THREE WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY*
ARTHUR F. HOLMESt
HIS paper is concerned with Dr. Zuur-
deeg's view of the nature of philoso-
phy in general and of an analytic philos-
ophy of religion in particular.' It will be
argued that it is possible to avoid the di-
lemma he presents. Whereas he implies
that all philosophers accept either the ide-
alist conception of philosophy as a deduc-
tive and conclusive superscience or else a
linguistic-analytic conception, the attempt
will here be made to slip between the horns
of this dilemma and to employ a third
method of doing philosophy, more tradi-
tional than either of the others. Accord-
ingly, we shall examine (1) his criticism
of the idealist conception, (2) his modifi-
cation of the analytic conception, and (3)
the third alternative to be developed.
1. The "idealist" is said to take philos-
ophy as a means of establishing "by the
use of reason, the true meaning of life, the
real value of things, the intrinsic nature
of the universe, the Absolute, or God." It
is a "higher"way, calling people to a high-
er life, and harmonizing all realms of ex-
perience.2 It should be noted that this is
not simply philosophy "in the grand style"
seeking a broad, interrelated overview; it
suggests a dogmatic system, complete and
inflexible; it is a means of establishing and
attaining, by pure reason, the absolute na-
ture of reality and value.
It may be noted that such a conception
of philosophy describes only some, not all,
* A paper read at a meeting of the Northern
Illinois PhilosophicalSociety, November,1960.
t Arthur F. Holmes is associate professorand
directorof philosophyat WheatonCollege,Whea-
ton, Illinois. A native of Dover, England, he
served in the Royal Air Force during World War
II, then completedundergraduatework at Whea-
ton, followed by an M.A. degreein theology. He
has the Ph.D. degreein philosophy from North-
western University. He has written for Chris-
tianity Today and other journals.
206
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non-linguistic philosophers. The ideal of
philosophy as a deductive, purely rational
science, seems for example to be foreign to
Socrates,to Aristotle-perhaps also to Plato
-foreign to Kant, to Mill, to Scottish real-
ism and its twentieth-centuryheirs. But it
is understandable that one confessing the
Christian faith should find it objectionable
and be tempted to "discover"its workings
in less ambitious metaphysicians. In effect,
it would replace creaturely modesty with
godlike self-confidence and the conflicts of
religion with the higher synthesis of philos-
ophy-as was implied in Hegel's dialectical
view of history. Accordingly, Professor
Zuurdeeg asserts that "convictional world
views replace convictors," so that "many
people no longer believe, strictly speaking,
in a God but in a Weltanschauung."3We
learn that "man-speaking-metaphysically
regards philosophy as a savior," because
"a closed system demands a philosophy-
savior."4
It must be emphasized that these ob-
jections, themselves convictional, presup-
pose that the "idealist" regards philosophy
per se not only as building world views but
also as giving demonstrative certainty to
thought and ultimate value to life. It may
be agreed that philosophy does not provide
demonstrative certainty, does not give in-
controvertible conclusions. But is it nec-
essarily the case that even the idealist finds
life's ultimate value in the system, per se,
that he looks to philosophy for life and
hope? Did the nineteenth-centuryGerman
philosophersaim to save men by means of
their world views? Or did they seek in
their world views to express the nature and
structure of the reality and values that do
save-whether a historical dialectic, a crea-
tive will, or whatever? They may have
erroneouslylooked to history, to nature, or
to transcendentalspirit for help-but even
 THREEWAYSOF DOINGPHILOSOPHY
Hegel viewed his philosophy as only the
expression of spirit. Hegel did not try to
"save" men; his philosophy did not pre-
tend to do so; "salvation" presumably lies
in the historical unfolding of the Absolute
as it absorbs its every particular expres-
sion. To say that Hegel's dialectic absorbs
religion into philosophy does not mean that
his philosophy becomes a religion. Dr.
Zuurdeeg, then, seems to have mistaken
the fact that some philosophersdiscuss the
purported sources of man's hope for the
supposition that philosophy itself is their
source of hope. He confuses their philoso-
phy of religion with religion itself.
A philosophy of religion, as part of a
philosophical Weltanschauung,is admitted-
ly something of a credo. It expresses the
values and convictions of its advocates.
Zuurdeeg is correct in regarding this as
inevitable: Wilhelm Dilthey's Weltan-
schauungslehremakes it plain that man op-
erates in a value-centric predicament;
philosophic reasoning cannot be isolated
from the motives of the philosopher or the
crises of his culture. It is the task of the
philosopher of religion to explore actual re-
ligions, his own included. This is not only
inevitable, it is also desirable. It is part of
the cultural function of philosophy-not to
build a God-substitutebut to conceptualize
and clarify the Lebenswelt, including the
perspective provided by the philosopher's
own values and convictions, and to expli-
cate this viewpoint, with the perspectives
it gives, in all possible phases of life and
experience. This, it may be emphasized, is
desirable. Conceptualization, clarification,
and explicitness are indispensableprerequi-
sites for analysis, for evaluation, and for
action. The world view is not an end in it-
self; but it is a very desirable means to
other ends.
This value-centric predicament, how-
ever, places men on the horns of a dilem-
ma. Either their philosophies will vary as
widely as their basic values and an ir-
reducible philosophical relativism like that
of Dilthey results, or else they fall prone
to dogmatism, even naiYvet6,in asserting
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207
uncritically the truth of their own particu-
lar positions. But this dilemma can be
avoided if one avoids uncritical assertions,
unscrutinized presuppositions, provincial
outlooks, unanalyzed contentions. In other
words, the value-centric predicament need
not be fatal to progress in philosophy pro-
vided the philosopherrecognizeshis Lebens-
welt as being prephilosophical and seeks
the philosophical rigor which it needs.
Such rigor we have learned to expect from
British analysis, and it must now be ques-
tioned whether Zuurdeeg really expects
help in this regard from this source.
2. The analytic conception of philoso-
phy, to which Dr. Zuurdeeg draws atten-
tion, stresses the analysis of language in
terms of either logical syntax or ordinary
usage. This conception, adequate in the
case of mathematical and scientific lan-
guage, he regards as insufficient when one
investigates the convictional languages of
religion, morals, and Weltanschauungen,
where a man's value-centric predicament
becomes apparent. "We have to analyze
not only the language itself, but also the
language situation."5Logical analysis must
give way to situational analysis. The man
who speaks becomes more important than
what he speaks, for his language is simply
the means of "establishing his existence."
Accordingly,Zuurdeegintroduces the prin-
ciples of situational analysis-the nature
of conviction and the convictor, the act of
assent and the role of the confessional
group, the "power"exerted by language in
society, etc.
All such investigations are tremendously
important. The only question is whether
they constitute the work of philosophy or
that of psychology and sociology. Is this
a philosophical approach to, and criticism
of, values, or is it a sociological one? Is
this a philosophy of religion or an ap-
proach to the psychology and sociology of
religion? Is this a philosophical or a psy-
chological examination of world views?
And if it is psychological rather than phil-
osophical analysis, can it provide the rig-
orous self-criticism necessary to the avoid-
208 THE JOURNALOF RELIGION
ance of both relativism and dogmatism?
Undoubtedly, the philosopher should be
aware of relevant psychological and socio-
logical contributions. The psychological re-
lation between values, interests, and needs
provides basis for work in value theory.
The psychology of belief has interested
philosophers ever since the days of David
Hume and Thomas Reid. John Henry
Newman's Grammar of Assent should be
read by philosophers even today. It gives
insight into the relationship between be-
lieving and thinking, or, if one prefers, be-
tween convictional and scientific language.
Such psychological analysis has its philo-
sophical implications, but it is still psy-
chology rather than philosophy. It seems,
therefore, that Dr. Zuurdeeg is psycho-
analyzing us rather than joining in the
philosophical dialogue. As a psychoanalyst
he may help us to understand ourselves,
just as the existentialist has done, but he
has neither established criteria for the
philosophicalevaluation of world views nor
engaged in the philosophical discussion of
values and religion. He may be simply
continuing the tradition of Dilthey's Welt-
anschauungslehreor Jasper's Psychology of
World Views, but he has failed to expose
values and faith to scientific thought and
philosophic analysis.
If this is the case, it means that philos-
ophers are asked to abdicate their historic
task in areas where convictions show up.
This would be a sad day not only for phi-
losophy but also for conviction. Followed
consistently, it would dim the light of rea-
son and of clear thought; it would lead to
fuzzy thinking, distorted values, and un-
co-ordinatedactivity. Without philosophical
analysis and criticism man forfeits the
means of avoiding the dogmatism or else
the relativism that stems from our value-
centric predicament. His hopes for a phil-
osophically respectable and logically de-
fensible world view are dashed to the
ground. In addition, without logical analy-
sis he tends to lose cognitive meanings and
thus the means of communication.He loses
the right to predication and with it the
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truth value of religious, moral, and meta-
physical language.
This, of course, raises the further ques-
tion of the relation between convictional
and indicative language. Professor Zuur-
deeg asserts that we communicate convic-
tions by witness rather than by analogical
predication; we validate them by living
and not by scientific or historical evidence
or philosophical argument. Convictions
stand immune from any logical validation
or invalidation.6 But can this actually be
what is meant? Is there no philosophical
reason for preferring monotheism to poly-
theism, or even Christianity to Marxism?
Is a young child's conviction, created by
fairyland convictors, that the moon is a
ball of green cheese immune from scien-
tific attack? Is the belief in the Easter
Bunny on the same philosophical level as
a belief in God? Is the difference one of
convictional seriousness alone? Both Cas-
sirer and Urban have pointed out that
linguistic science is opposed to the positiv-
ist tendency of regardingcertain sentences
as either exclusively emotive or exclusive-
ly indicative. The language situation is
never that simple. And if sentences are not
merely either emotive or indicative but
are, rather, both in varying degrees, then,
to the extent that convictional statements
are indicative or predicational-to that ex-
tent-they are amenable to logical, his-
torical, or scientific investigation, and phi-
losophy will have to be reinstated in a more
traditional role.
To segregate convictional language from
the logical and scientificsounds like Kierke-
gaard's overstatement of his case against
the idealistic conception of philosophy.
Such exaggerations are by no means new
in the history of thought. Tertullian's re-
action against gnostic rationalismproduced
a polemic against philosophy in general.
Pascal, reacting against Cartesian ration-
alism, became convinced of the equipol-
lence of all philosophical arguments re-
garding God. But the verdict of history
seems to be that these men were the vic-
tims of their convictions and their histori-
 THREE WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY
cal situations because they lacked the phil-
osophical criticism which would have both
unfrocked the dogmatism of "Q.E.D. ra-
tionalism" and prevented their own fi-
deistic skepticism. Likewise existentialism.
In rejecting Hegelian essentialism, Kierke-
gaard overstated his case and propounded
an antimetaphysical position. It is signifi-
cant that he did so by ridicule and rhetoric,
not by logical analysis. That his was in-
deed an overstatement is made evident by
the fact that his successors now probe the
essence of existence and give us new ontol-
ogies. Heidegger, to cite one example, does
not fall into the essentialist trap. He treats
the term "being" not in abstraction but in
terms of its history. But he also avoids
the existentialist's antiphilosophical over-
statement. The point is that, when he ex-
amines concepts such as freedom, angst,
existenz, and sein, he cannot help but phi-
losophize and ontologize.7 We must there-
fore desegregate convictional and scien-
tific language, value and fact, religion and
metaphysics.
3. The point of the foregoing comments
should now become clear. It is by no means
evident that the idealist and linguistic
analysis conceptions of philosophy, as Pro-
fessor Zuurdeeg speaks of them, are the
only alternatives in the field. To eliminate
the one does not establish the other. These
are not the only options. It may be ques-
tioned whether before the revolution in
philosophy they could ever have been so
regarded. In fact, in the Preface to the
second edition of his first Critique, Im-
manuel Kant indicates three types of phi-
losophy. What he calls "dogmatism" may
be seen not only in Leibniz and Wolff but
also in the Hegelians. It is what has here
been called the "idealist" method. "Skep-
ticism" may be seen not only in Hume but
also in linguistic analysts who, like Hume,
preclude metaphysics. Kant's "critical"
philosophy, however, did not abandon
metaphysics, nor did it abdicate to either
semantics or psychoanalysis. It worked on
epistemological reconstruction as the pro-
legomenon to any future metaphysics. It
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209
examined the metaphysical foundations of
morals. It may not have succeeded in build-
ing a dogmatic Weltanschauung, a closed
system that establishes beyond doubt the
intrinsic nature of the universe, nor in
opening the way to a new scientifically
oriented metaphysic. But neither did it
wholly forsake philosophy "in the grand
style." We may not agree with Kant's
epistemological reconstruction or with his
moral phenomenology.But neither dare we
assume that other such attempts at a third
philosophic method cannot be made.
J. F. Herbart regardedhimself as a suc-
cessor of Kant. For him, too, dogmatism
and skepticism were not the only alterna-
tives. The business of philosophy, he as-
serts, is to probe and refine the general
concepts of experience and the sciences, to
analyze their meaning and interrelations,
and, insofar as is possible, to develop them
into a harmoniouswhole.
The same could be said of many twen-
tieth-century realists in their appeal to
common sense, to the unavoidable presup-
positions of human life and thought. Like
G. E. Moore they seek to analyze the pur-
ported truisms of common sense. They re-
ject both the idealistic and the skeptical
views of philosophy. Their analysis is
more in the tradition of Herbart than of
Hume. They analyze concepts, not lan-
guage per se. And although their con-
ceptual analysis employs semantical and
phenomenological devices, yet they per-
sistently deal with a world of independent
realities. This is the third method of doing
philosophy.
It may be objected that the appeal to
common sense, to the basic commitments
of human life and thought, confuses the
logical with the convictional. It should,
rather, be said that this simply affirmsthat
philosophy begins in an existential matrix
rather than ex nihilo and so recognizes the
essential interdependenceof knowledge and
values, which is precisely what the exis-
tentialists have taught us and what Dr.
Zuurdeeg recognizes. Even Kant's "pure
reason" was not wholly free from its con-
210 THE JOURNALOF RELIGION
victions. He had his Lebenswelt: he had
been raised a Pietist; he had his values
and distrusted the encroaching mechanistic
world view. Yet what he did, he did not
only under the motivation of his convic-
tions but also under the relentless scrutiny
of an incisive and intellectually honest
mind. He realized that, if his convictions
were to withstand the encroachments of
scientific thought, he must establish their
philosophical legitimacy.
Was Kant right? With respect to his
own presuppositions and conclusions, one
may think not (unless a Kantian). But
with respect to his refusal to be either a
dogmatist or a skeptic, he was completely
right. Professor Zuurdeeg most commend-
ably rejects the dogmatist conception of
philosophy. But, less commendably, he
sees no alternative to a philosophical skep-
ticism in convictional matters. Of course,
he prefers to speak of an "analytic" rather
than a "skeptical" philosophy. Yet as phi-
losophy, we have argued, it is skeptical;
as psychology, it may well be analytic.
We have also suggested that, as psycho-
logical analysis, it is prevented from be-
coming philosophical and metaphysical by
its exclusive emphasis on language situa-
tions. Situational analysis is unsatisfactory
by itself. Traditional philosophic questions
are of perennial concern and are neither
fully resolved nor even fully understood
by such means. One might also argue that
linguistic analysis is also unsatisfactory be-
cause it is too limited-a fact which led
Zuurdeegto his innovations.
At this point it will help to pause and
delineate more carefully the nature of this
third way of doing philosophy, prefacing
such a statement with the reminder that
the so-called idealist and linguistic meth-
ods are both relatively recent in the history
of philosophy. Our "third way" is more
traditional as well as still applicable. We
shall observe (a) its starting point, (b) its
procedure,and (c) its outcome.
a) The starting point of philosophy is
the existential matrix, the Lebenswelt with
its precritical beliefs, concepts, attitudes,
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and values. It has been designated by such
phrases as "common sense," "natural be-
lief," "linguistic situation," etc., although
such designations presently seem to be
either ambiguous or else too narrow. "Lin-
guistic situation," I suggest, is too narrow;
so is "ordinary language"; they assume
that subsequent methodology is purely lin-
guistic-that some form of the study of
language is the key to an understanding
of man and his world. "Common sense"
sounds healthy, but it smacks of a naive
realismwhich refuses to be refined.Dewey's
phrase "existential matrix" is perhaps as
inclusive and apt as any.
b) The procedure of philosophy is con-
ceptual analysis, rather than just the nom-
inalists' scrutiny of words and their ex-
tensional meaning. Conceptual analysis is
a philosophical examination of the exis-
tential matrix with its beliefs, ideas, atti-
tudes, and values; the critical scrutiny of
the intensional meaning of both "common
sense" views and more relative concepts;
the relentless activity of an incisive and
intellectually honest mind. Conceptual
analysis will draw on psychological and
sociological considerations, to be sure, just
as it will take into account matters of fact
drawn from the natural sciences. It may
make use of phenomenological considera-
tions, as do H. H. Price and R. W. Sellars,
and of linguistic and logical techniques, as
did G. E. Moore. It will draw upon the
lessons of history, including the history of
philosophy, as did Aristotle. But through-
out, its immediate purpose is the analysis
of concepts-understanding, sharpening,re-
fining, and sifting them-to render them
philosophically respectable. This, in fact,
seems to be what generally happens in the
intellectual awakeningof a maturing mind.
It is the agonizing yet gratifying experi-
ence, in non-technical form, of many a
college student. Dr. Zuurdeeg, on the con-
trary, regards analysis as dominantly, per-
haps exclusively, linguistic. His view of
philosophy seems unduly restricted.
c) The intended outcome of conceptual
analysis is a body of philosophically re-
 THREE WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY
spectable concepts. Analysis illuminates
their interrelationships.By means of what
Broad calls synopsis and synthesis,8 it de-
velops a self-consistent, coherent concep-
tual framework.In the case of a Kant this
may mean a reconstructed epistemology.
The outcome is metaphysics-not a Q.E.D.
system infallibly describing the structure
of the universe or establishing the intrinsic
nature of the Absolute, but a more modest
conceptual and categorial frameworkwhich
enables one to think and talk consistently
and effectively about the world of science
and man, about fact and value, in the
light of the "guiding image," as John Wild
calls it, contributed by the existential ma-
trix of our inquiry. It is a metaphysic
stimulated by one's existential matrix, self-
consistent logically, and adequately ex-
plaining all relevant facts. The philosopher
is responsible not only to his own religious
roots but to every area of scientific thought.
Not all metaphysical questions are even
partially answered in advance by one's re-
ligious convictions. Possible viewpoints and
hypotheses are as likely to be accepted or
rejected on logical, historic, or scientific
grounds, as on religious ones, even though
many persons find religious grounds the
weightiest. Call it "speculativephilosophy,"
if one will, it can hardly be castigated as
a dogmatic, deductive system on the "ide-
alistic" model. Nor do I see here any abuse
of scientific-type language, rooted in anxie-
ty and purely convictional, the result of
some pseudo-scientific status-seeking. On
the contrary, the metaphysician is honest-
ly interested in truth as well as values, in
science as well as religion, in objectivity
as well as subjectivity. Professor Zuur-
deeg's concept of philosophy, it seems, is
too restricted in its outcome, as well as in
its starting point and procedure.
Pursuing, then, this notion of a third
way of doing philosophy, just what is the
philosophy of religion? It is the work of
analyzing, refining, sifting, interrelating,
and systematizing the basic concepts and
beliefs employed in religious life and
thought. Theology expounds and defends
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211
the concepts and beliefs of a given reli-
gious group. Philosophy is concerned with
more than one religion and more with
analysis and synthesis than with exposi-
tion and defense. Insofar as the philosopher
of religion himself possesses particular re-
ligious convictions, these will find inevita-
ble expression in his philosophy. Since they
are elements in his Lebenswelt, they mo-
tivate his thinking and give direction to
his investigation; they provide a perspec-
tive from which religion and life appear
meaningful, intelligible, and valuable, and
from which they may be synthesized into
an integrated whole.
This is another way of saying that ob-
jectivity is an ideal never completely re-
alized in the value-centricpredicament.In-
tellectual honesty, however,can be realized.
It recognizes how and where convictions
and perspective affect one's interpretations
and conclusions. It conducts the entire en-
terprise under the sort of relentless self-
scrutiny employed by Kant. It liberates
the thinker from the poverty of narrow
horizons and the bigotry of unsympathetic
attitudes.9
Finally, does this conception of the phi-
losophy of religion cast light on the reli-
gious language question? Inasmuch as it is
concerned with linguistic and situational
analysis only as a means to the under-
standing of religious concepts, beliefs, and
attitudes, the focus of attention is accord-
ingly shifted from the nature of religious
language to the nature of religious con-
cepts, beliefs, and experience. Religious
language, expressive of religiousbeliefs and
experience, is certainly convictional and
emotive, but it is also indicative and pred-
icational. The Apostles' Creed is as clear
an example as any. As soon as we rein-
troduce predication, we are compelled to
reintroduce two further aspects of tradi-
tional religious philosophy: the study of
analogical predication and the truth value
of religious language. These are aspects of
religious philosophy which Dr. Zuurdeeg's
situational analysis altogether overlooks.'0
212 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

NOTES
1. W. F. Zuurdeeg,An Analytical Philosophy 7. Cf. the criticism in S. M. Thompson's re-
of Religion (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, view of Zuurdeeg'svolume in Review of Meta-
1958). physics, XIII, 305-19.
2. Pp. 13-14. Cf. "The Nature of Theological 8. "Some Methods of SpeculativePhilosophy,"
Language,"Journal of Religion, XL, 1. Arist. Soc. Suppl., XXI, 1-32.
3. P. 113. 9. See the writer's comments on "The Theist
4. Pp. 135ff. and His Premises,"Basic CollegeQuarterly(East
5. Pp. 17 ff. ElsewhereDr. Zuurdeegspeaks of Lansing,Mich.: MichiganState University,Sum-
"the historicaldimensionof language."See his re- mer, 1959), pp. 4-6.
view of Wittgenstein'sThe Blue and Brown Books 10. Cf. S. M. Thompson,"Philosophyand The-
in Journal of Religion, XL, 54-55. ology: A Reply to Professor W. F. Zuurdeeg,"
6. Pp. 29-30. Journal of Religion,XL, 9-17.

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