Beja. Sr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
97149 31 March before the Court for a petition for certiorari with
1992
FACTS:
Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports
authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later
on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On
October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A.
Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and
Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Consequently they were preventively suspended for the
charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by
the district attorney for region X, administrative case
no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of
merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative
case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for
dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and for being notoriously undesirable.
Beja was also placed under preventive suspension
pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was
redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-
89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for
appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the
case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence.
However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later,
he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to
suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-
AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the
certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the
motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the
dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.
ISSUE:
Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC
has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager
of the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of
DOTC.
RULING:
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority
who may, by himself and without the approval of the
PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension. His
disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of
PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting
the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against
officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the
issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the
petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505
dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers
of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of
Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority
Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council
the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the
authority and other personnel”. On December 23, 1975,
PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a)
thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which
would be attached to the then Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communication.
When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and
Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied
PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being
supervision and control and administrative supervision,
“Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and the
attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy
and program coordination”. An attached agency has a
larger measure of independence from the Department
to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral
relationship” between the Department and the
attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy
and program coordination.” With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an
attached agency from the department control and
supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that
even an agency under a Department’s administrative
supervision is free from Departmental interference with
respect to appointments and other personnel actions “
in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The
Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the
approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to
investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant
Manager who may be charged with an administrative
offense. During such investigation, the PPA General
Manager, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in
Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of
the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to
preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it
validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to
act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89. The
AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and
VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose
General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its
reinvestigation.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
vs. CA G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers
and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS
members from transacting business with the SSS; that
the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of
the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and
that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS
failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months
or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain
amounts from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System
(SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law
becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of
government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec.
1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil
service are denominated as "government employees"]
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 &
70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees
of the SSS was illegal.
Office of the Ombudsman, Petitioner vs Ramon Galicia,
Respondent. G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Galicia was a former public school teacher.
Based on the academic records which were part of his
201 file, he graduated from FEU with a degree in civil
engineering but failed to pass the board examinations
and has earned 18 units in education, evidenced by a
copy of a Transcript of Records from the Caloocan City
Polytechnic College. Likewise, he passed the Teachers
Professional Board Examination (TPBE) given on
November 22, 1987.
On December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then
Principal of the MBASHS, reviewed the 201 files of his
teaching staff and noticed that Galicia’s TOR was not an
original copy and required Galicia and other teachers
with similar records, to secure authenticated copies of
their TOR. All of the teachers complied except Galicia.
Yamsuan verified with the school the authenticity of
Galicia’s TOR and was informed that the said school had
no record of the said TOR, and more importantly, that
they had no records that Galicia took up 18 units of
education in SY 1985-1986.
Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-
complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Galicia stated that the
complaint was malicious and motivated by revenge.
Galicia stressed that the TOR he submitted was
authentic, as shown by the signature of then College
Registrar Rolando Labrador. He argued that the
certification from the present college registrar that
CCPC had no record of his TOR did not prove that the
document was spurious. Rather, it only proved that
CCPC’s filing system of scholastic records was
disorganized. Moreover, Galicia argued that the TPBE
was a highly specialized type of exam that could only be
passed if the examinee acquired academic units in
education. If he did not take up the said 18 units in
education, then he could not have possibly passed the
TPBE.
During the preliminary conference, Galicia presented
for comparison the original of the TOR and Certificate of
Grades (COG), as well as the original copies of the other
documents in his 201 file. A subpoena duces tecum was
subsequently served upon Prof. Marilyn T. De Jesus,
Registrar of CCPC, for the purpose of certifying the
authenticity of Galicia’s school records. De Jesus
declined to certify the documents because no copies
were on file in the school.
Subsequently, the Ombudsman found Galicia guilty of
Dishonesty for which the penalty of Dismissal From the
Service, Forfeiture of Leave Credits and Retirement
Benefits and Temporary Disqualification for Re-
employment in the Government Service for a period of
One (1) Year was imposed.
Galicia filed a motion for reconsideration and raised the
issue of jurisdiction for the first time. He argued that it
is not the Ombudsman, but the Department of
Education, through the School Superintendent, which
has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public
school teachers, as mandated by RA 4670, (Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers).
Galicia further challenged the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman by invoking Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 or
the Ombudsman Act which enumerates the instances
when the Ombudsman may not conduct an
administrative investigation:
1) Complainant has an adequate remedy in another
judicial or quasi-judicial body;
2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;
3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made
in bad faith;
4) Complainant has no sufficient personal interest in
the subject matter of the grievance; or
5) The complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
According to Galicia, all of the above conditions were
present in the case filed against him. An adequate
remedy existed in the Office of the Secretary of
Education; the matter was outside the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman; the complaint was made in bad faith;
and complainant Yamsuan had no sufficient personal
interest in the matter.
Lastly, Galicia claimed that the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction since the complaint was filed only in 2002,
thirteen (13) years from the time he allegedly
committed the dishonest act in 1989. According to him,
this violated Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770, which
mandated that all complaints must be filed within one
year from the occurrence of the act charged.
The Ombudsman denied Galicia’s motion for
reconsideration. It declared that the Ombudsman’s
disciplining authority extended the School
Superintendent over administrative cases against public
school teachers. Galicia elevated the case to the CA.
On January 20, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the Ombudsman holding that jurisdiction
over public school teachers belonged to the School
Superintendent as mandated by R.A. No. 4670.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in nullifying the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman on alleged jurisdictional
infirmity?
Ruling:
Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states
that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, xxx”. Under Section 13,
Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct
investigations on its own or upon complaint by any
person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers
to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against
erring public officials and employees.
And Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act grants the
ombudsman the power to “Investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases.” While
Section 19 of the Act enumerates the types of acts
covered by the authority granted to the Ombudsman. In
the exercise of its duties, the Ombudsman is given full
administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not
limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or
recommending penalties. He is to conduct
investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and
require production of evidence and place respondents
under preventive suspension. This includes the power
to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or
employee.
A review of the Ombudsman Act and the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers reveals an apparent
overlapping of jurisdiction over administrative cases
against public school teachers.
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
grants jurisdiction over erring public school teachers to
an Investigating Committee headed by the Division
School Superintendent which reads: “SEC. 9.
Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against
a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent
of the Division or a duly authorized representative x x
x”.
Galicia argues that jurisdiction exclusively belongs to
the investigating committee on the main thesis that the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is a special law
which should take precedence over the Ombudsman
Act, a general law. The Ombudsman maintains that
jurisdiction among the two bodies is concurrent since
there is no express repeal in either of the laws that
would oust the Ombudsman from its authority over
public school teachers.
By virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
original jurisdiction belongs to the school
superintendent. The intention of the law, which is to
impose a separate standard and procedural
requirement for administrative cases involving public
school teachers, must be given consideration. Hence,
the Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the
Division School Superintendent. Even in the earlier case
of Alcala v. Villar, the Court held that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, respondent is estopped from attacking the proceedings
provides that the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary before the CSC.
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the In the present case, records show that Galicia was given
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and the right to due process in the investigation of the
agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local charges against him. He participated in the proceedings
government, government-owned or controlled by making known his defenses in the pleadings that he
corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials submitted. It was only when a decision adverse to him
who may be removed by impeachment or over was rendered did he question the jurisdiction of the
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. However, in Ombudsman.
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A. No. Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule
4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, that it is now too late for Galicia to assail the
specifically covers and governs administrative administrative investigation conducted and the decision
proceedings involving public school teachers. x x x rendered against him.
(Emphasis supplied)
Be that as it may, We hold here that the Ombudsman’s
exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
The CA was in error in relying on Alcala, without taking
into consideration the cases full import. In Alcala, the
Court, while recognizing the jurisdiction of the School
Superintendent, nonetheless upheld the decision of the
Ombudsman on the rationale that the parties were
afforded their right to due process during the
investigation proceedings. Respondent in the Alcala
case was given sufficient opportunity to be heard and
submit his defenses to the charges made against him.
Thus, he is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman after an adverse decision was
promulgated.
In the same manner, the recent Estandarte case
recognized similar circumstances cited in Emin v. De
Leon. In De Leon, it was found that the parties were
afforded their right to due process when both fully
participated in the proceedings before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The Court ruled that while
jurisdiction lies with the School Superintendent,