Current Psychological Reviews (1982), 2, 323-340

A Brief History of the Psychology of Testimony

SIEGFRIED LUDWIG SPORER

Universitiit Erlangen-Niirnberg, FR Germany

The h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of psychology has l a r g e l y i g n o r e d t h e h i s t o r y of a p p l i e d a s p e c t s

of its f i e l d . M o r e o v e r , c o n t e m p o r a r y l e g a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s h a v e o f t e n o v e r l o o k e d
previous r e l a t e d work. The p r e s e n t paper a t t e m p t s p a r t i a l l y to fill t h e s e gaps by
providing a b r i e l d e s c r i p t i o n of the h i s t o r y ol the p s y c h o l o g y of t e s t i m o n y at t h e
beginning of this c e n t u r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y in c e n t r a l E u r o p e . It is argued t h a t in
c e n t r a l E u r o p e , in c o n t r a s t to the U n i t e d S t a t e s and B r i t a i n , t h e r e e x i s t e d a
p e r v a s i v e e x p e r i m e n t a l psychology of t e s t i m o n y . This m o v e m e n t probably o r i g i n a t e d
with Binet in F r a n c e and Stern in G e r m a n y . H o w e v e r , it was e s p e c i a l l y t h e l a t t e r and
his I o l l o w e r s who s u c c e e d e d in i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g a ' P s y c h o l o g i e der Aussage' t h a t
was widely discussed in legal c i r c l e s at t h a t t i m e . Although t h e e a r l y s t u d i e s have
o f t e n been c r i t i c i z e d for t h e i r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l flaws and t h e i r n e g a t i v i s t i c o n e -
sidedness the European m o v e m e n t did have s o m e b e l a t e d i m p a c t in t h a t e x p e r t
p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t i m o n y slowly s t a r t e d to be a d m i t t e d b e f o r e c o u r t s of l a w . It is of
s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t to t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y r e s e a r c h e r t h a t many ol the c r i t i c a l issues
raised by e a r l y l e g a l scholars were q u i t e s o p h i s t i c a t e d and r e m a i n as p e r t i n e n t as
ever to the e x p e r i m e n t a l study of t e s t i m o n y .

One of t h e most i m p o r t a n t a r e a s in t h e new legat p s y c h o l o g y is t h e p s y c h o l o g y of

e v i d e n c e , in p a r t i c u l a r t h e p s y c h o l o g y ol e y e w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y ( C l i l I o r d & Bull,
1978; L o f t u s , 1979; Y a r m e y , 1979; Tapp, 1980; Lob, 1981; Monahan & L o f t u s , 1982). It
is also one of t h e oldest a r e a s . In f a c t , as I hope this paper shows, c o n t e m p o r a r y
psychology of t e s t i m o n y is in many r e s p e c t s a r e n a i s s a n c e of the ' P s y c h o l o g i e der
Aussage' t h a t flourished at the b e g i n n i n g of this c e n t u r y . While c o n t e m p o r a r y
r e s e a r c h e r s g e n e r a l l y a c k n o w l e d g e t h e s e e a r l y b e g i n n i n g s , the m a j o r purpose o l t h e i r
works ( i . e . , to r e v i e w t h e m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d r e c e n t r e s e a r c h ) does not allow s p a c e
for a d e t a i l e d analysis of h i s t o r i c a l r o o t s . Thus most a u t h o r s m e n t i o n e a r l i e r work
only in passing ( e . g . , C l i f l o r d & Bull, 1978; L o f t u s , 1979; Y a r m e y , 1979; n o t e w o r t h y
e x c e p t i o n s a r e Rouke, 1957; G r e e r , 1971; L e v i n e & Tapp, 1973; Lob, 1981).

0 1 4 4 - 3 8 9 5 / 8 2 / 0 2 0 3 - 3 2 3 $02.00 © 1982 Praeger Publishers

324 S.L. Sporer

Textbook histories of psychology as well as monographs on various aspects of the

history of psychology have s i m i l a r l y ignored such 'applied' aspects of t h e i r f i e l d
(for a detailed discussion, see Sporer, 1981). To f i l l these h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c gaps,
the present paper (1) searches for some of the roots of psychological thinking in
t h e writings of s e l e c t e d l e g a l s c h o l a r s and t h e i r d i s t i l l a t i o n in f o r m a l rules of
e v i d e n c e , (2) t r a c e s the beginnings of the p s y c h o l o g y of t e s t i m o n y in E u r o p e , and
(3) assesses its r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e l e g a l world, and (4) r e f l e c t s on s o m e of t h e
issues and problems t h a t s e e m to have a f f e c t e d t h e p s y c h o l o g y of t e s t i m o n y (and
legal psychology in g e n e r a l ) both past and p r e s e n t . The p r e s e n t paper does not
discuss the history of the psychology of l i e d e t e c t i o n in any d e t a i l , f o l l o w i n g the
current practice to exclude i n t e n t i o n a l distortions from the psychology of t e s t i m o n y
(cf. Stern, 1939; Wells, 1980). However, i t should be noted that this separation is
probably h i s t o r i c a l l y a r t i f i c i a l as previously this aspect was also widely discussed
( e . g . , in the work on 'Tatbestandsdiagnostik'; c f . Sporer, 1981).

COMMOINISENSE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW~ RULES OF EVIDENCE

'Above a l l , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedure has to be preceded by a comprehensive

i n t e r r o g a t i o n of the witness, wherein he is to describe the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features
which could f a c i l i t a t e recognition of the persons or objects to which his t e s t i m o n y
or statements r e f e r . T h e r e a f t e r , in the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedure i t s e l f , he is,
whenever possible, to be confronted with several persons or objects resembling the
one to be i d e n t i f i e d . He should be urged to point out, for example, the i d e n t i f i e d
object, without hesitation, and also to give the reasons why he had i d e n t i f i e d this
one as the real one instead of any of the others . . . On the one hand, the
i n v e s t i g a t o r has to take care, to the best of his a b i l i t y , to remove any changes
that may have occurred in the object to be recognized and that may thus i m p a i r
recognition- t h e r e f o r e , for example, he must not present the accused in his prison
clothes, or with a d i s t o r t i n g beard, etc. On the other hand, the i n v e s t i g a t o r must
beware of drawing the witness's a t t e n t i o n to the correct object through f a c i a l
expressions, gestures, or external signs that d i f f e r e n t i a t e the object in question
from others'. (Henke, 1838, pp. 705-706; my t r a n s l a t i o n )

This quotation is from a handbook of c r i m i n a l law and c r i m i n a l p o l i t i c s w r i t t e n

about 150 years ago! It demonstrates the sophistication and degree of psychological
learning one may find in the history of legal writings based on the e x p e r i e n c e ,
i n t u i t i o n and logic of legal scholars. The passage also addresses some issues and
problems t h a t , through the very fact of their historic recurrence, are i m p o r t a n t
ones worthy of the contemporary researcher's a t t e n t i o n .
The historiographer Thucydides, l i v i n g during the Golden Age of Greece in the
f i f t h century BC, already knew of the problems of eyewitness t e s t i m o n y , noting a
'want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by d i f f e r e n t eye
witnesses, arising sometimes from i m p e r f e c t memory, sometimes from undue p a r t i a l i t y
for one side or the other' (Levine & Tapp, 1973, p. I088). Two m i l l e n n i a l a t e r ,
Oerstett (1822) took i t for granted that 'it is easily i n t e l l i g i b l e that the proof
through witness testimony be, as a m a t t e r of course, f a l l i b l e (an sich t r ~ g l i c h sei)
and that only necessity had d i c t a t e d t h a t it be a d m i t t e d in all states' (p. 629; my
t r a n s l a t i o n ) . Many other legal scholars have shared these concerns ( e . g . ,
Kleinschrod, 1805; M i t t e r m a i e r , 1834; Brauer, 184q; Bentham, 1843; Gross, 189g; c f .
 History of the Psychology of Testimony 325

also S c h n e i c k e r t , 1904; Wigmore, 1909; H e l l w i g , 1910; U n d e u t s c h , 1967; G r e e r , 1971;

S p o r e r , 1981).
These various s c h o l a r s a t t e m p t e d to pinpoint the s o u r c e s of e r r o r ( e . g . , poor
l i g h t i n g , f r i g h t ) and to a c c o u n t f o r t h e m t h e o r e t i c a l l y ( e . g . , in t e r m s of
s u b s t i t u t i o n of i n f e r e n c e s for p e r c e p t i o n s ; s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p e r c e i v e d by
f a n t a s y ; s e e 8 r a u e r , 1801, and H e l l w i g , 1910). T h e r e w e r e also numerous a t t e m p t s to
e s t a b l i s h c r i t e r i a for the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of c e r t a i n groups of w i t n e s s e s a l t h o u g h
t h e r e was room f o r much dispute c o n c e r n i n g who should be d i s q u a l i f i e d as a w i t n e s s .
Most of t h e s e a t t e m p t s at c a t e g o r i z a t i o n r e f e r r e d to what we would t o d a y call
'person v a r i a b l e s ' , such as a g e , g e n d e r , or being a c l o s e r e l a t i v e ( c f . Gross, 1898;
U n d e u t s c h , 1967). O t h e r v a r i a b l e s used to e x c l u d e w i t n e s s e s , or at l e a s t to d e r o g a t e
t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y , r e f l e c t social s t i g m a t i z a t i o n p r o c e s s e s of t h o s e t i m e s ( e . g . ,
being of J e w i s h f a i t h , being an adulteress, having been i n c a r c e r a t e d ) . Many
e x c l u s i o n a r y rules also c o n t a i n e d i n t e r e s t i n g i m p l i c i t p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s
( e . g . , having t e s t i f i e d a g a i n s t a person once b e f o r e and t h e r e f o r e being his e n e m y ;
c f . c r i t i c a l l y , K l e i n s c h r o d , 1805).
Depending on the legal s y s t e m under c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( i . e . , a d v e r s a r y or
i n q u i s i t o r i a l ) many of t h e s e p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s o v e r t i m e have d i s t i l l e d ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y , into 'rules of e v i d e n c e ' in t h e c o m m o n law ( s e e G r e e r , 1971) and
c o d i f i c a t i o n s in penal and c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r a l codes: t h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s e x a m p l e s in
M i t t e r m a i e r ' s (1830) t r e a t i s e on e v i d e n c e which c o m p a r e s the German c r i m i n a l
p r o c e d u r e s with t h e English and t h e F r e n c h s y s t e m s . H e n c e t h e r e w e r e s p e c i f i c a g e
and/or gender norms for being c o n s i d e r e d to be c o m p e t e n t to t e s t i f y , or to s w e a r an
o a t h , t h a t varied c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m one c o u n t r y to a n o t h e r and o v e r t i m e ( s e e
M i t t e r m a i e r , 1830; U n d e u t s c h , 1967).
It should be n o t e d t h a t many of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s i n h e r e n t in t h e s e
r u l e s lend t h e m s e l v e s to e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n g . Much of this p s y c h o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e has
been c o l l e c t e d in Hans Gross's w i d e l y - r e a d 'Handbook for E x a m i n i n g 3 u s t i c e s ' (1893)
and in his t e x t b o o k on c r i m i n a l p s y c h o l o g y (1898). With t h e a d v a n c e m e n t of
' s c i e n t i f i c psychology' at the turn of the c e n t u r y , p s y c h o l o g i s t s d e v e l o p e d s o m e of
t h e tools to t a c k l e t h e s e p r o b l e m s , besides p r o v i d i n g some g e n e r a l k n o w l e d g e
r e g a r d i n g p e r c e p t u a l and m e m o r y p r o c e s s e s t h a t could have helped t h e legal world to
understand b e t t e r the i n t r i c a c i e s of eyewitness t e s t i m o n y . The e x t e n t to which the
'new psychology' a t t e m p t e d to meet this challenge is discussed b e l o w .

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE P S Y C H O L O G Y OF TESTIMONY

Background

By 'new' ' s c i e n t i f i c ' psychology we mean p s y c h o l o g y as a l a b o r a t o r y s c i e n c e as it

had d e v e l o p e d in t h e l a t t e r half of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , f o c u s i n g p r i m a r i l y on
p r o c e s s e s of s e n s a t i o n , p e r c e p t i o n and m e m o r y ( c f . Boring, 1950; Murphy & K o v a c h ,
1972; Watson, 1978; L e a h e y , 1980). T h e r e w e r e also o t h e r f o r m s of psychology in t h e
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , l a r g e l y inspired by p h i l o s o p h i c a l and m e d i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , t h a t
d e a l t with d i v e r s e f o r e n s i c issues, i n c l u d i n g t h o s e of t e s t i m o n y ( c f . Gross, 1898;
S p o r e r , 1981), and t h e r e was a l a r g e body of f i c t i o n , p o p u l a r - p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and
m e d i c a l writings t h a t r e v e a l e d s t r o n g s o c i o - c u l t u r a l biases a g a i n s t w o m e n , c h i l d r e n
and o t h e r subgroups ( c f . U n d e u t s c h , 1967; S p o r e r , 1991). It is a g a i n s t this g e n e r a l
c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d , as well as in c o m p a r i s o n with t h e various b r a n c h e s of
psychology a v a i l a b l e at the t i m e , t h a t the e m e r g e n c e of ' a p p l i e d p s y c h o l o g y ' ,
326 S L Sporer

p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e ' p s y c h o l o g y of t e s t i m o n y ' , as a n o f f s p r i n g of t h e n e w e x p e r i m e n t a l
psychology has to be understood.

F~rly Studies on the Psychology of Testimony

It would be d i f f i c u l t , and probably wrong from a sound historiographic perspective,

to single out a specific person and even more p r o b l e m a t i c to d e t e r m i n e a specific
date as the origin of the e x p e r i m e n t a l study of t e s t i m o n y . Occasional papers bore on
issues or dealt with themes that l a t e r were to become c e n t r a l to the psychology of
testimony ( e . g . , on association and memory in Germany and Italy: cf. Gross, 1898;
Wigmore, 1909), and one or the other author may even have noted p o t e n t i a l
i m p l i c a t i o n s ol their work for the c r i m i n a l justice system.
For example, C a t t e l l (1895) i n v e s t i g a t e d c e r t a i n aspects of ' i n c i d e n t a l memory'
that are relevant to the psychology of t e s t i m o n y . He demonstrated the u n r e l i a b i l i t y
of casual observation by positing questions to students about things they had
recently seen. Bolton (1896) picked up a suggestion of Cattell's to conduct this
sort of i n v e s t i g a t i o n with d i f f e r e n t classes of people. He r e p l i c a t e d and extended
Cattell's findings of the general inaccuracy of r e c o l l e c t i o n that seemed to occur
despite the confidence some of the subjects expressed in t h e i r observations.
However, in spite of remarks by these researchers regarding the p o t e n t i a l u t i l i t y of
their work for the c r i m i n a l justice system, apparently no one f o l l o w e d up t h e i r
suggestions.
From a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t vantage p o i n t , the Austrian examining justice Hans
Gross had become aware of the shortcomings of testimony and the differences between
individual witnesses. In his daily experience he claimed to have examined 'well over
#5 000' (Gross, 190#). For a long t i m e , Gross had employed 'witness tests' which he
used to perform r o u t i n e l y with witnesses in his c r i m i n a l investigations ( e . g . , he
had them estimate distance, t i m e , the number of coins, the age of people$ and he
tested t h e i r recognition of people); and he had also conducted investigations on
problems of perception, retention and reproduction (Gross, 189#, cited in Gross,
1907). Klaussmann (1899), a j u r i s t , also reported on a series of ingenious
techniques to test perceptual, judgemental and r e c o g n i t i o n a b i l i t i e s of witnesses.
P a r t i c u l a r l y interesting are his suggestions f o r f a c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n tests. Gross's
f a v o u r i t e demonstration experiment was a simple event ( e . g . , pouring water in one of
several glasses) on the details of which he questioned students, astonishing them at
the inaccuracies and errors that emerged (Gross, 1898). Gross also stressed the
importance of the s c i e n t i f i c approach to these problems, praising especially
Ebbinghaus (1885) for his sound approach (Gross, 1898). Large portions of Gross's
(1895) t e x t b o o k on c r i m i n a l psychology were devoted to general and d i f f e r e n t i a l
aspects of the psychology of t e s t i m o n y , making him an i m p o r t a n t pioneer in an area
that psychology proper had not yet s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n v e s t i g a t e d .

Louis William Stern and the q)sychologie der Aussage'

S t e r n a n d his f o l l o w e r s c a r r i e d o u t s o m e of t h e e a r l i e s t c o n t r o l l e d e x p e r i m e n t a l
s t u d i e s on t h e p s y c h o l o g y of t e s t i m o n y ) a n d t h e y w e r e a m o n g s t t h e f i r s t e x p e r i m e n t a l
psychologists explicitly to stress the importance of t h e i r w o r k t o t h e l a w ( a n d
o t h e r a r e a s s u c h as p e d a g o g y , m e d i c i n e , a n d e v e n h i s t o r y ) . H o w e v e r , o n e of t h e
e x p e r i m e n t a l p a r a d i g m s S t e r n (1902) i n i t i a l l y e m p l o y e d was a d a p t e d f r o m A l f r e d B i n e t
History of the Psychologyof Testimony 327
• • • --fl
(1897, 1900) who had also noted, in 'La S u g g e s t l b l l i t e , the p o t e n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s
of his experiments on s u g g e s t i b i l i t y ( w i t h o u t the use of hypnosis) for a 'science du
temoi gnage':

'The questions that we are t r e a t i n g here are so new that they shed l i g h t on some
unnoticed, unexpected blind spots. I want to point out in passing the usefulness
that could come from creating a p r a c t i c a l science of testimony by studying errors of
memory, the means of recognizing them, and also ways of recognizing the signs of
f a c t (or accuracy). This science is too i m p o r t a n t for i t not to be organized at some
time or another'. (Binet, 1900, p. 285; t r a n s l a t i o n in Wolf, 1973~ pp. 108-109)

Binet's (1900) experiments, using e l e m e n t a r y schoolchildren as subjects, w e r e

designed to i n v e s t i g a t e the effects of various forms of questioning with d i f f e r i n g
degrees of s u g g e s t i b i l i t y . The results showed a considerable proportion of wrong
answers, and this led Binet to stress the i n d i v i s i b l e unity of question and answer
(cf. Stern, 1902). In another series of experiments, Binet investigated the
i n f l u e n c e of a group of peers on t e s t i m o n y , finding what social psychologists such
as Asch were l a t e r to call ' c o n f o r m i t y ' e f f e c t s ( c f . Haines & Vaughan, 1979).
Although Binet did not f o l l o w through his ideas it is worth noting that he envisaged
a 'psychojudicial science' of a much more comprehensive scope, including the
psychology of jurors and judges, than did Stern and his f o l l o w e r s (Binet, 1905;
Wolf, 1973).
In Berlin during 1901, Stern introduced his research programme for the
'Psychologie der Aussage': that is, the psychology of verbal report as it occurs in
the law, in education, in psychiatry and even in history. (I prefer to leave the
term 'Aussage' untranslated. It was used in its broadest sense, r e f e r r i n g g e n e r a l l y
to 'that function which strives to bring to reproduction present or past r e a l i t y
through the a c t i v i t y of human consciousness' (Stern, 1903-1906, vol. l , p. l; my
t r a n s l a t i o n ) . Thus, neither the term 'report' (Whipple, 1909) nor 'testimony' seems
a wholly adequate translation although I have used the l a t t e r term i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y ,
at least in the legal c o n t e x t . ) Of special t h e o r e t i c a l interest was the e x p e r i m e n t a l
study of r e c o l l e c t i o n . Stern described his r e c o l l e c t i o n experiments in which
subjects were to report on pictures a f t e r studying them ('Bildversuch', usually
translated as 'picture test'). The obtained findings led him, perhaps too h a s t i l y ,
to conclude with the often cited adage: ' E r r o r - f r e e r e c o l l e c t i o n is not the rule but
the exception - and even the oath is no p r o t e c t i o n against deceptions of memory'
(Stern, 1902, p. 327). Stern was quick to point out the p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of
his alarming findings. A more cautious e v a l u a t i o n of people's accounts seemed
a p p r o p r i a t e , especially in a legal c o n t e x t . One p o s s i b i l i t y , Stern suggested, would
be to have key witnesses examined by psychological experts (or psychologically
trained jurists) to assess their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c degree of r e c o l l e c t i o n a b i l i t y , even
in 'normal' cases, given that the current methods had been developed f u r t h e r and
been made more r e l i a b l e . It should be noted that Stern did not phrase his
suggestions as demands, but rather f o r m u l a t e d them as problem areas which he hoped
f u r t h e r e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n could solve.
Stern also outlined a gamut of factors to be i n v e s t i g a t e d , for example the
effects of longer r e t e n t i o n i n t e r v a l s , various types of questioning and of hearsay.
Of special interest was his suggestion to study memory for events e x p e r i m e n t a l l y ,
either presented as ~ilms or pictures or as well-rehearsed and programmed dramas, in
order to be able to compare the contents of the report with that of the event
(Stern~ 1902). The drama experiment ('Wirklichkeitsversuch', that is l i t e r a l l y
328 S. L. Sporer

' r e a l i t y experiment', usually translated as 'event test') was f i r s t carried out in

the same year in the c r i m i n a l i s t s ' seminar of yon Liszt, the legal scholar and
well-known c r i m i n o l o g i s t at Berlin (von Liszt, 1902). Another l a w y e r , 3affa (1903),
has described the Liszt drama e x p e r i m e n t , in which an audience was asked to report
on a staged event they had seen, using 'free n a r r a t i v e ' . Some groups of p a r t i c i p a n t s
were i n t e r r o g a t e d a f t e r several days; a p r o p o r t i o n of these were also asked leading
and suggestive questions. Results i n d i c a t e d a general s u p e r i o r i t y in accuracy f o r
the 'free n a r r a t i v e ' compared with the ' i n t e r r o g a t o r y ' c o n d i t i o n , especially i f the
l a t t e r was tainted by suggestion. Earlier reports were more accurate than delayed
ones.

In the following years 'reality experiments' were quite fashionable, both as

instruments of scientific investigations and as demonstration experiments in
university law courses; even the participants of an interdisciplinary congress of
jurists, medical experts, psychiatrists and psychologists fell prey to the
investigatory zeal of this new field (cf. Stern, 1903-1906). And during the
renaissance of the psychology of testimony this research paradigm, aided by the
advances in film and video technology, is again frequently used (e.g., Buckhout,
197#; Marshall, 1980; c f . Wells, 1980).
Stern's call for an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y approach to the p r o b l e m of
'Aussagepsychologie' received a response from many psychologists, jurists, teachers,
psychiatrists and others. A boom of e m p i r i c a l investigations f o l l o w e d and they
tackled a great v a r i e t y of issues ( e . g . , the e d u c a b i l i t y of 'Aussagen', Borst, 1905;
the a b i l i t y of a panel of judges and one of psychologists to a r r i v e at the 'truth'
on the basis of witness testimony, K o b l e r , 1914; cf. Stern, 1908, and Sporer, 1981).
These studies also employed a diverse array of methods, from l a b o r a t o r y and f i e l d
experiments to case studies, and included q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e analyses of
errors and confidence indices (cf. Lipmann, 1935).
Stern was also instrumental in the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of this new f i e l d in
Germany. He coined the term 'angewandte Psychologie' ('applied psychology'; Stern,
1903-1906; Dorsch, 1963) and provided a new publication o u t l e t and a common forum
for discussion for the numerous 'Aussage' studies in his 'Beitr~ige zur Psychologie
der Aussage' (Stern, 1903-1906). In 1907, the 'Beitr/ige' were transformed and
expanded into the ' Z e i t s c h r i f t fiir angewandte Psychologie und psychologische
Sammelforschung' under the editorship of Stern and Lipmann. Otto Lipmann became an
important figure in the movement of applied psychology, and succeeded Stern as a
d i r e c t o r of the ' I n s t i t u t f~]r A n g e w a n d t e Psychologie' in 1916. A p r o l i f i c w r i t e r ,
Lipmann also published e x t e n s i v e l y on the psychology of t e s t i m o n y : for e x a m p l e , on
the 'psychology of the lie' (Lipmann & P l a u t , 1927) and on m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues
in the psychology of t e s t i m o n y ( L i p m a n n , 1935).

FURTHER DE~r.LOPMENTS

Stern and Lipmann were not the only psychologists interested in the psychology of
testimony. Other researchers picked up these ideas in Germany and elsewhere, the
most notable being Karl Marbe at Wi3rzburg, Edouard Claparede in Switzerland, and
Hugo Mtinsterberg in the USA ( c f . Dorsch, 1963). In a d d i t i o n , Wigmore (1909)
mentioned that in Russia, India and even in Chile some i n t e r e s t was shown. Binet in
France, however, seemed less successful in establishing the psychology of t e s t i m o n y
and expanding it into a 'psychojudicial science' (Binet, 1905; Wolf, 1973).
 History of the Psychology of Testimony 329

The first decade of the psychology of testimony brought f o r t h a large amount of

e x p e r i m e n t a l research by psychologists, physicians, psychiatrists, pedagogues and
even jurists. General factors such as r e t e n t i o n i n t e r v a l , e x c i t e m e n t , form of
questioning, influence of suggestion and oath, as well as d i f f e r e n t i a l factors such
as gender, individual differences in s u g g e s t i b i l i t y , and developmental aspects of
remembrance for pictures, events and verbal m a t e r i a l (rumour, hearsay) were
meticulously studied and analysed in both q u a l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e ways. Even
the p o s s i b i l i t y of i m p r o v i n g the f i d e l i t y of )Aussagen' t h r o u g h t r a i n i n g
('Erziehbarkeit'; Borst, 1905; Oppenheim, 1906; Breuking, 1910) was i n v e s t i g a t e d
e x p e r i m e n t a l l y ) i n d i c a t i n g a shift from the i n i t i a l n e g a t i v i s t i c outlook towards a
more balanced appreciation of testimony (Stern, 1903-1906) vol. 1, p. 539).
Of special interest is an early a t t e m p t by Kobler ( I 9 l # ) to compare the
c a p a b i l i t y of a tribunal of psychology=trained laypersons with one composed of
'real' judges to reconstruct the 'facts' of an event on the basis of witness
t e s t i m o n y . The results of this 'simulated t r i a l ' suggested that the two tribunals
arrived at s i m p l i f i e d and somewhat distorted versions of the )truth ) , based on a
p a r t i a l l y f a u l t y testimony, and reached comparable results in verdict and damages
compensated. In two other experiments, for the f i r s t t i m e short silent f i l m s were
used to maximize e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n t r o l over the presentation of b r i e f events to be
reported (Muscio) 1916; Vieweg, 1921). It would be impossible to summarize here the
scores of studies carried out in psychological l a b o r a t o r i e s , school classrooms, law
courses and s c i e n t i f i c m e e t i n g s d u r i n g those e a r l y years and p u b l i s h e d in
psychological, medical, educational and legal journals ( c f . Stern, 1908, 1911)
1913a; Whipple, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 191~) 1915, 1917).
The first book=length monographs on forensic psychology t h a t introduced the new
psychology of testimony to a broader r e a d e r s h i p appeared at the beginning of the
century ( e . g . , MEnsterberg, 1908; Reichel, 1910; Sti~hr) 1911; Marbe, 1913;
Varendonck, 191¢). Even some i n t r o d u c t o r y textbooks of psychology devoted space to
this new area ( e . g . , Braunshausen, 1915). Although r e s e a r c h a c t i v i t y declined and
s h i f t e d in e m p h a s i s a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l e n t h u s i a s m had w a n e d , by t h e end
of the 1920s a substantial body of knowledge) enriched by first=hand p r a c t i c a l
experiences before the c o u r t s , had a c c u m u l a t e d (see the r e f e r e n c e s d e t a i l e d in
Stern) 1908, 1911, 1913a, 1926; Vieweg, 1921; Schrenk, 1922; Lipmann, 1925, 1935;
Gorphe, 1927; Hellwig, 1927; Kuhlmann, 1929; Slesinger & Pilpel, 1929; M6nkemSller,
1930; Plaut, 1931; Undeutsch, 1967) Arntzen, 1970; Sporer, 1981).

Reception by the Law and Expert Psychological Testimony

From the very beginning, researchers and p r a c t i t i o n e r s alike were eager to point out
the implications of t h e i r findings for a proper e v a l u a t i o n of eyewitness t e s t i m o n y .
Specific procedural reforms for the handling of witness testimony during p r e - t r i a l
investigations by the police and the examining justice, as well as for the t r i a l ,
were proposed ( e . g . , Schneickert, 1904; Lipmann, 1905; Stern, 1905), and the
admission and consultation of psychological experts were variously demanded ( e . g . ,
by Stern, 1902; Lipmann, 1905; MLinsterberg, 1908).
The reaction of the legal profession was a c r i t i c a l one, but it would be wrong
to construe it as one of blank r e j e c t i o n , an impression one might derive from
reading Wigmore's (1909) s a t i r i c a l c r i t i q u e of M~nsterberg's p r o v o c a t i v e 'On the
Witness Stand' (190g) which contemporary researchers have, in my opinion
erroneously, taken as representative of the legal psychology movement of those days.
330 S. L. Sporer

The f a c t is that such notable legal scholars as Gross, Liszt, Aschaffenburg,

Radbruch and Wigmore welcomed these new approaches to the study of t e s t i m o n y , and
many a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in them: for example, by having ' r e a l i t y experiments'
conducted in their classes. Their criticisms were to the point but c o n s t r u c t i v e ,
emphasizing Stern's (1902) postulate of 'closeness to l i f e ' ('Lebensn~ihe') as a
principle for e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and thus a n t i c i p a t i n g many arguments about the
'external v a l i d i t y ' of l a b o r a t o r y experiments as we would call it today (Loh, 19gl;
Monahan & Loftus, 1982).
The criticisms and suggestions were of a substantive nature and o f t e n e n t a i l e d
highly specific methodological issues that revealed a high degree o£ psychological
sophistication on the part of lawyers. For example, lawyers generally favoured event
over picture tests ( e . g . , Gross, 1903; 3 a f f a , 1903), and stressed the importance of
focusing more on individual differences and idiosyncrasies of specific witnesses
( e . g . , Gross, 1903, 1904) rather than relying on findings based on group averages
( e . g . , Wigmore, 1909). In several studies conducted by jurists, the i n f l u e n c e of
a t t e n t i o n and the degree of e m o t i o n a l e x c i t e m e n t on the a b i l i t y to perceive and
remember was recognized ( e . g . , 3affa, 1903; Radbruch, 1906; Kobler, 19It+).
M e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n between t e s t i m o n i a l errors regarding 'central' and
'peripheral' details (in today's t e r m i n o l o g y ) was also elucidated by 3affa (1903)
and by Wreschner (1903), who argued that such a d i s t i n c t i o n had to be made on
e m p i r i c a l grounds, and not through Stern's (1902) method who a p r i o r i and
i n t u i t i v e l y had assigned a double weight to errors in ' i m p o r t a n t ' details.
These examples i l l u s t r a t e that there existed a sophisticated i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y
dialogue between psychology and the law at the beginning of this c e n t u r y . They also
demonstrate the interest that at least some members of the legal profession showed
in the advancement of psychology and its applications to the law. However, the legal
profession was r e l u c t a n t , if not v i o l e n t l y opposed, to relinquish c o n t r o l over the
actual evaluation of witnesses which they considered t h e i r own province. While they
were open to the t h e o r e t i c a l developments in psychology and while they recognized
the importance of psychological t r a i n i n g f o r jurists ( e . g . , Gottschaik, 1906;
Reichel, 1910; Friedrich, 1911; M i t t e r m a i e r , 1912; Stern, 1913b), they generally did
not want psychologists as experts to conduct psychological witness examinations and
experiments in their courtrooms ( e . g . , Gottschalk, 1906). Even Gross c l e a r l y
distinguished between ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' e x p e r i m e n t s , which psychologists were to carry
out to f u r t h e r knowledge on the psychology of t e s t i m o n y and which psychologists
should be called upon to discuss as expert advisers, and 'practical experiments'
(Gross, 1903), namely witness examinations that should remain in the hands of
examining justices (Gross, 1907).
C o n s i d e r i n g the wide a t t e n t i o n that t h e p s y c h o l o g y of testimony
received at that t i m e , f o r m a l response by the l e g i s l a t i v e and by the j u d i c i a r y was
s l o w . A c o m m i s s i o n f o r t h e r e f o r m of the code o£ c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e
('Strafprozessordnung') largely bypassed the suggestions and demands by the
'Aussage' psychologists although one could not say that i t had ignored these e f f o r t s
altogether (Schneickert, 1906). S i m i l a r l y , the j u d i c i a r y was i n i t i a l l y r e l u c t a n t to
admit psychologists as experts on testimony to the courtroom (Stern, 1926;
Undeutsch, 1954, 1967). However, defence lawyers (and also medical experts) adopted
the p r i n c i p l e of the new 'Aussagepsychologie' and f r e q u e n t l y usurped them to t h e i r
advantage (Undeutsch, 1954). Probably the f i r s t time that expert 'psychological'
testimony on the evaluation of witness t e s t i m o n y was heard before a court of law was
in the Berchtold murder t r i a l in Munich in 1896 (Schrenk-Notzing, 1897). Two
psychiatrists, Schrenk-Notzing and Grashey, a t t e m p t e d to demonstrate before the
History of the Psychologyof Testimony 331

court that the press, through its a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the chase for the murderer
and its biased reporting) had e x e r t e d suggestive influences and r e t r o a c t i v e memory
distortions ('rfickwirkende Erinnerungsfglschung'). Schrenk-Notzing's ([897) expert
testimony in this widely discussed case stressed the significance of suggestion on
testimony which he wanted to put on record although he had no doubt regarding
Berchtold's g u i l t .
Around 1903 or 1904) Stern probably became the f i r s t psychologist to t e s t i f y as
an expert regarding the truthfulness of the depositions of an adolescent boy who
supposedly had been sexually molested (Stern, 1926). From a c o m p a r a t i v e analysis of
the successive depositions of the boy Stern concluded that the l a t e r statements were
more l i k e l y to have been a product of suggestive questioning than r e c o l l e c t i o n s of
true experiences. This type of case) i n v o l v i n g some form of sexual abuse of children
or adolescents (mostly girls) by a t e a c h e r , priest, r e l a t i v e or stranger) became the
p r o t o t y p e of the case in which psychologists' t e s t i m o n y was called upon. One of the
best known is Amand van Puyenbroeck's murder t r i a l in Belgium in which Varendonck, a
psychologist, presented results of experiments he had s p e c i f i c a l l y conducted with
schoolchildren who were similar to the key witnesses, employing questions
p a r t i c u l a r l y pertinent to the ones used in the i n t e r r o g a t i o n s (Varendonck, 1911-
1912; o f . Whipple, 1913; Stern, 1926; Rouke, 1957). This case, as many others in
which psychologists t e s t i f i e d on behalf of the defence, resulted in an a c q u i t t a l of
the defendant ( c I . Stern, 1926). However, the goal of these psychologists was not
only to help defendants (in f a c t , Stern (1926) deplored the one-sidedness of cases
they were a d m i t t e d to) but also to act as advocates for the children and so save
them from the agony of repeated i n t e r r o g a t i o n s .
Once confronted with the i n t r i c a c i e s of courtroom routine psychologists also
became more aware of the judicial needs and ways of t h i n k i n g . It also seems t h a t
this exposure to courtroom r e a l i t y opened up new avenues and ways of knowledge for
the psychology of testimony, leading to an increased appreciation of case studies
('Kasuistik'; c f . Lipmann, 1935). By the beginning of the 1930s, a series of case
collections had accumulated ( e . g . , Stern, 1926; c f . Lipmann, 1933) which, along with
the monographs summarizing the e x p e r i m e n t a l work, amounted to a substantial body of
knowledge on the psychology of t e s t i m o n y .
Udo Undeutsch (1954, 1967), who l a t e r became one of the leading a u t h o r i t i e s on
the psychology of testimony in Germany, has provided us with an e x c e l l e n t summary of
the history of expert psychological testimony in Germany. He has r e f e r r e d to the
developments in Europe described so far as the 'first phase' in the history of the
psychology of testimony f o l l o w e d by a decline in research and p u b l i c a t i o n a c t i v i t y
for about the next two decades. His work has also shown that the r e f o r m a t o r y e f f o r t s
by the 'Aussage' psychologists had some belated impact on the Jaw of c r i m i n a l
procedures and on the decisions of German supreme courts. During the 1920s some
state ordinances met the suggestions put f o r t h by Stern and his f o l l o w e r s ( r e p r i n t e d
in Stern, 1926), and the use of psychological experts became gradually required
through higher court decisions for the e v a l u a t i o n of non-adult witnesses in the
1930s and 19q0s, and for adult witnesses in the 1950s.
It should be noted that the focus of the expert t e s t i m o n y in Germany was, and
s t i l l is, directed at the evaluation of i n d i v i d u a l witnesses and t h e i r t e s t i m o n i e s ,
unlike the situation in the USA where psychological experts today t e s t i f y only to
general factors that may, or may not, have a f f e c t e d the testimony of a witness
(Loftus, 1979). However, the question about whether the expert is to t e s t i f y to the
c r e d i b i l i t y of a witness in general or to the c r e d i b i l i t y of the details of the
testimony given has remained c o n t r o v e r s i a l (Liebel & yon UsJar, 1975; Wegener,
332 S L. Sporer

1981). It is also s t r i k i n g t h a t this approach has led to a much more b a l a n c e d

e v a l u a t i o n of witness t e s t i m o n y , which is also e v i d e n t in Stern's l a t e r w r i t i n g s
(e.g., S t e r n , 1930, 1939), c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e r a t h e r n e g a t i v i s t i c o u t l o o k
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the early days of the psychology of t e s t i m o n y . Undeutsch (195t~,
1967) has argued that this n e g a t i v i s t i c view was o r i g i n a l l y brought a b o u t by the one-
sided goals of the e x p e r t s and the o n e - s i d e d s e l e c t i o n of c a s e s . O r i g i n a l l y e x p e r t s
were called by the d e f e n c e only ( S t e r n , 1926i M6nkemiSller, 1930) whereas l a t e r it
was considered the duty of the s t a t e (the s o - c a l l e d ' A u f k l ~ r u n g s p f l i c h t ' by judge
and p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ) to make use of psychological e x p e r t s to g u a r a n t e e the
'finding of t r u t h ' . Other reasons for the o r i g i n a l l y n e g a t i v e t o n e may have lain in
the s o c i o - c u l t u r a l biases against women and children which prevailed at t h a t t i m e ,
as well as in f a u l t y methodology which was p r i m a r i l y designed to bring out the
l i m i t a t i o n s in eyewitnesses' performance ( c f . Undeutsch, 1967; Wegener, 1981).
However, it should also be pointed out t h a t in c e n t r a l Europe this move away
from l a b o r a t o r y and f i e l d e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n towards 'praxis', namely the diagnostic of
individual cases, has led to a stagnation in the~)retical advancements as well as to
unnecessary restrictions on the scope of topics t h a t 'forensic psychologists' have
tackled. For instance, most contemporary monographs in German on the psychology of
testimony ( e . g . , Undeutsch, 1967; Arntzen, 1970) almost exclusively discuss and
generalize from the evaluation of non-adult witnesses in sexual o f f e n c e cases. This
selection bias, dictated by the needs of the legal profession, has most l i k e l y also
led to another kind of one-sidedness that s i m i l a r l y should be avoided. :]udicial
p r a c t i c e has enslaved 'forensic psychology' as a subsidiary science from which i t
has to emancipate i t s e l f again.

Developments in English-speaking Countries

The p r e s e n t review has p r i m a r i l y focused on the history of the psychology of

t e s t i m o n y in c e n t r a l Europe, and e s p e c i a l l y in G e r m a n y . As other a u t h o r s have
i n v e s t i g a t e d the d e v e l o p m e n t s in E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g c o u n t r i e s , m a i n l y in the USA, I
s u m m a r i z e them only b r i e f l y here (see Rouke, 1957; G r e e t , 1971; Levine & Tapp, 1973~
A n a s t a s i , 1979i Loh, 19gl).
P a r a l l e l to the psychological knowledge i n h e r e n t in the rules of c r i m i n a l
p r o c e d u r e and legal c o m m e n t a r i e s in c e n t r a l Europe, t h e r e e x i s t e d , probably even
more pronounced and e l a b o r a t e d in the c o m m o n law of B r i t a i n and the USA~ 'rules of
e v i d e n c e ' t h a t s u m m a r i z e d c e n t u r y - l o n g psychological l e a r n i n g s on issues of
t e s t i m o n y and witness c r e d i b i l i t y (for examples see B e n t h a m , 1843; Wigmore, 1909;
G r e e r , 1971). But it is M~nsterberg's 'On the Witness Stand' (1908) t h a t is
f r e q u e n t l y , and i n c o r r e c t l y , considered to mark the s t a r t i n g point for legal
psychology. Mfinsterberg's p r o v o c a t i v e book comprised a series of essays published in
the preceding year in popular magazines. It contained many useful but o v e r s i m p l i f i e d
suggestions for applying the 'new psychology' to t e s t i m o n y and other c r i m e - r e l a t e d
issues, drawing heavily on the European work w i t h o u t giving specific references. The
essays were not w r i t t e n in a technical fashion but rather to popularize the ideas of
a legal psychology among the general public, hoping t h a t public opinion would e x e r t
pressure on the legal profession 'to turn the a t t e n t i o n of serious men to an
absurdly neglected field' (M{Jnsterberg, 1908, p. 9).
However, the way MUnsterberg went about selling his ideas was doomed to f a i l u r e .
His boisterous approach surely shows one way not to proceed if one wants to convince
an audience of the points one is t r y i n g to make. To call the legal profession
History of the Psychologyof Testimony 333

'obdurate' (p. 9), 'completely satisfied with the most haphazard methods ol common
prejudice and ignorance' (p. t~t~), 'unaware' (p. (~6), and 'slow to learn' (p. 63),
etc. was an inappropriate way to try winning over t r a d i t i o n - c o n s c i o u s members of the
legal profession. This sledge-hammer approach was more l i k e l y to create resistance
in the legal circles being challenged. And the reply was awesome. John Wigmore
(1909), Dean of the Chicago Law School, who himself had carried out ' t e s t i m o n i a l and
verdict experiments' (Greer, 1971), launched a vehement, s a t i r i c a l , c o u n t e r - a t t a c k
on M~Jnsterberg's assertions. His lucid analysis contained many criticisms t h a t have
remained pertinent even to present research on the psychology of testimony ( c f . Loh,
19gl). For example, he c r i t i c i z e d the legal n a i v e t y with which psychologists
approached the legal system in which they wished to play a part and he noted t h a t
over-hasty generalizations from e x p e r i m e n t a l results based on group means were no
sound basis on which one could assess errors of i n d i v i d u a l witnesses.
It should be noted, however, that many of Wigmore's criticisms were d i r e c t e d
against the 'associative method' of psychological 'Tatbestandsdiagnostik' ( l i e
d e t e c t i o n ) , which even in Europe only few researchers considered s t i l l f e a s i b l e , and
not against the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of e x p e r i m e n t a l psychology with the law in general.
The extensive bibliography in his a r t i c l e also attests to the fact t h a t Wigmore, and
probably many other legal scholars ( c I . McCormick, [927), were generally q u i t e
interested in what psychology had to o f f e r but not in the form in which it was
a v a i l a b l e at that t i m e . The way Milnsterberg presented his arguments was perceived as
'yellow psychology' which the legal profession thought it could do w i t h o u t (Moorep
1907).
Thus it seemed that legal psychology never r e a l l y got o f f the ground in the USA,
nor in Great Britain (Greet, 1971; Loh, 1981). Later a t t e m p t s , this time by lawyers,
to develop a legal psychology in the c o n t e x t of the 'legal realist' movement were
also unsuccessful ( c I . Loh, 1981). Occasional studies on the psychology of
testimony in the USA and B r i t a i n ( e . g . , Muscio, 1916; Cady, 192t+; Marston, 1924;
Slesinger & Pilpel, 1929) never amounted to a 'movement' comparable with the one in
central Europe; nor were the repeated proposals to wed the two disciplines
psychology and the law, ever consummated.

CONCLUSIONS

This review of the history of the psychology of testimony has a t t e m p t e d to

demonstrate that before the recent renaissance of the psychology-law i n t e r f a c e t h e r e
already existed at the beginning of this century in central Europe a smaller yet
comparable movement to marry the two disciplines. While the need to f i l l this gap in
the historiography of applied psychology constitutes a j u s t i f i a b l e goal in i t s e l f ,
t h e h i s t o r y of the p s y c h o l o g y of t e s t i m o n y is also of i n t e r e s t to p r e s e n t
researchers as i t highlights some problems that legal psychologists faced then and
which their counterparts face today. The very f a c t of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l recurrence
marks these issues as crucial ones that legal psychologists have to consider. It
should, however, be noted that most of the developments described took place w i t h i n
the context of an i n q u i s i t o r i a l legal system which f u r t h e r complicates a transfer of
these learnings to an adversary system of l a w .
One recurring issue is the degree of legal n a i v e t y with which psychologists 'ran
to help', o f t e n being unaware of the c e n t u r y - l o n g psychological learnings inherent
in the legal l i t e r a t u r e . Much of this psychological knowledge that has been
d i s t i l l e d from everyday courtroom experience lends i t s e l f to e m p i r i c a l testing and
334 S. L. Sporer

provides a good starting point for the legal psychologist; taking i n t o consideration
where the law is coming from ensures 'relevance t and increases the l i k e l i h o o d that
p s y c h o - l e g a l r e s e a r c h is p e r c e i v e d as p e r t i n e n t to t h e l e g a l issues u n d e r
discussion.
This should not be misunderstood to mean t h a t psychology should give up its
i n t e g r i t y and its unique perspective. The l a t t e r is also essential for providing new
insights through psychological t h e o r i z i n g and for pointing out issues that otherwise
may go unnoticed from a purely legal perspective. To meet these demands requires the
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a t r u l y i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y dialogue that f a c i l i t a t e s the
exchange of ideas. Stern and his f o l l o w e r s recognized this and sought to establish a
dialogue through the foundation of an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y journal and of research
i n s t i t u t e s . They also p u b l i s h e d in l e g a l j o u r n a l s and o f f e r e d courses and
conferences on legal psychology. Perhaps the less pronounced role d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
among academic disciplines existing at t h a t t i m e made this dialogue across t h e i r
boundaries easier. On the other hand 9 the numerous criticisms by jurists of the
early work by the 'Aussage' e x p e r i m e n t a l i s t s showed that these e f f o r t s were not yet
s u f f i c i e n t l y coordinated to meet the lawyers' needs. For e x a m p l e , p o l i c e o f f i c e r s ,
judges and attorneys would have been g r e a t l y interested if psychologists could have
provided them with f o o l p r o o f methods to signal whenever a specific witness before
them was t e l l i n g the truth and when not. Instead, they were being told t h a t
eyewitness testimony could be u n r e l i a b l e , and t h a t , for example, younger subjects,
on average, made more errors of r e c o l l e c t i o n than older subjects. Although the early
'Aussage' e x p e r i m e n t a l i s t s did address t h e issue of i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s ,
apparently this was not enough to meet the p r a c t i c a l needs of the jurists.
Another c r i t i c i s m was one l e v e l l e d at the contrived nature of some of the
experiments, especially the 'picture tests'. What did lawyers care about what
percentage of some hundred minor details of an i n t r i c a t e and a r t i s t i c p i c t u r e
children could reproduce a f t e r calm, one-minute study of the p i c t u r e when they were
interested to know whether or not l e g a l l y i m p o r t a n t facts of a r e a l - l i f e event could
be f a i t h f u l l y recovered from a witness who had caught only glimpses of a f l e e t i n g
event while in extreme e m o t i o n a l t u r m o i l or severe f r i g h t ? It was lawyers who f i r s t
employed the event methodology to the e x p e r i m e n t a l study of t e s t i m o n y , and its
continued p o p u l a r i t y has proved them r i g h t .
It was also lawyers who i n i t i a t e d the e x p e r i m e n t a l study of the i m p a c t of
testimony: that is, they realized that i t was not the correctness or falseness of
testimony in the abstract which was of importance but rather whether judge or jury
could discern between them and thus a r r i v e at an a p p r o p r i a t e decision. In other
words, the crucial question for the jurist is whether it is possible to achieve
correct conclusions and decisions despite some p a r t i a l l y i n c o r r e c t witness input.
One way (and most contemporary German forensic psychologists would argue t h a t i t is
the only way) to explore this issue is by s y s t e m a t i c a l l y observing the routine
variations of testimony in their natural settings ( e . g . , Undeutsch, 1967; Arntzen,
[970). The h i s t o r i c a l shift from the l a b o r a t o r y to courtroom (case) studies has
started this trend. Are we to repeat the h i s t o r i c a l cycle? At last, the h i s t o r i c a l
pendulum that has swung between both types of approaches w i l l probably come to rest
in the middle, indicating the necessity of both n a t u r a l i s t i c and e x p e r i m e n t a l
approaches and a striving for general theories that account for findings both in the
l a b o r a t o r y and the f i e l d .
But even if psychologists had elaborated the most consistent and e m p i r i c a l l y
corroborated theories on the conditions f o r the c r e d i b i l i t y of t e s t i m o n y and its
assessment, it would probably s t i l l take some t i m e before the courts and the
History of the Psychologyof Testimony 335

l e g i s l a t i v e i n c o r p o r a t e them into t h e i r decision-making. Consider for a moment the

f o l l o w i n g analogy. If a f t e r decades in which e x p e r i m e n t a l psychology has made use of
analysis of variance designs some group of statisticians a r r i v e at the conclusion
that all these studies are fraught with some h e r e t o f o r e unrecognized sources of
error that could only be e l i m i n a t e d if t h e i r new approach was f o l l o w e d , would we at
once burn our books and journals, shut down our computers and f o l l o w the new
s t a t i s t i c a l gospel? If not, how can legal psychologists expect that the legal
profession w i l l at once change its well-established ways of thinking (about
testimony) that have served it well for so long.'? We must not expect i m m e d i a t e
results, and we should be cautious and modest in our conclusions until t i m e shows
whether our o f f e r did in f a c t result in i m p r o v e m e n t . We must also beware of o v e r -
generalizing our results and must point out the positive as well as the negative
aspects of our findings to p r o t e c t them from abuse.
F i n a l l y , legal psychology has to understand itself as a h i s t o r i c a l l y grown
product t h a t has been shaped by e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l h i s t o r i c a l 'forces'. The
psychology of testimony at the beginning of this century has been repeatedly
described as ' n e g a t i v i s t i c ' , p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to its assessment of the (lack
of) value of testimony by children and women. As this tendency r e f l e c t e d socio-
cultural values prevalent at that t i m e , legal psychologists have to become aware of
possible biasing influences that may or may not a f f e c t t h e i r theorizing or even
their e m p i r i c a l data.
Today, as before, it is usually the defence which calls psychologists in the USA
and Britain to give expert psychological t e s t i m o n y . This form of selection bias may
also r e s t r i c t the impressions psychologists get from this l i m i t e d perspective. While
an e f f e c t i v e ' c r i m e c o n t r o l ' and a ' C i v i l L i b e r t i e s ' o r i e n t a t i o n need n o t
necessarily be exclusive nor c o n t r a d i c t o r y , social scientists should r e f l e c t on
t h e i r personal predilections before they render t h e i r services to one party or the
o t h e r . However, nobody w i l l mind if they dedicate their e f f o r t s to f u r t h e r the
finding of truth and the promotion of justice.

NOTE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A longer version of this paper was the basis for a presentation to the British
Psychological Society, Welsh Branch, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Psychology and Law
in Swansea, Wales, 3uly 1982, and is a v a i l a b l e from the author on request.
The author g r a t e f u l l y acknowledges the d i l i g e n t help of A. 3. Chapman in
adapting this paper.

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SlnE~ LUDWIG ~=ORIE~ Psychologie, Universit~it Erlangen-NiJrnberg, Regensburger

Strasse 160) 85 Ni]rnberg) FR Germany.