Professional Documents
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SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant is a full- edged member of Congress who is now con ned at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Accused-appellant led a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the rst
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Accused-appellant insisted that having been re-elected by his constituents, he had
the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. According to him, his covenant with
his constituents cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraint arising from
pending criminal cases. He asserted that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government.
When the voters of his district elected accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results, which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ve days or more
in a week virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
As such, an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public o cers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
The Court found the election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classi cation in criminal enforcement. The functions and duties of the o ce are not
substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
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freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and con nement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. The Court
was constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public
office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
Instant motion was denied.
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
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provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not
be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; . . ..
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest.
He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to con ne it
within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision,
to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to
the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess
or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do
so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
—
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance
of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House
may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The con nement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
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Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 2 which states,
inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public o cer for acts done prior to his
present term of o ce. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their o cers. When a people have elected a man to o ce, it must be
assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted
ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public o cer for
acts done prior to his present term of o ce. It does not apply to imprisonment arising
from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not removal, con nement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified. cdasia
One rationale behind con nement, whether pending appeal or after nal conviction,
is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 3 it is the injury to the public
which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
o ce cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he
ed and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives
for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to
justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from
its being contrary to well-de ned Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the
aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for
official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him
from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center,
Makati City;
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d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison
premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose
of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in
going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City.
c) to be con ned at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to
all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ve (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of
a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of
particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v.
Morfe: 5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and forti ed by
policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to
have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for
a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions e ciently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated
like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to
it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that
the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it su ces to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power.
The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is
trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue
is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga
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del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona de member
of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with
the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
dctai
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional o ce situated at Room N-
214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department
coordination, he is also provided with an o ce at the Administration Building, New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents ." Accused-appellant further
admits that while under detention, he has led several bills and resolutions. It also appears
that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary bene ts. Succinctly stated,
accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.
Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the con nes of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person
with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at
any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws." 6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both
in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective o cial result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly con ned under
law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public o cers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence
of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor
with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular a iction. An
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elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police o cer must maintain
peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classi cations is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. 8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9
We, therefore, nd that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classi cation in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the o ce are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and con nement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. 10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a
person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. 11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty.
As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to
the accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any
prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his
own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion 1 4 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of
freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits de ned by wall or any exterior
barrier." 15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society. 1 6 Prison o cials have the di cult and often thankless job of
preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to
provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.
17
Separate Opinions
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GONZAGA-REYES , J ., concurring opinion:
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz —
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina 2 we held that the trial court's
judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong.
Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and
constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of
his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators
provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. The Constitution states that —
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. 3
Footnotes
15. Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
16. Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd ed., p.
121.
17. Ibid.
4. Art. VI, Sec. 15. — The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.
5. Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425.
6. Art. VIII, Sec. 9 — A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at
its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the Batasang Pambansa
shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours
after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall
cease upon its failure to do so. A member shall not be questioned nor held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.
8. Ibid., 178-185.
9. Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.
10. Supra.
11. Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.