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SALES v.

BARRO public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to


FACTS: the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
1. Sales alleged that they are the owners of the land where contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred. Possession is
the respondents constructed a shanty without their also transferred, along with ownership thereof, to respondent
consent. And yet, the latter refused to pay rental. by virtue of the notarized deeds of conveyances. It was also
2. When the pet. demanded that they vacate the property, the proven that the stay of the caretaker was a mere privilege
respondents refused, prompting the filing of an ejectment granted by resp.
complaint.
3. MeTC granted the pet. on the ground that since occupancy SPOUSES CHUA v. SORIANO
was made possible by the pet’s tolerance, they can be FACTS:
validly ejected upon demand. 1. Celestino asked his cousin Soriano if he can lend him the
4. Reversed by CA which held that the complaint was for title of the latter’s land as a security for a loan to be used
forcible entry and that it lacked the requisite allegation of in his business operation. Acceding to the request, Soriano
prior physical possession. executed an SPC authorizing the former to mortgage said
5. Pet. argued that the complaint was for unlawful detainer, property.
hence there was no need to allege prior physical 2. The title however was destroyed when fire broke out,
possession of lot. resulting to loss of the files of registry of deeds. Soriano
HELD: Affirmed. Firstly, per. averred that the construction was again executed an SPA authorizing Celestino to initiate a
done without their consent. Secondly, it was noted that the pt reconstitution proceeding.
became owners on Jan 2004. By praying that they be paid for 3. When there was a rumor spreading that Celestino already
the rent from Jan 2004 leads to conclusion that pet had sold the property, resp inquired with the ROD and found
always considered occupation unlawful from the beginning. that the land has ben registered in the name of Sps Chua.
This is therefore a case of forceful entry. Said action requires 4. Claiming that his signature was forged, resp filed an
that pet. must allege his prior physical possession of the annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of title, and
property; and second, he must also allege that he was reconveyance.
deprived of his possession thru force, intimidation, threats, 5. Chuas contended that they were purchasers in good faith
strategy, and stealth. That they were registered owners since they bought the peorpety by virtue of an SPA duly
doesn’t convince as the action pertains to physical and not inscribed on the owner’s duplicate TCT and they inspected
legal possession. the property before buying iy.
6. Rendered in favor of resp. Affirmed by CA.
MEDINA v. GREENFIELD CORP HELD: A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property
FACTS: without notice that some other person has a right to or
1. Pet are the grandchildren of Pedro from his two marriages. interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has
The latter and his siblings executed a notarized deed of notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in
sale in favor of resp. who then registered in its name the the same property. Generally, a person dealing with a
title of the parcels of land. registered land can rely on the correctness of the TCT and is
2. Pet filed an action for annulment of title and deeds w/ not required to explore further than what the title indicates on
prelim injunction. They alleged that they were the co- its face. However, when a person who deals with registered
owners of the said lot and that despite the transfer of title, land through someone who is not the registered owner, he is
they remained in possession and in fact their caretaker expected to look behind the certificate of title and examine all
still reside on a portion of the property. the factual circumstances, in order to determine if the vendor
3. Action granted by RTC, but reversed by the CA which ruled has the capacity to transfer any interest in the land. He has
that resp is in constructive possession of the properties in the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he
dispute considering that it is already the registered owner. is dealing and the latter’s legal authority to convey. The
HELD: Preliminary injunction can’t be granted. The resolution strength of inquiry depends on the seller’s proof of capacity.
of the action hinges on the prima facie legal right to the If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney
properties. That they have been in possession despite transfer duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public
of title bears no legal consequence in the case at hand document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. An
because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already examination of the assailed SPA shows that it is valid and
deemed equivalent to delivery of the property to respondent, regular on its face. It contains a notarial seal. Moreover, SPA
and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally was accepted by ROD and inscribed in the owner’s duplicate
required. Under Art. 1498, when the sale is made through a title.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP v. CA 6. RTC declared Sps Occea as purchasers in good faith and
FACTS: ruled that action was time barred. This was reversed by
1. When resp. Jardinico bought the rights to Lot 9 from CA.
Robillo, the lot was vacant. Resp. then secured a title from 7. Sps Occea argued that they ere purchasers in good faith as
the ROD. a person dealing with registered land is only charged with
2. It was discovered later on that Kee had taken possession notice of the burden on the property annotated on the title
of the said lot. It turned out that the latter supposedly and that they relied on the representation of vendor
bought Lot 8 from CTTEI, the real estate agenet. Arnold that these houses were owned by squatters and
3. After the preparation of the lot plan, Octaviano, CTTEI’s that he was merely tolerating their presence on the land.
employee, accompanied Kee’s wife to and pointed that the HELD: What is material is whether the second buyer first
lot to be bought was lot 9.Kee constructed his residence, a registers the second sale in good faith, i.e., without
store, and an auto repair shop. knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
4. Jardinico then filed an ejectment complaint against Kee Generally, one who deals with property registered under the
who in turn filed a third party complaint against CTTEI. Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to
5. Granted by MeTC, but reversed by CA which ruled that Kee rely on the title. However, this does not apply when the party
was a builder in good faith as he was unaware of the mix has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
up and entitled to rights under Arts. 448, 546, and 548. impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or
HELD: Kee was a builder in good faith. Good faith consists in when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Being a prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
layman, he is not versed in the technical description of his property in litigation. In this case, it was admitted that Tomas
property to find a way to ascertain that what was described in inspected the property before buying it. Tomas should have
TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8 and not the land he was verified from the occupants of the land the nature and
occupying. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation authority of their possession instead of merely relying on the
of CTTEI, and because of the companys positive identification representation of the vendor that they were squatters, having
of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had seen for himself that the land was occupied by persons other
been a misdelivery. than the vendor who was not in possession of the land at that
time. Action also did not prescribe as prescription does not
SPS OCCEA v. ESPONILLA apply when the person seeking annulment of title or
FACTS: reconveyance is in possession of the lot because the action
1. After the death of Sps Tordesilla, their lot was inherited by partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible.
Arnold and Angela, who then executed a deed of definite
sale of shares, rights, interests, and participations in favor NOTE: Under Art 1544, in case of double sale of immovable
of Morales. property, the ownership shall belong: (1) to the person
2. Alberta possessed the lot as owner, constructed a house acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry
on it and appointed a caretaker to oversee her property. In of Property; (2) should there be no inscription, the ownership
1956, Arnold borrowed the title from Morales and shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
executed an affidavit stating that receipt in trust and that possession; and, (3) in the absence thereof, to the person who
it shall be returned without any changes. presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
3. Without the knowledge of the latter, Arnold and Angela
executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement declaring them KASILAG v. ROQUE
as the only co-owners of the lot without acknowledging FACTS:
the prior sale to Morales. 1. The heirs of the deceased Ambrosio filed a complaint to
4. When Morales died, her heirs asked Arnold that deliver to recover from the pet the possession of the land and
them the title of the land so they can register it in their improvements granted by way of homestead to Ambrosio.
name, but he failed to so. 2. Pet averred that he was in possession of the land and that
5. Arnold subdivided the lot, and sold the portion B & C to he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage
Sps Occea. Morales’ heirs found out what Arnold did when contract, entered into between him and the deceased
they were notified by their caretaker Abas that they were Ambrosio.
being ejected from the land. Heirs of Morales then filed 3. It appeared that pet loaned 1k to Ambrosio and they
annulment of sale. executed a mortgage contract over improvements. It was
stipulated that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem
the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years goods were then transferred from Garcia to Sierra, the
and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of newly appointed depositary.
the land in favor of the mortgagee. 2. In 1905, a decision was ruled by CFI against Reyes who
4. However, in 1933, Ambrosio was unable to pay the was adjudged to pay Garcia. For the purpose of levying
stipulated interest as well as the lax on the land and its upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at the
improvements. For this reason, they entered into another request of Garcia entered the warehouse where the goods
verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the pledged to the bank were stored under the custody of
possession of the land on condition that the latter would Sierra and seized the said property.
not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the 3. Bank then filed a complaint against the sheriff praying that
payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the a judgment be rendered declaring the execution as illegal.
land, and would introduce improvements. By virtue of this, 4. Sheriff alleged that the contract of pledge was defective as
pet took the land into his possession. Reyes, the debtor, continued in possession of the property
5. CA declared that the contract as well as the subsequent pledged.
verbal contract as null and void and that the pet acted in HELD: The Court held that the contract complied with all the
bad faith in taking possession of the land knowing that the requisites provided in Art. 1857, such that the property was
contract is void. pledged to secure a debt, the date of the execution, the terms
HELD: There is no question that the principal and mortgage of the pledge, and the property pledged, all of which appears
contracts were valid. As to the verbal contract which allowed in a public document, and the property pledged was placed in
the petitioner to take the land into his possession and would the hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor
benefit by the fruits not he condition that he would condone and creditor, under the supervision of an agent of the bank. In
the payment of interest, this was a contract of antichresis. this case, the goods were in the possession of the 3rd person.
Being a real encumbrance burdening the land, it is illegal and That the said goods were in the warehouse formerly rented by
void for violating Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874 which provides Reyes didn’t affect the validity of the pledge. The symbolical
that “lands acquired under the free patent or homestead transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation the warehouse where the goods were stored suffices to show
from the date of the approval of the application and for a that the depositary appointed by the common consent of the
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the parties was legally placed in possession of the goods.
patent or grant.” As to whether the land was taken into
possession in good faith or not, the Court held that it cannot REPUBLIC v. ALONTE
be established from the facts if he was aware of the flaw. FACTS:
However, while ignorance of the law is not excuse, possible 1. Alonte filed a petition for the reconstitution of the original
and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and of the TCT over her land. She alleged that the original title
from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines can be a basis was kept in the office of the registry of deeds which was
of good faith. In taking possession of the land and in destroyed by fire in 1988.
consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as 2. As she was in the US, she was represented by Editha as
a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits evidenced by an SPA. Granted by CA.
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, 3. Pet. alleges that resp. failed to allege the ff mandatory
as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. Resp. entitled to facts in her petition: 1) the names and addresses of the
have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the
petitioner, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying may have any interest in the property; 2) a detailed
its market value to be fixed by the court of origin. description of the encumbrance appearing on the title; and
3) the restrictions and liabilities allegedly appearing on the
BANCO ESPAÑOL FILIPINO v. PETERSON subject title.
FACTS: HELD: A thorough examination of the record reveals that
1. The bank loaned Php227k to Reyes who executed before there is no factual basis for petitioner's claim that respondent
the notary a mortgage over his properties which included a failed to comply with the requirements for a petition for
stock of merchandise, consisting of wines, liquors, canned reconstitution as enumerated in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A.
goods, and other similar articles valued at Php91k, but it No. 26. The fact that Editha Alonte, respondent's attorneyin-
was later agreed in a subsequent contract that the goods fact, testified that it is she and her family who are residing on
should only be liable for Php40k. The possession of the the subject lot does not negate the statement in the petition
for reconstitution that it is respondent who is in possession of
the lot. Under Art. 524, possession may be in one's own name hacienda, Cuaycong et al, had been using the said roads to
or in that of another. Clearly, Editha Alonte was exercising transport their products.
possession over the land in the name of respondent Lourdes 2. However, in 1911, Benedicto decided to close the roads
Alonte. This was supported by the Certification from the and began asking for toll fees for wagons passing through
Office of the City Treasurer which states that the real property their hacienda.
taxes on said property, declared in the name of Lourdes 3. Claiming that they have a right of way over the said
Alonte, had been paid. Nanca-Victorias Road, Cuaycong filed a complaint against
Benedicto.
MACASAET v. MACASAET 4. Lower court dismissed the claim over the Dacuman-
FACTS: Toreno Road for the other parties were in default, but
1. The pet. are the son and daughter-in-law of the declared that Cuaycong et al do have a right of way over
respondents, who filed an ejectment suit against the the Nanca-Victorias Road.
former. 5. Cuaycong argued that the road is a public highway and
2. Resp. alleged that they were the owners of the land but by even if it not, he acquired right of private easement
way of verbal lease agreement, the pet. occupied these HELD: Nanca-victorias Road is not a public highway. First it
lots and use them for residence. However, the pet. was shown that in the Torrens title held by Benedicto, there
allegedly failed to pay the agreed rent. was no encumbrance attached to the hacienda, that it is
3. Pet. contended that they didn’t have a verbal lease nowhere nearby a road nor does it border a road. Second, the
agreement. They claimed that the resp. invited them to road was not maintained by the local government. Its upkeep
construct their residence and business on the subject lots was solely supported by the road users for their benefits,
in order that they could all live near one other, employ convenience and interest. There was no adverse possession
Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the by the government. As to the rise of private easement, there
problems of the family. being no evidence that the original use of the road by
4. MTCC acceded that their stay was by mere tolerance but Cuaycong's predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee
still ordered pet. to vacate the premises. Affirmed. to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under
HELD: The Court has consistently held that those who occupy the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by of the owners of the estates affected. Possession, to
an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property constitute the foundation of prescriptive right, must be
upon demand. Toleration is defined as the act or practice of possession under claim of title i.e. it must be adverse. Acts of
permitting or enduring something not wholly approved of. possessory character performed by one who holds by mere
However, the possession is not by mere tolerance. Pet. proved tolerance of the owner cannot be made the basis of the
that resp. invited them to occupy the subject lots in order that prescriptive acquisition of rights
they could all live near one other and help in resolving family
problems. By occupying the lots, they only accepted an ASTUDILLO v. PHHC
invitation with the complete approval of the resp. While they FACTS:
had the right to occupy, this right ceased upon their receipt of 1. Mitra applied on behalf of his son Ramon for the purchase
notice to vacate. Their possession, which was originally of lot. This application was approved and he made a
lawful, became unlawful, hence the propriety of the ejectment downpayment amounting to 10% of the price of the lot.
suit. Resp. have the right to appropriate the building and 2. PHHC and Mitra then executed a contract of conditional
other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) sale. A final deed of sale was executed upon the full
refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the payment of the remaining the balance.
increase in value acquired by the properties by reason of the 3. It turned out that the lot in question was in the possession
said improvements. of Astudillo who constructed a residential house. She
averred that she has been on the land uninterruptedly
CUAYCONG v. BEENDICTO since 1957. She then filed an administrative investigating
FACTS: committee of PHHC a request praying for cancellation of
1. Benedicto owns Hacienda Toreno which is located in awarding of lot to Mitra.
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Two roads pass through the 4. Since no action was taken, she filed a complaint in the
said hacienda: the Dacuman-Toreno Road and the Nanca- lower court against PHHC and Sps Mitra. Dismissed on the
Victorias Road. For forty years, the owners of the nearby ground that she was a mala fide squatter.
HELD: Astudillo has no cause of action against Mitra and to
require that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter,
she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. Therefore, the
awarding of right to Mitra doesn’t prejudice her since she was
bereft of any rights. There was no evidence that she was a
member of the Piñahan Homeowners Association some of
whose members are "deserving squatters.”

PERAN v. CFI
FACTS:
1. An unregistered land was originally owned by Evasco. The
latter then executed a Reparticion Extrajudicial where he
partitioned his properties among his five heirs.
2. His heir Alejandro sold his property to Torella, who in turn
sold the land to Sabater. Pet. Peran acquired the land by
purchase from the latter. This sale was duly recorded in
the Register of Deeds.
3. In 1979, pet. asked Encarnacion Evasco, whose house was
built on the lot they bought. She also asked the latter to
remove the house and vacate the premises, but the
Evascos refused.
4. Pet. then filed a complaint for forcible entry and illegal
detainer. Resp. argued that they are lawful possessors for
more than 20 years of the said portion and that pet. had
no right to eject them.
5. Petition granted Municipal Circuit Court, but this was
reversed by the CFI on the ground that since the issue in
an illegal detainer case is physical possession, whoever
has prior possession, no matter in what character, is
protected by law.
HELD: Resp. may have been in possession of the portion they
occupy prior to petitioner but they have not proved their title
thereto, nor their right to possess. If at all, their possession of
the portion of the property was by mere tolerance of the
pet.’s precessors-in-interest which does not vest in them a
right. A possessor by tolerance is necessarily bound by an
implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.

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