Following these guidelines, the Committee recommended the acquisition of Goldstar
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right, it is a substantive right. To
deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process.
In this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, petitioners seek to set
aside the Order of the Sandiganbayan dated 27 June 1997 denying the Motion to Quash the
information filed against them for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners similarly impugn the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated 5 August 1997 which denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Pertinent to this case are the following facts:
In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city government of
Davao. The goal of said project was to make Davao City a leading center for computer
systems and technology development. It also aimed to provide consultancy and training
services and to assist all local government units in Mindanao set up their respective
computer systems.
To implement the project, a Computerization Program Committee, composed of the
following was formed:
Chairman : Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman, City Administrator
Members : Mr. Jorge Silvosa, Acting City Treasurer
Atty. Victorino Advincula, City Councilor
Mr. Alexis Almendras, City Councilor\
Atty. Onofre Francisco, City Legal Officer
Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr., Chief of Internal Control Office
Atty. Mariano Kintanar, COA Resident Auditor.[1]
The Committees duty was to conduct a thorough study of the different computers in the
market, taking into account the quality and acceptability of the products, the reputation
and track record of the manufacturers and/or their Philippine distributors, the availability
of service centers in the country that can undertake preventive maintenance of the
computer hardwares to ensure a long and uninterrupted use and, last but not the least, the
capability of the manufacturers and/or Philippine distributors to design and put into place
the computer system complete with the flow of paperwork, forms to be used and personnel
required.[2]
computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea
and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI).
After obtaining prior clearance from COA Auditor Kintanar, the Committee proceeded to
negotiate with SPI, represented by its President Rodolfo V. Jao and Executive Vice President
Manuel T. Asis, for the acquisition and installation of the computer hardware and the
training of personnel for the Electronic Data-Processing Center. The total contract cost
amounted to P11,656,810.00
On 5 November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of Davao unanimously
passed Resolution No. 1402 and Ordinance No. 173 approving the proposed contract for
computerization between Davao City and SPI. The Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the
City Mayor (petitioner Duterte) to sign the said contract for and in behalf of Davao City.[3]
On the same day, the Sangguniang issued Resolution No. 1403 and Ordinance No. 174, the
General Fund Supplemental Budget No. 07 for CY 1990 appropriating P3,000,000.00 for
the citys computerization project.
Given the go-signal, the contract was duly signed by the parties thereto and on 8 November
1990, petitioner City Administrator de Guzman released to SPI PNB Check No. 65521 in the
amount of P1,748,521.58 as downpayment.
On 27 November 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao received a letter-complaint
from a concerned citizen, stating that some city officials are going to make a killing in the
transaction.[4] The complaint was docketed as OMB-MIN-90-0425. However, no action was
taken thereon.[5]
Thereafter, sometime in February 1991, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 20,550-91,
was instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12 by Dean Pilar Braga,
Hospicio C. Conanan, Jr. and Korsung Dabaw Foundation, Inc. against the petitioners, the
City Council, various city officials and SPI for the judicial declaration of nullity of the
aforestated resolutions and ordinances and the computer contract executed pursuant
thereto.
On 22 February 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr. S.Y. Lee sent a proposal to petitioner
Duterte for the cancellation of the computerization contract.
Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sangguniang issued Resolution No. 449 and Ordinance
No. 53 accepting Goldstars offer to cancel the computerization contract provided the latter
return the advance payment of P1,748,521.58 to the City Treasurers Office within a period
of one month. Petitioner Duterte, as city mayor, was thus authorized to take the proper
steps for the mutual cancellation of the said contract and to sign all documents relevant
thereto.[6]
Pursuant to the aforestated authority, on 6 May 1991, petitioner Duterte, in behalf of Davao
City, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and the downpayment was duly refunded.
In the meantime, a Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit was tasked to conduct
an audit of the Davao City Local Automation Project to determine if said contract conformed
to government laws and regulations.
On 31 May 1991, the team submitted its Special Audit Report (SAR) No. 91-05
recommending rescission of the subject contract. A copy of the report was sent to petitioner
Duterte by COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo on 7 June 1991. In the latters transmittal
letter, Chairman Domingo summarized the findings of the special audit team, thus:
1. The award of the contract for the Davao City Local Automation Project to Systems Plus,
Inc., for P11,656,810 was done thru negotiated contract rather than thru
competitive public bidding in violation of Sections 2 and 8 of PD 526. Moreover,
there was no sufficient appropriation for this particular contract in violation of Sec.
85 of PD 1445.
2. Advance payment of P1.7M was made to Systems Plus, Inc. covering 15% of the contract
cost of P11.6M in violation of Sec. 45 of PD 477 and Sec. 88 of PD 1445.
3. The cost of computer hardware and accessories under contract with Systems Plus, Inc.
(SPI) differed from the teams canvass by as much as 1200% or a total of P1.8M.
4. The City had no Information System Plan (ISP) prior to the award of the contract to SPI
in direct violation of Malacaang Memo. Order No. 287 and NCC Memo. Circular 89-
1 dated June 22, 1989. This omission resulted in undue disadvantage to the City
Government.
5. To remedy the foregoing deficiencies, the team recommends that the contract with
Systems Plus, Inc. be rescinded in view of the questionable validity due to
insufficient funding. Further, the provisions of NCC-Memorandum Circular 89-1
dated June 22, 1989 regarding procurement and/or installation of computer
hardware/system should be strictly adhered to.[7]
The city government, intent on pursuing its computerization plan, decided to follow the
audit teams recommendation and sought the assistance of the National Computer Center
(NCC).After conducting the necessary studies, the NCC recommended the acquisition of
Philips computers in the amount of P15,792,150.00. Davao City complied with the NCCs
advice and hence, was finally able to obtain the needed computers.
Subsequently, on 1 August 1991, the Anti-Graft League-Davao City Chapter, through one
Miguel C. Enriquez, filed an unverified complaint with the Ombudsman-Mindanao against
petitioners, the City Treasurer, City Auditor, the whole city government of Davao and
SPI. The League alleged that the respondents, in entering into the computerization contract,
violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), PD No. 1445 (Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines), COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal Code
and other pertinent laws. The case was docketed as OMB-3-91-1768.[8]
On 9 October 1991, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Pepito A. Manriquez of the Office of
the Ombudsman sent a letter[9] to COA Chairman Domingo requesting the Special Audit
Team to submit their joint affidavit to substantiate the complaint in compliance with Section
4, par. (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (A. O. No. 07).
On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T. Arcangel, issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No.
20,550-91. The dispositive portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground of
prematurity and that it has become moot and academic with the mutual cancellation of the
contract. The other claims of the parties are hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On 12 November 1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez issued an order in OMB-3-91-1768
directing petitioners, Jorge Silvosa (City Treasurer), Mariano Kintanar (City Auditor) and
Manuel T. Asis of SPI to:
xxx file in ten (10) days (1) their respective verified point-by-point comment under oath
upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Davao City Dean Pilar C. Braga, et al. vs. Illegality of City Council
of Davao Resolutions and Ordinances, and the Computer Contract executed Pursuant
Thereto, for Recovery of Sum of Money, Professional Fees and Costs with Injunctive Relief,
including the Issuance of a Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction in which they filed a motion to dismiss, not an answer and (2) the respective
comments, also under oath, on the Special Audit Report No. 91-05, a copy of which is
attached.[11]
On 4 December 1991, the Ombudsman received the affidavits of the Special Audit Team
but failed to furnish petitioners copies thereof.
On 18 February 1992, petitioners submitted a manifestation adopting the comments filed
by their co-respondents Jorge Silvosa and Mariano Kintanar dated 25 November 1991 and
17 January 1992, respectively.
Four years after, or on 22 February 1996, petitioners received a copy of a Memorandum
prepared by Special Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman dated 8 February 1996
addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding OMB-MIN-90-0425 and OMB-3-91-
1768. Prosecutor De Guzman recommended that the charges of malversation, violation of
Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 177, Revised Penal Code against petitioners and their co-
respondents be dismissed. He opined that any issue pertaining to unwarranted benefits or
injury to the government and malversation were rendered moot and academic by the
mutual rescission of the subject contract before the COA submitted its findings (SAR No.
91-05) or before the disbursement was disallowed. However, Prosecutor De Guzman
recommended that petitioners be charged under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for having
entered into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, the
elements of profit, unwarranted benefits or loss to government being immaterial.[12]
Accordingly, the following information dated 8 February 1996 was filed against petitioners
before the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Criminal Case No. 23193):
That on or about November 5, 1990, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, accused
Benjamin C. De Guzman being then the City Administrator of Davao City, committing the
crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their
official functions, and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a negotiated contract for the purchase of
computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated for and in
consideration of the amount of PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN (P11,656,810.00), which contract is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, said accused knowing fully-well that the said
acquisition cost has been overpriced by as much as twelve hundred (1200%) percent and
without subjecting said acquisition to the required public bidding.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]
On 27 February 1996, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 March 1996,
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and
the speedy disposition of their case;
2. Petitioner Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with authority to enter into the
subject contract;
3. There is no contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since
the subject contract has been duly rescinded.
On 19 March 1996, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On 18 June 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27 June 1997. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
It appears, however, that the accused were able to file motions for the reconsideration of
the Resolution authorizing the filing of the Information herein with the Ombudsman in
Manila. This would mean, therefore, that whatever decision which might have occurred with
respect to the preliminary investigation would have been remedied by the motion for
consideration in the sense that whatever the accused had to say in their behalf, they were
able to do in that motion for reconsideration.
Considering the denial thereof by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court does not believe
itself empowered to authorize a reinvestigation on the ground of an inadequacy of the basic
preliminary investigation nor with respect to a dispute as to the proper appreciation by the
prosecution of the evidence at that time.
In view hereof, upon further representation by Atty. Medialdea that he represents not only
Mayor Duterte but City Administrator de Guzman as well, upon his commitment, the
arraignment hereof is now set for July 25, 1997 at 8:00 oclock in the morning.[14]
On 15 July 1997, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above order but the same
was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997.[15]
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioners allege that:
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION
TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A
(1) PETITIONERS WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 4, RULE II OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 07 (RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN); AND
(2) ASSUMING THAT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED,
THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY IN TERMINATING THE SAME THEREBY
DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.
B
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN FACT AND IN LAW, TO CHARGE PETITIONERS
DUTERTE AND DE GUZMAN OF VIOLATING SEC. 3 (G) OF R.A. 3019 IN THAT:
(1) PETITIONER DUTERTE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS CLOTHED WITH FULL
LEGAL AUTHORITY FROM THE CITY COUNCIL TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT
WITH SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.,
(2) THERE IS NO CONTRACT MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK OF AS THE SAME HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND NO
DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT;
(3) ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT RESCINDED, THE SAME CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.[16]
On 4 September 1997, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 23193.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
We have judiciously studied the case records and we find that the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner
laid down in Administrative Order No. 07.
In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were merely
directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case
No. 20,550-91 and SAR No. 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single affidavit
of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law.[17] They were just
required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit
Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary
investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation
was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended merely to adopt the
allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special Audit Report (whose
recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in question had been complied with)
as his basis for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was plainly anomalous and highly
irregular. As a consequence, petitioners constitutional right to due process was violated.
Sections (2) and (4), Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman) provide:
Sec. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether or not it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation
Sec. 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed
in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant
may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider
the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the
respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a
motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the
complainants affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time
of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or
having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted
for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts
material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may
conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to
be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being
questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the
clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be
asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the
witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall be
forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities
for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
In what passes off as application of the foregoing rules, all that petitioners were asked to
do was merely to file their comment upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and on the COA Special Audit Report. The
comment referred to in Section 2(b) Rule II, of A.O. No. 07 is not part of or is equivalent
to the preliminary investigation contemplated in Sec. 4, Rule II, of the same Administrative
Order. A plain reading of Sec. 2 would convey the idea that upon evaluation of the
complaint, the investigating officer may recommend its outright dismissal for palpable want
of merit; otherwise, or if the complaint appears to have some merit, the investigator may
recommend action under any of those enumerated from (b) to (f), that is, the investigator
may recommend that the complaint be: referred to respondent for comment, or endorsed
to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; or
forwarded to the appropriate office of official for fact-finding investigation. Now, if the
investigator opts to recommend the filing of a comment by the respondent, it is presumably
because he needs more facts and information for further evaluation of the merits of the
complaint. That being done, the investigating officer shall again recommend any one of the
actions enumerated in Section 2, which include the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation, on the other hand, takes on an adversarial quality and an
entirely different procedures comes into play. This must be so because the purpose of a
preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is
placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of public trial.[18] It is also intended to protect the state from
having to conduct useless and expensive trials.[19] While the right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for
a criminal offense and hence, formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not
a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accuseds claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.[20]
Note that in preliminary investigation, if the complaint is unverified or based only on official
reports (which is the situation obtaining in the case at bar), the complainant is required to
submit affidavits to substantiate the complaint. The investigating officer, thereafter, shall
issue an order, to which copies of the complaint-affidavit are attached, requiring the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavits. In the preliminary investigation, what the
respondent is required to file is a counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only when the
respondent fails to file a counter-affidavit may the investigating officer consider the
respondents comment as the answer to the complaint. Against the foregoing backdrop,
there was a palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of the fundamental
requirements of preliminary investigation.
Apparently, in the case at bar, the investigating officer considered the filing of petitioners
comment as a substantial compliance with the requirements of a preliminary investigation.
Initially, Graft Investor Manriquez directed the members of the Special Audit Team on 9
October 1991 to submit their affidavits relative to SAR No. 91-05. However, on 12
November 1991, before the affidavits were submitted, Manriquez required petitioners to
submit their respective comments on the complaint in the civil case and on Special Audit
Report (SAR) 91-05. Even when the required affidavits were filed by the audit team on 4
December 1991, petitioners were still not furnished copies thereof. The Ombudsman
contends that failure to provide petitioners the complaint-affidavits is immaterial since
petitioners were well aware of the existence of the civil complaint and SAR No. 91-05. We
find the Ombudsmans reasoning flawed. The civil complaint and the COA Special Audit
Report are not equivalent to the complaint-affidavits required by the rules. Moreover, long
before petitioners were directed to file their comments, the civil complaint (Civil Case No.
20, 550-91) was rendered moot and academic and, accordingly, dismissed following the
mutual cancellation of the computerization contract. In SAR No. 91-05, on the other hand,
petitioners were merely advised to rescind the subject contract which was accomplished
even before the audit report came out. In light of these circumstances, the Court cannot
blame petitioners for being unaware of the proceedings conducted against them.
In Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[21] this Court, speaking through Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, emphasized that it is mandatory requirement for the complaint to submit his
affidavit and those of his witnesses before the respondent can be compelled to submit his
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. Thus:
Even in investigations looking to the prosecution of a party, Rule I, 3 can only apply to the
general criminal investigation, which in the case at bar was already conducted by the PCGG.
But after the Ombudsman and his deputies have gathered evidence and their investigation
has ceased to be a general exploratory one and they decide to bring the action against a
party, their proceedings become adversary and Rule II 4(a) then applies. This means that
before the respondent can be required to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents, the complaint must submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses. This is true
not only of prosecutions of graft cases under Rep. Act No. 3019 but also of actions for the
recovery of unexplained wealth under Rep. Act No. 1379, because 2 of this latter law
requires that before a petition is filed there must be a previous inquiry similar to preliminary
investigation in criminal cases.
Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial, only evidence
may be considered. While reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an
investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be held only after sufficient
evidence has been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case
in court. As this Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG:
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end
in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case
is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A
preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding.
An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereof.
II
Compounding the deprivation of petitioners of their right to a preliminary investigation was
the undue and unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularity conducted
preliminary investigation. Petitioners manifestation adopting the comments of their co-
respondents was filed on 18 February 1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or
four (4) years later, that petitioners received a memorandum dated 8 February 1996
submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel M. De Guzman recommending the filing
of information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their
case.[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] we held that an undue delay of close to three (3)
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan
in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the
law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of
the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987
Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay
of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the
Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that
the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution
of a former high-ranking government official. In the first place, such a statement suggests
a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out
of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did
not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such painstaking and grueling
scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has
not yet invented a device for setting back time.
In the recent case of Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,[24] the Court upheld Angchangcos
right to the speedy disposition of his case. Angchangco was a sheriff in the Regional Trial
Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In 1990 criminal complaints were filed against
him which remained pending before the Ombudsman even after his retirement in 1994. The
Court thus ruled:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against
petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner
to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the
Ombudsmans own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all
these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in
September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the
government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombusman. If we
wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to
speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of
the writ prayed for.[25]
We are not persuaded by the Ombudsmans argument that the Tatad ruling does not apply
to the present case which is not politically motivated unlike the former, pointing out the
following findings of the Court in the Tatad decision:
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutional process in this case. Firstly,
the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits
by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutional process lending
credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot
emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and
all litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may be publics perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.[26]
The Ombudsman endeavored to distinguish the present suit from the Angchangco case by
arguing that in the latter, Angchangco filed several motions for early resolution, implying
that in the case at bar petitioners were not as vigilant in asserting or protecting their rights.
 for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; (3)
We disagree. The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not come into play
the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no such
government. The second element of the crime that the accused public officers entered into
distinction.While political motivation in Tatad may have been a factor in the undue delay in
a contract in behalf of the government is absent. The computerization contract was
the termination of the preliminary investigation therein to justify the invocation of their
rescinded on 6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and before the
right to speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts of each case must be taken into
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at
consideration in the grant of the relief sought. In the Tatad case, we are reminded:
that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called radical relief and Order on 12 November 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The contract,
to spare the accused from the undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of the law, non-existent, as if no contract was
it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutional guaranteed ever executed.
rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated
in those cases, particularly regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
its case.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and Criminal Case No. 23193
is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 4 September 1997 is
made PERMANENT.
In Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan,[28] the Court observed that the concept of speedy disposition
of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that the factors
that may be considered and balanced are the length of the delay, the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going.Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to
comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation.After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark,
petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already
been dismissed.

On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or
even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its
excuse for the delay-the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the
meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was
the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated
factual and legal issues, specially in view of the fact that the subject computerization
contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint.

The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on petitioners three motions for extension of the
time to file comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was not caused by
the motions for extension. The delay occurred after petitioners filed their
comment. Between 1992-1996, petitioners were under no obligation to make any move
because there was no preliminary investigation within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule
II of A.O. No. 07 to speak of in the first place.

III

Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge petitioners
for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO
ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the Resolution[2] dated
May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said
court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged
with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel
Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who
was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of
the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex
Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also
held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements
for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
(1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused;
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the
2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties
were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6)
whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other
victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined
whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases,
or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the
two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with
the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State
for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is
not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the
two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners
maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge
Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that
he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal
thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the
dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents
express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of
the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the
RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing
on the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable
cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was
furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that
private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the
private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty.
Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm
the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal
of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent
and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal
cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it
was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal
actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court
of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar
in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him
from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who
has control of the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy
of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.[7]Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence
of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object
to a provisional dismissal[10]does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the
new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express
consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may
be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival or refiling is
barred by the statute of limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation.[14] However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation[15] must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also
required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint,
the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role
of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist
the court in dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the
first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for
the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of
this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for
its examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have
personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be
issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a
hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a
mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals,
respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in
the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the
case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and
(2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal
of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A.[19]
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through
counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion
to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was
provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN: It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause
for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the
parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits,
made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause
for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding
to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall
not be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the
accused.
ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA: And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA: Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any
order, or any statement, which would normally be required by the Court on
pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very
limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be
very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to
come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO: You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that
sort which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal
law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson
agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion
for a judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if
there is no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only
prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may
read my prayer before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1)
a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled
hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be
withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court,
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case
because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of
arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good
Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal,
neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not
file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should
be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time
that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid
as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir
operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in
addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it
probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the
Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to
the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the
others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex
B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the
dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim.[21]
The respondent’s admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals
are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his
admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add
to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included
therein.This the Court cannot and should not do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioner’s contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in
crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties
or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party
or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the
public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the
victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the
hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the
offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between
the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable;
or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from
detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution
witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss
of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended
party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition
of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his
property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondent’s motion for a determination of probable cause
and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs
of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22,
1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and
set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although
the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that
notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were
issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance
who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon,
Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the
heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although
Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,[25]he did so only for some but
not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita
Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except
for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no
appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There
is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt
on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify
all the heirs of the victims of the respondent’s motion and the hearing thereon and of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of
their right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to protect their interests either in
the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in
the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.

II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and
all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing
thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply
the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused
would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and
diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They
posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within
which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the
State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said
cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year
and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for
the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case of conflict between
the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that
the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the
two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the
Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no
substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases
in question since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically
expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the
accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and
lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly
indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution
to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State
because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year
periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival
of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule
117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not
modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the
application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed
against the accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article
90.[32]
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes
are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that
prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have
by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes
are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered.[34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of
the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a
criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned
or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or
another crime necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety
as well as the expenses in any new indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case
beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for
the delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused
because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under
the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution
of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under
the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the
state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punished to be
deprived of his liberty shall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which
the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created
in the offenders’ title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes
barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and
that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect
the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right
which the state has against the offender the right to punish, as the only liability which the
offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who
has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held
that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigant’s rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of
his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so
would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the
United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the
injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, and injurious consequences.[45] This Court should not adopt an interpretation of
a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are
to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.[47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the
new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its
operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision
in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in
determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time
limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice.[50] The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness
or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
in his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He
is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or non availability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[59] this Court emphasized
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.[56] that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of
the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged
accused; not for the accused only. must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-
two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent
with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the
new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-
year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The
Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is
DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation with deliberate dispatch.
of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and
the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that
the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was
negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United
States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights.

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application
of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause
an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in
general and of criminal laws in particular.

To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the
revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the
effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the
time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The
State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December
1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification
for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.SPO4 EMILIANO ANONAS, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated October 11, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531.
On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at the Western Police
District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other persons were sniffing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug; and
that he was in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver
On December 9, 1996, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 53, same city, two separate Informations against respondent, one for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154398,
and another for illegal possession of firearm, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154399,
reproduced as follows:
Criminal Case No. Case 96-154398
That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
white crystalline substance separately contained in five (5) plastic bags marked "AJ" to
"AJ4" weighting two hundred twenty and .2462 (222.2462) grams known as "Shabu"
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
license or prescription thereof.
Criminal Case No. 96-154399,
That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under
his/her custody and control .38 caliber revolver without serial number with six (6) live
ammos and carrying the same outside his residence without first having secured from the
proper authorities the necessary license therefore.
No bail was recommended in Criminal Case No. 96-154398.
On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on
grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary
investigation was conducted.
On January 28, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion.
On April 14, 1998, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag, designated to conduct the reinvestigation, was
appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who took
his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in
detention.
On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
Informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due
process.
On January 12, 2001, the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that
Prosecutor Danilo Formoso, who took over the case, was not aware of the pending
reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation within
thirty (30) days.
On February 16, 2001, Prosecutor Formoso manifested before the trial court that the
reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in
the Informations against respondent.
On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss
the Informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated
September 7, 2001.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 67531, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to dismiss both
Informations.
On October 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the Order of
the trial court dated August 9, 2001 and dismissed the criminal charges against respondent.
The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his motion
for reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, violated his right to due
process. The Court of Appeals then ordered that respondent be released from custody.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration, but in
its Resolution dated January 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
The only issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent’s
right to due process has been violated.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial. Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This is reinforced by
Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires
that "the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion
of the investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998) was enacted on February 4,
1998. To implement its provisions, the Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98 dated September
15, 1998 setting a time limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The earliest rulings of the Court on speedy trial were rendered in Conde v. Judge of First
Instance,[2] Conde v. Rivera, et al.,[3] and People v. Castañeda.4 These cases held that
accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of Rights and that such right is
denied when an accused person, through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting
officers, is forced to wait many months for trial. Specifically in Castañeda, the Court called
on courts to be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of
justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the courts to see to it that the criminal
proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged
from the custody of the law.
In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,5 the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases. Similarly, in Roque v. Office of the
Ombudsman,6 the Court ruled that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman’s duty to act promptly on complaints before him. In Cervantes v.
Sandiganbayan,7 it was held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the Information filed six years after the initiatory complaint, thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case.
The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his
constitutional right to due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan,8 the Court, restating
the pronouncement in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,9held:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan
in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the
law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of
due process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of "speedy disposition" of cases
as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions),
the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to
three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due
to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant
or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
(Emphasis supplied).
The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more than
four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having
been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal
investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated
January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16,
2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City Prosecutor
to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation.
There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be
confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to
comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals,
respondent’s right to due process had been violated.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531. No costs.
ROBERTA S. SALDARIEGA, Petitioner, v. HON. ELVIRA D.C. PANGANIBAN,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 227, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, QUEZON CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated
April 21, 2014 filed by Roberta S. Saldariega (petitioner), through counsel, assailing the
Order dated June 14, 2013 issued by respondent Presiding Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban,
which granted the motion to reopen Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056,
for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed two (2)
Informations against petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056,
respectively.2 Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban.
Court hearings were set for the subject cases, however, the prosecution's principal witness
PO2 Nelson Villas (PO2 Villas), one of the arresting officers, failed to attend said scheduled
hearings, specifically on October 22, 2012 and October 25, 2012.3 Thus, during the May
16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge issued an Order provisionally dismissing the cases with
the express consent of the accused-petitioner,4the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
xxxx
Today is supposedly set for the continuation of the direct testimony of PO2 Nelson Villas.
However, although notified, said witness failed to appear simply on the ground that there
is a deceased relative, the body of whom, he will accompany to the province.
The records show that on December 10, 2012, he testified partially on direct examination
and he was notified of the March 26, 2013 continuation of his testimony, but despite Notice
in open Court, he failed to appear. Likewise, the Court noticed that the other prosecution
witness, PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan never appeared despite Notice received. It appears from
the records that only the Forensic Chemist testified on September 13, 2012, but the
Forensic Chemist does not have any personal knowledge of the source of the evidence she
examined, and also on the facts and circumstances affecting the arrest of the accused.
Thus, the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Public
Prosecutor did not object to the dismissal, provided the dismissal is only provisional. Hence,
let these cases be ordered PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF
THE ACCUSED AND HER COUNSEL. SO ORDERED.
On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against petitioner. PO2 Villas
explained that his failure to appear during the hearings of the cases was due to the untimely
death of his father-in-law.6 He further averred that PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan, one of the
arresting officers, is no longer assigned at the Cubao Police Station and had been
transferred at the Batasan Police Station since November 2012, thus, could not have
received his subpoena which is directed at his former place of assignment.
In the disputed Order7 dated June 14, 2013, respondent Judge granted the motion and
ordered the re-opening of the cases against petitioner and set the cases for continuation of
hearing.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She argued that the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion
to re-open the case.8
In an Order9 dated February 18, 2014, respondent denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On April 29, 2014, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the instant
petition.10
In their Comment11 dated June 11, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General, through then
Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza,12 maintained that respondent judge committed no
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated June 14, 2013 and February
18, 2014. It argued that petitioner did not expressly object to the motion to revive the
criminal cases.
Thus, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS CAN FILE A MOTION TO REOPEN A
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASE WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF A PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE A
MOTION TO RE-OPEN THAT DOES NOT CONTAIN A NOTICE OF HEARING AND A
SHOWING THAT THE OTHER PARTY WAS GIVEN A COPY THEREOF.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ACT FAVORABLY
UPON SAID MOTION.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-1 1-
173055-56 WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED BUT PREDICATED ON FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE WHICH VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT
EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTAL, SUCH THAT ITS REVIVAL WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL WITNESS PO2 NELSON
VILLAS FOR FOUR (4) CONSECUTIVE HEARINGS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED WAIVER
PURSUANT TO A.M. NO. 11-6-10-SC.
RULING

We deny the petition.
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from procedural infirmities which this Court
cannot ignore. While this petition is to be treated as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is
still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not
be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there
are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the
petition, which are not present in this case.13
Moreover, this being a petition on certiorari under Rule 65, the issues raised herein should
be confined solely to questions of jurisdiction. Thus, while in the course of the discussion,
it may be necessary to thresh out pertinent factual issues, the same is limited for the
purpose of resolving the issue on jurisdiction, that is, whether the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused,
the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph
of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013,
stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case
could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should
be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She
should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no
alternative but to require the prosecution to present its evidence. There was nothing in the
records showing the accused's opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any
after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the
periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally
dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law.
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because
it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there
was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of
the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.
In the Order denying the motion, the trial court stated that "in her Comment/Objection, the
Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily on the ground that double jeopardy has not
set in, because the provisional dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the
accused."14 The court even went further when it stated that "although the Motion to Re-
open the case was filed by the witness without securing the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the case because
she (the prosecutor) finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings was
due to the death of the father in law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May
12, 2013, as substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives."15
Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a public
crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes where the participation of
the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of civil liability, in the
instant case, there is no particular private offended party who can actually file the motion
to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the arresting officer, PO2 Villas,
who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense of duty as a police officer and
compelled by his sense of obligation considering that he knew his absence was the cause
why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.
We could not entirely blame PO2 Villas in filing the motion to revive since we are aware
that in drug-related cases, the arresting officers are usually required to explain by their
superiors when a case is provisionally dismissed due to their failure to appear during trial.
Thus, in order to exonerate themselves from a possible administrative and criminal liability,
the arresting officers would then opt instead to file the motion to revive on their own.
The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal
was made with the express consent of the accused, thus, there is no double jeopardy.
Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his
acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general
rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid
indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused,
(4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the
dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However,
there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if
the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is
insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has
been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial.16
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express
consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy
with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally
dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without
the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any
of the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue
the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of
insufficiency of evidence cannot be established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in
the proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
This Court has emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay
should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are
the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. In the instant case, petitioner
failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the trial was attended with malice or
that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the
prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings.17
Here, the delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the provisional
dismissal of the case on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay contemplated under the law
as to violate the accused's right to speedy trial. More so, when the cause of the delay is
valid, as in the instant case. Likewise, a perusal of the Order dated May 16, 2013 would
show that the order was categorical in stating that the dismissal of the complaint was
provisional with the express consent of the accused and her counsel. The court merely
stated in the Order as to what transpired during the proceedings of the case and not that
the dismissal was based on the accused's right to speedy trial.

While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot, however, deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. We reiterate that unjustified postponements which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused
to speedy trial.18

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner should establish that the court or
tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its
jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, we, thus, find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs
of certiorari with injunction, as there was no showing that the alleged error in judgment
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that
the issuance of the assailed orders was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down
through a petition for certiorari. No argument was shown that the trial court exercised its
judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and
hostility.

It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a
case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part
of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the
impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The term grave
abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.19Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction,
and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders dated June 14, 2013
and February 18, 2014 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056
entitled People of the Philippines v. Roberta Saldariega are AFFIRMED. Let the case be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with dispatch.
ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR.,Petitioner, - versus – SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO &
NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164268June 28, 2005
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated
March 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77818, and its resolution[3] dated June 28, 2004 denying
reconsideration thereof.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila,[4] a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres)
for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were transferred without
their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale[5] dated
July 21, 1979.
Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject
properties to him[6] as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification
of public document against Torres,[8] which was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MTC), Branch 8, on October 3, 2001.
Torres moved for reconsideration[9] but was denied.[10]
On appeal,[11] the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor
and ordered the withdrawal of the information.[12] The motion for reconsideration filed by
Aguinaldo was denied.[13]
A Motion to Withdraw Information[14] was filed which the MTC granted on June 11,
2003.[15] It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned.
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[16] which was
granted in the assailed decision dated March 22, 2004.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice dated November 12, 2002 and April 30, 2003 in IS No. 01B-05485 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 30, 2001 Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila
finding probable cause against private respondent Artemio Torres, Jr. is REINSTATED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.[17]
Torres motion for reconsideration was denied,[18] hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari[19] on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE MTC-MANILA DATED 11 JUNE 2003
RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
65 FILED BY RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF REINSTATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
REINSTATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001
VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A CRIMINAL CASE IS
WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ONCE THE
INFORMATION HAS BEEN FILED THEREIN.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF A RESPONDENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN
DETERMINING IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OCP-MANILA HAS ABSOLUTE DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO INDICT THE PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND THE OFFICE OF A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT
OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DELIBERATE
DISREGARD OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHEN IT IGNORED THE FINAL
ORDER OF THE MTC-MANILA DATED 11 JUNE 2003 AND ORDERED THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL
2001.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING
WARRANTING THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER (sic) FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WHICH THEY FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
VIII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DISREGARD OF
SECTION 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHEN IT
ENTERTAINED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 FILED BY
RESPONDENTS.[20]

The foregoing assignment of errors may be summarized into three issues:
I. Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to
withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for
the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the
alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
II. Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping.
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice gravely
abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding
probable cause against petitioner.
Anent the first issue, Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the
information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.
Citing Baares II v. Balising,[21] Torres insists that an order dismissing a case without
prejudice is final if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to
dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The
order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon
reinvestigation.
On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days
after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order
achieves finality. In Baares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into
place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal.
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss.
Hence, Baares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to
withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on
provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such
provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
There is provisional dismissal[22] when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies
with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused;
and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the
filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on
provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case.
Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss,
we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw
Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor
without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that
the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117.
Respondent-spouses are not guilty of forum shopping. The cases they filed against
petitioner are based on distinct causes of action. Besides, a certificate of non-forum
shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. In People v. Ferrer,[23] we held that such certificate is not even necessary
in criminal cases and distinct causes of action.
Be that as it may, what is principally assailed is the Court of Appeals decision reversing the
resolution of the Justice Secretary and reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP
of Manila.
The issue, therefore, is whether the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
reversing the investigating prosecutors findings on the existence of probable cause.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines preliminary
investigation as an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The officers authorized to conduct a
preliminary investigation are the: (a) Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (b)
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts Judges; (c) National and Regional
state prosecutors; and (d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law.[24]
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial
function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of
ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits
and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It does not place the
person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
Generally, preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the prosecutor. However,
since there are not enough prosecutors, this function was also assigned to judges of
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Their findings are reviewed by the
provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of
Justice in appropriate cases. After conducting preliminary investigation, the investigating
judge must transmit within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the entire
records to the provincial or city prosecutor.[25]
In Crespo v. Mogul,[26] we underscored the cardinal principle that the public prosecutor
controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses whose resolutions may be reviewed
by the Secretary of Justice.[27] We held that where there is a clash of views between a judge
who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor
should normally prevail.[28]
We ruled in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[29] that when a motion to withdraw an information
is filed on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to independently assess the merits of the
motion. The judge is not bound by the resolution of the Justice Secretary but must evaluate
it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts.
In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the
conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. While
his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial court must at all times
make its own independent assessment of the merits of each case.
Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case
may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when
what was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale.[30] It ruled that the defenses raised by Torres
should not have been considered during the preliminary investigation but should be
threshed out only during trial.[31] Only the evidence presented by the complainant should
be considered in determining probable cause or the lack thereof.
We are not persuaded.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI
report[32] and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of
petitioner.
It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not
only requires the submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit
his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon
for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating prosecutor to certify
under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the
evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence.
Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer
shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting
evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and merits of a partys defense or
accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full
blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and
supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the
persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination must be based
on the totality of evidence presented by both parties.
Prescinding from these premises, we find that the Justice Secretary did not abuse his
discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused
in determining the existence or the lack of probable cause.
There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The complaint and the 1979 Deed
of Sale do not connect petitioner with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed
that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was the author
thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the alleged
forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of
such facts and circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical nexus
between the acts and omissions and the accused.
The allegation that petitioner effectuated the illicit transfer of the disputed properties in his
name is without factual basis. He was not in possession of the alleged forged deed which
does not even bore his signature. We find merit in his contention that the subject properties
were sold to him on March 10, 1991 considering that the new TCTs were issued in his name
only on March 26, 1991. His address mentioned in the 1979 Deed of Sale was non-existent
yet in 1979, thus giving the impression that it was executed on a later date. It would be
absurd for petitioner to use the 1979 Deed of Sale to facilitate the transfer on March 26,
1991 considering his possession of the March 10, 1991 Deed of Sale.
Respondents never denied the allegation that they assumed the obligation of transferring
the Tanza properties in petitioners name. Considering that they wanted to cancel the sale
and that they were in possession of the forged deed, it is not far-fetched to assume that
they facilitated the transfer of the properties using the allegedly 1979 forged deed. It
appears that the conveyance of the questioned properties in favor of petitioner was made
at the instance of the respondents.
Torres has no reason to falsify the 1979 Deed of Sale when he had in his possession the
1991 Deed of Sale which he claims to be authentic. By presenting the alleged forged deed
of sale, respondents cast a cloud of doubt on petitioners title. While motive is not reasonable
basis in determining probable cause, the absence thereof further obviates the probability
of petitioners guilt.
Besides, Nelia Aguinaldo admitted in her letter dated November 12, 1998 the sale of the
properties although she wanted the sale cancelled. This admission is consistent with
petitioners declaration that the sale took place.
In their complaint, respondents claimed that they discovered the alleged illegal conveyance
in November 2000.[33] This was, however, belied by their Adverse Claim dated December
18, 1999 which appeared as Entry No. 5856-115 and annotated on the new titles issued in
the name of Torres in February 2000.[34] In November 1998, Nelia was claiming her share
in the property that was sold by Torres to Porfirio and Yolanda Dones in 1993.[35]
In D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra,[36] grave abuse of discretion is defined:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His
findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa
in his separate opinion in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[37] declared that the determination
of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted
to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors. To do
otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official.

In Noblejas v. Salas,[38] we reaffirmed the power of supervision and control of the

department secretary over his subordinate. We stated that the power of control therein
contemplated means to alter, modify, or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Secretary
of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless,
false or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he
orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not
convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.

We also find that the trial court independently assessed the merits of the motion to withdraw
information. Before it was granted, respondents were allowed to submit their
opposition[39] and the petitioner to comment[40] thereon, which were both considered. The
trial judge also considered the basis of the Justice Secretarys resolution before finding that
no probable cause exists, thus:

The two DOJ Resolutions absolving the accused from incipient criminal liability were
premised on the ground that the herein accused had no participation in the preparation
of the alleged falsified Deed of Sale dated July 29, 1979, which deed, in effect, transferred
ownership of private complainants three parcels of land located in Tanza, Cavite to the
accused. This finding was based on the argument that it would be highly irregular for the
accused to effect the transfer of the property through a falsified deed when accused had
in his possession a valid and genuine Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1991 executed by the
spouses-complainants transferring ownership of the aforesaid property to him.

The court is inclined to grant the motion of the public prosecutor.

The issues which the court has to resolve in the instant case had been amply discussed
in the aforesaid resolutions of the DOJ and it is convinced that, indeed, no probable cause
exists against the accused.[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
22, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated
November 12, 2002 is REINSTATED. No costs.
JAIME U. GOSIACO Petitioner, - versus - LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173807 April 16, 2009
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by juridical persons
such as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules. Our rules of procedure
governing the litigation of criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22)
have given the appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and we take the
opportunity herein to assert the necessary clarifications.
Before us is a Rule 45 petition[1] which seeks the reversal of the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR No. 29488. The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68 in Criminal Case No. 120482. The RTC's decision
reversed the decision[4] of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58 in Criminal
Case No. 70445 which involved a charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondents
Leticia Ching (Ching) and Edwin Casta (Casta).
On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with
ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48
days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through
its Business Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks no.
0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00 respectively. The
checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch.
ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000, acknowledged that it owed petitioner the
abovementioned amounts.[5]
Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to
deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and
payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds.
Petitioner informed respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000,[6] about the
dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of the money
placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan against the private respondents.
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability and
claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have
knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks. Such responsibility, she claimed
belonged to another department.
On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved[7] that ASB and its president, Luke Roxas, be
impleaded as party defendants. Petitioner, then, paid the corresponding docket fees.
However, the MTC denied the motion as the case had already been submitted for final
decision.[8]
On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve her
from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was civilly liable
since she was a signatory to the checks.[9]
Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the RTC
on the ground that the MTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or severally liable
with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a reconsideration which was subsequently
denied. Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she should not be held
civilly liable for the bouncing checks because they were contractual obligations of ASB.
On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC affirmed
the MTCs ruling which denied the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for lack of jurisdiction
over their persons. The RTC also exonerated Ching from civil liability and ruled that the
subject obligation fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held civilly liable.[10]
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the RTC
erred in absolving Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal of the MTC to implead
ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate veil of ASB and hold Roxas liable.
On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that the
amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to ASB and not to Ching. Roxas
testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks issued by Ching were for and in behalf
of ASB. The Court of Appeals ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case
since it is not a natural person and in the case of Roxas, he was not the subject of a
preliminary investigation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no need to pierce
the corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites were present.[11]
Hence this petition.
Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) is a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check
civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22; (2) can a corporation be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case;
and (3) is there a basis to pierce the corporate veil of ASB?
B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity,
the person or persons, who actually signed the check in behalf
of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as
payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely
affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice
because it was deemed injurious to public interests[12] and was found to be
pernicious and inimical to public welfare.[13] B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the act of
making and issuing bouncing checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks which
is considered malum prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and
not an offense against property.[14] It penalizes the issuance of a check without
regard to its purpose. It covers all types of checks.[15] Even checks that were
issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the ambit of B.P.
Blg. 22.[16]
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held
personally liable for violating a penal statute.[17] The statute imposes criminal penalties on
anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or issues a check
on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check
on presentment.[18] Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on
the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground
that it was a corporate act and not his personal act.[19] As we held in Llamado v. Court of
Appeals:[20]
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the
check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same
in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of
Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall
be liable under this Act.
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only
be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the recent case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders
Inc.,[21] the Court ruled decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg.
22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined through this case to
revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes us to discharge Ching
of any civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case against her, on account of her acquittal
in the criminal charge.
We recognize though the bind entwining the petitioner. The records clearly show that it is
ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. In the various stages of this case, petitioner has been
proceeding from the premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB
itself for the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premise,
petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case, even if such case
is criminal in nature.[22]
What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to pursue a separate civil
action against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly the
provisions involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases, which state that:
Rule 111, Section 1Institution of criminal and civil action.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complainant or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section
2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.[23]
We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg.
22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the joint trial of
both the criminal and civil liability. A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the
interpretation of penal laws is strictly construed against the State and liberally construed
against the accused. Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be
impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in
the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.
Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations
against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure.
Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil
action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was
issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the
natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had
signed the bounced check.
In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check in
behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such
civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the
signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the
corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from the
corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the
amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was permissible to pursue
the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the
civil liability.
However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability
attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue
the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil obligationthe corporation itselfis
no longer that clear. In theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case
for B.P. Blg. 22 should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check,
since such implied institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the
corporation.
Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory
of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount
represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from
the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the
account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very
obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these be exempted from paying the filing fees based on the amount of the checks should he
civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the pursue the civil action against ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason, we likewise
singularity of the amount of each. find that petitioner should not be barred by prescription should he file the civil action as the
period should not run from the date the checks were issued but from the date this decision
If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil attains finality. The courts should not be bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[25]
signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action
against the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Jaime U.
that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the amount of
standards and merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine the subject checks, in accordance with the terms of this decision. No pronouncements as
whether or not the signatory had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of to costs.
funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain
whether or not the obligation itself Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the Committee on Revision of the Rules
is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed for the formulation of the formal rules of procedure to govern the civil action for
independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other. the recovery of the amount covered by the check against the juridical person
which issued it.
It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were made liable for the SO ORDERED.
amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case, such signatory would have the
option of recovering the same amount from the corporation. Yet that prospect does not
ultimately satisfy the ends of justice. If the signatory does not have sufficient assets to
answer for the amount of the checka distinct possibility considering the occasional large-
scale transactions engaged in by corporations the corporation would not be subsidiarily
liable to the complainant, even if it in truth the controversy, of which the criminal case is
just a part, is traceable to the original obligation of the corporation. While the Revised Penal
Code imposes subsidiary civil liability to corporations for criminal acts engaged in by their
employees in the discharge of their duties, said subsidiary liability applies only
to felonies,[24] and not to crimes penalized by special laws such as B.P. Blg. 22. And
nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability to the corporation in whose name
the check is actually issued. Clearly then, should the check signatory be unable to pay the
obligation incurred by the corporation, the complainant would be bereft of remedy unless
the right of action to collect on the liability of the corporation is recognized and given flesh.

There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be pursued
even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First, the possibility
that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case
and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that should not be
permitted. Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the amount of the
check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend with that possibility through this
case. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best we refer the matter to the Committee
on Rules for the formulation of proper guidelines to prevent that possibility.

The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the
civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress if the
plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based on the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and the civil action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option
to file two separate cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the
corporation could evidently be pursued through the civil action alone.

Nonetheless, in petitioners particular case, considering the previous legal confusion on

whether he is authorized to file the civil case against ASB, he should, as a matter of equity,
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section
23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his
possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline
substance, which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement,5praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea
of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial
of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified
by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later,
in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the
Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as
provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate
of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice
but to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It
was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118,
the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining.
It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the
law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only
possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by
case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No.
191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve
an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for
the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional
because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare
Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial
station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26,
2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING
IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends
that the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the
grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2)
the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3)
the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or
a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for
failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is
within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions,
We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions
despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In
discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not
shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have
broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our
young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign
against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in
the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who,
because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and
convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and
its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the
all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers
and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest
requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of
procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon.
Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for
in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose
that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."
Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent
with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.
In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme
Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953
which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only
this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt
on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case
with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that
the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court,
and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5
of its Article X provided:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of
the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is,
by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-
making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power
of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-
making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and
more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after
the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to
delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present
lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5
(5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the
Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon
this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify
any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We
have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions
of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section
27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule
14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal
fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14
of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1,
1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and
of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the
1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was
amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-
trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained,
Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a]
conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and
other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during
pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited
to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or
modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which
are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which
are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive
in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional
system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then
the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive
rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional
dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof,
so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time
limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is
hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of
time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not
take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing
right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused
to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment
of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies
the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme
Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal
cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects
include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in
which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct
even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition,
it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are
ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of
a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and
a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks
posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence
of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the
chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the
offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should
a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged
or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail
(except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled
to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by
trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers
to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party57and the prosecutor,
which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control
of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense,
not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The
reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely
simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis
the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the
decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether
to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a
plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-
trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only
basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on
record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said
motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well
as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that
the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must
disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of
plea is improper and irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the equal protection clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or
a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against
plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding
accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann Fideli L.
Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death for
each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.
The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO.Q-96-68119
"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN
FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime
of rape defined and penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal code, as amended by RA
7659, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday of Ann Fideli L.
Magat in Kasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs, and by means of threat and
violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat."[1]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120
"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN
FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LON DONIO, her father, of the crime
of rape defined and penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September1996, in Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with
lewd designs and by means of threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and
feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco
Magat."[2]
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for
a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public
prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea bargain. Consequently, the trial court issued,
on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads: katarungan
"On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano and
upon the request of the accused, the information was read and explained to him in tagalog,
a dialect known to him and after which accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the crime
charged against him, and further pleads for a lower penalty to which the Hon. Public
Prosecutor interpose no objection.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO LON DONIO MAGAT,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to
RA 7659 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment
for each case."[3]
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground
that the penalty imposed was "too light."[4]As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-
arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a plea of not guilty.[5]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida Daniel,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation and complainant's mother.
On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty.[6] The court read to him
the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he understood his
change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the consequences of
his plea.[7]
Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required the
taking of complainant's testimony. The accused-appellant did not present any evidence.
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which
reads: HTML
"CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTY of the crime of Rape in violation
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, beyond reasonable
doubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
1.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; and
2.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby
ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages
and another sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages.
SO ORDERED."[8]
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into
trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial court dated January
10,1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court rendered judgment
convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or took steps
to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having attained finality can no longer
be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later realizes that the penalty imposed was
too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit that the re-arraignment and trial on the same
information violated his right against double jeopardy.
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own
plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the plea
bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance
where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a
lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.- The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
 lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. CODES
"A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser
penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded
guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly
observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the
penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged,
accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally
his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him.[9] Hence, an accused may not
foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain
penalty will be meted unto him.[10]
Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court
should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of
guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is
equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before
judgment may be rendered.[11]
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the
simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.[12] Thus, since the
judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not
lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant was
rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did not
question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he is
deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same[13] and waived the errors in
procedure.[14]
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for setting
aside the Order of January 10,1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he made an
improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the procedure laid
down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court.[15] He claims that the record
of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it conducted a searching inquiry
to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with full
understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that there is no evidence that the
trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now
enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (c) to ask the accused
if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.[16]
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the
procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a plea of
guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind
of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there might
have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree
of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.[17] Apart from the circumstances
that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the
consequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is essential to the
fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from death sentences.[18]
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial judge
has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the
voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence of
the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not make
the procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings[19] indubitably show that the judge
read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked him
questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational
attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of his
plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to
the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked for
forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform.[20]
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming that
there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the conviction
of the accused-appellant.
The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:
"Complainant's x x x parents separated when she was only seven (7)
years old and she and her younger brother David were left with her father,
accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister, Abigail,
stayed with their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp.
38-41; 49-51).
"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when
she resisted, thus, she found it futile to resist every time her father
touched her after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
"August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while
sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in their rented
house at Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the kisses of
her father. He then removed her clothes and after removing his own
clothes, went on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina as he
had done to her many times before this incident. After he had finished,
he told her to wash her vagina which she did (TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).
"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was
at home with accused-appellant and her brother after 'selling' when her
father ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleep
but complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again,
accused-appellant raped her on the same bed where her brother was also
sleeping. She did not resist him anymore because nothing would happen
anyway and he would just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 21-25).
 "x x x complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused
but also physically abused by accused-appellant who even beat her with
a whip while being tied and struck her with a bag containing tin cans
causing head injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also
confirmed that her father started raping her on her 9th birthday which
was repeated several times after that. She likewise revealed that she felt
some fluid ('katas') coming out of her fathers penis every time he raped
her but she did not become pregnant because her father made her drink
the water from boiled guava leaves and a medicine she identified as
'Gextex' (should be Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In fact,
when her menstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, her father
even boxed her stomach after making her drink the water boiled from
guava leaves and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She was
not able to report or reveal what her father did to her because she was
warned by him that he would kill her, her brother, her mother and her
relatives if ever she would escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had
nowhere else to go and was further made to believe by her father that
there was nothing wrong with what he was doing to her because it was
not forbidden by the Bible."
The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of the NBI
testified that complainant had "lax fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which may be
caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis. She also
concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the conclusion that there
was more than one or even more than ten (10) times of sexual intercourse or penetration
of a hard blunt object that passed through her vaginal canal. Moreover, her hymen orifice
can allow complete penetration of an average-sized Filipino adult penis in its erect stage
which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in diameter.[21]
Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's
evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the in culpatory testimony of the complainant,
giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.
While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial court in
obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely whether or
not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made
loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is predicated not on the
plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense
charged.[22] In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant was sentenced to death
without having been previously informed of the nature of the charges against him and of
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is fully
apprised not only of the allegations in the information but of the entire evidence of the
prosecution.[23]
Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It
removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[24]
Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that the complainant was already nineteen (19)
years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.......when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim." (Underscoring supplied)
Complainant was born on August 14, 1977.[25] On September 1, 1996, when the rape was
committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already nineteen (19) years
of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penalty should be reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-96-
68119, complainant being only 17 years of age when accused-appellant, his father, raped
her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages claiming that
the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs.
Victor,[26] which was later reaffirmed in People vs. Prades,[27] that "if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00."[28] Accordingly, in Criminal Case NO.
Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same (P75,000.00). As
rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and shame suffered by
the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations overtime, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."[29] More so,
if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs.
Prades[30] held: Chiefx
" x x x The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that
under consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases
should be dispensed within criminal prosecution for rape with the civil
aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein
such allegations can be made.
"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by
 the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such
agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary
implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through
the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade."
Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An award of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our mind more reasonable. However, we are deleting
the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal basis therefor.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of
the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be
imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.......In Criminal Case No. Q - 96 - 68119, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court convicting accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio of
rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of compensatory
damages be increased to Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos (75,000.00),
moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
exemplary damages deleted. Esm
2.......In Criminal Case No. Q- 96-68120, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court convicting accused - appellant of rape and sentencing him to
the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages is increased to Seventy
- Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) , moral damages is reduced to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages is deleted.
In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning
power.