 Frédéric Mérand and Kathleen Angers, “Military Integration in Europe,” in Beyond the Regulatory Polity?: The European
Integration of Core State Powers, ed. Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),
46-65.
31 Morris and White, “Neutrality and the European Union,” 107.
32 Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Scandinavia and Switzerland: small, successful and stubborn towards the EU,” Journal of European
Public Policy 9, no. 4 (2011): 529-49, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760210152420.

alliances but also from loss of treaty-making power in an economic union’.33Linking this to
Low-Beer’s interpretation recognizing neutrality, the Swiss interpretation of Irish military
neutrality will be different from the Irish assessment.
Therefore, Swiss security integration into the European Union has been minimal.
Despite trade links between them, Switzerland and the European Union have no agreements
on defense or foreign policy. Thus, it is the case that Swiss interaction with the European
Union has no impact on the military neutralism of the state because they do not have any
agreements with the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While
the lack of Swiss involvement in the European Union does frustrate decision-makers in
Brussels, Switzerland has found itself in a position ‘between non-splendid isolation and
integration without membership’.34 To solve this, Switzerland in 2016 formally withdrew its
application to accede to the European Union. Swiss neutralism is ultimately ground in the
people by a ‘traditional suspicion of foreign influence’ because of the impact on Swiss fed-
eralism and direct democracy.35 To the Swiss people, sacrificing their historical traditions
of governance is not a price worth paying for integrating into a pan-European organiza-
tion which could see Switzerland lose its military sovereignty to new initiatives, such as the
Permanent Security Co-operation (PESCO).
Switzerland and the United Nations

Switzerland stayed outside the United Nations during its foundation despite having
joined the League of Nations as a founding member, perhaps having been put off by the
failure of inter-war multilateralism.36 The shift towards multilateralism after the World War
I was designed as a death knell for neutrality, but instead was resurrected during the Second
World War.
The danger for Swiss neutralism in joining the United Nations is that United Nations
member states are bound by the decisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
meaning that Switzerland may have to accept resolutions it does not agree with. Security
Council Resolutions can ‘comprise the interruption of economic relations and means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.37 Swiss neutralism, on the
33 Ibid., 542.

34 Wolf Linder, “Switzerland and the EU: the puzzling effects of Europeanisation without institutionalisation,” Contempo-
rary Politics 19, no. 2 (2013): 190-202, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.785830.
35 Gstöhl, “Scandinavia and Switzerland,” 541.
36 Aoife O’Donoghue, “Neutrality and Multilateralism after the First World War,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15,
no. 1 (2009): 169-202.
37 Stefan Talmon, “The Security Council as World Legislature,” The American Journal for International Law 99, no. 1
(2005): 175-93.

62 Tárlach Russell
other hand, partly focuses on allowing Switzerland to be ‘a meeting ground for all sides.’38
Switzerland’s neutral position could lose prestige as they are bound by the possibility of the
Security Council moving troops across state boundaries.39
Despite the potential negative connotations of Swiss membership to the UN, Switzerland
has focused its efforts within the organization on fostering cooperative relationships, since
the United Nations and Switzerland share similar goals of international peace.40 Instead of
damaging Swiss neutralism, the UN actually complements it because it gives Switzerland
an international forum from which its goals can be expressed. While remaining neutral in
military status, the Swiss are able to use UN machinery to promote other objectives of their
foreign policy.
Switzerland and NATO

NATO is a formalized collective security organization which encompasses member
states in North America and Europe. Understandably, given the implications of a collec-
tive defence organization, Switzerland is not a full member state of NATO. Switzerland is,
however, a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and has been since 1996. The
Swiss government happily participates in such cooperation because Partnership for Peace
membership does not include an obligation to act under the collective defense mechanisms
of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. In addition, the objectives of the Partnership for Peace are
compatible with the objectives of Swiss neutralism; they include: ‘humanitarian missions,
regional stability, arms control, and other areas of non-traditional security.’41
Despite Switzerland engaging positively with the Partnership for Peace program, it has,
on occasion, impacted the neutrality of Switzerland. During the Kosovan crisis from 1998-
99, Switzerland agreed to European Union sanctions that were not approved by the United
Nations, and continued sanctions on Serbia during the NATO bombing campaign.42
While it is unlikely that Swiss membership of the Partnership for Peace program will
have a major long-term impact upon Switzerland’s military neutrality43, there may be oc-
casions in the future when Swiss neutralism will further be put to the test by NATO deci-
sions. Switzerland’s geographic location (surrounded by NATO members except for neu-
tral Austria and Liechtenstein44) means Switzerland should be able to continue to enjoy
38 John Dreyer and Neal G. Jesse, “Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both?” Journal of Military and Strate-
gic Studies 15, no. 3 (2014): 60-83.
39 Ibid., 66.
40 Ibid., 68.
41 Ibid., 67.
42 Marc R. Devore and Armin Stähli, “From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century,”
Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 1 (2011): 7.
43 In Kosovo, Swiss forces were not involved in NATO’s bombing campaign.
44 Liechtenstein has been without an army since 1868, so poses no military threat to Switzerland.

its relatively low-cost relationship with NATO and the Partnership for Peace program.45
Switzerland’s defense is non-excludable from NATO because of its geography, meaning any
attempt by NATO to limit Switzerland’s neutral position can push Switzerland to withdraw
from the Partnership for Peace. In either instance, however, it will likely be a choice of the
Swiss people on whether or not to integrate deeper into NATO’s institutions. As long as
Switzerland cherishes its neutral identity, further integration with NATO is exceedingly
unlikely.
Switzerland: Really 'The Model of Neutrality?'

Swiss neutralism appears to be in a comfortable position with its current degree of inte-
gration with ISOs, alongside its own deep-rooted attachment to neutrality.46 Swiss neutral-
ity is also recognized internationally by international organizations thanks to Switzerland’s
historically successful exercise of foreign policy.47
As illustrated in Figure 1, Switzerland (externally) fits under the realist assumption that
the world order does not demand for Switzerland to surrender its military sovereignty, and
instead is a beneficiary of the security efforts of other NATO member states. Such a situation
allows Switzerland to not participate in European attempts to integrate security structures
in the European Union and allows them free reign to operate and vote as they please in the
United Nations.
Internally, one must appreciate the Swiss commitment to armed neutrality as it contin-
ues to remain an important facet of the Swiss ‘Sonderweg’48 alongside federalism and direct
democracy.49 Coupled with Switzerland’s continuing embrace of a historical institution of the
state, the international community’s recognition of Swiss neutralism means it will continue
to be an institution that Swiss decision-makers will be under no obligation to relinquish to
international security organizations. Unless the discourse and desires of the Swiss public are
to change, Swiss military neutralism is under no significant threat given its current level of
interaction with ISOs. The only credible challenge is the UN Security Council sanctioning
NATO campaigns or sanctions that Switzerland may not agree with. Such moves, however,
would not oblige Switzerland to contribute militarily. To date, however, Swiss peacekeeping
efforts within the UN have been limited to unarmed officials and specialists.
45 Devore and Stähli, “From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence,” 7.

46 Thomas Christin and Alexander H. Trechsel, “Joining the EU? Explaining Public Opinion in Switzerland,” European
Union Politics 3, no. 4 (2002): 415-43, https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003004002
47 Francis Low-Beer, “The Concept of Neutralism,” The American Political Science Review 58, no. 2 (1964): 386.
48 ‘Sonderweg’ refers to the feeling amongst the Germanic countries that their countries have followed a unique course from
aristocracy to democracy. In Switzerland, it encompasses direct democracy, federalism and armed neutrality.
49 Devore and Stähli, “From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence,” 22.

64 Tárlach Russell
6. Ireland: The Rocky Road to Multilateralism

The Irish case is similar to Austria, Finland, Malta and Sweden; all are militarily neutral
full member states of the European Union. This is the most significant difference between
these states and the Swiss case. There is a relationship between Ireland and ISOs. Ireland’s
interaction has been typified by an attitude of suspicion towards the potential loss of its
values, only to be assured of them by the organizations that have historically embraced Irish
foreign policy values. This will be seen later when I look at Ireland’s relationship with ISOs,
but first I will elaborate on Ireland’s neutral status as a whole.
The foreign policy of Ireland is self-declared as neutral, but is not, and has not been uni-
versally recognized as such. In an assessment of former neutral states, Lebow claims Ireland’s
period of military neutrality ended in 1972, right before the state joined the European
Communities.50 However, Ireland and the European Union still recognize the state’s re-
spected status of military neutrality. Even before 1972, Ireland was denied membership at
the United Nations in 1955 by the USSR on the grounds of the nature of Ireland’s neutral-
ity – the state did not enjoy diplomatic relations with the USSR, so their neutrality can be
called into question.51 Switzerland, in contrast, has no real contestations to its neutral stance.
Tonra looks at the four key dimensions shaping Ireland’s security and defense: ‘Ireland’s
geographical position, the absence of a strong martial tradition, a commitment to collective
security and international law and a tradition of military non-alignment and neutrality.’52
Ireland’s position of neutrality emerged amongst revolutionary elements during the World
War I in 1917-18, and this ‘contributed to an instinctive Irish predilection for neutrality.’53
This position remained the preference of Irish foreign policy decision-makers through the
interwar period and World War II, as the national interest after 1919 focused on Irish sur-
vival and independence in the international system.54 Ireland’s commitment to its neutral-
ity was exemplified by Irish President Éamon De Valera refusing to commit Ireland to the
war effort, even when Winston Churchill as British Prime Minister offered a united Ireland
after the war in return.55 The motivation for maintaining neutrality throughout the war, for
De Valera, wanted Ireland to be in a position whereby foreign powers could not dictate its
foreign policy and the state was free to create a foreign policy identity separate from the
50 Richard Ned Lebow, “National Identities and International Relations,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
51 Royal Irish Academy, “Ireland 60 Years at the United Nations,” 2015.
52 Ben Tonra, “Security, Defence and Neutrality: The Irish Dilemma,” in Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John
Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 221. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
53 Raymond James Raymond, “Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism?” International Affairs 60, no. 1 (1983): 31.
54 Michael Kennedy, “The Foundation and Consolidation of Irish Foreign Policy: 1919-45,” in Irish Foreign Policy, edited
by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 20-35. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
55 Warren F. Kimball, “That Neutral Island: Ireland in WWII,” The Journal of Winston Churchill 145, no. 1 (2010): 54-61,
https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-145/churchill-proceedings-that-neutral-island/

British Empire.56 De Valera was indeed the Taoiseach [Irish head of state] when Ireland
passed a new Constitution in 1937, which he helped author. Constitutionally, ‘Ireland af-
firms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded
on international justice and morality.’57
Ireland’s neutrality in World War II can be seen from a perspective of a personal crusade
by De Valera to anger the British, ensuring the survival of the Irish state, and giving inter-
national recognition to Ireland’s independence. However, neutralism is something that has
become ingrained in the population of Ireland since then, and those who campaign against
further Irish integration into security institutions take the line of how damaging further
integration will be for Irish neutralism. Ireland has been in a position since 1987 where
European treaties are put to the electorate for legal reasons.58 The population of Ireland re-
jected the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, and a large part of that opposition stemmed from proposals
for a pan-European army and the militarization of the EU.59 Such a move would be anath-
ema to Irish neutralism, yet the referendum passed the following year was on the premise
that such cooperation would be voluntary.
Ireland’s neutralism can also be accounted for by its geographic position. Ireland can
afford the luxury of being ‘so enveloped by the military forces of the Atlantic Alliance that
it has been able to keep its own defense forces very small.’60 Therefore we can identify a
multifaceted Irish neutral identity: one historically grounded in the survival of the state
and cementing independence that became rooted in the people via historical affinity and
pragmatism. However, Ireland has never officially declared itself a ‘permanent neutral’ in
the same way that Austria and others have, but instead it is a ‘traditional policy of military
neutrality’ that has been in place since 1939.61 For the Defense Forces to be engaged in op-
erations of more than twelve personnel, the government has used the ‘Triple Lock’ system
to ensure Irish troop usages are UN mandated, approved by the Irish government, and by
Dáil Éireann.62
56 Kennedy, “The Foundation and Consolidation of Irish Foreign Policy.”

57 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland, enacted in 1937), Art. 29.1.
58 Katy Haywood, “The European Union: National and Supranational Dimensions to
Foreign Policy,” In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 54-69. Dublin: Gill
and Macmillan, 2012.
59 John O’Brennan, “Ireland says No (again): the 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty,” Parliamentary Affairs 62,
no. 2 (2009): 262.
60 Wayne C. Thompson, Western Europe 2012, (Lanham, MD: Stryker-Post Publications, 2012), 88.
61 Ben Tonra, “Security, Defence and Neutrality: The Irish Dilemma,” in Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John
Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 221. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012).
62 Ray Murphy, “International Security and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Irish Experience,” in Irish Foreign Policy,
edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 169-83. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012), 176.

66 Tárlach Russell
Ireland and the European Union

Ireland joined the European Communities in 1973 and is a member of the European
Union. Irish neutrality was severely tested by the escalating violence in Northern Ireland in
the late 1960s, particularly when British troops were sent over to Belfast and Derry in August
1969 to suppress the civil rights movement and enforce ‘law and order’. Therefore, Irish
foreign policy was in choppy waters in the immediate years before joining the European
Communities, as Ireland readied its troops ‘for participation in peacekeeping operations’
that were not necessarily sanctioned by the UN.63 Ultimately, the government did not
intervene.
When Ireland assumed Presidency of the European Council from January – June 1975,
Liam Cosgrave as Taoiseach ‘ensured that reference to security coordination spoke only of
political and economic aspects’ in order to exclude military provisions.64 In Ireland, how-
ever, there is an attachment to an exclusivist national identity which means issues such as
neutralism can be emotionally exploited by those against European military integration.65
This is exemplified by the need for EU and government commitments on Irish neutralism
before any referendum with foreign policy implications has been ratified. Upon declaring
that Ireland was joining the EU’s new PESCO program, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
Simon Coveney declared that:
‘participation in PESCO has no implications for Ireland’s policy of military neutral-
ity or the triple lock on the deployment of Irish forces overseas, that is, a UN Security
Council resolution or mandate, Government decision and Dáil approval.’66
There are three main phases of European military integration that simultaneously result
in the continuing evolution of Irish neutralism: the Maastricht Treaty of 1993; the Nice
Treaty referenda in 2001 and 2002; and the Lisbon Treaty referenda in 2008 and 2009. Before
1993, Ireland was not restrained in its foreign policy decision making: in 1982 they were able
to go against the EEC by refusing to place sanctions on Argentina following their invasion
of the British-claimed Falkland Islands.67 Whether a genuine neutral stance or a deliberate
attempt to anger the British, it was a decision the government was allowed to independently
make.
63 Ronan Fanning, “Playing It Cool: The Response of the British and Irish Governments to the Crisis in Northern Ireland,
1968-9,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 12, no. 1 (2001): 57-85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002059
64 Noel Dorr, “Ireland in an Interdependent World: Foreign Policy Since 1973,” in Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr,
John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 54-69. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012).
65 O’Brennan, “Ireland says No (again),” 269.
66 Simon Coveney, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: Motion,” Dublin, 7 December, 2017, Dáil Debates, https://www.
oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2017-12-07/speech/242/
67 Wayne C. Thompson, Western Europe 2012, (Lanham, MD: Stryker-Post Publications, 2012), 88.

In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Initially, the CFSP had limited compliance mechanisms because it was largely intergovern-
mental rather than centralized.68 A more singular High Commissioner was created in 1997,
but the organization remained largely ineffective in consolidating a pan-European foreign
policy because states could block or even bypass decision-making in CFSP due to multi-
level governance.69 Even as a member of the CFSP, Ireland, like Switzerland, was successful
in this period of exercising a neutral foreign policy. Ireland was still able to negotiate bilat-
eral agreements with other states, most notably the Belfast Agreement with Britain in 1998
which helped end the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. The EU was not party to the agreement
but did endorse the provisions of the bilateral international treaty.
Later, the Nice Treaty in 2001 sought to allow the CFSP and the EU’s desired European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to exist independently of NATO and foster the tri-
angular relationship between the EU, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).70
However, the referendum in Ireland to allow ratification of the Treaty of Nice failed ‘in part
because the voters who turned out perceived threats to Irish neutrality arising from the
Treaty.’71 This surprised the EU, which was forced into conceding the Seville Declarations
which secured confirmation the CFSP would not ‘prejudice Ireland’s traditional policy of
military neutrality.’72 Hayward went on to show this referendum confirmed that for EU ref-
erendums in Ireland, the terms and implications need to be clear to the electorate to ensure
any hope for ratification, which confirms a suspicion towards the erosion of Irish values.
The Nice Treaty episode was again repeated with the Lisbon Treaty referenda in 2008
and 2009. Like the campaign to ratify the Treaty of Nice, the public were never made fully
aware of what they were voting for by the political parties in favor of its ratification. Instead
those opposing the treaty raised the potential implications on Irish neutralism as the EU
sought to create a collective defense treaty independent of NATO.73 Post-referendum opin-
ion polls found that 42% of those asked believed the Lisbon Treaty would ‘erode Irish neu-
trality,’ while 33% believed the Treaty ‘would introduce conscription to a European army.’74
68 John Peterson and Marlene Gottwald, “The EU as a Global Actor.” In The European Union: How Does it Work?, edited by
Daniel Kenealy, John Peterson and Richard Corbett, 208-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
69 Michael Smith, "Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance, domestic politics, and national
adaptation to Europe’s common foreign and security policy," Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 740-58.
70 Ramses A. Wessel, “The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough In The Treaty Of Nice,”
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 8, no. 2 (2003): 265-88
71 Karen Devine, “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework,”
International Political Science Review 29, no. 4 (2008): 261-88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445156
72 Katy Haywood, “The European Union: National and Supranational Dimensions to Foreign Policy,” In Irish Foreign
Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 54-69. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2012: 146.
73 Foundation for EU Democracy, “The Lisbon Treaty: The Readable Version,” Accessed 15 January 2018. https://www.
euabc.com/upload/books/lisbon-treaty-3edition.pdf
74 O’Brennan, “Ireland says No (again),” 271.

68 Tárlach Russell
Like the Treaty of Nice, it took further EU declarations guaranteeing to safeguard Irish
neutrality and confirming no obligations to participate in ‘common defense of the Union’
in order for the Treaty to be ratified at the second time of asking.75 Even then, none of the
political parties who advocated against the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 were impressed enough
to change their minds the second time around. Suspicions remain about the militarization
of the EU as another attempt to build a pan-European state to give the EU the monopoly
over the use of force.
While the Irish people have not favored further security integration in the EU, there
is still broad support for Irish membership of the EU. This is ‘centered not on a shared
European identity or destiny but on the quest for more effective Irish agency within the
EU.’76 The Irish government is keen to follow the neoliberal agenda of the EU, but the best
framework for analyzing Irish neutralism and the EU is through the constructivist lens
because of the nature of Irish referenda which require popular support.77 Despite the gov-
ernment committing to PESCO in December 2017, it is unclear what effect that will have
on Irish neutralism given it has been called a voluntary commitment. If the people take a
stand against it like they have against European treaties, Irish soldiers may not have to fight
for Europe. However, as an EU member, Ireland will still have to contribute to the bill of
any EU military action, which calls into question the functionalism of Irish neutralism now
compared to 1972 just as they joined the European Communities.
Ireland and the United Nations

Ireland joined the UN in 1955 after ten years of trying – the USSR vetoed Ireland’s bid
in August 1946 on the grounds they feared Ireland would vote with the West in the General
Assembly.78 The speeches in Dáil Éireann on July 3, 1956 by Liam Cosgrave as Minister of
External Affairs and John Costello as Taoiseach show that Soviet concerns had some degree
of truth. There was a two-faced approach: on one hand, Costello explained how Ireland’s
UN policy would be based on Christian principles, be strongly anti-Communist and pro-
Western.79 Cosgrave similarly pledged Ireland to ‘support wherever possible those powers
principally responsible for the defense of the free world in their resistance to the spread of
75 Katy Haywood, “The European Union: National and Supranational Dimensions to Foreign Policy,” in Irish Foreign
Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 54-69. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2012: 146.
76 Ibid., 143.
77 Karen Devine, “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework,”
International Political Science Review 29, no. 4 (2008): 261-88, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445156
78 James Morrison Skelly, “Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55,” Irish Studies in
International Affairs 7 (1996): 63-80, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002026
79 Royal Irish Academy, “Ireland 60 Years at the United Nations,” 2015: 13.

Communist power and influence.’80 On the contrary, Cosgrave also added that Ireland’s aim
should be ‘to avoid becoming associated with particular blocs or groups so far as possible.’81
The government of the day committed Ireland to the Western order and Western values
without intrinsically voting in favor of power blocs which would limit the room to maneu-
ver at the UN.
What Cosgrave promised has largely been true of Irish intentions at the United Nations,
which means Ireland’s public stance has been one that commits itself to neutral status along
the lines the Constitution of Ireland: promoting international law and peaceful conduct of
relations between states.82 This ensured that Ireland acted independently of great power
blocks at the UN during the Cold War and were able to act with neutral judgement on UN
Resolutions.83
Irish voting behavior at the United Nations certainly suggests its neutral stance has not
been tainted by its membership, and instead the Irish votes have exercised insistence on
observing international law to settle disputes. This has involved voting both for and against
the pro-Western states that Costello heralded upon Ireland’s accession, even during the
Cold War. As early as 1957, just two years after joining the UN, Frank Aiken as Minister for
External Affairs supported having a vote on Chinese accession to the UN Security Council
over Taiwan despite American pressure.84 As recently as December 2017, the Irish voted
against the US on the key strategic objective of recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
Ireland instead voted in line with the UN and voted to recognize the UN’s collective deci-
sion on this matter.
Irish neutralism has not been targeted at the UN insomuch as voting behavior is still
directed along the lines Liam Cosgrave endorsed in 1955: ‘Ireland would uphold the UN
Charter; it would “maintain a position of independence, judging questions… strictly on
their merits”; but it was nonetheless part of the “Christian civilization” and thus should sup-
port the “powers responsible for the defense of the free world.”’85
Ireland has also been an eager contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, with an active
engagement in no less than thirty-seven UN missions from 1958-2012.86 Overall, Irish
80 Liam Cosgrave, “Address to Dáil Éireann Committee on Finance,” Dublin, 3 July, 1956. Dáil Debates, https://www.
oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1956-07-03/speech/187/
81 Ibid.
82 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland, enacted in 1937), Art. 29.3.
83 Seo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, “The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly,”
International Organization 50, no. 4 (1996): 629-52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704240
84 Christophe Gillissen, “‘Her place among the nations of the earth’”: Irish votes at the UN General Assembly, 1955-2005,”
Estudios Irlandeses 1, no. 2 (2007): 68-77. https://doi.org/10.24162/EI2007-2603
85 Ibid., 70
86 Ben Tonra, “Security, Defence and Neutrality: The Irish Dilemma,” In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John
Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 221. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2012: 228-230.

70 Tárlach Russell
peacekeeping in the UN is not a publicly controversial issue.87 However, UN-sanctioned

interventions carried out by the EU and NATO could test Irish resolve on neutrality in the
future, since security organizations regularly come to the UN to seek authorization for par-
ticular action.88 For now though, Ireland has been successful in practicing its neutral identity
when working and voting at the UN.
Ireland and NATO

Like Switzerland, Ireland is not a full member state of NATO. Similar to the Swiss,
Ireland has been a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1999. Therefore,
we can compare both Ireland and Switzerland’s relationships with the Partnership for Peace
to analyze the varying behavior of neutral states in an ISO. For Ireland to assimilate within
NATO at any level says a lot about its confidence that the Partnership for Peace will not im-
pinge on its neutrality now or in the future via future integration.
Irish history and geography have ensured the state has never seen it necessary to join
NATO and its collective defense mechanisms. Geographically, the island of Ireland has been
partitioned since 1921 with the Republic of Ireland in the south and Northern Ireland to
the north which is a part of the UK. The UK was a founding member of NATO in 1949. As
stated earlier, one of the main cornerstones determining Irish security and defense policy
has been Ireland’s geographical position.
Similar to the Swiss, Ireland’s interaction with the Partnership for Peace program has
not required an obligation to act on collective defense mechanisms which would directly
impinge state neutrality. During the Dáil debate on Irish membership of the Partnership for
Peace program, it was raised by Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs ‘that PfP [Partnership
for Peace] has developed into a major framework for co-operation, training and prepara-
tion for UN mandated peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks and crisis management.’89 Similar
to Irish interaction with the EU and UN, there is a strong emphasis on the Irish commit-
ment to collective security over joining great power alliances. This is one radical difference
between the Irish and the Swiss but can be attributed to Ireland’s meager defense spending.
For Ireland to even be taken seriously as a NATO member, Ireland would need a large-scale
upsurge in defense spending.90
With President Trump’s call on NATO members to contribute more financially, any
prospect of Ireland contemplating joining NATO is slim. Former Irish Minister of Foreign
87 Ray Murphy, “International Security and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Irish Experience,” in Irish Foreign Policy,
edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 169-83. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012), 175.
88 Ibid., 175.
89 Pat Carey, “Partnership for Peace: Motion (Resumed),” Dublin, 14 October, 1999, Dáil Debates, https://www.oireachtas.
ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1999-10-14/speech/222/
90 Raymond, “Irish Neutrality,” 39.

Affairs Alan Shatter relayed this by explaining that Ireland’s policy of neutrality stands but
claimed it does not hold much relevance in the fight against terrorism and facilitating UN
peacekeeping missions.91 This stance was reinforced in the Dáil, when Shatter, answering a
question on whether he wished for Ireland to join NATO, stated that Partnership for Peace
membership is essential for the interoperability of the Irish Defence Forces in UN peace-
keeping missions. These, he went on, meant Irish commitment to UN missions being under
the ‘Triple Lock’ permission system remained intact.
While Ireland’s position as a partner, but not a member, of NATO is likely to continue
for some time in its current form, it is worth considering the implications on Irish neutral-
ism. Ireland was bound in the same way as the Swiss by EU sanctions during the Kosovan
crisis in 1998-99, but Ireland as a member of the EU was able to have a say over using sanc-
tions as a tool before resorting to force. As long as the current intertwining of EU and NATO
states continues, Ireland should see itself in no position to sacrifice neutralism to a transat-
lantic partnership. This is an especially poignant point as the EU has expressed in full legal
terms the recognition of Irish neutralism.
The important point regarding the Irish relationship with NATO is that Ireland’s geog-
raphy would oblige Britain to come to Ireland’s defense anyway as long as the partition of
Ireland remains the norm. Ireland’s only land border is shared by a NATO member, so for
NATO’s own security it is best for them to protect the integrity of Irish territory.
Consequences of 'The Rocky Road'

Initial Irish suspicion of ISOs has not been without reason. Irish neutralism has con-
tinuously been strained, in particular by Ireland’s relationship with the EU. While as a po-
litical union it reflects more than just a security organization, the moves towards a common
direction in foreign, defense, and security policy could yet have a negative impact on Irish
neutralism. So far, the EU has accepted Irish neutralism only as a concession in order to
pass important EU treaties. Yet this has not stopped the EU from pushing forward its plans
for PESCO, which the EU hopes will lead to ‘deepening defense cooperation through bind-
ing commitments.’92
To maintain harmony domestically and internationally, Ireland’s official position on
neutrality has been unequivocal.93 It was initially a makeshift plan in 1939 to allow the Irish
Free State an independent say on their own foreign policy, and it has evolved along this line
to be something the people see as increasingly necessary and practical.
91 NATO Review Magazine, “Ireland: dealing with NATO and neutrality,” 2013, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/
Partnerships-NATO-2013/Second-video-Irish-minister/EN/index.htm,
92 European External Actions Service, “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – Factsheet,” 13 November 2017.
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en
93 Raymond, “Irish Neutrality,” 40.

72 Tárlach Russell
Going back to the assumptions from different theoretical perspectives, Ireland’s po-
sition can be seen from a rational institutionalist point of view: the extent of impact on
Ireland’s neutralism depends on the degree of centralization within differing organizations:
the EU’s centralization threatens Irish neutralism as it could tie Ireland to a new transna-
tional state or power bloc; the UN’s collective security mechanisms do not damage Ireland’s
inherent neutralism because it does not demand a permanent shift in the state’s foreign
policy direction; while NATO’s de-centralized partnerships allow Ireland to retain neutral-
ism and neutrality because its participation is limited to cooperation for UN-sanctioned
missions. This re-affirms Ireland’s commitment to liberalism in international politics, as it
sees its interaction as the best way to achieve its foreign policy objectives, in comparison to
relative Swiss isolationism.
Albeit on a smaller scale than Switzerland, Ireland’s neutral status is something inter-
nationally and institutionally recognized, and can only be taken away from the state via a
legal institutional loophole or by a dramatic shift in Irish public opinion. Irish adherence
to international treaties is a process which typically involves a public referendum, so gov-
ernment attempts to erode it could see them voted out of office, something policymakers
in a state much more concerned with domestic than international policies would want to
avoid. While Irish soldiers may not be fighting for a particular cause, something for the
Irish public and decision-makers to dwell upon is that Ireland will still be contributing to
the costs of initiatives taken in organizations they are a member of, despite not participating
in particular exercises.
7. Conclusion
Having looked at the two cases of Swiss and Irish interaction with ISOs, I now narrow
down my theoretical assumptions about the impact that these organizations have on neutral
states. For Switzerland, I found its neutral status fits the realist perspective whereby its status
is internationally recognized, and it could ‘free ride’ off the security costs of others. However,
it chose instead to pursue a policy of armed neutrality that means even if international cir-
cumstances change, Switzerland is in a position to enforce its own foreign policy directive.
Ireland, in contrast, comes under the rationalist perspective, where the degree of centraliza-
tion of security issues will influence its neutral status. This reflects foreign policy preferences
in both countries: the Swiss prefer to achieve foreign policy objectives bilaterally, while the
Irish prefer exercising their clout in international organizations.
What we can see, therefore, is an obvious practical ramification for neutral states who
join ISOs. Even if states still practice neutralism, they are bound in ISOs, at the very least,
by funding obligations which means while one may not be engaging in organizational mis-
sions, they are still contributing to them. Implications of this will be seen in future by the

evolution of the EU’s new PESCO program, which is voluntary to engage in but will be
funded by the EU as a whole.94
As seen in the case studies, states may not be bound to change their neutral status by
ISOs but are stuck in their relationships with great powers.95 Western neutral states are
bound in their relationships with the United States and are unlikely to join an alternative
institutional arrangement proposed outside of the Western order. Therefore, ISOs compel
state’s neutrality to evolve along a de jure line because they force continuous evolution of the
conception of neutrality in countries who join them. Neutral states are entrenched within
the systems they interact with, and therefore their status cannot be considered absolute neu-
trality. Institutional impact should be considered alongside other factors:
Geography, which matters for a state’s neutrality in wartime if it is to be considered
legitimate. Belgian neutrality was confirmed from 1839, yet it was in a strategically advan-
tageous position for a German invasion of France. After the Second World War, Belgium
decided to give up their neutrality and joined NATO in 1948 as a more effective way to
ensure their survival.
Public opinion, which means that states are still legally obliged to maintain a neutral
stance in cases where states place an emphasis on direct democracy. Even without direct de-
mocracy, liberal democracies are run by political parties who must be office-seeking before
policy making.
Organizational impact is not secondary to these other factors but is just one of several
important factors perpetually impacting upon the neutral status of neutral states. Exploring
the organizational impact vis-à-vis these other factors would require an entirely different
paper in itself, as well as the impact of bilateral state relations on neutral states. Both ques-
tions go beyond the confines of this paper.
94 This includes four self-declared neutral states, which is where the difference between de facto and de jure is highlighted.
95 Walter Laqueur, “The Specter of Finlandization,” Commentary 64, no. 6 (1977): 37-41, https://search.proquest.com/docvi
ew/1290076499?accountid=9630

74 Tárlach Russell
Works Cited
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3-32. www.jstor.
org/stable/174551
Alden, Chris, and Aran, Amnon, eds. Foreign Policy Analysis. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis
Group, 2016. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315442471
Aleksovski, Stefan, Avramovska, Biljana, and Oliver Bakreshi. “'Collective Security – The
Role of International Organizations – Implications in International Security Order.”
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 27 (2014): 274-82). http://www.mcser.
org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/5080
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strate-
gies and Institutions.” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226-54). http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2010357
Brunner, Edourad. “The Swiss Approach”. In Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects
for Europe’s Neutral and Non-Aligned States, edited by Michael H. Haltzel and Joseph
Kruzel, 283-85. Cambridge: Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1989.
Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland, enacted in 1937), Article 29.1-3 (on
International Relations)
Carey, Pat. “Partnership for Peace: Motion (Resumed).” Dublin, 14 October, 1999. Dáil De-
bates, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1999-10-14/speech/222/
Christin, Thomas, and Alexander H. Trechsel. “Joining the EU? Explaining Public Opin-
ion in Switzerland.” European Union Politics 3, no. 4 (2002): 415-43). https://doi.
org/10.1177/1465116502003004002
Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War
on Land (Hague Convention) 1907, (Article 1 and 2), opened for signature 18 October
1907, entered into force 26 January 1910.
Cosgrave, Liam. “Address to Dáil Éireann Committee on Finance.” Dublin, 3 July, 1956. Dáil
Debates, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1956-07-03/speech/187/
Coveney, Simon. “Permanent Structured Cooperation: Motion.” Dublin, 7 December,
2017. Dáil Debates, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2017-12-07/
speech/242/
Devine, Karen. “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical So-
cial Constructivist Framework.” International Political Science Review 29, no. 4 (2008:
261-88). http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445156

DeVore, Marc R., and Armin Stähli. “From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence:
Swiss Security in the 21st Century.” Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 1 (2011:
1-26). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02003.x
Dorr, Noel. “Ireland in an Interdependent World: Foreign Policy Since 1973.” In Irish For-
eign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 54-69.
Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
Doyle, Michael. “Liberalism and World Politics.” The American Political Science Review 80,
no. 4 (1986): 1151-69). http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960861
Dreyer, John, and Neal G. Jesse. “Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both?”
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 15, no. 3 (2014): 60-83). https://jmss.org/jmss/
index.php/jmss/article/view/545
Duffield, John. “What Are International Insitutions?” International Studies Review 9, no. 1
(2007): 1-22). http://www.jstor.org/stable/4621775
Fanning, Ronan. “Playing It Cool: The Response of the British and Irish Governments to
the Crisis in Northern Ireland, 1968-9.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 12, no. 1
(2001): 57-85). http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002059
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. , Kathryn. “International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917). https://www.
jstor.org/stable/2601361
Flanagan, Luke 'Ming'. "PESCO is not about peace, it is about preparing for EU wars," Irish
Examiner, March 20, 2018, https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/views/anal-
ysis/pesco-is-not-about-peace-it-is-about-preparing-for-eu-wars-833488.html
Foundation for EU Democracy. “The Lisbon Treaty: The Readable Version.” Accessed 15
January 2018. https://www.euabc.com/upload/books/lisbon-treaty-3edition.pdf
Gillissen, Christophe. “‘Her place among the nations of the earth’”: Irish votes at the UN
General Assembly, 1955-2005.” Estudios Irlandeses 1, no. 2 (2007): 68-77). https://doi.
org/10.24162/EI2007-2603
Goetschel, Laurent. “Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no.
2 (1999): 115-39). http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00108369921961807
Gstöhl, Sieglinde. “Scandinavia and Switzerland: small, successful and stubborn towards
the EU.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (2011): 529-49). https://doi.
org/10.1080/13501760210152420
Halbrook, Stephen. Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II. New York:
Sarpedon, 1998.

76 Tárlach Russell
Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Shreer. , Benjamin. “Towards a post-American Alliance?

NATO Burden-Sharing After Libya.” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 313-27).
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x
Hayward, Katy. “The European Union: National and Supranational Dimensions to
Foreign Policy.” In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy
and Ben Tonra, 54-69. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
“Ireland 60 Years at the United Nations.” 2015. Royal Irish Academy. https://www.dfa.
ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/aboutus/globalhorizonsyouthinitiative/Ireland-
--60-Years-at-the-United-Nations.pdf
“Ireland: dealing with NATO and neutrality,” 2013. NATO Review Magazine 2013. https://
www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Partnerships-NATO-2013/Second-video-Irish-min-
ister/EN/index.htm
Jesse, Neal G. “Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative
Perspective.” International Political Science Review 27, no. 1 (2006): 7-28). https://doi.
org/10.1177/0192512106058624
Johnston, Alistair Iain. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” In-
ternational Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 487-515). http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/3096058
Keatinge, Paul. “Making Sense of Irish Foreign Policy.” In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by
Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, vii-xvii. Dublin, Gill and
Macmillan, 2012.
Keethaponcalan, S.I. “Reshaping the Non-Aligned Movement: challenges and visions.”
Journal of the Global South 3, no. 4 (2016): 1-14). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40728-016-
0032-3
Kennedy, Michael. “The Foundation and Consolidation of Irish Foreign Policy: 1919-45.”
In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben
Tonra, 20-35. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
Kim, Seo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. “The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly.” International Organization 50, no. 4 (1996): 629-52).
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704240
Kimball, Warren F. “That Neutral Island: Ireland in WWII.” The Journal of Winston
Churchill 145, no. 1 (2010): 54-61). https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-
hour/finest-hour-145/churchill-proceedings-that-neutral-island/

Kroenig, Matthew. “The Case for Trump's Foreign Policy: The Right People, The Right Posi-
tions.” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 3 (2017): 30-34). http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.
journals/fora96&i=476
Laqueur, Walter. “The Specter of Finlandization.” Commentary; New York, N.Y. 64, no. 6
(1977): 37-41). https://search.proquest.com/docview/1290076499?accountid=9630
Lebow, Richard Ned. National Identities and International Relations. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2016.
Linder, Wolf. “Switzerland and the EU: the puzzling effects of Europeanisation without in-
stitutionalisation.” Contemporary Politics 19, no. 2 (2013): 190-202). https://doi.org/1
0.1080/13569775.2013.785830
Low-Beer, Francis. “The Concept of Neutralism.” The American Political Science Review
58, no. 2 (1964): 383-91). http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952869
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Secu-
rity 19, no. 3 (1995): 5-49). http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078
Mearsheimer, John. “Structural Realism.” In International Relations Theories: Discipline
and Diversity, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, 77-93. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2013.
Mérand, Frédéric and Kathleen Angers. “Military Integration in Europe.” In Beyond the
Regulatory Polity?: The European Integration of Core State Powers, edited by Philipp
Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs, 46-65. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Morris, Kate, and Timothy White. “Neutrality and the European Union: The case of Swit-
zerland.” Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 3, no. 7 (2011): 104-11). https://aca-
demicjournals.org/journal/JLCR/article-abstract/5E227687720
Morrison Skelly, James. “Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Na-
tions, 1946-55.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 7 (1996): 63-80). http://www.jstor.
org/stable/30002026
Murphy, Ray. “International Security and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Irish Experi-
ence.” In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and
Ben Tonra, 169-83. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
O’Brennan, John. “Ireland says No (again): the 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon
Treaty.” Parliamentary Affairs 62, no. 2 (2009): 258-77). https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/
gsp005
O’Donoghue, Aoife. “Neutrality and Multilateralism after the First World War.” Journal
of Conflict and Security Law 15, no. 1 (2009): 169-202). https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/
krp029

78 Tárlach Russell
O’Driscoll, Mervyn. “Multilateralism: From 'Plato's Cave' to the European Community:

1945-73.” In Irish Foreign Policy, edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy
and Ben Tonra, 36-53. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
Peterson, John, and Gottwald, Marlene. “The EU as a Global Actor.” In The European
Union: How Does it Work?, edited by Daniel Kenealy, John Peterson and Richard Cor-
bett, 208-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
“Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – Factsheet.” 13 November 2017, European
External Actions Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homep-
age/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en
Raymond, Raymond James. “Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism?” International Af-
fairs 60, no. 1 (1983): 31-40). http://www.jstor.org/stable/2618928
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Lib-
eral Democracies.” World Politics 43, no. 4 (1991): 479-512). http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2010534
Rittberger, Volker. “Theories of International Organizations.” In International Organiza-
tion, edited by Volker Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl and Andreas Kruck, 15-34. Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Russett, Bruce. “A neo-Kantian perspective: democracy, interdependence, and international
organizations in building security communities.” In Security Communities, edited by
Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and Steve Smith, 368-94. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998.
Ryan, David. US Foreign Policy in World History. London: Routledge, 2000.
Schindler, Dietrich. “Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the In-
ternational Community.” American University of International Law Review 14, no. 1
(1998): 155-70). http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol14/iss1/9/
Sheetz, Mark S., and Michael Mastanduno. , Michael. “Debating the Unipolar Moment.”
International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 168-74). http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539361
Shepherd, Alistair J.K. “EU military capability development and the EDA: Ideas, interests
and institutions.” In The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe, edited by Niko-
laos Karampekios and Iraklis Oikonomou, 65-83. New York: Routledge, 2015.
Shiraev, Eric, and Zubok, Vladislav M. International Relations. New York: , Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2015.
Smith, Michael. “Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance,
domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe's common foreign and secu-

rity policy.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 740-58). https://doi.
org/10.1080/1350176042000248124
Talmon, Stefan. “The Security Council as World Legislature.” The American Journal for
International Law 99, no. 1 (2005): 175-93). http://www.jstor.org/stable/3246097
The Data Team. “Military Spending by NATO Members,” The Economist, February 16,
2017.
Thompson, Wayne. C. Western Europe 2012. Lanham, MD: Stryker-Post Publications,
2012.
Tonra, Ben. “Security, Defence and Neutrality: The Irish Dilemma.” In Irish Foreign Policy,
edited by Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, 221-41. Dublin,
Gill and Macmillan, 2012.
Walt, Stephen. “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 35,
no. 2 (1991): 211-39). https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600471.
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Boston, Mass: McGraw Hill, 1979.
Wessel, Ramses A. “The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Break-
through In The Treaty Of Nice.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 8, no. 2 (2003):
265-88). https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/8.2.265.

To Nuclearize, or Not to Nuclearize
Tracing the South Korean Nuclear Debate from 2016 to the
Third Inter-Korean Summit
Daniel Jacinto
While 2018 was filled with significant diplomatic developments on the Korean Peninsula,
the geopolitical landscape two years ago was vastly different. The period from 2016-2017
marked a distinct crisis in the region, with unprecedented progress in North Korea’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs. While these events have consumed the lion’s share of inter-
national coverage, they have also triggered frantic, though seldom discussed, debate within
South Korea on whether it should acquire its own nuclear deterrent. This paper examines
the South Korean nuclear debate in two phases: the ‘crisis period’ between 2016-2017 and
the immediate ‘post-crisis period’ from the start of 2018 to the third Inter-Korean summit in
April, 2018. Using an original analysis of 750 articles from the leading English- and Korean-
language newspapers in South Korea, this paper identifies the key factors shaping the nuclear
debate, which policies were pursued, and what security narratives tackled the nuclear ques-
tion. The findings suggest that the South Korean nuclear discourse is heavily dependent on
the existence of a North Korean nuclear threat and concerns over U.S. involvement in South
Korean security. In debating both the reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and the
development of a domestic nuclear deterrent force, South Korean lawmakers and government
officials overwhelmingly address the nuclear question in terms of security or economic con-
cerns rather than normative ones. These findings are expected to directly impact the effective-
ness and stability of the ongoing peace efforts on the peninsula.
Introduction
Speaking in her New Year’s address in 2016, former South Korean President Park
Geun-hye addressed calls for her country to reintroduce U.S. nuclear weapons to deter the
North Korean threat by stating: “I have always emphasized in the international commu-
nity that the nuclear-free world must begin from the Korean Peninsula.”1 This principled
statement of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula—grounded in the Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between North and South Korea in January
1992—persisted through Park’s eventual impeachment and into the new administration of
the liberal Moon Jae-in. Speaking on his North Korea policy in an interview with CNN in
September 2017, Moon stated, “If we respond to the situation with an attitude that we will
1 Yoon Min-sik, “Park urges more aggressive role from China on North Korea’s nuclear problem,” The Korea Herald, January
13, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160113000648.
Daniel jacinto is a senior undergradaute student at the University of British

Columbia with an Honours specialization in Korean Language/Culture and a
Major in International Relations.
To Nuclearize, or Not to Nuclearize 81
counter a nuclear-armed North with a nuclear-armed South, peace cannot be maintained

between the two Koreas.”2
While firm opposition to South Korean nuclearization occurs consistently at the
highest levels of the executive government, lawmakers—and even the general popula-
tion—were not so convinced. In the face of North Korea’s unprecedented advancements in
missile technology, questions about South Korea’s own nuclear capability swept through
the public consciousness. Some proponents called for the reintroduction of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons, while others went further, demanding the establishment of a domestic
nuclear deterrent. Both options enjoyed a high degree of public support. Yet as quickly
as these debates emerged, North Korea’s diplomatic volte-face—its cooperation in the
PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics, the resumption of dialogue, and the third Inter-
Korean summit in April 2018—drastically altered the geopolitical climate. As relations
improved, these debates died down in the public discourse.
This paper will examine how South Korea grappled with the question of nucle-
arization from the beginning of 2016 to the third Inter-Korean summit in April 2018, a
time frame corresponding to a clear ‘crisis period’ and immediate ‘post-crisis period’ for
inter-Korean relations. After briefly tracing the history of nuclear weapons in South Korea
and scholarly literature on the debate, this paper utilizes an original analysis of 750 articles
from the leading English- and Korean-language newspapers in South Korea to identify
key factors shaping the nuclear debate, which policies were pursued, and what secu-
rity narratives (‘frames’) were used. The findings suggest that the South Korean nuclear
discourse is strongly tied to fears over the North Korean nuclear threat, and relatedly, U.S.
involvement in the South Korean (or, more broadly, East Asian) security architecture. The
findings also suggest that, despite the rhetoric framing the anti-nuclear debate, the nuclear
question is overwhelmingly addressed in terms of security or economic (i.e. material)
concerns rather than normative ones. These discoveries carry direct implications on the
effectiveness and stability of the ongoing peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

1. History of Nuclear Weapons in South Korea
The deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, from 1958 and expanding
through the early 1960s, was built on the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea after
the Korean War. These initially consisted of surface-to-surface missile systems, nuclear
landmines, cruise missiles, bombs for fighter-bombers, and nuclear artillery weapons
systems. By 1967, the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons arsenal in South Korea reached a total
of 950 nuclear warheads. However, new tactics for advanced conventional weapons and
2 Ser Myo-ja, “Moon rules out nuclear weapons in South Korea,” Korea JoongAng Daily, September 15, 2017, http://koreajoon-
gangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3038452.

82 Daniel Jacinto
concerns over the use of weapons stockpiles in allied countries led to an overall reduction
in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from around 640 in 1974 to 150 in 1982.3
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Cold War détente drove President George
H. W. Bush to announce the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) in September, 1991
to reduce U.S. overseas deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.4 Subsequently, the U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM) arranged the withdrawal of the approximately 100 re-
maining U.S. nuclear warheads from the peninsula. In November 1991, South Korea and
the United States agreed to completely withdraw all warheads by the end of the year. In
December 1991, President Roh Tae-woo announced that the withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear
weapons had been completed.5
While tactical nuclear weapons were largely a matter of U.S. decision making,
South Korea attempted its own domestic nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. De-
spite originating as a peaceful nuclear program, changes in the state’s security environ-
ment in the 1960s (largely due to the Nixon Doctrine) prompted its militarization under
President Park Chung-hee.6 From 1971-1975, the Korean Atomic Energy Research
Institute (KAERI) negotiated with nuclear-supplying countries such as France, Belgium,
and Canada to gain the requisite nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing technology.7
Weapons design and delivery technology fell largely on the Agency for Defence Devel-
opment (ADD), which in 1972 devised a missile development plan with the Institute of
Science and Technology (KIST), the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
(KAIST), and the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The ADD also acquired
basic ballistic missile design technology from McDonnell Douglas, secured a propellant
factory from Lockheed, and gained manufacturing technologies from the French com-
pany: SNPE.8
In 1974, following a successful nuclear test in India that raised concerns over
the stability of the non-proliferation regime, the U.S. began applying pressure on South
Korea’s nuclear and missile program. Multiple negotiations to end the program took
place between the U.S. embassy in Seoul and the Park administration with little success.
Ultimately, South Korea gave in and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April
1975. The final nail in the coffin came when Park backed out of a nuclear technology deal
3 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
73, no. 6 (2017), 350-351.
4 Susan J. Koch, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012),
2-13.
5 Kristensen and Norris, “A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea,” 351-352.
6 Sung Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of
South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 486-487.
7 Ibid., 489-492.
8 Ibid., 494-495.

with France between December 1975 and January 1976.9 Similar rhetoric continued into
the 2000s with few developments in South Korea’s nuclear capability.
1.1 The Nuclearization Debate in South Korea

Three main arguments have dominated the academic discourse on South Korean
nuclearization since the beginning of the 2010s. The first is the need to defend against a
nuclear North Korea. Proponents of this view suggest nuclear weapons are necessary to
protect South Korea against an attack from a nuclear-armed North Korea and to deter the
regime from provocations or nuclear blackmail.10 By extension, South Korean nuclear ar-
mament could serve as leverage to negotiate the mutual denuclearization of both Koreas,
and to pressure China to compel North Korea to denuclearize.11
The second argument concerns the efficacy of U.S.-extended deterrence guar-
antees. As described above, fears of wavering U.S. commitment to South Korean defense
prompted South Korea’s domestic nuclearization attempt in the 1970s.12 More recently,
given North Korea’s rapid progress in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, skeptics
have questioned the reliability of extended deterrence if it risks placing major cities on
the U.S. mainland under the North’s nuclear threat.13 The possible decline in American
economic and military supremacy and the lack of an overarching collective security insti-
tution in the region make nuclearization a wise precautionary strategy for South Korea to
reduce its dependence on the United States.14
The third and final argument revolves around a perceived lack of sovereignty
within South Korea over its own security. Here, successful nuclearization is equated with
state power: vis-à-vis North Korea and in light of continued U.S. wartime operational
control; as a continuation of South Korean political and economic development following
protracted foreign occupation and influence; and as a point of pride for its scientific com-
munity.15
1.2 Definining the Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods

While nuclear weapons have been discussed over a protracted period of South
Korean history, the geopolitical events in inter-Korean relations throughout 2016-2017
9 Ibid., 496-501.
10 Toby Dalton and Alexandra Francis, “South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty,” Asia Policy 19 (2015): 119-120; Raja-
ram Panda, “Should South Korea go Nuclear?” Asia-Pacific Review 22, no. 1 (2015): 159.
11 Mun Suk Ahn and Young Chul Cho, “A nuclear South Korea?”, International Journal 69, no. 1 (2014): 28.
12 Dalton and Francis, “South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty,” 118; Se Young Jang, “The Evolution of US Extended
Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 4 (2016): 507-513.
13 Panda, “Should South Korea go Nuclear?”, 159.
14 Ahn and Cho, “A nuclear South Korea?”, 29.
15 Ibid., 28, 31; Dalton and Francis, “South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty,” 119.

84 Daniel Jacinto
and rapid détente in the beginning of 2018 demarcate a distinct ‘crisis period’ and ‘imme-
diate post-crisis period’ in terms of factors impacting South Korean prospects for nuclear-
ization.
The two-year crisis period stands out in terms of the frequency and nature of
North Korea’s missile and nuclear testing.16 Quantitatively, there was a notable increase in
the number of provocations since Kim Jong-un’s leadership takeover in 2011-2012. Figure
1 shows the total number of provocations by year from 1958 to 2017. The two vertical
lines mark the North Korean regime changes in 1994 and 2011.
Figure 1 – All DPRK provocations (1958-2017)

Under the Kim Jong-il regime, North Korea engaged in a total of 77 provocations. By
comparison, North Korea engaged in 87 provocations under the Kim Jong-un regime: ten
more than under the preceding regime and in roughly one third the duration. 2016-2017
also reached unprecedented numbers of provocations, peaking at 25 in 2016 with a slight
decrease to 20 provocations in 2017. This marks the greatest period of heightened tensions
since 1967-1968.
The nature of these provocations is also significant. Figure 2 breaks down these
provocations by type.17 Again, the transition years between leaders are marked by a verti-
cal line.
16 This section draws from data on North Korean provocations from the Beyond Parallel study conducted by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. The dataset includes four categories of provocations: nuclear provocations; missile provoca-
tions; and two groups of other provocations (terrorist activities, military or naval skirmishes, territorial incursions, etc.). While
the Beyond Parallel study does not provide an explicit definition of a provocation, the coded events correspond to belligerent
military actions above the level of verbal rhetoric that resulted in a worsening of DPRK-ROK or DPRK-US relations.
17 The Beyond Parallel database breaks the provocations into four categories: 1) nuclear provocations; 2) missile provocations;
3) other provocations; and 4) other (terrorist activities, military or naval skirmishes, territorial incursions, etc.) The latter two
categories have been combined in this paper for ease of understanding.

Figure 2 – All DPRK provocations (1958-2017), by type
While ‘other’ provocations make up the bulk of provocations under Kim Il-sung
and the first half of the Kim Jong-il regime, most provocations under Kim Jong-un are
missile-type provocations, alongside several nuclear tests. In 2016-2017, these missile and
nuclear tests reached significant technological milestones. North Korea’s launch on July 4,
2017 of the Hwasong-14 was confirmed by the U.S. to be North Korea’s first ever inter-
continental ballistic missile test, at an estimated maximum range of 6,700 kilometres.18
This was surpassed by the Hwasong-15 on November 28, 2017 with an estimated range
of 13,000 kilometres, raising fears of reaching the U.S. mainland.19 On the nuclear front,
these two years saw North Korea conduct three separate nuclear tests: January 6, 2016,
September 9, 2016, and September 3, 2017. Estimates by the Norwegian Seismic Array
(NORSAR) rated the explosive yield of the January 2016 test at 10 kiloton (kT) equivalent
of TNT, doubling to 20kT for the September 2016 test, and up to 300kT for the most
recent September 2017 test.20,21,22
By late 2017, however, this crisis gave way to a distinct ‘immediate post-crisis
period’ wherein provocations effectively came to a standstill, followed by a shift towards
positive diplomatic developments on the Korean Peninsula in the new year. In his New
18 Choi Sang-Hun, “U.S. Confirms North Korea Fired Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” New York Times, July 4, 2017, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-icbm.html.
19 “North Korea launches ‘highest ever’ ballistic missile,” BBC News, November 29, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-42160227.
20 “Update on the location of North Korea’s latest nuclear test,” NORSAR, January 6, 2016, https://www.norsar.no/getfile.
php/133705-1476947899/norsar.no/Press/PressReleases/20160106-Press%20release%20NORSAR%20on%20North%20
Korea%206th%20Jan%202016.pdf.
21 “North Korean underground nuclear test larger than previous tests,” NORSAR, September 9, 2016, https://www.norsar.no/
getfile.php/134507-1480584418/norsar.no/Press/PressReleases/20160909-North-Korea-PressRelease.pdf.
22 “The nuclear explosion in North Korea on 3 September 2017: A revised magnitude assessment,” NORSAR, September 12,
2017, https://www.norsar.no/press/latest-press-release/archive/the-nuclear-explosion-in-north-korea-on-3-september-2017-a-
revised-magnitude-assessment-article1548-984.html.

86 Daniel Jacinto
Year Address for 2018, Kim Jong-un expressed his openness to participate in the Py-
eongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games, as well as his intent to pursue Détente on the
Korean Peninsula.23 Just over a week later, on January 9, a breakthrough in high-level
North-South negotiations at Panmunjom yielded the reinstatement of a military hotline
between the two sides, accompanied by North Korea’s official agreement to participate in
the 2018 Winter Olympic Games.24 The flurry of diplomatic exchanges eventually brought
Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, as well as North Korea’s ceremonial head of state, Kim
Yong-nam, in a high-level visit to South Korea; the former delivered a personal invitation
to South Korean President Moon Jae-in to visit Pyongyang for talks with Kim Jong-un.25
Just under two months later, this culminated in the third historic inter-Korean summit
on April 27, 2018 at Panmunjom. The summit outcome document, formally titled the
Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula,
included a clause affirming “the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclear-
ization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”26 The distinction between the two-year crisis
period from 2016-2017 and the immediate post-crisis period from January to April 2018
provides the basis for analyzing the nuclear debate in the following sections.
2. Methodology and Analysis of the Contemporary Debate

To assess the contemporary South Korean debate over nuclear weaponization,
the author examined two sets of newspaper articles by the three most circulated English
and Korean daily newspapers, as reported by the Korea Audit Bureau of Certification. The
English-language papers included The Korea Herald, The Korea Times, and Korea Joon-
gAng Daily; the Korean-language papers included Chosun Ilbo, DongA Ilbo, and Joon-
gAng Ilbo.27 The first set of articles corresponded to the crisis period and included a total
of 723 articles (323 English and 400 Korean) published from January 2016 to December
2017. The second set corresponded to the immediate post-crisis period, including a mark-
edly reduced sample size of 27 articles (11 English and 16 Korean) published from January
2018 through the end of April 2018.
23 “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” Korean Central News Agency, January 1, 2018, available on http://www.kcna.kp/
kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf.
24 “North Korea to send team to Winter Olympic Games,” BBC News, January 9, 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-42600550.
25 Anna Fifield and Ashley Parker, “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un invites South Korea’s president to Pyongyang,” The Wash-
ington Post, February 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-has-invited-south-koreas-
moon-jae-in-to-pyongyang/2018/02/10/d7db9dde-0ddd-11e8-998c-96deb18cca19_story.html.
26 Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, Ministry of Unification, April 30,
2018, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54179.
27 “2017 nyŏn (2016 nyŏndobun) ilgan sinmun 163 kaesa injŭngbusu,” Korea Audit Bureau of Certification, May 10, 2018,
available from http://www.kabc.or.kr/about/notices/100000002541.

For both sample sets, the author used the Dow Jones Factiva database to identify
articles with the following terms: “South Korea” AND (“nuclear weapons” OR “nukes”) for
English newspapers; and (“hanguk” OR “taehanminguk” OR “uri nara”) AND (“haeng-
mugi” OR “chŏnsulhaek” OR “haengmujang”) for Korean newspapers. The data was then
coded with the following research questions in mind for each respective period: When
and in response to what events has the topic of nuclearization gained public attention?
Was the debate centred primarily on domestic nuclear weapons or the redeployment of
US tactical nuclear weapons? Finally, what arguments were made, and under what secu-
rity narratives were these framed? These questions are addressed in the following sections.
2.1 Analyzing the Crisis Period

Using the frequency at which the sample texts were published, it is possible to
contextualize the debate in relation to key events from the 2016-2017 crisis period. Figure
3 shows the volume of newspaper articles on South Korean nuclear armament by date
from January 2016 through December 2017.
Figure 3 – Volume of Articles related to South Korean Nuclearization, by date (2016-2017)
The data suggests that debate over nuclear weapons was sporadic rather than
sustained, based around four major events labelled A through D. Each of these events are
characterized by a sudden increase in the volume of articles, followed by a steady decline
in the preceding weeks.
The period labelled ‘A’ takes place in late March 2016 and coincides with remarks
made by then-Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump. Discussing his foreign
policy in an interview with the New York Times on March 26, Trump stated he may be
open to South Korea and Japan having their own nuclear arsenals, in addition to the pos-

88 Daniel Jacinto
sible withdrawal of US troops from the region. These remarks were widely reported in
both the English and Korean-language newspapers. In response, Korea JoongAng Daily
issued an editorial calling Trump’s views “myopic” and asking Trump to “refrain from his
penny-wise and pound-foolish approach.”28 An opinion piece by Chosun Ilbo’s Lim Min-
hyuk on April 5, 2016 suggested Trump’s rhetoric of Korea as a “free rider” created a major
challenge for South Korean foreign affairs and alliance relations with the U.S.29 In July
2016, former Saenuri Party floor leader Won Yoo-chul cited Trump’s remarks as a pretext
for justifying South Korea’s nuclear armament on the grounds that they posed a major
challenge to South Korea’s existing national security framework.30 This notion of failing
U.S. extended deterrence featured prominently among the calls for South Korean nuclear-
ization.
The period labelled ‘B’ occurred in the aftermath of North Korea’s fifth nuclear
test on September 9, 2016. Much of the reports from the sample focused on a renewed
push from the conservative bloc in favour of nuclearization. On September 12, 2016 the
Korea Times reported calls from key Saenuri Party leaders, such as Chairman Lee Jung-
hyun and former chairman Kim Moo-sung, for a redeployment of tactical nuclear weap-
ons and a renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. atomic energy agreement.31 That month also
saw the formation of the South Korean Nuclear Research Group (Uri haek yŏn’gu hoe)
composed of various security, nuclear, and North Korea experts in favor of nucleariza-
tion.32
The period labelled ‘C’ coincided with the launching of four ballistic missiles by
North Korea on March 6, 2017. This was followed by reports of how the leading candi-
dates for the upcoming South Korean presidential elections responded to the provocation,
with Gyeonggi Province Governor and conservative Bareun Party representative Nam
Kyung-pil using the event as a pretext for U.S. tactical nuclear weapons redeployment.33
A DongA Ilbo editorial also used the occasion to call for a greater show of force from the
US-South Korea alliance, echoing calls for U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, in addition to
28 “Dangerous remarks from Trump,” Korea JoongAng Daily, March 28, 2016, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/
article/article.aspx?aid=3016744.
29 Lim Min-hyŏk, “[Tesŭkŭ esŏ] Han’guk ap e ‘T’ŭrŏmp’ŭ sihŏmdae’,” Chosun Ilbo, April 5, 2016, http://news.chosun.com/site/
data/html_dir/2016/04/04/2016040402881.html.
30 Yeo Jun-suk, “Former Saenuri whip repeats nuclear arms call,” The Korea Herald, July 25, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.
com/view.php?ud=20160725000734.
31 Kim Hyo-jin, “Key Saenuri Party members back nuclear armament,” The Korea Times, September 12, 2016, http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/485_214009.html.
32 Chu Sŏng-ha, “Han’guk tokcha haengmujangttaen NPT t’alt’oehaeya…kukche chejae kamdang ŭimun,” DongA Ilbo, Sep-
tember 12, 2016, http://news.donga.com/3/all/20160912/80254560/1.
33 Jun Ji-hye, “Presidential contenders slam N. Korea missile test in unison,” The Korea Times, March 6, 2017, http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/03/356_225155.html.

further deployments of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) batteries. 34

The final period, ‘D’, saw the greatest peak within the sample and corresponded
to North Korea’s largest nuclear test to date on September 3, 2017, along with its first
reported ICBM launch less than two weeks later on September 15. As expected, these
events prompted a massive backlash. A September 4 editorial by Chosun Ilbo claimed
that dialogue, diplomacy, and other economic or military means of pressure had been
exhausted, leaving only a balance of terror through nuclear redeployment as the only real-
istic response to these provocations.35 A week after the test, The Korea Times reported that
Liberty Korea Party Chairman Hong Joon-pyo launched a public petition with a goal of
10 million signatures in favor of tactical nuclear weapons redeployment.36 JoongAng Ilbo
also documented the visit to Washington DC by a delegation of LKP representatives to
lobby for tactical nuclear weapons, garnering an audience with US Special Representative
for North Korea Policy Joseph Yun, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Interna-
tional Security and Non-proliferation Elliot Kang, Republican Senator Cory Gardner, and
the conservative-leaning Heritage Foundation President Edwin Feulner.37
Examining these four major events within the identified crisis period, it appears
debates over nuclearization in South Korea are strongly correlated with two factors. First
are changes in the North Korean security front, with missile and nuclear tests provid-
ing the pretext and justification for a stronger military response within South Korea. The
second factor is US foreign policy, specifically its involvement in the Northeast Asian
ecurit infrastructure, highlighting the inseparable nature of South Korean defence and US
extended deterrence. Together, these two factors suggest a largely security-based, rather
than normative framing of the nuclear issue in South Korean society.
2.2 Two ‘Nuclearizations’: Domestic versus Tactical

The bulk of the debate from 2016-2017, as captured in the data, centred on two
forms of nuclearization: the development of a domestic nuclear weapons arsenal, and the
redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons. Within the 2-year span from 2016-2017, a
total of 338 sources contained at least one normative statement (i.e. statements with a clear
position either for or against nuclear weapons) pertaining to the development of a South
Korean domestic nuclear weapons program while 264 sources contained similar state-
34 “[Sasŏl] Puk ŭi ittan misail tobal, ‘Han-Mi tongmaeng ŭi him’ poyŏjul ttaeda,” DongA Ilbo, March 6, 2017. http://news.
donga.com/3/04/20170306/83197643/1.
35 “[Sasŏl] Mun taet’ongnyŏng kungmin ap e sŏsŏ Taehan Min’guk kal kil palk’yŏdalla,” Chosun Ilbo, September 5, 2017, http://
news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/04/2017090402785.html.
36 Choi Ha-young, “LKP leader’s ‘nuclear drive’ draws concerns,” The Korea Times, September 12, 2017, http://www.korea-
times.co.kr/www/news/nation/2017/09/356_236292.html.
37 Kim Hyŏn-ki, “Chayuhan’guktang ŭiwŏn tŭl, chŏnsurhaek chaebaech’i Miguk e kongsik yoch’ŏng,” JoongAng Ilbo, Septem-
ber 15, 2017, http://news.joins.com/article/21940427.

90 Daniel Jacinto
ments pertaining to the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Using the frequency of
these sources plotted over time as a proxy for their salience in the public discourse, figures
4 and 5 illustrate the trends in the debates for each nuclearization option.
While debate over both options was relatively sustained through the entire crisis
period, there was a slight shift within the sample over time away from domestic nuclear
weapons and towards greater discussion of U.S. tactical weapons. The initial emphasis on
domestic weapons may have been influenced by President Trump’s statements suggesting
South Korea and Japan develop their own nuclear weapons. However, recognition of the
diplomatic and economic risks involved in developing a domestic nuclear weapons capa-
bility may have pushed the debate toward tactical nuclear weapons instead. The changes
that occurred following the crisis would shift debate in largely different direction.
Figures 4 & 5 –Number of sources referencing domestic nuclear weapons vs. tactical
nuclear weapons, by date

3. Examining the Post-Crisis Debate

The post-crisis debate presented a starkly different image from that of the crisis
period. Sustained debate—or even discussion—of South Korea’s nuclearization drastically
declined during this period. While the low sample size of the post-crisis period made it
difficult to make in-depth qualitative comparisons, quantitatively, the comparison is rather
telling. Figure 6 compares the volume of articles by date during the crisis period (January
2016 – December 2018) and the immediate post-crisis period (January – April 2018).
Figure 6 - Volume of Articles related to South Korean Nuclearization, by date

(January 2016 - April 2018)
In the immediate post-crisis period, there was minimal discussion on South

Korean nuclearization among the sample newspapers with an average of 6.75 articles per
month (27 articles over 4 months). This is contrasted with the crisis period, during which
there was an average of 30.12 articles per month (723 articles over 24 months). Within the
immediate post-crisis period itself, there was a notable decrease in the volume of articles
over time, as demonstrated in Table 1.
Table 1 - Volume of Articles by Newspaper in Immediate Post-Crisis Period, by

month

92 Daniel Jacinto
While fifteen newspaper articles pertaining to South Korean nuclearization

were published in January, this decreased to six in February, further dropping to three in
March, and only two in April. The disproportionately high number of articles in January
could be explained by lingering skepticism over North Korea’s diplomatic overtures during
that period following Kim Jong-un’s New Years address. However, as it became clear that
North Korea was refraining from overt provocations—and amid North Korea’s successful
participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic games in early February—it appears
this skepticism subsided, and the nuclear option rapidly fell out of the public purview. By
April signs indicated that the third Inter-Korean summit would proceed without incident
and the question of South Korean nuclearization effectively became a moot point.
4. Framing the Debate: Security, Economic, and Normative Frames

Analyzing the various normative statements contained within the sample, it
is possible to build an overview of the dominant arguments used in the nuclear debate
during the most recent crisis period. These can be broken down into three types: security-
based arguments, economic arguments, and normative arguments. The vast majority
of the arguments fit within the first two categories, implying a strong perception of the
nuclear question in terms of material factors—i.e. military and economic hard power—
rather than ideational ones.
4.1 Security Frame

Virtually all the arguments on the pro-nuclear side of the debate fell within
the security frame. At its most basic, this argument calls for the use of nuclear weapons
to counter the North Korean threat. For instance, in the wake of North Korea’s January
2016 nuclear test and long-range rocket launch the following February, Saenuri Party
floor leader Won Yu-chul stated, “We have to take extraordinary measures to prepare for
changes in security landscape…we have to think about measures to ensure the nation’s
survival including nuclear armament for self-defense.38 Notions of the ‘balance of terror
(kongp’o ŭi kyunhyŏng)’ and the ‘nuclear hostage (haek injil)' regularly accompanied this
argument. For instance, former Korea Herald editorialist Kim Myong-sik notes, “a bal-
ance of terror with the realization of apocalyptic retaliation can prevent an adventure by
a dictator. This looks like the only feasible path we should take to meet the North Korean
madness.”39 The second concept is generally projected as the ultimate result of South
38 Yeo Jun-suk, “Senior lawmaker urges government to seek regime change in North,” The Korea Herald, February 15, 2016,
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160215000948.
39 Kim Myong-sik, “From fear, anger to stronger unity, resolve,” The Korea Herald, February 17, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.
com/view.php?ud=20160217001054.

Korea’s failure to counter the North with its own nuclear weapons, as shown in a Chosun
Ilbo editorial suggesting Kim Jong-un has already taken 50 million Koreans as ‘nuclear
hostages’.40
Variations of this argument emphasize the failure of U.S. extended deterrence, in-
ternational controls, diplomatic engagement, and the principle of denuclearization as ne-
cessitating the nuclear option to counter the North. In a Korea Herald interview, Saenuri
lawmaker Won Yoo-chul claimed, “The US nuclear umbrella, which we see as protection,
can be folded back anytime, and we just cannot borrow the umbrella whenever it rains.”41
In the wake of North Korea’s September 2017 nuclear test, LKP leader Hong Joon-pyo
stated that “for the past twenty years, we have repeatedly turned to dialogue and sanctions.
Nevertheless, North Korea has steadily been developing its nuclear weapons…at this point
dialogue holds little meaning.”42 Furthemore, writing for Dong A Ilbo, Choi Kang at the
Asan Institute for Policy Studies noted that no matter how much South Korea adhered to
the 1992 Joint Declaration on denuclearization, it was unlikely that North Korea would
give up its own nuclear weapons.43
A slightly different argument involve the use of nuclear weapons as a form of
diplomatic leverage—albeit with the same end-goal of removing the North Korean nuclear
threat. On the one hand, these nuclear weapons could be used as a negotiating card with
North Korea, as suggested by Gyeonggi Province Governor and Bareun Party representa-
tive Nam Kyung-pil during his campaign pledge for the 2017 Presidential elections.44 On
the other hand, as advocated by Kim Tae-woo, former researcher at the Korea Institute for
National Unification, nuclear weapons could be used not to pressure North Korea, but to
pressure China, noting: “China’s position in saying it will not acknowledge North Korea as
a nuclear state while opposing the collapse of its leadership is hypocritical…if necessary,
we must pressure China to fundamentally change its attitude with the nuclear card.”45
Not all the arguments within the defense-security frame were in favour of nucle-
ar weapons: in fact, a couple major rebuttals against nuclearization fell within the security
framework as well. First among these was the argument that nuclear weapons simply were
40 "[Sasŏl] Puk 6-ch’a haeksirhŏm, 5000-man i haek injil twaetta,” Chosun Ilbo, September 4, 2017, http://news.chosun.com/
site/data/html_dir/2017/09/03/2017090301724.html.
41 Yeo Jun-suk, “[Herald Interview] Former Saenuri whip says South Korea needs nukes,” The Korea Herald, August 21, 2016,
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160821000235.
42 Choi Kyŏng-un. “Hong Jun-p’yo ‘Ch’ŏng’ sŏ 5-tang taep’yo ch’ojŏng? Tŭllŏri hoedam en an kanda”, Chosun Ilbo, September
9, 2017, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/09/2017090900216.html.
43 Choi Kang, “[Tong’a kwangjang/Ch’oi Kang] Chŏnsurhaek chaebaech’i sŏdullŏya hanŭn kkadalk,” DongA Ilbo, March 18,
2017, http://news.donga.com/List/Series_70040100000019/3/70040100000019/20170318/83381634/1.
44 Pae Chae-sŏng. “Nam Kyŏng-p’il ‘Haengmujang junbi…2023-nyŏn put’ŏ mobyŏngje’ Anbo kongyak palp’yo,” JoongAng
Ilbo, February 19, 2017, http://news.joins.com/article/21279814.
45 Lee Sŭng-hŏn, “‘Chung kyŏnje wihan Mi ŭi ch’ŏmdanjŏllyŏk, Puk-haek taeŭng edo hwaryonghaeya’,” DongA Ilb, July 4,
2016, http://news.donga.com/Politics/BestClick/3/all/20160704/78998341/1.

94 Daniel Jacinto
not necessary for South Korea’s defense given that the U.S. extended deterrence system is
already in place. While this argument was largely given by foreigners like USFK Com-
mander Vincent Brooks and U.S. diplomat Marc Knapper, it was echoed by domestic
proponents like presidential special advisor Moon Chung-in.46 Relatedly, another major
argument was the fear that a nuclear-armed South Korea would trigger a nuclear domino-
effect across North East Asia, spreading as far as Japan and Taiwan.47
4.2 Economic Frame

In addition to security-based concerns, a significant portion of the debate em-
phasized the economic and diplomatic ramifications of breaking the non-proliferation
principle as a rationale to oppose South Korean nuclearization. The argument falling
within this framework was exclusively anti-nuclear. For instance, Cha Doo-hyun from the
Korea Institute for Defence Analyses noted that nuclearization would result in the block-
age of American uranium supply with massive ramifications for Korea’s energy industry.48
Likewise, Bareun Party representative Ha Tae-kyung criticized the domestic nucleariza-
tion movement as ‘nuclear populism,’ explaining that doing so would effectively subject
South Korea to the UN economic sanctions, much like North Korea.49 Handong Univer-
sity professor Park Won-gon similarly noted that domestic nuclearization would result
in South Korea’s international isolation with larger ramifications given the scale of South
Korea’s heavily global-reliant economy.50
4.3 Normative Frame

By far, the least employed argument was the use of norms to preclude the nuclear
option altogether on ideational grounds. This line of debate was most evident in former
President Park Geun-hye’s stated principle of a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weap-
ons.51 Building on this was the notion that gaining nuclear weapons acted as an implicit
acknowledgement (and by extension, justification) for North Korea’s nuclear weapons,
undermining the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While this argument was
46 “S. Korea’s nuclear armament would make US safer: expert,” The Korea Times, May 4, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/nation/2016/05/205_203995.html.
47 Ser Myo-ja, “Moon rules out nuclear weapons in South Korea,” Korea JoongAng Daily, September 15, 2017, http://korea-
joongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3038452.
48 Yi Yong-su, “‘Han’guk haengmujang’ pal ppaen T’ŭrŏmp’ŭ…Mi ŭi pihwaksan wŏnch’ik twijipkin,” Chosun Ilbo, November
15, 2016, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/11/15/2016111500193.html.
49 Oh Wŏn-sik, “Ha T’ae-kyŏng ‘Hong Jun-p’yo ‘tokcha haengmujangnon’ wihŏm ch’ŏnman…haek p’op’yullijŭm’,” JoongAng
Ilbo, September 16, 2017.
50 Yi Whan-woo, “NK test stirs call for nuclear armament,” The Korea Times, January 18, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/nation/2016/01/180_195722.html.
51 Yoon Min-sik, “Park urges more aggressive role from China on North Korea’s nuclear problem,” The Korea Herald, January
13, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160113000648.

also employed by the Park administration, it was especially prominent under the Moon
administration. Speaking before the National Assembly in August 2017, Chung Eui-
yong, head of the National Security Office of the Blue House, stated, “We will lose our
justification for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula if we place tactical atomic
weapons.” This position was later echoed by President Moon and Unification Minister
Cho Myung-hyun in the following months.52,53,54 In a sense, however, this argument cycles
back to security concerns rather than any fundamental ethical or moral reasoning behind
non-proliferation: denuclearization is sought after not out of the unacceptability of their
catastrophic impact or for its own sake, but rather specifically because, of the North Ko-
rean threat.
5. Implications and Conclusion

To nuclearize, or not to nuclearize: such is the perennial question within South
Korea, for whom the nuclear option is not merely one of principle but one of existential
threat. This debate came to a head from 2016 through the early part of 2018 amid unprec-
edented progress in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic weapons capabilities. As shown
in the analysis above, this period witnessed strong calls for South Korean nuclearization,
largely—though not exclusively—from conservative lawmakers in government. Such calls
depended heavily on a credible threat from North Korea and concerns over U.S. involve-
ment in South Korea’s security infrastructure. However, for the time being, North Korea’s
diplomatic about-face through the early portions of 2018 seem to have quelled such con-
cerns.
In some ways, the debate appears to have passed completely. A number of posi-
tive historical developments have taken place on the Korean Peninsula since the third
Inter-Korean summit: a surprise fourth summit in May 2018, the first ever U.S.-DPRK
summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in June 2018, and the fifth
and most recent inter-Korean summit in mid-September 2018. Within South Korea itself,
the failure of the conservatives during the June 2018 local and gubernatorial elections
witnessed the resignation of tactical nuclear weapons supporters Hong Joon-pyo and Yoo
Seung-min, foreshadowing a possible shakeup of their respective parties and platforms.
However, as history has shown, diplomacy surrounding North Korea has regu-
larly been a tentative business. Security and pragmatic concerns, particularly over North
52 Kim Hyun-ki and Ser Myo-ja, “Seoul asks for ‘strategic assets’ from U.S.,” Korea JoongAng Daily, http://koreajoongangdaily.
joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3037873.
53 Yu Yong-wŏn and Kim Chin-myŏng, “Mi F-35B·B-1B p’yŏndae, silchŏn ch’ŏrŏm Puk-kiji chŏngmilp’okkyŏk hullyŏn,” Cho-
sun Ilbo, September 9, 2017, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/01/2017090100343.html.
54 Chŏng Yong-su, “Cho Myŏng-kyun T’ong’ilbu changgwan ‘Han’guk chŏnsurhaek chaebaech’i hyŏnsilchŏk ŭro pulganŭng,”
JoongAng Ilbo, October 18, 2017, http://news.joins.com/article/22023502.

96 Daniel Jacinto
Korean provocations and US commitments to South Korean defense, have been the key
drivers for South Korean nuclear discourse. Under the present geopolitical circumstances,
both counts remain uncertain: it is unclear whether Kim Jong-un is intent on keeping his
denuclearization agreements in the long run; U.S. security involvement on the Peninsula
remains a sticking point for the peace process. While we may welcome the diplomatic de-
velopments on the Korean peninsula with cautious optimism, for South Korea, a country
with a history of public nuclear support and breakout capacity, it remains a challenge to
balance these two factors lest the question—to nuclearize, or not to nuclearize—linger in
the public consciousness.

Works Cited
English Language Sources
"Dangerous remarks from Trump." Korea JoongAng Daily, March 28, 2016. http://korea-
joongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3016744.
"Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address." Korean Central News Agency, January 1, 2018.
Available on http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf.
"North Korea launches ‘highest ever’ ballistic missile." BBC News, November 29, 2017.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42160227.
"North Korea to send team to Winter Olympic Games." BBC News, January 9, 2018. https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42600550.
"North Korean underground nuclear test larger than previous tests." NORSAR, Septem-
ber 9, 2016. https://www.norsar.no/getfile.php/134507-1480584418/norsar.no/Press/
PressReleases/20160909-North-Korea-PressRelease.pdf.
"S. Korea’s nuclear armament would make US safer: expert." The Korea Times, May 4, 2016.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/05/205_203995.html.
"The nuclear explosion in North Korea on 3 September 2017: A revised magnitude assess-
ment." NORSAR, September 12, 2017. https://www.norsar.no/press/latest-press-re-
lease/archive/the-nuclear-explosion-in-north-korea-on-3-september-2017-a-revised-
magnitude-assessment-article1548-984.html.
"Update on the location of North Korea’s latest nuclear test." NORSAR, January 6,
2016.https://www.norsar.no/getfile.php/133705-1476947899/norsar.no/Press/
PressReleases/20160106-Press%20release%20NORSAR%20on%20North%20
Korea%206th%20Jan%202016.pdf.
Ahn, Mun Suk, and Young Chul Cho. "A nuclear South Korea?" International Journal 69,
no. 1 (2014): 26-34.
Beyond Parallel. “North Korean Provocations and U.S.-ROK Military Exercises.” Accessed
June 30, 2018. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korean-provocations-us-rok-mil-
itary-exercises/.
Choi Ha-young. "LKP leader’s ‘nuclear drive’ draws concerns." The Korea Times, September
12, 2017. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2017/09/356_236292.html.
Choi Sang-Hun. "U.S. Confirms North Korea Fired Intercontinental Ballistic Missile." New
York Times, July 4, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/north-ko-
rea-missile-test-icbm.html.
Dalton, Toby, and Alexandra Francis. "South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty." Asia
Policy 19 (2015): 115-136.
98 Daniel Jacinto
Fifield, Anna and Ashley Parker. "North Korea’s Kim Jong Un invites South Korea’s presi-
dent to Pyongyang." The Washington Post, February 10, 2018. https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-has-invited-south-koreas-moon-jae-
in-to-pyongyang/2018/02/10/d7db9dde-0ddd-11e8-998c-96deb18cca19_story.html.
Hong, Sung Gul. "The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option." In The Park Chung
Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F.
Vogel, 483-510. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Jang, Se Young. "The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Am-
bitions." Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 4 (2016): 502-520.
Jun Ji-hye. "Presidential contenders slam N. Korea missile test in unison." The Korea Times,
March 6, 2017. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/03/356_225155.html.
Kim Hyo-jin. "Key Saenuri Party members back nuclear armament." The Ko-
rea Times, September 12, 2016. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/na-
tion/2016/09/485_214009.html.
Kim Hyun-ki and Ser Myo-ja. "Seoul asks for ‘strategic assets’ from U.S.." Korea JoongAng
Daily. http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3037873.
Kim Myong-sik. "From fear, anger to stronger unity, resolve." The Korea Herald, February
17, 2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160217001054.
Koch, Susan J. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992. Washington. D.C.: Na-
tional Defense University Press, 2012.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. "A history of US nuclear weapons in South Ko-
rea." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 6 (2017): 349-357.
Panda, Rajaram. "Should South Korea go Nuclear?" Asia-Pacific Review 22, no. 1 (2015):
148-176.
Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Ministry of Unification. April 30, 2018. http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/
news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54179.
Ser Myo-ja. "Moon rules out nuclear weapons in South Korea." Korea JoongAng Dai-
ly, September 15, 2017. http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=3038452.
Yeo Jun-suk. "[Herald Interview] Former Saenuri whip says South Korea needs
nukes." The Korea Herald, August 21, 2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20160821000235.
Yeo Jun-suk. "Former Saenuri whip repeats nuclear arms call." The Korea Herald, July 25,
2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160725000734.

Yeo Jun-suk. "Senior lawmaker urges government to seek regime change in North."
The Korea Herald, February 15, 2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20160215000948.
Yi Whan-woo. "NK test stirs call for nuclear armament." The Korea Times, January 18,
2016. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/01/180_195722.html.
Yoon Min-sik. "Park urges more aggressive role from China on North Korea’s nuclear
problem." The Korea Herald, January 13, 2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20160113000648.
Yoon Min-sik. "Park urges more aggressive role from China on North Korea’s nuclear
problem." The Korea Herald, January 13, 2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20160113000648.
Korean Language Sources

"[Sasŏl] Puk 6-ch’a haeksirhŏm, 5000-man i haek injil twaetta,” Chosun Ilbo, September 4,
2017. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/03/2017090301724.html.
"2017-nyŏn (2016-nyŏndobun) ilgan sinmun 163-kaesa injŭngbusu," Korea Audit Bureau
of Certification. May 10, 2018. Available from http://www.kabc.or.kr/about/notic-
es/100000002541.
“[Sasŏl] Mun taet’ongnyŏng kungmin ap e sŏsŏ Taehan Min’guk kal kil palk’yŏdalla.”
Chosun Ilbo, September 5, 2017. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2017/09/04/2017090402785.html.
“[Sasŏl] Puk ŭi ittan misail tobal, ‘Han-Mi tongmaeng ŭi him’ poyŏjul ttaeda.” DongA Ilbo,
March 6, 2017. http://news.donga.com/3/04/20170306/83197643/1.
Choi Kang. “[Tong’a kwangjang/Ch’oi Kang] Chŏnsurhaek chaebaech’i sŏdullŏya
hanŭn kkadalk.” DongA Ilbo, March 18, 2017. http://news.donga.com/List/Se-
ries_70040100000019/3/70040100000019/20170318/83381634/1.
Choi Kyŏng-un. “Hong Jun-p’yo ‘Ch’ŏng’ sŏ 5-tang taep’yo ch’ojŏng? Tŭllŏri hoedam en
an kanda.” Chosun Ilbo, September 9, 2017. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2017/09/09/2017090900216.html.
Chŏng Yong-su. “Cho Myŏng-kyun T’ong’ilbu changgwan ‘Han’guk chŏnsurhaek
chaebaech’i hyŏnsilchŏk ŭro pulganŭng.” JoongAng Ilbo, October 18, 2017. http://
news.joins.com/article/22023502.
Chu Sŏng-ha. “Han’guk tokcha haengmujangttaen NPT t’alt’oehaeya…kukche che-
jae kamdang ŭimun.” DongA Ilbo, September 12, 2016. http://news.donga.com/3/
all/20160912/80254560/1.

100 Daniel Jacinto
Kim Hyŏn-ki. “Chayuhan’guktang ŭiwŏn tŭl, chŏnsurhaek chaebaech’i Miguk e kongsik

yoch’ŏng.” JoongAng Ilbo, September 15, 2017. http://news.joins.com/article/21940427.
Lee Sŭng-hŏn. “‘Chung kyŏnje wihan Mi ŭi ch’ŏmdanjŏllyŏk, Puk-haek taeŭng edo hwary-
onghaeya.” DongA Ilbo, July 4, 2016. http://news.donga.com/Politics/BestClick/3/
all/20160704/78998341/1.
Lim Min-hyŏk. “[Tesŭkŭ esŏ] Han’guk ap e ‘T’ŭrŏmp’ŭ sihŏmdae.’” Chosun Ilbo, April 5,
2016. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/04/04/2016040402881.html.
Oh Wŏn-sik. “Ha T’ae-kyŏng ‘Hong Jun-p’yo ‘tokcha haengmujangnon’ wihŏm ch’ŏnman…
haek p’op’yullijŭm.’” JoongAng Ilbo, September 16, 2017.
Pae Chae-sŏng. “Nam Kyŏng-p’il ‘Haengmujang junbi…2023-nyŏn put’ŏ mobyŏngje’
Anbo kongyak palp’yo.” JoongAng Ilbo, February 19, 2017. http://news.joins.com/ar-
ticle/21279814.
Yi Yong-su. “‘Han’guk haengmujang’ pal ppaen T’ŭrŏmp’ŭ…Mi ŭi pihwaksan wŏnch’ik twi-
jipkin ŏryŏwŏ.” Chosun Ilbo, November 15, 2016. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2016/11/15/2016111500193.html.
Yu Yong-wŏn and Kim Chin-myŏng. “Mi F-35B·B-1B p’yŏndae, silchŏn ch’ŏrŏm Puk-kiji
chŏngmilp’okkyŏk hullyŏn.” Chosun Ilbo, September 9, 2017. http://news.chosun.com/
site/data/html_dir/2017/09/01/2017090100343.html.


SCIR Fall 2018 Edition

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

SCIR Fall 2018 Edition

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Southern California

The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual print

Copyright © 2018 Southern California International Review.

1. Chinese Migrants in Cape Town’s Local Retail Economy 11

2. The Competition Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in South Asia 40

3. The Rocky Road to Interdependence 52

4. To Nuclearize, or Not to Nuclearize 80

Please read, ponder, explore and enjoy.

Cheryl Yau is a senior at Pomona College, double majoring in International

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

11 Park, “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Chinese Entrepreneurial Migration

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Competition/Cooperation: Interactions within and without

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

65 Zi, “China Shop Businesses in Gaborone, Botswana,” 46.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

examples of Chinese and non-Chinese partnerships in Ghana and Namibia respectively,

75 Lam, “Chinese Adaptations.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

No. Sector Location Product Offerings Main Clientele

#4 Party/ Chinatown Decorative material; Cards, Almost entirely lo-

No. Owner(s) Origin Region Year of Brief Backgroud

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

#3 Ms. C Fujian 2005 Ms. C arrived to work at an aunt’s

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

4. Findings and Discussion

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

would go like this:

96 Zi, “China Shop Businesses in Gaborone, Botswana.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Interactions with Local Africans

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

No. Owner(s) Associated Orga- Personal Network General Appraisal

100 Lam, “Chinese Adaptations.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

No. Sector Employee Demographics and Relations

In the context of shop owner-customer and employer-employee interaction, we

102 Chen, “Chinatown in Johannesburg - A Social Survey.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Navigating the Chinese Diaspora

104 Heidi Ø. Haugen, “Chinese Exports to Africa.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

other example of significant interaction across documented divisions in the community.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Wardah Malik is a senior at the University of Toronto: Saint George studying

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 8 No. 2