Moral Regulation A Reformulation

Moral Regulation: A Reformulation
Author(s): Hannu Ruonavaara

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Nov., 1997), pp. 277-293
Published by: American Sociological Association
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Moral Regulation: A Reformulation*
HANNU RUONAVAARA
University of Turku, Finland
Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer introduced the concept of moral regulation to con-
temporary sociological debate in their historical sociology of English State formation,
The Great Arch (1985). In their work they fuse Durkheimian and Foucauldian analhysis
with a basic Marxist theory. However, this framework gives too limited a perspective to
their analysis. I suggest that moral regulation should not be seen as a monolithic project,
as merely action by and for the State, nor as activity by the ruling elite only. It should
be seen as a form of social control based on changing the identity of the regulated. Its
object is what Weber calls Lebensfiihrung, which refers to both the ethos and the action
constituting a way of life. The means of moral regulation are persuasion, education,
and enlightenment, which distinguishes itfrom otherforms of social control. Analyzing
the social relations of moral regulation provides a useful perspective on this forml of
social action.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to reformulate and theorize the notion of "mo
because I think that such a concept is potentially useful in analyzing certai
trends in the emergence of modern societies and also the contemporary "p
sure" regulating the use of intoxicants, sexual behavior, and so forth. First
discuss critically a particular use of the concept in earlier research, namely,
Corrigan's and Derek Sayer's historical sociology of English State formation
tributions, especially their book The Great Arch (1985), have inspired a num
empirical studies so that it is possible to speak of moral regulation studies
(historical) sociology (Valverde 1994a:vi). Second, on the basis of criticism o
the concept, I attempt to reformulate the idea of moral regulation in a way th
of the unnecessary theoretical baggage of the earlier uses.
According to Valverde, the interest in moral regulation is part of "a simul
thesis and critique of the Marxist, Durkheimian, and Foucauldian analyses o
society" (1994a:vi). This broad observation of Corrigan's and Sayer's work m
plemented with two other observations: (1) There are also other important in
rigan and Sayer want to synthesize, the most important of which are British
and historical sociology (especially the work of E.P. Thompson, Christo
Philip Abrams); and (2) though Corrigan and Sayer mix Marxism with class
(Durkheim and also Weber), social and political history, contemporary histo
ogy, feminist research, and so on, their problematique nevertheless remains
(see Sayer 1987 for a statement of their understanding of Marx's historical
the other perspectives are (very imaginatively) fitted into the Marxist star
their analysis.
*Address correspondence to the author at the Department of Sociology, 20014 University o

e-mail: hanruona@utu.fi. A number of people have made useful comments on earlier versions
especially thank Pekka Jokinen, Timo Kyntiaj, Tom Osborne, and two anonymous referees f
encouraging criticisms.
Sociological Theory 15:3 November 1997

? American Sociological Association. 1722 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
278 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
As the concept of "moral regulation" in Corrigan's and Sayer's work is rooted in Emile
Durkheil's political sociology. developed mostly in his posthumously published lectures
(Durkheim [19501 1992) and in other minor writings (see Durkheim 1986), it is necessary
to take a brief look at Durkheim's views on the matter. I shall also make use of some of his
arguments later.
DURKHEIM ON MORAL REGULATION
There are two levels in Durkheilm's discussion of moral regulation: a sociolog

of the place of moral regulation in social life, and a normative theory of how
lation can be achieved in modern societies. In Durkheim's view, moral regulat
itable for the functioning of society. The human actor is homno duplex, comp
opposing natures, one governed by violent passions and the other by reason an
(Turner 1992:xix). If regulation of behavior is lacking, "nothing remains but
appetites, and since they are by nature boundless and insatiable, if there is n
control them they will be not able to control themselves" (Durkheim [1950] 1
also 14-15). This state of affairs is injurious and distressing to the individual
that people are always on their own and against each other (Durkheim [19
25). The happiness of the individual thus depends on the regulation of the sa
the human nature. And, in fact, whenever people associate on the basis of sh
and interests, sentiments and occupations," moral rules regulating their action
action tend to become formulated (see Durkheim [1950] 1992:23-24). Thi
normal circumstances.
Durkheim's main concern is that in modern societies there seems to be one institutional
sphere of social life-one "social function," in Durkheim's term-that, in contrast, to for
instance, military, governmental, and religious functions, seems to lack both an authority
capable of moral regulation and elaborate moral rules. The social function in such a patho-
logical circumstance is the economy (e.g., Durkheim [1950] 1992:9-13, 29-30). As the
existence and survival of social functions are always dependent on appropriate mora
discipline (see. e.g., Durkheim [1950] 1992:14), this state of affairs is untenable. Here we
come to the normative side of Durkheim's analysis.
The oiil' actor that could serve as an authority capable of exercising moral regulation in
economic life Durkheim calls the profe.ssionlal group ([1950] 1992:17, 29). These are
corporate organizations reminiscent of craft guilds, and Durkheim suggests that they should
be established in industrial societies. However, these new guilds or corporations should
conform to the basic structural and functional prerequisites of modern society. The new
guilds, representing both employers and the employed in individual branches of industry,
should be national in scope, yet divided into central and regional levels of organization and
based on the principles of representative democracy (Durkheim [1950] 1992:37-39). Their
task would be to lay down rules concerning industrial relations, labor protection, good
practice in business, and so forth.
Durkheim emphasizes that the regulation exercised by professional groups must be
distinguished from mere (economic) control by rule, which is "a kind of policing, maybe
vexatious, maybe endurable, and possibly calling forth some outward reaction from indi
viduals, but making no appeal to mind and without any root in the consciousness" (Durkheim
[1950] 1992:28). In contrast to this, the collective discipline by professional group is
rooted in the consciousness and does appeal to mind. It is based on the shared ideas and
sentiments of the members of the group, and therefore it cannot be seen merely as an
outside control preventing the individual from doing what he/she wants to do. The new
guilds are to be not only interest organizations but also communities offering people with
MORAL REGULATION: A REFORMULATION 279
a shared interest an opportunity to develop solidarity. Apart from further

interests against other guilds, their function is to provide the setting for
"just to associate, for the sole pleasure of mixing with their fellows
feeling lost in the midst of adversaries, as well as for the pleasure of comm
( Durkheim 119501 1992:25). So, the moral authority of the professional
institution were founded--should be based on the commitmlent of the members, not the
power the institution has over them.
In regulating the relations between the economic agents and giving rules of appropriate
practice for them, the professional groups would have a similar rule-giving function as the
State. Yet Durkheim emphasizes that although the new guilds should get closer to the
State, they should nevertheless be "relatively autonomous" from it (Durkheim 119501
1992:36). What is the role of the State in this framework? For Durkheim, the State is the
central organ responsible for sucIl general legislation of the economic activity of individ-
uals that cannot be trusted to any specific group ([ 1950] 1992:39). However, it is too far
removed from the reality of individual branches of industry to be able to give more spe-
cific rules concerning theim, and, therefore, the professional groups should be entrusted
with this power (Durkheim i 195()1 1992:40()). According to Turner, the professional groups
are the mediating level between the individual and the State (1992:xxxiv).
Here we must specify what DuLrkheim means by the concept of State. He notes that the
concept is often used broadly, encompassing all of the administration and also the citizens,
but in his view it is more useful to refer to this complex whole by the concept of "political
society." The State, in the strict sense, is the part of political society responsible for deci-
sion and policy making (Durkheim [19501 1992:48: Giddens 1986:1-2). Therefore.
Durkheim is able to assert that the "whole life of the State . . . consists not in exterior
action. in making changes, but in deliberation, that is, in representations" and that the
"principal function" of the State "is to think" ( 119501 1992:51).
As for the professional groups, so also for the State, the main goal is moral: "the fun-
damental duty of the State ... is to persevere in calling the individual to a moral way of
life" (Durkheim 19501 1992:69: also 1986:198). The State is a moral authority that guar-
antees that individual citizens are treated fairly and equally. For Durkheim inequality is
inevitable, rooted in natural differences between people. but "morality demands that to a
certain extent we should be treated as if we were equals" (Durkheim 1986:192). Inequal-
ities should not lead to gross injustices. This happens, however, when people are divided
into "secondary groupings" with narrow sectional interests-"castes, classes, corpora-
tions. coteries of all kinds, and all economic entities" (ibid.:49). There should be a moral
authority above these groupings, to which the new guilds sketched by Durkheim would
also belong, capable of curbing their excesses. This moral regulator can be none other than
the State. It is (or should be) the organ of social justice (ibid.:45) and moral discipline
(Durkheim [19501 1992:72: also 1986:201 ). The task of the State is thus to hold in check
the interest organizations of the civil society, but Durkheim also sees these organizations
as a necessary counterbalance to the State, preventing it from becoming despotic ([1950]
1992:62-63).
THE MEANING OF MORAL REGULATION
Some central elements of Durkheim's view are preserved in Corrigan and Sayer
though it cannot be considered strictly Durkheimian. Their concern is to theoriz
State formation, and, therefore, they are mainly interested in Durkheim's view
moral role of the State. They argue that State formation is thus dependent on
change-in the case of the modern English State, a bourgeois cultural revolution. T
fresh perspective in Marxist analyses of the State, although similar thoughts

in the writings of Antonio Gramsci (see Corrigan 1994:250-51). They differ fro
in that they do not produce any general theory of the function and emerge
regulation. Their understanding of the State is also far from Durkheim's "opt
of it as the guarantor of equality and individuality (see Turner 1992:xxxiii-x
them, the English State is definitely the State of the ruling class (a capitalis
modern times), and moral regulation by the modern State serves not to guara
and justice but rather to legitimate a rule that, in fact, has no justification.
For Corrigan and Sayer, "moral regulation" is "a project of normalizing
natural, taken for granted, in a word 'obvious', what are in fact ontological an
logical premises of a particular and historical form of social order' (Corrigan
1985:4). Moral regulation and State formation are "internally related" (Corri
and Sayer 1980:10). For a particular State form to exist, it is necessary that it
and legitimated by a particular moral ethos" (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:4). Th
only based on a moral ethos but it is also the major agent of moral regulatio
This definition implies that moral regulation is a legitimating activity; its f
make certain social arrangements seem justified and natural (see also Osborn
This is what ideologies are usually supposed to do (see, e.g., Ruonavaara 1996b
Corrigan locates moral regulation in the "terrain of cultural production and
relations" (1990:132). Thus, from the perspective of social action, moral regu
seen as the action that makes ideologies effective: education, persuasion, indoc
and so forth. Dean has looked at the matter from a more system-centered per
says that, according to the "Corrigan and Sayer thesis," moral regulation is th
through which the process of State formation affects the process of cultural t
(1994a: 149; 1994b: 149).
Thus, moral regulation seems to concern the aspect of social life to which, according to
Purvis and Hunt, both the concept of "ideology" and that of "discourse" refer; "the idea
that human individuals participate in forms of understanding, comprehension or conscious-
ness of the relations and activities in which they are involved" (1993:474). In the defini-
tion the reference to ontological and epistemological premises points clearly to this aspect:
moral regulation is about affecting people's beliefs about social relations and institutions.
But there is also another, I would say, Foucauldian element in how Corrigan and Sayer
see moral regulation that can be found, for example, in their characterization of how the
State takes part in moral regulation. They say that States state; they make statements that
"define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social identity: they regulate, in
empirically specifiable ways, much-very much, by the twentieth century-of social life"
(Corrigan and Sayer 1985:3). Here the emphasis is on molding the self-image of people
and the moral evaluation of social practices. The State is seen as imposing on people
certain kinds of social identities and "proper forms of expression" (see, e.g., Corrigan
1990:109) and excluding others: people are made to see themselves as males or females,
adults or children, heterosexuals or homosexuals, and so on.
According to Corrigan and Sayer's view, however, all social identities are constructed
and, moreover, the idea of a unitary social identity is an error. Such a view reduces the
"fragility, permeability, difficulty and yet poetic energy of most human lives" (Corrigan
1990:114) into predetermined social classifications that allow no room for the possibility
of multiple identities (see also Dean 1994b: 146). There is also an element of repression:
the few "proper" and "normal" expressions of human experience are prescribed and a
multitude of other possible ones are tacitly defined as improper and pathological.
This comes very close to the analysis of the impact of power/knowledge relations on
the creation of modern subjectivity in Michel Foucault's work, for example, in his history
of punishment ([1975] 1979), and the introductory volume of his histo

([1976] 1981:92-102). Power not only prevents people from acting in ways
unacceptable, it also makes them want to act in acceptable ways; it creates
as Foucault says. People, enmeshed in the web of power/knowledge rel
define themselves in terms of the discourses imposed on them; they start
selves as offenders in need of correction, mental patients, pupils at school, s
In my view, there is a certain tension between Corrigan and Sayer's bas
definition of moral regulation as a legitimation of bourgeois rule and the F
emphasizing moral regulation's role in the construction of subjectivity. Th
elements that transcend the Marxist problematique, and I build my argume
this "Foucauldian" understanding of moral regulation. I want to dissociate
tion from legitimating particular State forms. It may be linked with such le
not necessarily; I suspect that in empirical historical cases the relation is m
than just that of moral regulation being a legitimation of the existing polit
CRITICAL VIEWS
Two somewhat different critical discussions of the concept and the theory of m
lation in Corrigan and Sayer's work have appeared: Mitchell Dean (1994b:52
iana Valverde (1994b). Dean's appreciative but critical discussion of "moral r
ends with a suggestion that the concept of moral regulation be substituted wi
one, namely Foucault's "governmentality." Valverde, while criticizing the State
nature of the theory, attempts to develop it further by linking it with certain idea
Bourdieu and suggesting that the concept of "moral capital" should be added to
ceptual framework in which moral regulation is developed. Before presenting
formulations I shall first take a brief look at these two discussions.
From Moral Regulation to Governmentality
Dean presents three major criticisms of Corrigan and Sayer's account of moral regulation.
First, he criticizes the theory of moral regulation for being based on "a language and
framework of 'culture' " (1994b: 147), which he considers suspect. Dean demonstrates that
Corrigan and Sayer's theory assumes a dual-level theory of experience and meaning. First
there is "a realm of experience grounded in material relations . . . and, second, an ideal
domain of the representation of experience" (1994b: 150). The collective representations
of experience are the domain of culture, and they both describe and prescribe possible
social relations and identities. Moral regulation manipulates this level of representation.
Simplifying a little, the work of moral regulation can be seen as that of producing collec-
tive representations that deform the historical experiences of the underprivileged classes.
Dean criticizes this account for overt naturalism based on a false, or at least suspect,
philosophical anthropology similar to Max Weber's view of the human actor. For Weber,
human subjects are endowed with a faculty to "attach and bestow meaning" to their expe-
riences. In Dean's view, this presupposition imposes a limitation on the analysis: it is
restricted to how people as subjects, "as a matter of course, come to bestow meaning on or
to represent their experience" (1994b: 151). What it excludes, is "the analysis of multiplic-
ity of the practical, technical, and discursive means by which self-formation occurs" (ibid.).
This is, as Dean says, an abstract criticism-but also a slightly obscure one.
Why should accepting the Weberian "philosophical anthropology" be dubious and why
should "self-formation" necessarily be taken into account here? What Dean feels is suspect
is the distinction between ready-made, already formed, subjects and their experiences. In
Foucault's analyses of punishment and sexuality the subject itself is seen as

the discourses and disciplinary practices of the ever-present Power. The mod
ogies of power are the ones that individualize the people subject to them and
them experience in certain novel ways. The formation of human beings into
giving subjects is a product of cultural practices that are linked to "Western
(Dean 1994b: 151).
I contend that the Foucauldian analysis substitutes the traditional sociological theory of
the human actor with another philosophical anthropology that denies the actor the author-
ship of her/his actions. In this view, the subject is wholly socially determined, and there is
no psychological or biological element that would escape social determination and form
an independent basis of subjectivity. This is a view that few would prefer to the traditional
view of the actor. The latter theory is by no means defunct (see Campbell 1996 for a
forceful defense), so the burden of proof lies heavily on the Foucauldian theory. How-
ever, not all of Dean's critique here requires accepting the Foucauldian philosophical
anthropology.
The distinction between the authentic experience of the subordinate classes and its
deformed representation by the powerful that Dean claims to have found in Corrigan and
Sayer's work implies an assumption that is hard to accept: If experience can be repre-
sented in a deformed way, there is apparently also an authentic way to represent it. This
idea of real and false meanings attached to experience implies a normative judgment: the
researcher, in fact, claims to be able to distinguish between the right and the false repre-
sentations of experience. This is not a tenable position. Though the theoretical distinction
between experience and its representations is worth preserving, this does not in any way
mean that we can distinguish between "authentic" and "deformed" representations. This
would mean accepting a rather naive realism that assumes that, in principle, there is one
right way of describing social reality.
The second critical point Dean makes is that Corrigan and Sayer tend to "over-
emphasize the unity of the state and its consequences" (Dean 1994b: 152; also 1994a: 15 1).
In his view. State formation is a much more fragmentary process than Corrigan and Sayer
assume. The State is composed of a multiplicity of agents and authorities, and it is difficult
to distinguish between the state and its "outside" (Dean 1994b:152-153; also 1994a:151):
This is clearly illustrated by the multiple and overlapping jurisdictions involving

local, regional, national, international and global authorities within which actors are
located. It is evidenced by the widespread development of non-profit community
and social services in advanced liberal democracies which are funded partially by
the national state but run by citizen associations, and by the neoliberal use of cor-
porations, charities, and families, to achieve governmental objectives (e.g. the pro-
vision of welfare and domestic care, the establishment of prisons, job-centers, etc.).
The problem with the all too unitary view of the State is that the perspective does not allow
for the different and even conflicting policies and strategies of different State agencies. In
Dean's view, the State is composed of agencies with dispersed and dissonant strategies
leading to dispersed and dissonant consequences and effects (1994b: 153; 1994a: 151).
A third criticism is that the State is not the only moral regulator, or, for Dean, the border
between the State and other agencies is fuzzy one; there are identity-forming agencies and
authorities whose relation to the State is rather distant (Dean 1994b:153; also 1994a:152):
"These 'practices of the self' run the gamut from the 'acceptable' ones promoted by 'psy'
disciplines, social work, medicine, education, established religion, forms of sport and
physical culture, to the plethora of practices associated with cults of self-lib

self-improvement (from martial arts to sexual realization) and 'how to' progra
business, money, marriage, and love." For Dean, taking these "practices and
the self" into account problematicizes the notion of the State itself.
Dean concludes this critical discussion with the suggestion that we can mo
the limits of moral regulation by adopting the concept of Foucault's govern
There are three reasons why I shall not deal with Dean's suggestion in more
in my view, none of Dean's criticisms forces us to abandon moral regulation
only some parts of Corrigan and Sayer's theory. Second, governmentality is
nected to Foucault's perspective on society that brackets off human action a
impersonal discursive formations, strategies, and tactics of power. My chose
is what I have called above the traditional theory of action, where the various
motivation of the actor is the force that fuels the action. The actor and his/h
cannot be dissected from the theory, and "moral regulation" should be d
action concept. A third reason for preferring moral regulation to governmentalit
former is the more straightforward and easily understandable concept of the
Foucault's obscure definition [1979:20]): governmentality seems to be a kind
that produces effects on various levels of human action from intrasubjectiv
welfare state policies (see, e.g., Dean 1994b: 161).
Elaborating the Moral Regulation Framework
Valverde' s reformulation of the moral regulation perspective is based on com

regulation with Bourdieu's analysis of different kinds of capital usable in so
of the main points Bourdieu advances in his magnum opus, Distinction (1
apart from possession of economic capital, the possession of cultural capital
people into distinct class positions. By cultural capital Bourdieu means, first
and qualifications acquired through education, and second, behavioral disposi
ues, and sense of taste acquired from education and the parental home. A pers
little economic capital but much cultural capital, like many intellectuals; and
much economic capital and little cultural capital, for example, an upwardly m
nessperson having little formal education. The capitals constitute distinct di
social differentiation. However, they can be transformed into each other: m
education, which equips one with cultural capital; and cultural capital, which
with monopolies of skill and judgment, can also be transformed into money
Valverde's innovation is that she adds a third type of capital: moral capital
that what different kinds of moral regulation agencies (e.g., schools, welfar
charities) do, "can be usefully conceptualized as oriented to the maximization
individual moral capital of the recipients and the aggregate moral capital of
state" (1994b:215). But what is moral capital? Valverde characterizes mor
"that elusive inward essence, 'character' (also known as 'moral fibre')" (19
also p. 218). Thus, moral capital has to do with how others judge a person's m
To put it more technically, moral capital is a particular kind of ethical subject
regulated, defined or certified, as Valverde says (1994b:216), as morally desir
moral regulators. The power of certification rests in the authority in question.
the Church held a near monopoly on certification of moral capital, now mor
certified by various professional groups (ibid.).
The new dimension of moral regulation opened by Valverde's reformulatio
moral regulation as exchange. Valverde develops this in the course of discuss
thropy in contrast to charity (1994b:220-21). Philanthropy has the long-term
of improving the poor and needy that is missing in charity, understood as

without any interest in how it is used. The philanthropist invests economic
capital in helping the poor in order to get moral gain. This is achieved when t
"pays back" in the currency of character, by becoming more "thrifty, clean,
and sober" (ibid.:221). Here the moral regulator is seen as a long-term moral
similar to the modern capitalist. And moral capitalism also has a spirit of it
nalized by most people: it feels wrong to give a beggar a few coins; the right
to give the donation to a well-administered corporate body that channels it
deserve it (ibid.).
Though the concept of moral capital can be useful in certain contexts
1996a) and the idea that moral regulation is not a one-way relation is an illum
there are, nevertheless, problems in Valverde's theory. If it is taken as an e
Bourdieu's analysis of capitals, the concept of moral capital might be consid
essary. It can be argued that moral capital is a part of cultural capital, a
respectability that is the precondition for competing for authority and inf
field. If parsimony is the ideal of concept formation, then moral capital can b
an unnecessary concept.
However, for Bourdieu, capital is a loose concept referring to any resourc
power struggle in a social field. He usually distinguishes major types
economic and cultural-but his writings abound with many other capitals: fo
Bourdieu (1991) we find: linguistic (p. 51), political (p. 28), functional (p. 196), personal
(p. 194), and symbolic (pp. 14-15). So, moral capital is probably as legitimate a Bourdi-
euan concept as any of these. However, for Valverde, the idea of moral capital as a resource
in a field is absent; she is more interested in developing an analogy between moral regu-
lation and entrepreneurial activity.
The important gain in Valverde's reformulation is the insight into the reciprocity of the
moral regulation relation. In my view, however, Valverde's theory takes the idea somewhat
too far. The idea of the moral regulator as a maximizer of moral profit seems more a witty
analogy than a useful analytical tool capable of clarifying what is going on in moral
regulation. Why is the philanthropist "obsessed with getting moral and social returns"
(Valverde 1994b:221)? How are such returns calculated? Why should he/she be interested
in "capital" that accumulates mainly in others, the regulated? The problem, I think, is in
the attempt to interpret ideological, goal-rational action as economic exchange. The eco-
nomic dimension is there, of course: the modern moral regulator attempts to be as efficient
as possible. But the idea of moral "profit" as the motivation of the activity seems far-
fetched.
GUIDELINES FOR REFORMULATION
The previous discussion and critique of Dean and Valverde is now used as a resource to
develop some methodological guidelines for reformulating moral regulation theory.
1. Moral Regulation Should Not Be Seen as Monolithic and Unitary
In Corrigan and Sayer's view, the State appears as a unitary subject of moral regulation. As
Dean points out, "this form of analysis does not allow for dispersion of the policies and
strategies enunciated within various sectors of the State (say, between the national treasury
and a women's unit of a regional Department of Health) and the possibility that moral
regulatory strategies could be similarly dispersed and dissonant (e.g., between the forms of
sexuality sanctioned within the military and within anti-discrimination legislation)" (Dean
1994b: 153; see also Valverde and Weir 1988:33). Conflicts between the plans
and levels of government are surely a striking phenomenon in any field of po
not also competing moral regulatory projects? Whether this is the case or not
question), the approach to moral regulation should allow the possibility of in
conflicts within the State.
2. Moral Regulation Should Not Be Seen Only as Activity by andfor the State
The point that Corrigan and Sayer's theory is too much centered on the State (Dean
1994b: 147; Valverde 1994a:ix) is, in my view, correct. The State is a powerful medium of
moral regulation but not the only one, nor is all regulating connected directly with legiti-
mating the State. For example, both Valverde (1994b) and Chris Rojek (1992) have ana-
lyzed the actions of nineteenth-century social reformist voluntary associations from the
moral regulation perspective (see also Valverde and Weir 1988:32). These organizations
represented civil society rather than the State. By civil society I mean here all the organi-
zations and secondary groups that are independent of the State and business organizations
(Allardt 1994:8).
Moreover, Corrigan and Sayer's concept has also been applied to a non-State moral
project that cannot be classified as State or civil society but rather as capital. Rojek (1993)
has used it in an analysis of the worldview and ideological images in the products of one
of the world's leading entertainment enterprises, the Disney corporation. He argues that
"Disney culture can be read as a deliberate exercise in moral regulation" where "the his-
torical and particular form of white, capitalist society" is presented as "the essential soci-
ety of reason and good" (1993:122).
3. Moral Regulation Should Not Be Seen Only as Activity by the Ruling Elite
In his analysis of the emergence of modern leisure, Rojek states that leisure management
"was part of the phalanx of the nineteenth-century regulative mechanisms formed to create
an obedient, able-bodied, law-abiding and docile class of 'working people'" (Rojek
1992:357). Though accurate in his research question, this characterization seems to reflect
the way moral regulation is seen generally: as a mechanism or action of the powerful to
make the powerless comply and accept the dominant order. In my view this covert assump-
tion blinds the analyst to the multitude of moral regulatory projects. It is analytically more
useful to see the moral discourse as a field where claims of different "moral entrepreneurs"
compete. There is surely more than one moral project and, at times, there is a fierce battle
between the views on how to steer social life. Of course, elite groups are better equipped
to act as moral entrepreneurs, but they do not necessarily represent a unitary ruling class.
Also the possibility of moral entrepreneurs representing and making claims for the
powerless and subordinate classes of people should be taken into account. Their project of
moral regulation can be more or less relevant to a project of State formation, but it is an
alternative one to that of the ruling elite. Many examples of this can be found: nearly all
great social movements from the Reformation to the Green movement have included an
element of moral regulation. Historically, the labor movement in many countries has also
contained a moral project apart from its economic and political content. A fairly well-
researched case of this is the early Swedish labor movement, which was not only engaged
in political struggle and union activity, but also in a cultural struggle (see, e.g., Ambj6rn-
son, 1991:54-55; also Franzen 1990; Horgby 1990).
In the early Swedish labor movement and the popular movements close to it, especially
the temperance movement, there was a widespread attempt to change the workers' way of
life, to create a self-disciplined and orderly (skotsam) worker who would be

well-behaved but yet politically radical. Central to this ideal was an active a
knowledge and culture and also the development of an ability to form one's
view independently (Ambj6rnson 1991:52): "The class-conscious worker,
this view, studies philosophy and literature in order to understand his role in
history" (Ambjornson 1991:75). The early Swedish labor movement was, thu
which the education and self-development of the workers was seen as a pre
the coming of the socialist society (ibid.).
In Mats Franzen's view (1990) the "project of orderliness" was more the cu
movement than the culture of the class in itself-to borrow Marx' phrase. T
the culture were the people who were active in the movement, usually thos
more able, ambitious, and better-off than the rest. He contrasts the ideal typ
worker with that of the stubborn (egensinnig) worker who did not plan his l
money on gambling and alcohol, did not go regularly to union meetings, was
up in trouble with the law, and so forth. The culture of stubbornness represe
side of working-class everyday life, the side not articulated in writing and sp
one that the culture of orderliness wanted to regulate.
REDEFINING MORAL REGULATION
I have referred above to "ways of life" as the object that moral regulators att
regulate. By way of life I mean the various aspects of how people live their eve
the practices of making a living, ways of spending leisure time, and forms of
and sociability. It is clear that moral regulation is concerned with regulating ro
social behavior, and the list above provides one taxonomy of such behavior. How
purely behavioral understanding of what moral regulation concerns is clearly
After all, Corrigan and Sayer stress firmly the aspect of regulating identities,
seeing oneself. As Valverde says (1994b:216): "The aim of moral reform ... is not so
much to change behaviour as to generate certain ethical subjectivities that appear as inher-
ently 'moral'. Correct actions will of course follow: but the subjectivity is more important
than the behaviour." The subjective element must be taken into account in thinking of the
object of moral regulation. What kind of concept would embrace this?
Dean (1994b: 152) has, in the context of discussing moral regulation, drawn attention to
the Weberian concept of Lebensfiihrung (e.g., Weber [1905] 1974; Hennis 1983), which in
the English literature has usually been translated as "conduct of life." This concept has the
merit of combining the objective side of the way of life, action, with its subjective side,
values and attitudes-or, ethos, as Weber characterized it. For Weber, conduct of life "was
the behavior of an active and reflexive individual, the aspects of which were subjective
meaning and objective significance" (Peltonen 1987:107; my translation). The concept
differs from way of life, as defined above, in the sense that it stresses, apart from objec-
tively observed behavior, the person's conscious "conducting" of his/her life (sometimes
Weber even uses Lebensmethodik as equivalent to Lebensfuihrung). This is closely con-
nected with the element of social identity: when a person begins to see him/herself as a
particular kind of member of society, the range of the kinds of actions that are appropriate
to him/her is also redefined. By adopting an identity, the person starts to conduct his/her
life in a new way.
If we insist upon this aspect of moral regulation, we can answer one nagging doubt
about the concept: Why introduce such a new concept; why not stick to good old "social
control"? After all, most of the actions defined as moral regulation in moral regulation
studies can probably be understood as social control, conventionally defined as control of
behavior exercised in a community in order to make the members of the comm

form to the dominant norms.' Room is made for the concept of moral regula
make a sharp distinction between mere control of behavior and regulation that
change the identity of the controlled. In fact, a similar distinction is made b
when he distinguishes "control by rule" from the moral control exercised by p
groups (see above). Control by rule can be seen as social control that attempts
people from doing certain things without requiring any moral commitment fr
trolled. In moral regulatory control such commitment is achieved through th
identity and acquisition of a particular ethos by the controlled.
To argue that moral regulation is only one form of social control, some kind
should be given of the various other forms of regulation of behavior. What wa
of steering people's behavior in the desirable direction? I shall here draw from
of regulation presented by Pekka Jokinen in a wholly other context, that of an
regulation of agricultural production (Jokinen 1995). First there are administ
lations, such as licensing laws, norms, and standards. Behavior can simply
by the force of law, and the ultimate guarantor of the regulation is the monop
by the State. Second, agricultural production (like any other action) can be co
economic steering, for example, by taxation or subsidies. Here regulation is tho
accomplished through the producer's calculation of self-interest. A third way
ling behavior in Jokinen's model is what he calls moral persuasion, by which
informing and educating the producers. For my purposes, in this classificatio
tion of behavior (banning, subsidizing/taxing, persuading), the third correspon
I call moral regulation.2
The distinctions between the three forms of regulation should be understood
ical or ideal typical; in real situations the different elements can overlap and m
also be useful to view them as aspects of social action. For example, the fact th
prohibits some acts contains no moral regulatory aspect in itself. It can, howev
that the fact that the law is of a particular kind, it expresses a kind of " communi
on the sort of person who commits acts prohibited by it. To win the approval of the
community the person is, in a way, "persuaded" to change him/herself. However, the
moral regulatory element or aspect is peripheral here.
The use of the concept of moral regulation should be restricted only to forms of regu-
lation that do not involve the use of force. This is perhaps rather evident, if we take
seriously the idea of moral regulation as activity aiming to change the regulated's identity.
There are, however, some special circumstances, like brain-washing, where identities can
be changed by force. But here the change is not endogenous to the person but is the result
of manipulating unconscious psychological mechanisms. If this restriction of the means of
moral regulation to education, persuasion, and propaganda is accepted, then the applica-
tion of the concept departs somewhat from some of the other uses, for example, that of
Rojek in his historical analysis of leisure management (1992).
Rojek argues that during the nineteenth-century, in the British regulation of leisure,
"physical force was crowded out and pushed back to the method of last resort by other
'psychological' practices of regulation: drill, parable, training by rote, respect for the rule
of law, love for the 'Nation,' and always, the bottom line of moral regulation in industrial
' In moral regulation studies the concept has also been applied to some phenomena that cannot directly be
interpreted as social control, e.g., to presenting tacit ideals of society and social life in mass entertainment (Rojek
1993) or moral evaluation of urban places (Adams 1994).
2 Jokinen also has two other forms of regulation which I do not consider relevant here-producers' self-control
and market mechanisms. Both refer to a laissez-faire solution by the State on the question of influencing agri-
cultural production. It can be argued that perhaps they should be seen as ways of steering agricultural production
that are alternatives to regulation, rather than forms of regulation.
capitalism-fear of unemployment, abandonment, destitution and enforced 'c

(Rojek 1992:356). In this sentence both force and economic sanctions are unde
alternative means of moral regulation. As it is reasonable to suggest that whil
may very well accomplish change of behavior, they may be much less effectiv
ing subjectivity and identity, it seems clear that, for Rojek, attempting a chang
is not a defining feature of moral regulation. For him, moral regulation is r
behavior, and his analysis is concerned with a change from one form of moral
another. From my perspective, the history of leisure management (as told by
interpreted as one of change from control by rule to moral regulation.
The distinction between force and persuasion is one that can be challenged f
cauldian point of view. A Foucauldian analysis of power focuses on the concr
which certain effects are produced on the people subjected to power. The tec
mechanisms of power, which are the central foci in Foucauldian analysis, oft
both "coercive" and "persuasive" elements; for instance, in the army, drill is
with patriotic speeches to produce committed soldiers. Therefore, the distinct
the two elements is, arguably, of little value. However, the distinction betw
and persuasion must be seen as one that attempts to capture analytically the
aspects of relations of regulation and power. It may well be the case that in
two are hard to separate, but that has little to do with whether or not the distinction is
analytically sensible.3 At least from an actor-centered perspective, it makes sense to dis-
tinguish between an exercise of control where a conflict of intentions or interests is re-
solved by making the actor comply against her/his will (coercion), and one where an
attempt is made to avoid such a conflict by influencing the actors intentions or interests
(persuasion).
The nature of moral regulation as an overt or tacit attempt to make those regulated
change their identities and ways of life implies an assumption which might, at first glance,
seem trivial. To present a project of moral regulation one has to believe that those sub-
jected to it are capable of reflecting and changing their lives when properly enlightened by
the regulators. Otherwise, the "ethic of improvement" (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:138) that
is the basis of moral regulation makes no sense. The idea of moral regulation, as defined
here, is closely connected with a mode of thought Zygmunt Bauman calls the ideology of
culture, and which he thinks is a modern form of thought that emerged sometime between
the end of the seventeenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries (Bauman 1992:3).
The ideology of culture is based on three premises. First, human beings are essentially
incomplete, and the attainment of their full humanity is a social process. Second, this
humanization is a learning process that involves taming antisocial, animal passions or
drives. Third, the humanization process requires educators, who guide the incomplete
towards completeness, and a system of formal or informal education (Bauman 1992:3).
The innovation of the ideology of culture is that it now made sense to formulate universal
models of a way of life. This was not the case in premodern society divided into self-
enclosed and culturally distinct ranks. In premodern society, human self-improvement
meant "becoming more like the model assigned to the rank and avoiding confusion with
other models" (ibid.:4; see also Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1980). A model for a way of
life for everyone was unthinkable. This attitude was, according to Rojek, continued even
in the more recent past. Rojek refers to the nineteenth-century Social Darwinist views in
Britain on the "residual" working class, which was seen as a hopelessly degenerate social
group which no amount of education would help (1992:362).
3 Even Martin Kusch's admirable-and highly sympathetic-attempt to make sense of Foucault's notion of
power cannot do without this distinction (see Kusch 1991, chapters 9 and 10).
To summarize: moral regulation is a special kind of social control that h

object-the conduct of life of the regulated, and a specific aim-the change
tity; its means are peaceful ones: education, propaganda, enlightenment.
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF MORAL REGULATION
My arguments already imply my perspective on moral regulation: I do n

mechanism, nor a function of the social system but as social action, that is,
relates to other people as its goal. As Valverde suggests, moral regulation
action and thus takes place in a social relation. There are always some actors
tion of regulators and others in the position of the regulated. What is charact
relation between the positions? I have referred to the intentions and actions o
regulators with the expression "moral project" without any elaboration on wh
that phrase. By moral project I refer to the moral regulator's conception of an
life and the regulator's long-term commitment to realize that ideal (rather
specific plan of action).
The characterization of a moral project points to the aspect I see as absolute
for any project of moral regulation: the regulator possesses an articulated pro
desirable conduct of life, that is, a discourse of an ideal conduct of life, and s
to how it could be realized. In this sense, the party of the regulators alw
intellectuals, people who are capable of expressing their values and ideals. It
matter whether these are professional intellectuals, as in moral regulation b
organizations (Valverde and Weir 1988:32), or lay "intellectuals," as in the case of the
early Swedish labor movement. The same does not have to be the case for the regulated. As
with the stubborn workers, the regulated may not have any articulated discursive grasp
of their conduct of life, nor any program suggesting that everyone should adopt it. This
feature is by no means necessary for the role of the regulated. Therefore, the possibility of
counterprojects by the regulated should be included by definition. Though the role of the
regulated does not entail moral projects challenging the ones they are subject to, neither
does it rule them out.
In empirical studies using the concept of moral regulation, the concept is usually used
for asymmetric situations: the regulators are considerably better equipped with cultural
and economic resources than the regulated. In many cases they also have administrative
power over the regulated (power to sanction economically or symbolically the conduct of
the regulated). Often the regulated are such that their opportunities to give voice to their
experience are limited: the urban poor of the nineteenth century (Mahood 1990; Valverde
1991, 1994b; Rojek 1992), welfare recipients in contemporary society (Little 1994), chil-
dren and adolescents (Adams 1994; Dehli 1994), or poor peasant settlers in a Third World
country (Woost 1994). Should the concept of moral regulation be reserved only for moral
projects where such asymmetries of power and resources are present? Moral regulation
studies have dealt almost exclusively with such situations and perhaps this also contributes
to the critical appeal of the perspective. The possible exceptions are the studies where the
regulated are hard to single out, where they are the "general public" rather than any spe-
cific group, as in Rojek's study of the Disney corporation.
However, the perspective I have been developing does not necessarily entail that the
regulated are always "underdogs." Thomas Osborne (1994) analyzes the nineteenth-
century attempts at reform of the recruiting patterns and education of the British admin-
istration in India in order to ensure that prospective administrators were not only competent
but also reflected the appropriate ethic of government in their conduct. The rule of India
represented especially "a situation where administrative government was necessarily posed
in terms of ethic, a way of life" (Osborne 1994:301), but the problem affected
government as well. The reformists recommended "the abolition of patrona
lishment of an open, competitive examination of civil service entry" (ibid.:2
not only to ensure the qualifications needed for effective government but th
was also to be a test of character: diligence, self-control, punctuality, and a
case is a project of moral regulation where the target is the group of people
become a part of the ruling elite. The asymmetry and a difference of powe
here between the regulator and the regulated, can be considered as a necessa
for successful moral regulation.
However, Osborne's argument is even stronger. His view is not merely that
ulation is not always targeted towards the underdog, but, rather, that the co
cially suitable for analyzing the formation of the ruling elite. This connect
arguments, such as that developed by Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner in The
Ideology Thesis (1980). They argue that the dominant ideology is not so
integrating the subordinate classes in to the social order; its main importance
ing the ruling class with a common culture that integrates it and legitimizes i
is indeed the case and the observation can be generalized to any privileged s
ries, not just social classes, then the analysis of moral regulation may be mor
case of the formation of ruling groups than in looking at the relation between
and the dominated.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to outline a concept of moral regulation that is more clear

the rather loose conceptualization found in most moral regulation studies an
most of their valuable insights. What I have specifically attempted is to dist
regulation from social control per se. Moral regulation is a special kind of so
Its target is primarily how people see themselves and their ways of life, and
persuasion rather than coercion. I have also emphasized moral regulation as a
place in a social relation between the regulator and the regulated.
What is the value of developing this kind of conceptualization of moral re
shall briefly discuss this by contrasting the approach developed here with t
sical attempts to understand processes of moral regulation. There are appa
between the moral regulation perspective launched in Corrigan's and Sayer
Gramsci's theory of hegemony. According to Gramsci, the power of a social
two foundations: the direct domination it exercises through the State and th
cultural leadership it holds in the civil society (Gramsci 1971:12, 57). Gram
that the latter aspect, hegemony, precedes the former: the aspiring social
hegemonic position in the intellectual, moral, and political spheres before it
opponents (ibid.:59). This is indeed similar to Corrigan and Sayer's argumen
Arch. Gramsci's Prison Notebooks even sketch (literally) what I have called
dian element of Corrigan and Sayer's notion of moral regulation: the State
"new types of humanity" (1971:242).
Why Gramsci's analysis is not enough for the kind of sociology of mora
processes I have in mind depends largely on the same underlying assumption
considered as too limiting in the case of Corrigan and Sayer. For Gramsci, h
cultural leadership by a social class, and the purpose of the exercise of hegemony is to
continue-or conquer-class domination. After all, Gramsci was preoccupied mainly with
the question of proletarian social revolution, that is, how the proletarian party could con-
quer State power, and he was looking at it from a broadly Leninist perspective. The notion
of moral regulation developed here constructs a more polycentric and heter

less State-centered and totalizing-perspective on the regulation of identities
than the notion of hegemony. That we should adopt such a view of socia
power is perhaps the main teaching of Foucault's approach.
Another alternative for the analysis of moral regulation processes is to turn
conventional Durkheimian approach. Here I shall confine my comments only
of analysis Durkheim provides in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (
The nature of that analysis is twofold, both sociological and normative. In spi
references to historical facts, Durkheim's account remains on a high level of
and the reader cannot be sure whether she or he is reading a sociological theor
society or a treatise in social philosophy on how such a society should b
Especially striking is Durkheim's treatment of the role of the State that, as a
real States, seems utopian. If the analysis is seen as an account of how St
function, the matter is completely different.
A great advantage of Durkheim's account of moral regulation is that it provi
of how moral regulation arises in terms of actors' interaction. Durkheim thoug
regulation occurs whenever actors interact in groups that are formed on the b
interests. Such interaction requires norms that regulate the egoistic side of
actor. Thus, the ultimate explanation of moral regulation resides in the dual n
human actor: on one hand, she or he needs interaction with others, on the oth
is driven by egoistic impulses. Though I do not wish to comment here on wheth
theory is accurate or not, I do want to point out that it is framed in a way th
with my actor-centered approach. Any theory of moral regulation should prov
of the micro foundations of moral regulation (like Durkheim does). That task
beyond the scope of this article.
The concept of moral regulation developed here is to be understood as an id
analytical construct, the usefulness of which lies entirely in its capacity to gr
social phenomena. Such a development of the concept may, at least to some ex
the intentions of Corrigan and Sayer. Some methodological statements by Sa
that his brand of historical materialism emphasizes the openness and histori
cepts (Sayer 1987:126-49); in such a view, the kind of abstract systematizatio
here is quite alien. My view is different: analytical conceptualization is the pr
knowledge and, to be useful, the concepts must be as clearly defined as possib
this gives no warranty for forcing reality to fit the preconceived concepts. On
the concept of moral regulation should be used, in true Weberian fashio
through which to look at social reality. Not only is the fit between the conc
empirical material interesting, so is the divergence between them.
I see moral regulation as a social form that can be detected in many differe
and contents. The concept's critical import lies in showing that some object of
example, the early Finnish temperance movement, can, in fact, be analyzed
of moral regulation. Beneath the apparent content of the movement-the pro
sobriety-there is a constellation of social roles and relations that can be foun
other objects of social inquiry, such as the education of the colonial administ
Britain (Osborne 1994), or Victorian philanthropy in Canada (Valverde 19
making in contemporary Sri Lanka (Woost 1994). If we are to believe Bauman
the ideology of culture, this social form is also one that is closely connected w
of modern societies.
Researchers have found the moral regulation perspective especially useful for historical
topics. I see two possible reasons for this. Perhaps the phenomenon of moral regulation is
so closely connected with the modernist era that it has little to do with the contemporary
societies now becoming postmodern. This is hard to believe. If we think of

social movements, or, indeed, the cultural climate in contemporary Europea
American societies, the questions concerning life style and self-improvemen
central. For example, the "new temperance" emphasizing good health an
prevention of addictions (from drugs to pornography and gambling), that W
sees as permeating U.S. society, can well be analyzed from the moral regulat
tive. If it is indeed the case that the present era is characterized by "the ob
private issues, and social movements aimed at individuals and groups who ar
to be 'unhealthy' " (Wagner 1987:540), then moral regulation studies may be
central than in the case of Victorian society.
Another possible reason for the comparative lack of moral regulation stu
temporary problems is that it may be easier to analyze the past than the prese
perspective. An analysis of the ideology that underlies moral regulation is an
of moral regulation studies. In analyzing ideologies that are distant in time
easier for the researcher to establish the necessary critical distance. In the ca
porary moral regulation, the ideologies are the ones that we ourselves are su
Moreover, they are often now expressed in technical language devoid of any
exhortations, such as discourses on health promotion or management doctri
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Moral Regulation A Reformulation

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Moral Regulation: A Reformulation

Author(s): Hannu Ruonavaara

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

University of Turku, Finland

*Address correspondence to the author at the Department of Sociology, 20014 University o

Sociological Theory 15:3 November 1997

DURKHEIM ON MORAL REGULATION

There are two levels in Durkheilm's discussion of moral regulation: a sociolog

a shared interest an opportunity to develop solidarity. Apart from further

THE MEANING OF MORAL REGULATION

fresh perspective in Marxist analyses of the State, although similar thoughts

of punishment ([1975] 1979), and the introductory volume of his histo

From Moral Regulation to Governmentality

Foucault's analyses of punishment and sexuality the subject itself is seen as

This is clearly illustrated by the multiple and overlapping jurisdictions involving

physical culture, to the plethora of practices associated with cults of self-lib

Elaborating the Moral Regulation Framework

Valverde' s reformulation of the moral regulation perspective is based on com

of improving the poor and needy that is missing in charity, understood as

GUIDELINES FOR REFORMULATION

1. Moral Regulation Should Not Be Seen as Monolithic and Unitary

life, to create a self-disciplined and orderly (skotsam) worker who would be

REDEFINING MORAL REGULATION

behavior exercised in a community in order to make the members of the comm

capitalism-fear of unemployment, abandonment, destitution and enforced 'c

To summarize: moral regulation is a special kind of social control that h

SOCIAL RELATIONS OF MORAL REGULATION

My arguments already imply my perspective on moral regulation: I do n

I have attempted to outline a concept of moral regulation that is more clear

of moral regulation developed here constructs a more polycentric and heter

societies now becoming postmodern. This is hard to believe. If we think of

.1994a. "Editor's introduction." Thle Canadian Journal of Sociology 19:2: vi-xii.

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