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Constructionism
Serge Moscovici
Dearest Marisa, 2
Thank you for the messages from Deriabin and Gergen as well as for your comments. I
apologise for answering only today. I have been busy writing an autobiographical narrative
which has taken up all my time for the two or three years, so that I somewhat drifted apart
from social psychology. Deriabin wonders why social constructionism and social
representations do not get close to one another. I wonder why Gergen, Ibanez, Potter and
others attack us wherever they can. Or else, what justifies the tone in which Gergen does in
this message and elsewhere. There is little sound argument in what he says and on the
contrary much labelling in order to associate us with a "bad" object. For instance
structuralism, in his opinion. As far as I know, structuralism was intended to be "formal"
and draw universal laws of thought on a basis. In this sense, historically speaking, it is
closer to Marxism, for instance. I have always entertained the greatest respect for Levi-
Strauss and his work. Yet, for many reasons, structuralism appears inadequate to a
dynamical and historical vision of social phenomena.
***
I cannot see where and how the theory of social representations has been rewritten
to fit the cognitive paradigm. Reading some philosophers of mind (Putnam, Kripke,
Davidson, Bunge, etc.) has brought me to ponder on our theory in the later years. I
know, however, at least three reasons why I could not have got closer to the so-
called leading paradigm:
***
For me, a theory exists only insofar as it fosters a practice of discovery, of facing
social problems, and gives some meaning to our lives. Is his intellectual community
broader than mine ? I am not sure of that for many reasons, including political ones.
But this judgement of broadness is also part of this tone of self-righteousness,
superiority, that he assumes towards me and my work. It is very self-serving. I have
had, for a long time, an explanation of this which has nothing to do with science,
only with the power that is today concentrated in one part of the world, one
language and institutions of diffusion of knowledge. In this respect, what to Gergen
appears as "owning the territory" to me appears as "owning independence or
freedom", the right to think and write in a world of diverse people, diverse culture,
diverse ideas and especially diverse social problems. And this diversity IS reflected
among the people interested in social representations. Since the only condition for a
dialogue is respect, scholarship, and no relinquishing this or that. Besides the
constructionist idea is in many respects and old one for us.
***
Communicating through Internet is a fine experience, addressing others as one
addresses oneself. In French, we say "thinking aloud". I know virtually nothing
about the debates that are taking place among the "specialists" of social
constructionism, whether they criticize themselves as much as they do others. I
surmise that Deriabin knows more about it. In his message, he says that there are
many common things between "social constructionism and social representation
theory". And he observes that Gergen and others do not refer to my work. Which
seems to him curious, but does not seem so to me. I have been long enough around
to have become acquainted with two attitudes which are in fact current ones. The
former consists in ensuring the exclusive ownership of ideas, neglecting those of
other people (past and present. Do you remember the case of group polarization?).
And the latter attitude consists in giving the impression that one's ideas are so
radical, so new that nobody else could have had them. For that matter, as Gun
Semin once said, a work older than ten years is no longer quoted ! To make this
kind of historical reference, one needs rigor and decent scholarship. Michael Billig
is an exception, a felicitous one. Everyone is too busy grabbing, asserting,
occupying the field! This rashness may deserve our admiration and the underlying
attitudes should perhaps not be criticized. Yet we must also be aware that this kind
of attitudes are often linked with a denial of the spirit of dialogue, of a certain
continuity of ideas. And it may even have the effect of splitting our research
community further apart. Recently, a number of books have devoted chapters to the
psychology of language, analysis of discourse, and so on. I have been struck by the
lack not only of references - after all, everyone is free to have some or not - but of
discussion of my work and, above all of that, of Ragnar Rommetweit. He is a deep
thinker ! It was he who opened the way to a criticism of Chomskian linguistics!
Despite this, linguistics is mentioned as if he had never written anything about it. I
could give more examples, but it is useless. I sometimes think that the habit of
referring to other people's (past and present work) in order to give meaning to one's
own is a "Mitteleuropa" sickness. It is a question of intellectual style and norms!
***
Mach's relativism is grounded on the idea that there are no foundations, nothing
"absolute". This prompted Einstein to say that Mach's relativism is good for
destroying but not for constructing. Thus the tendency to think of truth as something
that does not exist and ultimately as something that must not exist is a phenomena
of the modern age. There is some reason to believe that this tendency first appeared
in 19th century positivism. At the same time as the tendency to believe in the end if
ideology or the end of metaphysics from which we should free ourselves. Which
Rorty expressed when he said that "we should curse ourselves from our
metaphysical needs". This is why I think that constructionism epistemologically
assimilates many things that it rejects. Of course, when it mentions truth,
foundation, etc., - the point must not be overlooked -, the connotations are negative,
they are put between inverted commas. And this is interesting for our theory.
Because the social representation of knowledge retains "truth" and "falseness", f.i.
as basic cultural categories, just as the social representation of religion retains the
categories of "sacred" and "profane". So somewhere it seems to be understood that
constructionism is true, right, and the other points of view are false, wrong.
Otherwise one would not grasp wherefrom he draws the certritude of being
"radical", being in the right, while the others are not "radical" and, on top of that,
are wrong.
I say all this with a heart all the lighter as I have never been a positivism. In my
youth, I was more on the marxistic line. And later, when I did some research on the
history and philosophy of science, it was under the guidance of my master
Alexandre Koyr=E9 who was radically antipositivistic. Writing this at my age, I feel
like old Jacob saying to his son: "Your hands are the hands of Esau, but the voice is
the voice of Jacob".
***
Why do I tell you all that ? Because I came upon the notion of
constructionism in the context of the theory of social representations and
understood it as a theoretical, not a metatheoretical one. My effort was to
offer a plausible model of how knowledge and meaning are shared, and why
transformation, generation of knowledge, cannot but be a social process, not
an individual one. And that is important. Actually most researchers Deriabin
alludes to assert that construction IS a social (meta-theory). But my point of
view is that they do not show why it is NECESSARILY social (theory). If
they wanted to, then they could not do without the idea of social
representation. As it was the case with Searle when he wanted to study the
construction of social reality. I do not mean that the individual aspects are
negligible, or that the individual counts for nothing. But the social is
logically unavoidable as a basic "ingredient", because a way of representing
is also a way of communicating.
***
1. Vico and Marx, according to whom we know society because we made it.
***
***
Mauss said that "taboos are made to be violated". And I think I have violated
a taboo in my work about social representations, by often giving them the
form of essays, speculations. I have attempted always to lean on, yet
avoiding to imitate the argumentative rigor of standard scientific exposition.
The comparative looseness of logical texture gives the possibility of
experimental reflexions, which is more designed to explore than to
assertively conclude. Of course this leaves oneself vulnerable to criticism. In
fact, I wanted to leave my work open to discussion and invite the
contributions of others. I have been wrong and right. I have been wrong,
because critics have had it good and everyone feels entitled to teach me a
lesson, to tell what I must do or not do. And I have been right, because the
theory has greatly benefited from the discussion and contribution of others.
Whether one likes it or not, the theory of social representations has been
here for over thirty years and the number of those who took interest in and
contributed to it has kept growing. The theory has not become an institution
or a thing, it is still a theory in the making.
One should have a very bleak view of human knowledge to dissent with
Deriabin's questions. And because the theory is such as it is today, some
researchers of his generation will certainly give practical, creative answers
to his questions. Unless there is a compensation benefit to be got from the
present fragmentation of our discipline. The rigidity one observes today may
be due to the fact that most social psychologists have started by being
experimentalists, individualists, and later were converted to constructivism,
the social and language. But it is my task to analyse the cause of their
attitude. On the contrary, I can say, as an answer to one of Deriabin's
questions, that the fury or silence with which the results of my work meet
here or there can probably be partly explained by the fact that the theory of
social representations is complex and does not easily boil down to a
proposition that one can easily verify or falsify if one has a mind to. Nor to
a formula that can be started unreservedly, which in my opinion is particular
to every scientific proposition.
***
Marisa, I was wondering how to conclude this long rambling on Internet for
which you gave me the opportunity. It was a kind of holiday, a cathartic
experience, after ending a book which is so personal. Then I remembered a
proposal made once - before I used the e-mail of Internet myself - to study
precisely how common sense, the language exchanged, groups themselves
are shaped in this cybercommunication. Finally, it would be a nice way of
meeting and putting some ideas together. So the story will go on !
28 Apr - 27 May 1997
Serge Moscovici <moscovic@msh-paris.fr>
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