Arc Flash Evaluation and Hazard Mitigation
for the Colorado School of Mines
Electrical Power Distribution System
Charles A. Larkin, Janson Ferrera, Robert Kohl, Corey Lamb, Powell Margetts, and Ravel F. Ammerman, Ph.D.
Division of Engineering
Colorado School of Mines
Golden, CO 80401 USA
Email: rammerma@mines.edu
Abstract—An arc flash is the release of electrical energy during
an arcing fault, which dissipates in the form of heat energy,
intense light, blast pressure, severe sound waves, electromagnetic
radiation, and toxic gases. The thermal energy, concussive forces,
and flying debris can pose serious threats to the safety of
personnel working in close proximity to electrical equipment. In
order to identify the severity of an arc flash hazard at the
Colorado School of Mines (CSM), an arc flash hazard evaluation
of the electrical power distribution system has been conducted.
The arc flash analysis has been performed in accordance with
NFPA 70E: Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, and
IEEE 1584: Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations.
The analysis of the existing system configuration has revealed
that many locations on the CSM campus are in the “dangerous”
arc flash hazard category, and consequently work cannot be
performed on energized equipment at these locations. With an
understanding of the thermal energy available, design
recommendations, including the selection and coordination of
fuses and circuit breakers, were investigated to reduce the
severity of arc flash events. Implementation of the selected
protective devices can decrease the incident energy levels of CSM
locations and eliminate any instances of “dangerous” hazard risk
categories. Other hazard mitigation considerations include
increasing the working distance, and utilizing arc suppression
blankets while performing maintenance. In addition, electrician
training to promote safe work practices is strongly encouraged.
I. INTRODUCTION
An arc flash event is a highly destructive electrical hazard as
recognized by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) [1]. An arc flash is the release of
electrical energy during an arcing fault, which dissipates in the
form of heat energy, intense light, blast pressure, severe sound
waves, electromagnetic radiation, and toxic gases [2]. The
release of energy is enough to ionize the surrounding air and
vaporize equipment. The rapid expansion of vaporized metal is
equivalent to an explosion. Molten metal and copper shrapnel
may be expelled from the explosion. Intense blast pressure and
severe sound waves are also generated [3]. Arc flash events
can release enough energy to cause destruction of property and
severe personal injuries or even fatalities [1].
The work presented was supported in part by the Denver Section of the
IEEE Power & Energy Society and Industry Applications Society.
For the safety of personnel working on electrical equipment,
arc flash analyses of power distribution systems is mandated
by OSHA Standard 1910 Subpart S: Safety Standards for
Electrical Systems [1]. In addition, Article 130.3 of NFPA 70E
states that “a flash hazard analysis shall be done in order to
protect personnel” [3]. And Article 110.16 of the National
Electrical Code requires that arc flash warning labels be placed
on any electrical equipment that might require inspection or
maintenance [4]. Furthermore, the industry preferred method
for an arc flash analysis is documented in IEEE 1584. The
results of an arc flash study include the determination of
incident energy levels, flash protection boundaries, and the
personal protective equipment (PPE) that should be worn by
personnel performing energized maintenance [5].
An arc flash hazard analysis of the Colorado School of
Mines power distribution system has been conducted to
identify the severity of an arc flash hazard throughout the CSM
system. The study included all three-phase transformers on
campus, and the incident energy available at the low-voltage
side of each transformer under a three-phase bolted fault
condition was estimated using SKM PowerTools and by
manual calculations. Subsequently, hazard mitigation
recommendations were determined in order to minimize
incident energy levels, and to promote “safety by design.”
Also, arc flash training is strongly recommended for all CSM
electrical workers to encourage safe work practices.
II. PROCEDURE
A. System Verification
Field verification of equipment ensures the arc flash hazard
calculations are accurate to the equipment in operation. During
field verification the nameplate information from each
transformer was photographed and recorded. In addition, the
conductor characteristics and the characteristics of the
protective devices were documented. Furthermore, the
maximum available fault current from the utility, Xcel Energy,
and trip settings for the recloser on campus were acquired
from the area engineer for the CSM campus [6]. The collected
system data was input to SKM PowerTools to analyze the
CSM power distribution system by performing a short circuit
study, a protective device study, and an arc flash hazard study.
B. Modes of Operation
The CSM power distribution system is designed as a loop
with a switch near the center of the loop, which is normally
open, as illustrated in Fig. 1 [7]. However, this switch can be
closed to back-feed buildings if a segment of the system fails
or is shut-down for maintenance. While completing the study
several operating modes were considered. However, the results
from analyzing the different operation modes showed little
variation in incident energies at the low-side of the
transformers. This paper will focus on the low-voltage results
for Normal Operation, which consists of the normally-open
switch being open while all other switches throughout the
CSM distribution system are closed.
Fig. 1. CSM power distribution system with normally-open switch [7].
C. Short Circuit Study
During the short circuit study the bolted three-phase fault
currents at each bus location were determined. Computing the
bolted fault currents was easily done by performing a short
circuit analysis in SKM. However, the SKM results were
verified by manually calculating the bolted fault currents at the
low-side of each transformer. This was accomplished by
treating each 13.2 kV bus in the loop as an infinite bus. In
addition, the impedance of the cable between the bus and the
transformer was ignored, and the impedance of the transformer
was modeled as a pure reactance. This approach allowed the
maximum bolted fault current to be calculated for each
transformer. Furthermore, it was assumed that the system
voltage was at rated capacity (i.e. one per-unit).
The bolted three-phase fault at the low-side of each
transformer was compared to the SKM calculations to verify
the results. It was seen that the manual calculations provided a
conservative estimate of the fault currents determined by
SKM, as expected. Next, the bolted fault currents, Ibf, from the
SKM short circuit study were used to manually determine the
arcing fault currents, Ia, using the simplified 3-4-5 method
derived by Ammerman, Sen, and Nelson, as shown in (1) [8].
I a = 0.6 I bf
The simplified method was chosen because the equations
outlined in the standards can be quite cumbersome. In
addition, the 3-4-5 method is based on the IEEE 1584
equations, but will provide a conservative estimation.
However, SKM was utilized to determine the arcing currents
based on the IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E calculation methods,
and the calculations described by the standards were
performed manually at several transformers.
D. Protective Device Study
The next step was to perform a protective device study to
determine the clearing device and clearing time for each arcing
current. The time required to clear an arc is equivalent to the
duration of the arc, or the arcing time. The arcing time is
necessary to calculate the incident energy levels during the arc
flash hazard study. To complete the incident energy
calculations a maximum arc duration of two seconds was
assumed for each fault location as recommended in Section
B.1.2 of Annex B in IEEE 1584. Two seconds is a reasonable
maximum arcing time for calculations, because “it is likely that
a person exposed to an arc flash will move away quickly if it is
physically possible” [5].
SKM PowerTools was utilized to construct the time-current
characteristic (TCC) drawings for the protective devices. The
SKM software was also used to determine the arcing durations
for the IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E calculation methods, and
the arcing times were verified by manually examining the TCC
drawings. Furthermore, the drawings were manually inspected
to estimate the arcing durations for the 3-4-5 method.
During the protective device study the TCC drawings were
also analyzed to identify miscoordination. Areas of
miscoordination are evident if the curves for the various
devices overlap [9]. In addition, miscoordination exists if the
clearing device is a fuse or circuit breaker other than the
protective device directly upstream of the fault location.
Protective device coordination was considered while selecting
the recommended protective devices during hazard mitigation.
E. Arc Flash Hazard Study
The arc flash evaluation was conducted using SKM
PowerTools and the software determined the incident energy
level and arc flash boundary at the low-voltage side of each
transformer. SKM was utilized to perform the evaluation using
the IEEE 1584 method and the NFPA 70E method.
Furthermore, the SKM results were verified by manually
performing the analysis at several transformers using the
equations described in Section 5 of IEEE 1584 and the
equations outlined in Annex D.6 of NFPA 70E. Furthermore,
the arc flash evaluation was conducted manually by
implementing the 3-4-5 method, which allows the incident
energy, E, to be determined directly from the three-phase
bolted fault current and arc duration, t. The incident energy
level in cal/cm2 was calculated using (2) at the low-side of
each transformer [8].
(1) E = 3.11I bf t (2)

Equation (2) is valid for system voltages 480 V and below.
For the CSM power distribution system the secondary voltage
of each transformer is either 208 V or 480 V. The equation is
based on the IEEE 1584 method, and assumes panelboard
equipment type, an enclosed equipment configuration, an
ungrounded system, and a working distance of 18 inches.
Consequently, (2) provides a conservative or worst-case
approximation of the incident energy level [8].
To further illustrate the severity of arc flash hazard risks
throughout the CSM system Fig. 3 groups the IEEE estimated
energies by hazard risk category. The pie-chart indicates that
50% of the CSM incident energies are categorized as
dangerous, and another 33% of the incident energies are
classified as third and fourth category hazard risks.

III. ARC FLASH STUDY RESULTS

The incident energies determined by the three calculation
methods are compared in Fig. 2. For each calculation method
transformers below 240 V, and less than 125 kVA have been
classified as hazard risk category zero as recommended in
Section 4.2 of IEEE 1584, which states that “equipment below
240 V need not be considered unless it involves at least one
125 kVA or larger low-impedance transformer in its
immediate power supply” [5]. The hazard risk categories have
also been superimposed on the chart. Fig. 2 indicates that
several CSM incident energies merit concern, and many
energy levels are greater than 25 and even 40 cal/cm2.
Fig. 3. IEEE incident energies by hazard risk category.

IV. IMPLICATIONS
The hazard risk categories determined during the arc flash
study indicate what level of protective clothing must be worn
by personnel performing energized maintenance on equipment
classified as a certain hazard risk. Table I outlines the hazard
risk categories, including the incident energy values for each
category, and the level of personal protective equipment (PPE)
that must be worn by personnel. The hazard risk categories are
established in NFPA 70E [3].

TABLE I
PPE REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH HAZARD RISK CATEGORY [3]

Hazard Risk Incident Energy Clothing

Clothing Description
Fig. 2. Incident energy comparison of calculation methods. Category (cal/cm2) Layers
0 0.0 – 1.2 Untreated Cotton 1
In addition, the figure indicates that the incident energy 1 1.2 – 4.0 FR Shirt & Pants 1
Cotton Underwear +
level varies depending on the calculation method. However, it 2 4.0 – 8.0 1 or 2
FR Shirt & Pants
is seen that the 3-4-5 method does conservatively track the Cotton Underwear +
IEEE 1584 results in most cases. The 3-4-5 method fails to 3 8.0 – 25 FR Shirt & Pants + 2 or 3
provide a conservative estimation of the IEEE incident energy FR Coverall
at Meyer Hall, Engineering Hall, and Weaver Towers due to Cotton Underwear +
3 or
4 25 – 40 FR Shirt & Pants +
the shape of the time-current characteristic curve of the Multi-Layer Flash Suit
more
protective device at each location. At the three buildings the Dangerous!! > 40 NONE AVAILABLE -
IEEE results utilize an arcing current, which is significantly
less than the arcing current predicted by the 3-4-5 method. The As indicated by the table PPE does not exist that would be
greater arcing current utilized by the 3-4-5 method as adequate to protect electrical workers at 50% of the CSM
compared to the IEEE method, and the shape of the TCC locations that are categorized as dangerous. Consequently,
drawing results in an arcing duration which is significantly maintenance cannot be performed on energized equipment at
shorter for the 3-4-5 method, and consequently, the incident these locations. Furthermore, the recommended PPE for the
energy determined by the 3-4-5 method is less than the energy other hazard risk categories is designed to limit the thermal
predicted by IEEE 1584. energy at the surface of the skin to 1.2 cal/cm2, which is the
minimum energy necessary to inflict a curable 2nd degree burn
on unprotected skin [5]. However, the PPE cannot protect an
electrician from flying debris, such as copper shrapnel, or the
blast pressure, which might impregnate an individual into a
wall. In addition, the possibility of electrocution exists at all
hazard risk levels.
After observing the values of the CSM incident energies it is
evident that the hazards throughout the CSM power
distribution system must be addressed to protect electrical
workers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates electrical
hazards are one of the leading causes of fatalities in the
workplace. Between 1992 and 2002 more than 800
electricians, apprentices, electrical power installers, and
repairers were killed due to electrical injuries, and many more
individuals were injured [10]. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
has estimated that arc flash injuries account for 77% of all
electrical injuries. In addition, approximately five to ten arc
flash incidents occur in the United States everyday [11].
Besides the obvious increase in personal welfare, avoiding
injuries and fatalities can save millions of dollars, since the
costs associated with workplace injuries are expensive.
V. HAZARD MITIGATION
A. Protective Device Selection and Coordination
After examining the potential arc flash hazard risks
throughout the CSM distribution system the next task was to
determine design recommendations to minimize the risks and
to promote “safety by design.” The primary hazard mitigation
technique investigated was protective device selection and
coordination to reduce arcing durations and to limit current.
The goal was to determine the best sizes and settings of the
protective devices in order to minimize incident energy levels
and PPE category requirements while also maintaining system
reliability.
The arc flash hazard analysis of the existing CSM system
revealed that several of the protective devices directly
upstream of the low-voltage fault locations must be changed to
alleviate incident energy levels and to reduce the hazard risks
to acceptable categories. The TCC drawings that were
constructed during the protective device study were examined
to determine possible protective device changes that could be
implemented to reduce the incident energies. The time-current
curve of the first protective device directly upstream of the
fault location where the incident energy was desired to be
reduced was shifted to decrease the arc duration by
appropriately selecting a different fuse or circuit breaker.
Selecting a different fuse to replace an existing fuse was
preferred as opposed to utilizing a circuit breaker due to the
costs associated with purchasing and installing the different
types of protective equipment. For twenty-five fault locations
it is possible to reduce the incident energy to an acceptable
level by changing the existing fuse to an S&C K-Speed fuse.
The appropriate cartridge setting of the K-Speed fuse is
dependent on the arcing current available at a given fault
location. However, at several locations where a fuse has been
recommended it is possible to further decrease the incident
energy level by utilizing a circuit breaker, which can eliminate
any occurrence of hazard risk category four incident energies.
In some circumstances utilizing a new fuse is not sufficient
to reduce the incident energy level to an acceptable value
while maintaining system reliability. Implementing a different
fuse is constrained by the transformer inrush current at a given
fault location. The inrush current could cause “nuisance
tripping” if the time-current characteristic of the protective
device is not chosen appropriately. In these cases a circuit
breaker with adjustable settings is necessary. The circuit
breaker can have a “maintenance setting” that can limit the arc
duration while an electrician is performing work on the
energized equipment. In addition, the circuit breaker setting
can be adjusted for typical system operation to avoid nuisance
tripping. Maintenance cannot be performed on energized
equipment if the circuit breaker is configured with the “typical
operation” setting. At Hill Hall and the Student Center where
two of the three highest incident energies were observed
during the arc flash analysis of the existing CSM distribution
system an S&C Vista, Tap Fault Interrupter circuit breaker
should be installed. It is important that circuit breakers be
installed at the recommended locations, because these are the
most hazardous locations on campus.
Fig. 4 compares the IEEE incident energies of the system as
it is currently designed with the IEEE estimated energies with
the selected fuses and circuit breakers implemented. As is
demonstrated it is possible to dramatically decrease many of
the CSM incident energy levels and with the design
recommendations none of the incident energies are classified
as dangerous. However, until the recommended protective
device changes can be implemented maintenance cannot be
performed on energized equipment where the incident energy
level has been determined as greater than 40 cal/cm2, and
appropriate PPE must be worn when performing energized
maintenance at other locations throughout the CSM power
distribution system as dictated by the calculated incident
energy values.
Fig. 4. Mitigated IEEE incident energies and existing system IEEE energies.
While selecting the recommended fuses and circuit breakers
protective device coordination was considered. The
examination of the drawings revealed that the existing
protective devices and the recommended devices are well
coordinated in most cases. Typically, miscoordination was
observed at locations where an oil-immersed fuse is included
at a transformer. Due to the configuration of the CSM
distribution system, most instances of miscoordination that
were identified do not compromise system reliability, because
the miscoordinated devices serve a single transformer or
building. Since it was desired that the oil-immersed fuses
remain unchanged the two instances of miscoordination that
compromise system reliability were ignored in favor of
providing protective device recommendations capable of
minimizing incident energy levels.
B. Increasing the Working Distance
Increasing the working distance can also reduce incident
energy levels and mitigate arc flash hazards. For arcs in open
air the incident energy is inversely proportional to the square
of the working distance, so increasing the distance can greatly
decrease the energy level. The energy level is also decreased
as the working distance increases for arcs initiated in
enclosures. The use of extension tools, such as “hotsticks,” and
remote-operating systems can increase electrician safety when
working on energized equipment.
A hotstick is basically a long pole composed of insulating
material rated for a specific voltage level, and tools or fittings
are attached to the end of the pole. Electricians can use
hotsticks to perform energized maintenance while remaining at
a safe distance from equipment to avoid an arc flash. However,
utilizing extension tools could hinder the ability of an
electrician to properly perform maintenance on energized
equipment. To ensure safety electricians using extension tools
should generally wear additional PPE, such as gloves and a
face-shield [12].
In addition, remote-controlled devices and systems can be
used for racking a circuit breaker into and out of electrical
switchgear. Many of these devices can be used without any
modifications to the existing system, and the devices are also
portable [13]. Remote-racking of breakers allows an
electrician to work up to 40 ft away from the electrical
equipment. However, working from greater distances can limit
the ability of an electrician to detect problems during
maintenance, and some remote-racking devices have been
known to rack improperly positioned breakers, which could
potentially damage the equipment [14].
C. Arc Suppression Blanket
Another consideration is to use an arc suppression blanket
to isolate conductors while performing maintenance on
energized equipment. The blankets are typically constructed of
Kevlar and Nomex or canvas [15]. Despite its name an arc
suppression blanket does not actually suppress an arc, but it
does redirect the thermal energy and pressure waves away
from a worker. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated the
effectiveness of arc suppression blankets, but the performance
of a blanket is highly dependent on proper installation. Tests
performed at 6.2 kV, and 20 to 25 kA with an arc duration of
ten to twelve cycles have shown that a properly installed
blanket can dramatically decrease injuries sustained due to
thermal energy and flying debris [16].
D. Fiber Optic Detection
Fiber optic detection is a modern technique to mitigate arc
flash hazards, which is being marketed in industry. The basic
premise of this detection method is to use fiber optic sensors
or bare fiber optic cables to detect the intense light given off
by an arc flash. Two different types of sensors available for
use in a fiber optic detection system are point sensors and bare
fiber sensors. Point sensors are intended to be located in clear
view of the energized components where an arc flash will most
likely occur. Bare fiber sensors are used to monitor “large
distributed resources, such as switchgear system bus
enclosures” [17]. When exposed to light the sensor can
produce a signal, which is sent to a relay, and the relay
communicates with circuit breakers that can quickly interrupt
the current and quench the arc [18]. Due to the significant
decrease in arc duration the incident energy is reduced, which
creates a safer working environment for electricians
performing maintenance on the system. Fiber optic detection
of arc flash events is an effective hazard mitigation technique
that can be retrofitted to existing distribution systems.
VI. ARC FLASH TRAINING
It has been estimated “up to 80% of electrical incidents are
caused by human error” [18]. Consequently, one of the best
methods to minimize exposure to arc flash incidents is through
proper training and education, which must be provided to
individuals working in close proximity to energized
equipment. OSHA recommends safety awareness when
working on electrical equipment, which includes an
understanding of electrical hazards and safety related work
practices [18]. In addition, NFPA 70E clearly states that
employees are to be trained regarding the relationship between
electrical hazards and possible injury [19]. Personnel involved
with the operation or maintenance of electrical equipment must
understand the risks associated with their job, including a basic
understanding of the causes and consequences of exposure to
an arc flash. The significance of potentially fatal burns, molten
copper shrapnel, and concussive force from the blast are key
dangers to be discussed during training.
After an arc flash hazard analysis has been performed the
results of the evaluation should be presented to personnel
working on the system, and based on the incident energy
workers must understand what level of personal protective
equipment (PPE) is necessary, how to correctly wear PPE, and
the limitations of the PPE [18]. In addition, electricians must
be able to interpret arc flash hazard warning labels, and
personnel must understand the arc flash warning labels are
almost out-dated as soon as they are adhered to the electrical
equipment. Personnel should be advised that protective device
changes and changes to the overall system, such as new
buildings or new electrical equipment, could cause the warning
label to be inaccurate. Furthermore, electricians must be aware
of the arc flash protection boundaries for all locations
throughout the distribution system. The approach boundaries
for shock protection and flash protection, such as the limited,
restricted, and prohibited approach boundaries should be
known, and individuals must avoid working in hazardous areas
without the proper PPE or without proper qualification [19].
 VII. CONCLUSION
An arc flash analysis of the CSM electrical power
distribution system has been conducted to identify the severity
of an arc flash hazard at the Colorado School of Mines. The
arc flash evaluation has been performed in accordance with
NFPA 70E: Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace,
and IEEE 1584: Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard
Calculations. The analysis of the existing system configuration
has revealed that many locations on the CSM campus are
categorized as dangerous, and maintenance cannot be
performed on energized equipment at these locations until
modifications to the protective devices are implemented.
It was determined that installing twenty-five S&C K-Speed
fuses, and two S&C Vista circuit breakers can decrease the
incident energy levels of CSM locations and eliminate any
instances of dangerous hazard risk categories. In addition,
increasing the working distance and utilizing arc suppression
blankets while performing maintenance should be considered
to minimize the arc flash hazard risk imposed on electricians.
Furthermore, electrician training to promote safe work
practices is strongly recommended. Arc flash training can
increase worker awareness of arc flash hazards, teach workers
to respect arc flash warning labels, and emphasize the
importance of wearing proper protective equipment while
performing energized maintenance.
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors gratefully acknowledge Ted Trimmer and the
CSM electrical workers for their assistance throughout
completion of the CSM Arc Flash Hazard Study. Their
experience, expertise, and advice significantly contributed to
the success of the project.
In addition, special thanks are due to SKM PowerTools for
providing an enhanced version of the Arc Flash Hazard
evaluation software, which was crucial to the successful
completion of the project.
The authors also gratefully acknowledge The Denver
Section of the IEEE Power & Energy Society and Industry
Applications Society for providing essential funding, and the
organization encouraged the professional development of the
student team members by providing the opportunity to present
the project to practicing engineers.
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