Supreme Court of the Philippines

PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY

Tagaytay City

UPDATES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction determined by allegation in the complaint.

In Regalado v. Dela Rama, et al., G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017, Del Castillo, J,
an action for Recovery of Possession of a Real Property and Damages with Injunction was
filed. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction as the
assessed value was not alleged. It was denied ruling that the area of the land is 44 hectares
more or less and it is safe to presume that the value of the property is more than
P20,000.00. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the appeal, hence, a petition
for review was filed with the SC, which

Held: In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real
property: I) ejectment (either for un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case the
dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2) accion publici9na or a plenary action
for recovery of real right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year; and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership.

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 {RA 7691), the proper Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction
over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila). On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed
value of the property exceeds P20,000.00(or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).

Jurisdiction is determined by type of action and assessed value.

Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the
assessed value of the property. It follows that in accionpubliciana and reinvindicatoria, the
assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that
can take cognizance of the action (Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, 616 Phil. 519, 527 [2009]).

In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the Complaint is one for ejectment;
or b) if the same is deemed an accion publiciana, the R'TC still lacks jurisdiction as the
assessed value of the subject properties was not alleged in the Complaint.

As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made
to the averments in the complaint, and the law in force at the commencement of the action.
This is because only the facts alleged ill the complaint can be the basis for determining the
nature of the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the case.

Under Section 1,25 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional
facts that must be set forth in the complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as
mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

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 In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's prior physical
possession of the property; the fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action must be filed within one year from
the time the owner or the legal possessor learned of their dispossession. On the other hand,
a complaint for unlawful detainer must state that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession of the real property after the expiration or termination of his or her right to
possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year from the time such possession became
unlawful (Barbosa v. Hernandez, 554 Phil. 1, 6 [2007]).

Jurisdiction over accion publiciana is determined by the assessed value of the property.
An action for recovery of possession and damages was filed alleging that there was
encroachment on the property of plaintiff when defendant constructed his perimeter fence.
It was filed with the MTC as the alleged assessed value was P2,000.00. Demands were made
for the removal of such encroachment, but to no avail. A complaint was filed but the
defendant denied any encroachment. Judgment was rendered by the MTC in favor of the
plaintiff. On appeal, the RTC ruled that the action has already prescribed. The CA on appeal
denied the petition for review and annulled both decisions ruling that since it is an accion
publiciana, the RTC has jurisdiction. Is the CA ruling correct? Why?

Ans.: No. All cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. (Aliabo v. Carampatan, 407 Phil. 31, 36 [2001])This pronouncement
was based on Republic Act No. 7 691, expanding the jurisdiction of the MTC (Cabling v.
Dangcalan, G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016, Sereno, CJ).

Jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or

interest therein, as set forth in Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.
Blg.) 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege
the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint. In Penta Pacific Realty
Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, it was said that its
jurisdiction would now be determined by the assessed value of the disputed land, or of the
adjacent lots if it is not declared for taxation purposes. If the assessed value is not alleged in
the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The reason behind
this rule is that the trial court is not afforded the means of determining from the allegations
of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to
it or to another court. After all, courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of lands. (Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327, 336 [2005], citing Ouano v. PGTT
International Investment Corporation, 434 Phil. 28-37 [2002])

Real action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC or RTC.

An action for specific performance with prayer for reconveyance of a property was
filed, but the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the property. But the
declaration in the Amended Complaint stated that the property is valued at P6,000.00
based on the handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicated that the
property was purchased for the price of P6,000.00. Which court has jurisdiction? Why?

Ans.: MTC. The action is one for specific performance. In other words, the aim is to secure
the claimed ownership and title to the property which qualified it as a real action.

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.

Since the action is a real action, petitioners should have observed the requirement
under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as

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stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the
subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the
Amended Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of
docket fees to be paid.

In the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as stated in the
current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether
the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’
action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the
property (Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas, et al., G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016, Del Castillo, J).

In determining jurisdiction, the Court can rely on the declaration made in the
Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000,00. The handwritten document
sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by petitioners for
the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case against respondents, this amount
should be the stated value of the property in the absence of a current tax declaration or
zonal valuation of the BIR. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC and Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, provides that –
a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim,
CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or
for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-
intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS,
PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases
involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in
litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT
ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER
IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN
LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT.

shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees to be paid. Since the value of the
subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did
not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it should have dismissed
the case. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court clearly
committed grave abuse of discretion.

BARANGAY CONCILIATION

No need for barangay conciliation if party is a juridical entity.

In Uy v. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J, Vipa and
Levi are married with children. After the death of Vipa, one of their children, Grace Joy filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer against the lessee over a property forming part of the
conjugal properties of their parents. The MTC rendered a judgment against the defendants.
The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC on the ground that there was no referral to the
barangay for conciliation. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision saying that the Estate of the
Deceased is a juridical person hence, there is no need for barangay conciliation.

In upholding the CA’s decision, the SC

Held: Defendant’s claim that the complaint below should have been dismissed since Grace
Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of prior
barangay conciliation is untenable. Unlawful detainer cases are covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides

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that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

He failed to plead in the answer he filed with the MTCC that Grace Joy has no
authority to represent the Estate of Vipa. Neither did he raise therein the lack of barangay
conciliation between the parties herein prior to the filing of the complaint for unlawful
detainer. Accordingly, the foregoing defenses are already deemed waived.

Also, there was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the
barangay for conciliation pursuant to the KatarungangPambarangayLaw (Sections 399 to
422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book III and Section 515, Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No.
7160 (The Local Government Code). Only individuals may be paiiies to barangay·
conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against
corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received or
acted upon by the barangay for conciliation (Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v.
Heirs of Teves, 438 Phil. 26, 4 l (2002), citing Section 1, Rule VI of the Katar11ng(111g
PambarangayRt) I es implementing the KatarungangPambarangayLaw).The Estate of Vipa,
which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, which is
separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy (See Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragnte, 80 Phil.
776 [1948]). Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for
conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC.

No need for barangay conciliation if parties reside in different places; exception.

The basic question in Abagatnan, et al. v. Sps. Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, August 7,
2017, Del Castillo, J, is whether there is a need for barangay conciliation proceedings if the
parties do not reside in the same place. In this case, one of the parties resides in Laguna, the
other one in Pasig City. Ruling that there is no need for conciliation proceedings, the SC

Held:The LGC provides that "the luponof each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes," subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991, Section 408).

One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of1991, Section408(f)).

Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays are not required to submit their dispute to the luponas a precondition
to the filing of a complaint in court. The luponhas no jurisdiction over their dispute, and
prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing
in court.

In Pascual v. Pascual, 511 Phil. 700, 706-707 [2005],the Court ruled that the express
statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties
in interest in the case. Said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-
fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in
interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
(Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz, 531 Phil. 101, 115 [2006]).

Motion for execution of judgment based on compromise treated as initiatory pleading.

There was a compromise in the barangay. For failure to comply with the terms and
conditions, a Motion for Execution was filed with the MTC, rather than a complaint for
execution. It however contained ultimate facts constituting a cause of action, attaching

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thereto the compromise whose body was quoted. Is the “Motion for Execution” proper in
form and substance? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the
pleading are the allegations in the body and not the caption.

Thus, the motion for execution filed was intended to be an initiatory pleading or an
original action that is compliant with the requirement under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules
of Court that the complaint should allege the plaintiff’s cause of action and the names and
residences of the plaintiff and the defendant.

The motion could therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely as a
motion/special proceeding. For this reason, the proper remedy prescribed under Section
417 of the Local Government Code was filed (Sebastian v. Ng, G.R. No. 164594, April 22,
2015, Brion, J).

The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of
the amount involved.
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides that after the lapse of the six (6)
month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in
the appropriate city or municipal court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the “appropriate city or municipal

court” as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the
Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no
distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus,
there can be no question that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless
of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity. (Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 701, 711).

RULE 2 – Actions

Concept of splitting causes of action.

Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of
action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them(Perez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89; citing Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 91670, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 732). A single cause of action or
entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two
or more different actions (Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., Inc., 249 N.W. 467 [1933]). Thus,
Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of
action, viz.:
“Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.—If two or
more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others. (4a)” (Chu, et al. v. Cunanan, et al., G.R. No. 156185,
September 5, 2011).

Reason for the rule against splitting of causes of action.

Parties are not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the
grounds upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there

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would be no end to litigation (Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, 506
SCRA 336; Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89). Their
splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to
avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited
the dismissal of the second case on the ground of bar by res judicata (Chu, et al. v. Cunanan,
et al., G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011, Bersamin, J).

RULE 3 – PARTIES

Co-owners are indispensable parties in partition action.

Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a
pro-indivisoshare in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and
Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceasedConrado, Sr. leaving
children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and
Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Santiago allegedly bought the
shares of majority of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr.. He filed a complaint for
partition but did not implead Mateo’s children. Is the action proper without impleading
such persons? Explain.

Ans.: No, because they are indispensable parties. The absence of the indispensable parties
in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those
present.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in
the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. (Gabatin v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, 486 Phil. 366, 379-380 (2004), citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA, 450
Phil. 532, 541 (2003); further citation omitted). Thus, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil.
235, 265 (2004).

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the
property shall be joined as defendants.

Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the
said parties (Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al., G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe,
J).

Action for damages for breach of contract of carriage survives the party and can be
proceeded by the heirs through substitution.
During the pendency of an action for damages due to the sinking of M/V Princess of
the Orient, the plaintiff died. Thereafter the heirs upon motion, were substituted as
plaintiffs.

The defendant contended that the complaint for damages was purely personal and
cannot be transferred to his heirs upon his death. Hence, the complaint should be
dismissed because the death of the plaintiff abates a personal action. Is the contention
correct? Why?

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Ans.: No. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs (Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Sesante, etc., G.R. No.
172682, July 27, 2016, Bersamin, J).

Purpose of substitution of parties.

Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. (Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410, 429) It
protects the right of due process belonging to any party, that in the event of death the
deceased litigant continues to be protected and properly represented in the suit through
the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. (Sumaljag v. Diosdidit, G.R. No.
149787, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 53, 59-60.

When substitution is proper.

The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action
survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
following actions that survive the death of a party, namely: (1) recovery of real or personal
property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and (3)
recovery of damages for an injury to person or property. On the one hand, Section 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including: (1) claims for funeral
expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3)
all claims for money against the deceased, arising from contract, express or implied. (These
should be filed in the testate or intestate proceeding as claims against the estate).

A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or

malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages.The
passenger's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach
of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his
death, and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution (Sulpicio
Lines, Inc. v. Sesante, etc., G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016, Bersamin, J).

RULE 4 – VENUE

Venue of personal action is the place of principal office of corporation.

After the foreclosure of a property, there was a deficiency. The foreclosure was done
in Manila where the property was located but the action for collection of the deficiency was
filed in Makati City where the principal office of the plaintiff-mortgagee is located. Is Makati
the proper venue? Why?

Ans.: Yes. Makati is the proper venue because it is where the principal office of the plaintiff
is located.

It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal

action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been
fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in

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the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such
actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the
action is considered a transitory one.

Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover
the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal
action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein
(BPI Savings Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015, Bersamin, J).

SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Two (2) options if defendant does not file an answer in a case governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
In Fairland Knitcraft Corp. v. Po, G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016, Mendoza, J,
despite service of summons in an unlawful detainer, the defendant did not file an answer.
In such a case, there are two (2) options of the MTC, where it may render judgment
motuproprio or on motion of the plaintiff. (Sec. 6)

Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall
render judgment, either motuproprioor upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant
to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his
acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be
done in this situation except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint.

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within
the period provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead,
the court, motuproprioor on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. (Don
Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882 [1999] citing Bayog
v. Natino, 327 Phil. 1019 [1996]).

RULE 7 – FORUM SHOPPING

Certificate of non-forum shopping applies to natural and juridical persons.

In Societe des Products, Nestle, S.A. v. Puregold Price Club, Inc., G.R. No. 217194,
September 6, 2017, Carpio, J, the SC once again had the occasion to rule that the
requirement of certificate of non-forum shopping is applicable to natural and juridical
persons.

In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., 406 Phil. 543 [2001], it was ruled that the
requirements under the Rules of Court involving the certification against forum shopping
apply both to natural and juridical persons, to wit: "[t]he requirement that the petitioner
should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, considering

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that the mandatory directives of the Circular and the Rules of Court make no distinction
between natural and juridical persons."

In Fuentebella v. Castro, 526 Phil. 668 [2006], it was likewise held that the
certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal party. In case the
principal party cannot sign, the one signing on his or her behalf must have been duly
authorized, to wit: "the petitioner or the principal party must execute the certification
against forum shopping. The reason for this is that the principal party has actual
knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or
substantially the same issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition,
the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized."

Juridical persons; who sign the CNFS; Authority of the Board is necessary.
Juridical persons, including corporations, that cannot personally sign the
certification against forum shopping, must act through an authorized representative. The
exercise of corporate powers including the power to sue is lodged with the board of
directors which acts as a body representing the stockholders. For corporations, the
authorized representative to sign the certification against forum shopping must be
selected or authorized collectively by the board of directors. In Eslaban, Jr. v.
Vda.deOnorio, 412 Phil. 667 [2001], the Court ruled that if the real party in interest is a
corporation, an officer of the corporation acting alone has no authority to sign the
certification against forum shopping. An officer of the corporation can only validly sign the
certification against forum shopping if he or she is authorized by the board of directors
through a board resolution or secretary's certificate. In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., 492
Phil. 682 [2005], the Court ruled that a board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to
execute the certification against forum shopping is a necessary requirement under the
Rules. A certification signed by a person who was not duly authorized by the board of
directors renders the petition for review subject to dismissal.

The authority of the representative of a corporation to sign the certification against

forum shopping originates from the board of directors through either a board of directors'
resolution or secretary's certificate which must be submitted together with the
certification against forum shopping. In Zulueta, the Court declared invalid a petition for
review with a certification against forum shopping signed by the party's counsel which was
not supported by a board resolution or secretary's certificate proving the counsel's
authority. This Court dismissed the case and held: "[t]he signatory in the Certification of the
Petition before the CA should not have been respondents' retained counsel, who would not
know whether there were other similar cases of the corporation. Otherwise, this
requirement wouldeasily be circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing
corporate parties." Likewise, in Eslaban, this Court held that a certification signed by
counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 216 [2004],the
Court held that the failure to attach a copy of a board resolution proving the authority of
the representative to sign the certification against forum shopping was fatal to its petition
and was sufficient ground to dismiss since the courts are not expected to take judicial
notice of board resolutions or secretary's certificates issued by corporations.

Accordingly, the CA did not err in ruling that the petition for review should be
dismissed due to the failure of Nestle to comply with the proper execution of the
certification against forum shopping required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

RULE 8- MANNER OF ALLEGATIONS

How to contest genuineness and due execution of actionable document.

9
 There was a complaint for sum of money based on a promissory note. The answer of
the defendants denied under oath in their answer but did not state specifically the denial of
the genuineness and due execution of the PN. It merely alleged that although they signed
blank forms of PNs they were informed that their loan application was denied. Was there
sufficient compliance with the requirement of under oath and specific denial of the
genuineness and due execution of the PNs? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document,
the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the
pleading. The said instrument or document is called an actionable document and Section 8
of Rule 8 provides the proper method for the adverse party to deny its genuineness and
due execution.

To deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document: (1) there
must be a specific denial in the responsive pleading of the adverse party; (2) the said
pleading must be under oath; and (3) the adverse party must set forth what he claims to be
the facts. Failure to comply with the prescribed procedure results in the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the actionable document (Sps. Sy, et al. v. Westmont
Bank, et al., G.R. No. 201074, October 10, 2016, Mendoza, J).

Mere statement “specifically deny” allegations, not sufficient.

A complaint for sum of money was filed based on a promissory note. When the
obligation became due and demandable, there was no payment despite demands.
Answering the complaint, the defendants alleged that they “specifically deny” the
allegations in the complaint that they executed the loan agreement, the PN “for being self-
serving and pure conclusion intended to suit the respondent’s purposes.” Judgment was
rendered against defendants which was sustained by the CA on appeal saying that there
was admission of the genuineness and due execution of the loan documents. Is the CA’s
judgment correct? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. The mere statement that they “specifically deny” the pertinent allegations of the
Complaint “for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s
purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a
denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a
general denial does not become specific by the use of the word “specifically. Neither does it
become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law
that the allegations contested are “self-serving” or are intended “to suit plaintiff’s
purposes.”

The defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or
that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the
effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to
its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the
genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a
ground not affecting either (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent
Savings & Loan Bank), citing the earlier case of Songco v. Sellner).

To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant “sets forth
what he claims to be the facts,” which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the
Answer in this case.

Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the “specific denial under oath”
requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, is that petitioners
had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing

10
their loan obligation to respondent (Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc., et al. v. BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 187487, June 29, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).

Meaning of admission of genuineness and due execution of document.

The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the
party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was
signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively
eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the
document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its
face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were
forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.”

Accordingly, with petitioners’ admission of the genuineness and due execution of

the loan documents, the competence of respondent’s witness to testify in order to
authenticate the same is therefore of no moment. As the Court similarly pointed out in
Permanent Savings & Loan Bank, “[w]hile Section [20],51 Rule 132 of the [Rules] requires
that private documents be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they can
be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this
fact; in the present case, there is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with
respect to the loan documents because of respondent’s implied admission thereof
(Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the
earlier case of Songco v. Sellner).”

RULE 9 – EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Defenses not raised in MTD are deemed waived.

In Edron Construction Corp., et al. v.The Provincial Gov’t.ofSurigao del Sur, G.R. No.
220211, June 5, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J, there was a construction contract where despite
the completion of the various projects, and acceptance of the same, there was no payment
for the balance of the cost, despite demands, hence, a complaint for specific performance
with damages was filed. An answer was filed alleging that there was no unpaid balance as
the contractor was liable for defective works; and other defenses. One year thereafter, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action for failure to submit a sworn statement attesting to the fact that all the
contractor’s obligations for labor and materials have been fully paid as required by the
agreement. The motion was denied by the RTC, but it was reversed by the CA holding that
such sworn statement is a condition sine qua non in demanding full payment. Ruling that
the CA erred, the SC

Held: Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by
a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim (Sec. 1, Rule
9, Rules of Court).

Except for the defenses of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;
(b) litispendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses must be invoked
when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver thereof.
Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense
shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying

11
upon the same in further proceedings (See Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA, 711 Phil.
451 [2013]; see also: Phil. Trust Co. v. Sps. Roxas, G.R. No. 171897, October 14, 2015,
Jardeleza, J).

Policy of the rule on default.

The policy of the law has been to have every litigated case tried on the merits. As a
consequence, the courts have generally looked upon a default judgment with disfavor
because it is in violation of the right of a defending party to be heard. As the Court has said
in Coombs v. Santos, 24 Phil. 446, 449-450 (1913):
A default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of
the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final
expedient to induce defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by
the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A judgment by default
may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and
the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set
aside(Monarco Import Co., Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016,
Bersamin, J).

RULE 13 – SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, ETC.

Pleading filed through registered mail; date of mailing is date of filing.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Sps. Salvador, G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017, Del Castillo, J,
a partial motion for reconsideration was filed via registered mail on September 28, 2012
and received by the Court on October 5, 2012. The SC ruled that the motion was considered
filed on September 28, 2012.

Sec. 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered
mail, the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when
the court actually receives the mailed pleading (Russel v. Ebasan, 633 Phil. 384 [2010]).

RULE 14 – SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Defective service of summons can be cured by the filing of MR with affirmative

defenses.
In Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, etc., G.R. No. 209518, June 19, 2017, Tijam, J, an action
was filed seeking for a judgment ordering Tujan-Militante to surrender certain TCTs which
were all issued under the name of Nustad. It was alleged that the former has been
withholding the titles. Instead of an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as there was improper service of
summons. The court denied the motion, hence, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that the SPA is void as the attorney-in-fact was representing a Norwegian who is
not allowed to own land in the Philippines and prayed for damages. The CA recognized the
jurisdictional defect over the person of Tujan-Militante but it was cured by the filing of the
MR which sought for affirmative reliefs, an equivalent of voluntary appearance, hence,
appeal was made to the SC which

Held: A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of
summons. However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a
court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily
appears before it (Wong v. Factor-Koyama, G.R. No. 183802, September 17, 2009). Section
20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of

12
other grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Nation Petroleum
Gas, Inc. v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015).

While Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a

quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the ·subsequent filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is
inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for
such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the court's jurisdiction
(Reicon Realty Corp. v. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204796,
February 4, 2015).

Requisites before resort to service of summons by publication.

In Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017, Velasco, J, a complaint
for foreclosure of mortgage was filed. Summons was served upon defendant by publication.
The record shows that the sheriff attempted to serve summons on the defendants at the
property subject of foreclosure. After this single attempt at personal service there was a
motion for leave to serve summons by publication, not even by substituted service which
was granted by the lower court.

Ruling that there was no proper service of summons by publication, the SC

Held: There was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her the
summons before the service by publication as allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate
the residence of petitioner and her whereabouts.

As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons

cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be
resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant’s
“whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” The relevant
sections of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provide, thus:
Sec. 6.Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or if the refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him,

Sec. 7.Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant

cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are

unknown. – In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order.

13
Hierarchy and rules on service of summons.
It is, therefore, proper to state that the hierarchy and rules in the service of
summons are as follows:

1. Personal service;
2. Substitute service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time; and
3. Service by publication, whenever the defendant’s whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.

Whereabouts of defendants unknown; summons may be served by publication;

requisites.
In Express Padala (Italia) S.P.A. now BDO Remittance (Italia) S.P.A. v. Helen Ocampo,
G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017, Jardeleza, J, the basic issue is whether service can be
made through publication if the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown. In this case, the
sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons through the defendant’s uncle who was
the caretaker of the old family residence which was held by the lower court to be improper
since the whereabouts of defendant are unknown and the defendant was no longer residing
in the place. In holding that service can be made by publication the SC

Held: The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be served personally on
the defendant. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever practicable,
the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted
to. When the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts
to locate him have failed, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service.
Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof (RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 7).

Summons upon a partnership does not bind a partner.

There was a breach of contract where the seller of transreceivers that were
defective was not able to replace the same or refund the amount paid. A suit was filed
against the corporation that sold it which was later on discovered to be a partnership.
Summons was served upon the partnership and after trial, judgment was rendered against
it. Appeal not having been made, the judgment became final and executory. The sheriff
levied upon a vehicle belonging to Guy, a partner but he moved to lift the levy because he
was not the judgment debtor. The motion was denied, holding that as a registered
partnership, Guy should be treated as a general partner and may be held jointly and
severally with the partnership. This was affirmed by the CA which ruled that Guy cannot
feign ignorance of the existence of the summons and that summons be not served upon all
partners. It is sufficient that it be served on the managing partner, and being such, he is
bound by the service of summons upon the partnership based on Article 1821, NCC. Is Guy
bound by the summons? Why?

Ans.: No. Guy is not bound by the service of summons upon the partnership. This is
especially so that summons was not served upon the general manager.

Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam– the power of the court to
render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment
and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in
all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. (Macasaet v. Co,
Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198) Jurisdiction over the person of the

14
plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the
plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to
the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service
of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action.

Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an
exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical
entities. (Cathay Metal Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No.
172204, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 482, 504)

The partnership was never shown to have been served with the summons through
any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of
summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid.
Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. It is not correct to say
that it was immaterial whether the summons to the partnership was served on the theory
that it was a corporation (Michael Guy v. Atty. Glenn Gacott, G.R. No. 206147, January 13,
2016, Mendoza, J).

RULE 17 – DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

Effect of dismissal of an action without stating the ground.

Basically, the issue in Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No. 187342, April 5, 2017, Jardeleza, J, is
the effect if there is a dismissal of an action without pronouncement as to its nature,
whether with or without prejudice as it was based on Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
The MTC treated a belated Comment/Opposition as a motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the action without stating the ground. The SC

Held: A dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. Unless otherwise qualified by the court, a
dismissal under said rule is considered with prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case
(Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic,
G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 118;De Knecht v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108015, May 20, 1998, 290 SCRA 223, 239-240). When an order completely disposes of the
case and leaves nothing to be done by the court, it is a final order properly subject of an
appeal.

Dismissal for failure to prosecute; final order.

What is the nature and effect of a dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute for
an unreasonable length of time? Explain.

Ans.:It is a final, not interlocutory order, hence, appealable. Under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the
1997 Rules of Court, an action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the
following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to
prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the
Rules of Court or any order of the Court. (De Knecht v. CA, 352 Phil. 833, 849 [1998]).

The fundamental test for non prosequituris whether, under the circumstances, the
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
(Shimitsu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al., 688 Phil. 385, 398 [2012] citing

15
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 497, 505-506 [2000] and
Gapoy v. Adil, 171 Phil. 653, 658 [1978]; Roasters Phils., Inc. v. Gaviola, et al., G.R. No.
191874, September 2, 2015, Perez, J).

RULE 18 – PRE-TRIAL

Effects of failure to appear at pre-trial.

The effects of failure to appear at the pre-trial have been the issues raised in Ultra
Mar Aqua Resource, Inc. v. Fermida Construction Services, G.R. No. 191353, April 17, 2017,
Tijam, J, the SC

Held: If the defendant fails to appear for pre-trial, a default order is no longer issued.
Initially, the phrase "as in default" was included in Rule 20 of the old rules. With the
amended provision, the phrase "as in default" was deleted, the purpose of which is "one of
semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the
word default in the former provision since that term is identified with the failure to file a
required answer, not appearance in court."While the order of default no longer obtains, its
effects were nevertheless retained.

Thus, Section 4, Rule 18 requires the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-
trial conference.

The failure of a party to appear at pre-trial has adverse consequences: if the absent
party is the plaintiff then his case is dismissed; if the absent party is the defendant, then the
plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment
on the basis thereof.

By way of exception, the non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused if

(1) a valid cause is shown; or (2) there is an appearance of a representative on behalf of a
party fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to
alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents. What constitutes a valid cause is subject to the court's sound
discretion and the exercise of such discretion shall not be disturbed except in cases of clear
and manifest abuse (Daaco v. Yu, G.R. No. 183398, June 22, 2015).

In Domingo v. Singson, et al., G.R. No. 203287, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J, there was
likewise non-appearance at the pre-trial conference which justifiable reason, hence, the SC
once again emphasized that under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are
mandated to appear at the pre-trial (Rules of Court, Rule 18, Sec. 4). Pre-trial cannot be
taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital
objective; the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation (See The Philippine American Life &General Insurance Company v. Enario,
645 Phil. 166, 176, 177 (2010); Tolentino, et al. v. laurel, et al., 682 Phil. 527, 536 (2012);
RULES OF COURT, Rule 18, Section 5).

The case was initially set for pre-trial, after more than two years; the it was re-
raffled and immediately scheduled the pre-trial. What transpired thereafter is a series of
resetting of the hearing due to the failure of the petitioners and/or their counsel to appear
during the scheduled pre-trial dates where the petitioners and their counsel again failed to
appear without informing theRTC of the reason for their non-appearance. Clearly, the
petitioners' wanton disregard of scheduled pre-trial indeed justified the dismissal of their
complaint.

Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules

16
they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed (See Social Security
System v. Hon. Chaves, 483 Phil. 292, 301 [2004]; see also Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
v. Fadcor, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 197970, January 25, 2016, Peralta, J).

MODES OF DISCOVERY

Request for admission is not inconsistent with Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Rep. of the Phils., G.R. No. 213027; Imelda R.
Marcos, et al. v. Rep. of the Phils., G.R. No. 212253, January 18, 2017, Sereno, CJ., during the
pendency of the forfeiture proceedings against the Marcoses because of their alleged ill-
gotten wealth, the Republic filed a partial Motion for Summary Judgment involving certain
properties of the Marcoses. In the meantime, it also filed a Request for Admission asking
that there be admission that the set of jewelry known as the Malacañang Collection was
acquired during the incumbency of Pres. Marcos; that the same was acquired from abroad,
among others. The Marcoses contended that the filing of the Request for Admission was
tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position of the Republic that the case was ripe
for summary judgment as the Request entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a material
fact, hence, they moved that it be expunged from the record. Is the contention that the
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment and the Request for Admission are inconsistent to
one another correct? Ruling in the Negative, the SC

Held: A request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary judgment. The
request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by the
party and is requested as a result of that party's failure to respond to the court's directive
to state what specifically happened in the case (Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA, 334 Phil.
77 (1997), Diman v. Alumbres, 359 Phil. 796 (1998), and Allied Agri-Business v. CA, 360
Phil. 64 [1998]).The resort to such a request as a mode of discovery rendered all
thematters contained therein as matters that have been deemed admitted pursuant to Rule
26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

“A request for admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the
request for admission may be used as basis for filing a summary judgment” citing three
cases as follows: Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA, 334 Phil. 77 [1997]; Diman v. Alumbres,
359 Phil. 796 [1998] and Allied Agri-Business v. CA, 360 Phil. 64 [1998]. The first case
instructs that a request for admission "should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact,
or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish
said party's cause of action or defense."

The second case, on the other hand, teaches the nature of modes of discovery in this
wise:
Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written
request that he admit : (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is
bound within the period designated in the request, to file and serve on the
party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (1) denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting
forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn
statement, each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted.

17
 In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly served by
registered mail on Jose Lacalle on February 6, 1995, and a copy thereof on his
lawyers on February 4, 1995. Neither made any response whatever within
the reglementary period. Nor did either of them do so even after receiving
copy of the Dimans' "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE
PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION." dated March 28, 1995.
On account thereof, in legal contemplation, the Heirs impliedly admitted all
the facts listed in the request for admission.

On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues

apparently exist -- i.e., facts are asse1ied in the complaint regarding which
there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus
arising.from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by ad
admissions, depositions or admissions.

RULE 39 – JUDGMENTS

Action for revival of judgment is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In Anama v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017, Jardeleza, J, a
judgment was rendered by the CA, but it was not executed. A petition was filed to revive
the judgment and filed it with the CA contending among other things that it is the CA that
has jurisdiction since it was the one that rendered the judgment. The SC disagreed and

Held: An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a

judgment which could no longer be enforced by mere motion (Caiña v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 114393, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 252, 261). Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
“A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before
it is barred by the statute of limitations.”

Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of
entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion
after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the time
the judgment becomes final (Rubio v. Alabata, G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014, 717
SCRA 554, 559-560).

Nature of revival suit.

Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the judgment
sought to be revived (Philippine National Bank v. Nuevas, G.R. No. L-21255, November 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 434, 436-437, citing Philippine National Bank v. Bondoc, G.R. No.L-20236,
July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 770).It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to
be revived or enforced (Heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, G.R. No. 179638, July
8, 2013, 700 SCRA 746, 756, citing Juco v. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu, G.R. No. 150233,
February 16, 2005, 45 l SCRA 464, 473-474). It is a new and independent action, wherein
the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the
judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the
assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is

18
already final and executory (Saligumba v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008, 573
SCRA 8, 15-16).

As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the
rules on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its
jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition does
not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment.

Revival of judgment is n action beyond pecuniary estimation.

In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim.
But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs (Villena v. Payayo, G.R. No. 163021, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 592,
596-597).

As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to
have the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and
does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition to
revive judgment is properly with the R TCs. Thus,, the CA is correct in holding that it does
not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival of judgment.

The CA also has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of writ of
amparo,writ of habeas data,and writ of kalikasan. Not being one of the enumerated cases
above, it is clear that the CA is without jurisdiction to hear and decide an action for revival
of judgment.

Anama's reliance on Aldeguer v. Gemelo, 68 Phil. 421 [1939]to justify his filing with
the CA is misplaced. The issue in Aldegueris not jurisdiction but venue. The issue was which
between the RTC of Iloilo and RTC of Negros Occidental was the proper court to hear the
action.

Remedy of a third persons whose property is levied upon.

In Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017, Velasco, J, the spouses
Borlongan had a conjugal property. The wife signed a surety undertaking for and in behalf
of Tancho Corp. When there was no payment of the obligation, said property was attached
and levied upon and sold to answer for the judgment liability. May the other spouse file a
separate and independent action for annulment of the levy on their conjugal property?

Answering the query in the Affirmative, the SC

Held: Yes. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of
properties under execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action
with another court. The spouse can be considered a stranger to the contract.

Clearly, the availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision
requires only that the claimant is a third-party or a "stranger" to the case. The poser then is
this: is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property was
executed on account of the other spouse's debt, a "stranger" to the suit? In Buado v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 396,the Court had the opportunity to
clarify that, to resolve the issue, it must first be determined whether the debt had
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a

19
stranger to the suit who can file an independent separate action, distinct from the action in
which the writ was issued. It was held, thus:
A third-party claim must be filed [by] a person other than the
judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may
file a third-party claim.

This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to
the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the
other spouse being the judgment obliger, considered a "stranger?"

Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the

obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.

Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that

the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal

obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and

jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21.

5-year; 10-year period to execute judgment; effect if execution was not implemented.
A decision in an unlawful detainer case became final and executory on July 28, 2000.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for execution on August 8, 2000, but the judgment was not
implemented. Can he file another motion for execution after the lapse of 5 years when the
judgment became final and executory. Can he file another motion after the lapse of the 5-
year period? Why?

Ans.: No. As mandated by Section 6, Rule 39, if the prevailing party fails to have the decision
enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a
right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court
within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. (Rubio v. Alabata, G.R. No.
203947, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 554, 559-560) In the case at bar, the Decision,
despite the timely motion to execute the same, was not implemented by the court. The
failure to implement the Decision impelled Bajao to again file another motion to execute.
However, the course of action to execute the Decision is not accordance with Section 6,
Rule 39. The correct remedy is to file a complaint for revival of judgment in a regular court
within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. Actions for revival of
judgment are governed by Article 1144[3], Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Clearly, the proper remedy is to file a complaint for revival of judgment (Quilo, et al.
v. Bajao, G.R. No. 186199, September 7, 2016, Perez, J).

20
 APPEAL

Mode of appeal from RTC to CA, etc.

Appeals from the RTC to the CA in the exercise of the RTC’s original jurisdiction
pursuant to Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners file a notice of
appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC,
and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the fullamount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the
period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the
appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of
appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case. On the
other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary
period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-compliance
with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1,14
(c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only
way by which they could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the
RTC.

In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner

upon the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose
jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.

The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted,
or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a
matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of
discretion. An appeal as a matter ofright, which refers to the right to seek the review by a
superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first
instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final
order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be
disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether
to due course to the petition for review or not.

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also
significantly differs from that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of
court of the RTC is burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by
verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to the
CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. This requirement of
transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when
deemed necessary 9 Heirs of Arturo Garcia I v. Mun. ofIba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, July
22, 2015, Bersamin, J).

Decision of CA; remedy is appeal to SC not special civil action for certiorari; exception.
In Phil. Bank of Communications v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017,
Caguioa, J, a complaint for sum of money was filed but upon motion of the defendant, the
complaint was dismissed by the RTC for failure to comply with the order of the court to pay
additional filing fee. MR was filed but it was denied, hence, a notice of appeal was made to
the CA, but the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that appeal
was not the proper remedy. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, plaintiff filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. The CA ruled that the petition was a wrong mode of
appeal as it failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a Motion for
Reconsideration, a condition sine qua non for certiorari to prosper. Was the petition for
certiorari the proper remedy? In ruling that it was not, the SC

21
Held: Prefatorily, PBCOM availed of the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case before
the Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail the July
31, 2014 Decision and May 5, 2015 Resolution of the CA. In Mercado v. Valley Mountain
Mines Exploration, Inc.,677 Phil. 13 [2011], it was held that:
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a
general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party
adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright (Sps.
Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25, 44-45
(2011), further citing Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 428 Phil. 783, 791 (2002)).

Exception to the rule.

However, under exceptional circumstances, as when stringent application of the
rules will result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside technicalities and proceed
with the appeal (Sps. Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25,
45-46 [2011]). In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, 573 Phil. 472 [2008],the Court recognized the
broader interest of justice and gave due course to the appeal even if it was a wrong mode of
appeal and was even filed beyond the reglementary period provided by the rules. The
Courtreasoned that:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending
on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to
the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not
mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In
those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the
guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and
proper disposition of his cause. xxxx

In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be

faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus:

The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite

inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle
that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action
for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the
case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.

22
Appropriate remedy is special civil action for certiorari if appeal is denied due course.
What was assailed by petitioner-plaintiff was the order of the RTC denying due
course to the notice of appeal. The appropriate remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari. In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 433 Phil. 844, 854 [2002], it was ruled that a trial
court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is tantamount to a disallowance or
dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be
taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to elevate the matter through a
special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the CA's finding, PBCOM availed itself
of the correct remedy in questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.

RTC has power to deny appeal on grounds provided by the Rules if on other grounds,
No.
Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 13.Dismissal of appeal.- Prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may,
motuproprioor on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of
time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.

In Salvan v. People, 457 Phil. 785, 793 [2003],the Court held that the power of the
RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified in the afore-quoted provision.
In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely
different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy."

The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically

vested upon the CA and not the R TC. Rule 50, Section 1 of the same Rules states:
SECTION 1.Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(i) The fact that [the] order or judgment appealed from is not
appealable (Phil. Bank of Communications v. CA, supra).

RULE 57 – ATTACHMENTS

Discharge of attachment; meaning of the words “deposit” and “amount.”

In an attempt to discharge attachment on properties of a defendant, petitioner Bank
contended that it has the option to deposit real property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond
to secure any contingent claim over its property in the event the plaintiff would prevail. It
was argued that Sec. 2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term deposit, thus, it cannot only be
confined or construed to refer to cash. Is the contention correct? Why?

Ans.: No. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that “[a]n order of
attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the
court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and
must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of
the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to
satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as
hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the
amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value of the property to be
attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs.”

23
 Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that “[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall
without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in
the action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the
writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s
demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is
issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the
bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to
be attached, exclusive of costs (Luzon Dev. Bank, et al. v. ErlindaKrishman, G.R. No.
203530, April 13, 2015, Peralta, J).”

RULE 58 – INJUNCTION

Injunction cannot divest one of ownership.

In a case, claiming that they were prevented from entering into properties by the
security guards employed to secure the same, they filed a complaint for Damages with
prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The defendants contended that
plaintiffs do not own the properties and that the issue of ownership is still pending. The
RTC granted the petition but it was reversed by the CA holding that WPI and TRO are not
allowed where the claimants title has not been clearly established. It further held that a
WPI is intended to preserved the status quo ante or the last actual, peaceful and
uncontested status prior to the controversy and that an injunctive relief cannot transfer
possession pending litigation. Is the CA’s decision correct? Why?

Ans.: Yes. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation
against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only
upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of
the principal action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does
not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper
(Sps. Plaza v. lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014, 718 SCRA 19, 31). Corollarily,
preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession
and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right
is being disputed (See Almeida v. CA, 489 Phil. 648, 672 (2005); Raspado v. CA, G.R. No.
104782, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 650, 653; and Merville Park Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Velez, 273 Phil. 406, 412 [1991]). After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued
to preserve the status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation
which precedes a controversy (Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samul, 491 Phil. 458, 472
[2005]).

Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession
and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is
being disputed, as in this case. Preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy. Therefore,
it should not create new relations between the parties, but must only maintain the status
quo until the merits of the case is fully heard (See Los Banos Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, 433
Phil. 930, 945 [2002]; Sps. Laus, et al. v. Optimum Security Services, Inc., G.R. No. 208343,
February 3, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J).

RULE 60 – REPLEVIN

In a replevin suit, if plaintiff is no longer the owner, action not proper.

In Sy v. Tomlin, G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017, Del Castillo J, Sy filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of a motor vehicle which he owned and brought to a certain Chua, a
second-hand motor vehicle seller and who in turn sold it to a certain Ong. Chua, however
failed to remit the proceeds of the sale, hence, Sy filed the action to recover possession. It
was granted by the RTC, but it was reversed by the CA which the SC affirmed and

24
Held:Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, Sy thus ceased to be the owner
thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, he
lost his right of possession over the vehicle. His argument that Chua is a buyer in bad faith,
when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the, despite
having been apprised of Sy's earlier "Failed to Return Vehicle" report filed with the PNP-
HPG, is unavailing. Sy had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner of the
vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the
proceeds of the sale.

Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject
vehicle at the time he filed the case for replevin, Sy may not seek a return of the same
through replevin. Quite the contrary, Sy, who obtained the vehicle from Chua and
registered the transfer with the LTO, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is
entitled to its possession. Hence, the return of the vehicle to Chua is proper.

"In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either
the owner or clearly entitled to the possession. of the object sought to be recovered, and
that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same." "Rule 60 xx x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of
personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is 'the owner of
the property claimed ... or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be
the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his
legal basis therefor.”

RULE 65 – CERTIORARI

Certiorari is the remedy against judgment of acquittal; no double jeopardy.

A judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering
the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the
aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy,
(People of the Philippines, et al. and AAA v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 183652,
February 25, 2015) in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or
bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal
case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated (Morillo v. People, et al., G.R. No. 198270, December 9, 2015, Peralta,
J).

RULE 70 – FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Letter reminding possessor to vacate is an act of polite demand to vacate.

In Guyamin, et al. v. Flores, G.R. No.202189, Del Castillo, J, the respondents are the
owners of a parcel of land which has been occupied by tolerance by their own relatives. The
owners sent a letter “reminding” them to vacate the property because they decided to sell
the same, but to no avail, hence, a complaint was filed seeking to recover possession of the
property. The defendants filed an answer beyond the reglementary period required by the
Rules. Judgment was rendered in favor of respondents which the CA affirmed. Before the SC
the petitioners contended that the action was premature as there was no “demand” to
vacate, but they were merely “reminded” to vacate the premises. Is the contention correct?
Explain.

25
Held: No, because the word “remind” can be treated as an act of polite demand. As owners
of the subject property who have been deprived of the use thereof for so many years owing
to petitioners' continued occupation, and after all these years of giving unconditionally to
the petitioners who are their relatives, respondents must now enjoy the fruits of their
ownership. Respondents have been more than cordial in dealing with petitioners; they
have shown only respect and reverence to the latter, even to the extent of using less
offensive language in their complaint for fear of generating more enmity than is required.
Thus, instead of using "demand", respondents chose "remind". The parties being relatives
and the context and circumstances being the way they are, the choice of words is
understandable. The Court treated respondents' act as a polite demand; indeed, the law
never requires a harsh or impolite demand but only a categorical one.

With the clear realization that they are settling on land that they do not own,
occupants of registered private lands by mere tolerance of the owners should always
expect that one day, they would have to vacate the same. Their time is merely borrowed;
they have no right to the property whatsoever, and their presence is merely tolerated and
under the good graces of the owners. As it were, they live under constant threat of being
evicted; they cannot pretend that this threat of eviction does not exist. It is never too much
to ask them to give a little leeway to the property owners; after all, they have benefited
from their tolerated use of the lands, while the owners have clearly lost by their inability to
use the same.

Case filed before the barangay is a categorical demand.

There could be no more categorical demand by respondents than the filing of a case
against petitioners before the Barangay Chairman to cause the latter's eviction from the
property. The fact that only one of the petitioners was made respondent in the conciliation
process is of no moment; given the context, relation, circumstances, lack of visible defense
(Guyamin, et al. v. Flores, supra).

Automatic revocation of donation reverts ownership upon donor; can eject sub-lessee.
In Prov. of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware, G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017,
Jardeleza, J, a property was donated by the province to Camarines Sur Teacher’s
Association Inc. (CASTEA) to house its offices in connection with its functions. There was
an automatic revocation clause in case of violation of the condition of the donation. The
done violated it when it leased to Bodega, hence, there was a demand for it to vacate by the
province, but it refused. A complaint for ejectment was filed based on its ownership due to
the automatic revocation. Bodega anchored its defense or right of possession on the lease
contract. The MTC ruled in favor of the province which was reversed by the RTC. Appeal
was made to the CA which dismissedd the appeal, ruling that the province should have first
filed an action for reconveyance of the property and that the action has already prescribed
because it was not filed within 10 years. Reversing the CA, the SC

Held:If a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a

breach of a condition and the donee violates it or fails to comply with it, the property
donated automatically reverts back to the donor without need of any judicial declaration. It
is only when the donee denies the rescission or challenges its propriety that the court can
intervene to conclusively settle (Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata,
G.R. No. 148433, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 163; Dolar v. Barangay Lublub(Now P.D.
Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas, G.R. No. 152663, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA
458).

This right of possession prevailed over the lessee's claim which is anchored on its
Contract of Lease with the done whoseact of leasing the property, in breach of the
conditions stated in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic
revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized

26
administrator of the property to lease it. While a lessor need not be the owner of the
property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out
(Ballesteros v. Abion, G.R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 23, 33).The lessee
found no basis for its continued possession of the property.

Judgment in unlawful detainer is immediately executory.

Ejectment cases are governed by Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure. Its summary nature is designed to restore physical possession of a real property
to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties’ opposing claims in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. True
to its summary nature, the court’s jurisdiction is limited to the issue of physical or de facto
possession; hence, adjudications made on questions of ownership are provisional. To abate
losing litigants’ attempt to defer and circumvent summary ejectment proceedings, the rules
mandate that decisions involving ejectment cases are immediately executory. Section 21,
Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom.

Therefore, the decision ordering defendants to vacate the subject property pursuant
to the ejectment proceedings must be immediately executed. Especially so without any
substantial defense to oppose the ejectment order, the petitioners should yield possession
to respondent. Hence, petitioners’ ploy that would obliterate the objective of summary
ejectment proceedings must fail. The order to vacate is immediately executory (Quilo, et al.
v. Bajao, G.R. No. 186199, September 7, 2016, Perez, J; Santos-Yllana Realty Corp. v. Sps.
Deang, G.R. No. 190043, June 21, 2017, Velasco, J).

Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano is the Proprietor/Bar Review Director of

ALBANO BAR REVIEW CENTER
Website: www.albanobarreviewcenter.com

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