Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CHECKLIST
A. INTRODUCTION
I. THE RULE IN RYLANDS v FLETCHER [1866]
- Rylands v Fletcher [1866]
B. ELEMENTS (*ALL ELEMENTS MUST BE FULFILLED)
I. ACCUMULATION/INTENTIONAL STORAGE
- Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee & Anor [1957]
II. DANGEROUS THINGS/THING LIKELY TO CAUSE DAMAGE IF IT ESCAPES
- Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano [1921]
- Giles v Walker (1890)
- Pontardawe RDC v Moore-Gwyn [1929]
- Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd (1918)
III. ESCAPE
- Weng Lok Mining Co Ltd v Hiap Lee Brickmakers Ltd [1972]
- Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1946]
- Ponting v Noakes [1894]
- Midwood & Co Ltd v Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Manchaster [1905]
- Milik Perusahaan Sdn Bhd v Kembang Masyhur Sdn Bhd [2003]
IV. NON-NATURAL USE OF LAND
- Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board [1878
- Yat Yueng Hong Co Ltd v Sheridanlea & Anor [1963
- Abdul Rahman bin Che Ngah & Ors v Puteh bin Samat [1978]
- Hoon Wee Thim v Pacific Tin Consolidated Corporation [1966]
- Dr Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid & Anor v Jurusan Malaysia Consultants &
Ors [1997]
- British Celanese v AH Hunt [1969]
- Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004]
V. FORESEEABILITY OF DAMAGE
- Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994]
C. DEFENCES
I. CONSENT OF THE PLAINTIFF
- Sheikh Amin bin Salleh v Chop Hup Seng [1974]
II. COMMON BENEFIT
- Carstairs v Taylor [1871]
- Dunne v North Western Gas Board [1964]
III. ACT OF A 3RD PARTY
- Box v Jubb [1879]
- Rickards v Lothian [1913]
Ds themselves weren’t negligent and neither were they vicariously liable for the
negligence of their independent contractors but the HOL held them liable to P
Blackburn J:
“We think that the true of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings onto
his lands and collects and keeps anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it
in his peril, and if he does not do so, is prime facie answerable for all the damages which
is natural consequences of its escape.”
Lord Cairns approved this rule added: the rule only applied where D had used his
land for non-natural use
Case: Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee & Anor [1957]
Facts of the case:-
- P rented a shop house and lived on the 1st floor of the building
- The ground floor was sublet to the D, who was in the business of repairing &
distributing tyres
- D stored petrol for the purposes of his business D’s premises caught fire spread
to the 1st floor P’s wife & children died
Court held:-
D liable under the rule in Ryland v Fletcher petrol was a dangerous thing
In March, 1916, a private company formed by F. and P. for the purpose of acquiring
and carrying on the undertaking, entered into agreements with F. and P. for the sale to
the company, first, of the rights of the vendors under their agreement with the Minister
of Munitions, and secondly of the benefit of the tenancy agreement and of the buildings
erected by the vendors, completion to take place on payment of the consideration (which
was never paid). The vendors also agreed to allow the company to go into and remain in
occupation of the premises as tenants until the purchase consideration had been paid,
but until payment the company were to be deemed to be in possession of the premises,
machinery and plant as agents for the vendors. F. & P. never obtained the consent of the
landlords under the tenancy agreement to the assignment or parting with possession of
the premises. The company carried on the manufacture of explosives on the premises and
large quantities of D.N.P. were delivered at the factory by the Minister and were stored
there close to other inflammable materials, and as a result an explosion occurred which
Court held:-
1) That the company were liable on the principle of Fletcher v. Rylands (1866) L. R. 1 Ex.
265; (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330 for the damage caused by storing dangerous substances on
land of which they were in actual physical possession;
2) That F. and P. had not effectively divested themselves of the occupation which they
held under the tenancy agreement, and that they also were liable on the same principle
as occupiers.
SUMMARY
- X & Y set up a company Z Ltd operating as a factory
- The functions of Z Ltd was to perform a contract entered into by both X & Y with
another party manufacture explosives
- Z Ltd was a licensee Z Ltd was to manufacture the explosives on X & Y’s land
- A big explosion happened damaging neighbouring property & killed many people
Court held:-
1) Z Ltd liable as the licensee which had accumulated the thing
2) X & Y (as occupiers & landowners) were also liable for the escape of the thing
accumulated by their licensee the accumulation was a discharge of X and Y’s
contractual duty to another party
D ploughed his land but thereafter left it unattended thistles grew on the land
escaped to P’s land & seeded
Court held:-
- The thistles were natural growth of D’s land he couldn’t be found liable
- In cases like this liability maybe sought under tort of negligence & nuisance
If the occupier of the land hasn’t accumulated it & the escape was independent of D’s
conduct THE OCCUPIER WON’T BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE
ESCAPE OF A THING NATURALLY ON THE LAND
- Some rocks from D’s land fell onto P’s land due to changes in the weather
- D was held not liable as he didn’t accumulate the rocks
- The escape wasn’t caused by D’s act
- D used some explosives to blast some rocks on his lands some of the rocks fell onto
the land below & injured P
- The court found that although the rocks weren’t purposely collected/kept on the land,
the explosives were purposely collected & kept
- D was held liable for this deliberate accumulation which caused the escape of the rocks
and also because the way in which the injury was sustained (through rock-blasting)
held to be non-natural use of land
- It was the accumulation that gave rise to liability the explosives (if they escaped)
would likely to cause damage dangerous thing
- They’re deliberately collected & stored by D
- There’s an escape as the use of the explosives caused the rocks to fall away from D’s
land the damage was caused to P
- D ought to have foreseen that their rock-blasting activity may result in the escape of
rocks which may in turn cause damage
- If the thing that escapes is the dangerous thing itself liability is rather
straightforward
- If what escapes isn’t the dangerous thing itself but another object arising from the use
of the dangerous thing the occupier of the land may still be held liable provided the
escape occurs during a non-natural use of land
The rule is only applicable where the occupier brings, collects or keeps something on
his land
When something that is naturally on the land escapes & causes damage the
occupier won’t be liable unless:-
- He intentionally allows the escape to occur
OR
- The escape is foreseeable & yet D does nothing to prevent the probable escape
Case: Weng Lok Mining Co Ltd v Hiap Lee Brickmakers Ltd [1972]
Court held: Escape must be proven before the principle in Rylands v Fletcher is
applicable
An inspector of munitions was injured when a shell that was being manufactured at
D’s factory where she was employed, exploded & caused her substantial injuries
P’s horse reached its head into D’s land ate poisonous leaves of a yew tree which was
planted on D’s land
Court held: There’s no escape as the tree & it leaves didn’t extend beyond D’s boundary
P’s failed in his action
Case: Midwood & Co Ltd v Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Manchaster [1905]
Facts of the case:-
Ds were held liable when an explosion on their property caused inflammable gas to
escape into P’s house & set fire to P’s property
Case: Milik Perusahaan Sdn Bhd v Kembang Masyhur Sdn Bhd [2003]
Facts of the case:-
D was found liable when earthwork activities conducted on its land resulted in a
mudslide & considerable soil deposits were made on P’s adjoining (lower-level land)
P still required to prove either D himself/a person whose conduct he was answerable
has been negligent through act/omission
The negligence must have caused either the start of the fire/of its spreading to P’s
premises
Alternative – P may prove that D has caused/permitted to exist on his premises a
source of fire danger which constituted a material injury to P’s property
If there’s no escape of anything brought onto D’s land D could still be found liable
if P is able to prove (as laid down in Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v TNB
[1997] – following Musgrove v Pandelis [1919]):-
o D had brought onto their land things likely to catch fire, and kept them there in
such a condition that if they did ignite, the fire would be likely to spread to P’s land
o D had brought the things onto his land in the course of some non-natural use of
land
o The things had ignited & the fire spread
Cases:-
1. Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v TNB
2. Lee Kee v Gui See & Anor
Liability is imposed for the spread of fire if the spread was due to the default of D’s
servant, his guest & independent contractor
Liability will be excluded where the fire spread/occurred due to an act of nature/the
act of a stranger/trespasser over whom the D has no control
Liable – if he has knowledge about the fire though started by another party whom D
has no control
“It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others and must not
merely be ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of
the community.”
Lord Porter – Read v Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] all factors such as time, location and
the ordinary activities of mankind must be taken into consideration what is
dangerous/constitutes a non-natural use of land may differ in different circumstances
Court will consider public benefit of an activity but has to be weighed against the
extent of risk that arises from that activity
Courts will balance the probability of damage occurring + the seriousness of the
probable damage compared to the social benefit derived from the activity
Factors that will be taken into account by the courts:-
o The quantity of the thing
o The way in which it was stored
o The location of D’s land
Cases:-
CASE FACTS OF THE CASE
Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board D planted a yew tree on his land (yew
[1878] leaves are poisonous) branches & leaves
of the tree extended into P’s land P’s
horse died upon eating the leaves
P’S CONSENT
- The rule isn’t applicable to the escape of things brought/kept upon his premises by D with
the consent of P D isn’t liable except for negligence
- If P either expressly/impliedly consents to the existence of the dangerous thing & D isn’t
negligent in any way D isn’t liable for any escape & resulting damage
- Implied consent may be raised as a defence in cases where different floors of the same
building were occupied by different persons who are aware yet do not complain of any
activity conducted by any of them
- The accumulation of the thing was usual & not dangerous: P would be said to have
consented unless the occupiers weren’t aware of the fact of the accumulation
- The accumulation was unusual & dangerous: Doesn’t necessarily mean that P consented
to the consequences of any escape of that thing
Held:
(1) on the facts, it would seem clear that the only place where the fire could have
started was the defendant's oven;
(2) there was ample evidence in this case to show that the plaintiff assented to or
acquiesced in the use of the defendant's premises as a bakery with an oven therein
and therefore the defendants could not be held liable in damages under the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher;
(3) there was no evidence in this case that the defendants had caused or permitted to
exist on their premises a source of fire danger constituting a material injury to the
SUMMARY
- P owned a piece of land 8 terrace houses were built
- 4/8 houses were rented to D
- D used the rented premises for bakery purposes P KNOWS
- D’s negligence had caused fire all 8 houses were destroyed
- Court found that P consented in the use of D’s premises as a bakery
- P rented the ground floor of a factory from D (who occupied the floor above)
- Water from the roof was collected through gutters which were connected to a box
flowed into some pipes into the drain
- Rats had made holes in the box water dripped from it damaged P’s property
- D wasn’t negligent
- Court found that though the method was dangerous – D wasn’t liable the act was done
for the common benefit of both parties
Nichols vs Greenock
Nichols:
The flood was so great that it couldn’t
reasonably have been anticipated, and so
the escape of the water was an act of God
Greenock:
In collecting & damming up the water of a
stream, it had a duty to ensure that people
who were staying on lower ground
wouldn’t be injured/adversely affected as a
consequence of their activities
AG v Cory Brothers Ltd [1921] An artificial danger which escaped through
natural causes was no excuse to the person
who brought the artificial danger there in
the 1st place
Hoon Wee Thim v Pacific Tin Consolidated A heavy rainfall in a tropical country can’t
Corporation [1966] be held to be an act of God
1
CLA – Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67)
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
- Liability won’t be imposed on D who acts under the authority of a statute which excludes
liability for such acts
- If D was found to be careless in exercising his discretionary power LIABLE
- S.72(1)(a) – (j) Local Government Act 19762
2
Act 171