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Police Power

White Light Corporation et.a. v. City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the
Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the
Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Ruling: Not valid. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power,
and as such, it is unconstitutional. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions
by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.

As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No.
7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED

Police Power
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending
and Promotions, Inc.

G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009

Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and


Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro
Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate
and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that
MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would
transfer to the Government.

In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.
(Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter
installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the
MRT3.

In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other
advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the
posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in
any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After
Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s
billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of
respondents’ advertisement materials

Ruling: No. That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no
longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon
the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.

Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this
case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with
Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,
this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other
advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of
Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on
its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media
installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court
had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a
system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards,
signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of
the areas as to which the prohibition applied.

Police Power
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

Facts: The Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan
for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition
interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No.
5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an
optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and
similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot
sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an
independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the
public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise
optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is
allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a


complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its
business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19,
1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit
effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police
power.

Ruling: No. Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within
the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business
permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must
always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court
of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special
conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and
private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well
within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory
in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such
licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through
the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.

Eminent Domain
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

Facts: The following are consolidated cases:

- A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants.
Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The
petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power.
- A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against
Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform
Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
- A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
- A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of
cash.

Ruling:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in
these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner
and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR
can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree
with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA
6657:Section 16 (f).

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise
of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain.
The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash –
if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and
other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

Eminent Domain
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

GR 119694 22 May 1995

Facts: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print
space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by
the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper,
magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press
Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the
Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It
merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec
space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of
the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of
the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises
during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain

Ruling: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to
“taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just
compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a
de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary
value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity
for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI
are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed,
the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the
power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission.

Eminent Domain
FORFOM vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

G.R.No. 124795 December 10, 2008

Facts: Petitioner Forform Development Corporation is a domestic corporation duly organized


and existing under the Philippine laws and is the registered owner of several parcels of land in
San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of Title. The said parcels of land
were originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom.
While respondent Philippine National Railways is a government corporation engaged in
proprietary functions with principal office at the PNR Railway. President Ferdinand Marcos
approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project known as Carmona Project. During the
construction of the said project, several properties owned by private individuals/corporations
were traversed as right-of-way and one of those was a 100,128 square-meter portion owned by
Forfom. Forform filed before the Trial Court for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property
and/or Damages which in its decision dated October 29, 1992 ordering the PNR to pay
FORFORM for just compensation.

Plaintiff's claim for recovery of possession and the other prayers in the complaint are dismissed
for want of merit but the trial court found that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR
without due process of law and without just compensation. Both parties appealed the decision
which the Court of Appeals affirmed insofar as (1) it denies plaintiff's claim for recovery of
possession and (2) it awards just compensation at the rate of P10.00 per square meter which
defendant must pay to plaintiff, but with legal rate of interest thereon hereby specifically fixed at
six (6) percent per annum starting from January of 1973 until full payment is made.

However, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in the sense that plaintiff's claim for damages is
DENIED for lack of merit.

Issues: Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed
to file any expropriation case and to pay just compensation?

Ruling: The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State.
Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the
Constitution. Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.

A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent
domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or
otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar, with the entrance of PNR into the property, Forfom
was deprived of material and beneficial use and enjoyment of the property. It is clear from the
foregoing that there was a taking of property within the constitutional sense. Forfom's inaction
on and acquiescence to the taking of its land without any expropriation case being filed, and its
continued negotiation with PNR on just compensation for the land, prevent him from raising any
issues regarding the power and right of the PNR to expropriate and the public purpose for which
the right was exercised.

It is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed
on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left
to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Eminent Domain

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147, January 30, 2009

Facts: On January 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18115 which reserved
certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export
Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing
Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent
spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land. Petitioner offered to purchase
respondents’ lot P52,294,000 which respondents rejected.

Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. It sought a writ of


possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with
LBP in accordance with A.O. No. 50.7. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require
petitioner to comply with RA 8974, specifically Sec 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for
purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ
of possession.

Ruling: RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA 8974 applies to
instances when the national government expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects. The economic zone is a national government project. Also, the complaint
for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the law was approved
on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.

It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just compensation
will be determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may present
evidence relative to the property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.
Eminent Domain

Landbank of the Philippines v. Raymunda Martinez

G.R. No. 169008, July 31, 2008

Facts: The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP,
of which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was
just and confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.

PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation,
so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.

LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation
has become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP
instituted a petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its
discretion when it issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in
the RTC. CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department

(2) Whether or not petitioner committed forum shopping

(3) Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his
discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing
of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC)

Ruling:

The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal
legal counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal
Department’s filing of the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when
it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment
via certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision on
land valuation. The said adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day
period stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) Rules of Procedure.

On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its
ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains
finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the
fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be
filed with the SAC within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that
the PARAD’s decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition
for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.
Eminent Domain

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, et al vs. JOVITO M. LUIS, et al

G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009

Facts: Respondents are owners of a parcel of land taken by the City of Pasig in 1980 which was
used as a municipal road. The Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing
payments for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the
land only at P150.00 per meter2. Respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land which was rejected.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages before the RTC praying that
the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for 16 years of use at P500.00
meter2 with legal interest from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or if said
property can no longer be returned, that petitioners pay just compensation of P7,930,000.00 and
rental for 16 years of use at P500.00 per meter2, both with legal interest from the date of filing of
the complaint until full payment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents’ claim for just compensation has already prescribed

Ruling: Petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents’ action for recovery of
their property, which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is
already barred by prescription. In Republic v. CA, the Court emphasized "that where private
property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either
through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe." Government agencies should not exercise the power of eminent
domain with wanton disregard for property rights as Section 9, Art III of the Constitution
provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on the
grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public
utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left
to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Eminent Domain

NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY

656 SCRA 60, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011

Facts: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant
Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just
compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place
for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

Issue: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

Ruling: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite
period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the
payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay
not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the taking
of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the
owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and
enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value
Eminent Domain

Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic

G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011

Facts: At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue
of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu
City to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties.

At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:

First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final
decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by
the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. Second, the Lahug
Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased
by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex. Third, it has been
preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given
assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective
lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. "No less than Asterio Uy," the
Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, "one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which
interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airport’s expansion, affirmed that
persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport
is abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their
properties." In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit "G," the transcript of the deposition of
Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally offered in evidence
and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370,
the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA, recognized the reversionary
rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in interest and resolved the case
accordingly. This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there
exists an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had
suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme
that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport’s venue. Some acted
on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise
of eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent’s predecessors
that they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase
was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they
parted with ownership of their land.

Issue: Whether abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties were
expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos, et al. and respondents Inocian, et al. to reacquire them.

Ruling: YES. Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians’ right to repurchase is
what in Heirs of Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust
expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment.
In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the
MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to
keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the
parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state
of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In
effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public
use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the
government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the
transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance
of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price.
Due Process

EFREN T. UY v. JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES

AM No. RTJ-12-2332, Jun 25, 2014

Facts: Before us is an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality, denial of due process and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against
respondent Judge Alan L. Flores.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian Hefti reassigned Mustapha Gandarosa from Cagayan
de Oro City to Quezon City. Gandarosa, not amiable to the reassignment, filed a Rule 65 petition
with prayer for a TRO before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, under Judge Flores. The judge
granted Ganadarosa’s request.

According to the Administrative Code of 1987 in Book V, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Section 26(3),
an employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service
Commission.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Flores commit gross ignorance of the law by taking jurisdiction of
the case?

Ruling: Yes. When a law rule is basic, judges should simply apply the law. Anything less is
considered gross ignorance of the law. In this case, the law was clear that Gandarosa should have
filed the case with the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial Court.

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less
is gross ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by
the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith.[1] When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of
bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.

In Republic v. Judge Caguioa, we said that the rules on jurisdiction are basic and judges should
know them by heart.

Here, Judge Flores assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition assailing Hefti’s order when he
should have dismissed the petition for Gandarosa’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
An employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service
Commission per Section 26(3), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987,
Due Process

Due ProcessSecretary of Justice vs. Lantion

GR 139465, Jan. 18, 2000

Facts: Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of
Conspiracy to Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television,
False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another.

During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner,
Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government,
that he be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request against him after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the
meantime. The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the
RP – US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the U.S. in any proceedings arising from an extradition request.

The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding
judge RTC Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the
petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the extradition of
the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and hearing.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due process
over the government’s duties under a treaty?

Ruling: Yes. According to the principle of “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, parties to a treaty should keep
their agreements to good faith. However, Sec. 2 of Art. 2 of the Constitution (incorporation
clause) provides that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land”.

Incorporation clause is applied when there is a conflict between the international law and
local/municipal law. However, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal court.

The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of
international law are given an equal standing with, but not superior to, the national legislative
enactment. The principle of “Lex Posterior Derogat Priori” clarifies that a treaty may repeal a
statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And the Republic of the Philippines considers its
Constitution as the highest law of the land, therefore, both statutes and treaty may be invalidated
if they are conflict with the constitution.
Due Process

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

Facts: Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was
ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the
Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set
for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty
at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of due process

Ruling: No. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature
of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Due Process
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts: COMELEC removed Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system
through its Resolution No. 8679, in accordance with Section 6 (8) of Republic Act No. 7941,
also known as the Party-List System Act. RA No. 7941 provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The PGBI was removed from the list because it was not able to acquire 2% of the votes cast in
the 2004 elections, and failed to participate in the subsequent elections. Petitioner filed its
opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to Supreme Court
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in
question.

Issue: Whether or not there is a legal basis in the removal of PGBI from the roster of parties
under the party-list system?

Ruling: The Minero ruling cannot be applied in this case, therefore, it cannot sustain PGBI’s
delisting from the roster of register national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system. The COMELEC may upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it:

• Fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; OR

• Fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

The word “OR” is a disjunctive term indicating disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated. With this, the law provides for two separate reasons for
delisting.

To answer the second issue, Petitioner was not denied due process since it was given the
opportunity to seek the reconsideration of the above-mentioned resolution. The nature of due
process is the opportunity to be heard and to be able to explain one’s side or the opportunity to
seek a review of the action or judgment complained thereof. In some instances, a formal or trial-
type hearing is not needed.
Due Process

SUYAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 189644 | July 2, 2014

Facts: SUYAN was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425.
He pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of
prision correctional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a
Probation Order covering a period of six years.

While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violations of
Section 16 of RA 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him. Because of this, the
Chief of the Parole and Probation Office (ATTY. NAVARRO) recommended the revocation of
his probation, citing recidivism. NAVARRO also pointed out that SUYAN was no longer in a
position to comply with the conditions of his probation, in view of his incarceration.

The RTC ordered the revocation of SUYAN’s probation and directed him to serve his sentence.
SUYAN then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not
accorded due process. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the
RTC for further proceedings. Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.

The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer
SUYAN showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal
drug activities despite counseling and warning from the Office. The prosecution likewise filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that SUYAN has
already served his sentence on the other drug charges against him. SUYAN filed his Comment
but did not dispute the certification.

After hearing, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. SUYAN appealed with the CA,
but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.

Ruling: Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another
offense is a direct violation of the condition in his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly
outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the
commission of another offense shall render the probation order ineffective.

The Court’s discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation,
it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.
Due Process

EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and


EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN LUIS

Facts: Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed
by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who
was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of
Laguna. Petition alleged Ejercito distributed orange card to influence voters in his favor; and
Ejercito exceeds the amount of expenditures necessary. Ejercito proclaimed Governor.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for
the dismissal of the petition which was improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for
election offenses, thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department,
and if with probable cause, file with proper court. The COMELEC First Division resolved to
grant the disqualification of Ejercito. The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its
First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito. Ejercito filed before the
Court GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION against COMELEC and contends It violated the
right of petitioner due process when it ruled for disqualification of petitioner even it was not
prayed for disqualification. Worse, there is yet no finding of guilt by competent court that he
committed election offense.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling: NO. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an
independent action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple errors of judgment. More
importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to
exist. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
law. Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave
abuse of discretion.The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that
the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but
for disqualification as well. Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San
Luis’ petition. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the specific rule governing the disqualification of
candidates. Moreover, the averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the
OEC as grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds
for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the
candidate shall be disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from
holding the office. A similar tenor was expressed in the prayer in the petition filed by San Luis.

An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect of a disqualification
case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense.
The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department,
files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court
demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office. The conduct of preliminary investigation is
not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a disqualification case. The “exclusive
power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all casesinvolving criminal
infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to
the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be disqualified
even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation

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