EX PARTE FRALEY

State (P) v. Father (D)

Okla Crim. Ct. App, 1910

Summary: D shot and killed a man. Testimony demonstrated that D walked up to

the decedent, shot him, and then said, “I told you I’d kill you.” The man
had apparentally killed D’s son 9-10 months before and been acquitted.
D argued that he killed in the heat of passion, and that therefore he
could only be guilty of manslaughter. When the court denied bail, D
applied for habeas corpus. This court denies bail.

Issue: Will an objective standard be used in gauging the “cooling down” period
for murder v. manslaughter? (YES)

Reasoning: A killing in the heat of passion is manslaughter, not murder. However,

there must be a point at which the law will not give a D the benefit of this
rule, even if he has in fact not “cooled down.” Here, we are talking about
9-10 months, a period longer than the law can possibly allow.

Analysis: A reasonable man standard is used in determining a cooling down period

– ie the Q isn’t alone whether D’s passions in fact cooled, but also if was
sufficient time in which passion of reasonable man would cool. Ordinarily
one day, or even half a day, is in law much more than sufficient. A
subjective standard is also used, but if the actor’s subjective state of
mind remains agitated too long, the reasonable man standard takes
over. Actually, one has to question the validity of this in that argument
can be made that reasonable men don’t lose their heads to point of
killing.

Habeas Corpus  A proceeding in which a D brings a writ to compel a

judicial determination of whether he is lawfully being held in custody

Notes Rationale for cooling time rules  Although some courts allowed a
subsequent event to revive prior provocation, others applied cooling time
limitations w surprising strictness (State v. Gounagias – deceased
committed sodomy on unconscious D and spread it, D perpetually
taunted till he snapped and killed)
-here the final taunt before he snapped was nothing new and what
D would have anticipated from his experiences in past few weeks.
To say that it alone created sudden passion is to ignore admitted
fact that same thing created no such condition before.
-The theory of cumlative effect of reminders of former wrongs, is
contrary to idea of sudden anger as understood by doctrine of
mitigation. In nature of the thing, sudden anger cant be
cumulative. A provocation that doesn’t cause instant resentment,
but which is only resented after being though upon and brooded
over, is not a provocation sufficient in law to reduce intentional
killing from murder to manslaughter.
Indirect Provocation  Learning indirectly of harm done to relative of
killer, as opposed to harm to killer himself may constitute adequate
provocation. Also, some cts give some D leeway in terms of cooling time
in these situations