E.

Ex Post Facto Law / Bill of Attainder

1. People vs. SB, GR No. 101724, 3 July 1992

FACTS
- This is a petition regarding the resolution by the Sandiganbayan which granted the private respondent’s motion to quash the
information for violation of the anti-graft and Corrupt practices
- Private respondent, Governor Paredes was charged in 1989 with a violation of Republic Act 3019 or anti graft and corrupt
practices for acts allegedly committed in 1976.
- The Sandiganbayan granted his motion to quash on the ground of prescription.
- The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21, 1976) the period of
prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution
seems to agree with the movant's statement as to the term of the prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of
prescription should have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was allegedly filed by the Republic
for the cancellation of the title.
- when should the period of prescription have commenced to run as to the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded,
influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the application of the accused
for a free patent?

ISSUES

Issue: Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.

RULING
(Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No.
3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it
is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his
disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was
committed)

- The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation of the period for the
prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

- The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the
commencement of the period of prescription

- The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes application for a free patent in
January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January
21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.

The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing the
criminal action, is that:

- Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or
of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are founded
on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode
only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.
They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a
reasonable time after completion, when no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity. (22 CJS 573-
574.)
 - In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run on the commission of an offense and
not from the time when the offense is discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the
crime is complete. (22 CJS 585; Emphasis supplied.)
- Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and issuance of the free patent title by the
Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would
have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13)
years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the information
therein.
- Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from
ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by
Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the
shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time
he committed it.
- Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute fixes a period of limitation
as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is
committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed within the time
prescribed. (22 CJS 574.)
- Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a prosecution within the period specified is an
essential element of the offense. (People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927, Emphasis supplied.)
- Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes previously committed (22 CJS
576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61; Emphasis ours.)
- To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by
making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
An ex post facto law is defined as:

A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal
consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass
"any ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

- An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done
which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of
the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons
accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p.
520.)

Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed
no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years
before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offense
which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.

- WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

 2. Salvador vs. Mapa Jr, GR No. 135080, 28 November 2007

FACTS
- , Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of
Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents
- After considering the Committees allegation, the Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution, [6] dismissing the
complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation

- Committee filed for MOR but was denied.

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-
POST FACTO LAW[S].[9]

RULING
- As the Committee puts it, the issues to be resolved are: (i) whether or not the offenses subject of its criminal complaint have
prescribed, and (ii) whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.

- The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,[13] thus:

[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived
or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period
for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. [14]

- The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman
Desierto,[15] wherein the Court explained:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have
known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared
to question the legality of those transactions.Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date
of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Behest Loans.[16]
- This is now a well-settled doctrine which the Court has applied in subsequent cases involving the PCGG and the
Ombudsman.[17]
- Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not
have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly
committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.

- Even the Ombudsman, in its Manifestation & Motion (In Lieu of Comment), [18] conceded that the prescriptive period
commenced from the date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from the date the loan documents were registered
with the Register of Deeds. As a matter of fact, it requested that the record of the case be referred back to the Ombudsman for
a proper evaluation of its merit.

- Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsmans declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
violate the prohibition against ex post factolaws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to
their issuance and which was innocent when done.

- The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain.[19] Even this Court does not decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless that question is properly raised and
presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented.[20]

- Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,[21] where the petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6770 in
his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans decision, we had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no
 jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders.

- In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws.

- An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. [22] This Court added two (2) more to the list,
namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. [23]

- The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws
are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. [24] The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly
do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not
being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post
facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders
are ex post facto.

- One final note. Respondents Mapa and Zalamea, in their respective comments, moved for the dismissal of the case against
them. Mapa claims that he was granted transactional immunity from all PCGG-initiated cases,[25] while Zalamea denied
participation in the approval of the subject loans.[26] The arguments advanced by Mapa and Zalamea are matters of defense
which should be raised in their respective counter-affidavits. Since the Ombudsman erroneously dismissed the complaint on
ground of prescription, respondents respective defenses were never passed upon during the preliminary investigation. Thus,
the complaint should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its merit.

the petition is GRANTED

 3. People vs. Ferrer, GR No. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972

FACTS

- Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge thatdeclared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following:
1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of
contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to affordimpunity.
2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud.

The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes.

It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is
a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the
illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of
Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7
provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation
of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

ISSUE

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

RULING

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to
a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is
also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of
example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and
their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown thatmembership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the
organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the
subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in
accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt.
This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to
the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and
association is excluded in the prohibition ofmembership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government
of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membershipis willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the
TRIAL COURT.