reminded about the companys policy of not accepting
married women for employment.[4]
[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997] PHILIPPINE
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY,* petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the
alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of
company funds as grounds to terminate the services of
an employee. That employee, herein private respondent
Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her
having contracted marriage during her employment,
which is prohibited by petitioner in its company
policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated
against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by
an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner
as a reliever, specifically as a Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on
maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which
she signed with petitioner company, her employment
was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the
agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1,
1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondents services as reliever were again engaged by
petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F.
Dizon who went on leave during both periods.[2] After
August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever
Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was
once more asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee, the probationary period to cover
150 days. In the job application form that was furnished
her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the
portion for civil status therein that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3]
It now appears that private respondent had made
the same representation in the two successive reliever
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and
July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about
the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City,
Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a
memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to
explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private
respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all
along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil
status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced
by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed
from the company effective January 29, 1992,[6] which
she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost
of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in
connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the
information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation
of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit
the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then
executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of
petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a formal
proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or
their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R.
Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee, was illegally dismissed by
petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA, was
correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the
firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by
petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly
insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been
discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the
labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it
ruled that private respondent had indeed been the
subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her
employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor
arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de
Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in
view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not
be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed
the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for
the reinstatement of private respondent in her
employment with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its
resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil
action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor
arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial
resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm
that women should be regarded with love and respect
but, through the ages, men have responded to that
injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that
women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that
prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in
the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal
employment opportunities and standards. In the
Philippine setting, women have traditionally been
considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or
types of workers who must be safeguarded with
preventive and remedial social legislation against
discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring,
training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights
between men and women in almost all phases of social
and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section
14, Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in
nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all
times, the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article
XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the
1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State
to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial
security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article
XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working
women through provisions for opportunities that would
enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender
inequality have emerged with more frequency in the
years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1,
1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our
countrys commitment as a signatory to the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).[11]
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No.
6727[12] which explicitly prohibits discrimination against
women with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, promotion, and training opportunities;
Republic Act No. 6955[13] which bans the mail-order-
bride practice for a fee and the export of female labor to
countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights
of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192,[14] also
known as the Women in Development and Nation
Building Act, which affords women equal opportunities
with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for
appointment, admission, training, graduation, and
commissioning in all military or similar schools of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police; Republic Act No. 7322[15] increasing the
maternity benefits granted to women in the private
sector; Republic Act No. 7877[16] which outlaws and
punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the
education and training environment; and Republic Act
No. 8042,[17] or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, which prescribes as a matter of
policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with
emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights
are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out
that in the Family Code,[18] womens rights in the field of
civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights
of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138
thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular
kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of
women to be provided with facilities and standards which
the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their
health and safety. For purposes of labor and social
legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail
lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar
establishments shall be considered as an employee
under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand,
recognizes a womans right against discrimination with
respect to terms and conditions of employment on
account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the
issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a
female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process
scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to
labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is
required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance
of the employment ties of an individual under his employ,
to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence,
the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with
the services of such employee, ones labor being
regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of
manpower by the company falls within the so-called
management prerogatives, which prescriptions
encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers,
work assignments, working methods and assignments,
as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-
off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees.[19] As put in a case, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his discretion and best business
judgment, all aspects of employment, from hiring to
firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those
which may be provided by law.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not
accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the
test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than
the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on
account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly
that her ties with the company were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the
memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M.
Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the
reminder, in the words of the latter, that youre fully
aware that the company is not accepting married women
employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to
you.[21] Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the
same branch supervisor, private respondent was made
to understand that her severance from the service was
not only by reason of her concealment of her married
status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of
the companys policy against marriage (and even told
you that married women employees are not applicable
[sic] or accepted in our company.)[22] Parenthetically, this
seems to be the curious reason why it was made to
appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was
represented in this case only by its said supervisor and
not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise
be solidarily liable with the corporation.[23]
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the
true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she
was moved to act the way she did mainly because she
wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In
other words, she was practically forced by that very
same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her
civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While
loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of
employment, it should not be simulated.[24] It must rest
on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee
and not on the employers caprices.[25] Furthermore, it
should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which
are improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
In the present controversy, petitioners
expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not
because the latter got married but because she
concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her
concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty
hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which
justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate,
therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it
nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that
fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial
distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent
may well be minded to claim that the imputation of
dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that
although private respondent defied its policy against its
female employees contracting marriage, what could be
an act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it
submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that
marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage
as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no
objection. In other words, PT&T says it gives its
blessings to its female employees contracting marriage,
despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would
consequently respond for and which obviously it would
have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such
fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such
employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to
the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of
reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true
management policy or that we are being regaled with
responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained
reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse
through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy
against married women, both on the aspects of
qualification and retention, which compelled private
respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It
was, however, that very policy alone which was the
cause of private respondents secretive conduct now
complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar
saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the
admission of private respondent that she supposedly
misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground
to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere
and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent
admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed
to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether
different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely
because of her concealment of her marital status, and
not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of
company funds.That the labor arbiter would thus
consider petitioners submissions on this supposed
dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its
case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of
experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing
that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the
amount or whether her failure to remit the same was
through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence
was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely
agreed that private respondent execute a promissory
note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter
was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor
case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had
gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When
she was served her walking papers on January 29,
1992, she was about to complete the probationary
period of 150 days as she was contracted as a
probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her
dismissal would be effected just when her probationary
period was winding down clearly raises the plausible
conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from
earning security of tenure.[27] On the other hand, her
earlier stints with the company as reliever were
undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the
same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities
which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and
business of PT&T.[28] The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the activity performed by the
employee in relation to the business or trade of the
employer.[29]
As an employee who had therefore gained regular
status, and as she had been dismissed without just
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to full back
wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent.[30] However, as she had
undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing
her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful
imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension
imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate
the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were
to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for
her act which was not totally justified.Thus, her
entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed
from the time her compensation was withheld up to the
time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by
deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her
three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any
stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain
terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful
for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can
be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
148,[31] better known as the Women and Child Labor
Law, which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide
Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on
the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on
March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of
women and children in shops, factories, industrial,
agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other
places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt
here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air
Lines,[33] a decision that emanated from the Office of the
President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines
requiring that prospective flight attendants must be
single and that they will be automatically separated from
the service once they marry was declared void, it being
violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor
Code with regard to discrimination against married
women. Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents
policy or regulation with the codal provision of
law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136
of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in
ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage
of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight
attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities
of their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by
respondent. All along, it knew that the controverted policy has
already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when
Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women
and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity
of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the
validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a
momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree,
which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision
reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which
was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months
later, or on November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same
provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against
it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article
132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that
will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in
appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to
determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in
special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that
is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of
respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set
forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor
issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or
regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of
respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds
support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions
of work x x x.
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that
termination from employment of flight attendants on account
of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their
own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has
been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern
is not so much against the continued employment of the flight
attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by
the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of
marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the
instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight
attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this
needs no further discussion as it had been adequately
explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2,
1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent
went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216
of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social
institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-
marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of
a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as
contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure
conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in
this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the
distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent
overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program
their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed
in ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically
expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on
special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text
and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-
discrimination on the employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto,
et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial
Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same
nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the
service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to
consider female employees in the project it was
undertaking as separated the moment they get married
due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent
further claimed that complainant was employed in the
project with an oral understanding that her services
would be terminated when she gets married. Branding
the policy of the employer as an example of
discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal
employment opportunities to women simply on account
of their sex, the appellate court struck down said
employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to
the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the
Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements
which establish employer preference or conditions
relating to the marital status of an employee are
categorized as a sex-plus discrimination where it is
imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the
same should be evenly applied and must not inflict
adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is
protected by federal job discrimination
laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the
employment of married women, but do not apply to
married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the
United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal
statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees
and applicants on the basis of, among other things,
sex.[35]
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed
against all women but just against married women. And,
where the employer discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable is sex
and the discrimination is unlawful.[36] Upon the other
hand, a requirement that a woman employee must
remain unmarried could be justified as a bona fide
occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not
on the ground of a general principle, such as the
desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-
marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight
attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the
restriction was not related to the job performance of the
flight attendants.[37]
5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the
provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right
of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation
against marriage in connection with her employment, but
it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to
choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable
right.[38] Hence, while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same
should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.[39] Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioners
policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament
of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the
contract of labor state that the relations between the
parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely
contractual, impressed as they are with so much public
interest that the same should yield to the common
good.[40] It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor
should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor
impair the interest or convenience of the public.[41] In the
final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against
marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at
the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family
as the foundation of the nation.[42] That it must be
effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory
of the laws of the land is not only in order but
imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94951 April 22, 1991
APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
SINCLITICA CANDIDO, respondents.
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.
Angel Fernandez for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the
said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by
petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973
to perform laundry services at its staff house located at
Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she
was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17,
1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a
month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a
month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her
assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She
reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila
de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D.
Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to
continue with her work. She was permitted to go on
leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount
of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to
P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she
refused the offer and preferred to return to work.
Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and
dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request
for assistance with the Department of Labor and
Employment. After the parties submitted their position
papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the
case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, Conformably With The
Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company,
Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay the
complainant, to wit:
1 Salary
Differential –– P16,289.20
2. Emergency Living
Allowance –– 12,430.00
3. 13th Month Pay
Differential –– 1,322.32
4. Separation Pay
(One-month for
every year of
service [1973-19881) –– 25,119.30
or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100
(P55,161.42).
SO ORDERED.1
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered
by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing
the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed
decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which
appopriately should be a special civil action for certiorari,
and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as
such.2 The main thrust of the petition is that private
respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or
domestic servant and not as a regular employee of
petitioner.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code,
as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic
servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is
synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and
shall refer to any person, whether male or
female, who renders services in and about the
employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and
enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such
househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants,
laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other
similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp SO ORDERED.
or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company,
like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the
same token, it cannot be considered to extend to then
driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may
not be considered as within the meaning of a
"househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined
by law.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the

family of the employer in the home of said employer.
While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a
home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in
nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the
former instance they are actually serving the family while
in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any
other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being
rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business
concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.

Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper

or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the
business of the employer that such househelper or
domestic servant may be considered as such as
employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such
distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or
domestic servant is working within the premises of the
business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its
guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants
the conclusion that such househelper or domestic
servant is and should be considered as a regular
employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in
Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as
amended.

Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private

respondent and maintains that respondent abandoned
her work.1âwphi1This argument notwithstanding, there
is enough evidence to show that because of an accident
which took place while private respondent was
performing her laundry services, she was not able to
work and was ultimately separated from the service. She
is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular
employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent
appears not to be interested in returning to her work for
valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in
order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the

appealed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990
FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), Rev. SIM DEE the present Head Monk of the
Manila Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his
capacity as the President and Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of
the Philippines, Inc., and in his private
capacity, respondents.
L.B. Camins for petitioner.
Lino M. Patajo and Jose J. Torrefranca for private
respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari (which We treat as a
special civil action for certiorari) seeks to annul the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated November 29, 1988, which reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter dated February 10, 1988 in NLRC
NCR Case No. 12-4861-86 (Filomena Barcenas v. Rev.
Sim See, etc., et al.) on the ground that no employer-
employee relationship exists between the parties.
Petitioner alleged in her position paper the following
facts:
In 1978, Chua Se Su (Su for short) in his capacity as the
Head Monk of the Buddhist Temple of Manila and
Baguio City and as President and Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the
Phils. Inc. hired the petitioner who speaks the Chinese
language as secretary and interpreter. Petitioner's
position required her to receive and assist Chinese
visitors to the temple, act as tourist guide for foreign
Chinese visitors, attend to the callers of the Head Monk
as well as to the food for the temple visitors, run errands
for the Head Monk such as paying the Meralco, PLDT,
MWSS bills and act as liaison in some government
offices. Aside from her pay and allowances under the
law, she received an amount of P500.00 per month plus
free board and lodging in the temple. In December,
1979, Su assumed the responsibility of paying for the
education of petitioner's nephew. In 1981, Su and
petitioner had amorous relations. In May, 1982, of five
months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on
October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol.
Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant
remained and continued in her job. In 1985, respondent
Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President
and Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist
Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for
short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter,
Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly
allowance and the additional P500.00 effective 1983. In
addition, petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly
from their quarters in the temple by six police officers.
She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and
then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to
sign a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist
temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00.
Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her
and her son. Her personal belongings including assorted
jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.
Chua and DEE on the other hand, claimed that petitioner
was never an employee of the Poh Toh Temple but a
servant who confined herself to the temple and to the
personal needs of the late Chua Se Su and thus, her
position is coterminous with that of her master.
On February 10, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the complainant Filomena Barcenas,
and the respondent corporation is
hereby ordered to pay her the following:
1. P26,575.00 backwages from August
9, 1986 up to date hereof.,
2. P14,650.00 as separation pay;
3. P18,000.00 as unpaid wages from
August, 1983 up to August 8, 1986; and
4. P10,000.00 moral damages.
Complainant's charge of unfair labor
practice is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 1
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission which, as earlier stated, reversed the above
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this instant petition.
A painstaking review of the records compels Us to
dismiss the petition.
At the outset, however, We agree with the petitioner's
claim that she was a regular employee of the Manila
Buddhist Temple as secretary and interpreter of its Head
Monk, Su As Head Monk, President and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association
of the Philippines, Su was empowered to hire the
petitioner under Article V of the By-laws of the
Association which states:
 . . . (T)he President or in his absence,
the Vice President shall represent the
Association in all its dealings with the
public, subject to the Board, shall have
the power to enter into any contract or
agreement in the name of the
Association, shall manage the active
business operation of the Association,
shall deal with the bank or banks . . . 2
Respondent NLRC represented by its Legal
Offices 3 argues that since petitioner was hired without
the approval of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh
Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., she was
not an employee of respondents. This argument is
specious. The required Board approval would appear to
relate to the acts of the President in representing the
association "in all its dealings with the public." And, even
granting that prior Board approval is required to confirm
the hiring of the petitioner, the same was already
granted, albeit, tacitly. It must be noted that petitioner
was hired in 1978 and no whimper of protest was raised
until this present controversy.
Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the
temple could not be categorized as mere domestic work.
Thus, We find that petitioner, being proficient in the
Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly
Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before
Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged
meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised
the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted
as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with
some goverment offices; and made the payment for the
temple's Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these
tasks may not be deemed activities of a household
helper. They were essential and important to the
operation and religious functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee
ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the
birth of her love-child allegedly by Su The records do not
show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a
leave was granted her. Neither did she return to work
after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom
she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The
NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died
that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple.
Petitioner's pleadings failed to rebut this finding. Clearly,
her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her
old position which she had already abandoned.
Petitioner herself supplied the reason for her return. She
stated:
. . . (I)t was the death-bed instruction to
her by Chua Se Su to stay at the temple
and to take care of the two boys and to
see to it that they finish their studies to
become monks and when they are
monks to eventually take over the two
temples as their inheritance from their
father Chua Se Su. 4
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an
employee but rather as Su's mistress who is bent on
protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her
son and nephew. In her pleadings, the petitioner claims
that they were forcefully evicted from the temple,
harassed and threatened by respondents and that the
Poh Toh Buddhist Association is a trustee corporation
with the children as cestui que trust. These claims are
not proper in this labor case. They should be
appropriately threshed out in the complaints already filed
by the petitioner before the civil courts. Due to these
claims, We view the respondents' offer of P10,000.00 as
indicative more of their desire to evict the petitioner and
her son from the temple rather than an admission of an
employer-employee relations.
Anent the petitioner's claim for unpaid wages since May,
1982 which she filed only in 1986, We hold that the
same has already prescribed. Under Article 292 of the
Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-
employee relations must be filed within three years from
the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they
shall forever be barred.
Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to
work in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no
proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk. In
fact, she herself manifested that respondents made it
clear to her in no uncertain terms that her services as
well as her presence and that of her son were no longer
needed. 5 However, she persisted and continued to work
in the temple without receiving her salary because she
expected Chua and Dee to relent and permit the studies
of the two boys. 6 Consequently, under these
circumstances, no employer-employee relationship could
have arisen.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated November 29, 1988 is
hereby AFFIRMED for the reasons aforestated. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169295-96 November 20, 2006
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA CASTANEDA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 filed by Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation to reverse and set aside the Decision2 of the
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 64577 and 68477, dated January 31, 2005, which
dismissed petitioner’s consolidated petitions for
certiorari, and its subsequent Resolution,3 dated August
11, 2005, which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as narrated by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The present controversy began when private
respondent, Erlinda Castaneda ("Erlinda") instituted on
March 2, 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime
services, non-payment of service incentive leave pay
and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington
before the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City.
The complaint impleaded Mr. Antonio Tan in his capacity
as the Managing Director of Remington.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983
as company cook with a salary of Php 4,000.00 for
Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading
business; that she worked for six (6) days a week,
starting as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the
marketing and would end at around 5:30 p.m., or even
later, after most of the employees, if not all, had left the
company premises; that she continuously worked with
Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented
from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a
new site in Edsa, Caloocan City. She averred that she
reported for work at the new site in Caloocan City on
January 15, 1998, only to be informed that Remington
no longer needed her services. Erlinda believed that her
dismissal was illegal because she was not given the
notices required by law; hence, she filed her complaint
for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary
differentials, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay
and 10% attorney’s fees.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It
posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular
employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had
nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in
construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire
rope products. It also contended that contrary to
Erlinda’s allegations that the (sic) she worked for eight
(8) hours a day, Erlinda’s duty was merely to cook lunch
and "merienda", after which her time was hers to spend
as she pleased. Remington also maintained that it did
not exercise any degree of control and/or supervision
over Erlinda’s work as her only concern was to ensure
that the employees’ lunch and "merienda" were available
and served at the designated time. Remington likewise
belied Erlinda’s assertion that her work extended beyond
5:00 p.m. as she could only leave after all the employees
had gone. The truth, according to Remington, is that
Erlinda did not have to punch any time card in the way
that other employees of Remington did; she was free to
roam around the company premises, read magazines,
and to even nap when not doing her assigned chores.
Remington averred that the illegal dismissal complaint
lacked factual and legal bases. Allegedly, it was Erlinda
who refused to report for work when Remington moved
to a new location in Caloocan City.
In a Decision4 dated January 19, 1999, the labor arbiter
dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent
was a domestic helper under the personal service of
Antonio Tan, finding that her work as a cook was not
usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course
of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, which
operated as a trading company, and that the latter did
not exercise control over her functions. On the issue of
illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the
respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio
Tan when the corporation transferred office and that,
therefore, respondent could not have been illegally
dismissed.
Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) rendered a Decision,5 dated November 23,
2000, reversing the labor arbiter, ruling, viz:
We are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that
complainant is a domestic helper of the family of Antonio
Tan. There was no allegation by respondent that
complainant had ever worked in the residence of Mr.
Tan. What is clear from the facts narrated by the parties
is that complainant continuously did her job as a cook in
the office of respondent serving the needed food for
lunch and merienda of the employees. Thus, her work as
cook inured not for the benefit of the family members of
Mr. Tan but solely for the individual employees of
respondent.
Complainant as an employee of respondent company is
even bolstered by no less than the certification dated
May 23, 1997 issued by the corporate secretary of the
company certifying that complainant is their bonafide
employee. This is a solid evidence which the Labor
Arbiter simply brushed aside. But, such error would not
be committed here as it would be at the height of
injustice if we are to declare that complainant is a
domestic helper.
Complainant’s work schedule and being paid a monthly
salary of ₱4,000.00 are clear indication that she is a
company employee who had been employed to cater to
the food needed by the employees which were being
provided by respondent to form part of the benefit
granted them.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, we believe
that there is more reason to believe that complainant
was not dismissed because allegedly she was the one
who refused to work in the new office of respondent.
However, complainant’s refusal to join the workforce due
to poor eyesight could not be considered abandonment
of work or voluntary resignation from employment.
Under the Labor Code as amended, an employee who
reaches the age of sixty years old (60 years) has the
option to retire or to separate from the service with
payment of separation pay/retirement benefit.
In this case, we notice that complainant was already 60
years old at the time she filed the complaint praying for
separation pay or retirement benefit and some money
claims.
Based on Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended,
complainant is entitled to be paid her separation
pay/retirement benefit equivalent to one-half (1/2) month
for every year of service. The amount of separation pay
would be based on the prescribed minimum wage at the
time of dismissal since she was then underpaid. In as
much as complainant is underpaid of her wages, it
behooves that she should be paid her salary differential
for the last three years prior to separation/retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision is hereby, SET ASIDE, and a new one is
hereby entered ordering respondents to pay complainant
the following:
1. Salary differential - ₱12,021.12 2. Service Incentive
Leave Pay - 2,650.00 3. 13th Month Pay differential -
1,001.76 4. Separation Pay/retirement benefit -
36,075.00
Total - ₱51,747.88
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider this decision but the
NLRC denied the motion. This denial of its motion
prompted petitioner to file a Petition for Certiorari6 with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
64577, on May 4, 2001, imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the NLRC in (1) reversing in toto the decision
of the labor arbiter, and (2) awarding in favor of
respondent salary differential, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay differential and separation benefits
in the total sum of ₱51,747.88.
While the petition was pending with the Court of
Appeals, the NLRC rendered another Decision7 in the
same case on August 29, 2001. How and why another
decision was rendered is explained in that decision as
follows:
On May 17, 2001, complainant filed a Manifestation
praying for a resolution of her Motion for
Reconsideration and, in support thereof, alleges that,
sometime December 18, 2000, she mailed her
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration registered
as Registered Certificate No. 188844; and that the said
mail was received by the NLRC, through a certain
Roland Hernandez, on December 26, 2000.
Certifications to this effect was issued by the Postmaster
of the Sta. Mesa Post Office bearing the date May 11,
2001 (Annexes A and B, Complainant’s Manifestation).
Evidence in support of complainant’s having actually
filed a Motion for Reconsideration within the
reglementary period having been sufficiently established,
a determination of its merits is thus, in order.
On the merits, the NLRC found respondent’s motion for
reconsideration meritorious leading to the issuance of its
second decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated
November 23, 2000, is MODIFIED by increasing the
award of retirement pay due the complainant in the total
amount of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
THIRTY-SEVEN and 50/100 (₱62,437.50). All other
monetary relief so adjudged therein are maintained and
likewise made payable to the complainant.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner challenged the second decision of the NLRC,
including the resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration, through a second Petition for
Certiorari8 filed with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68477 and dated January 8, 2002, this
time imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC
in (1) issuing the second decision despite losing its
jurisdiction due to the pendency of the first petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and (2) assuming it
still had jurisdiction to issue the second decision
notwithstanding the pendency of the first petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, that its second
decision has no basis in law since respondent’s motion
for reconsideration, which was made the basis of the
second decision, was not filed under oath in violation of
Section 14, Rule VII9 of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC and that it contained no certification as to why
respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not decided
on time as also required by Section 10, Rule VI10 and
Section 15, Rule VII11 of the aforementioned rules.
Upon petitioner’s motion, the Court of Appeals ordered
the consolidation of the two (2) petitions, on January 24,
2002, pursuant to Section 7, par. b(3), Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of the Court of Appeals. It summarized
the principal issues raised in the consolidated petitions
as follows:
1. Whether respondent is petitioner’s regular
employee or a domestic helper;
2. Whether respondent was illegally dismissed;
and
3. Whether the second NLRC decision
promulgated during the pendency of the first
petition for certiorari has basis in law.
On January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the consolidated petitions for lack of merit, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
issuing the assailed decisions.
On the first issue, it upheld the ruling of the NLRC that
respondent was a regular employee of the petitioner
since the former worked at the company premises and
catered not only to the personal comfort and enjoyment
of Mr. Tan and his family, but also to that of the
employees of the latter. It agreed that petitioner enjoys
the prerogative to control respondent’s conduct in
undertaking her assigned work, particularly the nature
and situs of her work in relation to the petitioner’s
workforce, thereby establishing the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between them.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, it ruled that respondent
has attained the status of a regular employee in her
service with the company. It noted that the NLRC found
that no less than the company’s corporate secretary
certified that respondent is a bonafide company
employee and that she had a fixed schedule and routine
of work and was paid a monthly salary of ₱4,000.00; that
she served with petitioner for 15 years starting in 1983,
buying and cooking food served to company employees
at lunch and merienda; and that this work was usually
necessary and desirable in the regular business of the
petitioner. It held that as a regular employee, she enjoys
the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure
and that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proving that her dismissal on January 15, 1998 was for a
just or authorized cause and that the manner of
dismissal complied with the requirements under the law.
Finally, on petitioner’s other arguments relating to the
alleged irregularity of the second NLRC decision, i.e.,
the fact that respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
not under oath and had no certification explaining why it
was not resolved within the prescribed period, it held that
such violations relate to procedural and non-jurisdictional
matters that cannot assume primacy over the
substantive merits of the case and that they do not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction that would nullify the second NLRC
decision.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s contention that
the NLRC lost its jurisdiction to issue the second
decision when it received the order indicating the Court
of Appeals’ initial action on the first petition for certiorari
that it filed. It ruled that the NLRC’s action of issuing a
decision in installments was not prohibited by its own
rules and that the need for a second decision was
justified by the fact that respondent’s own motion for
reconsideration remained unresolved in the first
decision. Furthermore, it held that under Section 7, Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court,12the filing of a petition
for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding with the case.
From this decision, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on February 22, 2005, which the Court
of Appeals denied through a resolution dated August 11,
2005.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petitioner raises the following errors of law: (1) the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NLRC’s ruling
that the respondent was petitioner’s regular employee
and not a domestic helper; (2) the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that petitioner was guilty of illegal
dismissal; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred when it
held that the issuance of the second NLRC decision is
proper.
The petition must fail. We affirm that respondent was a
regular employee of the petitioner and that the latter was
guilty of illegal dismissal.
Before going into the substantive merits of the present
controversy, we shall first resolve the propriety of the
issuance of the second NLRC decision.
The petitioner contends that the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, upon which the second NLRC decision
was based, was not under oath and did not contain a
certification as to why it was not decided on time as
required under the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC.13 Furthermore, the former also raises for the first
time the contention that respondent’s motion was filed
beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period required under
the same Rules,14 since the latter received a copy of the
first NLRC decision on December 6, 2000, and
respondent filed her motion only on December 18, 2000.
Thus, according to petitioner, the respondent’s motion
for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper and the
second NLRC decision has no basis in law.
We do not agree.
It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of
procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of
substantial justice, particularly in labor cases.15 Labor
cases must be decided according to justice and equity
and the substantial merits of the controversy.16 Rules of
procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice.17 Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided.18
This Court has consistently held that the requirement of
verification is formal, and not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is merely a condition affecting the form of
the pleading, non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not
the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith.19 The court
may order the correction of the pleading if verification is
lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if
the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. 20
Anent the argument that respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, on which the NLRC’s second decision
was based, was filed out of time, such issue was only
brought up for the first time in the instant petition where
no new issues may be raised by a party in his pleadings
without offending the right to due process of the
opposing party.
Nonetheless, the petitioner asserts that the respondent
received a copy of the NLRC’s first decision on
December 6, 2000, and the motion for reconsideration
was filed only on December 18, 2000, or two (2) days
beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period requirement
under the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and
should not be allowed.21
This contention must fail.
Under Article 22322 of the Labor Code, the decision of
the NLRC shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from the receipt thereof by the parties.
While it is an established rule that the perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory, it is equally settled that the
NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there
is an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking
of the appeal.23 Among the acceptable reasons
recognized by this Court are (a) counsel's reliance on
the footnote of the notice of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter that "the aggrieved party may appeal. . . within
ten (10) working days";24 (b) fundamental consideration
of substantial justice;25 (c) prevention of miscarriage of
justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy
appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which
was already granted in an earlier final decision;26 and (d)
special circumstances of the case combined with its
legal merits27 or the amount and the issue involved.28
We hold that the particular circumstances in the case at
bar, in accordance with substantial justice, call for a
liberalization of the application of this rule. Notably,
respondent’s last day for filing her motion for
reconsideration fell on December 16, 2000, which was a
Saturday. In a number of cases,29 we have ruled that if
the tenth day for perfecting an appeal fell on a Saturday,
the appeal shall be made on the next working day. The
reason for this ruling is that on Saturdays, the office of
the NLRC and certain post offices are closed. With all
the more reason should this doctrine apply to
respondent’s filing of the motion for reconsideration of
her cause, which the NLRC itself found to be impressed
with merit. Indeed, technicality should not be permitted
to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving
the rights and obligations of the parties for the ends of
justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal
of cases but, more importantly, through a meticulous and
comprehensive evaluation of the merits of a case.
Finally, as to petitioner’s argument that the NLRC had
already lost its jurisdiction to decide the case when it
filed its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, suffice
it to state that under Section 7 of Rule 6530 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case. Thus, the mere pendency of a
special civil action for certiorari, in connection with a
pending case in a lower court, does not interrupt the
course of the latter if there is no writ of
injunction.31 Clearly, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing its second
decision which modified the first, especially since it failed
to consider the respondent’s motion for reconsideration
when it issued its first decision.
Having resolved the procedural matters, we shall now
delve into the merits of the petition to determine whether
respondent is a domestic helper or a regular employee
of the petitioner, and whether the latter is guilty of illegal
dismissal.
Petitioner relies heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr.
Antonio Tan and contends that respondent is the latter’s
domestic helper and not a regular employee of the
company since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct
personality from the petitioner. It maintains that it did not
exercise control and supervision over her functions; and
that it operates as a trading company and does not
engage in the restaurant business, and therefore
respondent’s work as a cook, which was not usually
necessary or desirable to its usual line of business or
trade, could not make her its regular employee.
This contention fails to impress.
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC,32 this Court held
that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company was a regular employee of the said firm. We
ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code,
as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic
servant" are defined as follows:
"The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous
to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any
person, whether male or female, who renders services in
and about the employer’s home and which services are
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and
enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the
personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s
family."
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such
househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants,
laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and
similar househelps.
xxx xxx xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
family of the employer in the home of said employer.
While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a
home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in
nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the
former instance they are actually serving the family while
in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any
other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being
rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business
concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper
or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the
business of the employer that such househelper or
domestic servant may be considered as such an
employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such
distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or
domestic servant is working within the premises of the
business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its
guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants
the conclusion that such househelper or domestic
servant is and should be considered as a regular
employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in
Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its
position paper33 that respondent worked at the company
premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its
employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as
well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who
caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but
also to that of the petitioner’s employees, makes her fall
squarely within the definition of a regular employee
under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case.
That she works within company premises, and that she
does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr.
Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the
petitioner’s right of control over her functions, which is
the primary indicator of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.
Moreover, it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly
related to the employer's business, then the person
performing such work could not be considered an
employee of the latter. The determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is
defined by law according to the facts of each case,
regardless of the nature of the activities
involved.34 Indeed, it would be the height of injustice if
we were to hold that despite the fact that respondent
was made to cook lunch and merienda for the
petitioner’s employees, which work ultimately redounded
to the benefit of the petitioner corporation, she was
merely a domestic worker of the family of Mr. Tan.
We note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that no less than the company’s corporate
secretary has certified that respondent is
a bonafide company employee;35 she had a fixed
schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly
salary of ₱4,000.00;36 she served with the company for
15 years starting in 1983, buying and cooking food
served to company employees at lunch and merienda,
and that this service was a regular feature of
employment with the company.37
Indubitably, the Court of Appeals, as well as the NLRC,
correctly held that based on the given circumstances,
the respondent is a regular employee of the
petitioner.1âwphi1
Having determined that the respondent is petitioner’s
regular employee, we now proceed to ascertain the
legality of her dismissal from employment.
Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on
respondent’s part when she refused to report for work
when the corporation transferred to a new location in
Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would
make long distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be
held guilty of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the
petitioner relocated, she was no longer called for duty
and that when she tried to report for work, she was told
that her services were no longer needed. She contends
that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or
authorized cause and that she was not given prior
notice, hence rendering the dismissal illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision dated January 31, 2005,
and the Resolution dated August 11, 2005, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and 68477 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

We rule for the respondent.

As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to

security of tenure under Article 27938 of the Labor Code
and may only be dismissed for a just39 or
authorized40 cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes
illegal and the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages computed from the
time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of

an employee to resume his employment.41 It is a form of
neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for
termination by the employer.42 For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1)
the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested by overt
acts from which it may be deduced that the employee
has no more intention to work.43The intent to discontinue
the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified.44This, the petitioner failed
to do in the case at bar.

Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the

respondent who quit her employment and refused to
return to work, greater stock may be taken of the
respondent’s immediate filing of her complaint with the
NLRC. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in
protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to
have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the
filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal
with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her
desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s
charge of abandonment.45

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the

employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and
valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal.46 The employer’s case
succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not
on the weakness of the employee’s defense.47 If doubt
exists between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter.48