I.

Intent to kill
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of
the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege
in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo. 8 Intent to kill, being a state of
mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e.,
the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, 9 we considered the following
factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances
under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We
have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and
the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. 10|||
(De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 178512, [November 26, 2014])

After all, it is settled that "[i]ntent to kill cannot be automatically

drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is
dangerous to life." 50 Rather, "[a]nimus interficendi must be established
with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of
the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence
of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable
doubt." 51
This is not to say that petitioner is without any criminal liability. When
the intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are shown to have been inflicted
upon the victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated or
attempted homicide but physical injuries only. 52
||| (Etino v. People, G.R. No. 206632, [February 14, 2018])

II. Mere Allegations

The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be
given credence. When the complainant relies on mere conjectures and
suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.||| (Morales, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No.
208086, [July 27, 2016])

Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be preferred to

indicate that the accused had taken part in it.40 Mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. (G.R. No. 208341,
June 17, 2015 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. MA. NIMFA
P. DE VILLA)

III. Rehashed MR

This is not the first time that the Court disallowed the repetitive filing of
identical motions against an interlocutory order. In a parallel case, San
Juan, Jr. v. Cruz,[22] the Court acknowledged that there is actually no rule
prohibiting the filing of a pro forma motion against an interlocutory order
as the prohibition applies only to a final resolution or order of the court.
The Court held, nonetheless, that a second motion can be denied on the
ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of the grounds and
arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. (PNB vs. THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN ET. AL., G.R. NO.
182507; June 18, 2010)

Petitioners above contention, as well as the arguments, citations, and

premises holding it together, is a rehash of their previous position
articulated in their memorandum[12] in support of their petition. They
have been considered, squarely addressed, and found to be without merit
in the Decision subject hereof. The Court is not inclined to embark on
another extended discussion of the same issue again.
(H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Et. al. Vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, et. al, G.R. No. 188456,
FEBRUARY 10, 2010)