Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Summary of Performance*
Performance Bands Bands Bands Bands Bands Bands Bands
Components Excellent Very Good Good Fair Weak Poor Not
(H1) (H2.1) (H2.2) (H3) applicable
Marks range:
Marks
60-69%
Marks Marks Marks range:
Marks
range: range: range: below
range:
70-100% 50-59% 40-49% 35%
35-39%
Attention to
assignment task
Analysis
Structure
Use of sources
References
Introduction
Conclusion
Spelling/Grammar
Presentation (Style)
* This table facilitates the assessment of your performance in selected components of your assignment, and is designed to alert
you to the general areas of strength and/ or in need of improvement in your work. Please note that the components are not equal
in terms of contribution to your overall mark. Attention to Assignment Task, Analysis and Structure are the three most
important criteria for assessment. Please note that the total mark indicated is based on an evaluation of your overall
performance in the set assignment.
Summary Comments
Annotated Feedback
(Refer to Assignment for the sections relating to the following comments)
1.
2.
Do you think Descartes’ philosophy offers a solution to radical scepticism?
Introduction
One feature that characterised the beginning of the modern philosophical period was the rejection
of the medieval reliance on qualitative descriptions in philosophical discourse. As Descartes
developed the method with which he would investigate the nature of his existence, he was
resolute in his belief that a proper understanding of the universe must be formulated in
quantitative terms. He was in the company of other great thinkers of his era such as Galileo who
expressed a similar conviction in 1623 when assessing the requirements for examining the natural
world:
Philosophy is written in this grand book [that is nature], the universe, which stands continually open
to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language
and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics and its
characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible
to understand a single word of it. (Stillman: 1957,238)
German mathematician Johannes Kepler and British natural philosophers Robert Hooke and
Francis Bacon all held similar opinions regarding the necessity for a mathematical model to form
the basis for an investigation into the true nature of the world around them (De
Grazia:1980,320). This new rationalist challenge to the authority of an ecclesiastical or classical
philosophical interpretation of the world would eventually lead Descartes to cultivate a hypothesis
regarding the certainty of our knowledge.
The following essay will determine whether or not Descartes' theory of the nature of his
existence, and the process of using reason to acquire higher forms of knowledge are adequate to
rebut arguments posited by radical scepticism. The remainder of the essay consists of three main
parts: beginning with an outline of Descartes' philosophy and examination of the components and
overall structure of the argument, as detailed in his Discourse on Method that lead him to assert
“...I think, hence I am...” . Next, in order to succinctly address the main question it will be
necessary to more fully understand how philosophical scepticism differs from ordinary incredulity
and in these terms discover what kind of argument radical scepticism makes. Finally, the
definition of “clarity and distinctness” as Descartes considered it will be juxtaposed with the core
argument of radical scepticism in order to determine whether Descartes is successful in his
attempt to make his philosophy successfully refute the radical sceptic argument.
This clarifies his position as a rationalist thinker who believes that higher forms of knowledge can
be gained through internal contemplation and deduction using a theoretical framework of
geometry-based logic as opposed to building knowledge through experience alone. This is the
philosophical background to the statement “I think, hence I am” otherwise known as The Cogito.
Descartes places the ultimate importance on the formation of and principles contained
within the Cogito, so much so that he makes it the cornerstone of his entire philosophy. As he
begins to contemplate the consequences of the Cogito he says:
...I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however
extravagant, could be alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without
scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.
(Descartes:1987,30)
It is at this point that the use of doubt will be returned to and examined in more detail. Descartes
employs doubting not as a form of Pyrrhonism or other tool of radical scepticism, but rather he
employs doubt in a systematic way in order to complement the other aspects of his method.
Descartes defines his knowledge by the absence of doubt, if he can demonstrate an absence of
the possibility of doubting the truth of his statement, he eliminates all except complete certainty.
The rational behind and resulting indubitability through systematic doubting is outlined by
Descartes during the fourth Discourse:
...I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground
for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly
indubitable (Descartes:1987,30).
Descartes, having thus far established how his method will accomplish the task of attaining truth,
next implements the method to examine the nature of his own existence. During the beginning of
the fourth Discourse Descartes compares his waking and non-waking thoughts in terms of their
relationship to the possibility of falseness and concludes that they are equally susceptible to being
false.
...when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake
may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I
supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had
in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams (Descartes:1987,30).
It is in the next sentences of the fourth Discourse that Descartes reveals the nub of his argument
summarised as such: since I can doubt the evidence of my senses (as previously established), I
can doubt all that my senses tell me i.e. that the world and its constituent parts including my
body exist. What I cannot doubt however, is that I am in the process of thinking that I am
doubting. I cannot remove or separate the process of doubting from the process of thinking and
vice versa. Therefore I am thinking and if I am thinking I cannot doubt that I exist, because in
doing so, I would only confirm that I am thinking.
I think, therefore I am.
This demonstrates the self evident nature of the Cogito and how the rationalist approach attempts
to argue towards higher knowledge that is unattainable through sensory experience. The Cogito
demonstrates that no experience or sensory interaction with the world is necessary in order to
draw its conclusion, it can be deduced from from the knowledge already held by Descartes. This
process of deduction from inherently held knowledge involves and propagates many aspects of
philosophical procedure including; the epistemic closure principle, the intuition/deduction thesis
and a priori knowledge and its utilisation from a rationalist perspective. These elements of
philosophy, though constituents of the Cogito, cannot be fully expanded upon during the course of
this essay, but what can be said is that they are all criticised in equal measure by radical
scepticism. What can be expressed now is that a priori knowledge relies upon a priori justification
which according to (Russell, 2007) “...is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense,
independent of experience”. But a priori knowledge is considered unattainable by radical
scepticism, this will be discussed later as it is now appropriate to differentiate between normal
incredulity and philosophical scepticism.
Conclusion
The Cartesian circle has generated huge amounts of philosophical discourse because it
pertains to and involves so many elements of philosophical interest. As Gewirth (1970:669)
observes
These issues of the Cartesian circle are of more than antiquarian interest. They bear on perennially
important problems of certainty, and they underlie much of the history of twentieth-century
philosophy which consists in a series of reactions to Descartes's metaphysics.
As previously mentioned the Pyrrhonian sceptics withheld assent to all non-evident propositions
and as illustrated radical scepticism also must hold a similar position regarding the issue of
Descartes' philosophy specifically with respect to the Cogito. Descartes' method of logical
deduction leads him into propositions that he perceives to be inherently clear and distinct in their
truthfulness and therefore without doubt; so it is essentially the validity of Descartes' deductive
reasoning that is under attack from the radical sceptical perspective.
As mentioned, Descartes seems to employ the Memory response as a method of
displacing the sceptics' argument regarding the circularity of his deductive reasoning. According to
Kekes (1975:35) however the central target of a sceptics attack is the process, not the noun
which results from the process:
The sceptic attacks the possibility of knowledge, certainty, or justified belief only indirectly. His
primary target is the process-reasoning-which allegedly yields the reliable conclusion. If reasoning is
successfully challenged, then the rationality of any of its products becomes ipso facto dubious.
Book References:
Descartes, R. (2006) René Descartes Meditations, Objections and Replies Eds Ariew, R., Cress, D.
Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company Inc.
Descartes, R. (1989) Discourse on Method and the Meditations Trans. John Veitch N.Y.:
Prometheus Books
Stillman, D. (1957) The Assayer, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co
Journal References:
De Grazia, M. (1980) The Secularization of Language in the Seventeenth Century:Journal of the
History of Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 319-329 Pennsylvania:University of Pennsylvania Press
Gewirth, A. (1970) The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67, No. 19,
pp. 668-685 N.Y.:Journal of Philosophy
Kekes, J. (1975) The Case for Scepticism The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 98, pp. 28-39
Oxford:Blackwell Publishing
Lawn, C. (2008) Oscail Course Notes Philosophy 1 Foundation Dublin:Oscail
Pritchard, D. (2002) Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Closure Theoria, Vol.
68, No. 2, pp. 129-161 University of Stirling:Stiftelsen Theoria
Van Cleve, J. (1979) Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle The
Philosophical Review, Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 55-91 North Carolina:Duke University Press
Web References:
Klein, P. (2005) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/#1
Markie, P. (2008) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/
Russell, B. (2007) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/