ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v.

LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta and she
gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.
Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their
rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land in his favor.
Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran executed an “Affidavit
of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The
Registry of Deeds then issued the title in her name.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against
Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever
to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the
RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd right as putative
heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC‘s dismissal of
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as
heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of
the title issued in her name
HELD:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could
be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status
as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

MARCOS II V CA GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997

Monday, January 26, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Taxation

Facts: Following the death of former President Marcos in 1989, a Special Tax Audit Team was created on
June 27, 1990 to conduct investigations and examinations of tax liabilities of the late president, his family,
associates and cronies. The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of
death of the decedent estate tax return and income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1986, all in violation
of the Tax Code. Criminal charges were field against Mrs. Marcos for violation of Secs. 82, 83 and 84, NIRC.

The CIR thereby caused the preparation of the estate tax return for the estate of the late president, the
income returns of the Marcos spouses for 1985 and 1986 and the income tax returns of petitioner Marcos
II for 1982 to 1985. On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued deficiency estate tax assessments and the
corresponding deficiency income tax assessments. Copies of deficiency estate and income tax
assessments were served personally and constructively on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon
Mrs. Marcos. Likewise, copies of the deficiency income tax assessments against petitioner Marcos were
personally and constructively served. Formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos on
October 20, 1992.

The deficiency tax assessments were not administratively protested by the Marcoses within 30 days from
service thereof. Subsequently, the CIR issued a total of 30 notices to levy on real property against certain
parcels of land and other real property owned by Marcoses.

Notices of sale at public auction were duly posted at the Tacloban City Hall and the public auction for the
sale of 11 parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no bidder, the lots were declared forfeited
in favor of the government.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an application for TRO before the CA to annul
and set aside the notices of levy as well as the notice of sale and to enjoin the BIR from proceeding with
the auction. The CA dismissed the petition ruling that the deficiency assessments for the estate and
income taxes have already become final and unappealable and may thus be enforced by summary remedy
of levying upon the real property.

Issue: Whether or not the proper avenue of assessment and collection was taken by respondent bureau.

Held: Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required for filing the same,
petitioner and other Marcos heirs never questioned the assessment served upon them, allowing the same
to lapse into finality, and prompting the BIR to collect said taxes by levying upon the properties left by the
late President Marcos.

The Notice of Levy upon real property were issued within the prescriptive period and in accordance with
Sec. 222 of the Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having become final, executory and demandable,
the same can now be collected through the summary remedy of distraint and levy pursuant to Sec. 205
of the Tax Code.

41. BERNARDO vs CA
G.R. No. L–18148 February 28, 1963
RULE 73 - VENUE AND PROCESS
Facts:
Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his wife, cousins all surnamed
Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Reyes (wife) died the
following year. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of Capili, she was substituted
by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all
surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. The executor filed a
project of partition in the estate proceedings in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the
estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Reyes, whose share was allotted to
her collateral relatives. These relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project of partition and
submitted a counter-projection of their own claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Capili on the theory that they belong not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses.
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for the reason that it falls under Article 133
of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the
court disapproved both project of partitions and directed the executor to file another, dividing the
property mentioned in the last will and testament of Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of
donation, between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were
conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not a probate court in a special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
deed of donation in question and pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned in the will.
Held:
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Court held that the determination of title to property
is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The probate court has the jurisdiction since there
is a necessity to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which
is to be distributed among heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including the widow, now
represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who appeared voluntarily.
The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the
claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in question the issue of ownership of the
properties is within the competence of the probate court.

lipio v CA (Obligations and Contracts)

Alipio v CA
GR No. 134100
September 29, 2000

EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS - DEATH

FACTS:
(1) Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he
subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and
the Manuel Spouses.
(2) The sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00.
(3) Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed
away on December 1, 1988.

RTC: Surviving spouse should pay. The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit
together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion
from the case.

CA: Surviving spouse should pay. It is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming
that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation.

ISSUE: (1) Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by
the conjugal partnership of gains, or
(2) whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

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APPLICABLE LAW/S:

• Rule 3. Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. When the action is for the recovery of money
arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the
court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person.

• Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter
is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. (1137a)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

HELD: (1) Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is liable. It is clear that Climaco
had a cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action
for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one
that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought
against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and
settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers
of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court
having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a
de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership
prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void. the inventory of the Alipios'
conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such
power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate
and not to any other court.

(2) The obligation is joint. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many
equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another. Clearly, the
liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is
chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be
divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.

Camaya v. Patulandon
FACTS:
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein
she devised a Lot to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan.
During her lifetime, the Rufina herself filed the Petition for the Probate of her Will
before the CFI.
Later, on June 27, 1973, the Rufina executed a codicil modifying her will by devising
the said Lot in favor of her four children Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia,
Huillerma and Juan (all surnamed Patulandong), and her grandson Mangulabnan –
Codicil modified the share of Grandson to the extent of 1/5.
Grandson Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of
the title of Lot, but Patulandong refused to heed the request because of the codicial
which modified the will of the testatrix.
Thus, Grandson Mangulabnan filed an ‘Action for Partition’ against Patulandong in
the RTC. The court in this partition ordered the partitioning of the property. However,
the court holds that ‘the partition is without prejudice to the probate of the codicil in
accordance with the Rules of Court.’
So, by virtue of the decision in partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation
of the title of the testatrix over Lot 288-A, and another TCT was issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot no. 288-A by a Deed of
Sale, and thus, a TCT was issued under the name of the Camayas.
However, when the decision of the probate court came, admitting the codicil,
it ruled as null and void, Deed of Sale in favor of the Camayas, and the
corresponding TCT issued in their name,
Further, Register of Deeds was ordered to issue instead corresponding certificates of
titles to the aforesaid four children of the testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to
the extent of 1/5 each pursuant to the codicil.
The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR.
Probate court
Denied this.
CA
Affirmed the decision of the probate court.

Thus, the case was brought to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void
and ordered the cancellation of the TCT of Camayas and the deed of sale.
2.Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance of the codicil.
HELD:
1.As to the first issue, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the
deed of sale as null and void, and also as to the cancellation of the TCTs under the
name of the Camayas.
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should not be included in the inventory.
If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession
of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion
of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate.
It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership
of the property. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the deed
of sale and the titles of the Camayas as null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
2.As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it
in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by
law; and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the
legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
Petitioners’ argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was
not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was
“without prejudice [to] … the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the prevailing
parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.

Emilio Pacioles v. Miguela Chuatoco-Ching

Facts:
1.Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her huband (petitioner) and two minor
children.
2.Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.
3.Miguelita’s mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. That the bulk of the estate is composed of paraphernal properties. She wished
to be appointed. She also said that she has direct and material interest in the estate because
she gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased on conditio ntaht they would
undertake a business endeavor as partners.
4.The mother asked that one Emmanuel be appointed.
5.Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-administrator.
6.No claims were filed. Thereafter, Emilio filed an inventory.
Emmanuel failed to file one.
7.Court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
8.Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax and
the partition and distribution of the estate.
9.RTC denied the petition as to the partition and distribution. CA affirmed.
Issue:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
Held:
1. General Rule:
a.jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased
persons but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings
.
i. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.
b.A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory
i.Pastor v. CA
1.As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title
2. Reliance to Pastor v. CA

a. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim.
Such reliance
is misplaced
.
b. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the
intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership
is merely to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory
. The facts of
this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
i.
First
, the inventory was not disputed.
1. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and
sought the exclusion of the
specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers
. But instead of doing so,
she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the
real estate properties.
ii. Second, Emmanuel (respondent’s son) did not file an inventory
1.
He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties
which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to
submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
2.Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its
proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is
well- settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions,
that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the
estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of
an intestate or probate proceedings.
The intestate or probate court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
a.
Jurisprudence states that:
i. probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards
said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so.
3. Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse
claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested

Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012
(Special Proceedings – Adoption)
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement
of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate.
Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana
Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and
the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who
passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her
adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a
copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the
General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on
Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, “imputations
of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had
already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the
local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil
registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records
kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These
certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast a
“cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.