Professional Documents
Culture Documents
a publication of
The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America
Book Reviews
Editorial Review Board for Volume 13
Special thanks once again to Mr. Robert J. Todd, whose generous contributions to the
Foundation have made this issue of the Review possible.
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1
Entire contents © 2015 by the Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America.
Permission to republish in any form is hereby granted, provided that source is
acknowledged. Electronic versions of the texts contained herein are available
at the Foundation’s web site, www.zubiri.org.
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Zubiri Studies in the 21st Century
Editorial
This issue brings together a wide range of topics, and shows the current
breadth and depth of Zubiri scholarship. It also illustrates the great variety of
areas where researchers have found application for Zubiri’s philosophy. This is
extremely important because it allows Zubiri’s thought to enter into wide areas
of scholarship and research, far beyond the confines of the philosophy class-
room and seminar. Philosophy of course should be a touchstone for knowledge
in all areas, and influence as well as be influenced by developments in those
areas, as Zubiri well knew. This means that scholars and researchers in many
areas such as physics, medicine, economics, and political theory—just to name
a few—must take the time to engage with the problems of philosophy and in
particular Zubiri’s ideas. Zubiri told me once that he got along better with sci-
entists than with philosophers.
The articles by Lechuga and Fowler penetrate deeply into science and
how Zubiri’s thought fits well with it, especially contemporary science, at the
cutting edge. Lechuga looks at the developments in science and points out that
in many ways science is still mired in Aristotelian ways of thinking, especially in
terms of substance, when Zubiri’s notion of substantivity is a better fit. Fowler
discusses Quantum Field Theory and how Zubiri’s ideas are able to handle the
many new ideas there, such as virtual particles, symmetry, negative energy,
negative momentum, and the blurring of the distinction between mathematics
and physics. Most earlier philosophies are unable to come to grips with these
new ideas—ideas that have been forced upon us by careful observation and ex-
perimentation with the most advanced equipment in the world, such as the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN in Geneva. The article by Ortega looks at
economics and sustainability in today’s world—both very important subjects.
He points out the inadequacy of conceptions based on positivism and analytic
philosophy, in favor of Zubiri’s ideas. Eric Weislogel looks at new metaphysical
ideas such as trope theory, and discusses them in the context of Zubiri’s phi-
losophy. In the area of theology we have two articles. Soares Bello’s article
considers criticism of Zubiri’s concept of religation, and shows that the criticism
is not justified. Sanchez Gauto examines Zubiri’s theology as manifested in Na-
ture, History, God and concludes that it represents a type of transcendental
panentheism, defined as a “vision” of God in the world and the world in God. In
the realm of psychology we have a very interesting in-depth study of the paral-
lels between the theories of American psychologist J. J. Gibson and Zubiri’s
noology. The article by Casanova Domingo is definitely a different take on polit-
ical theory with respect to Zubiri, rather different than the take of Senserrich y
Morata. We leave it to the reader to reflect on this and the other matters raised
in this issue.
Thomas B. Fowler
June, 2015
3
Ontología y ciencia: de la substancia aristotélica a la sus-
tantividad zubiriana1
Abstract
Science, for over a hundred years, has given new ways of approaching physical reality
and, thereby, also the necessity of new horizons of understanding. We now face classical
problems such as the principle of least action, but new ones such as the physical difference
between gravitational mass and inertial mass, the formerly so-called “wave-particle duali-
ty”, the thin line between the observer and the observed both experimentally—Compton
Effect, for example—and theoretically—Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle—the problem of
integrating gravitational force into the standard model, the impassable barrier of limit of the
speed of transmission of information, the problem of evolution and its many theories, living
organisms, self-organization of matter, the binding quantum, emergence of intelligence,
macromolecules, the passage between a macromolecule to a cell, space-time, among many
others; in short, the concept of system, clearly disclose an intellectual situation that re-
quires philosophical speculation for clarity in the foundations of our way of approach to
material reality. If there are epistemological or ontological problems in science, that is, if
there exist meta-scientific problems, I believe it is due to the horizon of understanding from
which we are facing them. In this paper I present the thesis that science has continued
thinking in an Aristotelian way in terms of the concept of substance, and I will propose an-
other independent variable: substantivity. To do this, I will briefly talk about on the hori-
zons of understanding that Zubiri found in West (mobility and nihility) and, then, I will
show why our intellectual situation invites us to think of complex structures from a horizon
that could be called that of complexity. Then, I will show how horizons previous to ours still
thought in terms of the Aristotelian concept of substance even though there are who may
not see it like that. Finally, I will say why to our horizon is required to think not so much in
terms of substance as of substantivity, if we as philosophers want to be at the height of our
times.
Resumen
La ciencia, desde hace más de cien años, ha lanzado nuevos modos de acercamiento a
la realidad física y, con ello, necesidad de nuevos horizontes de comprensión de la misma.
Problemas clásicos como el principio de mínima acción, la diferencia física entre la masa
gravitacional y la masa inercial; y modernos como la antes llamada «dualidad onda-
partícula», la delgada línea entre el observador y lo observado tanto experimentalmente –el
Efecto Compton, por ejemplo– como teóricamente –el principio de indeterminación de Hei-
senberg–, el problema de integrar la fuerza gravitacional al modelo estándar, la barrera
infranqueable de la velocidad límite de transmisión de información, el problema de la evo-
lución y sus múltiples teorías, los organismos vivos, la autoorganización de la materia, el
enlazamiento cuántico, la emergencia de la inteligencia, las macromoléculas, el paso entre
una macromolécula a una célula, el espacio-tiempo, entre muchos más; en fin, el propio
5
6 Carlos Sierra Lechuga
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
concepto de sistema, dan cuenta clara de una situación intelectual que requiere de la espe-
culación filosófica para mayor claridad en los basamentos de nuestros modos de acerca-
miento a la realidad material. Si existen problemas en la ciencia de orden epistemológico u
ontológico, es decir, si en ella existen problemas meta-científicos, se debe –creo yo– al hori-
zonte de comprensiones desde el cual se les está enfrentando. En este artículo, presentaré
la tesis de que la ciencia ha continuado pensando aristotélicamente en función del concep-
to de sustancia y propondré otra variable independiente: la sustantividad. Para ello, echaré
mano brevemente de los horizontes de comprensión que X. Zubiri ha encontrado en Occi-
dente (movilidad y nihilidad), para luego mostrar por qué nuestra situación intelectual nos
invita a pensar en las estructuras complejas desde un horizonte que podría llamarse de la
complejidad. Seguidamente, pasaré a mostrar cómo los horizontes previos al nuestro son
horizontes que piensan en función del concepto de sustancia aristotélica aun a pesar de
que haya quien así no lo viera. Por último, diré por qué para nuestro horizonte se requiere
pensar no tanto en términos de substancia cuanto de sustantitividad si como filósofos que-
remos estar a la altura de nuestros tiempos.
cosas (aliqua) según el cual—y sólo gracias cedor de, o al menos quien intenta cono-
a él—podrá conocérseles (sit modus eorum cer, sustancias. Modernamente, la sustan-
quae de re illa cognoscuntur); es decir que cia puede ser tanto cósica (por ejemplo, en
conociendo la sustancia de la cosa (rei el caso de Newton [substantia]) como «sub-
substantiam) nada de la cosa inteligida jetiva» (la res cogitans de Descartes) e, in-
excederá la razón humana (nullum cluso, exclusiva de la divinidad (como en
intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae su caso lo pensó Spinoza [substantia]). La
rationis excedet).9 Esto será preclaro para οὐσία griega termina desembocando me-
lo que más adelante diremos. Oὐσία, en dievalmente en conceptos substanciales
este sentido, se entiende como la cosa; no como el de ens, del cual uno de sus tras-
como cualquier cosa. Es la cosa más cosa, cendentales era ser quid (quiditas), lo que
es la cosa presente, más presente, según compartía cierta sinonimia con la afamada
la cual el resto de la cosa queda precisa- res. A partir de la modernidad, la sustan-
mente delimitada (πέρας) como cosa. cia subjetiva (p.e. res cogitans) tenderá a
Las realidades penden (ἤρτηται) de buscar sustancias objetivas (p.e. res ex-
un principio más real a ellas, de tal forma tensa) precisamente por estar puestas en
que conociéndolo a éste conoceremos a frente, en su frente (Descartes, Leibniz) o,
aquéllas. No se trata de una extrapolación en su búsqueda, afirmará la imposibilidad
de dicho principio hacia la totalidad de la de conocerlas (Locke, Hume, Kant) –es lo
cosa, sino de la representación de la tota- que se llamó ob-iectum. Quiero destacar
lidad de la cosa en la presentación de di- este punto clave de la modernidad: la sus-
cho principio. Es en este sentido como la tancia subjetiva busca en las cosas sus
sustancia fue un concepto que marcó la sustancias (las sustancias objetivas), no
historia de Occidente desde que Aristóteles sus accidentes. Busca de ellas lo que es
la acuñó explícitamente,10 tratándose en más real –o lo que así se considera que sea
efecto de ella como algo πέρας, algo tam- más real–, no aquello que parece (frente al
bién καθ' αυτό (suficiente) y algo ὑποκείμενον. sujeto) no más que algo accidental (distin-
La sustancia es también ὑποκείμενον, ción típicamente moderna entre el ser y el
es precisamente sustrato de accidentes. Si parecer, esse y percipere). Por ello es que,
la substancia es lo que está-ahí entonces bien entendido, Galileo –padre de la cine-
es lo yaciente (κεῖται), y estando además mática moderna– muestra esto diciendo:
por debajo (ὑπό) de otras realidades acci- […] io dico che ben sento tirarmi dalla
dentales, entonces es lo sub-yacente. Lo necessità, subito che concepisco una
sub-iectum es en esa medida una realidad materia o sostanza corporea, a
no dependiente; y así, lo substante deviene concepire insieme ch'ella è terminata e
sub-yacente (ὑπό-κείμενων). figurata di questa o di quella figura,
Pero la ciencia moderna es, preci- ch'ella in relazione ad altre è grande o
samente, moderna, no griega ni medieval. piccola, ch'ella è in questo o quel
¿Qué hay con este principio substancial y luogo, in questo o quel tempo, ch'ella
subsistente según el cual conociéndolo a si muove o sta ferma, ch'ella tocca o
él se conoce a la cosa toda? Dijo Aristóte- non tocca un altro corpo, ch'ella è una,
les “τί […] ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ poche o molte, né per veruna
ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα”11, qué es la imaginazione posso separarla da
οὐσία: aquello que no (se dice) de un queste condizioni; ma ch'ella debba
ὑποκειμένου, pero de ello (se dicen) las de- essere bianca o rossa, amara o dolce,
más cosas. Pasa que, siendo la sustancia sonora o muta, di grato o ingrato
aquello que no se predica sino de lo cual odore, non sento farmi forza alla mente
se predica, en la modernidad ocurrirá un di doverla apprendere da cotali
giro en el que las sustancias se distinguen condizioni necessariamente accompa-
de lo que propiamente –a partir de enton- gnata […] 12
ces– llamamos sujeto. El sujeto es el cono-
tancial sea su celulosa y no las longitudes pues baste tener en dicha estructura un
de las ondas electromagnéticas que rebo- elemento de más, por ejemplo de oxígeno
tan en ella, éstas como consecuentes a (H2O2), para dejar de tener agua y tener
aquélla. Pero sea como sea esta sustancia- entonces peróxido de hidrógeno –la llama-
lidad, esta hoja ya presente lo es tanto por da agua oxigenada. Cualquiera que en-
su celulosa como por su coloridad. Enten- cuentre irrelevante la estructura, tome un
diendo la sustantividad como un sistema sorbo de H2O2 en vez de uno de H2O y su-
de notas que precisa la concretitud de las frirá, literalmente, las consecuencias. Dice
cosas, la hoja (a)parece blanca porque es Zubiri que:
blanca, y sólo porque esto es verdadero,
[La sustantividad] funcional no es for-
patentemente verdadero (ἀλήθεια)19, es que
zosamente el resultado de
luego puede volverse a ello con el λóγος y
una combinación de sustancias que
desplegar la realidad presentada de mane-
produjera una sustancia nueva. Tam-
ra simple y de antemano. Diego Gracia ha
poco es un mero agregado de sustan-
dicho que “Si el acto de darme cuenta de
cias, porque en tal caso sólo tendría-
que el bastón parcialmente sumergido en
mos funciones aditivas. Es un acopla-
el agua está roto no me otorgara algún
miento de sustancias tal que todas
tipo de saber cierto e indubitable acerca de
ellas se codeterminan mutuamente. Y
la cosa, ¿cómo podría yo llegar algún día a
esto es lo que hemos llama-
deducir las leyes de la refracción?”20 La
do estructura. La sustantividad está
sustantividad nos muestra la cosa consti-
determinada no siempre ni formalmen-
tutivamente como una unidad integral-
te por sustancias, sino por estructura,
mente real, y no consecuentemente como
y consiste en una unidad coherencial
habiendo algo en ella más real que lo
primaria. Esta estructura es la esencia
otro.21
de la sustantividad en cuestión. La su-
Zubiri toma de la sustancia aristo-
prema forma de unidad metafísica de
télica el momento de estar presente (τὸ ὂν),
lo real, no es la unidad de sustanciali-
de delimitación de la cosa (πέρας) y de sufi-
dad, sino la unidad de sustantividad,
ciencia (καθ' αυτό), pero no así su sustrati-
la unidad estructural.22
vidad o subjetualidad (ὑποκείμενον), como si
hubiese algo más real que la totalidad de La sustancia es la que se separa de
la cosa que la hace ser, precisamente, esta la cosa misma como siendo lo más real de
cosa. Este «esta» es un deíctico que nos la cosa, sustrativamente, sin lo cual no
habla de la unidad o delimitación, de la habría tal; la sustantividad, por su parte,
suficiencia o ser por sí, y de su estar aquí es la cosa ya presente, con la que tropiezo,
ya presente. Las cosas son tales no tanto delimitada y suficiente, constituida por su
por una realidad mayor implícita en ellas, estructura, toda ella. Esto es justamente
cuanto por el modo como todas sus notas una constelación de notas que hacen de la
(o «propiedades») quedan estructuradas cosa una cosa constructa. La sustantivi-
para constituirlas. La sustantividad nos dad tiene que ver con la estructura23 de
dice que las cosas son tales por la estruc- algo, con su organización interna que lo
tura del todo, en vez de por el enseñora- hace ser precisamente un algo, ese algo
miento de una de sus partes. Así, por coherente por sí; con una realidad que, de
ejemplo, una molécula de agua es tal por suyo, se articula en relación consigo mis-
estructurarse de dos átomos de hidrógeno ma y en relación con lo otro precisamente
y uno de oxígeno (H2O), y sólo es tal por para ser real y uno. Tal realidad es una y
dicha estructura, ningún elemento suyo es está sistemáticamente organizada. No es
más real ni anterior que el resto de la es- una suma de propiedades (o notas) sino la
tructura. Antes de ello sólo hay hidrógeno unidad dinámica y estructural que concre-
y oxígeno, dos elementos «hidrogenales» y tiza la especificidad de la cosa. Pongamos
uno «oxigenal» por aparte, pero no agua. El un caso: la imposibilidad de medir a una y
modo de organización es fundamental, con la misma precisión el momento y la
que un horizonte es la clave desde la cual horizonte griego de la realidad sino de có-
se interpreta la obra de la comprensión. mo podía darse en movimiento. La pregun-
Pues bien, Xavier Zubiri ha encontra- ta fundamental en este horizonte es «¿por
do que en la historia de Occidente ha ha- qué lo que siempre está, cambia?». Desde
bido dos grandes horizontes desde los cua- este horizonte se precomprende la estancia
les se ha comprendido la realidad; los ha de la realidad y su movilidad, y desde aquí
llamado i) el horizonte de la movilidad y ii) se comprende el resto. Este es el horizonte
el horizonte de la nihilidad. El primero es de la movilidad.
el horizonte nacido con la filosofía griega y ii) Otro es el caso del horizonte de
muerto también con ella; el segundo es el la nihilidad. Este horizonte irrumpe en el
horizonte nacido con el cristianismo y que anterior con la llegada a Occidente del
culmina en Hegel, aunque dejando secue- judeo-cristianismo. Aquí comienza a haber
las incluso hasta Husserl y Heidegger.29 un interés particular por «el ser». El griego
i) Para los griegos, la realidad está no se ocupaba del ser, sino de lo que está;
dada, no se duda de que pueda o no estar. y es que no podría ocuparse del ser porque
Es lo que se muestra cuando en la Física en su horizonte no está precomprendido
Aristóteles dice que es ridículo querer de- en modo alguno su contraparte la nada.
mostrar la existencia de la naturaleza,30 lo Para el griego el mundo ha estado desde
que se muestra con el mismo concepto de siempre y para siempre, y los dioses res-
φύσις y la constante búsqueda de su ἀρχή y ponden a ello. Pero para el cristiano el
lo que queda a la vista con el afamado τό mundo no está dado sino que viene dado,
ὄν. La realidad está dada, y la pregunta viene dado por Dios. Y lo ha dado desde la
fundamental no va tanto por el lado de si nada (ex nihilo); cabe hacer mención que
debería o no estar dada sino por cómo es esta expresión –originaria de Tertuliano–
que está ya dada. Es verdad, la realidad no es siquiera bíblica, no aparece en el
ahí está, pero está moviéndose. ¿Cómo hebreo de la Tanaj sino tan sólo en una
puede entonces estar moviéndose sin dejar versión poco clara, en lengua griega, del
de estar? Si siempre está, ¿cómo es que deuterocanónico Macabeos (II, 7:28), ha-
está moviéndose? Surgió así toda la dispu- blando de una creación «desde las cosas
ta entre el ὄν y el μὴ ὄν, naciendo con ello, que no son/están» (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων). Quiero
por ejemplo, toda la física aristotélica lide- decir con ello que este nuevo horizonte
rada por la ενέργεια/ἐντελέχεια y la δύναμις a occidental es plenamente otro. Desde este
fuer de explicar el movimiento. No sólo otro horizonte, se piensa en la posibilidad
Aristóteles, sino también Platón pensaba de que este mundo pudiera ser otro que el
lo propio; bien es sabido que el único in- que es, es decir, se posibilita la posibilidad
tento de Platón por hacer una física está misma de los mundos posibles, así como
en el Timeo, mostrando que una de las el que el estado de cosas pudiera ser dife-
condiciones para lo estrictamente físico, rente. Este horizonte deja de preguntar
como lo es el tiempo, no es más que una por el cambio y la movilidad de lo dado y
copia imperfecta de la eternidad.31 Sus ahora lo hace por la propia aparición de lo
predecesores hicieron lo respectivo al no dado, por su quid. En este, la pregunta
dudar de la φύσις sino del modo de ser de deja de ser «¿por qué lo que siempre está,
su principio, su ἀρχή, ese principio orde- cambia?» y deviene en «¿por qué es el ser y
nador que regula los cambios físicos y que no más bien la nada?»32. Desde este hori-
permanece sin cambiar a pesar de generar zonte se precomprende al mundo como
el cambio. Incluso los eléatas partirán de creatura, es decir, como contingente, y
lo mismo, si bien para ellos el movimiento desde ahí se comprende al resto.
es aparente, ni duda cabe que hay movi- Pero nos interesa de esto el adve-
miento –a pesar de que lo más real no se nimiento de la ciencia en el cauce de los
mueva. Quizá esté demás decir que la horizontes. La ciencia moderna, como hoy
misma φύσις significa surgir, es decir, bro- la conocemos, nace en el horizonte de la
tar, cambiar. Así pues, no se duda en el nihilidad. La modernidad toda queda im-
buida en él; ¿no acaso su padre, Descar- en su pensamiento, en tanto que posible
tes, retoma a San Agustín en la vuelta a sólo como para él. La ciencia, nacida en el
uno mismo para conocer las cosas?33 El horizonte de la nihilidad, resulta idealista
horizonte de la nihilidad no trata de creen- anteponiendo la razón del sujeto a la pro-
cias teológicas, sino de precomprensiones pia constitución de lo real, el científico es
en la resolución efectiva de la realidad, y tal en la medida en que modela; como si
ahí quedan los padres de la ciencia. Justo hubiese un modelo racional (instituido
es mencionar que el matemático Cauchy, racionalmente) al que la realidad deba
teórico de las funciones continuas y crea- seguir o, justamente, amoldarse.
dor de la definición formal de límite, llegó Decía entonces que la ciencia nace
a decir “Yo soy cristiano, es decir, yo creo en el horizonte de la nihilidad, es decir, en
en la divinidad de Jesucristo, con Tycho- el horizonte en que se posibilita lo que las
Brahe, Copérnico, Descartes, Newton, cosas no son, que las cosas no sean y, con
Fermât, Leibniz, Pascal, Grimaldi, Euler, ello, en donde es viable conocer lo que es
Guldin, Boscowich, Gerdil, con todos los mediante lo que no es. Con el modelo ideal
grandes astrónomos, todos los grandes de lo real, se conoce lo que sí es con lo que
físicos, todos los grandes matemáticos de no es. Conocer la realidad conociendo la
los siglos pasados.”34 El horizonte da idealidad.
cuenta de que previa a sus disertaciones Hay que decir, por otro lado, que la
científicas, está precomprendida la reali- modernidad (y pre-modernidad) ha visto a
dad desde la nihilidad, esto es, de que las la conciencia como un contenedor al cual
cosas son contingentes y pueden conocer- le llegan contenidos. Es a esto a lo que nos
se a partir de lo que no son, y las leyes que referíamos antes cuando decíamos que lo
van encontrándose son las razones del conocido se subsume en el cognoscente. A
porqué (y/o cómo) haya algo en vez de veces se le ha visto como un contenedor
nada. con forma (Kant) pero a veces también sin
En este horizonte, pues, el conoci- forma (Locke), sea como sea, la verdad es
miento de las cosas puede ser sustituido que se le ha visto como contenedor. El
por el conocimiento del sujeto que conoce mundo, por su parte, es los contenidos
las cosas, o si se quiere: sustituir la reali- que por tales o cuales motivos terminan en
dad por un modelo ideal. El pensamiento aquel contenedor; para quienes creen que
moderno presupone una creencia acrítica el contenedor tiene forma, los contenidos
de una figura dada de la racionalidad, a de la conciencia adoptan la misma (al mo-
partir de la cual se cree conocer más la do como, análogamente, lo hace un fluido):
realidad alejándose de ella, tendiendo ha- el mundo queda idealizado, subjetivado;
cia su idealización. Hay un alejamiento de para quienes no, el contenedor es una
la realidad en pos de un acercamiento a la tabula rasa que adopta formalidad según
razón. Nótese la máxima hegeliana que la impronta que dejan sus contenidos: el
mienta Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich. sujeto queda mundanizado, es el empiris-
Was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig, lo que mo. Empirismo e idealismo son, en bruto,
racional es, eso es real; lo que real es, eso siameses. Sea como fuere, la conciencia es
es racional. El sujeto impone las condicio- un recipiente que recibe al mundo. El
nes de posibilidad de cognición de la cosa, pensamiento occidental moderno, con su
débilmente hablando; en sentido fuere: el ciencia germinal, está cuandocado dentro
sujeto impone las condiciones de posibili- del horizonte de la nihilidad.
dad de existencia de la cosa. Lo conocido Históricamente, pues, acaecen am-
es subsumido enteramente (o quasi) en el bos horizontes. Ahora bien, ¿qué hay con
cognoscente. Veremos más adelante como el concepto de sustancia? En ambos hori-
este «estar subsumido» no es sólo un modo zontes la búsqueda de comprensión se ve
de hablar. En términos de la segunda gran encaminada a la luz de la sustancia. En el
metáfora orteguiana: la naturaleza es un de la movilidad, lo que cambia no es la
pedazo del sujeto, en tanto que contenida sustancia; la sustancia es justamente
aquello más real que, por ser tal, no cam- bió en su Essai philosophique sur les pro-
bia. En el de la nihilidad, la sustancia su- babilités:37 “Una inteligencia que en un
ma no ha sido creada sino que es justa- momento determinado conociera todas las
mente la creadora (Ipsum Esse per se Sub- fuerzas que animan a la naturaleza […]
sistens). En este segundo horizonte nace podría abarcar en una sola fórmula los
la ciencia moderna. Y si bien su interés no movimientos de los cuerpos más grandes
está en esa suma sustancia (pues no re- del universo y los del átomo más ligero;
quiere de tal «hipótesis» divina, como lo nada le resultaría incierto y tanto el futuro
dijera Laplace), sí lo está en aquello que como el pasado estarían presentes ante
dicha sustancia ha creado a su semejanza: sus ojos.”38 Se trata aquí de conocer, pues,
las sustancias perenes del mundo finito. la sustancia del mundo. Una cosa u otra
Que pueden hallarse a la luz de los con- bien pudo haberla dicho Laplace o el
ceptos de, por ejemplo, ley y determinismo. Aquinate. Son parecidos, en efecto, porque
Las cosas perenes, no sus contingencias, ambos discursos parten del mismo hori-
son sustancias que obedecen siempre a zonte de nihilidad que precomprende como
las leyes naturales. Es así como, por fundamental una realidad primaria; para
ejemplo, es posible en la mecánica clásica el caso, la sustancia como materia. Aun-
conocer toda la trayectoria de cualquier que el mismo Aristóteles consideró que la
proyectil si de él determinamos la posición οὐσία estaba en el εἶδος y no en la mate-
y la velocidad. La posición y la velocidad ria39 –pues la materia no puede (ἀδύνατον)
son, para el caso, las cantidades matemá- nunca estar separada y, por lo tanto, no es
ticas que determinan la sustancialidad del independiente–, para entonces la única
proyectil –por decirlo así–, éste tiene (o sustancia que se tomaba por eje era la
cobra) realidad física si es viable determi- material. El químico y nobel Wilhelm Os-
nar dichas cantidades: con la posición y la twald dijo que “La substancia de la Física
velocidad se conserva la sustancialidad del y la Química del siglo XIX lleva el peculiar
proyectil, misma que permanece tanto nombre de materia. […] No es del todo fácil
atrás en el tiempo como adelante (deter- determinar unívocamente lo que hoy día
minismo).35 se entiende por materia, ya que al intentar
Hemos de recordar en este punto que dar una definición, resulta que en general
si la ciencia moderna nació fue en buena se ha presupuesto ya el conocimiento de
medida por la lucha anti-aristotélica que aquel concepto […]”40. Por su parte, el
se tuvo entonces de cara a sus explicacio- mismo Werner Heisenberg habló crítica-
nes cualitativas del mundo físico.36 Esto, mente de la sustancia material desde la
por otro lado, no significó la renuncia a la electrodinámica: “En la electrodinámica, lo
sustancia, sino la cuantificación de la auténticamente existente no es la materia,
misma; la sustancia sigue subrepticiamen- sino el campo de fuerzas. Un juego de
te. Estando Aristóteles en la cumbre de la relaciones entre campos de fuerzas, sin
época histórica del horizonte de la movili- ninguna substancia en que se apoyaran
dad, fue fácil que sus conceptos se filtra- dichas fuerzas, constituía una noción
ran, igualmente de manera histórica, al bastante menos comprensible que la
siguiente horizonte. noción materialista de la realidad […].”41
Si recordamos lo que Tomás de Es claro que de la sustancia está
Aquino dijo, a saber, que si la inteligencia brotando la ciencia moderna, pero ya des-
inteligía la sustancia de la cosa no habría de sí misma (con el electromagnetismo en
nada de ésta que escapara a aquélla (si general, la teoría cinética de gases, la ter-
intellectus humanus alicuius rei sub- modinámica de procesos irreversibles, etc.)
stantiam comprehendit nullum intelligi- es notoria la insuficiencia de tal noción y,
bilium illius rei facultatem humanae con ello, la necesidad de nuevas nociones
rationis excedet), entonces entenderemos a la altura de estas igualmente nuevas
el fuerte bagaje de esta precomprensión en exigencias.
las siguientes palabras que Laplace escri-
gen ser estudiados desde otro horizonte filosófica la especulación de nociones úti-
porque están siendo planteados desde les en el abordaje de lo real, y es labor
afuera de los límites que presuponen una filosófica proveer de herramientas teóricas
realidad suma y perene. Escapan, pues, a según las cuales el científico tenga de
los horizontes viejos reclamando uno nue- dónde partir para nuevas herramientas
vo. A éste horizonte Diego Gracia lo llamó matemáticas precisas47, una matemática
el horizonte de la complejidad.46 En las que mire los sistemas rigurosamente como
estructuras complejas se trata de no bus- sistemas constituidos por sus propiedades
car una realidad sustancial de la que de- estructurales, todos mayores a la suma de
penda toda la estructura, como si tuvieran sus partes, y no como efectos consecuen-
una piedra angular; toda la estructura es tes de un único principio.
real y toda ella tiene manifestaciones pro-
V. Conclusión
pias inexplicables sin la totalidad de la
estructura. Ver la totalidad de la estructu- Confío en que el filósofo español Xa-
ra como un único fenómeno en vez de co- vier Zubiri, quien hubiera estudiado con
mo un conglomerado de accidentes de- Einstein y Schrödinger en Berlín, y con
pendientes de una sola «parte» es partir Louis de Broglie en París, ha dado en el
desde un nuevo horizonte abierto a las clavo para el abordaje de las nuevas reali-
exigencias de los problemas de la ciencia dades a las que nos enfrentamos en nues-
de nuestro tiempo. tro tiempo. Nuestra situación intelectual
¿Por qué es que no puedo medir a da para más que un mero análisis lógico
la vez la posición y el momento de una del lenguaje, y no se trata aquí de distin-
partícula subatómica con arbitraria preci- guir taxonómicamente lo que es sustancia
sión? Esta pregunta se lanza sólo si se de lo que es sustantividad, se trata de es-
precomprende que la sustancia de un fe- cuchar a la realidad misma de las cosas y
nómeno tal está en su carácter de ser par- ver qué tienen ellas que decirnos, por en-
tícula. Las partículas son sustancialmente cima de lo que nuestros modelos canóni-
determinables por su momento y posición. cos y canonizantes prefieren. Se trata, a la
Pero este fenómeno subatómico requiere postre, de atenerse modestamente a la
de otra clave (la clave de interpretación) realidad de las cosas, de atender más a las
según la cual esta pregunta resulta ser, a cosas de las que queremos saber antes
la postre, una pseudo-pregunta o, al me- que a nuestras preconcepciones y prejui-
nos, una deutero-pregunta. Si se ve al fe- cios desde los cuales decimos que quere-
nómeno como totalidad estructural no nos mos saber. Nuestra situación intelectual
parecería extraña la ausencia de caracte- nos exige ver las cosas en su estructura,
rísticas de partícula porque de hecho no como sistemas, como complejos, como
esperaríamos que fuese una partícula o realidades respectivas48 y no innocuas.
que se comportase como tal; lo mismo si Interpretarlas en una nueva clave puede
esperamos que se comportase como onda. dificultar nuestro acercamiento al ser éste
Es verdad que hoy decimos que para cier- uno nuevo, radicalmente otro que ese que
tos experimentos el fenómeno acontece nos mantenía en un nivel considerable de
como siendo partícula, para otros no; pero certezas y en un estado confortable, pero
¿cómo se explica este cambio de dirección aminora la carga cuando la clave resulta
en la naturaleza? No se explica, y por eso ser una luz a la que esas realidades poco
tienen los científicos que recurrir a antro- comprensibles desde otro enfoque, son
pomorfismos como «el electrón decide ahora sensibles. No es que la realidad sea
si…»; no, no decide nada, carecemos de translúcida y por lo tanto estemos vedados
conceptos porque seguimos circundando de verla por principio, pasa que debemos
uno que nos limita la visión de cara a esta ajustar las longitudes de nuestras radia-
clase de fenómenos: la sustancia. La tota- ciones hasta alcanzar lo mínimo necesario
lidad de este fenómeno es total, y siendo el para que reboten contra su real e intrínse-
caso, uno debe verla como tal. Es labor ca opacidad. Aunque sea más cómodo
afirmar que sólo es cognoscible aquello mejor noción para acercarse a las realida-
donde hasta ahora conocemos, no es esto des complejas a las que hoy nos enfrenta-
ni verdadero ni laudable. Amicus Plato sed mos, quizá haya otras muchas que ayuden
magis amica veritas, donde «Plato» signifi- más y mejor, pero es una que atiende ho-
ca cualquier cosa que interpele al lector. nestamente al escudriñamiento de la tota-
Ver desde donde no se ha visto o desde lidad de lo real; escudriñamiento frente al
donde apenas se ha empezado a ver, sin cual Platón, hace ya más de 2000 años,
duda será arduo, pero al final alguien tie- confesó haber desfallecido49 pero –como
ne que poner (de θέσις) la vista (de ὁράω) en enseñara Zubiri– no por ello haberse des-
ello, es decir, alguien tiene que teorizar animado.50
(θεωρία). Quizá no sea la sustantividad la
Notes
1 Una versión más corta del presente artículo cia de algo (cuando un joven hereda, es in-
fue presentada como conferencia en el XVII dependiente de su familia y demás trabajos).
Congreso Internacional de Filosofía (Morelia, De aquí que se usara esta misma palabra
Michoacán, México) de la Asociación Filosófi- pero compuesta para indicar «autoridad»:
ca de México, A.C., en una de las mesas de ἐξουσία. Todavía hoy en griego moderno se
Filosofía de la Ciencia. habla de los bienes y la fortuna como
περιουσία.
2 Vicepresidente Asociado Fundador de la
Academia Internacional Tomás de Aquino
5 Quizá haya mejores traducciones para οὐσία,
(AITA). Miembro de la Sociedad Educativa pero la tradicional ha sido sustancia. Aun-
Latinoamericana para Fe y Ciencia que estrictamente esté en desacuerdo con
(SELFYC), instalada principalmente en Gua- llamarle así, prefiero dejarla tal y como se le
temala. Colaborador Asociado de la revista ha llamado para señalar la tradición de este
Razón y Pensamiento Cristiano, Chile. Editor horizonte.
y creador de la Colección Estudios Libres, en 6 Met. 1003b5. ARISTÓTELES, Aristotle’s Met-
Ediciones Castilibros, México. Licenciado en aphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, W.D.
filosofía por la Universidad del Claustro de Ross, 1924. Todas las citas griegas que vie-
Sor Juana, México. Ha participado como po- nen de la Metafísica se tomarán de esta edi-
nente en los VI y VII Congresos Latino Ame- ción. Las traducciones al castellano de las
ricanos de Ciencia y Religión, organizados mismas son traducciones mías, permitién-
por el Ian Ramsey Centre de la University of dome dejar en griego los términos que consi-
Oxford y en el curso Ciencia y Fe: Dos ven- dero clave.
tanas una Realidad organizado por el Fara- 7 Met. 1003b18.
day Institute de la University of Cambridge. 8 Met. 1028b3.
3 Cfr. Cfr. ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Filosofía y Metafísi- 9 SCG I, 3. “Cum enim principium totius
ca,” in. Cruz y Raya 10 (1935), pp. 7-60. Y
scientiae quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, sit
ZUBIRI, Xavier, Los problemas fundamenta-
intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod,
les de la metafísica occidental, Madrid: Alian-
secundum doctrinam Philosophi, demonstra-
za, 2008, pp. 67, 68. En esta última refe-
tionis principium est quod quid est; oportet
rencia Zubiri dice que el mismo Aristóteles
quod secundum modum quo substantia rei
dio tratamiento sistemático a dos modos de
intelligitur, sit modus eorum quae de re illa
acceso a la οὐσία, el del λóγος y el de la
cognoscuntur. Unde si intellectus humanus
κίνησις (dejando de lado el acceso por νοεῖν),
alicuius rei substantiam comprehendit, puta
pero que al final subsume la κίνησις en el
lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligibilium
λóγος, resbalando.
illius rei facultatem humanae rationis
4 La propia palabra οὐσία es usada en el griego excedet.” AQUINO, Tomás de, Summa contra
con la significación de heredad o herencia; la gentiles, Romae: Typis Ricardi Garroni,
herencia es lo que garantiza la independen- 1928. pp. 7,8.
“El principio del que parte toda ciencia Junio, 1981), Núms. 216-217, Vol 56, pp.
que pueda la razón percibir acerca de un ob- 41-59, p. 44.
jeto, es la captación de la sustancia del mis- 15 Op. Cit. ZUBIRI, Xavier, Sobre la esencia, p.
mo: porque como dice el Filósofo, el principio 86.
de toda demostración es la esencia de una 16 Ibid., p. 87.
cosa. Y así, según el modo como se conoce la
sustancia de un objeto, así es como se puede 17 “Radical y formalmente, lo real no es sustan-
conocer dicho objeto. Por ello, si la inteligen- cialidad, sino sustantividad.” ZUBIRI, Xavier,
cia humana puede comprender la sustancia “Reflexiones teológicas sobre la Eucaristía”,
de alguna cosa, como de una piedra o de un op. cit. p. 45.
triángulo, nada excede la inteligibilidad de 18 Aunque Zubiri no hablaría ni de «apari-
esa cosa a la facultad de la razón humana.” ciones» ni de «existente», a este respecto me
AQUINO, Tomás de, Suma contra los gentiles, parece que en las primeras páginas de L'être
México: Porrúa, Carlos Ignacio González, et le néant, con la fenomenología de fondo
2004. p. 3. Sartre ha sido preclaro: “Les apparitions qui
10 Platón, por su parte, ya hablaba también del manifestent l'existant ne sont ni intérieures
εἶδος como siendo οὐσία. Es interesante no- ni extérieures : eltes se valent toutes, elles
tar que él decía lo que más abajo señalare- renvoient toutes à d'autres apparitions et
mos decisivo en la interpretación zubiriana aucune d'elles n'est privilégiée. La force, par
de la sustancia aristotélica y que sugeríamos exemple, n'est pas un conatus métaphysique
al inicio: que la οὐσία es el objeto de la et d'espèce inconnue qui se masquerait
νόησις. “νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν” Rep. 534a. derrière ses effets (accélérations, déviations,
etc.) : elle est l'ensemble de ces effets.
11 Met. 1029a8
Pareiltement le courant électrique n'a pas
12 “…anzi, se i sensi non ci fussero scorta, forse d'envers secret : il n'est rien que l'ensemble
il discorso o l'immaginazione per se stessa des actions physicochimiques (électrolyses,
non v'arriverebbe già mai.” GALILEI, Galileo, incandescence d'un filament de carbone,
Il Saggiatore, progetto Manuzio, 1997, p. 108 déplacement de l'aiguille du galvanomètre,
(Cursivas mías). En castellano, traducción etc.) qui le manifestent. Aucune de ces
libre: actions ne suffit à le révéler. Mais elle
“ […] digo que siento la necesidad, tan pronto n'indique rien qui soit derrière elle: elle
concibo una materia o sustancia corpórea, indique elte-même et la série totale. Il
de concebir junto con ella que está s'ensuit, évidemment, que le dualisme de
delimitada y figurada de ésta o aquella l'être et du paraître ne saurait plus trouver
forma, que en relación a otras es grande o droit de cité en philosophie.” SARTRE, Jean-
pequeña, que está en este o aquel lugar, en Paul, L'Être et le Néant. Essai d'ontologie
este o aquel tiempo, que se mueve o está phénoménologique, Paris : Éditions Galli-
quieta, que toca o no toca otro cuerpo, que mard, 1943, p. 11.
es una, o pocas o muchas, y ni con gran 19 Nótese que ἀλήθεια no quiere decir algo como
imaginación puedo separarla de estas condi- «des-velar», sino más bien «sin-velos». No es
ciones; pero que deba ser blanca o roja, lo mismo des- que sin-, pues lo primero im-
amarga o dulce, sonora o muda, de olor plica que en efecto hay velos, y que éstos de-
agradable o desagradable, no siento que ben ser descorridos; lo segundo, por su par-
fuerce a mi mente a tener que aprehenderla te, quiere decir que efectivamente no hay ve-
acompañada necesariamente de estas lo alguno (y por lo tanto no hay que desco-
condiciones: más bien, sin los sentidos no rrer nada).
las hubieran advertido, tal vez el discurso [la 20 GRACIA-GUILLÉN, Diego, “Actualidad de
razón] o la imaginación por sí mismas no lo
Zubiri: La Filosofía como Profesión de Ver-
hubieran advertido jamás.”
dad”, in. Tellechea Idígoras, J. Ignacio (ed.),
13 ZUBIRI, Xavier, Sobre la esencia, Madrid: Zubiri (1898-1983), Vitoria: Departamento de
Alianza, 2008, p. 87. Cultura del Gobierno Vasco, 1984, p. 90.
14 ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Reflexiones teológicas sobre 21 “La sustancialidad sólo es un tipo de sustan-
la Eucaristía”, Estudios escolásticos (Enero- tividad: la sustantividad que algo posee para
que todo lo demás se apoye en él en orden a Y esto ha seguido de una manera muy
la existencia. Pero no es la única sustantivi- pertinaz hasta nuestros días.” ZUBIRI, Xa-
dad posible. Sustantividad es la suficiencia vier, Los problemas fundamentales de la me-
de un grupo de notas para constituir algo tafísica occidental, Op. Cit. p. 35.
propio; es la suficiencia del orden constitu- 30 “ὡς δ' ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι
cional.” ZUBIRI, Xavier, “El hombre, realidad γελοῖον” Física 193a3. ARISTÓTELES, Aristo-
personal”, In. Revista de Occidente, 1, 1963, tle’s Physics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, W.D.
p. 21. Ross, 1936.
22 Idem. 31 Vid. Timeo 37d. “ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῴου φύσις
23
Aquí estoy usando «constructo» y «estructura» ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ
sin mucho rigor distintivo. Formalmente son γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν:
diferentes, pero ahora no viene a cuento de- εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι,
tenernos en este detalle que, en otros ámbi- καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος
tos, es crucial. αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον
24 “La transformación de la sustantividad con- εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν.”
siste en que el sistema de propiedades pierde PLATÓN, Platonis Opera, Londres: Oxford
su unidad constitucional” ZUBIRI, Xavier, University Press, John Burnet, 1902.
“Reflexiones teológicas sobre la Eucaristía”, “Pero dado que la naturaleza del mundo
Op. Cit. p. 45. ideal es sempiterna y esta cualidad no se le
25 ZUBIRI, Xavier, “El hombre, realidad perso- puede otorgar completamente a lo generado,
nal”, In. Revista de Occidente, 1, 1963, pp. procuró realizar una cierta imagen móvil de
21-23. la eternidad y, al ordenar el cielo, hizo de la
eternidad que permanece siempre en un
26 ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Reflexiones teológicas sobre
punto una imagen eterna que marchaba se-
la Eucaristía”, Op. Cit. p. 45.
gún el número, eso que llamamos tiempo.”
27 A esto Heidegger llamó Verweisung, (vid. Sein PLATÓN, Diálogos VI: Timeo, Madrid: Gredos,
und Zeit, § 17) y Bezogenseins (vid, Ontologie María Ángeles Durán y Francisco Lisi, 2008,
(Hermeneutik der Faktizität), capítulo 4). Ga- p.182.
damer le llamará abiertamente Vor- 32 Recordemos la gran lucha de Leibniz por
verständnis
entender por qué hay algo (quelque chose, lit.
28 Posiblemente la aprehensión primordial de cualquier cosa) y no mejor nada (no La Na-
realidad esté exenta de estos horizontes. da, sino nada –Leibniz escribe rien y no
Creo que Zubiri así lo pensaría, así lo pienso Néant): “la première question qu’on a droit de
yo en lo personal; pero es un tema que ame- faire sera : pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque
rita filosofarse por aparte. chose que rien ? Carle rien est plus simple et
29 “El mundo griego ha visto esencialmente la plus facile que quelque chose. De plus,
idea del ens, la idea del ὄν, desde el horizon- supposé que des choses doivent exister, il
te de la movilidad. Si nos trasladamos al faut qu’on puisse rendre raison pourquoi
mundo medieval, nos encontramos con algo elles doivent exister ainsi, et non autrement.”
totalmente distinto. Lo primero que piensa el LEIBNIZ, Gottfried, Principes de la nature et
medieval es por qué hay cosas en lugar de de la grâce fondé en raison,
que no haya nada. Es curioso que esta pre- <http://www.maat.it/livello2/Leibniz-
gunta […] está inscrita dentro del horizonte Principes%20de%20la%20nature.html>,
de la nihilidad, que es el horizonte de la (consultado el 11 de marzo de 2013.) (Párrafo
Creación. La idea de la nada no cruzó jamás 7)
por la mente de un griego. Para la mente Además, la interpretación absolutamente
griega, Dios, el θεός, no ha hecho el mundo, entificada (pues ya no habla de «cualquier
ni siquiera en Aristóteles; el mundo está na- cosa» sino del «ente» [Seiendes] ni de nada
turalmente ahí. En cambio, para un medie- como rien sino como La Nada [no nichts sino
val, el mundo empieza por haber llegado a Nichts]) de Heidegger al respecto, diciendo
tener realidad. Por consiguiente, todo el pro- que una pregunta tal es fundamental.
blema del ser se inscribe dentro del proble- “Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht
ma de la nada y de su nihilidad. vielmehr Nichts?” HEIDEGGER, Martin, Was
ist Metaphysik?, Friedrich Cohen, Bonn, composent, si d'ailleurs elle était assez vaste
1931, p. 27. pour soumettre ces données à l'analyse,
33 Decía San Agustín: “Noli foras ire, in te embrasserait dans la même formule les
ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat mouvemens des plus grands corps de
veritas, et si tuam naturam mutabilem l'imivers et ceux du plus léger atome: rien ne
inveneris, trascende et te ipsum.“ (De vera serait incertain pour elle, et l'avenir comme
religione XXXIX). Si el nacimiento de la mo- le passé, serait présent à ses yeux. LA-
dernidad se cuandoca con Descartes, baste PLACE, Pierre-Simon de, Essai philosophique
decir que éste viene retomando una filosofía sur les probabilités, Paris: Bachelier, 1840, p.
y modo de filosofar muy agustino; volver a sí 4.
mismo e, incluso, meditar es algo que Agus- “Una inteligencia que en un momento de-
tín inaugura en su afamado si fallor [ergo] terminado conociera todas las fuerzas que
sum y en sus confesiones. Para las influen- animan a la naturaleza, así como la situa-
cias medievales en el padre de la moderni- ción respectiva de los seres que la compo-
dad, vid. Étienne Gilson, Études sur le rôle nen, si además fuera lo suficientemente am-
de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du plia como para someter a análisis tales da-
système cartésien, Paris : Vrin, 1930. tos, podría abarcar en una sola fórmula los
34 La cita continúa diciendo: “Yo soy también movimientos de los cuerpos más grandes del
católico como la mayor parte de ellos; y, si se universo y los del átomo más ligero; nada le
me pregunta la razón, yo la daré con mucho resultaría incierto y tanto el futuro como el
gusto. Se vería que mis convicciones son el pasado estarían presentes ante sus ojos.”
resultado, no de prejuicios de nacimiento, LAPLACE, Pierre-Simon de, “Ensayo filosófi-
sino de un examen profundo.” Citado por co sobre las probabilidades”, In. Hawiking,
Baltasar Rodríguez Salinas y José L. de Ma- Stephen (ed.) Dios creó los números, Barcelo-
ría. “Cauchy”, Historia de la Matemática, na: Crítica, 2005, p. 362.
1994, pp. 79-111. 39 Met. 1029ª27 “[…] οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην:
35 Esta noción ha traído vicios en la ciencia ἀδύνατον δέ”, […] que οὐσίαν sea la materia,
contemporánea pues, como «gracias a» posi- esto es imposible.
ción y momento las cosas «cobran» realidad 40 La cita completa es: „Die Substanz der
según la mecánica clásica –ya que de otro Physik und Chemie des neunzehnten
modo no podríamos saber de ellas y, sin sa- Jahrhunderts führt den besonderen Namen
berlas, «cómo decir que son reales»–, enton- der Materie. Diese ist sozusagen als
ces 1) o el principio de indeterminación de Verdampfungsrückstand hinterbliebe, nach-
Heisenberg está equivocado (lo que tuvo que dem viele von den Substanzen des
rechazarse no de buena gana sino porque la achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, insbesondere der
potencia operativa del mismo obligaba a ello) Wärmestoff, die elektrischen und magne-
o bien 2) aquello que se mide en Mecánica tischen Materien, das Licht und noch
Cuántica no es (tan) real, dejando en ascuas manche andere, im Laufe der Zeit ihres
a quienes preguntan por el sentido físico de Substanzcharakters verlustig gingen und als
las ecuaciones matemáticas. „Kräfte“ ein mehr geistiges Dasein zu füren
36 Galileo se refiere a los aristotélicos con su angewiesen wurden. Was gegenwärtig unter
personaje abiertamente burlón llamado Sim- Materie verstanden wird, ist nicht ganz leicht
plicio. Cfr. su Diálogo sobre dos nuevas cien- unzweideutig festzustellen; denn versucht
cias. man bestimmte Definitionen zu ermitteln, so
findet sich, dass meistens die Kenntniss
37 En lo que sigue de este párrafo, compuesto
dieses Begriffes bereits vorausgesetzt wird
por lo demás de citas, para facilitar al lector
[...]“ OSTWALD, Wilhelm, Vorlesungen über
su ritmo citaré en castellano, dejando para
Naturphilosophie, Leipzig: Veit und comp.
las notas al pie los originales.
1902, p. 148.
38 La cita completa es: Une intelligence qui,
“La substancia de la Física y la Química
pour un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les
del siglo XIX lleva el peculiar nombre de
forces dont la nature est animée, et la
materia. La materia es por así decir el
situation respective des êtres qui la
residuo de una evaporación, lo que ha
quedado luego que muchas de las cos, Vol. 22, N° 42, año 2013, pp. 170-201.
substancias del siglo XVIII, especialmente el Y en: SIERRA-LECHUGA, Carlos, “Asir gra-
fluido calórico, las materias eléctrica y dualmente la realidad: para un principio de
magnética, la luz y muchas otras, hubieron correspondencia ontológico-
perdido en el curso de los tiempos su epistemológico”, Atualidade Teológica, ano
carácter de substancias y, consideradas XVII, fasc. 45, 2013.
como ‘fuerzas’, hubieron accedido a una 45 La cita completa es: “Es sind also zwei
forma de existencia más espiritual. No es del Gruppen verschiedener Gründe vorhanden,
todo fácil determinar unívocamente lo que von denen die eine das Festhalten an der
hoy día se entiende por materia, ya que al Wirklichkeit der Dinge, wie sie uns
intentar dar una definición, resulta que en erscheinen, die andere das Abgehen von
general se ha presupuesto ya el dieser Ansicht unterstützt. Wenn der hier
conocimiento de aquel concepto […]” OS- vorhandene Widerspruch sich soll lösen
TWALD, Wilhelm, “Lecciones sobre filosofía lassen, so wird dazu der Nachweis
natural”, In. Heisenberg, Werner, La imagen erforderlich seins, dass bei beiden Ansichten
de la naturaleza en la física actual, México: Unvollständigkeiten vorhanden sind, deren
Planeta, 1993, p. 115. Ausfüllung die Vereinigung bewirken wird.
41 Werner Heisenberg, La imagen de la natura- Diese Unvollständigkeiten werden natürlich
leza en la física actual, Op. Cit. p. 10. El ori- in der beiderseitigen Abgrenzung des
ginal se llama Das Naturbild der heutigen Substanzbegriffes zu suchen sein”
Physik, desafortunadamente no disponemos OSTWALD, Wilhelm, Vorlesungen über
de un ejemplar para citarlo, por lo que me Naturphilosophie, Op. Cit. p. 148.
disculpo con el lector al no ofrecerle la posi- “De modo que tenemos dos distintos
bilidad de hacer su propia traduc- grupos de razones, de las que unas nos
ción/interpretación del texto. llevan a atenernos a la realidad de las cosas
42 No quiero decir que la física clásica sea obso- según se nos aparecen, y las otras al
leta, sólo estoy diciendo que sus problemas abandono de dicha apariencia. Para resolver
no son los problemas con que hoy nos en- esta contradicción, hay que mostrar que
contramos. Sus problemas siguen pudiendo cada una de las indicadas actitudes encierra
ser resueltos (y así seguirán) con física clási- insuficiencias, mientras que la combinación
ca, pero hay otros que exceden su campo de ambas constituye una nueva y suficiente
epistémico y a ellos me refiero. tesitura. Es natural que las insuficiencias
43 Hasta que surgiera la genialidad de un gran aludidas hayan de buscarse mediante una
hombre de ciencia que ideara una matemáti- delimitación, en dos opuestos frentes, del
ca menos reduccionista: Henri Poincaré, uno concepto de substancia.” OSTWALD,
de los padres de la topología. Wilhelm, “Lecciones sobre filosofía natural”,
In. Heisenberg, Werner, La imagen de la na-
44 Que diga que un concepto matemático no
turaleza en la física actual, Op. Cit. pp.
existe, significa sólo que no está en el mundo
114,115.
físico, pero sí en el conceptual; pasa que a
esa «existencia» conceptual no le nombro
46 Conferencia llamada “Nuestra situación inte-
existencia sino consistencia. He tratado esta lectual: Zubiri en el horizonte de la compleji-
diferencia (además de la subsistencia) en: dad.”, dictada por Diego Gracia Guillén
SIERRA-LECHUGA, Carlos, “¿Por qué deci- (Fundación Xavier Zubiri, España) el martes
mos que la Realidad es una y que, además, 31 de agosto de 2010 en el marco del III
tiene ventanas distintas?”, in. Navarro, César Congreso Internacional Xavier Zubiri que tu-
y Chamorro, Gonzalo (eds.), Ciencia y Fe: dos vo lugar en el Salón de Honor de la Pontificia
ventanas una realidad, Guatemala: Sociedad Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile.
Educativa Latinoamericana para Fe y Cien- 47 Es verdad que ya se intentan (la matemática
cia, 2013, pp. 23-37. También en SIERRA- fractal, sistemas dinámicos [sistemas de
LECHUGA, Carlos, “Dios y la Realidad Fási- ecuaciones diferenciales], matemática del
ca: Aplicación de las distinciones entre la caos, cómputo numérico, teoría de juegos,
consistencia lógica, la existencia objetual y la variable compleja, etc.), pero según nos dice
subsistencia metafísica.”, Apuntes Filosófi- la experiencia, con un éxito grande, sin du-
da, pero no tan grande como se esperaría. 49 ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν. Fedón, 99d.
48 Zubiri también trató el tema de la respectivi- 50 ZUBIRI, Xavier, Los problemas fundamenta-
dad de lo real. Tema de orden metafísico pe- les de la metafísica occidental, Op. Cit. p.
ro que, nuevamente, a mi parecer puede ser 121.
retrotraído al del orden físico (propio de las
ciencias).
Contact information:
Correo: rideo_ergo_sum@hotmail.com
Website: http://carlossierralechuga.blogspot.mx/
Thomas B. Fowler
Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America
Washington, DC USA
Abstract
The nature of reality as revealed by the most modern science is compatible with Zubiri’s
philosophy, but less so with traditional philosophies. This vindicates Zubiri’s view of reality
as formality rather than a zone of things, and his view that progression is a search not just
for new things but also for new forms and new modes of reality.” Zubiri understood well
the quantum theory developed by his friend Werner Heisenberg and others in the first dec-
ades of the 20th century. He recognized that this new theory of physics brought with it
new modes of reality, such as that of elementary particles, neither waves nor bodies exclu-
sively, which do not fit into classical philosophy and are not visualizable in any ordinary
sense. But newer developments, especially Quantum Field Theory, have continued in quite
unexpected ways and revealed still more forms and modes of reality that had not been sus-
pected. The nature of these modes suggests that the boundary between the physical and
the mathematical is blurring, all of which can be accommodated in Zubiri’s thought, but
which is devastating for much of Western philosophy, especially Hume and Kant, and actu-
ally favors a more Platonist view. This includes virtual particles that have non-physical
properties: negative energy, negative momentum (momentum opposite to velocity), off-shell
mass values, speeds greater than light; gauge fields that are more real than ordinary fields,
but less measurable; internal symmetry spaces that allow calculations but are otherwise
non-real; and symmetry principles in which reality seems to “partake”. Quantum Field
Theory also moves away from the problematic action-at-a-distance notion of classical fields,
to a more traditional causality requiring contiguity, but with many important differences
from the classical view. The nature of the scientific method as understood on the basis of
Zubiri’s philosophy changes somewhat with these new developments. However Zubiri’s
analysis of science and scientific reality can handle these changes.
Resumen
La naturaleza de la realidad tal como lo revela la ciencia más moderna es compatible
con la filosofía de Zubiri, pero no tanto con las filosofías tradicionales. Esto justifica la opi-
nión de Zubiri de que la realidad es formalidad en vez de una zona de las cosas, y su opi-
nión de que “la marcha es una búsqueda no sólo de nuevas cosas reales sino también de
nuevas formas y de nuevos modos de realidad.” 2 Zubiri entiende bien la teoría cuántica
desarrollada por su amigo Werner Heisenberg y otros en las primeras décadas del siglo XX.
Reconoció que esta nueva teoría de la física trajo consigo nuevos modos de realidad, como
el de las partículas elementales, ni olas ni corpúsculos exclusivamente, que no encajan en
la filosofía clásica y no son visualizables en el sentido ordinario. Pero los nuevos desarro-
llos, especialmente la Teoría cuántica de campos, han continuado en formas inesperadas y
nos han revelado aún más formas y modos de realidad que no se había sospechado. La
naturaleza de estos modos sugiere que la frontera entre la física y la matemática se está
23
24 Thomas B. Fowler
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
desdibujando, todo lo cual puede ser alojado en el pensamiento de Zubiri, pero resulta de-
vastador para gran parte de la filosofía occidental, especialmente la de Hume y Kant, y de
hecho favorece una visión más platónica. Esto incluye las partículas virtuales que tienen
propiedades no físicas: la energía negativa, el impulso negativo (impulso opuesto a la velo-
cidad), los valores de masa fuera de la capa, una velocidad superior a la luz; los campos de
norma que son más reales que los campos comunes, pero menos medibles; los espacios de
simetría interna que permiten cálculos, pero que en otro sentido son no reales; y los princi-
pios de simetría de los que la realidad parece “participar”. La teoría cuántica de campos se
aparta de la noción problemática de “acción a distancia” de los campos clásicos, acercán-
dose a una causalidad más tradicional que requiere la contigüidad, pero con muchas dife-
rencias importantes respecto del punto de vista clásico. La naturaleza del método científico,
tal como se entiende sobre la base de la filosofía de Zubiri, cambia un poco con estos nue-
vos desarrollos. Sin embargo, el análisis de Zubiri de la ciencia y la realidad científica pue-
de manejar estos cambios.
that the boundary between the physical Gauge fields and gauge symmetry
and the mathematical is blurring, which is Gauge fields are essential to mod-
devastating for much of Western philoso- ern physics, but are very peculiar “enti-
phy, especially Hume and Kant, and actu- ties”, for want of a better term. They be-
ally favors a more Platonist view. gan as ways (auxiliary fields) to express
constraints, but soon took on a life of their
Modern physics and Zubiri’s philosophy own. The simplest example of a gauge
of reality field is the vector potential A, defined with
Zubiri was well acquainted with quan- respect to the magnetic field vector B. One
tum mechanics, as developed by Bohr, of Maxwell’s equations is B 0 .
Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli, and others. Hei- Whenever the divergence of a vector field is
senberg, in particular, was his friend. So zero, it immediately follows that the field—
he recognized the significance of the new B in this case—is the curl of another field;
ideas such as the wave/particle duality: that field is always called the “vector po-
In the most elemental field of reality we tential”, A, with defining equation
have intellectively apprehended that the B A . Thus the vector potential A
material things in it are what we term expresses the constraint on B that its di-
‘bodies’. In the progression beyond the vergence must be zero. What is especially
field it has been thought for many cen- significant about A is that it is not unique-
turies that the things “beyond” are also ly determined: one can add the gradient of
bodies—of another class, to be sure, any scalar function to it and its defining
but still bodies. It required the commo- equation is unchanged, because if
tion generated by quantum physics to A A f , we have
introduce in a difficult but undeniably B A ( A f )
successful way the idea that the real
beyond is not always a body. Elemen- A f A
tary particles, in fact, are not corpus- since the curl of a gradient is always zero.
cles (neither are they waves in the clas- Susskind notes:
sical sense, be we leave aside this as- The vector potential is a peculiar field.
pect of them) but another class of mate- In a sense it does not have the same
rial things. Borne along by the field in- reality as magnetic or electric fields. Its
tellection of things, we were disposed to only definition is that its curl is the
intellectively know the things beyond magnetic field [B]. A magnetic or elec-
the field as bodies, different perhaps, tric field is something that you can de-
but when all was said and done, still tect locally. In other words, if you want
bodies. The measure of the real was to know whether there is an elec-
undertaken with a determinate metric: tric/magnetic field in a small region of
“body”. Now, the progress toward reali- space, you can do an experiment in
ty has opened up to us other real mate- that same region to find out…But vec-
rial things which are not bodies.3 tor potentials cannot be detected local-
But stranger ideas have come from QFT, ly.4
such as virtual particles, gauge fields, iso-
Moreover gauge fields such as A go far
spin, and internal symmetries, all of which
beyond mere computational devices. Ex-
stretch our notion of what is real in the
periments can be devised that show (very
sense of empirically observable, but which
indirectly) the presence of the A field using
are in some ways more real than what is
the Aharonov-Bohm effect, where no B
empirically observable. First let us exam-
field exists.5 Furthermore, we cannot do
ine these notions, and then explore how
physics without them:
they fit with Zubiri’s understanding of
reality, causality, and knowledge. There is no way to derive Lorentz’s force
law from a Lagrangian without the vec-
tor potential [A]. This is a pattern: To and what is apprehended therein has
write the equations of modern physics its proper intelligibility.8
in either Lagrangian or Hamiltonian
QFT and related developments have shown
form, auxiliary gauge fields have to be
us that there are forms of reality beyond
introduced…Gauge fields cannot be
those conceived by quantum mechanics.
“real,” because we can change them
In addition, QFT gives us better insight
without disturbing the gauge invariant
into the problem of causality. Traditional-
physics. On the other hand, we cannot
ly causality was assumed to require a con-
express the laws of physics without
tiguous, efficient cause. This made expla-
them.6
nation of inertial movement, such as that
So the gauge fields such as A are in a of a stone that has been thrown, very diffi-
sense more real than fields we can actual- cult: there is no contiguous efficient cause.
ly measure, such as B. This is hard to Even worse was the problem of action at a
explain on the usual view that reality is a distance, which came to the fore with New-
zone of things, but is readily understand- ton’s laws and his theory of gravity. How
able on the basis of Zubiri’s philosophy: could the earth cause instantaneous
“The real is not a ‘thing’ but something ‘in changes in the motion of the moon over a
its own right’, thing or not”7. distance of 400,000 km? The answer to
the first problem was stated by Galileo and
Virtual Particles and Causality incorporated into Newton’s laws as the
First Law of Motion, the Principle of Iner-
Zubiri was well acquainted with quan-
tia: “a body in uniform motion tends to
tum mechanics and the ways in which it
stay in motion unless acted upon by an
revised our notions of physics and reality
external force.” But this did not really
from classical mechanics. As noted above,
solve the causality problem; it merely af-
he noted that in quantum mechanics we
firmed that such causality is not relevant.
learned about forms of reality that are not It was not until Einstein and his applica-
“bodies” in the classical sense. Zubiri also tion of symmetry that we understood why
recognized that with quantum mechanics, it is not relevant: there are no privileged
we have moved beyond visualizability as a reference frames in the universe. What
criterion for scientific reality: looks like motion to one observer looks like
…elementary particles are realities, different motion to another, or no motion
since they are given a splendid mathe- at all. No causal explanation is needed
matical description in quantum me- because we are just looking at a symmetry
chanics. Nonetheless, they are not vis- of nature.
ualizable as if they were waves or parti- The second problem proved more dif-
cles. Their real structure is such that ficult. Faraday first recognized that
they are emitted and absorbed as if sources of electric and magnetic force cre-
they were corpuscles and they propa- ated “fields” in space. In classical physics,
gate as if they were waves. But they and even relativistic physics, a field is an
are neither. And it is not just that in entity which has a value at each point in
fact we do not see these particles, but space and time, and which is capable of
that they are in themselves realities exerting a force on particles as a function
which are “non-visualizable”. And…the of its value where the particle is, and the
identification of the visible and the in- relevant “charge” on the particle (e.g., elec-
telligible is philosophically false: every trical or gravitational). Thus any suitable
intellection is sentient and, therefore, object that ventures into the volume of
every mode of apprehension of the re- space where the field exists would experi-
al—even if that reality be neither visual ence a force proportional to its “charge”
nor visualizable—is true intellection, with respect to that field. Maxwell showed
that these fields are not instantaneous,
but propagate at the speed of light; and ties, such as travelling faster than light, or
this idea was extended to gravity: the negative momentum (momentum in oppo-
earth sets up a gravitational field, felt by site direction to velocity). Moreover the
the moon. Einstein later refined the idea interaction between real particles, mediat-
of a gravity field, replacing it with the no- ed by the virtual particles, is the result of
tion of a warped spacetime fabric. But the sum of probabilities of all possible
how this fabric interacts with bodies was ways in which the virtual particles can
left somewhat obscure. travel between the real particles. Figure 1,
QFT solved the problem by a return, from Feynman, shows some of the possible
in a sense—but only in a sense—to the paths a photon can take in going from
idea of contiguity. In QFT, a field does not point S to point P, reflected off of a mirror.
have the function of exerting a force on The amplitude at point P is the sum of the
objects; rather, the field merely creates amplitudes of all the paths, as determined
virtual particles which mediate the force, by their phases, which add as shown at
i.e., transfer energy and momentum be- the bottom of the figure. Only those paths
tween the particles. That is, the virtual near the center have phases which are
particles are force carriers. They are close in value and hence add; those fur-
called “virtual” because they are not ob- ther away are random and cancel. Thus
servable even in principle without disrupt- we say that the light takes the shortest
ing the interaction between the particles path—the usual law of reflection, even
and in fact can have non-physical proper-
though in reality it takes all paths simul- particles are not real in ordinary sense—
taneously but most of them cancel out. they have some other form of reality. This
Likewise In the case of interactions, all has culminated in the Path-Integral formu-
possible exchanges of virtual particles can lation of much of physics, pioneered by
occur, an infinite number, some of which Dirac and especially Feynman, based on
are shown in Figure 2, for Compton scat- earlier work by Fermat.
tering (interaction of a photon and an elec- If reality were a zone of things, we
tron). The first two diagrams show the could not put virtual particles and sym-
basic interaction of the photon and the metry principles in it, and we certainly
electron. The remaining figures show the could not explain the path integral formu-
alternative ways of interaction. The more lation of physics, with the “same” particle
loops, the less probable the interaction, taking an infinite number of paths be-
but all must be summed to get the total tween origin and destination. But virtual
probability of the interaction occurring. particles and symmetry are real, though in
Figure 3 shows the interaction of an elec- a different way than even the waves and
tron and a positron, which annihilate in a particles of quantum mechanics. We have
burst of energy as a photon (indicated with taken leave of “thingness” as a criterion of
k in the diagram), the virtual particle, reality, though we started with:
which subsequently creates another elec-
tron and positron (Bhaba scattering). As …the intellection that the real things
before there is the basic interaction, and are bodies, but also and above…that to
an infinite number of variants, only a few be real is to be a “thing”, in the sense
that this word has when one speaks,
of which are shown. It is never possible to
for example, of “thingness”. That was
observe the virtual particles without com-
the measure of reality: progression be-
pletely disruption the interaction, i.e., cre-
yond the field was brought about by
ating a new and different interaction that
thinking that the measuring reality is a
now involves the observer.
“thing”. An intellection much more dif-
As described above, the virtual par-
ficult than that of quantum physics
ticles, the gauge bosons, have some rather
was needed in order to understand that
peculiar characteristics: they “take” an the real can be real and still not be a
infinite number of paths between the par- thing…that progression is a search not
ticles simultaneously, each with a certain just for new things but also for new
probability; and they can assume non- forms and new modes of reality.”9
physical characteristics such as negative
momentum and speeds greater than the The path integral formulation of physics,
velocity of light. So we have not really encompassing Feynman diagrams, defi-
reestablished contiguity because virtual nitely represents a new mode of reality.
But then physicists realized that the en one of the equations, we can deduce
arrows in this schema can be reversed, the others.15
implying a radical change in reasoning
In fact Einstein used this approach in his
and hence in the way of doing physics:
development of the General Theory of
After Einstein worked out special rela- Relativity, which describes gravity. Rather
tivity, it dawned on him and his con- than infer the theory in a laborious man-
temporary Hermann Minkowski that ner from a collection of disparate facts
the arrows in this schema may be re- about the motion of bodies, he formulated
versible. Suppose that it was secretly a symmetry that was capable of actually
revealed to us, in the dark of night, that determining the theory. The symmetry he
the world is Lorentz invariant. Knowing used is related to the invariance in the
this, can we deduce Maxwell’s theory speed of objects falling in a gravitational
and hence the facts of electromag- field. He noted that it is impossible to
netism, without ever stepping inside a distinguish between the effect of gravity
laboratory? To a large extent, we can! and that of uniform acceleration—this is
The requirement of Lorentz invariance known as the “Equivalence Principle”—a
is a powerful constraint on Nature. key symmetry in nature. As a result the
Maxwell’s equations are so intricately schema he followed is that shown in Fig-
interrelated by this invariance that, giv- ure 5.
Mode of Reality
Ordinary Quantum Virtual Phantom Quasi- Postula-
objects postulation tion
Measura- Directly Measurable Inferred Not measur- Not physical Strictly
bility measurable subject to from effects; able but but real and mathe-
limitations characteris- physical in connected matical
(uncertainty tic would some sense with physi-
principle) violate phys- cal reality
ical laws if
directly
measurable
Examples Macroscopic Subatomic Virtual par- Vector poten- Symmetry Hilbert
objects particles- ticles tial, isospin spaces,
wave/particle space, weak imagi-
duality isospin nary
space, gauge num-
fields bers
The Scientific Method in Zubiri’s Phi- hazy. For example, in medicine, there is
losophy and Zubiri’s Philosophy of Sci- the problem of the interaction of mind and
entific Reality body. What is the mind, and is it real,
Two key notions in Zubiri’s philosophy does it form part of the canon? Are colors
of reality with respect to science are that of naturalistic? What about other psycholog-
canon and postulation. We shall review ical phenomena, such sounds, or even
these briefly. dreams? While it might be relatively easy
to disregard dreams, colors are more diffi-
The Canon of Reality
cult. If we discount or reject colors, we are
Zubiri pointed out the key role of the in danger of rejecting the whole basis for
canon of reality in his work. Canon comes our perception of nature and natural phe-
from the Greek , rule. Though intro- nomena.
duced much earlier and used by Kant and In the 18th century, it was widely ac-
others, he believes that the original, ety- cepted that there is a distinction between
mological meaning is the only one that is primary and secondary qualities, and that
valid: only the former were really important with
respect to nature. In the 19th and early
That reality which is already known in-
20th centuries, physicists thought that
tellectively is not a medium but a
they had everything pegged with a deter-
measure, both with respect to what
ministic billiard-ball model of reality. The
concerns what is real and what con-
cerns that which we call “form and idea of things that could be waves under
mode of reality”. Now, that which is some circumstances and particles under
measuring is always reality in the pro- another was not part of their canon. Nor
found sense. But the measurement is were things that had inherent uncertain-
always brought about by some particu- ties. But even in high-energy physics to-
lar metric. Reality as the measuring day, supposedly the hardest of the hard-
principle is what I term canon of reali- core science, things are not always so
ty.21 clear. Nobody knows what dark matter is,
let alone dark energy, how they may inter-
Simply put, the canon of scientific reality act with “regular” matter, or what proper-
is the set of entities usable in scientific ties they may have. The uncertainty prin-
explanation or acceptable as outcome or ciple made clear that full explanation by
prediction of scientific theory. Knowledge means of physical laws, as envisioned by
through reason in all its forms involves the Laplace’s Demon, was an unrealizable
canon: fantasy, thus delivering a great blow to
…reason consists in measuring the re- reductionism.
ality of things; in it real things give us A review of the history of science read-
the measure of their reality. But reason ily discloses that science has repeatedly
measures reality in accordance with and profoundly changed our view of the
canonic principles which are sensed in world and of reality, and thus affected our
the field manner.22 canon of reality, as well as affecting the
specific canon of scientific reality. The
So science as knowledge inevitably works
canon of reality allows us to search for
by utilizing a canon that is the set of
new things and new forms of reality. It is
things deemed to be acceptable as objects
of science. This is often taken in general thus a guide, but of a particular and es-
terms as “matter and energy”. The impli- sential sort:
cation is that the canon can be clearly and A canon is not a system of normative
unambiguously delineated. However, up- judgments but is, as the etymology of
on closer inspection, the canon of science the word expresses precisely, a “met-
or the canon of scientific reality is often ric”; it is not a judgment or a system of
but real content. And this is so whether nism. And all of this is, without any
dealing with theoretical or non- doubt, a free creation for rationally in-
theoretical construction. It is not postu- tellectively knowing the foundation of
lation of reality but reality in postula- all the cosmos. Its fertility is quite ap-
tion. One postulates what belongs to parent. Nonetheless, the fabulous suc-
something [suyo] but not the de suyo cess of the idea of a mathematical uni-
itself. Postulation is the mode by which verse cannot hide its character of free
in-depth reality is endowed with a freely creation, of free postulation, which pre-
constructed content.27 cisely by being free leaves some unsus-
pected aspects of nature in the dark.29
The great success of science over the past
four centuries has been due to its use of With the notions of canon and postulation,
such postulation: it is possible to construct Zubiri’s vision of
the scientific method.
In physics, at the beginning of the
modern age, there were two great free
Scientific method
creative efforts to intellectively know ra-
Zubiri never explicitly stated his no-
tionally the in-depth reality of the uni-
tion of the so-called “scientific method”,
verse. One consisted in the idea that
but it is possible to deduce it from his
the universe is a great organism whose
diverse elements comprise systems by writings, and in particular, his idea of the
sympathy and antipathy. But this never canon of reality and his notion of postula-
had much success. The one which tri- tion of reality. Indeed, by formulating the
umphed was the other conception. It scientific method in terms of these two
was the free creation which postulates ideas, matters are notably clarified. In
for cosmic reality a mathematical struc- this approach science involves 5 steps:
ture. That was Galileo’s idea in his New
Science: the great book of the universe, 1. Start with some knowledge of reality (at
he tells us, is written in geometric lan- all three noetic levels-primoridial ap-
guage, i.e., mathematics.28 prehension, logos, and reason). All
science is based on observations which
Due to the state of knowledge of mathe- ultimately derive from primordial ap-
matics—what we would now term “ordi- prehension, and all rational explana-
nary differential equations”—this view of tions are intended to tell us about real-
physics became identified with a particular ity beyond apprehension which may
type of determinism known as mechanism, account for our observations. Typical-
and the idea that science could be other ly the scientist starts from knowledge
than mechanistic in this sense was at least at the logos level, and more of-
changed only after prolonged battles, ten at the level of reason. For exam-
fought mostly in the early decades of the ple, the Special Theory of Relativity
20th century. But this changed with the starts with observations about Galilean
development of quantum mechanics, when (non-accelerated) frames, and the
the recognition of the probabilistic nature speed of light, and as we noted, sym-
of physical laws was forced upon the re- metry in the form of the Lorentz trans-
luctant practitioners of physics—but was formation. All of these are already
understandable because of advanced in concepts at the rational level, though
mathematics itself, which made clear that they clearly use the logos level because
determinism was a special case of proba- things are named. Likewise quantum
bilistic and statistical descriptions. Thus mechanics starts with the observed
The mathematical structure of the uni- distribution of light frequencies from
verse subsists independently of its ear- atoms, and Maxwell’s theory starts
lier mechanistic form, which was too with observations about electric and
limiting. Mathematicism is not mecha- magnetic fields. In the theory of evolu-
Gather data
Rethink
Postulate reality
Gather Explore
more data if postulated reality
necessary Modify
Canon of
reality if
Verify
necessary
N Y
Satisfactory?
exist, since we cannot make stars in a symmetries have already been discovered
laboratory, or even travel to them. Nor and analyzed by mathematicians; so what
can we recreate mountain-building plate Zee is referring to here is not the discovery
tectonics. per se, but the discovery of applicability.
Thus physicists are not in the business of
Revisions to Zubiri’s Philosophy of Sci- discovering new symmetries, but rather
ence and Philosophy of Reality with determining in which symmetries
physical reality “participates”, so to speak.
It is with respect to postulation of re-
With respect to mathematics, Zubiri notes:
ality that the new view of physics has led
us to a more profound understanding. A free thing is the physical reality with
Rather than postulate a new descriptive a freely postulated content. Such are
law, such as the Universal Gas Law or the objects of mathematics, for they are
Schrodinger’s equation, the physicist real objects constituted in the physical
starts with some basic observations and a moment of “the” reality in a field, the
symmetry principle, and infers the de- same reality according to which things
scriptive law. For example, consider the like this stone are real. The moment of
hydrogen atom: reality is identical in both cases; what
is not the same is their content and
…the rotational symmetry group im- their mode of reality. The stone has re-
poses the shapes that a hydrogen atom ality in and by itself, whereas the circle
can assume, and…the energies associ- has reality only by postulation. None-
ated with these structures are accu- theless the moment of reality is identi-
rately reflected in the hydrogen spec- cal.33
trum.31
So in this sense we have mathematical
Now there are many symmetries possible, realities determining, not describing, reali-
often expressed in terms of symmetry ty. In this way, the boundary between
groups, such as SO(2), the group of rota- mathematics and physics—long thought to
tions about a point in two dimensions; or be unbridgeable—has now broken down.
SO(3), the group of rotations about the The postulation step in science, or at least
origin in three dimensions, etc. So utiliz- in fundamental physics, is postulation of a
ing the Myth of the Cave from Plato, the symmetry—something already real, from
task of the physicist is metaphorically, to mathematics—from which implications
ascend from the cave of day-to-day experi- about reality beyond apprehension are
ence in which he sees but the shadows of drawn, rather than a direct postulation of
ultimate reality on the wall, to the light of reality beyond apprehension. This is the
day of reality, to wit, the symmetries which sense in which Zubiri’s philosophy of reali-
govern reality, though mathematics. Zee ty must be modified.
Notes: What is the reality of symmetry?
The discovery of a symmetry is much Symmetry, known and studied by mathe-
more than the discovery of a specific maticians since the 19th century, is real in
phenomenon. A symmetry of space- the same sense as other mathematical
time, such as rotational invariance or objects—spaces, irrational numbers, etc.
Lorentz invariance, controls all of phys- But not every symmetry governs reality.
ics…Lorentz invariance, born of elec- So those symmetries that have been found
tromagnetism, proceeds to revolutionize to “dictate” reality—in the form of fixing
mechanics. And once the laws of mo- particle number, types, and characteris-
tion of particles are revised, our con- tics—have a special type of reality which
ception of gravity has to be changed as goes beyond that of pure mathematical
well, since gravity moves particles.32 objects, but is not that of directly observa-
ble entities such as bodies or even waves.
What is most interesting is that all these It does not seem that Zubiri anticipated
this blurring of the distinction between nature. And he only postulates the ap-
mathematics and science, though it most plicability of an already known symmetry.
likely would have delighted and intrigued Then he proceeds to deduce the conse-
him, especially in view of his theory of the quences and see how well the fit observa-
reality of mathematical objects and the tions.
recognition of reality as formality rather Because of its belief in reality as a
than a zone of things. zone of things, the situation we now have
In a famous essay, Nobelist Eugene in physics, with virtual particles, sym-
Wigner asked why mathematics is so effec- metry, and gauge fields, matters are very
tive in describing reality through science.34 dire for the empirical tradition in philoso-
While it is obviously impossible to give a phy, capped by Hume, for whom
non-theological answer to this question, knowledge was divided into matters of fact
Zubiri’s philosophy at least gives some and relations of ideas. The rather stark
insight. The fact that mathematicians overlap of “ideas”, i.e. mathematics, and
postulate reality, and postulate many “fact”, i.e., physical reality, makes his phi-
types of reality, with widely varying struc- losophy and that of the other empiricists
turality, suggests that some of these pos- untenable. In a related vein, the general
tulations might have applicability to our Kantian approach is also untenable. Kant
experience of reality. Kant’s explanation of accepted by and large Hume’s criticisms,
this applicability—that the mind synthe- but sought to overcome them by building
sizes reality according to rational princi- causality and physics as then understood
ples such as Newtonian mechanics—is into his philosophy. The idea that “catego-
clearly wrong. Zubiri’s idea, applied to ries” can change and expand (essentially
symmetry, seems much closer to the Zubiri’s canon of reality) was not really
truth. Although symmetry is a notion that amenable to Kant’s philosophy; and the
comes from ordinary experience, its ap- idea that mathematical notions such as
plicability in fundamental physics stems symmetry can exercise a power over reality
from extensive work (i.e., postulation) on does not fit either, since Kant envisioned
the part of mathematicians of such things the domination of mind over matter as a
as symmetry groups. The symmetries that type of synthesis of raw experience by the
appear to govern reality stem from postu- mind, not something that the mind can
lation first as reality by mathematicians, truly grasp of reality. The situation for the
then postulation as reality in some sense rationalist philosophies is somewhat bet-
by physicists describing the world. ter, but their lack of basis in empiricism is
How far the use of symmetry will take still ultimately fatal.
us, that is, the extent to which reality Zubiri’s comments still hold true by
“participates” in symmetry, is unclear. and large:
Attempts to unify the four forces of nature
based on ever larger symmetry groups In summary, that which specifies intel-
appear to have stalled, at least in the lection, making of it knowledge, is in-
sense that “supersymmetry” and string depth reality. And this in-depth reality
does not consist in either objective
theory are not yielding any verifiable pre-
ground (Kant), or in intelligible entity
dictions. In QFT, forces are interpreted as
(Plato), or in causality, still less in nec-
interactions with gauge bosons, as noted
essary causality (Aristotle), or in the
earlier; but gravity has stubbornly resisted
absolute (Hegel). In-depthness is the
this interpretation.
mere “beyond” as “ground-reality” in all
As for the scientific method, the pos-
the multiple modes and forms which
tulation step is where a small correction this beyond can assume. Causality or
must be made. As noted, the scientist the principles of a deductive form of
postulates not a law describing reality knowledge are not thereby excluded,
beyond apprehension, but a symmetry of
nor are the possible steps toward an fields, virtual particles, and symmetry
absolute reality. What is excluded is groups, fit quite well with his thinking that
the idea that something of sort formally the canon of reality is never fixed, and can
constitutes the in-depth reality in be expanded. The new modes of reality do
which reason is installed by the move- not have to be identified with “bodies” in
ment of intellection as thrown from any classical sense. Nor is it the case that
from the field to the beyond.35 we are compelled to think about reality in
Conclusion these ways, as Kant believed. We have
Zubiri’s philosophy of scientific reality discovered these new forms of reality in
is able to absorb the new developments in the course of normal scientific investiga-
QFT, as is the scientific method implied by tion, and they have replaced earlier no-
his philosophy. In particular, the new tions.
modes of reality, represented by gauge
Notes
Francisco Ortega
Universidad de Sevilla
Sevilla, España
Abstract
Resumen
Partimos de la consideración de la “relación económica” como una relación dialéctica entre
Hombre y Naturaleza, como tal lo verdaderamente real es el Sistema Global que dicha rela-
ción determina. Dicho Sistema consta de dos momentos analíticos, por un lado lo que en-
tendemos por Naturaleza, Mundo o Realidad (o Physis) y por otro el Hombre (o sociedad) en
cuanto constituido en una estructura institucional. Toda estructura viene determinada por
la ideología (superestructura) y para cambiar aquella también se requiere cambiar esta, lo
cual requiere salir de la conceptuación meramente modernista de la economía que encierra
el Positivismo y la Filosofía Analítica por una más Contemporánea, desde la cual la Reali-
dad son sistemas (grafos) constituidos por nodos o cosas-sentidos dialéctica o respectiva-
mente configurados. Por último presentamos ejemplos concretos de estructuras económicas
modernistas que no permiten un sistema sostenible en la relación Hombre-Naturaleza (co-
mo son las supuestas leyes rectoras en parque naturales andaluces)
43
44 Francisco Ortega
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
dad del Sistema como un todo relacional analíticamente los términos relacionales
Hombre-Mundo, es decir, lo verdadera- Naturaleza-Hombre, tenemos que:
mente real no es la Naturaleza o la Socie- a) Por su lado la Physis aporta a la
dad en cuanto subsistemas independien- relación una “fuerza impositiva” que es la
tes sino la relación misma como Sistema fuente del “estar siendo” de la relación
Total. Pero además, entiéndase que esa misma, este es un elemento formal im-
sustantividad o sostenibilidad consistente prescindible para la relación puesto que la
en la permanencia de la actividad relacio- condición ontológica del Hombre es la de
nal es dinámica y lo cual nunca es mecá- mera “apertura”, es decir algo que tiene
nica sino teleológica; lo importante es que condiciones para “recibir”, una fuerza ex-
el telos o fin al que tiende no implique la terna que llamamos fuerza física. Es el
extinción de la relación misma sino a un sentido originario del término Physis en la
equilibrio entre los subsistemas para lo- Antigua Grecia y lo que Aristóteles enten-
grar su permanencia sine die. Desde el derá por substancia en cuanto fuente que
orto de la Cultura Occidental en los Preso- hace que lo que Hay esté ahí o se sustente
cráticos (interpretación de Zubiri de Par- ahí por sí mismo. Otro problema sería
ménides), entendemos que lo que Hay o cómo históricamente esa substentabilidad
Ser es una actividad de ser; un “estar sos- ha llegado a entenderse; recorrido que va
teniéndose” o “estar siendo”, en gerundio, desde la noción de aje, a los eidos platóni-
lo verdaderamente existente es la relación cos, a las cualidades substantivas básicas
dinámica y no los términos relacionales de Aristóteles (aire, agua, fuego, tierra)
como momentos aislados o posiciones ab- hasta la noción moderna de átomo como o
solutas contrapuestas, como entiende el mínima extensión (espacio-tiempo) divisi-
Ser la Cultura Oriental. Es decir, desde ble, y la contemporánea de cuerda. Todo lo
una consideración Contemporánea y Occi- cual es un problema de hermenútica his-
dental, la Unidad Sistémica que hay que tórica (entender el contexto histórico que
sostener es en toda regla una relación dia- condicionó el inicio de la investigación de
léctica en el sentido hegeliano del mismo: la Tabla Periódica hasta el actual Bosson
la relación de la Natura o Physis con lo de Higgs), en el cual ahora no entramos.
otro que no es ella, el Hombre. En toda En definitiva, decimos que el Ser es lo que
relación dialéctica, un término o momento Hay en cuanto un “de suyo” físico o fuerza
de la relación de define abstractamente en cuanto que es algo que se impone “en,
por su oposición al otro, pero lo verdade- por desde” sí mismo (Inteligencia Sentien-
ramente real es la relación misma en te).
cuanto Sistema. b) Por el otro lado, el Hombre en
Ahora bien, si queremos hacer una cuanto el “otro” término de la relación, lo
análisis de la relación desglosando sus que aporta es no una formalidad sino el
términos, los podemos separar como mo- contenido de la relación, digamos que el
mentos constitutivos aunque siempre Hombre aporta la parte “psíquica” o “in-
siendo conscientes de que cada uno de tencional” (Husserl) que constituye la rela-
ellos son meros momentos abstractos, lo ción con un sentido cognitivo teórico y
verdaderamente real es su “respectividad” práctico para el Hombre mismo en cuanto
constituyente en cuanto actividad relacio- consciencia, sentido que a su vez determi-
nal. El Hombre no es algo “aparte” de la na el telos de la relación. Con tal el Hom-
Naturaleza ni ésta algo diferente a su rela- bre es un subsistema que se concreta en
ción con el Hombre, aunque sea en una una “estructura” institucional, desde la
mera relación cognitiva. Por ejemplo, ¿ha- cual se materializa la relación misma. Lo
bría electrones o bosones sin el Hombre decisivo es que aprehendemos la relación
que constituya su presencia en su mente? económica Hombre-Naturaleza como una
Pues bien, si analizamos el Sistema relación con “tal” contenido, aprehende-
Global como un supuesto y ficticio eco- mos las cosas de la Physis como tales co-
sistema económico y para ello separamos sas con un sentido funcional para de la
vida humana, así aprehendemos la Reali- tivo de esa estructura. Ese concepto de
dad o el Mundo como un sistema esencial ideología ha evolucionado y actualmente
o campo global de significación constituido ya no lo entendemos con la connotación
por tales entidades u objetividades con un peyorativa que tenía para Marx, para él
significado determinado, el cual también estaba determinada por la estructura ins-
es un sistema dialéctico o relacional (Zubi- titucional era el instrumento de justifica-
ri diría de respectividades) ción lógico-hermenéutica de la misma con
Teorizar ahora sobre las condicio- el fin de perpetuarse; sin embargo actual-
nes de la objetividad y la significación hu- mente se usa en un sentido más positivo
mana nos va a llevar demasiado lejos (In- como “marco” cultural de principios teóri-
teligencia y Logos), lo importante ahora es cos, conjunto de valores, conceptos, apti-
entender lo que llamamos “estructura” en tudes, teorías... necesarios que dan de sí
cuanto instrumento institucional desde la una estructura. La ideología es un “círculo
que Hombre constituye la actividad del hermenéutico”, un “horizonte de sentido”,
Sistema relacional Hombre-Physis. “Es- una “visión del mundo”... que causa y de-
tructura” es un rancio concepto utilizado termina una estructura. Siempre nos que-
por la Antropología Cultural (Estructura- da la vieja cuestión de si para cambiar la
lismo) pero su origen está en la Filosofía estructura (por lo tanto la infraestructura)
Marxista. Viene a significar el conjunto de como marco normativo de instalación del
normas, instituciones, ritos, regulacio- Hombre en la Physis hace falta primero
nes,... desde la que se efectúa la relación cambiar la ideología o a la inversa (como
misma y que determinan un contendido o consideraba el materialismo dialéctico). En
sentido concreto teórico-práctico de la todo caso, en su sentido amplio, una ideo-
forma-Physis. Dicha estructura institucio- logía es una cultura en cuanto consciencia
nal a su vez, determina la instalación del social que determina una estructura la
Hombre en la Physis desde una “infraes- cual determina a su vez una infraestructu-
tructura” como manera de materializarse ra. Siguiendo con nuestro ejemplo, el que
esa estructura. La estructura está cau- mayoritariamente tengamos plantas nu-
sando una determinada infraestructura en cleares depende de las normas e institu-
cuanto modo ejecutivo o agente material ciones que lo hacen posible y a su vez es-
de la estructura en su acción con la Phy- tas depende de la ideología cultural que le
sis, esto es, la infraestructura es: el tipo de da sentido. Esta consideración del Hombre
construcciones civiles de una habitat físi- es puramente heideggeriana: el Hombre es
co, de industrias productivas, la infraes- “pastor del ser”, entifica el ser, al nom-
tructura viaria, energética. Por ejemplo, si brarlo y darle sentido crea las entidades
una estructura energética prima la obten- que constituyen la Physis. Así cada socie-
ción de energía a través de centrales nu- dad culturalmente diferenciable e históri-
cleares, la infraestructura que concreta camente constituida constituye o crea su
esa interacción serán plantas tales. propio “mundo entorno”, crea su propio
La estructura económica es lo que “claro de bosque”, o “cuida del ser” a su
el bueno de Marx quería cambiar con su propia manera. Es decir, la vida humana
“revolución”, es decir, la estructura insti- se realiza desde un conjunto de entidades
tucional de producción de momento histó- esenciales que se definen entre sí (dialécti-
rico, que fue la de final del XIX, para así camente o en respectividad) constituyendo
generar otra infraestructura de cara a un un marco cultural o ideológico (genos o
reparto más comunitario de la riqueza campo de sentido), y si se quiere cambiar
(hasta alcanzar una utópica riqueza tal la estructura e infraestructura relacional
que permita a todos los miembros d ela de Hombre con la Physis también hay que
colectividad existir según sus necesida- cambiar ese marco superestructural.
des). Ahora bien, en relación a ella, tam- En definitiva, es la ideología como
bién se refería a una “superestructura” o ámbito psíquico de una colectivo (Espíritu
ideología como marco de sentido justifica- Objetivo de Hegel) quien determina en
tes en el libro de A. Smith: Ensayo Sobre una red o campo de sentido, en un primer
la Naturaleza y las Causas de la Riqueza grado dichos los nodos son “leyes físicas”
de las Naciones (1776) que da pie a la con- que se relacionan como un sistema cerra-
ceptuación económica positivista que ac- do de respectividades (las tres leyes de la
tualmente ha entrado en crisis. Desde un mecánica), pero a su vez cada una es un
punto de vista Contemporáneo la Physis sistema que está constituido por concep-
no es ya un mecano controlable por un tos-definiciones, los cuales son nodos o
orgulloso Hombre que domina en base a entes con un sentido determinado por su
las condiciones que impone su excelentí- respectividad dentro de una ley (nociones
sima lógica identitaria: la razón analítica. de materia, espacio, velocidad, tiempo,...),
Este es el presupuesto básico del concepto conceptos que a su vez están se constitu-
de empresa como institución estructural yen por generalizaciones de presencias
básica de la acción económica en la Mo- primordiales con un sentido determinado
dernidad. desde una investigación histórica y cultu-
Para empezar, actualmente el con- ral. Pero no sólo una teoría científica,
cepto de Naturaleza como un ámbito de también cualquier novela es un sistema o
partes extensas (hasta llegar a una míni- “campo de sentido” donde los personajes,
ma) ha desaparecido. ¿Qué extensión o por ejemplo, son psicológicamente identifi-
materia tiene un bosson de higgs? De cables o entidades con sentido por su res-
acuerdo con una lógica dialéctica, que es pectividad: D. Quijote es quien es respeto
el modelo de función racional que está a Sancho, Dulcinea,... o incluso al paisaje
presente en Física Contemporánea, en la manchego; La Regenta es quien es respec-
Physis todo son “campos de sentido” o to al Magistral y viceversa;... Pero ¿qué es
“redes de nodos”, y estos son entidades o exactamente un nodo? Una cosa-sentido o
cosas-sentido que interaccionan unos en- ente tal y como lo expresa Zubiri en su
tre otros constituyendo el campo, sistema teoría del conocimiento, así toda ciencia o
o grafo. Un ente o cosa-sentido es una disciplina académica es necesariamente
realidad transcendental pero cultural e una ontología históricamente constituida
históricamente constituida como tal signi- (es lo que viene a demostrar la Estructura
ficación, no es una definición constituida de las Revoluciones Científicas de Khun).
respecto a sí misma sin más (es lo que El modelo de la Physis Contempo-
distingue al Wittgenstein del Tractatus ránea es el siguiente: el átomo actual es
cercano a la concepción analítica de la un sistema o grafo de partículas subató-
razón del segundo Wittgenstein de las In- micas interrelacionadas dialécticamente a
vestigaciones Filosóficas, en realidad cer- través de algo que se conceptúa como
cano a la razón entendida como razón dia- “fuerzas atómicas débiles”; a su vez estos
léctica). grafos atómicos constituyen nodos que
En todo caso la Realidad como Sis- son las moléculas interaccionando dialéc-
tema está constituida por redes de nodos ticamente a través de “fuerzas de enlaces
entendidos como entidades o cosas- químicos” (iónico, mecánico, covalente);
sentido que a su vez pueden ser un sub- grafos que a su vez interaccionan dialécti-
sistemas o subredes constituidas por otro camente formando nodos o moléculas pro-
subnodos, es decir en cuanto unidad sis- teicas más complejas; que a su vez son
témica un nodo o ente puede ser un sub- grafos que interaccionan formando nodos
sistema o campo de sentido menos genéri- como los corpúsculos intercelulares (ribo-
co o menos abstracto, los sistemas son somas, mitocondrias,...); que interaccio-
redes cuyos nodos son a su vez subsiste- nan formando células; tejidos; órganos;...
mas, como en un juego de muñecas rusas. Lo importante es entender:
Una teoría física (por ejemplo la mecánica 1º) Que en el grafo o sistema, cada
newtoniana) es un sistema explicativo nodo o elemento relacional es lo que es,
constituido de nodos o entidades relacio- una cosa-real, por su relación dialéctica
nadas entre sí o en respectividad como dentro del sistema, la relación de respecti-
vencia ecológica actual como un problema cala libre” porque una crisis en aquél nodo
ideológico en cuanto que es esta la que “da determina una crisis en todo el Sistema
de sí” la estructura institucional que a su Global destruyéndolo, cuando lo ideal se-
vez determina la infraestructura producti- ría un Sistema Global sustentable de tal
va actual del Mundo. Si la estructura es manera que al no depender de ningún
una gigantesco campo de sentido consti- nodo principal la red se mantuviera sine
tuidos por: normas, leyes, decretos, nor- die, lo mismo que los nodos que son su-
mas regulativas,.... A su vez, la infraes- bredes. La dependencia, por ejemplo, de
tructura económica también es un sistema una red energética basada en producción
en red, y en cuanto global, sería el Sistema nuclear, si hay una crisis en su abasteci-
Global de relaciones efectivas de la Socie- miento haría depender todo el suministro
dad Humana con la Naturaleza, la infraes- y por ende todo el sistema, aunque peor es
tructura económica mundial actual es un la dependencia financiera...
enorme grafo o sistema dialéctico en red: Atendamos a un ejemplo concreto a
un sistema más o menos “modular en nivel de “sistema económico nacional” de
red”, donde los nodos son también subsis- como la ideología determina una estructu-
temas; el sistema financiero, el sistema ra u a su vez esta una infraestructura
energético, el sistema agrícola,.... “Más o inviable: la estructura actual de regulación
menos” modular porque siempre hay no- medioambiental en España está hecha de
dos que por su abanico de interacciones tal manera está pretendiendo actuar sobre
con el resto de los nodos o subsistemas es alguno de los nodos concretos de un sis-
una “entidad” más decisiva o principal tema (una especie silvestre, un cultivo,...)
para la pervivencia del Sistema Global, queriendo inhibir actuaciones o promover-
como ha sucedido recientemente con el las, pero, por ejemplo una especie en peli-
Sistema Financiero, es tan principal que el gro de extinción no se salva sin salvar el
Sistema no es modular sino de “escala ecosistema entero, de ahí que esa estruc-
libre”, todos los subsistema se relacional tura mecanicista es claramente un fraca-
con él a través del “apalancamiento” y de so. Lo mismo sucede con las legislaciones
tal manera que una crisis en el sistema de control de residuos; un conjunto de
financiero y repercute en una inhibición leyes con propuestas mecánicas totalmen-
del flujo monetario y en desestabilización te fracasadas no tienen en cuenta ni plan-
del Sistema Global (parecido sucedió con tas para reciclaje, ni procedimientos de
la Crisis del Petróleo en le 73, la principa- recogida en función de ellas, no hábitos
lidad y dependencia energética de este consumidores,... Para una conservación
recurso supuso una crisis en todo el Sis- eficiente del ecosistema de una zona, por
tema Económico Occidental). ejemplo, hay que partir de un análisis dia-
Pero para ello hay que aprehender léctico de las especies que configuran el
la Naturaleza dialécticamente, como un sistema, siempre suele haber unos nodos
Sistema en red y no como “partes aisla- “principales” por su mayor número de
das” identitariamente definibles como en interacciones que otros, así en el sistema
realidad todavía se hace por desde una ecológico que es el bosque mediterráneo,
ideología que parte de la consideración de por ejemplo, desde un estudio del grafo
la economía como ciencia positiva (tanto que en qué consiste, es más importante el
en los planes del Gosplan como en la Es- nodo-conejo que el nodo-lince, aquel in-
cuela Neoclásica y posteriormente la desa- teracciona como presa con el lince, el águi-
rrollada por la Sociedad Mont Pelerin). la, el zorro, el meloncillo, la gineta,... y
Efectivamente, desde esta ideología la in- como depredador con un conjunto de
fraestructura del Sistema Económico Glo- plantas, gramíneas, leguminosas,... que si
bal es un grafo donde cada nodo es un proliferan demasiado pueden hacer desa-
subsistema (energético, agrícola,...) pero el parece incluso el marco vegetal de soto-
principal es el financiero, de tal manera bosque y se convierte en estepa. Es obvio
que el sistema no es modular sino de “es- que el conejo es imprescindible para ese
“sistema ecológico”, es un nodo principal como sistema, no puede existir como “Na-
pero el lince no. Lo que es absurdo es pre- turaleza Virgen”, lo que hay es un sistema
tender “salvar al lince” sin salvar a todo el relacional que si ha pervivido durante mu-
ecosistema del cual es parte y para ello es cho tiempo es porque es un sistema equi-
imprescindible una recuperación de las librado, sustentable por, desde, y con la
poblaciones de conejos, para “salvar al actuación humana (cinegética, agrícola,
lince”. ganadera,...). Lo que se ha mantenido via-
Por otro lado, queda claro que la ble es la relación misma y sus nodos prin-
Sociedad Humana Contemporánea des- cipales Comunidad Humana-Naturaleza
pués de años de “propaganda e informa- como tales son sólo momentos teóricos
ción ecologista” tiene una fuerte concien- resultado de un análisis cognitivo, pero lo
cia de su dependencia en la interacción verdaderamente real es la relación misma
con la Naturaleza, es decir, de la Unidad es decir, el sistema relacional que califi-
relacional Grupo Humano-Naturaleza en camos de “Natural”. Ahora bien, si por
base a un “dependencia amorosa o simpa- moda, por demagogia política (con intere-
tética” y no en base a una masoquista ses manipuladores de la población), por
“dependencia de dominación”. Lo verdade- ignorancia creyendo en una economía po-
ramente decisivo e importante en esta sitiva,... se estructuran instituciones que
propaganda ideológica es efectivamente la cambian los términos seculares de la rela-
noción tácita de que un sistema económi- ción Comunidad Humana-Naturaleza,
co es un grafo de interrelaciones donde los podemos encontrarnos con otro Sistema,
nodos principales son, por un lado comu- quizás no deseado o no sostenible. Piénse-
nidades humanas y por otro los elementos se en un ecosistema económico con una
presentes de su medio bio-físico y que, en infraestructura muy simple: en la explota-
cuanto relación dialéctica, la pervivencia ción de una “dehesa de encinas y alcorno-
de uno depende de la del otro y viceversa ques”. Es un sistema natural que subsiste
en una relación “simplatética”. Esto hay en cuanto intervenido por el Hombre en
que entenderlo adecuadamente porque, si función de la relación económica que lo
secularmente hay seres humanos en un hace viable, como tal: las encinas se po-
medio o ecosistema concreto interactuan- dan, se mantiene una proporción de gana-
do en él y ese sistema ha subsistido de do, un determinado tipo de ganado y no
esta manera, es imprescindible mantener otro, los alcornoques se descorchan, se
dicha actuación si no el sistema entrará hacen cortafuegos,... el sistema tal y como
en crisis buscando un equilibrio de espe- secularmente se ha intervenido es viable
cies que bien podría ser no deseado para económicamente y por ello existe. Ahora
el sistema. Por ejemplo, la desaparición de bien, por cierto enfoque bisoño o ideológi-
la secular actuación de carboneros en Do- co modernista se genera una estructura
ñana con su “tala depurativa” sobre el normativa (llámese Plan Rector del Parque
alcornocal hizo que la proliferación de en- Natural) que inhibe la actuación tradicio-
fermedades en dicha especie vegetal hicie- nal: se prohíbe la tala, se requiere autori-
ra desaparecer en pocos años casi la tota- zaciones para desbroce, se prohíbe el des-
lidad de la arboleda y las subsiguientes caste cinegético,... El resultado es “otro
especies asociadas (por la urgencia ante ecosistema” probablemente menos viable
los controles de la UNESCO ha habido que para en sus sostenibilidad al estar regula-
replantar con ejemplares ya adultos). Pero do por normas mecanicistas que no tienen
en España apenas quedan nichos ecológi- en cuenta el conjunto: más incendios,
cos sin intervención humana (Doñana menos biodiversidad al predominar la es-
mismo era un coto con una secular actua- pecie más concurrente, abandono, enfer-
ción cinegética), y además todo los Parque medades... Además, probablemente para
Naturales eran lo que eran en virtud de la comunidad humana el sistema es invia-
dicha actuación secular. En líneas genera- ble económicamente para mantener el
les, actualmente la Naturaleza en España, número de miembros de personas que
Notes
1 ¿Cómo debemos entender el cáncer en cuanto El tejido celular está continuamente reno-
enfermedad orgánica? Situándonos a un ni- vándose, las células se duplican y redupli-
vel del sistema orgánico de tejido, donde las can. Dada la complejidad de un genoma
red está constituda por nodos denominadas como sistema de genes ¿porqué dentro de la
células , un tejido consiste básicamente en infinita posibilidad de duplicaciones singula-
células interconectadas dialécticamente, su- res que ofrece una célula madre empiezan
cede que hay una que desconecta de ese gra- sólo a replicarse unos genes determinados
fo o red no ejecutando la función-sentido que para constituir un tejido determinado? El
debira según su posición en la red, de ese hecho es que dentro de un mismo organismo
modo si se autoduplica y crece por su cuenta cada vez que una secuencia de ADN se repli-
produce el tumor en cuanto tejido ajeno al ca en una meiosis se producen mutaciones,
grafo o red de tejidos que constituyen al res- singularidades genéticas (cada vez que una
to del órgano ¿por qué en un momento dado base nitrogenada no rompa según el modelo
sucede esa “crisis” en una célula ? Las redes prederminado), son los llamados seudoge-
biológicas siguen un modelo “modular” o red nes. Pero como no tienen relación con el res-
de pescadores, aquí cada nodo es un subgra- to de la red proteica el sistema que constitu-
fo de elementos fuertemente conectados en- ye ese gen es inestable y sus elementos son
tre sí pero poco con el resto del sistema glo- reutilizados desapareciendo como nodo, aho-
bal donde también está incurso. Normalmen- ra bien si un gen de ese tipo si es capaz de
te una célula que por azar aparece de esta interaccionar con otro gen forman una pro-
manera (resultado de una meiosis no previs- teína nueva y tenemos otro tipo de células en
ta) es inviable y se desmantela en nodos más el mismo tejido que si a su vez se replica
primarios, pero si puede nutrirse u creecer dan lugar a un grafo subsistente totalmente
genera una tejido dentro del tejido sin la or- independiente dentro del tejido original, de
denación de funciones adecuada al órgano esta manera se desarrolla un nuevo tejido
donde se da. dentro del otro y no tiene nada que ver con el
originario e incluso con el resto del sistema
2 Tratar de explicar la evolución de las redes orgánico.
celulares es una tarea ambiciosa y que aquí
tampoco podemos ahora intentar, lo que es
3 «La partícula no sólo conoció una crisis de
evidente es que hay que partir del subgrafo orden y una crisis de unidad (se calculan
que determina la aparición de un gen nuevo hoy más de doscientas partículas subatómi-
en cuanto secuencia atómica mínima capaz cas), sino que experimentó una crisis de
de autorepetirse, es decir, capaz de singula- identidad. Ya no se la puede aislar de modo
rizarse: una mutación. Por lo mismo podría- preciso en el espacio y en el tiempo. Ya no se
mos entender que el cáncer se produce la puede aislar totalmente de las interaccio-
cuando hay algún gen dentro de la estructu- nes de la observación...En fin, es la idea de
ra del ADN constituyente de una célula, el unidad elemental misma la que se ha vuelto
cual no se autoreplica, produciendo células problemática: quizás no exista la última o la
diferentes al que constituye el tejido inicial. primera realidad individualizable o aislable,
sino un contínuum (teoría del bootstrap), in- mo...Todos los objetos clave de la física, de la
cluso una raíz unitaria fuera del tiempo y del biología, de la sociología, de la astronomía,
espacio (d´Espagnat 1972)...En tanto que ob- átomos, moléculas, células, organismos
jeto, la partícula ha perdido toda sustancia, ,sociedades, astros, galaxias, constituyen
toda claridad, toda distinción, a veces inclu- sistemas. Fuera de los sistemas, no hay sino
so toda realidad: se ha convertido en nudo dispersión particular. Nuestro mundo orga-
gordiano de interacciones y de intercambios. nizado es un archipiélago de sistemas en el
Para definirla es necesario recurrir a las in- océano del desorden.» Ed. Morin, pág. 119-
teracciones de las que participa, y cuando 121, El Método I, La Naturaleza e la Natura-
forma parte de un átomo, a las interacciones leza, ed. Cátedra, Madrid 1981
que tejen la organización de este áto-
Eric Weislogel
Saint Joseph’s University
Philadelphia, PA USA
Abstract
Ontology is defined as the study of what there is in the most general sense. Depending on
the philosopher, ontology may or may not be a synonym for metaphysics. As is universally
admitted, the definitions of “ontology” and “metaphysics” are generally contested, and some
philosophers, such as Xavier Zubiri as we shall see, have tried to distinguish them. In this
essay, I will first outline one particular position that is central to contemporary debates in
ontology, a version of trope theory. In particular, the one-category “bundle theory” (the idea
that things are bundles of tropes) that I will present will draw heavily (but not exclusively)
from Peter Simons’ work. Ultimately, I’ve synthesized ideas from several trope-theoretical
positions to formulate what I take to be somewhat strengthened version of trope theory.
Let’s call this a Plausible Trope Theory (PTT). By “plausible,” I certainly don’t mean uncon-
troversial, nor do I mean there could not be a more plausible trope theoretical ontology. I
simply mean that if one were committed to developing a trope theoretical ontology, PTT
would not be a bad place to start. Second, I will consider some significant criticisms of
trope theory in general and bundle theory in particular, and how PTT might address them.
Third, I will highlight key elements of Xavier Zubiri’s understanding of the nature of real
objects as constitutionally sufficient unified systems of notes, which on the surface bears a
resemblance to trope theory. In the process I will discuss Zubiri’s understanding of the dis-
tinction and relation between metaphysics and ontology, presenting a condensed version of
Zubirian metaphysics (ZM). I will compare and contrast the basic understanding of the
terms “trope” and “note,” in part to determine whether Zubiri’s theory is committed to a
one-category ontology. Finally, I will show the similarities and differences between PTT and
ZM and raise some questions for further ontological reflection.
Resumen
Ontología se define como el estudio de lo que hay en el sentido más general. Según el filóso-
fo, la ontología puede o no puede ser sinónimo de la metafísica. Como se admite universal-
mente, las definiciones de “ontología” y “metafísica” generalmente se disputaron, y algunos
filósofos, como Xavier Zubiri como veremos, han tratado de distinguirlos. En este ensayo,
voy a esbozar una primera posición particular que es central en los debates contemporá-
neos en la ontología, una versión de la teoría de tropo. En particular, el de una sola catego-
ría de “teoría del paquete” (la idea de que las cosas son paquetes de tropos) que presentaré
se base en gran medida (pero no exclusivamente) sobre las obras de Peter Simons. En últi-
ma instancia, he sintetizado las ideas de varios puestos de tropo teóricos para formular lo
que estimo una versión mejor de la teoría de tropo. Vamos a llamar a esto una Teoría Plau-
sible de Trope (PTT). Al decir “plausible” ciertamente no quiero decir “incontrovertible,” ni
me refiero a que no podía haber un tropo ontología teórica más plausible. Simplemente
quiero decir que si uno se compromete a desarrollar una ontología teórico tropo, PTT no
57
58 Eric Weislogel
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
sería un mal lugar para comenzar. En segundo lugar, voy a considerar algunas críticas
significativas de la teoría del tropo, en general, y el paquete teoría en particular, y cómo PTT
podría abordarlos. En tercer lugar, voy a destacar los elementos claves de la comprensión
de Xavier Zubiri de la naturaleza de los objetos reales como sistemas unificados constitu-
cionalmente suficiente de notas, que superficialmente parece relacionada a teoría de Trope.
En el proceso voy a hablar de la comprensión de Zubiri de la distinción y la relación entre
la metafísica y ontología, la presentación de una versión condensada de la metafísica zubi-
riano (ZM). Voy a comparar y contrastar la comprensión básica de los términos “tropo” y
“nota”, en parte para determinar si la teoría de Zubiri se ha comprometido a una categoría
única ontologíca. Por último, voy a mostrar las similitudes y diferencias entre PTT y ZM y
plantear algunas preguntas para la reflexión ontológica.
I. Ontology and Trope Theory: Towards have the opportunity to examine one sub-
a Plausible Trope Theory (PTT) set of trope theories, that of “bundle theo-
ry”—in short, the idea that things are
Thomas Hofweber, in his article “Logic
bundles of tropes. This is what ontologists
and Ontology” in the Stanford Encyclope-
call a one-category ontology, meaning that
dia of Philosophy,1 generalizes the issues
the category of trope is, according to these
of concern to contemporary ontologists as
philosophers, adequate for articulating a
follows:
sufficient understanding of the basic na-
The larger discipline of ontology can
ture of real things. In the main, we will be
thus be seen as having four parts:
engaged with (O3) in this discussion, but
(O1) the study of ontological commit- the other issues will no doubt arise.
ment, i.e. what we or others are com- Allow me to address briefly a set of re-
mitted to, lated questions that might arise for the
reader at the outset: Is not science – in
(O2) the study of what there is,
particular, physics – sufficient for answer-
(O3) the study of the most general fea- ing the concerns of (02) and (03)? Does not
tures of what there is, and how the science tell us what there is and explain
things there are relate to each other the most general features of reality? Is it
in the metaphysically most general not the case that, today, metaphysics
ways, simply reduces to physics?2 Does the
trope-theoretical ontology to be discussed
(O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e.
in these pages consider itself in competi-
saying what task it is that the disci-
tion with the ontology of science?
pline of ontology should aim to ac-
To fully address these concerns would
complish, if any; how the questions it
take us far afield of our theme here, but it
aims to answer should be understood;
must suffice to say that although these
and with what methodology they can
seem like reasonable questions, in fact,
be answered.
these questions rest on significant confu-
In the process of addressing these sions about both science and ontology.
broad concerns, ontologists involve them- Trope theorists (as is the case with most
selves with a variety of specific questions mainstream ontologists and, for that mat-
about objects, universals, properties, ter, Zubiri) are not concerned to develop a
tropes, time, events, change, identity, sets, competing ontology. “Science,” if there is
numbers, persons, free will, God, and so such a unitary thing, must necessarily
on. We cannot, of course, deal with all have ontological commitments. Both work-
these matters in the confines of this paper ing scientists and ontologists are, in a
in the manner each deserves. Instead, we sense, triangulating towards a plausible
will explore one particular ontological posi- ontological view of reality, one that
tion, trope theory. Indeed, we will only squares with the practice of science but
that is logically and metaphysically coher- in which the tropes “inhere.” This, of
ent. So it is not a matter of an ontology course, should seem unsatisfying to one-
competing with science so much as it is a category trope theorists, as it would intro-
matter of (possibly) competing ontologies. duce the distinct ontological category of
And it is not even necessarily a matter of substance and treat tropes as properties
competing ontologies, as I hope to show in inhering in substances. But, on the other
this paper, but rather of complementary hand, to say that a cue ball just is the
ontological insights. Both trope theorists conglomeration of certain tropes leaves the
and Zubiri mean for their philosophical theory vulnerable to saying that if a trope
considerations of what there is in its basic white is over here and a trope spherical is
structures to be a complement to and elu- over there and a trope weighs six ounces is
cidation of the findings of the natural sci- at some third place and smooth-surfaced is
ences.3 in yet another place, we’d still have a cue
Tropes are “ontologically unstructured ball. That stretches credulity.
(simple) abstract particulars.”4 Although Thus it is said that the “compres-
Santayana first used the term “trope” in a ence”10 of these tropes constitutes the ob-
philosophical sense, it is generally consid- ject. But, again, how should we under-
ered that the locus classicus of trope theo- stand “compresence”? And what all is
ry is an essay by Donald Williams.5 He compresent? The four tropes, white, spher-
proposed that tropes (he adopts the term ical, smooth-surfaced, and weighs 6 ounc-
“abstract particular”) es, are compresent, but is that compres-
ence, itself, a trope? And white and spheri-
…are the primary constituents of this
cal are compresent - is that particular
or any possible world, the very alphabet
compresence a trope as well? In other
of being. They not only are actual but
words, are there relational tropes such as
are the only actualities, in just this
compresence? And if so, are there further
sense, that whereas entities of all other
relations between the compresence trope,
categories are literally composed of
itself, and the “atomic” tropes (white,
them, they are not in general composed
spherical, et. al.) of the kind we named? If
of any other sort of entity.”6
so, does it lead to an infinite regress? And
Thus, on this view, things are composed of even if that regress is infinite, is it vicious
tropes and the relations of location and or benign?11 Call these sorts of relations
similarity.7 Now, this understanding of “internal relations.”
tropes as primitive — i.e., considered as a Of course, we have not mentioned the
one-category ontology8 — leads directly to further tropes, which Williams for one
the “bundle theory” of objects: objects are would countenance, of “external relations”:
nothing but bundles of tropes. the compresence of the white-spherical-
A question arises for bundle theory: smooth-weighs-6-ounces and the green-
what makes this object (this bundle of felt-flat-surface of the pool table. Must we
tropes) this object?9 Specifically, must consider such tropes, if tropes they be, in
there be some substrate in which the understanding the constitution of the cue
tropes inhere or which in some other fash- ball?
ion binds the tropes in such a way as to And what are we to say of two identi-
constitute this object? Let’s take for an cal cue balls? Is it even possible to have
example a white billiard ball. Among the two identical objects at all? And what
key tropes that constitute this object are about the trope “white,” which constitutes
“white,” “spherical,” “smooth-surfaced,” both cue ball A and cue ball B? In classi-
and “weighs six ounces.” How shall we cal ontology, the white in cue ball A and
think about this? Some philosophers ar- the white in cue ball B are instantiations
gue that there would have to be some who- of “whiteness,” a universal (e.g., a Platonic
knows-what (Locke called it a “bare par- form). The concern with universals for
ticular”) that “underlies” these tropes and trope theorists (but not only them) is that
they seem to commit us to ethereal, inde- Tropes are not independent things,
pendently existing abstract objects, which but are ontologically dependent. However,
conflicts with the commitment of modern in their bundling tropes can also yield
science to a physicalist metaphysics. As something emergent, something more then
mentioned, PTT is meant to be a comple- just an agglomeration, something with an
ment to the modern scientific worldview, independence of its own.
not an alternative to it. But if tropes are The notion of dependence, here, is still
particulars rather than universals, they problematic. As we saw, one-category on-
cannot be in two places at once, as uni- tologists do not want anything in their
versals allegedly can be. So how does trope theory that would commit them to a sec-
theory explain two white cue balls?12 ond (let alone a third or fourth) ontological
Trope theory holds that tropes are particu- category. So upon what are the tropes of a
lars, and so either does not countenance given thing dependent? It certainly cannot
universals or reduces them to classes of be a “bare substance,” on this view.
exactly similar objects (with very little Simons proposes what he calls a nu-
analysis of in what “exact similarity” or clear theory to attempt to address this
“exact resemblance” consists)13. question. It is a “pure” bundle theory, if I
One hopes that in addressing these may put it that way, a one-category ontol-
sorts of issues we can come to a better ogy. There is no thought of substance or
understanding of the constitution of real an “extra” substratum or otherwise prop-
objects. Setting aside the question of uni- ertyless something-or-other that bundles
versals for the time being, let’s at this tropes together. Simons’s theory, though,
point keep in mind that tropes ought not will hold that there is “something” upon
to be considered as parts of a thing such which tropes are dependent. But can he
that a thing is “made up of” tropes. De- have his cake and eat it, too? Can he hold
spite the way Donald Williams puts it (see to a one-category ontology that (1) answers
above), that is not the best way to under- the question of how this object is this ob-
stand bundle theory’s tenets. According to ject; (2) accounts for the distinction be-
Peter Simons, “Trope bundles are not tween essential and accidental features of
meant to be mere collections, and certainly things, and thus accounts for the intuition
not collections of self-subsistent individu- that things can indeed undergo accidental
als which could first exist and then be change; (3) does not sneak in through the
assembled into a whole like an army is back door some notion of substance or
built by putting men together, or a ship is substratum under another guise, thus
built out of divers bits of steel, etc.”14 vitiating the claims of the sufficiency of
Some philosophers would say that tropes one-category ontology?
are not parts but ways things are. To see what he intends by this “some-
On the other hand, Simons reminds thing” that is not another ontological cate-
us, gory, we have to see how Simons thinks
objects are constituted. Objects can be
We should not however take seriously
thought to be constituted generally in two
the view that tropes, whether they are
(non-temporal) stages. To understand
ways or not, are not entities at all.
what follows, we must make a brief detour
Clearly a bundle theorist cannot, be-
to discuss the meaning and the weakness
cause then he would be building enti-
of foundation relations as Edmund Husserl
ties out of non-entities. Ways and
sees them. According to him, a right un-
tropes are not nothing, hence they are
derstanding of foundation relations will
something, hence they are entities. But
stave off the threat of an infinite regress
they are not THING-like, if by that we
that arises if two objects can only be uni-
mean substance-like. They are not res,
fied via some third entity. Husserl recog-
they are rei or rerum.15
nizes two forms of foundation relations
that are immune to this threat:
however. We’ve already seen some issues culmination of his lifetime of philosophical
that arise with this notion of compresence, endeavors. That book, entitled Man and
including the fact that it may imply an God (El Hombre y Dios), was left uncom-
unwarranted conception of absolute space pleted.30 Although Man and God is an am-
and time. In addition, as Maurin points bitious and wide-ranging work, it does
out, either compresence is an “internal” provide a convenient summary of Zubiri’s
relation, in which case the tropes that are metaphysical vision of reality as it was laid
compresent must always be compresent27 - out in his earlier works, especially On Es-
- an unacceptable consequence -- or com- sence31 (Sobre la esencia)32 and The Dy-
presence is an “external” relation, which namic Structure of Reality33 (La estructura
would then lead to different metaphysical- dinimica de la realidad).34
ly unpalatable consequences (viz., Brad- Zubiri would make a distinction be-
ley's Regress28). Again, the question is al- tween the terms metaphysics and ontology,
ways: What makes this object this object? viewing the latter as founded upon the
former. For Zubiri, reality is not merely a
C. A brief rejoinder from PTT
field of things. Thus to understand what
The Plausible Theory of Tropes I've contemporary ontology might learn from a
been sketching in this paper may be able Zubirian point of view, it is important to
to address some of the key objections lev- establish what Zubiri means by the word
eled by Levinson, generally by taking a cue “reality.”
from Levinson's own parting remarks. The He begins his discussion by saying
strategy would be, first, not to conceive of that “everything real is constituted by cer-
tropes in the traditional language of at- tain notes.”35 Each note exhibits two mo-
tributes (whether properties, qualities, or ments of a thing. First, each note “be-
ways). Second, discussion of tropes should longs” to the thing, and, second, each note
take place in terms of states of affairs. serves to determine what the thing is to
However, this latter piece of advice which it “belongs.” I put the term “belongs”
raises other sorts of problems. If a particu- in scare-quotes to indicated that there is
lar state of affairs consists in part of a not a relationship between, on the one
“property instantiation” or “property ex- hand, a thing and, on the other, a note.
emplification,” we are still left with the Certainly, for Zubiri, there is no “thing”
problem of the means of that instantiation that has a metaphysical (let alone tem-
or exemplification. Or we could put it this poral) priority over its notes. His example:
way: what are we talking about when we heat is a note of a thing, and heat deter-
talk about properties in this case? We re- mines that the thing is a hot thing (and
turn, thus, to the problem universals, and not some other kind of thing). Zubiri
however we solve it, we are sure to be spurns the traditional term “property” in
committing ourselves to at least a two- his exposition because of his objection to
category ontology. In other words, there the traditional coupling of property with
might be tropes, but there has to be more substance. On this traditional view, sub-
than tropes. stance is conceived as a subject in which
PTT, which is committed to a one- properties inhere. I like to call a simplistic
category ontology, might propose the fol- version of this traditional substance-
lowing workaround for this objection: metaphysics the “Mr. Potatohead Meta-
states of affairs are adequately describable physics.” Mr. Potatohead is a children’s toy
in terms of abstract particulars that are that consists in a brown ovoid plastic po-
the constituents (not parts) of a given state tato with a variety of small holes in it, as
of affairs.29 well as a separate set of attributes (eyes,
mustache, ears, lips, etc) that can be in-
III. Zubirian Metaphysics
terchangeably plugged into the holes, thus
At the time of his death, Zubiri was at giving Mr. Potatohead a variety of possible
work on a book that was, in effect, the looks. On the simplistic view of substance-
metaphysics that Zubiri rejects, the “pota- - something “physical” (by which term he
to” represents the substance and the ears, does not mean simply material; he is dis-
lips, eyes, etc., represent the properties. tinguishing “physical” from “theoretical” or
Zubiri objects to the Lockean idea that “conceptive,” which are mere for Zubiri).
there must be something underlying the Only certain kinds of things can appre-
features or properties that is in itself, hend reality. To illustrate this point, Zubiri
somehow, featureless.36 compares humans and dogs as they en-
But what is reality? For Zubiri, reality counter heat. For a dog, heat is the signal
is the fact that notes belong to a thing in for a certain response (move away, come
their own right.37 The “in their own right” closer). That just is heat for a dog, and, if I
is the key. This is the formality of reality. may put it this way, it’s all about the dog.
To be formally real, a thing must have its But for a human, heat is a warming, and
notes in its own right. Notes cannot simply not simply a stimulus invoking a response.
be imputed to a thing, nor can they be It might invoke a response in a human, for
simply signs of a stimulus-response rela- instance if the heat causes discomfort in
tion if the thing to which the notes belong the human. But the human apprehends
is to be a real thing. What does this mean? the heat in its own right, immediately (i.e.,
Suppose I imagine I am experiencing a does not have to reason towards that as a
dragon. The dragon is large, green, scaly, conclusion).
and fire-breathing. But none of these This, by the way, is the answer to
notes of the dragon belong to the dragon “Cartesian anxiety” concerning the “exteri-
in their own right, but are merely imputed or world.” How do I know there is a world
by me. Thus the “dragon” is not real (be- “out there” that’s not just in my head?
cause “its” notes do not belong to “it” in Zubiri answers: Before you even come to
their own right). Take another example: I know the world at all you apprehend the
am at work on a table. Its notes include otherness, the in-its-own-rightness, of
that it is a fine workspace and it is aes- things. That is a precondition of knowing
thetically pleasing. According to Zubiri, a (and hence questioning) anything at all.
table is not a real thing - or as he puts it This capacity of human beings forms the
more informatively - a table is a “meaning- basis of what Zubiri calls “sentient intelli-
thing” but not a “reality-thing.” Yes, there gence.”
is a real thing here in my office, a thing We can see – as we always do in met-
whose notes belong to it in its own right. aphysical exploration – that the epistemo-
That thing has a certain mass, shape, logical quickly enters into the discussion.
physical makeup, etc. It is a physical ob- However, what Zubiri is describing here is
ject. The fact that it is a “table” is a func- not, at bottom, epistemological but meta-
tion of my having a need for this physical physical. He is not addressing the ques-
object according to some project I am pur- tion of how we know but of what reality is.
suing. Tables do not have their notes as Reality is not a function of human know-
tables in their own right, but only as im- ing; rather, he says that reality is “activat-
puted by some person or other. Meaning- ed” in sentient intelligence.39 Reality is
things are not independent from reality- neither a concept nor an idea. Reality is
things, of course, and certain reality- fundamental and, for Zubiri, an obvious
things and not others have the capacity to fact. Where we philosophers go wrong is in
be certain meaning-things. As Zubiri says, the “entification of reality”40—adopting the
the reality-thing water has no capacity to idea that reality = things, and the “logifica-
be a table.38 tion of intellection”41—the idea that reality
How do we know that certain things is a function of predication.
are real? We apprehend reality directly, To continue, things (generally) have a
says Zubiri. Reality is not a concept or variety of notes, and real things have those
abstraction nor is it the conclusion of a notes in their own right. Those notes form
line of reasoning. It is - as he likes to put it a unity, but that unity—the unity of a real
thing—is not simply an additive unity but Zubiri does not think the “more” is
a systematic unity. A real thing is a unified some extra thing, even though every real
system of notes. What does this mean? thing is not just the sum of notes, not just
Zubiri explains that every note of a thing a string of notes. Each note is constitu-
should be understood as a “note-of” the tional in character, and the system of
thing. In other words, there are no free- notes has constitutional sufficiency—
floating notes, and a thing is not a mere meaning that this systematic unity is suf-
conglomeration of pre-existing notes. To ficient for constituting this thing. The for-
say that a note is always a note-of is to say mal notes (as opposed to the “adventi-
that a note is what it is as a function of all tious” notes, notes that are a function of
the rest of the notes of the thing. And it is the thing’s relationship with other things
to imply that the thing is what it is solely in the world) in their systematic unity just
as a function of the notes that it possesses are the real thing; they constitute the real
in its own right.42 There is no Mr. Potato- thing. So where is the “more”?
head apart from his notes, and the sys- Here, Zubiri makes another important
tematic unity of his notes just is Mr. Pota- distinction. He coins another term, sub-
tohead. The unity makes the notes to be stantivity, and then opposes it to “sub-
what they are, and the notes make the stantiality.” The latter term refers to Aris-
unity what it is. The key here is the prepo- totle’s (and St. Thomas’) notion of sub-
sition “of.” Zubiri says that the “of” is a stance. In Zubirian terms, a substantivity
moment of a thing’s reality. Things are, in is not a substance. The way Zubiri would
effect, particular forms of “of-y-ness” (if put it, each organism is one substantivity
you will forgive me this atrocious locution). comprising a multitude of “substances.”
So is Zubiri saying something like, “A He gives the example of the substance,
thing is nothing more than its notes”? No, glucose. It is a substance, not an “acci-
he is not. Every note, insofar as it is a dent.” But it is taken up by an organism
note-of, always points to something (say, a human being) in such a way that it
“more.”43 Your notes, for instance, are loses its (on Aristotelian terms) substanti-
“your notes”—not mine or anyone else’s. ality as it becomes note-of the human be-
Your notes are notes at all only because ing. Zubiri reserves the term “substance”
they are yours. It is not as if there is a big in the contemporary sense of “stuff” or
bucket of notes somewhere and someone “material.” Things are substantivities.44
(say, God) grabs up a bunch of these pre- Again, this is the reason Zubiri wants
existing notes and glues them together to speak of “notes” rather than “proper-
and comes up with you. If that were the ties.” On Aristotelian terms, properties
case, you would be nothing more than inhere in a subject (the word “sub-ject”
these glued-together notes. Hume perhaps literally means “thrown underneath”). For
thought something like this. There is no Zubiri, notes cohere among themselves,
“substance” at all (that’s just a manner of comprising a systematic unity. The sys-
speaking); all there is are properties. But tematic unity is substantivity.
that is not what Zubiri is saying. He does Further, Zubiri makes the distinction
not think that Hume’s position is defensi- between notes that are constitutive and
ble. What would it mean to say that there notes that are not constitutive. All notes,
is “big” or “green” or even “hairy” all by says Zubiri, are constitutional; some are
themselves? If that is incoherent, things constitutive. He gives the example of “all
won’t get any better if you string them white cats with blue eyes are deaf.”45 He
together into a “big-green-hairy”—all by says these notes are constitutional (of
itself it won’t result in a big, green, hairy blue-eyed, deaf, white cats), but not con-
monster. You need something more. But stitutive. Why not? Because these notes
the “more” is the question. Is it a sub- are “grounded in others.” What others?
stance, something in some way “independ- The notes of the cat’s genes. These genetic
ent” of the accidents? notes are constitutive of the cat (i.e., ac-
count for its bare existence, so to speak), The unity of the system of notes de-
unless of course science comes to show termine a thing’s “interiority,” what Zubiri
that genetic notes are further grounded in calls its in. These notes form a constitu-
more “fundamental” notes. But this, he tional systemic unity. But at the same
says, is a matter for biology, not philoso- time, notes project outward. This is the
phy.46 system’s ex. Zubiri, then, defines dimen-
Compare this to Aristotle’s under- sion as “the projection of the whole ‘in’ into
standing of the structure of the human the ‘ex.’”48 Each constitutional sufficiency
soul. According to him, that structure is (laypersons call that a “thing”) has multi-
based on functions. For instance, there ple dimensions, multiple ways it projects
are the rational functions of the soul. “itself” outwards. And each dimension
What mechanism allows for these func- projects the entire unity of the system of
tions (e.g., brain, neurons, central nervous notes.
system, etc.) is a biological question. The Even though notes are always “notes-
metaphysical question is: What are the of,” each note, itself, is a form of reality.
constitutive functions of any human being They are real. “The color green is the
(no matter how they happen)? Or in other greenish form of reality.”49 An entire sys-
words, what functions are essential if a tem of notes as a constituted reality is a
thing is to be a human being? This is form of reality. There are various forms of
something like what Zubiri is after here. reality. Zubiri says that the notes of a liv-
He finds the essence of things in their ing being are “reduced to physico-chemical
constitutive notes, the systematic unity of elements.”50 The living being qua living
notes that are not grounded upon other being, however, has its own form of reality
notes and that are necessary and constitu- (different from a star or a stone, he says).
tionally sufficient for the thing. He writes, The corollary to this is that a living being
is not reducible to its physico-chemical
The constitutive notes comprise the
elements. Those are different forms of real-
radical subsystem of substantivity: they
ity.51
are its essence. Essence is the struc-
You might say that they are different
tural principle of substantivity. It is not
realities, but for Zubiri reality is always
the correlate of a definition. It is the
numerically one. There is just one reality,
system of notes necessary and suffi-
but it is comprised of multiple forms of
cient so that a substantive reality may
reality. And each form of reality deter-
have its remaining constitutional notes,
mines how that reality is “implanted” in
including adventitious notes.”47
the one reality. Personhood, for instance,
Here again, Zubiri is distinguishing is a “way of being implanted in reality.”52
himself from Aristotle. He is trying to de- Zubiri summarizes:
fine what the essence of something is.
[E]verything real, be it an elemental
Traditionally, essence is presented in
note or substantive system, has two
terms of an idea or a definition. For in-
moments. There is the moment of hav-
stance classically, the essence of a human
ing these notes: this is suchness. And
being was to be an appropriate body with
there is the moment of having form and
a rational soul. A human being is an “em-
mode of reality; which technically I
bodied soul.”
shall call ‘transcendental,’ designating
For Zubiri, this seems “definitional,”
with this term, not a concept, but a
merely a way of speaking. For him, the
physical moment….53
essence of anything is the substantive
system of constitutive notes. That’s the We said that a substantive reality is
technical definition of (the word) “essence,” “more” than the sum of its notes. What is
but essence is not a technical definition. It the “more,” we wanted to know. It is not a
is a reality. subject, a subjectum, that is standing un-
der an array of properties. Zubiri writes,
Each real thing, through its moment of Notice at this point that Zubiri is not
reality, is “more” than what it is saying “in relation,” because a relation
through the mere content of its notes. implies that there are at least two separate
The moment of reality, in fact, is nu- things that then come together in that
merically identical when I apprehend relation. But openness is a constitutive
several things as a unit. This means element of anything real to be real at all.
that the moment of reality is, in each To be the note that it is, the note has to
real thing, an open moment. It is already be open to other notes and be con-
“more” than the notes, because it is stituted by its openness to other notes.
open to everything else. This is the Relations can only come after this consti-
openness of the real. The openness is tutional openness, are only possible be-
not of conceptual character. Nor is it cause of this openness of the real. If there
the case that the concept of reality can were no openness of the real, there could
be applied to several real things; rather, never be any relationships at all. There are
reality is a moment physically open in thus systems of systems of notes, based in
itself. That is the reason why transcen- the end on the most fundamental or con-
dentality is not a mere concept, com- stitutive notes (in biology, this might be
mon to everything real; transcendental- the notes of genes; in physics, perhaps it
ity is not community. It is actually is superstrings).
about a physical moment of communi- This insight leads Zubiri to a further
cation.54 point about reality, the difference between
relationality and respectivity. He says,
“The moment of reality is numerically
“Everything real, both in its suchness and
identical,” just means there is one reality.
in its reality, is intrinsically respective.”55
Each “thing” has its form of reality and
He writes, “Respectivity remits [“sends
each collection of things (say, a landscape)
forward”] each real thing to another.” Real
has its form of reality. But there is just
things are like this because of their consti-
one reality.
tutive openness. The ground of the in-its-
The “more” of each substantive reality
own-rightness is respectivity. Each real
lies in its openness to everything else. A
thing is what it is in its respectivity to-
tree is a tree and as such it is open in its
wards what else is, in its constitutive
implantation in reality to be an element of
(which means “that which makes some-
the landscape (which in turn has its own
thing to be what it is”) openness. Each real
form of reality, different from the mode of
thing is implanted in reality in a determi-
reality of the tree). Zubiri calls this the
nate way, based on its capacities for re-
openness of the real. When Zubiri writes,
spectivity, based on its role (so to speak) in
“transcendentality is not community; it is
the system. The thing determines the sys-
actually about a physical moment of
tem and the system determines the thing –
communication,” he means that openness
and all this is before anything like “rela-
does not merely mean that things can be
tionships” develop. This is a constitutive
set next to each other and considered as a
fact – not a choice or an option, not just a
collection of things, a “community” of
way of looking at things – according to
things. He means that openness of the real
Zubiri.
entails that all things are communicating
(in a manner of speaking) with each other; Nothing is real if it is not “its own” re-
they are being together essentially because ality, and nothing is “its own” reality
anything real is always open to everything unless it has to be, by virtue of being
else. Respectivity is always necessary; re- constitutively open. […] The result is
lations are possibly accidental, but always that every real thing is open “towards”
and necessarily founded on (prior) respec- other real things, and each form and
tivity. mode of reality is open to other modes
and forms of reality.”56
of something I do, some act or set of acts I i.e, would have to make reference to our
perform. He means function as in “func- human way of apprehending reality, in
tion-of” (as he means note as in “note-of”). order even to get started.
This is more or less a restatement of the Having brought to light some of the
lesson that any “thing” is a constitutional- key ideas of Zubiri’s quite elaborate meta-
ly sufficient system of real notes, and both physical vision—and before attempting to
the notes and the system they comprise map his work onto contemporary discus-
are constitutively open to the rest of reali- sion in ontology—we should pause to
ty. The notes determine the thing; the highlight some key questions and prob-
thing determines the notes; and everything lems raised by this work.
determines (in one way or another) every-
1. Have we hit bottom?
thing else. This is not because we think
it’s this way; it’s because it is this way. In philosophy, starting points matter.
Everything is the way it is as a function of Despite the last century’s philosophical
the way everything else is.58 preoccupation with anti-foundationalism,
Finally, Zubiri makes a distinction be- anyone hoping to develop a systematic
tween being, the province of ontology, and theory—especially of reality, itself—has to
reality, the province of metaphysics. He make a start somewhere, beyond which
bases that distinction on the difference the theory cannot go. All sensible philoso-
between actuality and actualness. Being is phers agree that at some point one has to
to reality as actuality is to actualness. The put one’s foot down, so to speak, and ac-
latter term in each pair is the ground or cept that other philosophers can always
foundation for the former term in each question this starting point. There is no
pair. A key implication of this distinction getting around this, and we must remain
is that whatever we say in ontology ought humble about our choices of principles.
to be grounded in reality, properly Zubiri—in some ways like Descartes—
grasped. In On Essence, Zubiri makes a begins his metaphysical quest from an
conceptual cut in this manner: experiential or epistemological standpoint.
Reality, for Zubiri, is the foundation for all
The view from without inward is a way that follows. There is no getting outside,
of viewing as inhesion and leads to a underneath, or beyond reality. But we “get
theory of the categories of being. The at it” immediately. We apprehend the “in-
view from within outward is a view of its-own-right-ness” of things (and do not
actualization or projection and leads to have to argue towards it or deduce it). It is
a theory of the dimensions of reality. our starting point.
These two manners of viewing are not Now, there is a long-standing drive in
incompatible; rather, both are neces- thought for “objectivity,” a point of view
sary for an adequate theory of reality.59 that is not any particular point of view, a
Real things are unified systems of position that is absolute, and this for fear
notes in their own right that can be un- that a subjective and relative position
derstood from the point of view of either could only yield a parochial theory, per-
the “in” (the “of-y-ness” of the respective haps no better than a idiosyncratic taste
notes) or the “ex” (the outward projection, or predilection. This purported Holy Grail
the dimensions, the actualness of the of theory has been described as view of
thing as a function of all other things). things as if we never existed.60 But is such
Zubiri would say that an Aristotelian- a goal attainable? I think not. I know of no
inspired category ontology can (and must) one who has fundamentally doubted the
be developed based on the former perspec- veridicality of one’s own general experience
tive, just as a metaphysics of reality in all (even accounting for error as a modulation
its dimensions would need to be developed of the veridicality of experience). It seems,
on the latter. The latter project would have to me anyway, acceptable to start with this
to take into account sentient intelligence, reality that we apprehend directly in its
“in-its-own-right-ness” and see where this count for the difference between things.
methodological starting point leads us. But what differentiates one note from an-
One possible objection that could be other? Is it that notes, themselves, have
levied against this option can be drawn notes? Does this lead to some sort of re-
from deconstructions of what is called the gress? Would such a regress be vicious or
“metaphysics of presence,” the idea that benign?
being is not fully, transparently present to
3. What accounts for the systematic unity?
apprehension but subject to position in
I.e., why are there certain things rather
differential systems and temporal deferring
than others?
(what Derrida called différance). Zubiri’s
thought, I might argue, tends to be im- Again, to say that different things dif-
mune from such criticism. A defense fer due to the different notes that form
stems from the distinction Zubiri makes their systematic unity raises the question
between reality and being and with the of why are there different systematic uni-
notions of “openness,” “functionality,” and ties? What even accounts for these uni-
“respectivity.” However, this argument ties?
cannot be made here. Suffice it to say that 4. Is there a phenomenological basis of
any philosophical position – including de- metaphysics, and if so is this legitimate?
construction—has a certain “aboutness.”
This may be a complementary ques-
To the extent that a philosophical position
tion to the first one raised here. I think we
is not just meaningless chatter, it has an
would agree that there is a difference be-
object. Deconstruction is, to my mind, still
tween asking about what there is and ask-
too wedded to a philosophy of language.
ing about what we apprehend that there
Zubiri’s philosophy—while not reverting to
is. We would all wager, I’m sure, that there
pre-Kantian naïveté—is about reality.
are things we do not apprehend (to say
2. What is the ontological status of nothing of comprehend). Does Zubiri’s
“notes”? principle, that reality is apprehended im-
But what, exactly, in addition to the mediately by sentient intelligence, leave us
formality of reality (i.e., the “in-its-own- with a merely subjective or correlationist
right-ness”), do we apprehend? What is, view of reality? Has he, in spite of himself,
besides the formality, the content of that missed the point that reality exceeds our
basic apprehension? It is the notes of indi- apprehension? This is the gist of the
vidual things. Zubiri holds that “there is knock on Kant made by Quentin Meil-
nothing real that is not individual.”61 lassoux.62 Kant rightly recognized that
Those individual things are unified sys- human modes of apprehension deny ac-
tems of notes. Now, we know that Zubiri cess to things-in-themselves – his “Coper-
does not think that notes themselves are nican revolution.” But then Kant, says
things, and so he does not hold to some Meillassoux, limits reality to what is struc-
idea that things are mere conglomerations tured by the structure of reason—
of notes. But what exactly is the ontologi- “correlationism.” Meillassoux suggests
cal status of notes? How shall we think that Kant should have quit while he was
about what he is calling notes? Notes are ahead, having undone anthropocentric
not the imputation of human beings. They notions of reality. The problem, it seems to
are realities or forms of reality (if not me, however, is that there is no way to not
things). But what does this mean, ulti- have some degree of “correlation” between
mately? In many ways, “notes” is an our thought and our world. Otherwise, our
unanalyzed concept in Zubiri’s thought. thoughts are about nothing and the world
What accounts for the fact there are differ- infinitely withdraws. Certainly, we cannot
ent notes? Different things are different plumb the depths of reality with anything
because they are each a systematic unity like comprehensiveness, let alone com-
of different notes. It is the notes that ac- pleteness. There is an irreducible mystery
to being. But this does not mean we can (that are likewise respective). The core or
make no headway in trying to understand essence is a matter for science to deter-
reality to some extent. It is a story for an- mine (for instance, that it is the genetic
other time, but Zubiri’s analysis of sen- material of organic beings that constitutes
tient intelligence may provide substantial the essence of those beings). That there is
tools for the project of understanding reali- such a core is a “physical” (i.e., not merely
ty that does not simply determine things theoretical or conceptive) fact. Is there a
to be correlates of thought or conscious- “more” to O? Yes, but only in the (im-
ness. portant) sense of “transcendence in”, as
As we will now see, Zubiri’s philoso- Zubiri puts it—in other words, in the
phy is hardly the only one open to these openness of the real, i.e., vis-à-vis respec-
kinds of questions and objections. tivity.
(b) PTT, while not countenancing a
IV. Conclusions: Similarities, differ-
featureless substratum, nevertheless holds
ences, and some further questions
that there is a core or nucleus of mutually
Clearly, similarities and differences founding tropes, each of which is founded
exist between a plausible trope theory upon the others members and none of
(“PTT”) and Zubirian metaphysics (ZM). Let which is founded upon any non-member.
us explore some of them. This nucleus might then serve as a one-
1. Both Zubiri and PTT reject what I’ve way foundation for other tropes that might
called the “Mr. Potatohead” substance- themselves be founded on other non-
attributes ontology. Both ZM and PTT re- members of this essential nucleus.
ject the idea of an underlying who-knows- (c) We can see, therefore, that ZM and
what to which adhere various properties. PTT have similar intuitions as to the suffi-
Both find the trouble with this notion of cient constitution of any object, O. But in
underlying subject (or bare substance) to neither case is there some thing in addi-
be that it is an empty notion. A that- tion to the notes or tropes that constitute
which-lacks-any-features-in-its-own-right O.
is literally unthinkable. 4. Neither ZM nor PTT accepts the ex-
2. Both ZM and PTT (as opposed to, istence of free-floating notes/tropes. How-
say, Williams’ understanding of trope the- ever, there is a difference.
ory), reject the Humean version of bundle (a) PTT seems to agree with all trope
theory. ZM rejects it as strictly insufficient theories (whether they be exclusive or an
to account for the constitution and identi- element of a multi-category ontology) in
ty of things, and PTT rejects it for its in- seeing tropes as abstract particulars that
soluble logical difficulties, as outlined have an “identity” of their own. Tropes
above. come ready made, so to speak (despite
3. Nevertheless, both ZM and PTT rec- their not being free floating). Levinson, as
ognize the importance for reasons of object we saw, criticized this position on a num-
identity (especially through change and ber of fronts, but a key complaint is that
over time) to posit something that counts this conception of trope would automati-
as the essence of the thing that remains cally entail at least one additional ontolog-
(essentially) the same over time and ical category: a universal. It would do so
through change. because to even understand the trope is to
(a) ZM maintains that an object, O, is see a trope as a token of a type (and there
a unified system of notes whose essence is seems no getting around this with the
its irreducible core of fundamental, consti- suspect notion of “exact similarity”).
tutionally sufficient constitutive notes. The (b) ZM, on the other hand, finds the
unification of the system is a function of “identity” of any note to be a function of all
the respectivity or openness of reality – the the other notes to which it is both respec-
notes of O are what they are as a function tive and open. In other words, a note is
of (or with respect to) all of the other notes what it is because of all the other notes of
the object as well as of the object itself fundamental level, that of sentient intelli-
(considered as a unified system of those gence, the intellect actualizes the reality
notes) it characterizes. In addition, that that the table qua thing is in its own right.
note is what it is as a function of how the But the truth of this intellection is prior to
object as a whole is open and respective logos, prior to the articulation even of the
the rest of reality. Not only are there not thing’s de suyo features. Does the intel-
free-floating notes, there are also no sub- lect’s ability to articulate such features
stantially independently identifiable notes imply a realist commitment to universals
at all. or abstract entities? If the formality of re-
(c) The question is whether PTT or ZM ality is the in-its-own-right, then are artic-
is more satisfying of our explanatory ob- ulations themselves real? Or, if they are
jectives. Short of a (paradoxical) Platonic indeed real, would they have any neces-
view of a particularist ontology (i.e., trope sary connection to that of which they are
theory), there is no adequate way of un- articulations? It is hard to see how they
derstanding tropes themselves, as Levin- would, and if they do not then articulation
son has argued quite vigorously. On the appears nominalistic. “Reality things” in
other hand, ZM leaves us in the same bind logos turn out to be “meaning things” rela-
as some of his illustrious predecessors, tive to particular theoretical programs of
including both Parmenides and Heraclitus, one kind or another.
as well as any contemporary process- The possibility I am raising here is
relational metaphysicians (for instance, certainly arguable and depends on possi-
Whitehead): How can we tell what O “real- ble interpretations of Zubiri’s metaphysical
ly” is if its notes are subject to a constant position. I raise the issue in consideration
flux of respectivity (or, the flip side of the of the question raised earlier: How can we
same coin, if it is melted into a single Real- tell what object O “really” is if its notes—
ity)? the ones it has de suyo—are subject to a
(d) But what if Zubiri is a nominalist constant flux of respectivity? It would
after all? What if “reality-things” are, seem the answer is that we cannot.
themselves, (merely) “meaning-things,” The lesson to be drawn from this
things that derive their identity and mean- (possible) conclusion is that the ontologi-
ing as a function of their place in a human cal project, whether in the guise of a quest
experiential scheme of one particular sort for an plausible trope theory (a desidera-
or another (physics, say, or metaphysics)? tum of those adhering to the “unholy trini-
Thomas Fowler63 identifies nominalism, ty” of nominalism, reductionism, and nat-
the metaphysical view that only particu- uralism) or rather in the terms of Zubiri’s
lars exist, that so-called “universals” and metaphysical program, is always a practi-
“abstract entities” are simply manners of cal project, a praxis, and as such is a
speaking, 64 as one of the three pillars of function of human projects generally. Nei-
the “unholy trinity” in much contemporary ther PPT nor ZM—nor any other meta-
philosophy of science (the other two pillars physical program—could possibly bring
being naturalism and reductionism).65 the quest to get at the basic structures of
Zubiri's view of what he calls “meaning reality to a close.
things” is clearly nominalist in the sense Recognizing this, the terms of the de-
that a table qua table has no de suyo (i.e., bate have changed. It is no longer a matter
in-its-own-right) features. But what of the of seeking “adequacy” but rather a ques-
“reality thing” that can manifest as a ta- tion of the nature of the praxis itself. What
ble? For Zubiri, the table qua thing has its are we really after?
reality de suyo, and not simply as a func- In any case, both PTT and ZM make a
tion of human perception or practical in- substantial contribution to our metaphysi-
terest. cal and ontological project. Both, though,
But here it pays to recall Zubiri's in- have their weakness. PTT tries to account
sight into the levels of intellection. At the for things in isolation in a way that Zubiri
would find, in fact, implausible. Respectiv- fault, unable to account adequately for the
ity and the openness of reality demand at identity and perdurance of objects without
least the addition of other strategies. ZM, the supplement of categorical ontology.
on the other hand, may be holistic to a
Notes
1 Hofweber, Thomas, “Logic and Ontology”, The tropes and their connections of location and
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring similarity.” Williams, p. 8.
2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 8 I.e., a single category is sufficient for ade-
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr201 quately explaining the basic structure of real-
3/entries/logic-ontology/>. ity.
2 For instance, here is a view that can be found 9 This is the most commonly raised question in
repeated throughout the contemporary cri- terms of getting at the heart of trope theory.
tique of metaphysics: “Metaphysics nowadays See, for instance, Márta Ujvári, The Trope
pretty much amounts to microphysics and Bundle Theory of Substance: Change, Individ-
macrophysics, particle physics and astro- uation and Individual Essence (Walter de
physics, made possible first by microscopes Gruyter, 2012). P. 164
and telescopes, and now by computer-driven 10 Williams lists as alternatives terms to com-
microscopic and macroscopic instruments presence, “collocation,” “belonging to,” “con-
that probe the unimaginably small and the cresence,” “coinherence,” “togetherness,” and
unimaginably large…”. John D. Caputo, The “concurence.” Williams, p. 8.
Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (In- 11 Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Bradley’s Regress,”
diana University Press, 2014), pp. 113-114.
Philosophy Compass, 7.11 (2012) pp. 794-
3 This desideratum is not universally shared 807; Maurin, “Trope Theory and the Bradley
among all metaphysicians and ontologists, of Regress,” Synthese, Vol. 175, No. 3 (August
course. This is a key issue in metaphysics 2010), pp. 311-326; Ross P. Cameron, “Tur-
generally: What is the relation between our tles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and
ontological commitments and our engage- Fundamentality,” The Philosophical Quarter-
ment in the world – including our scientific ly, Vol. 58, No. 230, pp. 1-14.
engagement? Which drives which? The two 12 One solution is to say that exact resem-
views under consideration here, however, are
blance is simply the ontologically innocuous
strongly committed to consistency with mod-
supervenience of the tropes being the tropes
ern science.
they are. It is an internal relation. It is, as
4 See Anna-Sophia Maurin, “Tropes,” Stanford David Armstrong would say, an “ontological
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, free lunch.” See Peter Simons, “Particulars in
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/, Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of
accessed 6/24/14 1:19 pm. Substance,” Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
5 Donald C. Williams, “On the Elements of Be- cal Research, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Sept. 1994), p.
ing: I,” The Review of Metaphysics 7(1953). 556.
6 Williams, p. 7. Readers unfamiliar with trope 13 Generally, “similarity” is taken to be primi-
theory may detect a similarity with Leibniz’s tive, i.e. admitting of no further analysis.
monads. The resemblance, however, is quite 14 Peter Simons, “Particulars in Particular
superficial. Mention of Leibniz in trope- Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Sub-
theoretical literature is almost non-existent. stance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Leibniz saw the “building blocks” of reality to Research 54(1994)., p. 562.
be immaterial, non-extended, soul-like spir- 15 Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing:
itual substances. One will search in vain for
Three Trope Theories of Substance.”, p. 565.
such language among contemporary ontolo-
gists. Aristotle and Locke are the real progen-
16 Note that in the case of the third objection,
itors of trope theory. traditional (i.e., non-place) substratum theo-
ry holds the advantage: the whole bundle
7 “Any possible world, and hence, of course,
(“attached” to its substratum - whatever that
this one, is completely constituted by its
is) moves.
17 Edward N. Zalta, “Frege,” Stanford Encyclo- it could not serve as a building block of reali-
pedia of Philosophy, ty, as trope theorists want tropes to do.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ 28 See Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Trope Theory and
Accessed 10/14/2014 18:11. the Bradley Regress,” Synthese 175, no. 3
18 Simons uses the term “substance” in this (2010). and Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Bradley’s
discussion, but there is an ambiguity at Regress,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 11
work. Substance can mean one of two (along (2012). “Bradley’s Regress” is the same sort
with property) metaphysical co-principles of of objection that Aristotle’s “Third Man” ar-
things. This is the propertyless something-or- gument held against a Platonic theory of
other of what I will refer to later as the “Mr. forms.
Potatohead version of substance theory. But 29 What I have in mind here as a strategy is
substance can also mean that which is apt to akin to Donald Davidson’s “anomalous mon-
exist in itself, a whole existing in its own ism” theory of mental events. His view on
right and not as an intrinsic part of anything that issue is that all mental events are physi-
else. Here, Simons means the latter. To keep cal events, but that they are anomalous. That
matters - to my mind, anyway - more clear, I means we have not two different ontological
will just use “object” or “thing” instead of categories (mental and physical), but rather
“substance.” two irreducibly different explanations of men-
19 “A foundational system is not just a mere tal events. See “Mental Events” in Donald
collection or plurality of things, but a con- Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events
nected system.” Simons, “Particulars in Par- (Philosophical Essays of Donald Davidson)
ticular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of (Oxford University Press, 2001)., pp. 229-
Substance.”, p. 563. 244.
20 Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing:
30 El Hombre y Dios was originally organized
Three Trope Theories of Substance.”, pp. and completed by Ignacio Ellacuría and pub-
567-568. lished in 1984. That version of the book went
through five editions. The English transla-
21 Jerrold Levinson, “Why There Are No
tion, Man and God, by Joaquín Redondo
Tropes,” Philosophy 81, no. 04 (2006).
(with critical revisions by Thomas Fowler and
22 See Williams, “On the Elements of Being: I.” Nelson Oringer) was made from (apparently)
pp. 4 ff. the 2nd or 3rd edition of El Hombre y Dios,
23 Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. both from 1985. That translation appeared in
570. 2009 (University Press of America). In 2012,
24 See Cynthia Macdonald, “Tropes and Other a greatly expanded New Edition of El Hombre
Things,” in Readings in the Foundations of y Dios appeared. This has yet to be translat-
Contemporary Metaphysics, ed. S. and C. ed to English. In this paper, I will be citing
Macdonald Laurence (Oxford: Blackwell, from the English translation [hereinafter MG]
1998). and the 5th edition of the Spanish original
[hereinafter HD].
25 Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p.
527. E. J. Lowe is criticized in a similar fash-
31 Xavier Zubiri, On Essence. Translation and
ion. See pp. 575-6. Introduction by Robert Caponigri (Catholic
Univ. of America, 1963).
26 Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p.
579.
32 Xavier Zubiri, Sobre La Esencia / About the
Essence (Obras De Xavier Zubiri) (Spanish
27 As an example of an internal relation, if John Edition) (Alianza Editorial Sa, 1962). Original-
is shorter than Mary, that is simply by virtue ly published in 1962.
of the fact that John is the height he is and
Mary is the height she is. There is nothing
33 Xavier Zubiri and Nelson R. Orringer, Dy-
“additional” at work here. If John is the namic Structure of Reality (Hispanisms) (Uni-
height he is and Mary is the height she is, versity of Illinois Press, 2003).
then they will always be in the height relation 34 Xavier Zubiri, Estructura Dinamica De La
they happen to be in - necessarily. Note that Realidad / Dynamic Structure of Reality
an internal relation would not, therefore, be a (Obras De Xavier Zubiri) (Spanish Edition)
trope, as it has no “independent” reality. I.e., (Alianza Editorial SA, 1994).
35 Xavier Zubiri, Man and God (University Press 51 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper,
of America, 2009)., 24. this insight might be fruitfully applied to is-
36 “The idea then we have, to which we give the sues in the philosophy of mind by those the-
general name substance, being nothing but orists hoping for a viable non-reductive phys-
the supposed, but unknown, support of icalism.
those qualities we find existing, which we 52 Technically, a form of reality has a particular
imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, mode of implantation. See Zubiri, Man and
without something to support them, we call God, 27.
that support substantia; which, according to 53 Zubiri, Man and God., 27.
the true import of the word, is, in plain Eng- 54 Zubiri, Man and God., 27.
lish, standing under or upholding.” John
55 Zubiri, Man and God., 27.
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under-
56 Zubiri, Man and God., 28.
standing; book 2, chapter 23; “Of our Com-
plex Ideas of Substances” 57 Zubiri, Man and God., 29.
ter usage was Aristotle’s or St. Thomas’s, and and Nominalism: The “Unholy Trinity” and
the difference between their metaphysical Its Explanation in Zubiri’s Philosophy,” The
theories still holds (despite this ambiguity). Xavier Zubiri Review 9(2007). 72
45 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. 64 Stathis Psillos, Philosophy of Science a-Z
46 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2007). 163
47 Zubiri, Man and God., 26.
65 Fowler, “Reductionism, Naturalism, and
48 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. Nominalism: The “Unholy Trinity” and Its
49 Zubiri, Man and God., 27. Explanation in Zubiri’s Philosophy.” 71
50 Zubiri, Man and God., 27.
Abstract
The present article aims to provide an answer to the criticism formulated by the philoso-
pher Gustavo Bueno to Zubiri’s Theologal Philosophy. On one side, Bueno considers the
concept of “religation” not to be a consistent one because it relies on the “absurd” notion of
creation; on the other side, he states this concept is not a good enough foundation for a
Philosophy of Religion, since religation would not account—for instance—for the existence
of irreligious people. To refute these theses it will be necessary to verify the relationship
between religation and creation as well as clarify the distinction between religation and
religion
Resumen
El presente artículo pretende responder a las críticas del filósofo Gustavo Bueno a la filoso-
fía teologal de Zubiri. Bueno, por un lado, considera que el concepto de “religación” no es
consistente, pues se apoya en la noción “absurda” de creación; por otro, piensa que tal
concepto no sirve como base de una filosofía de la religión, una vez que la religación, por
ejemplo, no daría margen a la existencia de personas irreligiosas. Para contestar a estas
tesis será necesario averiguar la relación entre religación y creación y aclarar la distinción
entre religación y religión.
77
78 Joathas Soares Bello
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
por sus premisas, ya por sus consecuen- puede “demostrar” racionalmente su fun-
cias. damento allende la aprehensión –el fun-
Según Bueno, Zubiri habría susti- damento del poder de lo real o de la reali-
tuido la conexión transcendental entre la dad simpliciter allende la aprehensión
“conciencia de mi existencia” y el “espacio también es, forzosamente, el fundamento
de los objetos” por la conexión entre “per- de la persona humana. El poder de lo real
sona” y “Dios” o, con más cautela, entre en cuanto fundamento de la realización
persona y “ente fundamentante” o “Poder humana dado en intelección primordial no
último de lo real”. De la misma manera es formalmente lo mismo que su funda-
que los objetos del espacio-tiempo no son mento demostrable en intelección racional.
algo sobreañadido (tras su re- Pero demostrar algo no es hacer este algo
representación) a la conciencia, sino algo presente en intelección primordial, sino
constitutivo de ella, tampoco el Funda- “dar razón”, a través de él, de aquello pre-
mento sería algo sobreañadido a la perso- sente en esta intelección; es decir, en el
na, sino constitutivo de la misma; así co- caso que nos ocupa, se trata de pensar
mo el mundo exterior no puede conside- aquello que posibilita que el poder de lo
rarse contenido de una tesis demostrable, real sea fundamento mostrable y mostrado
una vez que su presencia está presupues- de la realización humana. Una posibilidad
ta en toda demostración, el poder de lo sería decir que el poder de lo real es un
real no sería algo demostrable. Pero la puro factum, que es justamente la posición
doctrina de la religación sería “heterodoxa” atea. Zubiri y Kant recurren a vías distin-
respecto de la filosofía crítica, según la tas para llegar a Dios, pero en ambos ca-
cual el orden moral práctico es el funda- sos, se trata de partir de lo dado en
mento de las ideas transcendentales (Al- aprehensión—el poder de lo real o el orden
ma, Mundo, Dios), como si este orden fue- moral como lo entiende Kant—para justifi-
ra el ens fundamentale; la doctrina de la car a Dios como fundamento metafísico ya
religación pasaría por alto la crítica de la del hecho de la religación, ya de los hechos
razón, recorriendo en sentido contrario el morales. Bueno confunde aquí el orden de
camino crítico, y recayendo en las posicio- la fundamentación epistemológica—o
nes escolásticas prekantianas20. ¿Cómo “noológica”, en términos zubirianos– con el
responder a este planteamiento? orden de la fundamentación real o metafí-
Para Zubiri, hay una respectividad, sica. En el caso de Kant, el orden moral es
en la intelección, entre inteligencia y reali- fundamento del conocimiento de Dios co-
dad en cuanto “verdad real”, es decir, mo “Sumo Bien”, pero Dios mismo es el
realidad actualizada –y no realidad “allen- fundamento (postulado) de la realidad
de” la aprehensión–; y hay otra en la ac- moral: “la razón práctica […] apoyada so-
ción humana –considerada metafísicamen- bre el hecho moral tan inconcuso en su
te, en cuanto constituyente de la “realidad género como el hecho científico, se ve for-
humana siendo”–, entre la persona y el zada a aceptar como condición de posibili-
poder de lo real (que es la misma realidad dad del mismo la existencia de Dios”21. En
como ultimidad, posibilitación e impelen- el caso de Zubiri, el poder de lo real es el
cia), presente en cada cosa real; esta se- fundamento del conocimiento de Dios co-
gunda respectividad, que es la religación, mo “realidad absolutamente absoluta”,
también es algo dado en la intelección pero Dios es el fundamento de la realidad
primordial. Este poder de lo real es fun- como poder. La perspectiva “crítica” kan-
damento de la persona humana, y no es tiana está asumida en la noología de Zubi-
nada sobreañadido a ella, como afirma ri, y no representa ningún escollo para su
Bueno. Pero no se trata de algo “presu- filosofía teologal. Dicho eso, pasemos a la
puesto”, sino de algo “mostrable”, porque crítica que Bueno hace de la religación en
está presente en la aprehensión primordial cuanto fundamento de la filosofía de la
de toda acción del hombre. A partir de esta religión.
presencia del poder de lo real es que se
del hecho de la religación (que el ateo pue- zonable y, si es posible referirlo a la religa-
de “olvidar”), y en la cual el ateo identifica ción—como pienso que es e intenté apun-
este poder con la facticidad de su vida. tarlo—, no implica ninguna dificultad.
Pero como el fundamento real del ateo no Sobre la crítica de Bueno acerca de
es su propia vida32, solamente el “fracaso” la religación como posible fundamento de
de ésta lo hará percibir esta realidad: la religiosidad, se puede decir que sólo la
realidad humana se encuentra estricta-
En su hora, la vida fundamentada so-
mente religada, pero esta religación no es
bre sí misma aparece internamente
aún religión sino la raíz de todas las acti-
desfundamentada, y, por tanto, referida
tudes posibles frente al poder de lo real,
a un fundamento de que se ve priva-
sean religiosas o no-religiosas (atea, ag-
da.[.…] Por esto el ateísmo verdadero
nóstica o indiferente).
sólo puede dejar de serlo dejándole que
La religación no es una teoría, sino
sea verdadero, pero obligándole a serlo
que Zubiri nos brinda la descripción del
hasta sus últimas consecuencias. Sin
hecho, por todos constatable, de la depen-
más, el ateísmo se descubrirá a sí pro-
dencia que la persona humana tiene en
pio siendo ateo en y con Dios. El fraca-
relación a la realidad, la cual nos remite al
so que constitutivamente nos acecha
problema del Fundamento de esta reali-
asegura siempre la posibilidad de un
dad. El ateísmo asumido por Bueno es
redescubrimiento de Dios33.
una posibilidad de interpretar el poder de
Es decir, el ateo no es una suerte lo real: éste sería mero factum, y la vida
de hombre “no-religado” –una especie de humana sería autosuficiente. Pero tal
“no-predestinado” que vive “suelto” en el ateísmo no es el punto de partida en la
mundo y que no podría llegar a ser religio- experiencia humana, y el teísmo zubiriano
so–, sino que vive la religación apoyado en tiene derecho a la ciudadanía filosófica:
un fundamento aparente –su propio ser–, éste no es fruto de una especulación “ab-
y su posible hallazgo de este hecho descu- surda”, basada en sofismas, sino de una
bre que su vida, en cuanto se apoyaba en posibilidad anclada en el hecho mismo de
sí misma, no estaba en su verdadero fun- la religación, pues el poder de lo real no es
damento y, en esta medida, estaba des- un poder de una realidad específica, y así
fundamentada. Éste me parece el único es razonable pensar que se funda en la
modo posible de entender lo que dice Zu- Realidad Divina.
biri, a la luz del contexto y de su conclu- En nuestros días, el problema de
sión: este descubrimiento descubre, a la Dios, antes de ser el problema de su exis-
vez, que el ateo siempre estuvo “en” Dios y tencia, es la cuestión de si la vida humana
“con” Dios, pudiendo ahora estarlo for- tiene fundamento. La religación apunta a
malmente. que “alguien viene”, y justifica los esfuer-
zos intelectuales para la demostración de
Consideraciones finales
la faz concreta de este Fundamento. La
Con lo dicho, queda demostrado fecundidad filosófica de esta idea de la
que el motivo que Bueno apunta para con- religación, a mi parecer, no queda com-
siderar la religación como un “contra- prometida por la crítica de Gustavo
modelo” no se sostiene: el concepto de Bueno, sino que ésta ha sido ocasión para
causalidad creadora es perfectamente ra- establecerla aún más firmemente.
Notas
24BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y 29 BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios
la religión, p. 208. y la religión, p. 212.
25 Bueno también se refiere a los problemas de 30 Cf. NHD 393.
la “ciencia” y de la “moción” divinas, pero la 31 Como afirma Antonio Pintor-Ramos, “la ex-
posibilidad de conciliarlas con la libertad de plicación que en 1935 se daba del fenómeno
nuestras acciones, sin absorberlas, queda ya del ateísmo por la ‘soberbia de la vida’ puede
fundada en la razonabilidad misma de la sin duda explicar muchas formas concretas
creación. Aquí no me referiré a las posibles de ateísmo, pero filosóficamente no puede
soluciones (tomista o molinista, por ejemplo), considerarse ni satisfactoria ni suficiente”
sino que remito a un texto de Zubiri en el (PINTOR-RAMOS, “Dios y el problema de la
cual trata de estas cuestiones y propone su realidad en Zubiri”, en Cuadernos de Pensa-
respuesta particular: cf. SSV 155-193. miento, n. 1, 1997, p. 109).
26 BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios 32 Desde la comprensión de que el fundamento
y la religión, pp. 210-211. del poder de lo real es la realidad divina.
27 HD 92-93. 33 NHD 393-394.
28 Cf. PFHR 87.
Abstract
Xavier Zubiri can be seen from a new viewpoint called “Arch-individualism” or, more politi-
cally, “Revolutionary Right.” This school of philosophy, Archindividualism, acts much like
Xavier Zubiri himself, as Zubiri always has the philosophical and Christian tradition as his
starting point; nothing can be done without the tradition or away from the tradition. But it
is not vulgar Conservatism, either politically or theologically. Zubiri shows that a revolu-
tionary analysis of reality, the human being and his relationship with God can be made
from the very realm of tradition, purifying it without throwing it away, and thus opening the
way for true human liberation. Now a parallel with the Theology of Liberation (from its lead-
ing head and Zubiri's disciple, Ignacio Ellacuría) facilitates the comparison between the left-
wing perspectives starting from Zubiri and the right-wing perspective, also starting from
Zubiri, of Arch-individualism, which in turn is very close to Theology of Liberation, alt-
hough Theology of Liberation would be left-wing.
Resumen
O Xavier Zubiri pódese ver desde un novo punto de vista chamado Arqueoindividualismo
ou, máis politicamente, Dereita Revolucionaria. Esta escola de filosofía, o arqueoindividua-
lismo, traballa moi no estilo do Xavier Zubiri, porque o Zubiri sempre ten a tradición filosó-
fica e cristiá coma o seu punto de partida; non se pode facer nada sen a tradición ou fora
da tradición. Mais isto non é conservadorismo vulgar, nin politicamente nin filosoficamente.
O Zubiri mostra que unha análise revolucionaria da realidade, do home e da relación do
home co Deus, é posible dende o mesmo campo da tradición, purificándoa sen desbotala, e
así abrindo o camiño para a verdadeira liberación humana. Agora un paralelo coa Teoloxía
da Liberación (partindo da súa cabeza representativa e discípulo do Zubiri, o Ignacio Ella-
curía) facilita a comparación entre as perspectivas esquerdistas que parten do Zubiri e a
perspectiva dereitista, tamén inspirada no Zubiri, do arqueoindividualismo, o cal pola súa
parte está moi próximo á teoloxía da liberación, aínda que a teoloxía da liberación sería
esquerdista.
87
88 Alexandre Xavier Casanova Domingo
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Fin da opresión do home polo home Diferenza entre homes peores e mellores
Antiabortismo Forte e sostida redución da natalidade
Aristocratismo Autosalvación individual
Soterioloxía Promoción de todos á casta suprema
Nirvana Afirmación eterna e infinita do ego
Dereita Revolución
Outros (engadir) ¿?
fermidades que os ricos, mesmo sendo moi (mellor: emanado, segundo o meu punto
indulxente con esta frase e co contexto no de vista) pensaríamos que hai unhas ba-
que tradicionalmente se di, cómpre re- rreiras físicas i espirituais á súa compren-
coñecer que a pobreza non achega a Deus, sión que non existen, pois se o home quere
non produce nada positivo en si mesma; chegar á santidade, chegará a ser santo, e
que da pobreza se debe fuxir coma do de- as portas do inferno non prevaleceran con-
mo. tra el; crer que a salvación non é posible
Dito con outras verbas, e bastante dende a racionalidade humana é o erro do
duras: teoloxía si, parvadas non. calvinismo.
En xeral: a apoloxía da dor e das O que se necesita é amor sen nar-
dificultades no mundo fenoménico, tan cisismo. O que se necesita é egoísmo ben
característica de tódalas relixións e cos- entendido, que é o amor a si mesmo, e non
movisións de alicerce bíblico (incluidas as desprezo do próximo. Quen se ama a si
tendencias islámicas) choca de sócato co mesmo, amará con verdade e con poder ó
feito de que hai moitas manifestacións da seu próximo.
dor que son completa ou case completa- Por isto queda o aporte sólido do
mente mecánicas, estériles, que nada te- Xavier Zubiri á liberación real do home, un
ñen de divino directa ou indirectamente e aporte tan sólido que non precisa gaban-
que, simplemente, débense á autonomía zas indixestas.
relativa de funcionamento e desenvolve- O Deus revélase precisamente na
mento que ten o mundo material fenomé- acción do home que busca entender, que
nico transitorio. busca a realización da súa máis alta posi-
En xeral, a dor non acerca ó Reino bilidade. É un Deus intrínseco á concien-
de Deus, senón todo o contrario. cia do individuo, sen por iso limitarse á
Agora, pode parecer que me afasto escuridade e á continxencia do individuo
radicalmente do Xavier Zubiri e que vou a transitorio. É un Deus que libera por estar
un prometeísmo laicista e inmanentista. dentro mais empurrando para fora. Fora
Pois non hai tal. O que busco, o do mundo material de tebras: ata o Cristo
que busca a dereita revolucionaria, é unha Cósmico.
revolución metafísica e política real, que A intelección sentinte, segundo o
ten moi en conta a tradición (de feito, en Xavier Zubiri, permite un acceso completo
típica frase da dereita: o que non é tradi- á realidade percibida. Hai nisto unha su-
ción é plaxio) mais que, lonxe de insistir peración da dualidade, da imperfección no
no pecado, a culpa, a caída e conceptos coñecemento.
ligados, insiste no contrario: na acción A miña interpretación do Zubiri é,
santa, na autoxustificación inocente, no abofé, meta-kantiana. Sosteño que as aná-
andar ergueito. lises da aprehensión da realidade polo
Di o Zubiri, citado polo Everaldo home, pola súa intelixencia, pola súa afec-
Cescon, que o amor en Deus "é real, formal tividade, pola súa corporalidade e polo
e constitutivamente um êxtase de pura vo- encontro transcendentalmente reforzante
lição e de pura inteligência". Isto implica coa Realidade Derradeira, o Deus, permi-
plenitude física no posible, plenitude sí- ten progresivamente chegar a un coñece-
quica e apertura á excelencia espiritual. É mento exacto do real, por moi longo que
deiformidade, deiformación... ¡deificación! resulte o proceso.
O que se necesita é un equilibrio Esta posibilidade non é unha vari-
superior. Sen conciencia do carácter tran- ña máxica, mais si a guía antirrelativista
sitorio, insatisfactorio e humillante do que orienta en todo o proceso. Os planos
mundo fenoménico, creríamos que é posi- de realidade, especialmente na Historia
ble a felicidade nun plano existencial tan (aquí salienta o Zubiri máis teólogo, máis
baixo; é o erro do prometeísmo. Por outra cristián) son progresivamente transparen-
parte, sen conciencia da natureza intrin- tes segundo a actuación do home religado
secamente divina do ser humano creado ó Deus.
non pode vivir. Pódese entende-la dereita divino. O cal implica recoñecer, sen ro-
revolucionaria, aínda, como unha forma manticismo ilusorio, o peso determinante
de teoloxía ou filosofía da liberación... (e abafante se non o recoñecemos) das leis
mais, iso si, unha teoloxía da liberación do mundo material, para crea-los puntos
realista e nunca utópica. de salto a dimensións cada vez máis li-
Trátase no noso sentir, no sentir do bres, cada vez menos atadas á materiali-
arqueoindividualismo, dunha lectura rea- dade animal transitoria, do home no que
lista e progresista das teses do Xavier Zu- ten de propiamente anxélico, de crístico e
biri. O home, sendo en principio unha divino.
realidade limitada e falible, ten, nembar- E, como non tratamo-los arqueoin-
gantes, a capacidade de acolle-la capta- dividualistas de fachendear de novidade
ción do poder divino e humanizar toda a académica, coma o noso interese é sinxe-
realidade, cara á divinización tamén, pois lamente a liberación real, física, metafísica
a “deiformidade” e a “deiformación” do ho- e relixiosa, do ser verdadeiro empírico, do
me implican que o home só pode ser ple- home, quedamos á espera de todo tipo de
namente humano aspirando a ser tamén críticas e suxestións.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to reflect about a portion of the correspondence between El-
lacuría and Zubiri in order to establish a foundation for articulation of thought of the Jesuit
based on his reception of Zubiri’s thought, and their relationship. For Ellacuría philosophy
was always something very serious, something that required a disciplined exercise in
search of impeccable intellectual rigor. Following these criteria he laid the foundations of
what was supposed to represent a new Christian philosophy that was in full harmony and
consistency with Latin American reality. We could summarize the center of his intellectual
concerns, his intellectual project. But it is something else. This article seeks to show, on
one hand, something of the meaning of philosophy and life, and on the other hand, to as-
sert the importance of the philosophy of religion as a discipline or field of philosophy, one
that can access the keys to many of the conflicts pressing upon our century. This is im-
portant because without thinking how can action be developed? Philosophy and life show
that life is religated, and it is though religación that theology is done in the passionate de-
sire to give consistent voice to religated reason. This is the common ground of Xavier Zubiri
and Ignacio Ellacuría; teacher and student. Both epitomize consistency and accuracy; and
for both intellectual passion becomes life and how you always pay a price for that con-
sistency when there is no possibility to buy what is not for sale.
Resumen
El objeto de este trabajo es reflexionar alrededor de una parte de la correspondencia entre
Zubiri y Ellacuría a fin de poder establecer las bases de la articulación del pensamiento del
jesuita a partir de la recepción, por su parte, del pensamiento y de su relación con Zubiri.
Para Ellacuría la filosofía fue siempre algo muy serio, algo que requería de un ejercicio dis-
ciplinado a la búsqueda de una impecable rigurosidad intelectual. Siguiendo estos criterios
acabó construyendo las bases de lo que habría de representar una nueva filosofía cristiana
que estuviera en plena sintonía y coherencia con la realidad latinoamericana. Así podría-
mos resumir el centro de sus preocupaciones intelectuales, su proyecto intelectual. Sin
embargo es algo más. Este artículo quisiera mostrar, también, por un lado algo del signifi-
cado del binomio filosofía y vida y por otro lado, reivindicar la importancia de la Filosofía de
la Religión como disciplina, o ámbito de la Filosofía, privilegiado para poder acceder a las
claves de muchos de los conflictos que urgen, que están apremiando a nuestro siglo a pen-
sar, por que sin pensamiento ¿cómo va a elaborarse la acción? Pensar de forma significati-
va, desde dentro y para adentro. Del binomio filosofía y vida, la vida se religa, es religación
y religación que se hace teología en el deseo apasionado de dar voz coherente a la razón
religada. Es este el lugar común de Xavier Zubiri e Ignacio Ellacuría; maestro y alumno; a
mi entender epítomes ambos de coherencia y rigor; de pasión intelectual que se hace vida y
de cómo siempre hay que pagar un precio por esa coherencia cuando no hay posibilidad de
comprar aquello que no está en venta.
97
98 Nativitat Senserrich y Morata
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
lado como los del otro insinúan artera- discusión minuciosa contra el suare-
mente como hipócrita inocencia: ¿es cismo le ha hecho presentar un tomis-
que el cristiano no tiene suficiente con mo exacerbado y poco actual. De todos
su cristianismo como respuesta intelec- modos, se ha metido en un terreno en
tual y como actitud vital?4 el que es imposible co-filosofar en Cen-
troamérica, donde sería una pena que
La respuesta intelectual y la actitud
la filosofía comenzara siendo discusión
vital no son suficientes para Ellacuría,
escolástica. Tal vez, el autor haya pro-
creencia que para él se subsume a Santo
yectado demasiado su propia y perso-
Tomás a quien admiraba profundamente
nal formación y preocupación filosóficas
por su audacia intelectual. En los años
en un ambiente cuyo tono existencial es
que transcurrieron a partir de 1955, Ella-
ciertamente distinto. Esto no obsta a
curía tomó partido en el llamado movimien-
que el autor le sea permitido y aun
to neo-tomista que propugnaba la vuelta a
obligado tener su específica interpreta-
un pensamiento católico tomista a partir
ción del ser ni a que se le niegue con-
de la síntesis entre la filosofía de Santo
tacto con el tomismo contemporáneo.
Tomás y los descubrimientos de las cien-
Con todo, creo sinceramente que una
cias y de las filosofías de Kant y Heidegger.
predisposición personal le empuja a in-
Las figuras más prominentes en esos años
terpretar conforme a sus esquemas aun
del neo-tomismo eran el Cardenal Mercier,
a los tomistas contemporáneos, despo-
que fundó la escuela de Lovaina y Mare-
seyéndolos así de lo más original en
chal. En España destacó el que fuera
ellos.6
maestro de Zubiri, Juan Zaragüeta. En
este contexto, él buscaba y creía posible Centrándose en el tema de Centroamérica
encontrar elementos comunes entre la y la filosofía escribe:
filosofía tomista y las filosofías contempo- ¿Puede ser entonces el tomismo con su
ráneas. Ellacuría pretendía la síntesis en- forma y sus específicos contenidos filo-
tre tomismo y modernismo. De hecho, su sóficos una auténtica filosofía efectiva
admirado Santo Tomás había hecho lo en Centroamérica7? La pregunta es
mismo cuando intento armonizar su pen- desaforada y a su respuesta no se van a
samiento con las filosofías de Aristóteles y aportar aquí sino unas posibles direc-
Averroes. Ellacuría se expresa como sigue trices, las más de ellas negativas. Desde
en otro texto inédito en junio de 1958: luego no, si se trata de un tomismo in-
Urgentemente se precisa captar y decir temporal y repetitivo, es decir, un to-
lo que de positivo tienen los modernos, mismo que ni siquiera reproduce el va-
no de corrida y con la prisa de añadir lor filosófico de su origen, sino tan solo
inmediatamente un pero adversativo y la inteligencia de sus fórmulas. Hay que
destructor, sino con ánimo abierto de añadir inmediatamente que, si el to-
buscar lo valioso aún entre actitudes y mismo ha sido solo eso en muchas par-
expresiones que admiten un doble sen- tes y tiempos, no tiene por qué serlo y
tido…5 de hecho no lo es hoy en varios pensa-
dores, auténticamente tomistas, autén-
En esta etapa se consideraba un par- ticamente pensadores y auténticamente
tidario de la filosofía perenne, un escolás- contemporáneos.8
tico. Sin embargo, ya aquí su postura es
de una gran apertura lo cual le coloca, en El movimiento tomista y neo-esco-
ese medio, como un heterodoxo. A propósi- lástico era, en ese momento, en que lo
to de un texto redactado por Peccorini El vivió Ellacuría una postura muy de avan-
ser y los seres en 1961 que se presentaba zada, dada la situación de una Iglesia Ca-
fiel a las posturas tomistas, Ellacuría es- tólica muy conservadora que en ese mo-
cribe: mento estaba preocupada atacando al
modernismo, lo moderno y lo que en rela-
El haberse entretenido demasiado en la ción se mantuviera en ambos. Su pensa-
miento hasta aquí ya nos muestra un Se aprecia con claridad que la síntesis
Ellacuría radical, a la vanguardia de los que Ellacuría pretendía pronto se desva-
movimientos intelectuales de la Iglesia. necerá a partir de ese primer contacto.
Parece ser que para él no era incompatible Volvió a tener la segunda entrevista con
servir a la Iglesia, ser radical de varias Zubiri el 2 de agosto de 1962. En diciem-
maneras y vivir y estar de acuerdo con los bre de aquel mismo año aparecía publica-
tiempos. Ignacio Ellacuría creyó encontrar da SE y el 27 de enero de 1963 Ellacuría
en el pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset una le envía una carta entusiasmada a Zubiri
filosofía susceptible de poder formar parte de la que reproduciré algunos fragmentos.
de su síntesis. Algunos especialistas creen En ella se ve como esta obra le hace pen-
que intentó cristianizar a Ortega intentan- sar en la auténtica posibilidad de una
do dar con lo más esencial de su pensa- nueva filosofía cristiana, trans-escolástica
miento. Más concretamente y como indica y trans-tomista:
el título de un trabajo redactado en esos
…le quería agradecer su libro por lo que
mismos años Posibilidad y modo de apro-
tiene de servicio no sólo a la filosofía y
ximación de la filosofía escolástica y la
no sólo a la verdad, sino, sobre todo,
filosofía vitalista moderna, hacer compati-
por lo que tiene de servicio al cristia-
ble el pensamiento de Ortega con la filoso-
nismo y por lo que tiene de servicio a la
fía escolástica. Sin embargo, tal proyecto
Verdad. Yo lo siento así y así se lo digo
se irá desvaneciendo en la medida en que
sin limitación alguna … Lo que me pasó
Ellacuría conozca el pensamiento de Zubi-
fue que el libro fue un deslumbramien-
ri, en el que encontrará mucho más vita-
to en un terreno en el que me parecía
lismo del que creyó hallar en Ortega. En
que ni yo cabría en el deslumbramiento
esa obra encontró el plus de realidad que
… Yo creo que los formados en la esco-
le faltaba para que su proyecto intelectual
lástica tendían a pensar que lo que us-
fuera viable en Centroamérica. Únicamen-
ted les podría dar de avance y profundi-
te la vida, anclada en la realidad, podría
zación estaría en un terreno no todavía
renovar el pensamiento filosófico cristiano.
cubierto por ella, el terreno de los exis-
La crítica que Ellacuría hace al escolasti-
tencialismos, historicismos y vitalismos
cismo es la falta de radicación vital en la
…; en el mejor de los casos pensaban
vida misma, el sentido vital. Todo ello es-
que usted iniciaría una síntesis y no un
taba en plena sintonía con su espirituali-
mero conglomerado, entre la filosofía
dad de aquel momento.
clásica y la filosofía última … El asom-
Paralelamente Ellacuría se planteaba
bro ha sido, entonces, que usted ha
la posibilidad de poner límites a los exis-
dado todo esto de una forma superior,
tencialismos y en esos términos pensó en
como quien da una solución no al pro-
Zubiri. Lo que había leído de él en NHD le
blema mal propuesto, sino a un pro-
había gustado y creyó que su tesis docto-
blema que luego habría que replan-
ral le daría un espacio apto para discernir
tear… Desde luego no se dirá que su fi-
en qué medida el pensamiento de Zubiri
losofía, ni aún siquiera su filosofar, sea
podía acotar los vitalismos y existencia-
aristotélico, ni escolástico. Yo diría que
lismos9. En una carta de Ellacuría a su
es más bien un mea-aristotelismo y
vice-provincial se expresa como sigue con
tras-escolástico… ni en la técnica, ni en
relación a la primera vez que vio y habló
los resultados de su pensamiento. Y es-
con Zubiri, el 8 de septiembre de 1961:
to para nuestros tiempos balbucientes,
Le dije sucintamente que veía en él un nebulosos e inacabados es ya un valor
modelo de juntura entre lo clásico y lo de primera línea. Pero la escolástica en
moderno, entre lo esencial y lo existen- los escolásticos de hoy no tiene de or-
cial. Zubiri sonrió y dijo que efectiva- dinario las cualidades que le son pro-
mente ese había sido el intento de su pias sino de una manera que yo llama-
obra.10 ría prestada y no originalmente creado-
tal y como Zubiri expresó que constituyen tender muchos de los conflictos más cru-
hoy un marco privilegiado para poder en- ciales de este nuestro siglo.
Notas
1 Valdés Valle, R: “La evolución del pensa- ta, 1990, pp. 323-372, y 393-442 respecti-
miento filosófico de Ignacio Ellacuría” en vamenter.
ECA (1996) Vól. 51 Núm, 577-578 Nov-Dic. 8 Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1040
pp 1029-1047. La revista ECA es una publi- 9 Respecto a poner límites a vitalismos y exis-
cación de la Universidad Centroamericana tencialismos recomiendo la lectura de Las
José Simeón Cañas fuentes espirituales de la angustia y de la es-
2 Ibid., p. 1029. peranza de Zubiri en donde se ve con clari-
3 Ibid., p. 1030. dad, a mi parecer, cómo el filósofo concreta
los límites a los existencialismos. Este texto
4 Ibid. constituye un apéndice de la obra de Zubiri
5 Respecto a esta expresión “… una auténtica Sobre el Sentimiento y la Volición que publicó
filosofía efectiva en Centroamérica?” Ellacu- Alianza EditoriaL Zubiri lo escribió a princi-
ría se está refiriendo a un pensamiento filo- pios de 1961 a partir de una petición por
sófico que pueda conectar con la realidad en parte de Monseñor Boyer-Mas que organiza-
la praxis. En este pensamiento que lograra ba unos encuentros de intelectuales cristia-
finalmente articular y sistematizar la reali- nos conocidos con el nombre de “Entreriens
dad tal y como Zubiri la entiende se converti- de Bayonnex”. Fue el propio Monseñor Bo-
rá en eje vertebrador de su filosofía que es a yer-Mas quien lo tradujo al francés y lo leyó
la vez teología y Teología de la Liberación. en el encuentro de mayo de 1961, al que Zu-
Recomiendo para profundizar en todo ello la biri no asistió en persona. Se publicó, por
lectura de los textos de Ellacuría que forman primera vez, en Revista de Filosofía. 3. épo-
parte de Misterium Liberationis. Concreta- ca, vol. IV(199l), núm. 6. págs. 239-245. Edi-
mente " Historicidad de la salvación cristia- torial Complutense, Madrid. Actualmente en
na", y "Utopía y profetismo", en Mysterium Sobre el Sentimiento y la Volición, Madrid,
Liberationis. Conceptos fundamentales de la Alianza Editorial y Fundación Xavier Zubiri
Teología de la liberación, tomo I ( I. Ellacuría 1994 .
y J. Sobrino coeditores) Madrid: UCA y Trot- 10 Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1041.
ta, 1990, pp. 323-372, y 393-442 respecti-
vamente.
11 Ibid., p. 1042.
6 Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1031.
12 Ibid.
7 Respecto a esta expresión “… una auténtica
13 La tesis doctoral de Ignacio Ellacuría se titu-
filosofía efectiva en Centroamérica?” Ellacuría ló La principalidad de la esencia de Xavier
se está refiriendo a un pensamiento filosófico Zubiri y la defendió en Madrid en la Univer-
que pueda conectar con la realidad en la sidad Complutense en 1965.
praxis. En este pensamiento que lograra fi- 14 Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1044.
nalmente articular y sistematizar la realidad 15 Ibid., p. 1045.
tal y como Zubiri la entiende se onvertirá en 16 Ibid., p. 1046.
eje vertebrador de su filosofía que es a la vez
teología y Teología de la Liberación. Reco-
17 Ibid., p. 1047.
miendo para profundizar en todo ello la lec- 18 Ibid., p. 1048.
tura de los textos de Ellacuría que forman 19 En efecto, Ellacuría sigue las ideas que sobre
parte de Misterium Liberationis . Concreta- Filosofía de la Religión expuso Zubiri en su
mente " Historicidad de la salvación cristia- texto “Note sur la Philosophie de la Religion”,
na", y "Utopía y profetismo", en Mysterium publicado por el Bulletin de l’Institut Catholi-
Liberationis. Conceptos fundamentales de la que de Paris. Texto que publicó como parte
Teología de la liberación, tomo I ( I. Ellacuría de sus reflexiones acerca de la Filosofía de la
y J.Sobrino coeditores). Madrid, UCA y Trot- Religión en relación al curso “La Philosophie
Abstract
Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) was perhaps the most original and systematically rigorous think-
er in contemporary Spanish philosophy; but he may also be the least known, due to cir-
cumstances of his life that prevented him from occupying the center stage in Spain’s intel-
lectual life. This paper intends to show that Xavier Zubiri’s theology is in fact a form of
panentheism, a view of God where the world is in God via an ontological link, and yet God
and the world are not identical. After a summary review of literature relevant for under-
standing the question and some basic notions on panentheism, we analyze Zubirian theol-
ogy as shown in two of Zubiri’s most important works: Nature, History, God and Man and
God. The conclusion of this study is that Zubiri’s theology may be in fact a form of tran-
scendental panentheism.
Resumen
Xavier Zubiri (1898–1983) fue quizás el pensador más original y más sistemáticamente ri-
guroso de la filosofía española contemporánea; pero también es el menos conocido, debido
a circunstancias de su vida que le impidieron ocupar un lugar central en la vida intelectual
de España. Este trabajo busca mostrar que la teología de Xavier Zubiri es de hecho una
forma de panenteísmo, una visión de Dios en donde el mundo está en Dios mediante un
vínculo ontológico, y aun así Dios y el mundo no son idénticos. Después de una breve rese-
ña de la literatura pertinente para comprender la cuestión y algunas nociones básicas de
panenteísmo, se hace un análisis de la teología zubiriana tal como se muestra en dos de las
obras más importantes de Zubiri: Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, y El Hombre y Dios. La conclu-
sión de este estudio es que la teología de Zubiri puede ser en realidad una forma de panen-
teísmo transcendental.
107
108 C. Eduardo Sanchez Gauto
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
other version of classical theism. However, osophical system is directed, and without
there are some hints that Zubiri’s theology it would not be understandable.14 He im-
might be considered as a form of panen- plicitly recognizes a panentheism in Zubiri
theism. Rivera Cruchaga, in an obituary when he states: “God is effectively in eve-
for Zubiri, unconsciously alludes to the rything, but not “exactly” as the pantheist
possibility of panentheism in Zubiri’s phi- would have it”.15
losophy. He remembers an anecdote where Despite all these hints, at the present
Zubiri said to him: “When we are in the time the author is not aware of any identi-
truth, we are in the Word of God, we live fication of Zubiri as a panentheist, save
in God”.7 Cescon hints that Zubiri could perhaps a brief, ambiguous and inconclu-
have understood the God-world relation- sive mention by Franciscan theologian
ship in panentheistic fashion, without Félix Alluntis.16
using the specific term. Since Zubiri un-
Panentheism
derstood each thing as a manifestation of
God, because it is not God and yet it is Panentheism can be described as “a
formally constituted in God,8 Cescon con- ‘vision’ of God in the world and the world
cludes that for Zubiri a separation be- in God”. This quote, which for now shall
tween God and the world was inconceiva- remain unattributed, shows how according
ble.9 to this particular view of the God-world
A thorough study of the concept of relationship, God and the world are joined
religation and his correlation with human together in some sort of ontological link.
experience of God is done by Correa Panentheism can be generically de-
Schnake.10 Without realizing it, Correa fined as the view of God where “God and
describes religation in strongly immanent- the world are ontologically distinct and
ist terms that might hint at panentheism: God transcends the world, but the world is
“religation is a presence of God in things in God ontologically.”17 According to
precisely in order to constitute them as Palmquist, “panentheism typically refers to
real, and specifically in the human person a synthesis between traditional theism
as that which is constituting its mission to and pantheism, whereby the whole world
the ground of its own personal reality in (and everything in it) is believed to be in
the configuration of himself.”11 God, though God transcends the bounda-
Marquínez Argote sees a remarkable ries of the natural world and is more than
similarity between the theologies of Zubiri nature.”18
and another panentheist thinker, Paul That is, the world and everything in it
Tillich, despite evidence that Tillich was is in the being of God or ontologically in
not aware of the thought of the other. God.
Marquínez attributes this similarity to the The notion that the world is in the be-
fact that both were disciples of ing of God, that is, ontologically in God, is
Heidegger.12 For Marquínez, the similarity key for panentheism and it serves to dis-
lies specifically in the analogy between the tinguish it from modern statements of
devices of the “depth of the ultimate” in classical theism which strongly emphasiz-
Tillich and religation in Zubiri. Corominas es the notion of divine immanence. Cooper
also point out the deep influence of explains that for the classical theist, God
Heidegger in the formulation of Zubiri’s is not only immanent; he could be abso-
theology, making it instrumental in the lutely immanent because God’s transcend-
abandonment of Zubiri’s previously held ence is absolute.19
modernistic convictions.13 David H. Nikkel offers a thorough
Zárraga Olavarría, after offering an characterization of the concept:
elaborate explanation of Zubiri’s view of “Panentheism” literally means “all in
God, states that the problem of God was God.” (The word was coined by the
for Zubiri the “north” to which all his phil- early nineteenth-century German phi-
form the impression that is just another religation man is shown everything that is
existential analysis.32 However, right be- real. It is no mere experience of man, nor a
hind the existentialist language lies the psychological or social phenomenon, or
procedure of phenomenological analysis: a moral conscience, but the very principle
series of methodological reductions in or- and ground of any possible experience,
der to examine the structures of con- including these four aspects.
sciousness with the purpose of appre- This religation exposes man to that
hending universal truths.33 This has not ultimateness which Zubiri calls deity.40
gone unnoticed. Several studies have This is another key concept to which
pointed out the key place of phenomenolo- Zubiri will return later in Man and God.
gy in Zubiri’s thought and specifically in Here, it is described as not necessarily
his reflections on the problem of God.34 being God as a reality in and of Himself.
Melero Martínez, for example, states that “Deity” is here just a trait, and an enig-
phenomenology is the general humus matic one to boot, by which man is being
(substrate) of Zubiri’s philosophy.35 shown all that is real. The discovery of this
The first step is an analysis of human deity is thus the principle, the beginning of
existence. Here we begin to see the initial any possible experience. Now, deity as
steps of Zubiri’s phenomenological and described is just an enigma and because
transcendental view of God: man is always of this enigmatic condition, deity forces
positioning himself in respect of something human intelligence to learn about it.
which Zubiri calls “ultimateness”. This is The second step is thus the solution of
because man is not a mere thing; but as a the enigma of the deity, and this step is for
strictly personal reality, it stands against Zubiri strictly demonstrative. Deity is in-
the whole world in an absolute way and exorably grounded on “reality-deity” or
his acts are the actualization of his abso- “divine reality”. It is this reality-deity as a
lute reality. What is this ultimateness? character of the ultimate reality or as first
Zubiri responds: cause. Since it is the first cause of all
This ultimateness is not merely some- things, including human realities
thing in which man “is,” but rather equipped with intelligence and will, it is a
something in which man has to be in first reality which is also intelligent and
order to be able to be what he is in free-willing. This reality is beyond the
each of his acts. Thus the ultimate- world in order to ground the world as a
ness has a grounding character.36 reality. Now, this poses a question: is this
This grounding effected by the ulti- ultimate reality, is this first cause, God?
mateness determines the absolute charac- This leads us to the third step.
ter of human reality, although Zubiri still The third step points out that the first
does not disclose at this point what or who cause which was shown in the second step
this ultimateness is. This ultimateness to be also free and personal, is essentally a
makes the man religated to it. Thus, personal, transcendent reality, and this an
Zubiri introduces a key concept in his ex- “absolutely absolute” reality. To this reality
planation, something that would be place we can call him God. Now, how can we say
at the center of his view of the God-world that God is the grounding, the foundation
relationship. Religation is “the absolute of the world? For Zubiri, the answer lies in
personal character of human reality actu- an act of pure donation. Since it is a self-
alized in the acts which it carries out”.37 donation of a pure and perfect will, it is
As one commentator put it, religation is also pure ecstasy, of pure love. This pure
the ontological link to the ground of exist- love is the highest form of causality. Thus,
ence,38 or, more clearly, is the ontological God is the grounding of the world out of
link by which man has access to God.39 By pure self-donation in love.
In summary, the three steps are the duction to the problem of God, and here
following: the key issue of God’s relation to the world
1. Analysis of the human existence: is explored with more detail than in the
discover the ultimate reality, or previous chapter. According to Corominas,
“deity”. this essay was heavily influenced by
Heidegger’s philosophy.43
2. Deity as first cause or “divine Zubiri again uses a phenomenological
reality”. method to access God as a reality, with
3. First cause as an absolutely religation as his key concept. In order to
absolute, free and personal reality; know if there is a God, we must begin from
that is, God. human existence. This is the starting point
Zubiri ends this reflection saying that of Zubiri’s phenomenological access to
even though finding God from the philo- God. Now, this is possible because for
sophical way is possible by tracing these Zubiri phenomenology is not only ontolog-
three steps, it is impossible to grasp ade- ical (as in Husserl), but also a way to ana-
quate concepts about God. Man think by lyze reality and not only consciousness.
abstracting concepts from things. Some of Man’s personhood is his being. Per-
these concepts are “representative”, which sonhood is implanted into being in order
are inadequate for thinking about God. to realize itself while living with other
But others are “directionals”, which could things. Now, the “with” is one of human
be Zubirian-speak for the phenomenologi- personhood’s formal ontological traits in
cal intentionality; they point out to other itself. Man has to realize himself as a per-
things. They could help in our way to- son during his own life. This life is a mis-
wards God; but we must discern ways to sion; life is something sent to man, and
God that are possible from others which existence is imposed upon him. What
are not. In other words, and inasmuch as makes this imposition is also what “im-
Aquinas’ arguments for God are ‘ways’, we pels” (move, prompt, make do) man to live.
have the outline of a via phenomenologica Now, what is what impels man into
to God.41 living? It’s something previous or “anteri-
This paper by Zubiri purports to be a or”. This is something into which man
mere introduction. However, in a few pag- holds onto in order to exist and realize
es Zubiri manages to present several key himself. This is unavoidable since man
concepts of his thinking, such as deity and cannot “be” by himself. “[Man] needs to be
religation, or the hierarchy of absolute prompted to make himself. His ontological
realities. There is no explicitly panentheis- nihility is radical”.44 There is something,
tic statement here, although it should be then, that makes us to be.
noted that God is shown as the ground At this stage, Zubiri introduces his
and foundation of any reality by “ulti- key concept in his access to God. This is a
mateness”, and man is intimately linked to point that was identified as essential for
Him by “religation”. God is thus shown as both his theology and anthropology.45 We
a transcendental reality which is the ulti- are prompted into being, we are obligated
mate ground of existence for any being, to exist, because we are ontologically
enabling their existence by their link to linked to what makes us to be: We are
him in deity or religation. religated. Religation, thus, is that ontologi-
cal link to something that previously
In Regard to the Problem of God makes us to be.46 It’s a link to something
from which we come and “makes there to
In Regard to the Problem of God is a be”. Religation evidences the fundamentali-
much larger text which was initially pub- ty of human existence, something that
lished as a journal article in 1935.42 There, causes that we are being being. Man is not
Zubiri formulates a more detailed intro- only religated; he is constitutively religated.
Now, since man exists “with” things, There is no identification of the being
and man is religated, the something that of metaphysics with God. In God the
religates man, religates with him the whole “there is” surpasses infinitely with re-
world. In religation, “the whole material spect to the “is.” God is beyond being.
universe appears”.47 Prima rerum creatorum est esse, being
This means that religation is our way is before created things, the medieval
to access all reality. This begs the ques- Platonists said. Esse formaliter non est
tion: What is that something that religates in Deo ... nihil quod est in Deo habet
man? For Zubiri, this is “what we call rationem entis, being is not formally in
God”: a reality which Zubiri names as dei- God ... nothing which is in God has
ty.48 But this isn’t God per se yet; it’s a the form of being, repeated Master
reality that opens up for us the ultimate Eckhardt, and with him, all of the
reality of God and shows that we are Christian mystics.52
grounded in that reality. God is ens fun- The concept of being becomes prob-
damentale, the being which grounds us. lematic, and here is where panentheism
Groundness is God’s chief attribute. comes full circle for Zubiri: Since God is
Religation shows us that God is not a beyond being, we need a different concept
thing. Man is not with God (as it is the of what a being is. The doctrine of creatio
case with things); man is in God. Zubiri ex nihilo, paired with the Aristotelian idea
here quotes Acts 17:28, “In him we live of substance, could lead to the undesira-
and move and have our being”. Man does ble outcome of pantheism. Anything that
not need to arrive to God; he is coming “is” is anything that comes from God.
from Him. The problem of God is thus the Since God’s status is now a metaphysical
problem of religation.49 While many have problem, the world also becomes problem-
seen the concept of religation as an origi- atic at once. What is the answer? Panen-
nal feature of Zubiri, Yáñez points out its theism:
roots in the thought of José Ortega y Gas- Religated existence is a “vision” of God
set, Zubiri’s mentor and professor of phi- in the world and the world in God.53
losophy in Madrid.50
The quote may be familiar to the read-
God is thus a transcendental reality
er, because it was used to characterize
accessed through religation. By religation,
panentheism at the begining of this paper.
humanity and the whole world is “in God”
This is the core of Zubiri’s panentheism.
ontologically. Zubiri describes his panen-
“God remains linked to the world ‘by rea-
theistic vision in this terms:
son of being’.”54 And the existential link is
God is not something which is in man what Zubiri calls religation.
as a part of him, nor is He something What is atheism, then? Atheism de-
which is added to him, from outside; nies deity; it is a negative position regard-
nor is He a state of conscience; nor is ing deity.55 Atheism comes when the man
He an object. What of God there may feels that he is unbound; ignores his reli-
be in man is only the religation gation, and identifies his being with his
through which we are open to Him, life. This happens when the person feels
and in this religation God becomes self-sufficient. “Success is the great crea-
patent to us. Hence one cannot, strict- tor of atheism”.56 Human life is the ulti-
ly speaking, talk of a relationship with mate absolute and, quoting St. John,
God.51 Zubiri states that man falls into “pride of
But who is God? Even the verb “is” is life”.57 That’s why pride is the capital sin
troublesome because God is beyond Being; among all capital sins. This prompts
He is the One who makes being possible Zubiri to make an interesting insight:
as ens fundamentale.
The present time is a time of atheism; Supernatural Being: God and Deification in
it is an time that is proud of its own Pauline Theology
success. Atheism today affects, primo
This is the last chapter on Nature,
et per se, our time and our world.
History, God, and it is made from the
Those of us who are not atheists, are
notes of two courses Zubiri gave; one on
what we are despite our time, as the
atheists of times past were so despite Hellenism and Christianity in Madrid
theirs... As an historical period, our (1934-1935) and the other in Paris (1937-
time is one of “unbinding” and dis- 1939). Zubiri says almost defensively
fundamentation. For this reason, the “They are simply an exposition of some
religious problem of today is not a New Testament texts, as seen by the Greek
problem of differing faiths, but the tradition. They are, therefore, simple his-
problem of religion-irreligion.58 torical pages, nothing more. I must em-
phasize this.”61 Despite this disclaimer,
Since this position is not sustainable,
however, this chapter has very little of
man has tried to clutch himself in all
actual New Testament theology and a lot of
kinds of supports. Today, Zubiri says, is
Christian Neoplatonism, incorporated al-
the time of philosophy. But philosophy
most wholesale into Zubiri’s theology.
cannot be a way of life. Yet, “at the bottom
Zubiri actually admits his partiality some
of a great part of contemporary philosophy
lines below, where he uses “Greek theolo-
lies a surreptitious deification of exist-
gy” as a synonym with Christian Neopla-
ence”.59
tonism: “Personally I shall not hide my
Again, panentheism could be athe-
affection for Greek theology. Without any
ism’s demise:
exclusivism whatsoever, I have yielded in
Surely the hour will come when man, the following pages to this propensity.” All
in his intimate and radical failure, will in all, this is no minor footnote in Zubiri’s
awake as if from a dream finding him- thought. It is a key development of his
self in God and failing into the realiza- thinking62 and the basis for many con-
tion that in his atheism he has done cepts of his theology, such as religation.63
nothing but be in God. Then he will Melero Martínez explains the im-
encounter himself religated to Him, portance of this essay for Zubiri:
not so as to flee from the world, and
others, and himself; but the other way The inclusion of a text of theology,
around, in order to sustain and main- Supernatural Being: God and Deifica-
tain himself in being. God does not tion in Pauline Theology, which closes
manifest Himself primarily as nega- the book, invites to reflection: Why
tion, but as fundamentation, as what should a theological discourse ap-
makes it possible to exist. Religation pears in a text of philosophy? Why the
is the possibilitation of existence as last word in Zubiri is theological? The
such.60 seriousness of these questions is
heightened because it was an un-
In this article Zubiri begins a phe- published text that could have been
nomenological analysis of human exist- silenced. Only those who attended the
ence and ends with a panentheistic vision course at Madrid, 1934-1935, or
of God as a transcendental agent beyond those of the Foyer international des
being but the ground where all beings étudiants catholiques of París in 1937
have their existence. Man apprehends the could have known of its existence. At
world by being linked to this transcenden- this time, Zubiri is a secularized priest
tal agent by religation. Without even begin writing about theology. This text was
to define anything related to God’s charac- the last one to pass the ecclesiastical
ter, Zubiri’s panentheism is already an censors in October 27, 1944, which
essential part of his theology. held back the printing of the book.
Only the internal need of this dis- nature. In the Father, it is a principle;
course would justify its inclusion.64 in the Son, as constituting agency; in
Zubiri begins by investigating the be- the Holy Spirit, as self-donation in
ing of God and to the effect he draws heav- act.72
ily from ideas from Plato, Aristotle, and the Being simultaneous and eternal ema-
“Greek fathers”, which for Zubiri usually nations, both the Son and the Holy Spirit
denotes the Christian Neoplatonist philos- are images, eikón (icons) of God with a
ophers, among whom Pseudo-Dionysius is distinctively Neoplatonic flavor:
heavily mentioned.65 “God is love” is no The Son is eikon because He proceeds
mere statement; it is a metaphysical defini- immediately from the Father; the Holy
tion mediated by the dialectic between Spirit is so because He proceeds from
agape and eros66 God’s being is nothing the Father through the Son, and con-
static but energéia, power, operating activ- sists in manifesting the identity of the
ity.67 God is power; both as power that Father and Son: pneúma ek Patrós
unfolds Himself to the world (agape) and di’hyioû ekporeuómenon. Such is the
as a power that seeks its own and natural Greek scheme.73
perfection (eros).68 God’s love is both ec- This Neoplatonistic chain-of-being de-
static and effusive manifesting itself in an piction of the internal structure of the
internal emanation or “effusion”, the Trini- Trinity is essential to Zubiri’s view of God
tarian life; and an external effu- and determines a panentheistic view of
sion/emanation, a creation and a “deify- God’s relationship to the world. The Trinity
ing” self-donation or deification.69 This is not only a model of divine life; “Let us
insight by Zubiri was noted by some as the not forget that this expresses not only the
basis for the later Zubirian concept of “the nature of the Divine life, but also the struc-
power of the real”.70 ture of creation and of deification”.74 God’s
The Trinity is the mysterious mode of personal life is extended by ontological
being an infinite God which is yet one by emanation (effusion) into creation and
nature. In order to develop his view of deification.
Trinity, Zubiri turns to Richard of St. Vic- The trinitarian structure of divine life,
tor. Richard’s doctrine on the Trinity were then, causes the ontological and dialecti-
used for Zubiri as building blocks to de- cal unity of God and the world that is the
velop a trinitarian theology of eternal, per- distinctive mark of panentheism. By crea-
sonal emanations.71 God is an infinite be- tion, God produces what is “the other” but
ing whose infinity is pregnant with love, as an emanation of God Him”self”. If there
understood as the very ecstasy of being. is any doubt that his could be panenthe-
God is a personal reality full of love and ism, let’s take a look at the very own
manifests itself as a personal reality (the words of Zubiri:
Father) which due to his own perfection
And hence the creation, at the same
eternally generates as an emanation an-
time it produces things distinct from
other person (the Son), which is the per-
God, maintains them in ontological
sonification of the power, the dynamis of
unity with Him through effusion.75
the Father. This perfection, when it is an
actuality that reverts upon its essence is In keeping with this idea, Zubiri ex-
the person of the Holy Spirit. Zubiri de- plicitly rejects pantheism.76 By via negati-
scribes in this way the procession— va, Zubiri states that the transcendence
perichoresis, circumincession—of the God- production of creation is opposed to the
head. immanent procession of the Divine per-
sons. This is why Zubiri prefers the term
Each person is distinguished from the
“effusion” to emanation. For him, “emana-
others by the way of having the divine
tion” has a pantheistic connotation.
Creation produces the otherness in beings, whose being is their life (zoé); and
God and in creatures is an ascending at- finally, personal beings, whose being is
traction to God and is patterned, as it was their spirit (pneûma).81 Second, there is
previously stated, in the life of the Trinity. the cosmic unity of creation: “Being, as
The emanations inside the Trinity set the active unity, unifies things in themselves
pattern for a chain of being in creation: “in and is unified with God. But we added
the transcendental act of creation, the that it also unifies each thing with all oth-
three persons fulfill the same function in ers of its species.”82
the order of causality as in the life of the But there is more. A second effusion
Trinity”77 Only God truly “is”, and His cre- from the Trinity where God personally
ation is an absolute action in nothingness. gives Himself to the world: deification. By
How this happens is interesting: deification, creatures get re-united with
Creation, then, as an absolute act of God’s personal life and the cycle of divine
God, is a voice of God in nothingness. love gets completed. Deification has two
The logos has a subject: nothingness; specific moments: First, God makes the
and a predicate: the Divine ideas. The nature of a creature —man— the nature of
outcome is clear: nothingness is His own personal being. This is the reality
transformed (if I may be permitted the of Christ in the Incarnation. Second,
expression) into “someone” (subject), through Christ humankind participate
and the ideas are projected onto this their personal life into God’s personal life.
someone making of him a “something” To this, Zubiri calls Sanctification. Even
(predicate). In this way the ontological through deification’s chief object is man,
structure of creation is determined; the whole material creation cannot be
the finite entity is above all a duality completely excluded from this process and
between that it is and what it is.78 somewhat is affected by it. In this way,
This leads to another statement that Zubiri’s panentheism grounds his philo-
is rather obliquely panentheistic and a sophical interpretation of Christian and
quotation of Acts 17:28, a locus classicus Roman Catholic doctrine.
of many panentheists: Thus, in “God and Deification” we
have a Neoplatonic theology which is
Thus it is clear how, without blurring
strongly immanentistic and, in the opinion
the distinction between God and crea-
tures, everything there is in them of of this writer, even panentheistic. God is
positive being is owing to the presence viewed as effusive love and the Trinity is
of God in them. If, dealing with finite His life as emanations or “effusions” of his
causality, the action of the agent is love. Outside Trinity, God’s love emanates
received in the patient, then in re- or effuses in two ways. Naturally, in crea-
gards to the creator-actor the patient tion by effusing or emanating a hierarchy
and its passivity only exist due to their of beings which remain ontologically
presence in the agent. We are, we linked to God’s transcendental reality.
move, and we live in Him, St. Paul will Supernaturally, by “deifying” His whole
say, probably repeating a formula al- creation by a personal Incarnation in
ready current in his day.79 Christ and sanctification by grace for hu-
manity. Deification is a way for creation to
Zubiri now works the consequences of
return to God’s intimate life.
his panentheism. First, there is an elabo-
rate, Neoplatonic chain of beings, “the Summary
ontological hierarchy of beings according
to their greater or lesser formal perfec- In Nature, History, God Zubiri offers a
tion.”80 This hierarchy has three orders in fairly complete account of his theology.
the material realm: bodies (soma), whose God is the ground of all beings and the
being is its light (phos); then the living ultimate transcendental reality. All things
the eyes of Zubiri, all of them fail. First, ond, it is a supreme reality. But here
because they are reductionistic: these ar- Zubiri makes an interesting point, which
guments do not consider man as a whole, would echo the Neoplatonists and Jakob
but just a portion of him (intelligence, will, Böhme: God is a supreme reality but not a
feelings). Second, these arguments pre- supreme being. God is beyond being.100
suppose a certain kind of dualism: “the Third, God is an “absolutely absolute reali-
truth” against “other truths” in Augustine; ty”. The experience of religation is enig-
the categorical will against all other voli- matic because it offers an idea of God but
tions in Kant; the feeling of dependence immediately poses the question: Does
against all other feelings in Schelierma- such reality exists? Zubiri now goes to
cher. Third, the arguments require oppos- justify the reality of God’s existence.
ing and distinguishing man from cosmos;
man is considered as very different, to the Zubiri’s Justification of God’s Reality
point of opposition, to the world. But this How can we say that God exists,
is false because man is in the world. It is then? Zubiri does so by resorting to a
an “impossible antithesis”.93 How, then, phenomenological epokhé, that is, the
can we arrive to God? suspension of judgment about the exist-
In order to arrive to God, Zubiri turns ence or nonexistence of the phenomena
to the now familiar phenomenological de- and the exclusion of any factual data or
vice of religation. Religation is the ontologi- anything that would prevent the appre-
cal link of the whole human existence to hension of the phenomena while fully de-
the power of the real. “Religation is not scribing them,101 starting from his view of
mere linking or sentiment of dependence, religation. He builds a “justification” of
but the constitutive and formal turning God’s existence, which in fact is an expla-
towards the power of the real as funda- nation of God’s existence analogous to an
ment of my personal life.”94 Religation is argument or demonstration.102 Thus, one
thus the very root of the human being.95 can think of Zubiri’s justification of God as
This might appear to be just another a via phenomenologica, or phenomenologi-
anthropological way, but Zubiri claims this cal argument for God even though it may
is not the case. Religation is not a merely not be strictly a syllogistic argument. It is
anthropological phenomenon. It is the very a long series of concatenated conclusions
structure where the power of the real hap- where another key feature of Zubirian
pens.96 Religation is anthropological, cos- thought makes its appearance: sentient
mological and ontological in character. intelligence.103
“From this follows that religation is not Reality is apprehended in two differ-
something human in contradistinction to ent, yet simultaneous, moments. First, the
the cosmic, but the very occurrence of all mind apprehends the quality of the thing
reality in man and of man in reality.”97 In (a thing is red, heavy, etc.) and second, the
religation, the power of the real shows mind has a distinct impression of the real-
itself as something ultimate, possibilitat- ity of the thing. Now, “[s]ince to apprehend
ing, and impelling. This is a key feature of reality is intelligence, and to have impres-
Zubirian cosmology and his phenomeno- sions is sensing, it follows that the intel-
logical constitution of reality towards lective apprehension of man is sentient:
God.98 The significance of this concept is his intelligence is a sentient intelli-
such that Cescon would write in 2007, gence.”104
“the Zubirian concept of ‘religation’ repre- Man has a sentient living in reality.
sents the superseding of Thomism and the His life consists in acts made within reality
introduction of existentialism in Spain.” 99 and this constitutes him as a person.
Religation provides an idea of God When man acts, he does more than merely
based on three points. First, God is the perform an action; he is slowly actualizing
foundation of the power of the real. Sec-
and building his Self, his person.105 “Man of reality itself where things understood as
is a substantive reality and the Self con- real “more” than the things themselves?
sists formally in the actualization of this Zubiri explains this maintaining that each
reality in the world”.106 Due to this actual- thing is a vehicle of a character and power
ization, the Self can stand in front of any that is not exhausted in the concrete
reality and is thus an “ab-solute” being. things, but surpasses them.
However, the Self, which is absolute, is But this is not clear by any means,
also acquired; and due to this tension, and this unclearness comes from things
man only a “relatively absolute” being, and themselves. This is the “enigma” of reality;
is radically restless in life. Man’s personal reality is constitutively enigmatic. Because
life then, is a process of actualization of of this, we are religated to the power of the
the Self, which is a relatively absolute be- real in an enigmatic way. The enigma of
ing. reality makes us restless because in every
Man’s person is constituted in respect action, man feels a double question: “What
to reality; reality is a constituting respectiv- is going to become of me, of my absolute
ity of the human person as long as the being? And, What am I going to make of
person is with the things. Since this is myself since I am making that being?”110
what constitutes the human person, the The power of the real throws intelligence
reality is ultimate. Moreover, since reality towards this enigma, and makes intelli-
is what enables the human to be his Self, gence aware of the radical foundation of
reality is also possibilitating. Man’s reality each real thing in religation. “Religation is
is then constantly in the making; and religation to reality in its enigma.”111 The
since reality impels (moves, drives to) man root of this enigma is that the power of the
to actualize his Self, reality is also impel- real is grounded in reality itself; but this
ling. This reality dominates with its power, reality is beyond each concrete thing in
but this dominance is not the result of itself. There is another reality which
physical force, but it makes us physically grounds “the” reality; and since this reality
aware of this reality. Thus, religation phys- determines my relatively absolute being, it
ically determines man’s absolute being. must be an absolutely absolutely reality.
Reality is “what makes me be I”.107 Zubiri identifies this absolutely absolute
What is reality, then? It’s not some- reality with God.112
thing like a sea that bathes or submerges The power of the real can be found in
things. Reality is a character of things; but the concrete reality of each thing. Since
the reality of things exceeds their being. the power of the real is God as an abso-
“The impression of reality is physically lutely absolute reality, He “is present for-
transcendental to each thing. Because of mally in things constituting them as re-
this, real things have the power of deter- al”113 Thus, the relationship God-world is
mining my relatively absolute being.”108 In panentheistic:
each thing we infer that being real is more The presence of God in real things is
than being this or that. Each thing, in primarily that of a formal character.
reality, determines the power of the real God is not primarily present in real
and the ontological link to reality mani- things as the cause is in its effect, but
fested as religation, and determines the is present constituting them formally
absolute being of man. The “more” present as real. The possible effective causa-
in each thing constitutes the power of the tion of God with respect to things is
real and determines human personality.109 an ulterior interpretation required by
The power of the real is based on the something prior: by the formal pres-
“strange unity” between what a thing is ence of God in things. And this pres-
concretely and the moment where being ence consists in the fact that the reali-
real is being “more”. What is this character
2. Things are a seat of God’s Once he worked out the details of his
immanent presence and this gives phenomenological-transcendental variety
them “deity”. of panentheism, Zubiri offers a view of
God’s reality in two stages: first, he deals
3. Finally, man accesses this reality with characters dealing with God consid-
by the phenomenological device of ered in Himself and then he considers
religation. some aspects of the God-world relation-
In Zubiri’s own words: ship.
God regarded as God is the absolutely a) God considered in Himself
absolute reality as ultimateness, pos-
sibilitation and impellence, formally Zubiri starts by stating that God is
present in real things and constituting the “absolutely absolute” reality: “an abso-
their reality. That reality is eo ipso dei- lutely absolute reality is the reality, which
ty and manifestation of God, not in a is “in and by itself” full and absolute reali-
general and abstract way, but in all ty considered as reality.”131 This does not
the concretion history reveals to us. mean, however, that God is the highest
Such is the reality of God, justified by Being, or the classical theistic notion that
the way of religation.126 identifies God’s essence with His exist-
ence. The reason is that God’s existence is
c) God as Ground of the Human Self and fundamentally different to any other exist-
The Reality ence of real things. God is “a reality, which
By the link of religation, God is the through elevation is not only above and
ground of any reality and specifically of beyond the difference of essence and exist-
human life; He is the reality-ground. As ence, but also above and beyond its al-
such, God grounds human freedom, the leged identity.”132 God’s metaphysical es-
course of human life and the execution of sence of God is to be an absolutely abso-
human actions.127 However, Zubiri is ad- lute reality, and the identity of essence
amant in maintaining the distinction be- and existence in God are consequential to
tween God and man but the core of this this, and not the reverse.
distinction stems from his panentheistic Since this absolutely absolute reality
view of God: “precisely because man is not is one and unique, the world is one and
God, it is God who is making that man not unique and its foundation, i.e., God, is
also one and unique. Because of this, In God, to my way of thinking, per-
Zubiri regards any polytheism as meta- sonhood is not consequent upon sub-
physically impossible. The unicity belongs stantive reality nor upon His life, but
to God as a transnumerical character. The is the very principle of it. Intelligence
absolutely absolute reality (God) cannot be and volition are the way of being abso-
one because there are no other similar lutely His-own, the way of realizing
realities; God is one because the absolute- Himself with respect to what He al-
ly absolute reality is absolutely one in and ready is as person. This clearly shows
of itself. that, in God, intelligence and volition
Besides being one, God is also a con- are necessary intrinsic moments of
crete reality, an absolutely concrete reality. His substantive reality. The His-
This concretion manifests in a personal ownness (suidad) is the fundament of
reality: “In His absolute concretion, God is life, and life is the fundament of intel-
essentially personal.”133 Moreover, it is a ligence and volition.136
dynamic reality. “Dynamic” does not In summary, Zubiri ascribes the fol-
means here that God is subject to a devel- lowing characters to God when considered
opment process as in Hegelian thought or in Himself: absolutely absolute reality,
process philosophy; “Dynamism is neither unicity, uniqueness, concreteness, dyna-
action nor operation; to my way of think- mism (in the sense of actuality, not devel-
ing, it is what I have called ‘giving of one- opment), personhood, life, intelligence and
self’“ 134 and “the divine life is not a be- will. It is fair, thus, to conclude that
coming”.135 Dynamism means here the Zubiri’s inner picture of God is fairly clas-
self-possession of the reality in itself; and sical and roughly consistent with classical
for Zubiri this is the essence of life itself. theism.
Thus, God as an absolutely absolute reali-
b) God Considered in Respect to
ty implies His aseity, His self-actuality,
Real Things and the World
and therefore He is Absolute Life in Him-
self. To put it in other words, God is an Zubiri understands God’s relation to
absolutely absolute reality, and thus He is real things as a panentheistic relationship.
a personal reality, and therefore He is a God is the grounding reality or realitas
living reality. fundamentalis.137 However, God as an ab-
God’s self-actuality is above all an ac- solutely absolute reality is independent of
tuality in the sense of presentation of real- things. We cannot know God effectively in
ity to Himself and thus, God’s self- Himself, but only as a ground and founda-
actualization is also His intelligence. Since tion of real things.138 However, Zubiri
this intelligent self-actuality is self- seems to imply that the God-things rela-
possession, it is also fruition in the full- tionship is different from a typical World-
ness of His own reality. Because of this, Soul relationship:
God’s self-actuality considered as self- God is not grounding things as a kind
possession is also God’s will. Therefore, of spirit underlying them; this would
God’s self actualization is in fact the key to be an absurd animism. God is
God’s intelligent and rational life. Note that grounding things as an absolute self-
when speaking about God, Zubiri inverts giving. To ground is to self-give.139
the chain of faculties in human psycholo- Zubiri then specifies the relationship
gy: Intelligence and will are moments of God-things among panentheistic lines. The
God’s life, which in turn is a consequence formal presence of God in things is intrin-
of His personhood, which in turn is a sic to real things, to the point that there is
grounding principle of God’s metaphysical no physical or metaphysical separation
reality: among God and things; but there is a real
distinction between God and things. For
Zubiri, this is God’s “transcendence”: “This of God in the world is neither remote-
characteristic, according to which God is ness nor identity.142
present in things with a formal and intrin- Consequently, Zubiri also denies
sic presence, yet things are not God, is God’s identity with the world and God’s
precisely what I call the transcendence of absence from it as it would be in deism or
God “in” reality.” God is not transcendent agnosticism; and the relationship between
to things; God is transcendent in things: God and the world is also a classic state-
ment of panentheism:
The transcendence of God does not God is simply transcendent “in” the
consist in being beyond things, but world. The fundamentality of God is
the other way around. Transcendence the worldly transcendence of God. The
is precisely a mode of being in them, world formally carries God in itself.143
that mode in accordance with which
God’s presence in things is not only
they could not be real in any sense,
formal and intrinsic, but also a constitut-
unless they formally included in their
ing presence. God makes things real and
reality the reality of God, without this
thus God, as an absolutely absolute reality
in any sense making God identical to
the reality of things.140 is a fountain-ality of reality; God is realitas
fontanalis.
Zubiri thinks that by applying his For Zubiri, then, God is an absolutely
concept of “transcendence” he can avoid absolute reality, concrete, personal, living,
both extremes of pantheism and deism or intelligent and willing, the power of the
agnosticism. He denies pantheism because real, the ultimate, possibilitating and im-
God’s being “in” things is also is an alteri- pelling reality, and the ground of religa-
fying (or other-ifying) “in” and thus an tion.
identity between God and things would be
impossible. He also denies deism and ag- Summary
nosticism, i.e., stating that God is absent
from things, because things without God In Man and God, Zubiri develops an
would not be real. “The transcendence of impressive feat: expound a coherent natu-
God is neither identity nor remoteness, ral theology where he develops a transcen-
but transcendence in things.”141 dental view of God that is yet compatible
to standard Roman Catholic doctrine. Us-
The panentheism of Zubiri is rein- ing religation as a key phenomenological
forced by universalizing the statements device, he embarks in an explanation or
with respect to things to the world. Things justification of the reality of God via a
in reality have the attribute of respectivity, phenomenological epokhé or analysis. He
and the unit of respectivity is the world. finds God as the ground of all reality, the
Therefore, anything that can be predicated foundation of the power of the real, an
of the God-things relationship can be said absolutely absolute reality that is ultimate,
also of the God-world relationship: possibilitating and impelling. In Himself
He is one, personal, living, intelligent and
willing; and with respect of the world He is
Hence, the formal and transcendent
the ground of all reality. God is ontologi-
presence of God in things is a pres-
cally linked to the world as a transcenden-
ence in the whole world as such. God
tal personal power, grounding and giving
is transcendent in things, and be-
Being to all reality.
cause of this He is transcendent in
A comparison of Zubiri’s theology in
the world. Indeed, for the same reason
Man and God with the theology developed
that the transcendence of God is not
in Nature, History, God shows that Zubiri’s
identity or remoteness, the presence
theology is now more complete, with
themes that were previously hinted now There are places in both Nature, History,
fully developed (i.e., religation). Despite the God and Man and God where Zubiri
span of almost forty years between these speaks not only of God’s presence in the
two books, the coherence of thought be- world, but also of the world in God.144 In
tween the ideas in both books is remarka- view of this evidence, this study concludes
ble. that there is a panentheism in the theolo-
gy of Xavier Zubiri.
2. Conclusions Zubiri strongly affirms the immanence
of God in the world at an extent that bor-
After considering the distinctive fea-
ders on pantheism. In “God and Deifica-
tures of Zubiri’s theology in both Nature,
tion” he maintains that a necessary con-
History, God and Man and God, the re-
sequence of the chain of being is the cos-
markable uniformity and conceptual co-
mic unity of creation and the unity of be-
herence between two works that are sepa-
ing and God (who Himself is beyond be-
rated by a time span of roughly four dec-
ing). Religation guarantees this ontological
ades is nothing short of remarkable. There
link of immanence.
are developments, of course, such as the
At the same time, Zubiri denies em-
concept of the power of the real; but the
phatically that his view of the God-world
key concepts such as religation, deity, and
relationship should be considered as pan-
the phenomenological epokhé as a method
theism;145 that is, he denies that the God-
to access God’s reality show an amazing
world relationship should be understood
continuity. Nevertheless, there is a refine-
as an identity. Zubiri denies such identity
ment of concepts and themes in the latter
and instead maintains a distinction be-
work. By Man and God, Zubiri shows his
tween God and the world. Furthermore,
theology as one of the pillars of his
the necessary character of the unity of
thought, and a powerful contribution to
God and the world should not be extended
philosophy in itself.
to the act of creation itself. Once created,
This study shall conclude by first ex-
the cosmic unity of being and God is nec-
amining the issue of whether there is a
essary; but creation itself is contingent
panentheism in Zubiri’s theology; second,
because it is the product of God’s freedom.
by considering whether this panentheism
A good summary of the God-world re-
could be described as a transcendental
lationship in Zubiri is provided by Antonio
panentheism; third, by contrasting the
González, who does so while managing to
peculiar aspects of Zubiri’s panentheism
avoid the use of the term “panentheism”.
against Cooper’s 5-point matrix; and then
a final evaluation will be attempted. This means then that God is not seg-
regated from the world, and the ac-
There Is a Panentheism in Zubiri’s theology cess to Him is not, then, a fleeing from
the world, but a deepening in the real-
There is no doubt that Zubiri’s view of ity of things. This is not pantheism
God is strongly immanentistic, a charac- because God is an absolutely absolute
terization that is common to both panen- reality with respect to the world. But
theism and modern classical theism. Many also it is not possible to maintain that
statements given by Zubiri are consistent God and the world are “two” realities.
with panentheism, but they cannot ex- God and the world are not two, but
clude a strongly immanentistic version of they are not one, neither. It is not
classical theism. God is the power of the about identity or duality, but precisely
real and the ground of all reality. For about transcendence. God is trans-
Zubiri, God is in the world and constitutes cendent “in” things, without being
any and all reality. separated from them. This is what
However, there are other statements Zubiri means when he writes “God
that are consistent with panentheism.
“panentheism” even once despite being a On the other hand, however, Zubiri
term well known because of the Krausist affirms the personal reality of God and
influence in Spain. describes Him as a personal, living, free,
There may be a reason for that. intelligent, and willing reality. Thus,
Corominas points out a little known fact of Zubiri’s God would hardly be the nonper-
Zubiri’s life, his excommunication in 1922 sonal being of non-personal panentheists
for his adherence to Modernism, the Ro- such as Ruether or Tillich.
man Catholic counterpart to Liberal Prot- Therefore, even though he is influ-
estantism who was thoroughly condemned enced by Neoplatonism, it can be main-
by Pope Pius X in his encyclical letter Pas- tained that Zubiri is a personal panenthe-
cendi dominici gregis (1907).151 Zubiri later ist, because for him God is both the
recanted from his Modernist views, but he ground-of-being and an eminently person-
was always suspicious in the eyes of the al reality.
Nationalist-Catholic establishment that Part-whole or relational panentheism
ruled Spain after the Spanish Civil War. Certain types of panentheism main-
As Corominas aptly puts it: tains that the world is part of divine na-
For Zubiri, Modernism was no mere ture while others view the world as a rela-
anecdote. It marked indelibly his life tional correlate of God. For Zubiri, the
and work, somewhat conditioned the world is “in God”. Moreover, creation is an
free expression of his faith, and made emanation from God and things are kept
him adopt a certain restraint up to the in ontological unity with Him.155 However,
end of his days in expressing certain Zubiri still maintains a firm distinction
theses. [Zubiri] wanted to be sure that between God and the world. Thus, Zubiri
everything that he said was orthodox should be regarded as a part-whole panen-
and he was willing to remain silent theist, with some qualification.
before entering again in a conflict with
the Church.152 Voluntary or natural panentheism.
This circumstance may explain why This distinction stems from how different
Zubiri never wanted to identify his theolo- panentheisms have answered the ques-
gy as panentheism: he wanted to avoid tion: “Could God exist without a world?” If
even the slightest suspicion of heresy. But the answer is that the world is a necessity
this is an argument from silence. The real for God, then this panentheism is natural;
answer, of course, is unknown. while if the answer is that God is free and
Personal or ground-of-being panentheism creation is an act of divine freedom, then
For some thinkers, mostly those of the we have a voluntary panentheism.
Neoplatonic tradition, God is the non-
personal Ground of Being. For others, Zubiri’s position on this distinction is
mostly modern and contemporary panen- clear. He maintains inequivocally the at-
theists, God is personal and their panen- tribute of divine freedom and affirms crea-
theism is relational or interpersonal. tion as a product of God’s free agency.
On one hand, Zubiri clearly follows Moreover, Zubiri affirms divine freedoms
the Neoplatonic tradition, and this is clear- explicitly against gnosticism and Ploti-
ly shown in the theology of his essay “Su- nus.156 He does not even hint to the “com-
pernatural Being: God and Deification in patibilist” compromise on divine free-
Pauline Theology”153 God is the ground of dom.157 Therefore, in Zubiri we have a
any and all beings and any and all reality; distinctly voluntary panentheism.158
He is the absolutely absolute reality, the Classical or modern panentheism
ultimate, possibilitating, impelling reality. The final distinction is between a
This would place Zubiri in the ground-of- panentheism that affirms divine omnipo-
being field.154 tence and does not allow for creatures to
affect God, which was the case of classical ology highly original and yet deeply re-
panentheists, or stating that God is affect- spectful of Roman Catholic doctrine.
ed by human action. In the case of Zubiri, Upon careful examination of the rele-
his panentheism is a way to explain how vant texts in both Nature, History, God and
God is the ground of all reality; God affects Man and God, this study finds that the
creatures by the power of the real, but theology of Xavier Zubiri is a transcenden-
creatures do not affect God. Therefore, tal panentheism, mediated by a phenome-
Zubiri’s panentheism is a classical panen- nological device (religation), and character-
theism. ized as implicit, personal ground-of-being,
part-whole, voluntary, and classical.
Final Evaluation Zubiri maintains a personal God, but
The contribution of Xavier Zubiri to modified by a modified Neoplatonic ontolo-
philosophy is of such a significance that gy of “chain of being.”
he could be counted, in all justice and In all, this is the work of a genius, a
without any exaggeration, among the towering mind who despite his physical
greatest philosophical minds of all time. self-exile influenced and still remains in-
His approach to the problem of God shows fluential for much of the current Roman
the breadth and depth of thought in Catholic philosophy and theology, and a
Zubiri, as well as the formulation of a the- significant contribution to the history of
philosophy.
Notes
63 Marta Jiménez Valverde, “La religación en 84 Zubiri, X., El problema filosófico de la histo-
el pensamiento de Xavier Zubiri,” Revista ria de las religiones (Madrid: Alianza Edito-
de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica rial / Sociedad de Estudios y Publicacio-
2, no. 6 (1959): 59-64. nes, 1993). English translation: The Philo-
64 Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del sophical Problem of the History of Religions,
hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 57. trans. Joaquín A. Redondo, 1999 [book on-
line]; accessed 15 April 2014; available
65 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 473ff;
from
Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the
http://www.catholicphilosophy.com/sys-
Philosophers, pp. 45-47.
tmpl/translatorsintro/index.html; Internet.
66 “There is a profound difference, indeed
85 Zubiri, X., El problema teologal del hombre:
almost an opposition, between agape and
Cristianismo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial /
eros. But this opposition always occurs
Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones,
within a common root; it is an opposition of
1997). English translation: Christianity,
direction within the same general line: the
trans. Joaquín A. Redondo, 2001 [book on-
ontological structure of reality.” Zubiri, Na-
line]; accessed 15 April 2014; available
turaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 464.
from
67 Ibid., p. 467-468. http://www.catholicphilosophy.com/sys-
68 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 473. tmpl/translator/index.html; Internet.
69 Ibid., p. 480-481. 86 See Marquínez Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xa-
70 Juan José García, “El poder de lo real en vier Zubiri: Planteamiento del problema de
Xavier Zubiri y su lectura de los padres Dios,” p. 104; Zárraga Olavarría, “Xavier
griegos,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 4 (2002): Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” p. 10, 47.
19-66. 87 See Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal
71 Interestingly, when Moltmann explicitly del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 157-171;
assumes his panentheism in Trinity and Everaldo Cescon, “A “trilogia teologal” de
the Kingdom he also gives credit to Richard Xavier Zubiri: Contribuições e problemas
of St. Victor. “The basis [of Moltmann’s abertos,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9 (2007):
panentheism] is Richard of St. Victor’s doc- p. 114-115.
trine of the Trinity” See Moltmann, Trinidad 88 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 118-121. com-
y Reino de Dios: La doctrina sobre Dios, pare with Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.
chapter 4, note 17 (p. 122). 2 a. 3 resp.
72 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 486. 89 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 121.
73 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 490. 90 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 121-122.
74 Ibid., p. 491. 91 For Duns Scotus’ argument, see Frederick
75 Ibid., p. 493. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols.
(Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1946-
76 See ibid., p. 493, 496. 1975; New York: Doubleday, 1994), vol. 2
77 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 495. chap. 48 No. 3, pp. 520-523; Julián Ma-
78 Ibid., p. 496. rías, Historia de la Filosofía, 21st ed. (Ma-
drid: Revista de Occidente, 1969), III, 10,
79 Ibid., p. 497. Emphasis of this author.
A), p. 173; Carlo Balic, “Scotism,” in Sa-
80 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 497. cramentum Mundi, vol. 6 (London: Burn &
81 Ibid., p. 499. Oates, 1968), 52-54; Johannes Hirschber-
82 Ibid., p. 501. ger, Historia de la Filosofía, 3rd ed., trans.
Luis Martínez Gómez, 2 vols. (Barcelona:
83 See Ignacio Ellacuría, “Presentation”, in
Herder, 1968), vol. I, p. 431; “Duns Escoto
Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. i-x; Marquínez
(Juan)” in José Ferrater Mora, Diccionario
Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri: Plan-
de filosofía, 5th ed., 2 vols. (Buenos Aires:
teamiento del problema de Dios”; García,
Editorial Sudamericana, 1965), vol.1 , pp.
“Inteligencia sentiente, reidad, Dios,” p. 17.
488-490; Michele Federico Sciacca, Historia
de la Filosofía, 3rd ed., trans. Adolfo Muñoz
Alonso and Juan José Ruiz Cuevas (Barce- la filosofía contemporánea hasta los pro-
lona: Luis Miracle, Editor, 1958), pp. 254- blemas actuales, 2nd ed., trans. Claudio
255. Matons Rossi and Juan José Ruiz Cuevas
92 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 123. (Barcelona: Luis Miracle, Editor, 1956),
IV, 2 (p. 143); Marías, Historia de la Filoso-
93 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 126.
fía, p. 398-399.
94 Ibid., p.128. See also Melero Martínez, “El
102 See García, “Legitimidad de las opciones
problema teologal del hombre en Xavier
no teístas en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri.”
Zubiri,” p. 171-202.
103 For a concise explanation of the concept,
95 Even though Zubiri appears to reject cos-
see Fowler, “Introduction to the Philoso-
mological arguments —based on an out-
phy of Xavier Zubiri,” p. 10-13.
dated notion of causality— in favor of a
phenomenological approach based on reli- 104 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 135.
gation to the power of the real, some have 105 Ibid., p. 136.
argued that the power of the real in Zubiri 106 Ibid., p. 136.
is just another notion of causality; see
107 Ibid., p. 140.
Thomas B. Fowler, “Causality and Personal
Causality in the Philosophy of Xavier 108 Ibid., p. 141.
Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 10 (2008): 109 José Antonio Hernanz Moral, “La consti-
91-112. On the other hand, Antonio Gon- tución del orden transcendental en la me-
zález points out that in one of his minor tafísica de Xavier Zubiri,” Estudios Lati-
writings, Zubiri appears to have endorsed a noamericanos, nos. 14-15 (2004): 5-23.
cosmological argument for God; see Anto- For the place of the transcendental in the
nio González, “La vía cósmica hacia Dios metaphysics of Zubiri see Basabe Martín,
según Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Re- “La metafísica realista de Xavier Zubiri”;
view 7 (2005): 91-107. Roberto Hernáez Rubio, “El realismo sis-
96 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 129. témico de Xavier Zubiri” (PhD diss., Uni-
versidad del País Vasco, 1995), p. 69-83.
97 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 129.
110 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 146.
98 See also the characterization of religation
offered by Jesús Conill-Sancho, “«La voz de 111 Ibid., p. 80.
la conciencia». La conexión noológica de 112 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 147.
moralidad y religiosidad en Zubiri,” Isego- 113 Ibid., p. 148.
ría, no. 40 (2009): p. 124. For the power of
the real, see García, “El poder de lo real en 114 Ibid., p. 148. Emphasis in the original.
Xavier Zubiri y su lectura de los padres 115 Ibid., p. 149. Emphasis of this writer.
griegos,” p. 25-38. 116 Ibid., p. 149.
99 See Everaldo Cescon, “A “trilogia teologal” 117 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 149.
de Xavier Zubiri: Contribuições e proble-
118 See Basabe Martín, “La metafísica realista
mas abertos” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9
de Xavier Zubiri,” p. 182-183.
(2007), 113.
119 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 153.
100 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 131.
120 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 154-155.
101 On the epokhé see Diogenes Allen, Philos-
ophy for Understanding Theology (Atlanta: 121 See ibid., Appendix 1, p. 89-91; p. 155-
John Knox Press, 1985), p. 261; Solomon, 156.
Continental Philosophy Since 1750, p. 135- 122 Ibid., p. 154-155.
136; Wolfgang Stegmüller, Corrientes fun- 123 Ibid., p. 155.
damentales de la filosofía actual, with a
124 Ibid., p. 155-156.
foreword by Eugenio Pucciarelli (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Nova, 1967), chap. II, 4 (p. 125 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 156.
117-122); Michele Federico Sciacca, La fi- 126 Ibid., p. 157.
losofía, hoy: De los orígenes románticos de
127 Ibid., p. 161. Zubiri claims that these 148 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of
predicates could be valid for any God, and the Philosophers, “Basic Terms and Dis-
not only for the Christian God. tinctions in Panentheism”, in Chapter I,
128 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 161. pp. 26-30.
129 Ibid., p. 161. 149 Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the
Philosophers, chapter 5, p. 121-122.
130 Ibid., p. 162.
150 Marías, Historia de la Filosofía, p. 325;
131 Ibid., p. 165.
other similar statements at “Krause (Karl
132 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 166; emphasis Christian Friedrich)” in Ferrater Mora,
of the author of this paper. Diccionario de filosofía, vol I, p. 1065-
133 Ibid., p. 168. 1066; Copleston, A History of Philosophy,
134 Ibid., p. 168. vol. 7, p. 146-147; and especially the
Spanish philosophy appendix to
135 Ibid., p. 169. Hirschberger, Historia de la Filosofía, vol.
136 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 170. II, p. 489-492.
137 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 172. 151 See Aubert, “Modernism.”
138 Ibid., p. 173. 152 Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis mo-
139 Ibid., p. 173. dernista,” p. 18.
140 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 175. 153 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 455.
141 Ibid., p. 176. 154 For example see Fowler, “Introduction to
the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” p. 6:
142 Ibid., p. 176.
“[Zubiri] rejects the traditional notion of
143 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 177; emphasis God as a reality object, instead conceiving
from the author of this paper. of Him as a reality fundament or ground”
144 See for example Zubiri, Naturaleza, Histo- (Emphasis of the author of this paper).
ria, Dios, p. 443. Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, 155 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 492-
p. 149. 493, 497.
145 See, for example Zubiri, Naturaleza, Histo- 156 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 493.
ria, Dios, p. 443, 493, 496; Zubiri, El
157 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of
hombre y Dios, p. 175-176.
the Philosophers, p. 29.
146 Antonio González, “La novedad teológica
158 However, see Juan Alejandro Navarrete
de la filosofía de Zubiri,” Revista Latinoa-
Cano, “Materiales para la elaboración de
mericana de Teología 10, no. 30 (1993): p.
una teología de la creación desde Zubiri:
255; for a similar statement see Jesús
Análisis de un párrafo del libro “El pro-
Sáez Cruz, “La causalidad personal: una
blema teologal del hombre: Cristianismo”,”
propuesta zubiriana en diálogo con Mario
Revista realidad, no. 112 (2007): 247-257,
Bunge, parte II,” The Xavier Zubiri Review
who tends towards the necessity of the
11 (2009): p 78.
world from what Zubiri wrote in The Theo-
147 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 141; see also logical Problem of Man: Christianity.
Hernanz Moral, “La constitución del orden
transcendental en la metafísica de Xavier
Zubiri.”
Abstract
Although James J. Gibson (1904-1979) and Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) were never ac-
quainted, the harmony between the two is remarkable: the power of truth, the power of real-
ity holds them. The author is highly critical of authors such as Fodor and Pylyshyn, and he
is in the passionate defense of the positions of Gibson and the ecological psychology, albeit
with important nuances from Zubiri, the Spanish philosopher, disciple of Husserl,
Heidegger and Ortega y Gasset, among others. Perception is direct and not mediated by in-
ferences of any kind, because it is direct at its root: the primordial apprehension of reality.
We perceive in the field of reality, in which we “are” fluently, and where things are among
others: it is the duality of the logos that involves primordial apprehension. The inferences of
Gibson’s critics would approach to this duality, but leaves untouched the primordial ap-
prehension. Our senses considered as perceptual systems “come out” (Gibson) and feel real-
ity directly. That is, human sensing is intellective (Zubiri). Indeed, sentient intelligence is the
other side of intellective sensing. Perceiving is the simplest and best way of knowing (Gib-
son). Although he did not elaborate anything like Zubiri’s logos and reason, our hypothesis
is that his theory of direct perception would approach the primordial apprehension of
Zubiri. The ecological approach to perception is in line with the physical-sentient in Zubiri,
as a “phenomenology” prior to the level of scientific explanation at the level of reason. This
phenomenology can be understood as a philosophical dimension in the context of scientific
psychology. There is nothing like Zubiri’s noology for this joining of philosophy and sci-
ence.Gibson and Zubiri could well be a prelude to a revolution in cognitive sciences. It al-
ways takes time. They are destined to become classics.
Resumen
Aunque James J. Gibson (1904-1979) y Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) no llegaron a cono-
cerse, es asombrosa la sintonía entre ambos: la fuerza de la verdad, la fuerza de la realidad
los sostiene. Contra autores como Fodor y Pylyshyn, el autor es fuertemente crítico y se
sitúa en la defensa apasionada de las posiciones de Gibson y la psicología ecológica, si bien
con importantes matices provenientes del filósofo español, Zubiri, discípulo de Husserl,
Heidegger y Ortega y Gasset, entre otros. La percepción es directa, y no mediada por infe-
rencias de ningún tipo, porque lo es en su raíz: la aprehensión primordial de realidad. Per-
cibimos en el campo de realidad, en el que estamos fluentemente, y donde las cosas están
entre otras: es la dualidad del logos que envuelve la aprehensión primordial. Las inferencias
de los críticos con Gibson apuntan a esta dualidad, pero resbalan sobre la aprehensión
primordial. Nuestros sentidos considerados como sistemas perceptivos “salen afuera” (Gib-
son) y sienten la realidad directamente. Esto es, el sentir humano es intelectivo (Zubiri). Se
supera el origen de todos los dualismos, provenientes de las operaciones de la mente sobre
133
134 Alfonso de la Puerta González-Quevedo
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
las entregas de los sentidos. En su lugar, la inteligencia sentiente es la otra cara del sentir
intelectivo. Percibir es la forma más simple y mejor de conocer (Gibson). Si bien éste no ela-
boró nada parecido al logos y la razón zubirianas, nuestra hipótesis es que su teoría de la
percepción directa “apunta” a la aprehensión primordial de Zubiri. La aproximación ecológica
a la percepción estaría en línea con lo físico-sentiente en Zubiri, como una “fenomenología”
previa al nivel de explicación científica al nivel de la razón. Dicha fenomenología puede en-
tenderse como una dimensión filosófica en el contexto de la psicología científica. Nada como
la noología zubiriana para esta articulación filosofía-ciencia. Gibson y Zubiri, bien podrían
ser el preludio de una revolución en ciencias cognitivas. Esto siempre requiere tiempo. Esta-
rían destinados a convertirse en clásicos.
but something that is situated (this the simplest and best form of knowledge.14
sounds so much like Zubiri). The ambient All this also implies a new theory about
light contains the invariants10 of optical the non-perceptual forms of conscious-
structure that would be directly captured11 ness, such as dreams, hallucinations,
by our perceptual systems. Gibson’s meta- memories, etc. He responds that the visu-
phor states that our senses “go outside” al system that extracts certain invariants15
and directly capture ambient optical distri- from the flow of stimulation can function
bution. Finally, he assigns special im- without the constrictions of that flow while
portance to what he calls the principles of separating later from the stimulation.
reversible occlusion, and the occluding He returns to the idea of affordances
edge. These principles require very little that he earlier introduced in SCPS. We
description, since almost everything ap- might define them as impelling possibilities
pears in their names. Nevertheless, they of stimulation as a function of the struc-
express in condensed form an essential tures and needs of the animal. In the hu-
nucleus of the ecological optics12 of direct man being they include meanings and
perception. In addition, they hold very values. And they are directly perceived.
important consequences for psychology This supposes for him the apex of his eco-
and epistemology. What underlies this is logical optics and a new approach to psy-
that what is seen now and what is seen chology.
from here is specified by the ego, not the
Gibson Seen from Zubiri’s Perspec-
environment. While admitting the percep-
tive16
tion of the ego on the same footing as the
perception of the environment, Gibson Our second17 major hypothesis is that
suggests that the latter perception is time- “ecological” in Gibson is equivalent to the
less, and that the past-present-future dis- physical-sentient in Zubiri. Gibson makes
tinctions are relevant only for the con- it clear he is dealing with an approach
sciousness of the ego. He proposes sur- both to perception and to psychology. To-
mounting the doctrine whereby perception day in cognitive sciences it is said that the
is to be restricted to the present moment, model of mind is determined by the model
and everything else is memory. Perception of perception. I would say that they co-
can extend to past and future because it is determine each other, since perception,
given in time and in movement. Kaplan’s according to Zubiri, is a psycho-organic
experiment of 1969 decisively demonstrat- act. These are the philosophical supposi-
ed, according to Gibson, that we also per- tions of modern science. If the first philos-
ceive things of which we have no sensation ophy fails, the search loses orientation,
at the present moment (hidden), and that and the reception of empirical data is mis-
these things cannot any under circum- placed.18
stances be described as remembered.13 The theories criticized by Gibson use
In accordance with this posing of the the categories of science at the outset.
issue, according to Gibson, the old prob- They begin by conceiving space as physics
lems of the permanence of the object, per- does, as a geometric abstraction that shel-
ceptual constancy, and so many other per- ters bodies, for which we have no sensible
plexing points that for centuries have re- impressions, and continue with light con-
sisted analysis of philosophers and psy- ceived in terms of photons or electromag-
chologists vanish forever like mist. netic waves, passing through receptors
Finally, we can ask how Gibson de- and nerve cells until reaching the postula-
scribes what is postulated as mental repre- tion of inner images. But in the ecological
sentations. For Gibson his theory does not approach, there is no space19 but the me-
rest on itself. It implies a new theory of dium, no radiant but ambient light, no
knowledge in general. “To know” is an physical but ecological optics. Sensations
extension of “to perceive.” To perceive is are merely incidental and the senses are
perceptual systems that extract the infor- Instead, contrariwise, Zubiri tells us
mation in “field simultaneity” of environ- that it is perception that breaks into the
mental optical distribution. There is no unfortunately denoted “subject” and “ob-
transmission, but we enter into direct ject.” Zubiri’s sentient intelligence (or in-
communication with the things we see. tellective sensing), as well as the ecological
Our nerve structures “resound” with them. approach, preserve the unity of the act of
Of course there are no mental representa- perception, becaue perception is direct.
tions in the “inner theatre of conscious- The underlying logic is that of field simul-
ness.” Speaking of the ecological ap- taneity. This is only possible with what
proach, Gibson intends for this to encom- Zubiri calls actuality.
pass all necessary levels through which Actuality does not mean the condition
the study of perception can be broached, of being an act (actuity). The condition of
by which one must begin. It is a question, being an act (actuity) would come from the
hence, of a phenomenology which we see act of Aristotelian potential. It would be
greatly in tune with Zubiri’s realism. The real and effective fullness of being, which
level of scientific reason, let us recall, is in our context we can correlate, among
always something lying beyond.20 other things, with the level of actuations of
Our third major hypothesis consti- things in receptors, with their interactions.
tutes a development of the first: it is the But actuality on the level at which percep-
radical philosophical supposition, con- tion takes place is not the condition of
scious or not, which errs in theories that being an act. Actuality means “being here-
Gibson criticizes, and also in those that and-now present” from the standpoint of
criticize him.21 If perception is conceived oneself because of being real, while em-
as a synthesis of subject and object, we phasizing the “being” of “being here-and-
have dualism right from the outset, and now present.”22 It is something noergic.23
our attempts to free ourselves from it will It apprehends the real, it is intellective,24
be in vain, because the unity of the per- and at the same time something physi-
ceptual act has been lost at the point of cal,25 something sentient. It does not need
departure. We say this because it is im- to come to reality, because it is already
possible to escape a “transmitting” or “pro- situated within it and is “at one,” a situa-
jective” logic. It is what I call “the con- tion of the thing in us, and our being situ-
structivist journey”, with the light rays hit- ated in the thing. This is unity. In reality
ting the objects that reflect them, the it is a question of a co-actuality. The thing
transductions of energy in our interior, the qua perceived and I qua perceiver are in
nerve impulses, sensory organization, and the same act of perception. This is unity. It
the construction of the terminal image in is also unity of what is intentional (intelli-
the “theatre of consciousness,” where, to gence or nous) and what is physical (ergon)
be sure, the homunculus will be necessary in the noergic part of actuality. Sentient
or—but which, in the final analysis, would intelligence is no longer merely intentional.
be a more sophisticated version of the The dualism sensing/making intelligible,
same fallacy, according to Gibson—the expressed in psychology as sensation and
neuronal engrams that represent the “psy- perception, and in many other forms, has
chological subject.” As can be seen, this been surmounted.
entire heap of nonsense originates with This means that the actualizations of
the duality of the point of departure. Per- the condition of being an act26 will always
ception would then be irremediably indi- go too far afield27 with respect to the actu-
rect, that is, mediated by mental represen- alizations of actuality.28 Hence, we could
tations, inferences, etc., in sum, by the correlate Gibson’s relationship stimulus
addition of the mind. All this also implies information with Zubiri’s notion of actuali-
inexorably mechanicism and mind-body ty, and the relationship stimulus energy29
dualism. with the state of being an act (actuity), just
as radiant light, measured by the catego- does not perceive the same as a six-year-
ries of physical science, go hand in hand old child, as an adolescent of sixteen, as
with the condition of being an act (actuity), an adult of sixty. Where does the differ-
while ambient light and ecological optics go ence lie? Apparently, the mental struc-
hand in hand with actuality. tures so acquired make the difference.
For the human being, affordances The issue here would be the role that sim-
would be the equivalent of Zubiri’s idea of ple apprehensions play, the roll through
the meaning-thing, which would go unreality, in Zubiri, in perceptual learning,
“mounted” atop the reality-thing. We are in the sense that we have remarked about
on the level of socio-cultural symbolic Piaget. Though Gibson concerned himself
meanings, which in Zubiri is given in the to a degree about the theme of learning in
logos. Let us recall that they are neither his first book PVW, usually insists stub-
physical nor phenomenal, but ecological. bornly that there is no enrichment of the
Perception is a psycho-organic act. This input, but that what basically progresses is
leads us to the construct system of human the education of attention and the abililty
substantivity in Zubiri, with its organic to extract the inexhaustible wealth of in-
and physic subsystems. Only from this formation contained in the environmental
standpoint can the dualisms be coherently light of the ambiance. Here Gibson seems
surmounted. In Zubiri co-herence is what to need some important corrections and
is proper to the construct system of hu- qualifications. These would be along the
man substantivity, wherein every note is a lines that, although the origin of all learn-
note-of-all-the-others, co-herent with all of ing is in reality itself—we believe that di-
them; substantivity in Zubiri’s philosophy rect perception, the impassioned intuition
takes the place of substance/subject of in- of Gibson, would point toward primordial
herent properties. Thus what is psychic or apprehension30 as understood by Zubiri—
mental and what is organic are only sub- nonetheless not everything is simply a
systems without substantivity. Only the question of progress of attention. Or at
human being as a system has constitu- least the latter would have to be grounded
tional sufficiency, which defines substan- on the duality of the logos: simple appre-
tivity. Thus everything organic is psychic hensions play a role, although ultimately
and everything psychic is organic. What is they must be realized in what is primordi-
psychic would be our turn toward reality. ally apprehended. And in perceptual learn-
Co-herence surmounts the dualisms be- ing, acquired mentality, constituted by the
cause only in it is there system, that is, building of cerebro-mental structures as
unity. Piaget shows, would have to play a role
In intimate connection with what has and would correspond to the gradual im-
already been said, in Zubiri would there be provement of those simple apprehensions.
no mental representations and this would We will consider this at greater length be-
harmonize with the alternative that Gibson low. But before that we will characterize
offers to non-perceptual psychic phenom- the two important positions.
ena: dreams, hallucinations, memories… Let us follow a symbolism, inspired in
There exist, though, some critical ob- Gestalt psychology,31 and consider the
servations to make of Gibson from Zubiri’s figure-ground dichotomy. The concrete
standpoint. Let us focus on perceptual discussion is going to play the role of the
learning. We call to mind the stages of the figure; and Gibson and Zubiri’s opposition
development of intelligence according to to—let us say—the dominant ideology in
Piaget, which involve an entire perceptual the fields of psychology and philosophy in
learning, as a function of different mentali- respect to the problem of our concerns, is
ties or mental structures that the child going to play the role of the background.
has been building in his interaction with We pretend, then, that the contrast be-
the world. It is obvious that a newborn tween figure and ground offers us a depth
dimension perspective of our question by controversy that has been endlessly de-
the lines connecting them. Let us start bated by philosophers and scientists.34 We
with the ground of our two opposing men- note that, in his way, Zubiri tries to an-
talities: swer it throughout his last work, the trilo-
gy on sentient intelligence, which retro-
The two positions
spectively illuminates all his former work,
Let us start with Fodor and Pylyshyn’s and thereby also illuminates our question.
famous article (1981, see bibliography) in According to Zubiri, the origin of much of
which they think they have argued strong- Western philosophy’s dualisms comes in
ly that there will not be a Gibsonian revo- no small measure from the dualism be-
lution in cognitive psychology. In contrast tween sensing and intellection. However,
to this view our modest study is pointing this trilogy forcefully establishes that,
in the same direction as the words of the though sensing and intellection are for-
great neurologist Edelman: mally distinct, human sensing, unlike an-
imal sensing, is intellective35. Or, what is
But I must also add that the cognitive
the same, intellective knowing is sentient.
enterprise rests on a set of unex-
amined assumptions. One of its most The problems that have crystallized as a
curious deficiencies is that it makes result of this confusion are called by
only marginal reference to the biologi- Zubiri logification of intellection and the
cal foundations that underlie the congeneric entification of reality,36 to which
mechanisms it purports to explain. we alluded earlier. When Gibson charac-
The result is a scientific deviation as terizes the theories that he criticizes as
great as that of the behaviorism it has theories of perception based on sensation,
attempted to supplant. The critical er- he says that it is a question of “the deliver-
rors underlying this deviation are as ies of the senses to the mind.” Coincidenc-
unperceived by most cognitive scien- es between Gibson and Zubiri are striking.
tist as relativity was before Einstein The latter characterizes this mentality as
and heliocentrism was before Coper- conceiving intelligence, unlike his sentient
nicus.”32 intelligence. In Gibson, all his work, but
very expressively the title of his second
Gibson himself repeatedly expressed simi- book, is fully in line with this: The Senses
lar opinions, saying that the many experi- Considered as Perceptual Systems (SCPS),
ments done by constructivist cognitive not as mere channels of sensation. Gibson
psychology were focused wrongly. He did also dedicated considerable efforts to try-
not say they lack any value, but argued ing to imagine how and why this wrong
that they must be reinterpreted. We be- state of affairs has historically been pro-
lieve, with the disciples of Gibson, authors duced, given its volume. And so back in
of the 1981 work Ecological Laws of per- pre-historic times, there was the projective
ceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and nature of shadows, whether from sunlight
Pylyshyn, that his ecological approach to or fire, and later, the myth of Plato’s cave,
perception is revolutionary, and basically at the origin of Western philosophy, in
correct.33 Why then, this state of errone- which the shadows of objects also project
ous theories, put forth by a significant on the wall of the cave. This is what he
minority? This is not the place to try to calls the “fundamental graphic act,” at
formulate a response to this great and first scribbles, and then drawing and
complex question. Gibson’s disciples cor- paintings on the cave walls, until the in-
rectly point out that the debate between vention of writing, up through the discov-
the position of the Establishment, repre- ery of perspective by Renaissance painters,
sented by Fodor and Pylyshyn at that and the invasion of all kind of representa-
time, and the ecological stance they advo- tions (paintings, photographs, film, televi-
cate, should be considered part of a larger sion, symbols of all kinds in two dimen-
sions, etc.) in modern culture. This secular these concepts as inferred mental
tradition would be at the origin of the pic- structures or processes. Conceptualiz-
ture theory of perception. In modern phi- ing vision along the lines of a camera
losophy and psychology that yielded the obscura is an early instance of this
representational theory of perception, the tendency. More modern examples in-
idea that we perceive through mental im- clude viewing the mind/brain as a tel-
ages in two dimensions (representations), ephone switchboard, a sequential pro-
to which the action of the mind must be cessing computer, or most recently, as
added in order to perceive three dimen- a parallel processing system. Like
sions. It is not that traces of distance and these developments –although per-
depth dimension are not found in stimuli, haps less obviously –mental represen-
but rather that mechanicism in modern tations, now so central to cognitive
culture has produced the pernicious effect theories, are in the first instance, fea-
of the distorting influence of technology in tures of the world…
the popular mind and in a great number of …What the emphasis on mental rep-
scientists. So Gibson is engaged in dis- resentations has succeeded in doing is
mantling one of the biggest fallacies in this to deflect attention away from the role
field: that the image of the retina is trans- that representations as features of our
mitted to the brain. This fallacy may adopt environment play in our daily transac-
tions. In turn, this emphasis on men-
sophisticated ways, but it is the basis of
tal representation has misled us
all conceptions of projective logic we have
about the nature of cognition itself.”38
grouped under the term “constructivist
journey.” But let us focus on what the title of our
epigraph says to try to make a concrete
Even the more sophisticated theory
contribution to the debate. Let us go be-
that the retinal image is transmitted
as signals in the fiber of the optic yond the background problem, and illus-
nerve has the lurking implication of a trate with the figure of a specific problem,
little man in the brain. For these sig- which, by the way, we believe represents
nals must be in code and therefore something nuclear.
have to be decoded; signals are mes-
sages and messages have to be inter- The pickup of information and the in-
preted. In both theories, the eye variants of optical structure (Gibson)/
sends, the nerve transmits, and a recurrences and simple apprehensions
mind or spirit receives. Both theories (Zubiri)
carry the implication of a mind that is This section title expresses something
separate from a body.37 related to—but is not identical with—the
fundamental point of disagreement be-
Let us also quote the eloquent words of the tween the two mentalities,39 focusing espe-
book Ecological Psychology in Context cially on how the article by Fodor and Py-
(Harry Heft, 2001) to illustrate the influ- lyshyn represents the Establishment.40
ence of technology on current theories of Criticism of this article and the prompt
perception and cognition, especially in response of Gibson’s disciples M.T. Tur-
psychology: vey, R.E. Shaw, E.S. Reed and W.M. Mace,
The practice by philosophers and psy- 1981 (see bibliography), are full of im-
chologists of using the idea of repre- portant nuances, some of which we will
sentation to describe an essential fea- discuss. This is where Zubiri comes in.
ture of mind reflects a long-standing While we are unequivocally with Gibson’s
tendency to import as concepts arti- followers in this controversy, we have yet
facts found in the world “into” the to pinpoint why we think that the criticism
black box of the mind, and to use of Fodor and Pylyshyn is understandable
(though we do not agree with it in the portant subtle modifications. And these
end). The Gibsonian position is passionate would come, in our view, following Zubiri,
because it has captured the root of the by the hand of recurrences which inevita-
error of the widespread opposite mentality. bly put our being fluently in reality, and
And it has to do with realism. It is not which, in turn, inexorably require the de-
surprising that one of the major intellec- tour by irreality. It is the irreality of simple
tual roots of Gibson was the radical empir- apprehensions (percepts, ficta46 and con-
icism of William James, albeit mostly cepts), which play a role in all perception.
through his disciple Edwin B. Holt and his Let’s look a little more in detail the issue.
philosophical behaviorism.41 Fodor and It is not that perception is indirect, it
Pylyshyn insist that, however interpreted, is not. To begin we must clarify what we
in the end we will run into the problem of mean by perception. While Zubiri some-
the inevitability of inferences, or mental times uses this term, the term used pref-
representations, or intentionality.42 Let us erably in his most definitive and mature
quote them towards the end of their arti- work, the trilogy on the sentient intelli-
cle: gence, is apprehension. This is also a phil-
osophical context of noology,47 or philoso-
Missing the point about inference,
phy of intellective knowing. Zubiri states
missing the point about mental repre-
that noology (philosophy of intellective
sentations, and missing the point
about intentionality are thus all as- knowing), and metaphysics (philosophy of
pects of missing the same point.43 reality) are strictly congeneric. We cannot
speak of our apprehension of reality with-
What do we think is right in Gibson? He is out necessarily referring to the reality we
right: perception, ultimately,44 is direct. apprehend. Both the charters of intelli-
But it is not only because of that, but be- gence and the charters of reality are in-
cause of the overall coherence of all his volved in the act of apprehension, as
analysis and proposals, and because of hs Zubiri likes to say. This means that man
focus on the ecological approach, which is communicates directly with reality. Moreo-
the right point of departure. Otherwise, as ver, he says:
he used to say, we would be “putting the
cart before the horse”. What fails in Gib- And indeed, by the mere fact of here-
and-now apprehending things as real-
son, and why do we think he needs
ity ... man finds himself inexorably
Zubiri’s critical foundation? 45 We describe
bound to reality. Bound to reality, but
it as follows: the profound truth of his
also, secondly, swollen with reality. So
radical intuition, his defense of a new orig-
swollen, that nothing, not even the ir-
inal model of perception, and the light that
real, falls outside reality. He is bound
this sheds on a new approach to psycholo-
to and swollen with reality, but also
gy, have led him to underestimate the rel- driven by the real, and physically
evance of some arguments of his oppo- dragged along. Now, none of these
nents. These arguments contain portions three characteristics is formally the
of truth, and so are worth more patient distinction between the character of
consideration by him. Of course, the pur- reality and its contents....The distinc-
pose is not to take them literally, but to tion between the character of reality
reinterpret their criticism in a way that, we and its content becomes, in the intel-
think, lends them the attention they de- lective act, something different; it turs
served. In this way they would have been into the creation of the scope, the
able to provide a non-negligible role in the scope of reality, where man will in-
consolidation of his basically correct intui- clude not only the things he actually
tions. We believe that his theory of infor- perceives, but also the things that he
mation pickup in conjunction with his the-
ory of perceptual invariants needs im-
creates. It is the real scope of irreali- sensing. Neither that purely sensible
zation.48 sensing that empiricists talk about,
nor even the intellective sensing of the
We need never “come to reality”, but
impression of reality. Because that
we are already and always installed, irref-
would be to sense; but it would not be
utably, in reality. We are reality, every- to have experience….The integration
thing is reality, and there is nothing that of the irreal, a figuration, into the real,
is not reality. Even the irreal, simple ap- is just this: experience. “51
prehensions, are “really irreal”, they are
reality, although in the form of irreality.49 And he defines perceiving thus:
The human being inexorably forges the Now, testing in this case is not simply
irreal (percepts, ficta and concepts) in or- to capture what I have ahead. This
der to be in reality fluently, because of a would be purely and simply to feel.
functional necessity. The human being But it consists in noticing52 that is ex-
has to make its life; it has to choose be- actly the same. However, to notice is
tween possibilities, freely. This way it also the vulgar manner of expressing what
builds the figure of its substantive being. the Latin verb per-captare means,
And for that it must to rely on things. But from per-caeptio, which is just percep-
for that it needs to recognize them: this is tion….That is the first mode of experi-
where, inevitably, our being fluent in reali- ence: the experience of the sameness
ty cannot consist in mere sensing, in the of a recurring object is precisely what
flow of always-new content in the stream we call the per-caeptio, perception;
of consciousness, to use William James’ this is the direct perception of the
famous expression. If so, Zubiri says, in- sensed, with respect to what is figured
stead of living and making our lives, in recurrence. .... In this sense, expe-
choosing between options, and relying on rience is the experience of sameness53,
things, “we would just let ourselves live.” not in an incidental way, but formally.
With reference to psychologists, let us Perhaps psychologists would disagree
mention the classically so-called perceptu- with that, but I would argue with
al constancy, which has to do with what them about it.54
Gibson called the direct pickup of invari-
That is to say, to perceive is an expe-
ants, and what Zubiri called recurrences.50
rience of us, which would put us in the
This is where one can introduce an im-
charters of intelligence, which, as we have
portant nuance. While in some contexts
explained, are the charters of our sensing,
Zubiri used the terms apprehension and
which is an intellective sensing. What does
perception interchangeably, there is a dif-
it mean to say that it is our experience,
ference between the two in his work. In his
although an immediate experience? It
course, published as a book, Man, the Real
means that to make our life, to choose
and the Unreal (HRI), Zubiri does study
among possibilities, we approach things,
perception, and characterizes it as percep-
in the recurrences, figuring out what they
tual experience. Before doing so, he ex-
would be, and integrating our figuration
plores the meaning of experience, distin-
(the irreal) into the moment of primordial
guishing up to five meanings. Finally he
apprehension of the directly sensed. Our
defines the one we are interested in here
simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta55and
thus:
concepts) ultimately come from our experi-
Experience is constitutive and formal ence with reality. They constitute that
testing, testing if things indeed are or which earlier in this paper—recalling Pia-
are not as we have esteemed them— get’s, theories—I have called the “mentality
and not by reasoning, but precisely by gained mentality by an ‘experienced’ per-
immediate contact with them….For ceiver,” that mentality with which things
this reason experience is not mere are perceived; it may not be the same as
ness. Admirable, but no doubt there are of other things. We do not have the same
“two things in one” in the “starting point,” appearance when dressed in a particular
two realities, analytically distinguishable, way, or hair arranged in a certain way,
but not separate, because they are in the than we do in other ways. And, as an es-
same sentient act. Here we have the duali- sential part of the field of reality, we are as
ty in a unitary act of direct perception. We midfield; as we said the perceived in and
give the name “apprehension” to this direct the perceiver are inseparable in apprehen-
communication with reality, unmediated sion. Things have relations (in the lan-
(by mental representations or the like), guage of ecological psychology) or have
and direct in this sense, not indirect, un- respectivities (in the language of Zubiri),
mediated. But duality is also at the root. It between them, and between them and
is not, as in Kant, some kind of experience us.64 Finally, Zubiri says, man is the geo-
by synthesis of the perceiver and the per- metrical locus of reality. The first respectiv-
ceived. Rather on the contrary, and in line ities would be integrated into our percep-
with phenomenology,62 Zubiri will say, it is tion. That is, we perceive a thing from the
rather a dis-integration of the poorly- standpoint of other, previously perceived
named “subject” and the poorly-named things, even to form the elemental and
“object”, as already explained. And that is constitutive experience of all perception
because we start from the radical unity of that psychologists call object permanence,
the perceptive act. From the epistemic perceptual constancy. Not only constancy
point of view this unity is prior and more of the who (the individual), but constancy
fundamental than the aforementioned of the what (the species). The perceptual
duality, as we have just expressed. It is experience always carries constitutively
from this phenomenological unity that we inherent the experience of these same-
have called “apprehension,” which puts us nesses. And William James said, according
into direct communication with the real, to Harry Heft, that percepts and concepts
that we can subsequently access either the are continuously melded. And perceiving a
charters of reality or the charters of sen- thing in terms of other previously per-
tient intelligence (that is to say intellective ceived things, we have, according to
sensing; it could also be read as “percep- Zubiri, at once a primordial apprehension
tion”). In our being fluent in reality, with of reality, involved, or encapsulated, as it
different contents streaming, we live mov- were, in the duality alluded to earlier.
ing, even when we seem to be still. In this That is to say, there is the duality of, first,
flow recurrences are inevitable, and ac- the simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta
cording to Zubiri this occurs continuously, and concepts, or the irreality of the char-
viz. the merger or integration of the real ters of intelligence), with, on the other side
and the irreal of our simple apprehensions (but cast or integrated with the above),
(percepts, ficta and concepts). We perceive, what was previously apprehended in pri-
we have the perceptual experience of the mordial apprehension (that is to say, the
new merged with what we recognize. Gib- charters of the reality in which we are in-
son and the ecological psychology speak stalled). Another metaphor to express it
about “persistence and change,” for exam- would be to say that in perception, which
ple, in our locomotion. We perceive when is always direct and unitary, a root, a pri-
we recognize, or when we capture what mordial apprehension of reality, is always
remains and does not change in the mid- given; although this root is displayed un-
dle of changes (as Gibson would say), or folding in certain branches (which Zubiri
(as Zubiri says) one thing from the stand- called the “duality of logos,” because one
point of another thing. Zubiri says that in thing is perceived in terms of others) that
the field of reality we perceive a thing are the charters of intelligence: percepts,
among others.63 But we can also say that ficta and concepts.
we perceive one thing from the standpoint
oneself because of being real (while ac- of overcoming the insurmountable dichot-
centing the “being here-and-now” of “being omy, harshly criticized by our two authors,
here-and-now present”). Present to what? and to which both proposed solid solu-
It depends on the context, on what you tions. It is—recalling the famous example
consider.68 But in our case, let us think of cited by Gibson in SCPS71—to overcome
our sentient intelligence. And so actuality, the paradox of the two tables of Edding-
translated as “being here-and-now pre- ton.72 One would be the familiar table, on
sent”, communicates directly, in appre- which I study, or I write, or I eat. The oth-
hension, the real as perceived (the being), er is the scientific table, composed of at-
with the sensor, to which it makes pre- oms, molecules, energy. Eddington said,
sent. We put the accent on the being here- according to Gibson, that the table is only
and-now to emphasize the apprehensive “a swarm of atoms,” and that, according to
character of our direct communication physics, the objects that are on it do not
with the real of the environment. As we really touch it; there would be a bom-
said earlier, in this apprehension there are bardment of molecules, and that, in fact,
“two things in one”, although the appre- the familiar table, like “the earthly world of
hension is the unitary root of our direct surfaces, objects, places and events”, is a
and immediate contact with reality. But fiction, because to the world of physics
this root is split into a duality. Or we could only those particles exist. Zubiri has ech-
say that the root continues to a stalk from oed this major problem and has spoken of
which a branch sprouts. That branch the scandal of modern science.73 For many
would be the logos we have mentioned scientists and philosophers sensible quali-
above. And it is in the logos where our ties are subjective:
everyday perception occurs. So we said
If it is an ingenuous realism—and it
that perception is given in the logos “that
is—to make sensible qualities into
involves the primordial apprehension”. We
properties of things outside of percep-
also said that the deployment, or modali- tion, it is an ingenuous subjectivism
zation or reactualization of what was pre- to declare them simply subjective.
viously intelligized (sensed) in primordial Real things are set off in some zone
apprehension, was given “without leaving beyond perception, and everything
the apprehension”. And reason? This is else is put into the zone of the subjec-
another question. tive.74
Reason will be of paramount im-
portance in the study of perception, in the So in our issue of perception, neither
critical foundation of Gibson’s ecological psychologists or physicists, biologists or
approach to perception. To rescue ecologi- physiologists, or philosophers (though it
cal psychology from the margins69 the level depends on whom you ask) know where to
of reason is also primary. For in reason, house the color.75 The scandal is—to men-
yes we escape from apprehension, in the tion another aspect of the same thing—
conceptualization of Zubiri, and we access that science has ignored explanation of
reality in depth, categorized by science. sensible qualities, and does not tell us a
Though the logos enriches the content70 of word about how the physicochemical and
primordial apprehension, maintaining the psycho-physiological processes inside our
same formality of reality, and without leav- bodies produce sensible qualities such as
ing apprehension, in reason, we progress color or sound, or what these qualities in
from the field to the world. Or, if preferred, their formal reality are. Phenomenology
we progress from “reality at the surface merely describes them. Zubiri qualifies as
level” to” reality in depth”. We think this scandalous that what is ignored is what,
latter formulation is clearer to psycholo- in the last analysis, is the foundation of all
gists, scientists and philosophers in gen- real knowledge. This situation is science’s
eral, and for all readers. It has the virtue responsibility, according to Zubiri.76 In the
same vein two young followers of Gibson mind; and we consider that the solution
said as early as 1981: he brings to us is is not only highly solvent
and solid, but fascinating. Stemming from
A good measure of philosophical
remote origins in ancient Greece, the prob-
thinking will be needed just to gener-
lem goes back centuries in modernity. Let
ate the questions about the essential
nature of a knowing agent that theory us recall again the problem of the division
and experiment will address. It is not of sensible qualities into primary and sec-
that the problem is a new one; it is ondary by Descartes and Galileo. From
not. Nevertheless, the problem has of- there it went to other philosophers and
ten been avoided, perhaps because of scientists like Locke. It is interesting to
the apparent recalcitrance of the quote the above authors, Michaels and
problems of purpose and intentionali- Carello, regarding the dualism of “the per-
ty for a science trying to deal with ob- ceiver and the perceived” that represents
servables. the division of the qualities as primary and
secondary mentioned before, dualism that
However, in the face of the seemingly has covered much of the history of philo-
obvious truths that knowing implies sophical and scientific thought:
someone who knows, and that what is
known and how it is known cannot be Perhaps the most fundamental prem-
indifferent to who knows, the time has ise to which we would object is that
come to squarely face these issues. objects have certain properties while
Psychologists who are hesitant to ideas about objects have certain other
tread on this terra incognita or who properties. At issue for us is not so
feel that the ecological psychologists’ much whether the object in the head
“obvious truths” above are misty or (idea) and the object in the world have
spiritual exhortations should recog- different properties, but whether it
nize that similar exhortations have makes sense to consider them as two
been coming from the other side of objects.78
science. Quantum mechanics has its The interesting thing that these au-
own “algorist problems” in trying to thors are telling us here for us is their
understand what it means to observe. brilliant intuition along the lines not just
Shaw and McIntyre (1974) quote of Gibson, but of Zubiri and his primordial
Winger (1970):
apprehension. Not that they or Gibson
…the basic concept in the epistemo- noticed the difference between the primor-
logical structure of physics is the con- dial apprehension and the logos (this is
cept of observation and … psychology one of the main shortcomings of Gibson
is not yet ready for providing concepts and ecological psychology, but fortunately
and idealizations of such precision as we have Zubiri), but they do make a con-
are expected in mathematics or even ceptualization that confronts the dominant
physics. (p.37)77 positions (wrong in their judgment and in
It can be seen that some people are aware ours) based on a direct perception which
of the philosophical problems that under- they do not withdraw, and that in our view
lie modern science, including psychology; points towards Zubiri’s primordial appre-
problems, moreover, that are old and re- hension. And then they make a conceptu-
calcitrant in themselves, which Gibson alization that we see consistent with the
himself said have occupied the most prom- primordial apprehension, where there
inent thinkers of history. We simply say— would be compactly the charters of intelli-
though humbly and modestly—that the gence (or intellective sense) and the char-
Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, is, in ters of reality, in the same being, in the
our view, one of those heads in Gibson’s same sensing, as explained. This is what
makes the question consistent whether it
would make sense to consider two differ- the primordial apprehension appre-
ent objects. According to Zubiri, from this hends reality. The intellection of the
compaction we can try to access either the most poor reality intellectively known
charters of intelligence or the charters of in the primordial apprehension is im-
reality. It is the same spirit in which the mensely richer as intellection than the
above mentioned Scottish philosopher intellection of reality in its ulterior
Thomas Reid expresses himself. But let us modes. It is only as referred to the
return to the topic of reason and to our primordial apprehension of reality
progression, according to Zubiri, from ap- that the ulterior modes are what they
prehension of the logos to the world, mov- are, viz. intellections of the real. It is
ing out of apprehension. I said that the because of this that these ulterior
formulation of the progression from reality modes are just succedaneous.”79
at the surface level to reality in depth, in That is why we say that Gibson is ul-
the context of our article, seems to us timately right about his critics. We think
preferable here, because, among other his stubborn defense of perception as di-
things, it has the potential to connect to- rect and not mediated by mental represen-
gether the two tables of Eddington. Be- tations or any such thing (which Zubiri
cause, of course, there is only one table: says almost in the same terms) points pre-
Gibson would agree. What we perceive first cisely to this fact, that the root of all per-
is the familiar table, which, according to ception, primordial apprehension (but ul-
Zubiri, is not only real, but it is the real teriorly deployed into a duality) makes of
table par excellence. The scientific table perception always something direct and
only represents an enrichment of content, immediate, makes what is perceived a
progressing from reality at the surface presentation and not a representation,80
level of the table (the familiar table), to and makes the basis of all perception a
reality in depth of the table (the scientific direct communication with reality, in
table). We say “real table par excellence,” which we are always irrefutably installed:
because, for Zubiri, as we said, in all per-
ception of reality we can distinguish con- In this apprehension, then, we appre-
tent and formality of reality. All they do, hend the reality of the real impressive-
logos and reason, is to enrich the content, ly.81 For this reason I call it the pri-
maintaining the same formality of reality. mordial apprehension of reality. In it
They are modalizations or re-actualizations the formality of reality is apprehended
of the primordial apprehension of reality directly, and not by way of representa-
(which would occur in the perception of tions or the like. It is apprehended
immediately, not in virtue of other ap-
the familiar table; this perception occurs
prehensive acts or reasoning process-
in the logos, but involving the primordial
es of whatever sort. It is apprehended
apprehension). But of the two aspects,
unitarily; that is, the real, which can
content and formality of reality, the mo-
and does have a great richness and
ment that has primacy is the moment of
variability of content (in general), is in
reality. So Zubiri says that the logos and
its content apprehended unitarily as
reason, ulterior modes of intellection, are formality of reality pro indiviso, so to
successive: speak. Later I shall speak of this con-
It is therein that all of the enrich- tent; for now I refer only to the for-
ments of the intellection of what mality itself of reality. It is in the uni-
something is in reality have to be in- ty of these three aspects (directly,
scribed. Hence, despite its enormous immediately, and unitarily) that the
volume and richness, the intellection fact that the formality of the real is
of the ulterior modes is unutterably apprehended in and through itself
poor with respect to the way in which consists.
In the primordial apprehension of re- suyo83 or “in its own right”. And this be-
ality, the real is apprehended in and gins in the apprehension, since in appre-
through itself. By virtue of being an hension are compactly the charters of in-
apprehension, in it we “are actually” tellective knowing and the charters of real-
in reality itself. And this apprehen- ity, at one and the same time and undivid-
sion is primordial because every other ed, in the co-actuality of a same being
apprehension of reality is constitutive- here-and-now. In the example of the table
ly grounded on this primordial appre- the real starts in the apprehension of the
hension and involves it formally. It is familiar table. From there we can progress,
the impression which primarily and through reason, towards its foundation in
constitutively installs us in the real. the world: photons, electromagnetic waves,
And this is essential. One does not wavelengths, rods and cones in the retina,
have a primordial impression and be- occipital region of the brain,84 etc. The
sides it another apprehension; rather, character of being de suyo or “in its own
what we have is a primordial right”, would be common to all forms of
modalized apprehension which is, at intellective sensing (or sentient intellec-
the same time, in distinct forms. The tion): be it primordial apprehension, logos,
real, apprehended in and through it- or reason (where scientific categories
self, is always the primordial thing would reside). Thus, the colors, or the
and the essential nucleus of every ap-
causal level of functionality in the logos, or
prehension of reality. This is what the
the differential equations of quantum
expression “primordial apprehension
physics, are all be real, not for being here
of reality” signifies.82
or there, but for being what they are, de
Zubiri says that in the issue before suyo or “in their own right”, absolutely
us, perception, the electromagnetic waves, independent of everything else and of all
or photons, do not produce color (because possible apprehender, as a prius, which,
here we would still have two things or a where appropriate, grounds its own ap-
duality) but that the electromagnetic wave prehension and imposes itself with a cer-
of light is the color in perception. There- tain force in the impression of reality. How-
fore, in perception, when we progress from ever in the case of differential equations at
apprehension of the logos to the world (or the level of reason, they must be tested;
the in-depth dimension of reality itself, for though what is tested is not the truth of
example the table), we go from the per- they affirm (it would not be verification,
ceived color to the study of the foundation which is not needed in mathematics) but it
of this reality in the world, that is to say, would be the very presence of the reality
in depth, where we categorize the afore- apprehended in line with the deduced
mentioned foundation in several possible truth.85 All this, as shown, is in perfect
ways. One of them—and very important harmony with Gibson’s ecological ap-
for Zubiri—is the categorization that sci- proach to the psychology of perception.
ence does; therefore we would be proceed- Therefore, since his second book, SCPS,
ing from the perceived color to the wave- he said and emphasized to the various
lengths or photons. All this puts before us students studying perception that scien-
Zubiri’s concept of reality. tific categories were not relevant at this
We have seen that for Zubiri, we do level of study. Therefore he also insisted
not need to reach reality. For Zubiri sensi- that we should “not put the cart before the
ble qualities are real, and, as stated above, horse”. By this he meant not to start with
are part of reality par excellence. Zubiri abstract geometric space, with electro-
does not say that they are real beyond magnetic waves (with the categories of
apprehension. They are real in apprehen- science); as Zubiri says, “at the starting
sion, they are real in perception. Reality is line.” That reality in depth you reach by
not a zone of things. Reality is what is de marching from the apprehension of logos
How would this integration or realiza- tions of the past; or that memory is
tion be? How would these simple appre- actually physiological, not mental,
hensions or gained mentality of an experi- consisting of engrams or traces; or
enced perceiver be in us? Let us recall that that it actually consists of neural
Gibson said that in perceptual learning connections, not engrams; that
there is no enrichment of the input, but a memory is the basis of all learning;
progressive differentiation which is a re- that memory is the basis of habit; that
sult of exploring, and an education of at- memories live on in the unconscious;
tention. In that way Gibson was fighting that heredity is a form of memory;
against classical theories of perception that cultural heredity is another form
based on sensation; Zubiri called these of memory; that any effect of the past
conceptions “conceiving intelligence”. Ex- on the present is memory, including
pressing this in a way similar to that of hysteresis. If we cannot do any better
both authors, we would say that it is to than this, we should stop using the
overcome conceptions that are based on word.89
“the operations of the mind on the delivery Zubiri, in general, did not deal with
of the senses”. It is something that comes memory in his writings. Why? We tend to
from the dualism at the starting point, think that just as—to take one significant
which is superceded by our two authors, example—the word culture hardly appears
who are based on the unity of the percep- in his writings, the word memory, like the
tive act. word culture, would be heavily loaded with
Gibson also disputes that memory connotations that he wished to avoid.
plays some role in perception. With this he Zubiri, however, spoke of the meaning-
was opposed to the theories that conceive thing, which could be considered as a
perception as a series of snapshots which basic ingredient of culture.90 Therefore, we
must then be integrated into a sequence— believe that most likely he would be on
theories which are unable to account for guard regarding the tremendous complica-
motion, either coming from the world, or tion around memory—possibly, we are
from movement of the observer. It would speculating, in a way similar to that ex-
require a continual recalling of appropriate pressed by Gibson here. Let us quote a
representations from memory store. Gib- text that we consider very important in
son is opposed, and Zubiri also, to con- this regard:
ceive memories or memory contents of
thought in the form of representations or ... The brain configures the mind, but
mental images. The issue also has to do the mind also configures the brain.
with the stream of thought of William And just as the psyche does not re-
James and the fact that our perception, is ceive “traces” from the brain, so nei-
ther does the brain have traces of the
not only in motion, but in time. Let us
psyche. For configuring does not
quote them:
mean “impressing traces”, but config-
Because we are led to separate the uring a mode of being and acting in
present from the past, we found our- the field of reality. And this “availabil-
selves in what I have called “the mud- ity” for action is psycho-organic,
dle of memory” (Gibson 1966a)88. We brain-mental. In the brain neither
think that the past ceases to exist un- situation nor memories are deposited,
less it is “preserved” in memory. We but the brain acquires more or less
assume that memory is the bridge be- new “ways of functioning,” which fur-
tween the past and the present. We thermore are not privative of the op-
assume that memories accumulate tion that has determined them.”91
and are stored somewhere; that they
The issue of integration or realization
are images or pictures, or representa-
of simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta
clear, is enough that the reader will not sion; and integration or realization is done
confuse Zubiri’s position with those of on the root of the same apprehension,
Gibson. In EAVP, when summarizing his which is primordial apprehension. Said
Pickup Information Theory, he reviewed The primordial apprehension is the exigent
Traditional Theories of Perception: Input basis of simple apprehensions (percepts,
Processing, and referred, among others102 ficta and concepts) and where they are
to those in which there is the Application integrated or realized. We think these es-
of Memories to the Sensory Inputs, with sential nuances (a paradox!) that Zubiri
which he differed. All of them have to do provides in his trilogy about sentient intel-
with “mental processing of information”, ligence are what the too obvious direct
as it may be read in the title of the section. pickup of information invariants of Gibson
And if there is something characterizing needs. In any case, I must say that the
Gibson’s position, it is opposition to all subject is difficult and requires a thorough
theories consisting in information pro- analysis. Zubiri dedicated two books to it,
cessing. All of them suffer a projective HRI, and the second volume of the trilogy
logic, which our two authors have called on the Sentient Intelligence, IL.
“the operations of the mind on the delivery
Conclusion
of the senses.” All of them are forced to a
model of indirect perception, to the en- In Zubiri perception is a very complex
richment of the sensory input by the mind. phenomenon situated in the logos. Pri-
Let us quote Gibson: mordial apprehension in a pure state
would never be given.104 Nonetheless, it is
The fallacy is to assume that because
constitutively implicated in the logos and,
inputs convey no knowledge, they can
therefore, in every perception. The hypoth-
somehow be made to yield knowledge
esis I suggest is that direct perception in
by “processing” them. Knowledge of
the world must come from some- Gibson would approach primordial appre-
where; the debate is over whether it hension in Zubiri, although Gibson never
comes from stored knowledge, from elaborated anything like Zubiri’s notion of
innate knowledge, or from reason. But logos. The thesis of his critics, that all
all three doctrines beg the question. perception implies some kind of inference,
Knowledge of the world cannot be ex- would approach, on the one hand, the
plained by supposing that knowledge duality of the logos, but, on the other
of the world already exists. All forms hand, leaves untouched the primordial
of cognitive processing imply cognition apprehension that all logos involves. We
so as to account for cognition.103 perceive in the field of reality in which we
are situated in a state of flux. This is con-
While in Zubiri the issue of integration gruent with Gibson’s theory that we per-
or realization of percepts, ficta and con- ceive in motion, in time.105 Gibson’s af-
cepts in what was previously intellectively fordances of things “would contain” their
known in primordial apprehension could sociocultural meanings and would be in
be confused with the stance criticized by tune with Zubiri’s notion of habitude, and
Gibson as The Application of Memories to with the thing-meaning.
the Sensory Inputs, we believe that what Vis-à-vis theories that he criticizes
has already been explained leaves it suffi- and vis-à-vis his critics, Gibson basically
ciently clear that this is something quite is right. The powerful, well-elaborated phi-
different. In Zubiri knowledge of the world losophy of Xavier Zubiri, with which he is
comes from the primordial apprehension, very much in tune, backs him up. This
present in every perception. The simple basically refers to his ecological approach,
apprehensions (percepts, ficta and con- which we describe as phenomenological
cepts) come from the irrealization of a con- and prior to the level of scientific explana-
tent apprehended in primordial apprehen- tion. In this work we understand phenom-
Psychological Review, Vol. 62, Nº6, Cornell MONSERRAT, Javier. 1976. «El rea-
University. lismo zubiriano en el conjunto de una teo-
GONZALEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Antonio. ría crítico-fundamental de la ciencia», en,
1994. “La Tarea de la Filosofía”, cap.3 de Realitas. II, 1974-1975. Sociedad de Estu-
“Un solo mundo. La relevancia de Zubiri dios y Publicaciones. Ed. Labor. Madrid,
para la teoría social”. Tesis doctoral. Facul- pp. 139-202.
tad de Filosofía y Letras. Universidad Pon- MONSERRAT, Javier. 1998. La Per-
tificia Comillas, Madrid. cepción Visual. La arquitectura del psi-
GONZALEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Antonio. quismo desde el enfoque de la percepción
2004. “Ereignis y actualidad”, en Desde visual, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid.
Zubiri, Diego Gracia (editor); Editorial Co- MONSERRAT, Javier.2001. “Engra-
mares, Granada. mas neuronales y teoría de la mente”, en
GONZALEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Antonio. Pensamiento, Vol. 57, Nº 218, pags. 177-
2008. “Las cosas”, en “Zubiri ante Heideg- 211.
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Ricardo Espinoza (eds), Herder, Barcelona. xión fundamental de Zubiri con las cien-
-RACIA, Diego. 2005. “Ciencia y cias humanas” in The Xavier Zubiri Re-
Filosofía”, in The Xavier Zubiri Review, view, vol.7, edited by “The Xavier Zubiri
vol.7, edited by “The Xavier Zubiri Foun- Foundation of North America”, Washing-
dation of North America”, Washington D.C. ton D.C.
GRACIA, Diego. 2014. Zubiri, Treinta MONSERRAT, Javier.2007. “Zubiri
Años Después, Anales de la Real Academia desde la Ciencia Cognitiva”, en Nicolás,
de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, Año LXVI- J.A., Samour, H. (edtrs.), Historia, Ética y
Número 91-Curso Académico 2013-2014. Ciencia. El Impulso Crítico de la Filosofía de
GUEDÁN PÉCKER, V.L. 2001. “La no- Zubiri”, Ed. Comares, Granada.
ción de paradigma y su aplicación a la NAKAYAMA, Ken. 1994. “James J.
psicología”, en Pedro Chacón Fuertes (ed.), Gibson-An Appreciation”, Psychological
Filosofía de la Psicología, Ed. Biblioteca Review, vol.101, Nº 2, 329-335.
Nueva, Madrid. PELEGRINA CETRÁN, Héctor, 2006.
HEFT, Harry. 2001. Ecological Psy- Fundamentos Antropológicos de la Psicopa-
chology in Context, Lawrence Erlbaum As- tología, Edcs. Polifemo, Madrid.
sociates, Inc., Mahwah, NJ. PINTOR-RAMOS, Antonio. 1993. “El
KUHN, Thomas S. 1957. La Revolu- Sentido en Zubiri”, en Antonio Pintor-
ción Copernicana, Ariel, Barcelona, 1996. Ramos, “Realidad y Sentido. Desde una
LOSADA LABRAÑA, Mario. 2009. “La inspiración zubiriana”, Publicaciones Uni-
concepción del conocimiento científico en versidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Sala-
Naturaleza, Historia, Dios: la interpreta- manca.
ción ontológica del principio de indetermi- PINTOR-RAMOS, Antonio. 1996. “Zu-
nación de Heisemberg”, en Zubiri desde el biri (1898-1983)”, Ediciones del Orto, Ma-
siglo XXI, Antonio Pintor-Ramos (Coord.), drid.
Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de PUERTA GONZÁLEZ-QUEVEDO, Al-
Salamanca, Salamanca. fonso de la. 2005. Lectura de J.J. Gibson
MAZÓN, Manuel. 1999. Enfrentamien- desde la Antropología Básica de Zubiri.
to y Actualidad. La Inteligencia en la Filoso- Primeros Materiales de Investigación, tra-
fía de Xavier Zubiri, Estudios 74, Universi- bajo de investigación para el D.E.A. (Di-
dad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid. ploma de Estudios Avanzados), presented
MICHAELS, Claire F and CARELLO, in la Universidad Pontificia Comillas, in
Claudia. 1981. Direct Perception; Prentice- Madrid, June 2005.
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey TURVEY, M.T., SHAW, R.E., REED,
07632. E.S. &MACE, W.M. 1981. “Ecological laws
Notes
1 This article has deliberately many words in repeated endlessly for centuries among phi-
italics. At least once in the text expressions losophers and psychologists
appears in italics that in the work of Gibson 7 See for a grounding of metaphor in cognitive
or of Zubiri have special significance, either sciences, in cognition in general, and in the
by the strong condensation of meaning, for thinking of Zubiri, Cope 2007.
the importance of it, or to make clear im- 8 In note 12 are additional references about
portant distinctions. ecological optics, and in our last long sec-
2 See Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981 or Nakayama, tion, before the conclusion, by the second
1994. third of this writing, "The pickup of infor-
3 The terms "projective or transmitting logic", " mation ..." on the pickup information theory.
field simultaneity" or “constructivist journey” 9 The medium (aerial for us…) in Gibson, to-
have been invented by me, in the sense that I gether with substances, form the environ-
have created them here, from my analysis of ment, and seem to be separated by surfaces.
Gibson from Zubiri standpoint, ignoring if They are ecological.
such expressions have ever come to the mind 10 We deal with the concept of invariants in
of anyone in these contexts, or if they have note 14.
already been used by others (which could 11 The pickup information theory, central in
have happened, but it is not something that I
Gibson’s theory, will account for this, which
know of, even if it were something well
we are only mentioning briefly here. In the
known in general). I am therefore responsible
second half of this article, we discuss in
for its introduction here.
some detail this nuclear and controversial
4The term constructivism in psychology of per- point about Gibson´s theory from Zubiri
ception denotes those theories in which the standpoint—the direct pickup of optical in-
final product of our perception is constructed variant structure.
on the basis of stimuli originating from the 12 The ecological perspective is central to Gib-
outside in our mind. This term holds a very
son’s proposal. Introduced in his second
different meaning in Zubiri and in other con-
book, SCPS, he made further developments
texts.
in his last one, EAVP. Gibson acknowledges
5 PVW: see bibliography that it was nonexistent at the time that he
6 In parallel, we note that criticism of the oppo- created, but he considered it essential for his
site view, the Establishment, such as Fodor new theory. He is aware that, for now, he can
and Pylyshyn, represented in their article in only guess at its main lines. It is very differ-
1981 (see bibliography), said on pg. 194: ent from the classical optics of physical sci-
“Missing the point about inference, missing ence. It is in line with its ecological approach.
the point about mental representations, and And he says it will be interdisciplinary, and
missing the point about intentionality are thus made of contributions from physical optics,
all aspects of missing the same point.” (see lighting engineering, ecology and descriptive
note 44). We think, as do the disciples of geometry. Instead of dealing with radiant
Gibson, expressed in their article written in light, it will deal with ambient light, which we
reply to the previous one of Fodor & Py- discussed. There will be very important con-
lyshyn (Turvey, M.T., Shaw, R.E., Reed, E.S., cepts in it, like ambient optic array, optical
Mace, W.M., 1981), in the final Postscript, structure, optical invariant structure, and its
that the controversy between defenders of culminating concept, the affordances (which
ecological psychology and the article by we see in tune with the concept of habitude
Fodor and Pylyshyn representing the Estab- and meaning-thing in Zubiri). In our thesis,
lishment, is to be positioned in an argument we study a first consideration of light, from
Gibson’s ecological optics. This is in keeping mostly we point to lines of convergence, but
with the theme of ecological approach, and also we examine analytically in detail, to
with the ulterior access to the categories of some extent, some points of special interest.
science at the level of reason. In the case of In general we talk about hypotheses.
light, access to radiant light as energy, and 16 See also, Harry Heft, 2001, pgs. xxii and xiii
its electromagnetic waves, photons, etc. As of the Introduction, among others. Besides,
ambient light is taken with reference to an the author has the power to note that one of
organism; however the radiant light is taken the great problems of modern psychology of
with reference to the universe. (SCPS, p. 13). the scientific field is an inadequate philo-
13 We will discuss later, toward the end, how sophical heritage that permeates many of
these statements have much in tune with the their historical developments: basically a
whole trilogy of Zubiri on the sentient intelli- metaphysics of Cartesian origin, and a phys-
gence (see bibliography: IRE, IL, IRA) ics of Newtonian origin, and, in general, a
14 Gibson tells us that: “The theory of the con- philosophy designed to natural things, not
current awareness of persistence and change for humans, their psychology, their behavior.
requires the assumption of invariants that This is in line with the doctoral thesis that
underlie change of the optic array.” (EAVP, we are developing (Critical Foundations -
pg. 310). He postulates various kinds of in- from Zubiri standpoint- of JJ Gibson´s eco-
variants: “those that underlie change of illu- logical approach to psychology of perception)
mination, those that underlie change of the in which one of the hypotheses to study is
point of observation, those that underlie over- the decisive non empirical component (philo-
lapping samples, and those that underlie a sophical) in theories of perception, both the
local disturbance of structure” (EAVP, pg. ones criticized by Gibson, or the contempo-
310). The theory of extracting invariants by a rary theories, we would say. Of course, deci-
visual system plays the role, Gibson recalls, sive in Gibson: hence our research. In this
of the theories of “constancy”. To illustrate, line (what a coincidence!), Harry Heft argues
we point out some of these invariants within that the intellectual roots of Gibson, being
the different types; for example, the edge of many, are one of the most important in Wil-
the nose, or the horizon, would be invariants liam James, whose radical empiricism has
in line with the mutuality between the ob- been seen in line with the so-called "new re-
server and the environment. The horizon, for alists". Edwin B. Holt, who decisively influ-
example, is an invariant of all optical distri- enced Gibson, is one of them and, according
butions and from all observation points; it is to Harry Heft, through which the influence of
that to which all the optical movements re- William James came to Gibson. Zubiri was
fer. It is neither objective nor subjective. also interested in William James, whose pag-
es The Stream of Thought, chapter nine of his
15 To read this letter, in general, the best and
Principles of Psychology, described as memo-
most convenient, it is a certain familiarity
rable, and the author as genial. We guess
with Zubiri, in addition to Gibson. To a first
there is a great harmony in the characteriza-
approximation to Gibson, we recommend the
tion done by Zubiri in HRI of our "being flu-
website of the Center for the Ecological
ent in reality", with the stream of thought of
Study of Perception and Action (CESPA) be-
William James, as described by Harry Heft.
longing to the University of Connecticut, in
And this coincidence commented by Zubiri in
the US, where there are still some who were
HRI is what has made us better understand
direct disciples of Gibson. For Zubiri we rec-
the distinction, central to his philosophy, be-
ommend the introductions of the website The
tween content and formality of reality. Our
Zubiri Foundation of North America, either in
apprehension flows from one content to an-
English or Spanish. Here one can find the
other, "in reality", in the field of reality. Dif-
online magazine The Zubiri Review. Of
ferent contents are flowing, but all are part
course, if the language of our author is mas-
of the same formality of reality. Our hyper-
tered, the Spanish website is recommended,
formalized neurophysiological structures,
www.zubiri.net, for those able to take ad-
formalize all our apprehensions with the for-
vantage of the joint use of both sites. In this
mality of reality. Hence, in Zubiri, the field
article we have the current limitations, so
will be considered as a means of intellection
(or intellective sensing); that is, considered 19 For Zubiri all space, whether physical or
as a means of perception. This will bring im- geometrical, is to be ultimately referred to
portant consequences. You can also see the real space and to be inscribed in it and not
strong epistemological tensions in the study vice versa. Space is grounded in spacious-
of perception and cognitive sciences in gen- ness as a real property of things, sensed in
eral in Monserrat, Javier, 1998, pgs. 41, 46, primordial apprehension. Physical space and
79 and 105, among others (see bibliography). geometrical space are situated on the level of
17 We gave an exposition of the first hypothesis scientific reason and therefore lie in a status
in the initial lines of our introduction. lying beyond with respect to real space,
which is always something sensed.
18 This statement should be qualified. We follow
here our convictions, influenced by Harry
20 Ulterior is the expression used by Zubiri.
Heft, 2001, who in his pages. 114-119, and 21 See Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981, Nakayama,
169-171, adequately clarifies the issue. In 1994.
the US the influence of the phenomenological 22In intimate connection the theme of being,
tradition in psychology often had mentalist the presence of the real in the world, prior to
connotations. Gibson was identified, though its presence in intellection, and the complex
openly and critically, in the behavioral and theme of the entification of reality and its re-
positivist tradition, namely William James lated logification of knowing, are very im-
line, which made him reject anything with portant, but we cannot enter into these mat-
those mentalist connotations. It was through ters here. Suffice it to say here that the ex-
the disciple of William James, Edwin B. Holt, pression of the latter in psychology would be
that Gibson received this influence, although the duality sensation-perception.
Gibson then drank directly from James´s 23 Noergic is a philosophical neologism of Zubiri
Principles of Psychology, and there is no evi-
that comes from melting two Greek terms:
dence that he was familiar with many of
nous (intelligence) with ergon (activity, work,
James’s writings other than the aforemen-
energy ... it's something physical, and this is
tioned. More inclined to the source of W.
the meaning given by Zubiri).
James than to the Gestalt, from which, how-
ever, he received a strong influence (Koffka, 24 Intellective in Zubiri means that it appre-
Heider), we could say that the phenomeno- hends reality.
logical method of Gibson would come closer 25 Physical in accordance with its meaning in
to the way of Merleau Ponty or Heidegger, ancient philosophy, not what it means in
than to the Husserlian line, which he did not modern science. See General Note in SE.
get to know. Also Langfeld, influenced by 26 The Spanish term used by Zubiri is actuidad.
Carl Stumpf, student of Brentano, and Rob-
ert MacLeod, influenced by David Katz, of
27 We could say that “the actualizations of the
experimentalist phenomenologists line, left- condition of being an act are ulterior with re-
their mark on Gibson in his formative years. spect to the actualizations of actuality”.
Harry Heft concludes that there is a clear 28 As the phrase could lead to confusion, we
use of phenomenological ideas in Gibson, in clarify: actualization is a sustantivation of
his first phase, hence the search for concep- the verb to actualize; actuality is the noun.
tual frameworks derived from that experi- 29 Gibson distinguishes between stimulus ener-
ence, and to contrast hypotheses experimen- gy and stimulus information. This is about, in
tally. This would make of Gibson someone the first case, the stimulus categorized as
away from classical behaviorism, rather an energy according to the magnitudes of physi-
experimentalist phenomenologist, hardly cal science, and in the second, of its dimen-
with philosophical prejudices. For us this sion of ecological information that directly the
lands on the ecological approach. This, in animal captures , and therefore is defined
turn, puts him in Zubirian terms, in line with reference to the animal , ie, the "ecolog-
with the ulteriority of scientific categorization ical" level, according to the ecological princi-
at the level of reason, beyond the first phe- ple of mutuality between the animal and its
nomenological level of perception at the level environment. The latter is explicitly defined
of logos that involves primordial apprehen- by Gibson in his third book, EAVP, pg. 8.
sion.
it is, at its root, direct. As explained below, 51 HRI pp. 155-156. We have to clarify, to avoid
what happens is that, ulteriorly, a duality is susceptibilities of Zubiri´s connoisseurs, we
given in perception, duality that has a direct are following in this article more the book
root. This ulteriority is not temporary, but HRI than IL, as it seems to us, for the prob-
concerns foundations. The basis or root is lem at hand, the most enlightening book.
direct, although the direct nature involves a Although, actually, as Jesus Conill warns us
duality. We explain in detail below. in the Introduction, the meaning of experi-
45 We know of no better philosophy, having the ence Zubiri offered in this book is not exactly
strength and creditworthiness of the philos- the same as the one in IRA, or SH. But also
ophy of Zubiri, not only for the problem at he remembers Mary Riaza, who, in the fol-
hand, but for the great problems of human lowing publications considered this book “a
beings and contemporary culture. treaty of experience”, and this course as the
most appropriate place to reconstruct a the-
46 See the home page of The Xavier Zubiri
ory of experience in Zubiri: Riaza, María,
Foundation of North America
“Una línea de experiencia que pasa por
(http:www.zubiri.org). The Spanish Word
Kant”, in Realitas I, 1974, pp. 399-436, and
used by Zubiri is ficto, the term for the men-
“Sobre la experiencia en Zubiri”, Realitas II
tal entity of a fiction or creation, as percept is
(1974-75) 1976, pp.245-312 . Cited by Jesus
the term for the mental entity of a percep-
Conill, pg. x of the Presentation of HRI.
tion. The closest word in English could be
notional.
52 The Spanish word used by Zubiri is per-
catarse, which, etymologically, has exactly
47 The word used by Zubiri in Spanish is
the same Latin root than per-captare (actual-
noología, kind of philosophical neologism,
ly, the Spanish expressions percatarse and
coming from the Greek nous, which means
percepción come from the Latin per-captare).
intelligence.
53 This note is ours. Later on we explain that
48 HRI, pp. 65-66 (Spanish original: to my
sameness can be considered from the indi-
knowledge there is no translation into Eng-
vidual point of view that is the sameness of
lish of HRI yet). Moreover, the scope of the ir-
who, relative to the percept, or the sameness
real, which in its most definitive version by
of what, from the point of view of the notes,
in IL consist of percepts, ficta and concepts
relative to the concept (HRI, pgs. 178 and
(the simple apprehensions) as herein men-
179). We will see that this has everything to
tioned, and comes from the irrealization of
do with Gibson´s theory of invariants.
the content of what is apprehended in pri-
mordial apprehension in a retracting move-
54 HRI pg. 167.
ment, while retaining the moment of formali- 55 Remember this is our particular translation
ty of reality. of a neologism created by Z to design that
49 Of course, the above is not a truism, nor a which corresponds to a fiction: ficto (the term
simple game of words, but, in our view, an used by Z); we have percept translating per-
invaluable conceptualization which is a cepto, concept translating concepto; so we de-
product of a thorough analysis, such as cided to translate ficto by fict.
those of Zubiri. This is in contrast to many 56 Gibson J.J. and Gibson Eleanor J., 1955a ,
analyses in which reality is “a zone of things” and Gibson J.J. and Gibson Eleanor J.,
(González, Antonio, 1994) not included in 1955b.
perception. In them the perceptive act lacks 57 Despite important differences—and there are
unity, e.g. those of the Establishment of many—any reader of issues of perception
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s article, or theories crit- knows the figure-ground duality of Gestalt
icized by Gibson, based on sensation, or psychology. This is given as a reference to
those of constructivists from the field of sci- know what Zubiri is talking about here.
entific psychology, or scientific or philosoph- 58 Zubiri says that the respectivity (in respect to
ical theories with a Kantian matrix, either
which we consider one thing, depending on
expressed or implied.
what, etc.) is a deeper stratum than the sim-
50 We refer to HRI. ple relationship, to the point that it predates
the related things, and grounds them. The
issue is complex and we can find it in Re- Of course, not everything matches, because
spectividad de lo Real in EM. the wordy analysis of Zubiri we believe is
59 The translation into Spanish of is here would unprecedented, and therefore, we could find
be está, not es. Perhaps the sentence could important and not negligible differences, as
have been expressed using the verb to stay, in fact we do, which in certain contexts are
instead of to be. In Spanish, we distinguish important. But here we look at the lines of
between ser and estar, a difficult task for a convergence.
beginner studying Spanish: both are trans- 61 Gibson quotes the Scottish philosopher
lated by the verb to be. In Zubiri the differ- Thomas Reid, who wrote this in 1785, in
ence between ser and estar yields a very im- SCPS p.1.
portant philosophical meaning which has 62 We could characterize the philosophy of
much to do with our investigation, because Zubiri, roughly, as a phenomenological real-
in Western philosophy there was no im- ism.
portant difference between being (ser) and 63 In order to give orienting references let us
reality (which in Zubiri’s philosophy is often
put this in connection with, for example, the
“represented” by the word estar). Actually,
Gestalt figure-ground phenomenon.
most times, instead of “reality” the term used
was being. For Zubiri there is something be- 64 Here respectivities is the noun in plural de-
yond being which is more radical. The ulti- rived from respect, as in respect to, for exam-
mate is reality, not being. Being is only a ple. One thing is considered X in respect to
mode of reality, not viceversa, as in the other thing.
Western tradition. That was called by Zubiri 65 IRE, pp. 36-37.
the entification of reality, which entailed its 66 HRI, p. 168.
congeneric logification of intellection: because
logos is not, for Z, the radical mode of intel-
67 HRI, p. 169.
lection: the primordial apprehension of reality 68 We are thinking here about the subject of
is instead. In psychology, as we have stated being, that for Zubiri, is the actuality of the
repeatedly in this work, this historical prob- real in the world. That is, reality may and
lem of the Western tradition has appeared in does have many respectivities or actualities;
the form of the distinction between sensation the actuality in the sentient intelligence is
and perception. As we have mentioned be- just one of them.
fore, and will explain later on, the huge his- 69 It is an expression of Harry Heft, 2001, p.
torical problem of entification of reality and xxiv of the Introduction.
logification of intellection is one of the main 70 Clarification for Gibsonians: The enrichment
problems visited on the Western tradition by
of the content, while maintaining the same
the separation of sensing and intellection in
formality of reality (thus, as it were, without
the human contact with reality. Gibson’s
losing the primordial apprehension of reality,
theories, as we have shown in previous
which is at all times the demanding referent
chapters, are in tune with all this, in his
of the simple apprehensions realizing it) has
way.
nothing to do with the enrichment of a poor
60 Among other things, worth, because Gibson input to which Gibson and his tradition crit-
is directly inspired by him in his revolution- icize and oppose. They do so because the lat-
ary conception of the senses considered as ter would be qualified by Zubiri as conceiving
perceptual systems (a revolution in tune with intelligence: it starts from a duality and from
Zubiri; the authors did not know each other, an indirect perception mediated by mental
but they had something important in com- representations. However, in Zubiri, this en-
mon: the underlying truth, a genius to reveal richment is only of the content, it belongs to a
it, and courage to proclaim it against the sentient intelligence frame, and starts from a
prevailing theories). Gibson’s theory is the unitary and direct perceptive act; and is a
necessary conception consistent with his presentation and not a representation. Never-
ecological approach to direct perception. In theless, primordial apprehension, direct and
turn, attunement to the sentient intelligence unitary at its root, is ulteriorly split into a de-
(or intellective sensing) of Zubiri is important,
as shown here, and generally, in this article.
ployment where we can see the duality of the authors, looks to be a compendium of refer-
logos. ence today in Ecological Psychology. It can
71 SCPS, pp. 21 and 22, paragraph The World be found in the world wide web, on the web-
of Physics and the Sources of Stimulation. site of the Center for the Ecological Study of
Furthermore, this issue is directly related to Perception and Action (CESPA) of the Univer-
the ecological approach. Gibson always said sity of Connecticut.
that it is the level where you have to start ... 78 Michaels, Claire F. and Carello, Claudia,
because it is the level of the animal ... the 1981, pg.177.
reality being structured at all levels ... these 79 IRE, pg.267 (English version, pg. 97).
are embedded (nested like Russian dolls) one 80 For example, in IRA, pg.159 (Spanish ver-
into each other. Please continue now seeing
sion); English version, p. 299.
how these levels—in which the environment
and reality are structured—are the appropri- 81 Impressively means, according to Zubiri,
ate framework to use with Zubiri, as one of sentiently, through our senses, but not con-
these levels, the one of the world, to which ceptualized in the classical manner, but as
we access going from apprehension of logos, intellective sensing. By being senses they
the level where perception occurs. It is worth capture through sensitive impression, by be-
noting that Gibson joined the General Sys- ing intellective they capture the stimuli as
tems Theory explicitly. We think that the real, ie as de suyo or “in their own right”;
philosophy of Zubiri, in general, is in tune which means, absolutely independently of
with it; especially through his concepts of the capturer, and of everything else. It is a
system and structure. sentient intelligence, not just sensible. This
means, in line with Gibson (senses consid-
72 Eddington was a physicist, famous for
ered as perceptual systems, and knowledge
spreading the theories of Einstein in Eng-
as an extension of perception) having struc-
land, who in 1929 published a book that had
turally three stages: in addition to the mo-
great impact, The Nature of the Physical
ment of affection—state of being affected, not
World. Insurmountable differences were evi-
as a feeling or emotion—a moment of other-
dent between the world described by physi-
ness, and a moment of force of imposition.
cal science, and the one we see in our daily
Zubiri insists that philosophy has overlooked
lives. Gibson echoes this controversy, since it
impression, and was fixed almost exclusively
has everything to do with his positions, and
on affection (in line with projective logic), ne-
very specifically with the issue of the ecologi-
glecting the moments of otherness and force
cal approach.
of imposition almost completely. The other-
73 IRE, pg.177 (Spanish Version; English Ver- ness was for the mind (“the operations of the
sion pp. 64-65). mind on the delivery of the senses”), with the
74 IRE, pp.177-178. What we have described consequent problems regarding intentionali-
formerly as constructivist travel, regarding ty, or the correspondence between the mind
theories that Gibson criticizes, seems some- and that otherness.
thing very similar to what Zubiri describes 82 IRE pp. 64 and 65 (Spanish Version), English
here by saying that it starts from the real version, p. 26.
things in the area beyond perception, and 83 We do not translate de Spanish expression
the rest is quartered in the area of the sub-
de suyo, but it is equivalent to en propio,
jective.
which we do translate (following the main
75 HRI, pp. 171-176. translators of Zubiri into English—Nelson
76 IRE, pp. 176-177. Orringer, Thomas B. Fowler, etc.—by in its
77 Michaels, Claire F. and Carello, Claudia, own right.
1981, pgs. 168 and 169 (see bibliography). 84 Is it right to have included in the world, both
They are quoting Wigner, E.P. In W. Moore & the wavelengths, etc., as well as the rods and
M Scriven (Eds.) Symmetries and Reflections: cones of the retina and the occipital region of
Scientific Essays in Honor of Eugene P. Wig- the brain In fact, all things considered, if re-
ner. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970. The ality is not a zone of things, and if “it begins
book Direct Perception, from the mentioned in the apprehension”, which is also reality
par excellence, and the world is reality in remember in EAVP, pp. 138-140, a reflection
depth, which is beyond apprehension. But on this problem around a mailbox. It is the
also, in respect to the apprehension, in this problem of meaning and values of things,
case corresponding to the color of the table, that Gibson argues that we perceive directly,
it turns out that this “beyond” in respect to as they would be placed on the affordances
color is both electromagnetic waves and pho- of things, which are specified in ambient
tons, as well as rods and cones of the retina light. Given the dualism of the phenomenal
and the occipital region of the brain. mail and the physical mail of Koffka, Gibson
85 IRA, pp. 253-254 (Spanish version), English concluded: “I prefer to say that the real post-
version, p. 332. box (the only one) affords letter-mailing to a
letter-writing human in a community with a
86 Indeed, as Neisser (1978) pointed out some
postal system”. Just note here that our hy-
time ago, the identification of stimulus invar-
pothesis is that the concepts of Zubiri that
iants is “the largest outstanding promissory
are closer to, or have to do closely with, the
note in ecological optics” (p.24). This state-
affordances of Gibson are be meaning-thing
ment remains only slightly less true today.
and habitude. But we cannot here go in
87 In HRI, Zubiri speaks of integration. In IL, the depth in the confrontation of the positions of
second volume of the trilogy, he speaks of our authors on this point. Our first impres-
realization. Percepts, ficta and concepts sion is that, although there would be differ-
come from the irrealization of the content of ences, their conceptualizations on this point,
primordial apprehension. It is what Zubiri in line with their general positions, which to-
called, in HRI, the forging of the irreal. gether are of great harmony and affinity,
88 Gibson quotes himself: Gibson J.J. “The would not be a striking exception to that af-
problem of temporal order is stimulation and finity.
perception”, Journal of Psychology 62, 141- 91 SH, pg. 542.
149. 92 EAVP, pg. 225.
89 EAVP, pg. 254. 93 In his philosophy, Zubiri replaces, consistent
90 Something very important in the philosophy with all his positions, the old concept of sub-
of Zubiri is the distinction in each real thing stance by the concept of substantivity. The
(most of which are surrounding us humans) substance is a sub-jectum, subject of in-
of its dimension of reality-thing and its di- inherent properties. Substantivity is a struc-
mension of meaning-thing. Zubiri gives the tural system of co-herent notes or properties,
example of a table. We never perceive a table where each property or note is note-of-all
as such, but the physical materiality of its others. There is an “in” and an “ex” which
notes, either wood or whatever material. To could be translated as inner and outer. The
be a table is the dimension of meaning-thing, “in” is structurally reflected (structure) on
which would go mounted, so to speak, on its the “ex”. But according to this, sentient intel-
most radical dimension of reality-thing. For ligence is a systemic property of the whole
Zubiri, the meaning-thing is a constructed substantivity, not subjacent, but in any case
function of our lives, particularly our being super-shelf. This is in line with, not a “pro-
(our personality), with the reality of the table, jective logic” (as it would be the case of sub-
namely the reality-thing. We have, in that stance), but with a logic of “field simultanei-
way, the reality of the table. Antonio Gonza- ty”.
lez points out in “Las cosas” (González Fer- 94 EAVP pg. 239.
nández, Antonio, 2008) that a significant vir-
tuality of the philosophy of Zubiri, which dis-
95 EAVP pg. 247.
tinguishes him from all phenomenological 96 EAVP pg. 256.
currents, is that it does not stay in the mere 97 EAVP pg. 258.
sense, but comes even to what is most radi- 98 EAVP pg. 263.
cal, that is reality. And this has big conse-
quences. This is also, in its conceptualiza- 99 Obviously, this statement is our interpreta-
tion, an old problem that Gibson dealt with tion, standing on what was said here by Gib-
and was already treated by the Gestalt. We son, but from a view of the whole of his
work. Gibson did not speak clearly of some-
thing like a primordial apprehension as stand by itself, but Zubiri’s support makes it
Zubiri did, nor develop anything like logos patent.
and reason as Zubiri did, as we have repeat- 100 Hypothesis: is it the truth that underlies
edly pointed out. Having his stubborn de- both by low?
fense of direct perception in the background 101 Obviously, we think that this theory already
of our mind, against theories of perception
exists. It is over a thousand pages of the tril-
defending that we perceive through mental
ogy of Zubiri on the sentient intelligence, with
images, we think that statements like the
its three volumes: Intelligence and Reality,
one upon which we are commenting, “are
Intelligence and Logos, Intelligence and Rea-
consistent with” or “suggest” something simi-
son (see bibliography). This is the subject of
lar to the primordial apprehension of Zubiri.
our interest and the subject of our doctoral
Moreover, the meaning of knowing in Zubiri
thesis: Critical Foundation—from Zubiri’s
is very accurate, as an ulterior mode of intel-
standpoint—of J. J Gibson´s Ecological Ap-
lection ultimately anchored in the primordial
proach to Psychology of Perception.
apprehension. In Gibson, the meaning of
102 In addition to the above-specified, he men-
knowing does not seem as precise as in
Zubiri. Anyway, Gibson explicitly admits that tions and analyzes the following ones in
“The ecological theory of direct perception EAVP, pp. 251-253: Mental Operations on
cannot stand by itself. It implies a new theo- the Sensory Inputs, Semilogical Operations
ry of cognition in general”. We do think on the Sensory Inputs, Decoding Operations
Zubiri has developed a philosophy which, on the Sensory Inputs.
103 EAVP p. 253.
among many other things, self-gives some-
104 Or hardly ever?
thing that could be considered the grounds
of a new theory of cognition in general. That 105Time in Zubiri is in intímate connection
is why we try to give critical foundation and with being, but, as we said, we cannot enter
support to Gibson through Zubiri. We believe here into this very important but complex
that Gibson’s theory has enough strength to and deep theme.
Este texto de José M. Millás surge de la preparación de unas clases para la Facul-
tad de Teología de la Universidad Gregoriana de Roma. Dirige su atención a la filosofía
de la realidad de Zubiri y atiende a las premisas de que es insuficiente la justificación
de la existencia de Dios y la fe cristiana en los modelos clásicos que conocemos. Por un
lado, aparece la realidad y la credibilidad de Cristo en la filosofía de X. Zubiri y por otro
lado, la idea en J. Montserrat de renovar el paradigma del pensamiento cristiano.
Millás decide atender a una intuición según la cual en el pensamiento de J. Mon-
tserrat sí se hallarían los elementos fundamentales para esa justificación y credibilidad
a las que antes aludía. El objeto principal de este libro es la fundamentación de la fe así
como la contribución a la estructuración del pensamiento cristiano a fin de que pueda
facilitar el desarrollo de una teología dogmática coherente y actual.
La obra tiene dos partes. La primera titulada “Realidad y credibilidad” en la que el
autor se centra en el concepto de realidad en el pensamiento de Zubiri y el pensamiento
de Montserrat en cuanto a la renovación del paradigma cristiano que corresponda a la
comprensión actual del mundo y del hombre. Aunque el mismo autor advierte que ha-
brá que verse si todo ello posee una fuerza de convicción suficiente. Con lo cual queda
bien planteada la cuestión desde el punto de vista del autor que responde de este modo
al tema siempre espinoso del cambio de paradigma en el cristianismo. Un tema que han
abordado muchos teólogos y filósofos. Después de muchos años intentando explicar ese
cambio de paradigma todavía no me parece claro.
En este punto de la reflexión el Dr. Millás no deja a Dios ni a Cristo fuera de ese
hipotéticamente necesario cambio de paradigma y es muy de agradecer ya que en esos
intentos de explicación hemos oído hablar muy serenamente a teólogos y otros pensa-
dores en términos de una religión sin Dios, una espiritualidad sin fe y hasta de un cris-
tianismo sin Cristo, que no digo Jesús histórico, sino Cristo, un Cristo tan poco cris-
tiano que yo no puedo entender.
La aceptación, la asunción, del carácter profundamente enigmático que tiene la re-
ligación como experiencia y como manifestación está presente en todo el libro. Se trata
de una idea fundante en el pensamiento del autor y transita honestamente, sin que se
fuerce su comprensión, todos y cada uno de los capítulos.
La segunda parte titulada “Realidad y teología” sigue los pasos de PTHC, El proble-
ma teologal del hombre: Cristianismo de Zubiri, publicado en 1997. El autor cree que un
planteamiento contemporáneo de la Trinidad tendría que ver con comprenderla en la
realidad, en la vida, La centralidad de Cristo Jesús en la comprensión del Cristianismo
así como la actualidad de este Cristo en la Iglesia son de una fuerza significativa al ela-
borar la idea de realidad en el seno de la reflexión teológica. En el último capítulo el
profesor Millás entiende la realidad de la Iglesia anclada en la historia tanto de la Reve-
lación como de la Tradición. Es fundamental para el autor mantener la historicidad
inevitable, y en su comprensión inquebrantable, de la Iglesia hoy. Sin embargo, la his-
toria no es lo más radical del Cristianismo sino el dar de si de Dios en la Historia de la
Revelación; del mismo modo que Cristo es no sólo central sino la justa respuesta al
enigma de la realidad.
167
168 Book Reviews
* * *
El estatuto biológico y ontológico del embrión humano, Francisco Güell, Bern: Peter Lang,
2013, 610pp, $137.95.
This book is an investigation of the biological and ontological status of the human em-
bryo, based on Zubiri’s philosophy. In particular, it utilizes his notions of essence and
substantivity. It is an attempt to bridge the longstanding gap between the way that the
sciences perceive the world, and the way that the humanities—and in particular philos-
ophy—perceive the world. Zubiri himself of course always sought to do this; but the
present book does so by focusing on a topic of particular interest today in bioethics.
The book is divided into three principal parts: Part I is a detailed exposition of the prin-
cipal notions of Zubiri’s philosophy, especially those in Sobre la esencia [On Essence].
The second part shifts to biology and gives a detailed explanation of the development of
the human embryo from the standpoint of the biologist and physiologist. In the third
part there is a precise description of biological reality intended for the purposes of onto-
logical and ethical examination and reflection. The author believes—and no doubt
Zubiri would concur—that there is a continuity between biological and philosophical
investigation.
In his conclusion, Prof. Güell notes that “the conclusions about the analysis of
the substantive character of the embryo, about the constitutive sufficiency of the em-
brio and about the essentiality or constitutionality of the genetic and epigenetic material
correspond to the precision which Zubiri bestows upon the meaning of “substantivity,”
“constitutional sufficiency,” and “essence.” (p. 562) The point of the book is to demon-
strate that a complete understanding of the genetic process of the human requires more
than biology; it requires a grasp of philosophical concepts such as those provided by
Zubiri.
I recommend this book highly for all who are interested in biology, in Zubiri’s
views of science, and in questions about the uniqueness of humans. Though long, it is
a very worthwhile study.
The Xavier Zubiri Review is soliciting papers for its 14th edition, which will be pub-
lished in 2016. Papers dealing with any aspect of Zubiri’s philosophy or biography
will be considered. Of special interest are papers that extend Zubiri’s thought to
new areas, expound and solve problems in his philosophy, and deepen our under-
standing of key aspects of his philosophical system. All papers are reviewed by the
Editorial Review Board, and authors may be asked to make changes or corrections.
Papers may be in any language, though English and Spanish are preferred. Papers
should be 10-20 pages in length, and should be submitted electronically if possi-
ble. This may be done by including a diskette along with the printed version of the
paper, or by sending the paper electronically, as an e-mail attachment. Charts,
diagrams, and photographs are acceptable, though photographs will only be print-
ed in black-and-white. All papers accepted will be published on the Xavier Zubiri
Foundation of North America’s web site, www.zubiri.org, as well as in printed form.
Papers must be received no later than 1 April 2016 to be considered for this issue.
Authors should also include a brief biography and a photograph, or be prepared to
supply them after acceptance of their paper for publication.
We are also seeking Zubiri-related books to review. If you wish to have your book
reviewed in these pages, or if you would like to serve as a book reviewer, please
contact the editor at the address below, or send an e-mail message.
171