THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE Sayo vs.

Chief of Police
TAMPARONG, ET AL., defendants-appellants Detainee (D) vs. Arresting Authorities (P)
No. 9527. August 23, 1915Ponente: J. Trent GR L-2128, , May 12, 1948 (80 Phil. 859)

FACTS Summary:Two suspects of a robbery were arrested upon a

Defendants were convicted for having played the game of
chance called “Monte,” in violation of Ordinance No. 35
Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, where
they were again tried andconvicted upon the same charge
Defendants raised their appeal to the Supreme Court which
ONLY
allowed to hear the caseon the grounds that the validity of
Ordinance No. 35 was in questionISSUE/s1.
Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid2.
Whether or not the Supreme Court is required under the law
to examine the evidence forthe purpose of determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendantsHOLDING/s1.
Yes, Ordinance No. 35 is valid.2.
No. Although the SC wrote that Act No. 1627 does not
explicitly limit their powers fromexamining issues of facts, it
likewise does not expressly authorize them to do so. The
SC,nevertheless, interpreted that the law was NOT framed
to confer them the said power.RATIO/s1.
complaint of another person.
Rule of Law:Under the constitution, no person may be
deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after
examination of the complainant and his witness.
Facts:Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging
Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin Mostero (D) with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a
policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the Sayo (D) and
Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them with
the fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for habeas
corpuswas heard, the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D) were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed charges against them with the proper courts
justice.
Issues:Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Ruling:No. Under the constitution, no person may be
deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after
examination of the complainant and his witness.

For the issue at hand, the SC merely wrote, “The first
question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the
case of the United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. 01). The cases
are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the
case is unnecessary.” Nothingmore.
2.1 The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the intention
of the “framers” of the amended section of Act No. 1627; the
latter being ambiguous in the sense that it did not
explicitlyallow nor prohibit SC to examine issues of facts on
appeals. The SC found, in light of formerpractices and from
further understanding the circumstances in which the
framers of theamended law were subject to, that the
amendment was not meant to confer in them the jurisdiction
of reviewing questions of fact .
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person
without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or
anyother person, except in those cases expressly authorized
by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is
to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other
political subdivisions. A fortioria police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged

2.2 The SC further distinguished their holding from

Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees,and Boise Artesian
Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. These two latter
cases weretaken to the US SC directly from the circuit courts
as writs of error , (not as appeals) wherthe US SC does not
only have jurisdiction to review constitutional questions but
also everyother question properly arising.2.3

In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that the

ruling for this issue in the last10 years has remained uniform.
And that the court, since its organization, never held that
ithad the power to review facts touching guilt of an accused
person, ONLY as to when theappeal involved the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of
amunicipal or township ordinance.

Digester‟s Notes:

SCRA was 14 pages long and about 12 pages were

exhausted to explain holding for the 2nd issue

The SCRA made no attempt to expound on Ordinance No.

35 and “monte” and therefore led the digester to believe that
they were of little issue to the case‟s facts
Arsenia Garcia vs Court of Appeals
484 SCRA 617 – Criminal Law – Felonies – Mala In Se vs
Mala Prohibita Crimes – Defense of Good Faith
In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial
elections.
Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was
one of the designated election officers. Garcia was accused
by Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Pimentel alleged that Garcia decreased Pimentel’s vote by
5,000 votes.
The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia
invoked that the trial court erred in ruling that her defense of
good faith was not properly appreciated. She averred that
due to the workload given to her during said elections, she
got fatigued and that caused the error in the tabulation of
Pimentel’s votes.
Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special
law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and therefore, good
faith is not a defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the
Electoral Reforms Law is a malum prohibitum.
HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those
felonies in violation of the Revised Penal Code. However, it
must be noted that mala in se are crimes which are
inherently immoral. Hence, even if the crime is punished by
a special law, if it is inherently immoral, then it is still a crime
mala in se.
In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law
is a mala in se crime because it is inherently immoral to
decrease the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is
being punished is the intentional decreasing of a candidate’s
votes and not those arising from errors and mistakes. Since
a violation of this special law is a malum in se, good faith can
be raised as a defense.
However, Garcia’s defense of good faith was not proven.
Facts show that the decreasing of Pimentel’s vote was not
due to error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly
handled certain duties which were not supposed to be hers
to perform. That’s a clear sign that she facilitated the
erroneous entry.
US vs. Macasaet
May 08, 2014
US vs. Macasaet
11 Phil 447
Issue: WON penalties of the violation of Sec 66 of the
internal revenue law be applicable to the case of Agrapino
Macasaet
Facts: In the September 1907, the accused Agrapino
Macasaet had been selling native wine at retail without
necessary license. The said act was a violation of the Sec
66, in relation to sec 68, subsection 5 of the Internal
Revenue Law. The accused, as he appealed following the
judgement of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which
was payment of the fine amounting to 300Php and
imprisonment for five months, felt that the said penalty of
imprisonment was illegal. The said judgement of the Court of
First instance of Batangas was based on the punishment
prescribe on the provision of Act No. 1732, sec 1 of Internal
revenue law that stipulates that “ a fine is imposed as a
whole or any part of the punishment for any criminal offense
made punishable by any act or acts of the Philippine
commission, the court shall also sentence the guilty person
to suffer subsidiary the imprisonment until the fine is
satisfied” which took effect on November of the same year
as the trial.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled, with the basis that penal
statutes cannot be made retroactive and based on the facts
that the effectivity of the penal statute exemplified in the
provision of art. No. 1732 was in November of 1970 and that
the trial of the accused started prior to the said effectivity,
affirmed to the appeal of eradicating imprisonment of five
months as part of the penalty of his violation. The
judgement, thus, be limited to the fine and costs.
Disposition: Judgement modified.
PEOPLE v. CRISANTO TAMAYO,
GR No. 41423, 1935-03-19
Facts:
convicted... iolation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5,
series of 1932, of said municipality... vi... conviction...
resulted and a fine was imposed
From that decision this appeal was brought
Issues:
While this appeal was pending, the municipal council
repealed section 2 in question... ct complained of,... is now
legal in that municipality
Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against
him on account of that repeal.
But not a single sentence in either decision indicates that
there was any desire to hold that a person could be
prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no longer
criminal.
Ruling:
such conduct,... is no longer deemed criminal,... it would
be... illogical for this court to attempt to sentence appellant
for an offense that no longer exists... proceedings1 against
appellant must be dismissed.
Principles:
In the leading cases... would not destroy criminal... liability
Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but
even in Spain, where the... offense ceases to be criminal,
prosecution cannot be had.
US v. CUNA / GR No. L-4504 / December 15, 1908
FACTS:Cuna, on June 30, 1907, sold opium to Apolinanaria
Gumpal, Filipina, who was not a doctor or a registered user
of the drug. He was charged in violation of Sec. 5 of Act No.
1461 of the Philippine Commission.Cuna demurred on the
ground that the said act was repealed by Act no. 1761 on
October 10, 1907 and because having repealed during the
pendency of the case with no exception regarding the
pendency, there was no law in force thus no jurisdiction of
any courts.The trial court dismissed the case. The
Government appealed and argued that both Acts penalizes
the same crime and should not be construed as having the
courts deprive Cuna of trial.
ISSUE: Whether Cuna, who committed the crime before the
repeal, should be convicted.
RULING:The trial court cited the American and English
common-law doctrine in their decision. The Supreme Court
(SC), although they consider it right, said that those laws
were not in force in the country.The SC said that no
retroactive effect of the law shall take effect except when the
punishment will be more favorable to the accused. Being
that the new law penalized the same act in the repealed law,
there is no retroactivity. The old law should still be
prescribed.The SC decided that the Courts have jurisdiction
over the case. The decision of the trial court was reversed.
TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA, complainant-appellee,
vs. VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-922 November 8, 1902
Nature of the Action: An appeal from decision of lower court
Facts: Defendant was the editor of “Miau“, a periodical
published and circulated in Manila, which later published an
article containing an alleged injurious matter. Thereafter,
defendant was found guilty of the offense “injurias graves” of
Articles 457 and 458 of the Penal Code. Meanwhile,
subsequent to the article’s publication, Act No. 277 was
enacted “defining the law of libel”, and reforming the pre-
existing Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injurias.
Section 13 of the same act provided that laws which may be
in conflict with said act are deemed repealed; provided that it
shall not apply to laws which are applicable to pending
actions or existing causes of action. An appeal was filed
claiming that the punishment for defendant should be that as
stated in Act 277.
Issue: Did the lower court erred in applying the punishment?
Ruling: In view of all the circumstances of the case we fix the
penalty as four years of destierro and a fine of 4,000
pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day’s banishment for
every 12 ½ pesetas not paid, and the costs of both
instances. The judgment of the court below will be modified
in accordance with this opinion, and the record will be
returned to that court for the execution of the sentence as
thus modified.
Ratio Decidendi: Yes. The Supreme Court held that since
Act No. 277 explicitly stated its inapplicability, the said act
cannot be applied to the present case; that the act is left
intact in all its parts as respects pending actions or existing
causes of action. Thus, the punishment must be determined
exclusively by the provisions of the former law.
People vs. Sindiong and Pastor
October 25, 2017LEGIStrata
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T.
PASTOR, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-335 February 12, 1947
Nature of the Action: An appeal from the decision of the trial
court
Facts: Defendants were charged of violating Sections 1458
and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code, having
deliberately evaded paying the percentage tax while being
owners of ‘Magazine Center’, an establishment devoted to
selling newspapers from 1936 to 1938. However, defendant
Sindiong countered that the law accused of him were
repealed by CA Nos. 466 and 503, which were in force in
1939, and which excluded Sindiong’s business from the
requirement of paying taxes.
Issue: Can defendants be charged against a law that has
been repealed?
Ruling: Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the
order appealed from be, as it is hereby, affirmed with costs
de officio.
Ratio: No. The Supreme Court held that upon the enactment
of the National Internal Revenue Code (CA 466 and 503),
the defendants ceased to be bound in paying taxes. The
prevailing doctrine is that where the repealing law wholly
fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries
with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the
old law prior to the repeal.

Pp. vs. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410
People v. Almuete
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976
FACTS:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and
Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the
information that the accused being tenants of Margarita
Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her
consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests
of five cavans of palay each to her damage.
The lower held that the information is basically deficient
because it does not describe the circumstances under which
the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the
accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon
for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that
the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten
percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-
threshing without notice to the landlord is punishable
pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.
HELD:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing
found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954
is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy
system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the
harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself
also ceases). applies to this case.
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared
agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary
to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural
leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire
country "as a land reform area".
US vs. Taylor
October 25, 2017LEGIStrata
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARSON
TAYLOR, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-9726 December 8, 1914
Nature of the Action: An appeal for criminal libel
Facts: Defendant, as alleged, was then and there the acting
editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher of
Manila Daily Bulletin, a paper of large circulation edited in
English and Spanish. Thereafter, an article against one Atty.
Ramon Sotelo was published in said newspaper which
implicated that there had been conspiracy and fraud
between said attorney and owner of the burnt building so as
to collect insurance. Atty. Sotelo further contended that the
article was of a certain false and malicious defamation and
libel. The CFI agreed to Atty. Sotelo; hence, this appeal.
Issue: Did the lower court erred in ruling that the defendant
was criminally liable?
Ruling: For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no
proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant was
the “author, the editor, or the proprietor” of the newspaper in
question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed,
the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from
the custody of the law, with costs de officio.
Ratio Decidendi: Yes; explained by the Supreme Court,
common law crimes do not exist in the Philippine islands.
Thus, an act does not constitute a crime when no law makes
it so. In the instant case, although libel is made a crime, the
defendant is not the author, editor, or proprietor of the said
newspaper—instead, only its manager. Neither does the
proof show in the record that the manager played a part in
the publication of the article.

The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act

of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian
Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is
the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-
threshing.

As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-

threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense
under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an
offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian
Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of
Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or
abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would
subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore
pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.
US v. Antonio Abad Santos THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH
6 Phil 243 ELKANISH

FACTS:
Abad Santos, the appellant was charged of violating the
provision in InternalRevenue Law which states that it shall
keep a day book in which one shouldenter in detail the
amount of money received in the conduct of the
business(Circular No. 467 issued by collector of Internal
RevenuE) Violation of anyprovisions of IRL or any lawful
regulation of BIR is stated in Sec 185 of RA 2339 of Admin
Code). The appellant owns a printing establishment called
/he 01celsior therefore isbound to the circular that was
issued! It was charged in the information thatit failed to make
an entry for Jan 5 1915 and therefore violated the
saidregulation! Appellant employed a bookkeeper that is said
to be in-charge of the book.

ISSUE:
won the appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue
Law.

HELD:
No. The appellant must be ac5uitted! It is clear that the
appellant hademployed a bookkeeper to be in3charge, and
he took no part in keeping thebook in 5uestion! /herefore, the
appellant knew nothing! 6enal Statutes areto be strictly
construed and courts will not hold a person
criminallyresponsible for the acts of another, committed
without his knowledge orconsent, unless there is a statute
requiring it.
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Yu Hai alias “HAYA”
GR Nos. L- 9598, 38216 15August1956
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On October 22, 1954, the accused was charged in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of
Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for
having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu,
a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof.
The accused moved to quash the information on the ground
that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal
action or liability therefore had already been extinguished;
and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of
December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the
theory that the offense charged was a light offense which,
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in
two months.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Did the court err in considering the offense committed as a
light felony?
No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C
states that “an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on
the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of
classifying the offense committed as a correctional penalty,
is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses.
Also, if the SolGen’s interpretation of the law is accepted
then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony
as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1
peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and
there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the prescriptive
period for certain light offenses over other light offenses
Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26
since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the
penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the
accused, it should be the one to be adopted.
HELD:
THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into
several subjects or articles, having respective appropriate
headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each
article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate
as a general rule for settling such questions therein.
Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute
are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of
the result of one construction is a strong argument against
its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as
will avoid such result.
PEOPLE VS. GATCHALIAN
NATURE: Liberality in favour of the accused
FACTS:
Alfonso Gatchalian was charged before the court of First
Instance of Zamboanga with a violation of Section 3
Republic Act 602 AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A MINIMUM
WAGE LAW, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
From August 4, 1951 to December 31 1953, the accused
who is the owner of New Life Drug Store only paid a salary
which is less than that provided by law to Expedito
Fernandez a salesman in the said business establishment.
(Monthly salary of 60-90, unpaid salary is 1016.14 for the
period mentioned.) He pleaded not guilty to the charge when
arraigned last June 19, 1956. Filed motion to dismiss, the
court after hearing all the arguments issued an order
dismissing the information with costs de oficio (court cost will
be paid by the state) and cancelling the bail bond by the
accused. The Court ordered Regional Representative of
Department of Labor to immediately institute a civil action
against the erring employer. Motion for reconsideration was
denied so the government took the said appeal.
STATE’S CONTENTION:
Law which was violated by the accused carries it with both
civil and criminal liability.
ACCUSED’S CONTENTION:
The violation charged does not constitute a criminal offense
but carries only a civil liability and if it does the law alleged
violated does not carry a penalty penalizing it. Law is
ambiguous
ISSUE:
Minimum wage Law, Section 3 does not provide clear cut
criminal punishment, broad and ambiguous
CRIME: Violation of Minimum Wage Law
HELD:SC concluded that the court a quo
erred in dismissing the information filed against the appellee
and, consequently, its order of December 3, 1956, subject of
this appeal should be set aside. NO decision but ordered
that the cases be remanded to the court a quo for further
proceeding, with costs against appellee. The intention of the
law is clear, to slap not just of criminal liability but also of civil
liability he may commit as a result of underpayment. The law
is all-embracing, any violations of the ‘provisions of this act’
embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law
has been adopted.
Order for review of court a quo.
G.R. No. L-38725 October 31, 1933 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff- COMMISSIONER OF INTERNALREVENUE, respondent.
Appellee, vs. PEDRO MANABA,Defendant-Appellant. [Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30
SCRA968(1969)

Facts: Petitioner William Reagan, a citizen of the United

States and an employee of Bendix Radio, Division of Bendix
Aviation Corporation, which provides technicalassistance to
the United States Air Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base,
Philippines.Petitioner questioned the payment of income tax
assessed on him by respondentCommissioner of Internal
Revenue on a sale of his 1960 Cadillac car to PFC
WilliamJohnson, Jr., US Marine Corps executed at Clark Air
Base. It is the contention of thepetitioner, that in legal
contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory
andhence outside of our jurisdiction. Petitioner seeks to
refund the amount P2,979.00 of income tax he paid

.Issue: Whether or not Clark Air Base is outside of Philippine

territory therefore excludedfrom the jurisdictional powers of
the Philippines to tax.

Held: No. According to jurisprudence, People v. Acierto ,“By

the [Military Bases] Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the United Statesexercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein."The Clark Air Force Base
is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income
taxlegislation. There is nothing in the Military Bases
Agreement that lends support to suchassertion, It has not
become foreign soil or territory. The Philippine's jurisdictional
rightstherein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have
been preserved. As to certain taxmatters, an appropriate
exemption was provided for.

William Reagan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

November 9, 2011
30 SCRA 968 – Political Law – Sovereignty

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help

provide technical assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April
1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two
months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he
would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it
to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The
sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable
income of Reagan to be at P17,912.34 and that his income tax would
be P2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he
sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan
claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in
legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also
cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his
employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.

ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to

Philippine income tax?

HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its

authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other
hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends
support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil
or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines
merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases –
this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise
noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is
derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of
US source hence taxable.
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the
transport of animals named Stanford commanded by H.N.
Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found
that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads
of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper
suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for
most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while
in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55
and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however
contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it
said that the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about
ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships
involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense
committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial
waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the
headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the
vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the
Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a
Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the
illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within
the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same
conditions existed when the ship settled from the foreign port
and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found
guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
Case Title: US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573
Subject Matter: Applicability of the provisions of Art 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port
of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its
cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The
defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought
these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that
as his hold had already been searched several times for
opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All
the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English
nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.
Issue:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its
jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter.
The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable
by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel
being considered as an extension of its own nationality.
However, the same rule does not apply when the article,
whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present
case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the
Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.
THE UNITED STATES VS. LOOK CHAW
GR No. L-5887
December 16, 1910
FACTS: Defendant Chaw was found in possession of two sacks of
opium on board the steamship Errol of English Nationality departed in
Hongkong bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
He stated, freely and voluntarily that the contraband belonged to him
but prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds that the court
has no jurisdiction to try the same and facts therein did not constitute
a crime. The court of First Instance of Cebu ruled that it did not lack
jurisdiction in as much as the crime had been committed within its
district, on the wharf of Cebu. Hence, the defendant appealed to
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of the Philippineshave jurisdiction
to try unlawful possession of opium on a foreign vessel and unlawful
sale of opium on Philippine soil.
RULING: The court ruled that on the account of foreign vessel being
an extension of its own nationality, mere possession of thing of
prohibited use in Philippine Islands does not constitute a crime and
therefore not triable by the courts in the Philippines. However, in the
case at bar, the can of opium landed from the vessel upon Philippine
soil is an open violation of the laws of the land, and therefore as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of commission of the
crime, only the court established in the said place had competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty. Therefore, imprisonment and fine were reduced from 5 years
to six months and 10,000 to 1,000 respectively. Other aspects were
affirmed in toto with the cost of this instance against the appellant.
Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts:
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign
vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He
bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board
and had them in his possession during the said trip. The 8
cans of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of
the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon
anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant confessed
that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to
his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was
his intention to import the prohibited drug.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into
the Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any
person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug
into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found
under this person's control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction
limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal
importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or
the defense proves otherwise.
U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917)
Cf. French vs. English rule
FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman
on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the
port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them
in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the
steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the
search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler
of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did
not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did
not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into
the Philippine Islands has been proven?
RULING: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the
vessel from which the drug discharged came into Philippine waters
from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this
case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, “Any person
who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands…” Import and bring should be
construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port,
without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. The
importation is not the making entry of goods at
the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port, and the
importation is complete before the entry to the customhouse.
Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from the
size of the amount brought.
Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General,
filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer
sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented
by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which
resulted to the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in
our jurisdictional waters.
Held:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our
internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of
jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having
the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious
effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is
revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.
FACTS:
· appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard
the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel
was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.
· Lower court dismissed the case
ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction
waters
HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance
with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
· 2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law
French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory
English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are
in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed.
· As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty
or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find
nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation
the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
· mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this
drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our
territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that
our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is
not considered a disturbance of the public order.
· to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard
a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that
our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive
statute.