Case Title Terry v Ohio

G.R. no. 392 U.S. 1

Main Topic Search and Seizures
Other Related Topic
Date: May 21, 1905

DOCTRINES
“Terry Stop” - Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where, in the course of investigating
this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.

FACTS:
Petitioner John W. Terry was stopped and searched by an officer named Martin McFadden after
the latter observed and noticed that Terry, together with Katz and Chilton, were seemingly casing
a store for potential daylight robbery. According to the police officer, his attention was attracted
by two men whom he has never seen before, Chilton and Terry, who were standing in a corner of
the street. The two men walked on a shor distance of the street to look at the same store window,
and they went throguh the same series of motions which aroused the suspicion of the officer. He
followed them and saw that they rejoined with a third man, and they followed the path he was
walking. He then presumed, based on his experience, that the suspicious men were planning to
hold a daylight robbery, and that they might be armed. The police officer approached the men
and introduced that he was a police officer. The men mumbled and the officer grabbed petitioner
Terry and patted down the outside of his clothing. He removed Terry's overcoat completely,
removed a .38 caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered all three men to face the wall with
their hands raised. Officer McFadden proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and
the third man, Katz. He discovered another revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but
no weapons were found on Katz. The officer testified that he only patted the men down to see
whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the outer garments of either
Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. Petitioner assails that the action of the police officer is a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, or his right to privacy.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . .
."
ISSUES:
Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited
search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.
 HELD:
The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable search
when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the
officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by
being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.

The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of
the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it held,
was essential to the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for, without it, "the
answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is
admissible."

An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause,
when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous. What the
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. In
the case at hand, the officer had probable cause to believe that the men were planning a stick up.
It would be wrong for him not to stop the men and investigate as to whether they were really
planning what the officer thought they would be doing.

Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this
behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.

the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a
police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him or her without probable cause to arrest,
if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and
presently dangerous."

Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a
search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry and Chilton
were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his own
protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that
they might be armed.

The Court rejected the idea that a "stop and frisk" could categorically never be a search or
seizure subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it made room for the idea
that some police action short of a traditional arrest could constitute a seizure—that is, "whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person." The Court also noted that "... it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language
to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' "

Thus, when the police detective took hold of Terry and patted him down on that Cleveland street,
the detective "seized" Terry and subjected him to a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. But the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches and
seizures, so the Court next had to determine whether Terry’s seizure and search were
"reasonable".

The Court ruled that the police officer's actions were reasonable because of the circumstances
that led him to conduct the search and seizure. The suspicious actions of the men, and it is
reasonable to believe that men who are planning a robbery have guns and other weapons with
them. The sole justification of the search is the protection of the police officer and others nearby,
and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. The police
detective here limited his search to the outer surfaces of Terry's clothing. Thus, the search was
reasonably related in scope to the concern for his own safety that justified the stop from the
beginning. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the revolver found on Terry's person was
properly admitted into evidence.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Dissent.

Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that the majority’s holding would
grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not
possess.

Concurrence.

Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional
necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular
facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.