G.R. No.

147148 January 13, 2003

PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner, vs.AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
Facts:
 Respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP"1 over the person and properties of her sister
Julieta: “xxx 2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati Medical Center
where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a "mini"-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early
1995; 3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside assistance, and she has to be moved
by wheel chair; 4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with an
aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;] 5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and
that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises; 6. That the
nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka.
Sister Cristina of the Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to the filing of this
petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom of this petition[;] 7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management
of commercial, agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where Julieta Ledesma holds an interest,
and that she is in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the
Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.”
 Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition: “xxx 2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent
and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. She is very able to take charge
of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her letters to the petitioner. Xxx 2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of
Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic
 RTC – found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property" and appointed respondent as guardian of
her person and properties: “xxx It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the appointment of Amparo as
guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. She further added that there were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta
to Amparo which showed Julieta's sentiments regarding certain matters. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed
the petition. Ms. Goyena's mere conjecture that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied. Neither
does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. It is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an
adverse interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to her.”
 CA – affirmed the trial court's decision: “xxx While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient showing that
petitioner is hostile to the best interests of the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the appointment of
a person to guard her sister's interests, initiated the petition for guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated by a
desire to prejudice Julieta's health as well as financial interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had initially
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years also militate against her
assuming the guardianship of the incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not interested to be appointed legal
guardian. But the persons that she points to as being better choices as Julieta's guardian over the appellee have not acted, nor even
indicated, their desire to act as such.”
Issue: WON CA and RTC erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of
Julieta.
Held: The petition fails.
 It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as
this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law. 5 The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is question of fact.6
 That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner.
 In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties: “xxx As a rule, when it
appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for
and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear
that he has fallen into grievous error.”
 Here, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
 Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed a rift between the two which amounts to
antagonistic interests. The first merely shows Julieta's lack of interest in future investments, not necessarily a business disagreement,
and certainly not per se amounting to antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter unsuitable for appointment
as guardian.
 The second letter shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at the Makati Medical Center on account of her
stroke, 2) there was disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3)
respondent took over management of the hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No inference as to the existence
of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta can thus be made.
 The third letter has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for
appointment as guardian. The letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta's nephew Julio Ledesma, and not respondent, who ignored the
"request."
 As for the fourth letter it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not even addressed to respondent but to a
certain Connie (a sister-in-law of Julieta).
 Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta's properties and use
them for her own benefit21 is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.
 The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati
Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the
observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of doctors 22 after she checked out
and was returned to the hospital when she suffered another stroke.
 G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA
ESTRADA, respondents.
Facts:
 Being then (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the UP, was declared incompetent by judgment1 of the RTC of QC in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed
legal guardian of her person and estate.
 Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the (MeTC) to eject
the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later amended to identify the
incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
 The amended Complaint: “xxx that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and
failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
 Defendants – that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
 MeTC – judgment in favour in Caniza, the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by
way of attorney's fees.
 RTC – reversed judgment. It held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved
is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation xxx demanding adjudication by such plenary action for
recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by the RTC."
 CA – affirmed RTC. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
an accion interdictal in the MeTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by what
purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the
proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part
of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that
Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out."
 Estrada’s contention – the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession
of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and
hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of
forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen
Cañiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is
admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust
them from the disputed premises.
Issues: (a) WON an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute;
(b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said
action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent
Cañiza after the latter's death.
Held:
First Issue
 A cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices
to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint
for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
 Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of
possession in the latter's favor. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without
any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 24 The situation is not much different from that of a tenant
whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. 25 In other words, one whose
stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave.
 The complaint filed by Cañiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first
letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact
a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was
actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last) written demand to vacate.
 The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her
 judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen
Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the
right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that
right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
Second Issue
 The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in
possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom,
since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
 A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted
to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder.
 An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with
the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house
on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
 Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her
aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of
the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her
properties . . "
 By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. 34 It also became
her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. 35 That
right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who
retains it, 36 and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose. 37
 Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable
and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.: “Sec.
4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. — A guardian must manage the estate
of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so,
and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.”
Third Issue
 As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to
dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all
authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion
is without merit.
 The relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the
rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only
two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this
Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in
accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
 To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit
instituted by her through her guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have
taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
 G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,
DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HADJI
YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
Facts:
 During her lifetime, (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia
and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with (Enrique): Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
 Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a total
area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285 , (P-
14608) P-51536and P-20551 (P-8348).
 Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children
Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
them to the (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.
 The children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties against spouses Uy
before the RTC assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
 Heirs of Uy – the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They
also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.
 RTC – ordering the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that
while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa
and Douglas.
 CA – reversed RTC ruling. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and
sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment
of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and that Eutropia and Victoria belatedly filed their
actionin 1997, ormore than two years fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It,
however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-heirs. CA declared the
extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding that
as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing
Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it
upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
Issues: WON CA erred: (1) when it upheld the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale” as far as the shares of Eutropia and Victoria were concered; and (2) when it did not nullify or annul the said settlement
with respect to the shares of Rosa and Douglas.
Held: The petition is meritorious.
 It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second
marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares,
pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read:
 Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy,
all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded
and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding
upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
 Segura vs. Segura – “It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the
rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution xxx”
 However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique
and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties
of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11 and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share
in the estate.12
 With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural
guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that
time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares
in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
 Section 7, Rule 93 provides: “SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
 considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file
the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only
to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with
the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.”
 Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority,
unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, 15 is unenforceable.
 Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale.
 Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus,
purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the
estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing
ratification.
 Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have
effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the
buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer."
 On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it
seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years
provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject
estate. Besides, an "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in
accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
 However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action
accrues,22 which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed. Here, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which
spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.

Facts:
 (Petitioner) filed with the RTC, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the
property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
 It is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten
(10) years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident
after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and
judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people
around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
 (Respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.
 RTC – petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal
affairds and administer his properties.
 CA – dismissed appeal.
Issue: WON respondent is considered an “incompetent person” as defined under Section 2 Rule 92 of the ROC who should
be placed under guardianship.
Held: We find the petition to be without merit.
 Francisco vs. CA – A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian"
acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well
as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate
care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
 In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or
an incompetent.
 A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
 We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence."
 With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted
purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal
properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which
did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action
and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
 In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the
occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations
of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice." 18
G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.

Facts:
 Petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura)
with the (RTC).
 Abad averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her advanced
age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus
becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.
 Biason filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition – he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not
notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the
appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon
City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s
guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties.
 RTC – denied Abad’s petition and appointed Biason as Maura’s guardian.
 Abad’s argument – RTC erred in disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura’s guardian despite the fact that he has
all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was not a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground
for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is
residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian.
 CA – affirmed RTC decision.
 Pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died.
 Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that
the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
 Abad commented that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in the appointment of Biason as guardian
which he believed had been rendered moot and academic by the latter’s death. He also supported Maura’s prayer for the
termination of the guardianship by asseverating that her act of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact
that she is of sound mind and that she can competently manage her business affairs.
 We find Maura’s motion meritorious.
 An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.22
 With Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian
or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment
since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will
not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.