Chua v.

Villanueva

Courts; Jurisdictions; Tariff and Customs Code; Searches and Seizures; Forfeiture Proceedings; Regional
Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with
these proceedings; The Collector of Customs sitting in the seizure and forfeiture proceedings has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of
dutiable goods.—Jurisdiction over the instant case is well-settled by law and jurisprudence. The Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines under Section 602 provides: SECTION 602. Functions of the
Bureau.—The general duties, powers and jurisdiction of the Bureau shall include: . . . (g) Exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and customs laws.
(Emphasis ours.) The most recent case of R.V. Marzan v. Court of Appeals, citing Jao v. Court of Appeals,
laid down the following jurisprudence: In Jao v. Court of Appeals (249 SCRA 35), we held that the RTC is
devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs, and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with the said proceedings
even if the seizure was illegal. Such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
Thus, we held: There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass
upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Customs sitting in seizure and
forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming
cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It is
likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No.
1125, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals,” specify the proper
fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these
proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs,
whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from there to the Court of Appeals. Chua, Jr. vs. Villanueva, 478 SCRA 264, G.R. No. 157591 December
16, 2005

COC v. Agtha

Obligations; Foreign Currencies; The rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should
be the prevailing rate at the time of payment.—The Court agrees with the ruling of the CTA that AGFHA
is entitled to recover the value of its lost shipment based on the acquisition cost at the time of payment.
In the case of C.F. Sharp and Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 381 SCRA 314 (2002). the Court ruled
that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the
time of payment. Commissioner of Customs vs. AGFHA Incorporated, 646 SCRA 530, G.R. No. 187425
March 28, 2011
As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in
the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in
failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods’ disappearance, considering that they were in its
custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation. The situation does not allow us to reject
respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine
must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage
of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. Commissioner of Customs vs. AGFHA Incorporated,
646 SCRA 530, G.R. No. 187425 March 28, 2011

Note.—There is no legal impediment to having obligations or transactions paid in a foreign currency as

long as the parties agree to such an arrangement. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 494 SCRA 25 (2006)) Commissioner of Customs vs. AGFHA Incorporated, 646 SCRA 530, G.R.
No. 187425 March 28, 2011

Chevron v. COC

Taxation; Tariff and Customs Code (TCC); Under Section 1301 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC),
imported articles must be entered within a non-extendible period of 30 days from the date of discharge
of the last package from a vessel, otherwise, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) will deem the imported
goods impliedly abandoned under Section 1801.—Under Section 1301 of the TCC, imported articles
must be entered within a non-extendible period of 30 days from the date of discharge of the last
package from a vessel. Otherwise, the BOC will deem the imported goods impliedly abandoned under
Section 1801. Thus: Section 1301. Persons Authorized to Make Import Entry.—Imported articles must be
entered in the customhouse at the port of entry within thirty (30) days, which shall not be extendible
from date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft either (a) by the importer, Chevron
Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No. 178759 August 11,
2008 being holder of the bill of lading, (b) by a duly licensed customs broker acting under authority from
a holder of the bill or (c) by a person duly empowered to act as agent or attorney-in-fact for each holder:
Provided, That where the entry is filed by a party other than the importer, said importer shall himself be
required to declare under oath and under the penalties of falsification or perjury that the declarations
and statements contained in the entry are true and correct: Provided, further, That such statements
under oath shall constitute prima facie evidence of knowledge and consent of the importer of violation
against applicable provisions of this Code when the importation is found to be unlawful. (Emphasis
supplied) Section 1801. Abandonment, Kinds and Effect of.—An imported article is deemed abandoned
under any of the following circumstances: x x x x x x x x x b. When the owner, importer, consignee or
interested party after due notice, fails to file an entry within thirty (30) days, which shall not be
extendible, from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft, or having filed such
entry, fails to claim his importation within fifteen (15) days, which shall not likewise be extendible, from
the date of posting of the notice to claim such importation. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “entry” in customs law has a triple meaning—it means (1)
the documents filed at the customs house; (2) the submission and acceptance of the documents; and (3)
the procedure of passing goods through the customs house; Clearly, the operative act that constitutes
“entry” of the imported articles at the port of entry is the filing and acceptance of the “specified entry
form” together with the other documents required by law and regulations.—The term “entry” in
customs law has a triple meaning. It means (1) the documents filed at the customs house; (2) the
submission and acceptance of the documents; and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the
customs house. The IED serves as basis for the payment of advance duties on importations whereas the
IEIRD evidences the final payment of duties and taxes. The question is: was the filing of the IED sufficient
to constitute “entry” under the TCC? The law itself, in Section 205, defines the meaning of the technical
term “entered” as used in the TCC: Section 205. Entry, or Withdrawal from Warehouse, for
Consumption.—Imported articles shall be deemed “entered” in the Philippines for consumption when
the specified entry form is properly filed and accepted, together with any related documents regained
by the Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No.
178759 August 11, 2008 provisions of this Code and/or regulations to be filed with such form at the time
of entry, at the port or station by the customs official designated to receive such entry papers and any
duties, taxes, fees and/or other lawful charges required to be paid at the time of making such entry have
been paid or secured to be paid with the customs official designated to receive such monies, provided
that the article has previously arrived within the limits of the port of entry. x x x x x x x x x (Emphasis
supplied) Clearly, the operative act that constitutes “entry” of the imported articles at the port of entry
is the filing and acceptance of the “specified entry form” together with the other documents required by
law and regulations. There is no dispute that the “specified entry form” refers to the IEIRD. Section 205
defines the precise moment when the imported articles are deemed “entered.”

Same; Same; Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public revenue
which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been ordained to perform for the
welfare of its constituents; Under the relevant provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC), both the
Import Entry Declaration (IED) and Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD) should be filed
within 30 days from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft.—Taxes are the
lifeblood of the nation. Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public
revenue which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been ordained to perform for
the welfare of its constituents. Hence, their prompt and certain availability is an imperative need and
they must be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Clearly, and perhaps for that reason alone, the
submission of the IEIRD cannot be left to the exclusive discretion or whim of the importer. We hold,
therefore, that under the relevant provisions of the TCC, both the IED and IEIRD should be filed within
30 days from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft. As a result, the
position of petitioner, that the import entry to be filed within the 30-day period refers to the IED and
not the IEIRD, has no legal basis.
Same; Same; Fraud; Words and Phrases; Fraud, in its general sense, “is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in the Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No. 178759 August 11, 2008 damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another.”—Fraud, in its
general sense, “is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
the damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another.” It is a
question of fact and the circumstances constituting it must be alleged and proved in the court below.
The finding of the lower court as to the existence or non-existence of fraud is final and cannot be
reviewed here unless clearly shown to be erroneous. In this case, fraud was established by the IPD-CIIS
of the BOC. Both the CTA First Division and en banc agreed completely with this finding.

Same; Same; Same; Where there is fraud, the prescriptive period of the finality of the liquidation under
Section 1603 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) is inapplicable.—Due to the presence of fraud, the
prescriptive period of the finality of liquidation under Section 1603 was inapplicable: Section 1603.
Finality of Liquidation.—When articles have been entered and passed free of duty or final adjustments
of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and passage free of duty or settlements of duties
will, after the expiration of one (1) year, from the date of the final payment of duties, in the absence of
fraud or protest or compliance audit pursuant to the provisions of this Code, be final and conclusive
upon all parties, unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely tentative.

Same; Same; From the wording of the amendment, RA 7651 no longer requires that there be other acts
or omissions where an intent to abandon can be inferred—it is enough that the importer fails to file the
required import entries within the reglementary period.—From the wording of the amendment, RA
7651 no longer requires that there be other acts or omissions where an intent to abandon can be
inferred. It is enough that the importer fails to file the required import entries within the reglementary
period. The lawmakers could have easily retained the words used in the old law (with respect to the
intention to abandon) but opted to omit them. It would be error on our part to continue applying the
old law despite the clear changes introduced by the amendment. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No. 178759 August 11, 2008 Same; Same;
Due Process; Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, due notice was not necessary; The
minutes of the deliberations in the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means on the
proposed amendment to Section 1801 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) show that the phrase “after
due notice” was intended for owners, consignees, importers of the shipments who live in rural areas or
distant places far from the port where the shipments are discharged, who are unfamiliar with customs
procedures and need the help and advice of people on how to file an entry.—Under the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case, due notice was not necessary. The shipments arrived in 1996. The IEDs
and IEIRDs were also filed in 1996. However, respondent discovered the fraud which attended the
importations and their subsequent release from the BOC’s custody only in 1999. Obviously, the situation
here was not an ordinary case of abandonment wherein the importer merely decided not to claim its
importations. Fraud was established against petitioner; it colluded with the former District Collector.
Because of this, the scheme was concealed from respondent. The government was unable to protect
itself until the plot was uncovered. The government cannot be crippled by the malfeasance of its
officials and employees. Consequently, it was impossible for respondent to comply with the
requirements under the rules. By the time respondent learned of the anomaly, the entries had already
been belatedly filed and the oil importations released and presumably used or sold. It was a fait
accompli. Under such circumstances, it would have been against all logic to require respondent to still
post an “urgent notice to file entry” before declaring the shipments abandoned. The minutes of the
deliberations in the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means on the proposed
amendment to Section 1801 of the TCC show that the phrase “after due notice” was intended for
owners, consignees, importers of the shipments who live in rural areas or distant places far from the
port where the shipments are discharged, who are unfamiliar with customs procedures and need the
help and advice of people on how to file an entry.

Same; Same; An abandoned imported article shall ipso facto be deemed the property of the
Government.—Section 1802 of the TCC provides: Sec. 1802. Abandonment of Imported Articles.—An
abandoned article shall ipso facto be deemed the property of the Government and shall be disposed of
in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied) The term “ipso facto” is Chevron
Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No. 178759 August 11,
2008defined as “by the very act itself” or “by mere act.” Probably a closer translation of the Latin term
would be “by the fact itself.” Thus, there was no need for any affirmative act on the part of the
government with respect to the abandoned imported articles since the law itself provides that the
abandoned articles shall ipso facto be deemed the property of the government. Ownership over the
abandoned importation was transferred to the government by operation of law under Section 1802 of
the TCC, as amended by RA 7651. A historical review of the pertinent provisions of the TCC dispels any
view that is contrary to the automatic transfer of ownership of the abandoned articles to the
government by the mere fact of an importer’s failure to file the required entries within the mandated
period.

Same; Judicial Review; The constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force
of law cannot be attacked collaterally—there is a legal presumption of validity of these laws and rules,
and unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.—
Petitioner claims it is arbitrary, harsh and confiscatory to deprive importers of their property rights just
because of their failure to timely file the IEIRD. In effect, petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of
Sections 1801 and 1802 by contending that said provisions are violative of substantive and procedural
due process. We disallow this collateral attack on a presumably valid law: We have ruled time and again
that the constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law cannot be
attacked collaterally. There is a legal presumption of validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule
is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands. Besides, [a] law is deemed
valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x
x The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.

Same; Court of Tax Appeals (CTA); By the very nature of its functions, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) is a
highly specialized court specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax and customs cases—as a
general rule, its findings and conclusions are accorded great respect and are generally upheld by the
Supreme Court.—By the very nature of its functions, the CTA is a highly specialized court Chevron
Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No. 178759 August 11,
2008specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax and customs cases. It is dedicated exclusively
to the study and consideration of revenue-related problems and has necessarily developed an expertise
on the subject. Thus, as a general rule, its findings and conclusions are accorded great respect and are
generally upheld by this Court, unless there is a clear showing of a reversible error or an improvident
exercise of authority. There is no such showing here. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710, G.R. No. 178759 August 11, 2008

COC v. Marina

Appeals; Court of Tax Appeals; Motion for Reconsideration; Before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En
Banc could take cognizance of the petition for review concerning a case falling under its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction, the litigant must sufficiently show that it sought prior reconsideration or moved
for a new trial with the concerned Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) division.—On the procedure, the Court
agrees with the CTA En Banc that the Commissioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of
Rule 8, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals requiring that “the petition for review
of a decision or resolution of the Court in Division must be preceded by the filing of a timely motion for
reconsideration or new trial with the Division.” The word “must” clearly indicates the mandatory—not
merely directory—nature of a requirement.”

Same; Same.—The rules are clear. Before the CTA En Banc could take cognizance of the petition for
review concerning a case falling under its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the litigant must sufficiently
show that it sought prior reconsideration or moved for a new trial with the concerned CTA division.
Procedural rules are not to be trifled with or be excused simply because their non-compliance may have
resulted in prejudicing a party’s substantive rights. Rules are meant to be followed. They may be relaxed
only for very exigent and persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate to his
careless non-observance of the prescribed rules. Commisioner of Customs vs. Marina Sales, Inc., 635
SCRA 606, G.R. No. 183868 November 22, 2010

MV Don Martin v. Sec. of Finance

Mitsubishi Motors v. BOC

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous
belief of the court that it exists.—Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear,
try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the
case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any
or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

Taxation; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—The
CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC. In the
instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any action
on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Therefore,
the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the guise of
furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be corrected. In
Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8 (2013), the Court held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a
magic wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Corporations vs. Bureau of Customs, 759 SCRA 306, G.R. No. 209830 June 17, 2015

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period set by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect
an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.—In
view of respondent’s availment of a wrong mode of appeal via notice of appeal stating that it was
elevating the case to the CA — instead of appealing by way of a petition for review to the CTA within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the RTC’s August 3, 2012 Order, as required by Section 11 of RA
1125, as amended by Section 9 of RA 9282 — the Court is constrained to deem the RTC’s dismissal of
respondent’s collection case against petitioner final and executory. It is settled that the perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well,
and that failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from
final and executory. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporations vs. Bureau of Customs, 759 SCRA 306,
G.R. No. 209830 June 17, 2015