[G.R. No. L-69809. October 16, 1986.] teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty.
l Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA)
No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of
whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court’s
decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
"In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
"That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to
come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault
case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business
trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico
where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit ‘D’, tsn, April 22, 1982,
pp. 4-5).
"When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as
to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant
heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault"
"(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been
increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made
together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the
client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before
the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office;
"(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of
Don Bosco Technical High School;
"(c) P1,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
"(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section
of Don Bosco Technical High School;
"(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office,
whereas Montebon’s affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case
against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
"(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco
Technical School;
"(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault
Case to the mass media;
"(h) P2,000.00 attorney’s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp.
47-48).
"Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he
was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered `Yes’. Complainant
then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.
(tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
"Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
"Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent,
complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
1
Wiretapping Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22,
1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner
appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore,
covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to
overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is
covered in the term "device" as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.chanrobles
law library
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the
appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the
telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico
was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is
covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c)
whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said
telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is
ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or however otherwise
described;
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any
tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or
after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or
to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate
the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition."cralaw virtua1aw library
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute
and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence
secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is
whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer
listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison
sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both
listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant
Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the
words uttered were made between one person and another as
distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to
listen to and overhear the caller’s message with the use of an extension
telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine
bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge
against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office if he knew
that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter
how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word
of the caller against the listener’s.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic
equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to
carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines." An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone
and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications
of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around
the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an
extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would
subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
2
public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension
lines to their bosses’ telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or
recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and
another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use
of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that matter, would a "party
line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording
devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic
devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill
No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate,
telephones and extension telephones were already widely used
instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable
was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized
into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of
devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or
walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The
omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and
covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law
because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone
apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus
consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a
main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be
transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached
to a main telephone line to get the desired communication coming from
the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.chanrobles law
library : red
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern,
Inc., 66 SCRA 113, 120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-
444), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that `however general
the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those upon which the parties intended to agree.’ Similarly, Article 1374 of
the same Code provides that ‘the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly.’
x x x
"Consequently, the phrase `all liabilities or obligations of the decedent’
used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those
listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all
other obligations of the decedent. The rule that `particularization followed
by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former’ is based
on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are
addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities,
though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are
used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607;
115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973
ed., pp. 180-181."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200,
although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by
their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially
now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the
3
main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is
calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone
and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line
or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the
case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-
138):chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number
may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument.
Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party
may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the
conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any
privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of
605, interception, has not occurred."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party
would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his
hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no
distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an
extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at
bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase
"device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the
rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be `the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish
a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L
Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill
v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d 549; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA
821, 63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452.) The purpose is not to
enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d
737, quoted in Martin’s Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp.
183-184)."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that in the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not
contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited
"device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more
concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation.
x x x
Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is
certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which
Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno. Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less
possible with the amendment than without it, because with the
amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government
testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this
amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and
the person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could
record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is
more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as
experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
x x x
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions,
with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there
is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a
recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying
the evidence is not very much.
Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the
presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we
could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful.
But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other
electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be
used in court.
4
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for
use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of
the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or
arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of
Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994.]
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon city and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT
AVAILABLE TO CHALLENGE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF TRIAL COURT;
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — The extraordinary writ of certiorari is
generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court.
The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all
of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of
telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape
recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his
friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. Rep. Act No.
4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other
purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
. . . . Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to
consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence
the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to reverse the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28545 entitle "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F.
Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
Rafael S. Ortanez" .chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of
lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to
Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo
F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in
evidence Exhibits "A" to "M"
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette
tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral
offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court
admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
5
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals
assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of appeals rendered judgment which is the
subject of the present petition, which in part reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic
reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial
judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even
handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a
supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the
judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action
of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be
anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being
subject of a counterproductive ‘ping-pong’ to and from the appellate court
as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we
cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby
DISMISSED." 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for
review, stating:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Grounds for Allowance of the Petition"
"10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor
previous decisions of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of tape
recordings has not, thus, far, been addressed and decided squarely by the
Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law
and with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same
can still be [the] subject of a petition for certiorari." 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by
the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge
an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.chanrobles law library :
red
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and
the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the
court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all
of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of
telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape
recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his
friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for
other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
6
or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing
or investigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the
afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette
tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No.
4200.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic
Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving
the applicability of American jurisprudence, having arrived at the
conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence
under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545
is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible
in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, Respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. 2The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) - Good Afternoon
M'am.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) - Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot
ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka
kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
CHUCHI - Kasi, naka duty ako noon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
ESG - Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)chanrobles virtual law library
CHUCHI - Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon -chanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka,
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako
ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo,
kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa
akin makakahingi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
CHUCHI - Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung
paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka
kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na
kita).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
7
CHUCHI - Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty
ko.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
CHUCHI - Kumuha kami ng exam
noon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
CHUCHI - Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayochanrobles virtual law
library
ESG - Kukunin ka kasi ako.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
CHUCHI - Eh, di sana -chanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi
ako.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
CHUCHI - Mag-eexplain ako.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
ESG - Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung
paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang
ko.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka
doon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
CHUCHI - Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga
Union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
CHUCHI - Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na
loob.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
CHUCHI - Paano kita nilapastanganan?chanrobles virtual law library
ESG - Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act,
dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester
S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate
in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
8
Contrary to law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the
trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1)
the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that
2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19,
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its
assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and
void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the
ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent
judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari. 5chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication. 8In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or
content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise
the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not
illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in
the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13under this provision of R.A.
4200.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
9
 xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Senator Tañada: That qualified only
"overhear".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved
not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording
is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort
to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative
of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?chanrobles virtual law library
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special
proceedings?chanrobles virtual law library
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?chanrobles
virtual law library
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to
record the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it
against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your
honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being
recorded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of
recorders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of
the board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no
objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Senator Padilla: Now, I can
understand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we
say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against
you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that
warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may
be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)chanrobles
virtual law library
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of
the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he
would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the
bill. It is the communication between one person and another person - not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together
with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
10
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one
can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February
22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires
of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature of conversationsbetween individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communicationbetween individuals - free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17chanrobles virtual law library
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to
a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999.]
FELIPE NAVARRO, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding
petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
11
temporal, as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the
heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.chanrobles law library
The information against petitioner alleged —
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the
City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the
Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the
Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged
in the discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head
with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging
his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said
Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4,
1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of
the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan,
went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude
dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered
beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a
strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera
and took a picture. 2chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex
Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture.
3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." 4 Sioco
pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would
kill him. 5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he
ran out of the joint followed by his companions. 6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the
matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were
having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and
his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk
officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle. 7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a
corner for around fifteen minutes. 8 Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned
to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba
kilala?" 9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and,
pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?" 10
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag
namang ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to
mediate." 11 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu
pa kayo." 12 He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of
record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.
13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan." 14 Petitioner
Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko." 15 The two then had a heated
exchange. 16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang
baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo." 17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah,
ganoon?" 18
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the
handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood
flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him
a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. 19
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay
kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." 20 He said to Sgt. Añonuevo:
"Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si
Ike Lingan ang naghamon." 21 He then poked his gun at the right temple
of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. 22 Jalbuena could
not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote
his name in print. 23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his
office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital.
The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casañada, arrived and, learning that
Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died
from his injuries. 24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the
exchange between petitioner and the deceased. 25 The following is an
excerpt from the tape recording:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
12
Who is that abusing?
Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
I’m here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I’m out of the
problem. Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!

Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .
Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Pulis ito! Aba!
Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do
not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
against me. I’m the number one loko sa media. I’m the best media man. .
.. Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.

Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Mayabang ka ah!

Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
(Sounds of a scuffle)chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I’m brave also.
Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan,
Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay
mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako.
Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni
akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha.
ko.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.

Lingan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit
him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that
You are challenging me and him. . . . Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head
on the concrete. 26
Navarro:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court
Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . .
. Parang minomonopoly mo eh. After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the

13
prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for the
prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that
moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally
responsible.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
The defense’s evidence which consists of outright denial could not under
the circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley
Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the truth,
testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him
harm or injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra.
Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on
how Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena
sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the head injuries of
deceased Lingan were caused by the latter’s falling down on the concrete
pavement head first.chanrobles law library : red
The Court of Appeals affirmed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We are far from being convinced by appellant’s aforesaid disquisition. We
have carefully evaluated the conflicting versions of the incident as
presented by both parties, and we find the trial court’s factual conclusions
to have better and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of
appellant’s aggression does not impair the probative worth of his positive
and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellant’s unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the
defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or
disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same
motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him
into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated
him and further challenged him to a fist fight.
x x x the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
On the other hand, appellant’s explanation as to how Lingan was injured is
too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the
number, nature and location of Lingan’s injuries as shown in the post-
mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times
when he was outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet,
Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow,
between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal
region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly, these injuries could not have
resulted from Lingan’s accidental fall.chanrobles law library : red
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON
SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN
THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of
Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge
against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the
conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. 27 Trial
courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to
determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence. 28 In
the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court
erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Indeed, Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No.
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The
law provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
14
 of Lingan, issued a medical certificate, 34 dated February 5, 1990,
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the containing the following findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess
any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or Post Mortem Findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by = Dried blood, forehead & face
this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to = No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as = Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. = Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left

x x x = Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right
eyebrow

SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, = Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any = Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or CAUSE OF DEATH:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
administrative hearing or investigation.
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. 29 Since the exchange between petitioner = BLOW ON THE HEAD
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Dr. Yamamoto testified:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording
is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings
recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one number one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?
he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong. 30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object,
he personally made the voice recording; 31 that the tape played in court sir.
was the one he recorded; 32 and that the speakers on the tape were
petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.chanrobles law
library : red A It is possible, sir.

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a
was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the concrete floor?
placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2)
that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and A Possible, sir.
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body

15
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your
findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun
because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A Same cause, sir.
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A Same thing, sir.
Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what
could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it
states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain
it?
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of
the brain, sir.
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.chanrobles law library
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
A May be, sir.
Q How about shock?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Which of these two more likely to cause death?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Shock, sir.
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.
x x x
FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Could a bumping or pushing of one’s head against a concrete floor have
caused shock?chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Possible, sir.
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A Possible, sir. 35
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner
Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and
16
struck him on the forehead with his fist.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner
Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or
act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone.
36 The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the
act. 37 To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit
the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. 38 And it
must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval
between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the
crime by the accused. 39
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded
the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People v.
Macaso, 40 we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly
taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance
should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be
appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner
Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that
he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance
should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be
imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating
circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. 41 In People v. Castro, 42
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding
him guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a
place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in
this case was committed right in the police station where policemen were
discharging their public functions. 43
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances
and one aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its
minimum period. 44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of
which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. 45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 is in accordance with current jurisprudence. 46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer
a prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9181. November 28, 1955.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON.
NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO
PANGANIBAN, Respondents.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman,
City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and Assistant City Attorney Julian E.
Lustre for Petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and
Rufino Navarro for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSION; ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF DECLARANT’S GUILT. —
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if an accused’s
confession may not be competent as against his co-accused, being
17
hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession is
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt (U.S. v.
Vega, 43 Phil., 41; People v. Bande, 50 Phil., 37; People v. Buan, 64 Phil.,
296), and should be admitted as such.
2. ID.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION OF CONSPIRATOR; SECTION 12, RULE
123, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CONFESSION MADE AFTER CONSPIRACY HAS
ENDED. — Section 12 of Rule 123, providing that "The act or declaration of
a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration," refers to statements made
by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise ("during
its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U.S. v.
Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U.S. v. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People v.
Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People v. Napkil, 52 Phil., 985).
3. ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS, WAIVER OF; COURT HAS NO POWER TO
DISREGARD EVIDENCE "MOTU PROPRIO." — The exclusion of the
proffered confessions was no made of the basis of the objection interposed
by defense counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the
Court issued motu proprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the
right to object is a privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is
deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to
disregard the evidence (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
4. ID.; ID.; RULE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. — The practice of
excluding evidence of doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the question should be avoided. In a case of any
intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith
on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule
safety accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the
proof offered will be connected later." (Prats & Co. v. Pheonix Insurance
Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817.) At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the
admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such
policy in criminal cases where questions arises as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may
lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on
March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose
identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in
the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955,
and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence.
During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution
was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National
Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-
judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan
Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as
against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the
exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different
ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove
conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter,
according to the transcript, the following remarks were
made:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FISCAL LUSTRE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the
confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself?
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court
that you cannot prove a confession unless yon prove first conspiracy thru a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by
law." Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of
exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition
for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the
18
review and annulment of the lower Court’s order completely excluding any
evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution’s evidence on the
alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of
the extrajudicial confession of an accused freely and voluntarily made, as
evidence against him.
"SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be
given in evidence against him."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s
confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban,
being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession
of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant’s
own guilt (U. S. v. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People v. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People
v. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the
proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."cralaw virtua1aw library
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during
the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in
furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case,
long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. v. Empeinado,
9 Phil., 613; U. S. v. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People v. Badilla, 48 Phil.,
718; People v. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove
conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of
them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape
recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty.
Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much
less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might
still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and
Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence.
Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the
confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to
exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of
conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proffered confessions
was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban’s
counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued
motu-proprio. Panganiban’s counsel objected to Consunji’s confession as
evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that
it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not
be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban
without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions
on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object
is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
evidence (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility
of the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the
purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of
the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not
before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any
purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such
confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who
made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in
order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the
final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be
able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what,
under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the
case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-
817:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most
effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial
19
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or
technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a
case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of
bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney
that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides, a judge
of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of
proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a
mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme
Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial,
— a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand,
the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as
to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the
law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish
the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course
is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal,
this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct
judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where
questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court
below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this
opinion Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban.
So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, Petitioners,
vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY,
and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth P300,000.00 more or less.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed
a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings
Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they
do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him;
and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p.
107.] chanrobles virtual law library
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on
January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat
[Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding
among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-
64;] chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao
Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and, chanrobles virtual
law library
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision,
pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
20
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo,
pp. 105-106.] chanrobles virtual law library
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED
and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows: chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage for many years: chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's
Republic of China (sic); chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of
Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and
Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded
from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36-
37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court
of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The
Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided
to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA
SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS
NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2;
Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely
on the following testimonial and documentary
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that
time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her
elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the
parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be
married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the said
agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them
died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen,
the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was
born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in
FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the
practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just
between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that
matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be;
that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law,
then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the
parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-
to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in
her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the
wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and
on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and
then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer
as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed
only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the
21
parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a
carriage where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before
departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the
town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding
to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that
after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the
carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy
Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to
the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already
and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found
now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not
know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years and
because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that
after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife,
and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in
March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in
1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and
lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during
the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp.
50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that
he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat
and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document
signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16;
Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October
3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status-Married"; "If married
give name of spouses-Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage-1931"; and
"Place of marriage-China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status-Married"; and, 'If married,
state name and address of spouse-Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit
"4".] chanrobles virtual law library
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of
the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information
available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui
Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic
of China" [Exhibit "5".] chanrobles virtual law library
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of
the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno,
Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.]
On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right
can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil.
390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).] chanrobles virtual law library
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect
to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.-The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible
as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved
to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
22
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.-An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).] chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot
be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they
are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or
custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken
by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).] chanrobles
virtual law library
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a
marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which
as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of
marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]chanrobles virtual law library
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years
later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as
being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did
not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral
testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a
complaint for adultery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]chanrobles
virtual law library
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private
respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of children-Four"; and, "Name-All living in China"
[Exhibit "SS-1";] chanrobles virtual law library
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with
Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze
Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and, chanrobles virtual law library
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage
license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he
has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom-Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho-
23
she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]chanrobles
virtual law library
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition
of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who
are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.] chanrobles virtual law
library
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12,
1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and
that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally
terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on
May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28,
1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born
on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that-
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided
into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall
be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand
Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same
building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates
and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be
transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy,
and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ...
[Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.) chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.] chanrobles
virtual law library
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao
Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the
City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.-chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:chanrobles
virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity
and acknowledgment; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one
to three of the civil code; chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
24
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA
1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA
307.]chanrobles virtual law library
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial
Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-
47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass
upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep.
Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any
case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case
involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13,
1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis
supplied.) chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the
same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52,
63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds
no reversible error committed by respondent
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185708 : September 29, 2010]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. JUANITO CABIGQUEZ
Y ALASTRA, APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), Mindanao Station, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated October 29,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18
finding appellant Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra (Cabigquez) and Romulo
Grondiano y Soco (Grondiano) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
(Criminal Case No. 2001-816), and also convicting appellant Cabigquez of
rape (Criminal Case No. 2001-815), both crimes committed against private
complainant AAA,[3] a 43-year old widow and mother of ten (10) children.
Grondiano decided to withdraw his appeal before the appellate court.[4]
Hence, this review shall consider only Cabigquez's appeal.
Below are the facts, as culled from the records of both the trial and
appellate courts.
In the evening of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor children -
BBB, CCC, and DDD[5] - slept inside AAA's small sari-sari store which was
annexed through the exterior balcony of her house at Purok 1-A, Tablon in
Cagayan de Oro City. AAA's head was close to the door, while a cabinet
stood at her right side. She left the 50-watt incandescent bulb on as they
slept through the night.[6]
At around 3:30 a.m., March 27, 2001, AAA was awakened when clothes
fell on her face. When she looked up, she saw a man whose face was
covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage jacket and cycling
shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her. AAA shouted "Ayyy!,"
25
rousing her three children from sleep.[7] Despite the cover on the burglar's
face, BBB was able to identify him as Romulo Grondiano, one of their
neighbors, based on the hanging mole located below his left eye.[8] Armed
with a stainless handgun,[9] Grondiano ordered AAA and her children to lie
face down.[10] Though stricken with fear, BBB noticed that Grondiano had a
companion who stayed at the balcony keeping watch.[11]Grondiano then
ransacked the store, taking with him P3,000.00 cash from the cabinet and
P7,000.00 worth of grocery items. Before he left, Grondiano pointed the
gun at AAA's back and warned them not to make any noise.[12]
As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB identified
the man as appellant Juanito Cabigquez as the latter did not conceal his
face. Armed with Grondiano's gun, Cabigquez stripped AAA of her short
pants and underwear, placed a pillow on her lower abdomen and mounted
her from behind. He lifted and twisted one of her legs and pinned the
other. AAA shouted "Ayaw!" (No!), but offered no further resistance.
Cabigquez inserted his penis into AAA's vagina, and proceeded to ravish
her in full view of her children, and even as the latter cried for mercy.
Before he left, Cabigquez threatened to kill AAA and her children if they
would tell anyone about the incident.[13]
Afraid for their lives, AAA and her children remained prostrate on the floor
even after the two malefactors had left. Shortly thereafter, they decided
to proceed to the house of AAA's older son, EEE, and asked for help. AAA
failed to disclose to her son the identities of the two men. Meanwhile,
BBB, fearing retaliation from the two men, decided not to divulge the
identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother and brother.[14]
That same morning, March 27, 2001, AAA reported the incident to the
Puerto Police Station. No criminal complaint, however, was filed since AAA
was still uncertain of the identities of the two men. AAA was physically
examined by Dr. Cristilda O. Villapañe and Dr. Riman Ricardo, resident
physicians at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center.[15] Dr. Villapañe's
examination revealed that the smear recovered from AAA's vagina was
positive for spermatozoa,[16] while Dr. Ricardo found a two-centimeter
contusion on AAA's left hand dorsum.[17]
On May 24, 2001, Cabigquez was arrested for possession of illegal
drugs.[18] Grondiano was likewise arrested on May 26, 2001 also for
possession of illegal drugs.[19] With the two men incarcerated, and now
certain of their safety, BBB finally mustered the courage to reveal the
identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother.[20]
On July 18, 2001, two Informations were filed against Cabigquez and
Grondiano, viz:
Criminal Case No. 2001-816 (For: Robbery)
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y
ALASTRA, alias "DODOY", and ROMULO GRONDIANO y SOCO, alias
"Molok", of the crime they committed, as follows:
That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 o'clock in the early morning
in a store located at Purok 1-A, Barangay Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping with one another,
with intent to gain and violence or intimidation of persons, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away cash -
Php3,000.00 and assorted [grocery] stocks valued Php7,000.00 all in all
amounting to Php10,000.00, owned by and belonging to one [AAA], in the
following manner: that accused Romulo Grondiano intimidated the
offended party with a gun pointed to her and her three children and
ordered them to lay on the floor with face down and then took, robbed and
carried away the aforementioned valuable personal things while Juanito
Cabigquez y Alastra acting/serving as lookout at the door of the store, to
the damage and prejudice of the offended party, in the total sum of
Php10,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to and in violation to Article 294, par. 5, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.[21]
Criminal Case No. 2001-815 (For: Rape)
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses, JUANITO CABIGQUEZ
Y ALASTRA ALIAS "DODOY", of the crime of RAPE that he committed as
follows:
That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 o'clock or thereabout, in the
early morning, at Purok 1A, Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a gun, and with the use thereof, by means of force, and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledged (sic) of the offended party [AAA], against her will [and]
in the presence and full view of her children.
Contrary to and in violation to (sic) Article 266-A (Formerly under Art.
335) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.[22]
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.[23] During the trial,
Cabigquez admitted that on the night of March 26, 2001, he slept in the
house of Leonila Omilao, a neighbor of Cabigquez and AAA.[24]He admitted
26
that he did not have any quarrel with AAA and found no possible reason
why AAA would file the complaints and testify against him.[25] Omilao
herself testified that Cabigquez was in her house on the night of the
incident and even saw the latter sleeping in the kitchen. During Omilao's
cross-examination, however, the trial court noted Silvina Cabigquez,
appellant's daughter, coaching Omilao in her answers.[26]
On October 21, 2002, the trial court, on motion by the defense, ordered
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila to conduct a
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis on the sperm taken from AAA's
vagina. On May 21, 2003, NBI Forensic Chemist III Aida Viloria Magsipoc
testified that the sample collected from AAA did not match Cabigquez's
DNA profile since the specimen submitted to them were mere vaginal
discharges from AAA.[27]
On October 29, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
Cabigquez and Grondiano of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of
said decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused JUANITO
CABIGQUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Article 266-B of
the same Code, and there being one aggravating circumstance [the used
(sic) of a deadly weapon (firearm)] without a[ny] mitigating circumstance,
accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ is hereby sentenced and is SO ORDERED to
suffer the supreme penalty of Death by lethal injection, including its
accessory penalties. He is further directed and is SO ORDERED to pay the
victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity,
plus another TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00), as moral
damages. Pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. 7659 and Section 10 of Rule 122
of the Rules of Court, let the entire record of this case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
FURTHERMORE, the Court likewise finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and
ROMULO GRONDIANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of
Robbery punishable under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, and [there] being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused JUANITO
CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO are hereby sentenced and are SO
ORDERED to serve the [penalty of] imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, TEN
(10) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as
the MINIMUM, to SIX (6) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS
OF PRISION MAYOR, as the MAXIMUM, including its accessory penalties,
plus further SO ORDERED to pay the stolen items and cash in the sum of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).
SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, October 29, 2003.[28]
The records of the case were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[29] the case was referred to the
CA.
In his appeal, appellant maintained his defense of alibi and denial. He
questioned the accuracy and credibility of BBB's testimony given her
failure to immediately divulge the identity of the perpetrators after the
incident. Appellant also noted that AAA's lone interjection, while she was
allegedly being raped by him, can hardly be considered as a manifest
resistance.[30] The defense also argued that the prosecution failed to
establish conspiracy since BBB did not actually see that Cabigquez was on
the balcony while the robbery was being committed.[31]
By Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA upheld the RTC in convicting
appellant of both crimes of robbery and rape. The CA found BBB's
testimony candid and not prompted by ill-motive. As to BBB's failure to
promptly implicate Grondiano and Cabigquez for the crimes, the appellate
court ruled that this cannot be taken against her in the light of serious
threats made by said accused on their family. The alleged contradictions in
the testimonies of AAA and BBB were likewise not fatal to the case of the
prosecution as they bear no materiality to the commission of the crime.
The CA also noted that the accused were able to consummate their
criminal acts without any physical resistance from the victims who could
not even cry loudly because they were ordered at gunpoint not to make
any noise. It rejected the defense of alibi put up by Cabigquez in view of
his admission that he stayed at a house within the vicinity of AAA's
store.[32]
The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed October 29, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, convicting Juanito A. Cabigquez,
the lone appellant before Us, for the crimes of Robbery and Rape, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Juanito A. Cabigquez is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime
of Rape.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Before this Court, appellant Cabigquez reiterates the following arguments:
27
 I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS COMMITTED
ROBBERY, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THEM TO
PAY THE COMPLAINANT P10,000.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.[34]
We sustain the ruling of the CA.
The factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court,
indubitably prove that appellant raped AAA even if the specimen obtained
from the vaginal swabs and submitted to the NBI failed to match
appellant's DNA profile. Rape is committed by a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation.[35] The
commission of rape was clearly shown by testimonial and documentary
evidence; the defense submits that it is the identity of the perpetrator
which is not duly established.
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is indeed a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.[36] In this case,
however, the result of the DNA test is rendered inconclusive to exculpate
or inculpate the appellant since the sample tested by the NBI merely
contained vaginal discharges. In the laboratory test earlier conducted by
Dr. Villapañe on the vaginal swab obtained from AAA's genitalia, the
presence of spermatozoa was confirmed. This notwithstanding, the
totality of evidence satisfactorily established that it was indeed appellant
who raped AAA.
AAA's daughter, BBB, who witnessed the entire incident which happened
inside their store on the night in question, positively identified appellant as
the one who raped her mother against the latter's will by threatening her
and her children with a handgun he was then carrying. BBB's unflinching
and consistent testimony, when taken together with Dr. Villapañe's
findings and AAA's own declarations in court, provides sufficient basis for
the conviction of appellant for rape.
Quoted herein are the relevant portions of BBB's testimony on direct
examination as to her identification of appellant as her mother's
rapist, viz:
Q Now, [BBB], you said that you are 13 years old and you said a
while ago you sworn that you will tell the truth, can you remember
that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay now, are you going to tell the truth and nothing but the truth
before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir I will tell the truth.
Q Do you know what will happen to you if you tell a lie in court?
A Yes, sir I will be imprisoned.
Q Do you want to be imprisoned?
A No, sir.
Q So, you will tell the truth nothing but the truth?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know accused Romulo Grondiano?
A Yes, sir because he is our neighbor.
xxxx
Q Do you also know accused Juanito Cabigquez who is
accused for rape and co-accused in robbery?
A Yes, sir he is also our neighbor.
Q For how long have you known Juanito Cabigquez before
March 27, 2001?
A Since I came that age of reason I already knew Juanito
Cabigquez.
Q Is Juanito Cabigquez also a resident of Purok 1-A at Tablon?
28
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you also know the nickname of Juanito Cabigquez?
A Its Dodoy.
Q If Juanito Cabigquez is inside this courtroom, can you point to him?
A Note: Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name
identified himself as Juanito Cabigquez.
Q Okay, on March 27, 2001 at about 3:30 early in the morning, do
you remember where were you?
A I was inside our store sleeping together with our mother.
Q Aside from you and your mother, who were other persons who
were with you?
A Together with my two (2) siblings.
xxxx
Q Now, while you were sleeping together with your mother and your
two (2) younger siblings at that time, what happened?
xxxx
A The three (3) of us were awakened because of the shout of our
mother.
Q Who is that us?
A I together with my two (2) siblings.
Q Your mother also woke up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, after you were awakened by the shout of your mother, what
did you observe, if there was any?
A I saw my mother knelt down and I came nearer and then I
embraced her because I thought she was dreaming but I saw
Romulo Grondiano with a gun.
xxxx
Q Alright, what happened while you saw accused Romulo Grondiano
already at the door of your store of your mother holding a gun and
your mother was kneeling?
A He ordered us to lay face down.
Q After Romulo Grondiano ordered you to lay face down, what did
you, your mother and your two (2) siblings do?
A I let my mother lay face down.
Q How about you?
A I also lay face down.
Q How about your two (2) younger siblings?
A They also lay face down.
Q Alright, while the four (4) of you were lying face down, what did
you observe?
A I noticed that he had a companion who is at our balcony.
Q How were you able to notice that he has a companion?
A Because we had a chair made of bamboo and then if somebody or
a person hit it, it will sound.
xxxx
Q Now, after Romulo Grondiano took all those things that you have
enumerated a while ago, where did Romulo Grondiano go?
A He pointed a gun at my mother's back and then ordered us not to
move.
xxxx
Q Alright, after Romulo Grondiano told you, your mother and your
two (2) younger siblings not to move, where did Romulo Grondiano
go?
A He went to the balcony and then Juanito Cabigquez replaced him
(Romulo) in going up, he (Juanito) went inside our store.
xxxx
Q Alright, you testified a while ago that after Romulo Grondiano went
inside your store he passed by the balcony of your house, then co-
accused Juanito Cabigquez came in, where did Juanito Cabigquez
come in?
A He entered in our store.
Q The same store where you, your mother and two (2) younger
siblings were staying at that time?
29
A Yes, sir. came in. My question is, when did your mother actually shout?
A When Juanito Cabigquez was removing the shortpants of my
Q How were you able to recognize that it was Juanito Cabigquez who mother.
came in?
A Because I saw him. COURT: (to the witness)

Q When you saw Juanito Cabigquez, were you still lying face down or
were you already sitting?
A I was already lying face down.
Q How were you able to see him?
A Because I looked back at the door because I thought that
Romulo Grondiano already left but then I saw Juanito
Cabigquez came in and replaced Romulo Grondiano.
Q This Juanito Cabigquez who came in after Romulo Grondiano went
out, is he the same Juanito Cabigquez the co-accused for robbery
and accused in rape case?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is inside this courtroom, can you point him again?
A Note: Witness pointed again to a person who when asked of his
name identified himself as Juanito Cabigquez.
Q After Juanito Cabigquez came in inside the store, what did you
observe?
A He removed the shortpants of my mother and then he got
the pillow of my mother and placed it under her abdomen.
Q Can you tell the Court what kind of shout your mother did?
A My mother shouted "ay!"
PROS. M. NOLASCO: (cont'g.)
Q Now, was Juanito able to take off the shortpants of your mother?
A Yes, sir because it was a gartered shortpants.
Q Now, how about the panty of your mother?
A It was removed together with the shortpants.
Q Now, after the shortpants and panty of your mother were
taken off and the pillow was placed under her abdomen,
what next did you observe?
A Juanito Cabigquez mounted on my mother.
Q And then, what did Juanito do when he mounted to your mother?
A He did a push and pull motion.
Q How about your two (2) younger siblings, were they still awake at
that time?
A Yes, sir, they were crying.

xxxx Q How about you?

A I also cried.
Q Now, what was the position of your mother when Juanito
Cabigquez took off the shortpants of your mother? Q When you noticed that he (Juanito Cabigquez) entered your store,
A She was still lying face down. was he carrying a gun?

Q What was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez put xxxx
the pillow under her abdomen?
A She was still lying face down. A He was bringing a gun.

Q By the way, when Juanito Cabigquez entered the store, was the
light still on?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that your mother shouted when Juanito Cabigquez
xxxx
Q Can you demonstrate the length of the gun that you saw?
A The gun which Juanito Cabigquez was bringing was the same gun
Romulo brought.

30
Q How about your mother while Juanito Cabigquez was
already mounted on her and make a push and pull motion,
what did your mother do?
A My mother was crying.
xxxx
Q You said that you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings
were crying while Juanito Cabigquez mounted on your mother and
made a push and pull motion, what happened after that?
A He pointed his gun at the back of my mother and then told
us not to tell to anybody because they will return and kill us.
Q Now, after Juanito Cabigquez warned you not to tell anybody
otherwise they will return and kill you, what did Juanito Cabigquez
do?
A He went up to the balcony.
xxxx
Q How about Juanito Cabigquez, when he entered your store of your
mother and raped your mother, what was he wearing?
A He was wearing a white t-shirt and maong pants.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Was it long or short?
A Long pants.
xxxx [37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant asserts that it is significant that AAA herself did not recognize
him and his co-accused despite her familiarity with them as they were her
customers in her store. It was pointed out that the identification of the
perpetrators was supplied solely by her daughter BBB, who should not
have been given any credence in view of her inconsistent declarations such
as when she testified that when she woke up, her mother was kneeling
contrary to the latter's testimony that when clothes fell on her face, she
was awakened and that her mother shouted but a gun was pointed to her.
Moreover, BBB saw the accused several times after the alleged crimes
transpired and yet she did not manifest any alarm even when they
reported the matter to the police; it was only after the accused were
detained that their identities were revealed. In the light of serious
discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, appellant
maintains that BBB's identification of the perpetrators of robbery and rape
was unreliable and doubtful.[38]
We are not persuaded.
While it is true that the most natural reaction for victims of crimes is to
strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the manner in which
the craven acts are committed,[39] in this case, AAA cannot be faulted for
failing to recognize appellant as her rapist though the latter was their
neighbor. It must be recalled, as narrated by AAA and BBB, they were all
still lying face down when appellant suddenly entered the store right after
his co-accused Grondiano exited through the balcony taking the loot with
him. BBB recounted that her mother was still lying face down when
appellant removed her mother's short pants and panty, placed a pillow
below her abdomen and then proceeded to rape her. It was BBB who had
the opportunity to look at this second person who entered their house
because she looked back at the door thinking that Grondiano (the one who
first entered the store) already left, but then appellant immediately came
in after Grondiano. Although AAA was able to shout at that time, she
could not move because she was afraid that her three children, who were
already crying, will be harmed.[40]
As to the alleged inconsistency in the position of her mother when accused
Grondiano entered their store, the same is inexistent considering that AAA
was relating the exact moment when she woke up and realized the
presence of an intruder because clothes fell on her face, while BBB who
was awakened by the shout of her mother, simply described her mother
then already in a kneeling position as she woke up first. BBB had thought
her mother was just dreaming but then she saw Grondiano already inside
the house with a gun.
Neither would BBB's delay in revealing the identities of the perpetrators to
the police taint her identification of appellant as the one who raped her
mother and conspirator of Grondiano in robbing their store. Failure to
immediately reveal the identity of a perpetrator of a felony does not affect,
much less impair, the credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is
adequately explained.[41] BBB sufficiently explained her action in not
immediately divulging to her mother and brother nor reporting to the
police whom she saw inside their house that early morning of March 27,
2001. She was afraid that the assailants would make good their threat
that they will return and kill their family if they reported the incident to
anybody. But when a couple of months later appellant and his co-accused
Grondiano were arrested on drug charges, BBB finally felt it was safe to
come out in the open and inform the police of the identities of the two men
who robbed their house, one of whom subsequently raped her mother
31
(appellant).
Appellant cannot seek acquittal on the basis of the negative result of the
DNA test on the specimen conducted by the NBI.
A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the evidence
presented before the court points to no other possible
conclusion, i.e., appellant raped the private offended party. A positive DNA
match may strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, but an
inconclusive DNA test result may not be sufficient to exculpate the
accused, particularly when there is sufficient evidence proving his guilt.
Notably, neither a positive DNA match of the semen nor the presence of
spermatozoa is essential in finding that rape was committed. The
important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.[42]
Moreover, it is evident that the rape of AAA was committed in the
presence and in full view of her three minor children. Thirteen (13)-year
old BBB, as well as her two minor siblings who were present at the time
when the rape was committed, was already old enough to sense the
bestiality being committed against their own mother.[43] Such
circumstance, as recited in the last portion of the Information for Criminal
Case No. 2001-815 is, by itself, sufficient to qualify the rape under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code,[44] as amended. Consequently, the CA
was correct in affirming the conviction of appellant for qualified rape.
With respect to the charge of robbery, we find no merit in appellant's
argument that the prosecution failed to establish that he conspired with
co-accused Grondiano in stealing goods from private complainant's store.
He asserts that there was no proof that he was outside the store when the
crime of robbery was being committed; private complainant and her
daughter merely surmised that another person was outside the store
because of a creaking sound created by a bamboo chair, but they actually
did not see that person or if there was indeed that person.[45]
On this issue, we hold that the CA correctly ruled that conspiracy was
sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence on record, thus:
We also find that the trial court correctly appreciated conspiracy against
Cabigquez with respect [to] the crime of robbery. There is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the acts of the
accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interest.
Neither [AAA] nor [BBB] saw Cabigquez acting as a lookout outside the
store. However, the creaking sound coming from the balcony and the fact
that [BBB] saw Cabigquez go inside the store, as soon as Grondiano left,
reasonably verify a discernment that someone stood by outside and close
to the store's entrance during the looting, and that such person was
Cabigquez. The fact that only Grondiano concealed his face reasonably
indicates a prior agreement between the two (2) malefactors for
Cabigquez to act as a lookout in the commission of robbery. After raping
[AAA], Cabigquez also warned of killing [AAA and her children] if they told
anyone about the incident, which threat contributed to the common
sentiment of concealing both crimes of robbery and rape. These
circumstances sufficiently establish a joint purpose and design, and a
community of interest, between Cabigquez and Grondiano, in committing
the crime of robbery.[46]
On the matter of actual damages awarded by the trial court, appellant
questions the amount thereof, insisting there was no basis for the actual
cost of the items taken from the store.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining such
award. In People v. Martinez,[47] this Court ruled that the trial court has
the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because
these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of
expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent to
proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.
Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and
perfume are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of
unquestionable demonstration.[48] Here, what is involved are common
goods for everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores
like private complainant's store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and
cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of
P10,000.00 as computed by the private complainant representing the
value of stolen merchandise from her store.
Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the sums awarded as civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages. Applying prevailing
jurisprudence, the private complainant is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[49]
Lastly, the death penalty imposed on appellant was correctly modified
32
to reclusion perpetua, in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines."[50] Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on
appellant, he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of the said law,
which provides:
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 9,
2008 of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00409 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant in Criminal Case No. 2001-815
for qualified rape is herein clarified as without eligibility for parole, and the
appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 49327. July 18, 1991.]
AMELIA C. ELAYDA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and
SPOUSES PEDRO ROXAS and LEONORA T. ROXAS, Respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin, Reyes, Fernando & Iguidez Law Offices
for Petitioner.
Amelia G. De Castro and Ida R. Makalinao-Javier for Private
Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — Only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of
the Court of Appeals, this Court being bound by the latter’s findings of
fact, subject to certain well defined exceptions.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; ADMISSIONS MADE IN PLEADINGS; CONCLUSIVE AS TO
THE PARTY MAKING IT. — An admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to
him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not . . . (Section 2, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court).
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF PLEADINGS; ALLEGATION OF USURY NOT
SPECIFICALLY DENIED, DEEMED ADMITTED; CASE AT BAR. — Correct was
the Trial Court’s ruling, sustained by the Appellate Court, that Elayda’s
failure to deny specifically and under oath the accusation of usury set out
in the Roxases’ Amended Answer with Counterclaim — alleging that Elayda
required and received from the Roxas Spouses, "kickbacks and interest in
excess of the legal rate" — constituted an admission of that accusation.
The ruling is entirely in accord with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
which pertinently provides that" (a)llegations of usury are deemed
admitted if not denied specifically and under oath." The admission is a
judicial admission, albeit implied, and cannot be negated "unless
previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake," supra, a
showing which Elayda has not made.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Once again, in the resolution of an appeal, the Court is called upon to
apply a familiar rule of unvarying observance which is, that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of
the Court of Appeals, this Court being bound by the latter’s findings of
fact, 1 subject to certain well defined exceptions. 2 In accordance
therewith, the Court now resolves the proceedings at bar.
The proceedings originated from a complaint of Amelia C. Elayda filed in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) at Quezon City
against the Spouses Pedro Roxas and Leonora T. Roxas. 3 In her
complaint, Elayda basically sought recovery of loans extended to the
33
defendants in the aggregate sum of P90,000.00, with interest, the loans
having been secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and
receipts signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry
to be sold on commission. In their answer, the Roxases admitted having
received said loans but claimed that the loans had been paid in full; that in
fact, their total payments exceeded the total obligation justly and actually
due from them, and they had been required to pay usurious interests.
On these issues, trial was had.
The plaintiff, Elayda, presented her testimonial and documentary proofs in
due course, in substantiation of her cause of action for recovery of
P90,000.00 plus interest.
The Roxas spouses in their turn, adduced evidence which tended to show
that they had received the loans aggregating P90,000.00 on two separate
occasions — one in the sum of P40,000.00 and the other, in the amount of
P50,000.00; that they were required to give, and did give, a "kickback" of
P10,000.00 and to pay, as they did pay, interest at the rate of four
percent (4%) a month; and that the total payment made by them to
Elayda amounted to P112,674.00.
To counteract this evidence of the Roxases, Elayda tried to submit a
statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total loan
given by her to the spouses amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000.00 (as
stated in her complaint and as sought to be established by her in her
evidence-in-chief); that the payments made by the spouses on account
thereof came up to only P110,474.00 — of which the sum of P14,223.81
was charged to interest at 14% per annum and P96,250.19, to principal —
thus leaving a balance due from them of P89,749.81. The proffered
statement was rejected by the Trial Court, on objection of the Roxases, on
the ground that it was contrary to the judicial admissions in plaintiffs
complaint and was being presented after conclusion of the
trial.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The Trial Court thereafter rendered judgment adversely to the plaintiff
Elayda. 4 Upon the ultimate finding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (as established by the evidence) defendants have paid plaintiff the
total sum of P112,674.00 on account of the principal loan of P90,000.00
but it is settled law that in a usurious transaction the creditor may only be
reimbursed the amount of the principal loan and must return the interest
paid by the debtor the agreement to that effect being null and void (Art.
1957, New Civil Code). It results that plaintiff is under obligation to return
to defendants the sum of P22,674.00 representing the kickback and
usurious interest charged on the loan."cralaw virtua1aw library
it disposed of the case as follows.
"WHEREFORE, the preponderance of evidence being clearly in favor of
defendants, the complaint is dismissed and the plaintiff is condemned to
reimburse and return to defendants the sum of P22,674.00, with costs
against plaintiff."cralaw virtua1aw library
Elayda filed a motion for reconsideration and or new trial. This was denied.
5
Elayda appealed to the Court of Appeals. There she also failed. The
Appellate Tribunal affirmed the Trial Court’s judgment in its entirety, as
"being in accordance with law and the evidence." 6 She moved for
reconsideration, and when her motion was denied, 7 took an appeal to this
Court by certiorari.
Various errors are attributed by Elayda to the Court of Appeals and the
Trial Court, viz.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) affirming the Trial Court’s adjudgment that Elayda should return
P22,674.00 to the Roxases, as excess payment of the latter;
2) taking account of partial payments of the Roxases prior to November
17, 1964, the date when they agreed on P90,000.00 as the liquidated
unpaid balance;
3) finding that the only loans extended to the Roxases were two; one in
the amount of P60,000.00, in September, 1963 and the other, in the sum
of P40,000.00 in November, 1963, and disregarding the five (5) checks
presented by Elayda in the total sum of P97,600.00;
4) finding that the Roxases did pay 4% interest monthly to Elayda;
5) holding that the failure of Elayda to deny, specifically and under oath,
the Roxases’ allegation of usury, was an implied admission of the
allegation;
6) not sentencing the Roxases instead to pay P90,000.00, with interest at
12% per annum from November 17, 1964 as well as attorney’s fees and
costs.
The assignment of errors makes it obvious that the whole case turns on
one crucial issue, which is, whose version of the material occurrences has
34
been established by a preponderance of the evidence:chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
a) that of Elayda — that the amount lent by her to the Roxas Spouses was
actually P186,000.00, not P90,000.00 (as set out in her complaint); that
the payments made by the defendants added up to only P110,474.00, of
which the sum of P14,223.81 was applied to interest at 14% per annum
and P96,250.19, to principal, thus leaving a balance of P89,749.81 still
owing to her — or
b) that of the Roxases — that the loan in truth given was only P90,000.00;
that they gave on demand a "kickback" of P10,000.00 and paid interest at
the rate of four percent (4%) a month; and that all the payments made by
them really came to P112,674.00.
It should be equally obvious that the determination of this issue — which
includes substantially all other questions set up by Elayda (e.g., whether
or not the checks given to Lim Go Tong constituted additional loans of the
Roxases; whether interest at usurious rates was in fact paid; etc.) — is
essentially a factual adjudication which, by authority of the rule and
precedents adverted to in the opening paragraph of this opinion, is
conclusive on and may not be reviewed by this Court, absent any of the
recognized exceptions thereto. But this is what at bottom petitioner would
have this Court do: go over the proofs presented by the parties, and
analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the Trial Court and the
Appellate Court were correct in according superior credit to this or that
piece of evidence and eventually, to the totality of the evidence of one
party or the other. This, the Court cannot and will not do.
Of course, the matter of whether a particular item of proof was properly
admitted or rejected in light of the rules of evidence, is an issue of law. Of
this character is the issue raised by Elayda in respect of the Trial Court’s
rejection of her accountant’s statement. This issue this Court can and does
now pass upon.
The Court declares the rejection to be correct. Such rejection is entirely in
accord with the "familiar doctrine" that "an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the palty making such admission and
are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary
thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not . . ." 8 That doctrine, by the way, has since
been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964,
Section 2, Rule 129 of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Judicial admissions. — Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings,
or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and
can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake."cralaw virtua1aw library
Nothing in the record shows that Elayda’s admissions in her complaint
were indeed "made through palpable mistake."cralaw virtua1aw library
Besides, if it be true that the total loan liability of the Roxases was not
P90,000.00 only, but P186,000.00 (or P187,600.00), it is quite surprising
that Elayda’s evidence-in-chief, as plaintiff, was directed to proving an
obligation of only P90,000.00. Even more surprising is the fact that in her
complaint Elayda only alleged the sum of P90,000.00 as the indebtedness
of the Roxases to her. The evidence of an indebtedness in excess of
P90,000.00 would therefore appear to be a mere afterthought, difficult to
accept at face value.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Also correct was the Trial Court’s ruling, sustained by the Appellate Court,
that Elayda’s failure to deny specifically and under oath the accusation of
usury set out in the Roxases’ Amended Answer with Counterclaim —
alleging that Elayda required and received from the Roxas Spouses,
"kickback and interest in excess of the legal rate" — constituted an
admission of that accusation. The ruling is entirely in accord with Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that "allegations
of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath."
The admission is a judicial admission, albeit implied, and cannot be
negated "unless previously shown to have been made through palpable
mistake," supra, a showing which Elayda has not made.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the
challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding that of the Trial
Court, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-45354. July 26, 1988.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT
NEWMAN y BECLAR and DIONISIO TOLENTINO y
SANTILLAN, Defendants-Appellants.
35

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Manuel B. Valdezco, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL
EXAMINATION; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARRESTING OFFICER.
— At the time a person is arrested it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for his arrest, and he must be shown
the warrant for his arrest, if any. Before his interrogation, he shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
2. ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF COUNSEL, IMPERATIVE; WAIVER OF RIGHT,
HOW MADE. — No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the foregoing procedure,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
3. ID.; ID.; "ADVICE" GIVEN BY ARRESTING OFFICER, PERFUNCTORY AND
PRO-FORMA; NOT CONSIDERED SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
LAW. — It can be gleaned from the record of the case that the advice as to
constitutional rights of the accused, given by the investigating officer, was
perfunctory and pro-forma, intended obviously to pay lip service to the
prescribed norms, through a recitation by rote of the sacramental advice.
In the case at bar, the two (2) extrajudicial statements and waivers carry
the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to the mind of the Court,
indicates that lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating
officers to fully and truly inform the accused of their rights to remain silent
and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The "informing" done by
the police in the case at bar was nothing more than a superficial and
mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of the
fundamental law, as to give a semblance of compliance therewith. The
right of a person under interrogation to be informed of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication
that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is
a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been
"informed" of his rights.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER, NULL AND VOID. — The stereotyped "advice"
appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated, has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Its tired,
puntilous, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression
of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
record also shows that the interrogations were conducted incommunicado
in a police-denominated environment. When appellant Newman gave his
confession, his companions in the room were police officers. And the only
people with Tolentino when he "confessed" were also police investigators.
Indeed, the Court is far from certain or satisfied that the waivers of
counsel and the subsequent confessions were indeed voluntary and free.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; CONFESSION,
INADMISSIBLE. — The rejection of the extrajudicial confessions in the case
at bar is called for under the provision in the 1973 Constitution,
specifically, Art. IV, Sec. 20 which includes, among the rights of the
accused "the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such right." Any confession obtained in violation of the provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. Thus, even if the confession of the
accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel,
it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given.
6. ID.; ID.; PICTURES REENACTING CRIME CONSIDERED INADMISSIBLE
IN CASE AT BAR. — As to the reenactment of the crime, the Court notes
that appellant Dionisio Tolentino testified that he participated in such
reenactment after he was directed to do so by the policemen. Such
reenactment was scripted, to say the least. Besides, pictures reenacting a
crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves
inadmissible.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT
POSSESSOR OF STOLEN ARTICLE IS THE TAKER, NOT OVERCOME IN THE
CASE AT BAR. — The accused-appellants were positively identified as the
persons in possession of the stolen properties — the watch and the
Driver’s license. Both accused offered no satisfactory explanation as to the
fact of their possession of the stolen properties. Such evidence abundantly
incriminates them and proves that they took them with animus lucrandi. A
36
disputable presumption exists that a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act. Appellants offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such
presumption. Not even an alibi was presented for their defense. The
connection between the appellants’ unexplained possession of the stolen
personal properties taken from the victim and the homicide committed or
the attack on Efren Bantillo, is too close and too obvious. It can only lead
to the inevitable conclusion that the men who stole the wristwatch and
driver’s license of deceased Bantillo were the very same persons who
stabbed and killed him. Logic and experience easily allow such inference. A
presumption of guilt arises if the effects belonging to a person robed and
killed are found in the possession of another.
8. ID.; ID.; DYING DECLARATIONS; CONSIDERED MADE BY DECEASED IN
VIEW OF AN IMPENDING DEATH. — The ante-mortem statement, taken
together with the other evidence, especially, the stolen watch and the
driver’s license of the victim found in the possession of the accused, points
to a conclusive finding that indeed the accused are guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide. The appellants contend, however, that the dying
declaration was not made by the deceased under consciousness of an
impending death. The Court holds otherwise. The victim was brought to
the hospital in a very serious condition. The nature of the two (2) stab
wounds was fatal. When the victim opened the bandage (towel given by
Rosita Empio) his intestines came out.
9. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; CONSPIRACY
ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence, it may be inferred from the acts of the assailants. The
simple fact that they were present together during the commission of the
crimes, thus giving unto each other moral and physical aid and assistance
taken together — clearly manifest a concerted action in the pursuit of a
common design to kill and, subsequently, to steal. The finding that there
were two (2) fatal and penetrating stab wounds of three (3) to four (4)
inches deep, one in the chest and the other just below the navel, plus the
stab wound in the left forearm and incised wounds at the finger and thumb
of the deceased, would strongly indicate that one accused was evidently
holding back the victim to immobilize him while the other accused was
stabbing him; or at least such a circumstance would reveal that appellants
helped each other during the commission of the crime. Such method of
attack or manner of killing clearly indicates the indispensable cooperation
and spontaneous coordination between the appellants.
10. ID.; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. —
Conspiracy being present, it does not really matter that the prosecution
had failed to show who as between the two (2) accused actually stabbed
the victim. Both Newman and Tolentino are liable as co-conspirators since
the act of a co-conspirator is the act of the other regardless of the precise
degree of participation in the act.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal from the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, 12th Judicial District Branch IX, Bacolod City, dated 27 October
1976, in Criminal Case No. 1572 entitled "People of the Philippines,
Complainant v. Albert Newman y Beclar and Dionisio Tolentino y Santillan,
Accused," finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide.
The accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an
information which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 19th day of March 1975, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the herein
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another being then armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means
of violence did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and stab with the said knife, one Efren Bantillo, thereby causing
upon the person of the latter the following wounds to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. Wound stab 1 inch left hypochondriac region along anterior axillary line,
penetrating abdominal cavity with prolopse of omentum, perforating ilium
three (3) points (thru & thru) Hemorrhage internal severe, shock
secondary.
2. Wound stab one (1) inch 6th l.c.s. along anterior axillary line left
penetrating chest cavity, perforating diaphragm one (1) inch, and
lacerating left lobe liver by one (1) inch. Hemorrhage severe.
and then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry
away from said Efren Bantillo one (1) Ceba Wristwatch, wallet with
pertinent papers inside, all having a total value of P500.00, Philippine
Currency; which wounds directly caused the death of the said victim, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
37

1) As indemnity for the death of the victim — P12,000.00
2) As indemnity of the loss of earning capacity of the victim — 10,656.00
3) As moral damages — 10,000.00
Act contrary to law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
City of Bacolod, Philippines, March 26, 1975." 1
Upon arraignment on 18 June 1975, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
both accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On 29 October 1976, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
part of which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Albert
Newman y Beclar and Dionisio Tolentino y Santillan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and hereby
sentences them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay the heirs of
the deceased Efren Bantillo, jointly and severally, the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) by way of civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and, to pay the costs.
"The wrist watch, the FIFTY PESOS (P50.00) and the comb recovered from
the crime scene, the driver’s license and other personal effects of the
deceased Bantillo are ordered returned to his heirs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." 2
The facts of the case, as summarized in the Solicitor General’s brief, are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of March 19, 1975, while Rosita
Empio was selling coffee in her store located in Barrio Granada, Bacolod
City, a Minica taxi, (Ganbusco 500), bound for Bacolod City, stopped in
front of her store. Her attention was attracted by the driver, later
identified to be Efren Bantillo, who waved at her. When she approached
the taxicab, the driver asked her for help saying that he had been held-up
on the other side of the bridge. The driver was holding his left breast. She
asked him if he had other wounds and the driver pointed to his stomach.
She got a towel from her house to bind the wound but when she saw
intestines coming out of the big wound on the stomach, she was
frightened. She called other persons for assistance. A certain Felix and one
Kiko Luces bound the wound and they took the driver in his taxi to the
hospital at Bacolod City (pp. 16-18, tsn, July 9, 1975; pp. 5-6 t.s.n, July
24, 1975).
"When the taxicab arrived at the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial
Hospital in Bacolod City, Patrolman Eduardo Yanson, a police investigator
of the Bacolod City Police Force happened to be in the vicinity. He noticed
that a wounded man was taken to the emergency room, so he followed to
investigate. Sensing that the wounded man was in serious condition, he
took a piece of paper and began to ask him some questions (pp. 3-4, 7-8
tsn, Aug. 11, 1975). He was able to obtain the name of the victim as Efren
Bantillo, his age and address; that he was held-up by two persons whom
he did not know, but one was a short fellow with long hair, and the other
was tall and stout, and that sixty (P60.00) pesos was taken from him. As
the victim was getting delirious, Pat. Yanson also asked him if he feels he
was going to die. The victim was not able to answer him anymore because
he fell unconscious. The victim was not able to sign the piece of paper
where he jotted the answers to his questions (pp. 9-11 t.s.n., Aug. 11,
1975). When police investigators of the Theft and Robbery Section arrived,
Pat Yanson, endorsed the case to them. Upon his return to his office, he
executed an affidavit, narrating the foregoing incident. At the trial of the
case, however, he could not present the piece of paper on which he jotted
down the answer of the victim because he could not find it in his folder
where he used to keep his papers (p. 16, t.s.n., Id.).
"Dr. Orville Paez, resident physician of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano
Memorial Hospital in Bacolod City treated Efren Bantillo for two stab
wounds, one at the 10th intercoastal space, left front side, and another at
the abdomen below the navel. The wounds were caused by a knife similar
to the one presented as Exhibit "N." Both wounds were fatal (pp. 4-7,
t.s.n., Oct. 9, 1975). Efren Bantillo was admitted to the hospital at 10:30
p.m. on March 19, 1975. Despite an operation and all the medical
assistance given to him, the victim died at 2:40 p.m. on March 20, 1975.
Dr. Paez signed the death certificate of the deceased. According to the
doctor, the victim suffered other minor injuries, such as a stab wound at
the middle left forearm, an incised wound at the left 3rd finger and the
thumb, which injuries could have been caused by a sharp knife (pp. 11-12,
t.s.n. Oct. 9, 1975). The doctor confirmed the fact that a policeman
interrogated the victim at the emergency room before the operation took
place (p. 18, t.s.n., Oct. 9, 1975).chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"Patrolman Ramon Iligan, homicide investigator of the Bacolod Police
Department headed the team that followed up the investigation of this
case (p. 21, t.s.n., Aug. 27, 1975). Early in the morning of August (sic)
38
20, 1975 Pat. Daniel Lucot another police investigator was sent to Bo.
Granada and from there to Hacienda Hermilinda together with police
photographer Eleuterio Salde. They arrived at Hacienda Hermilinda at
about 9:00 a.m. (pp. 4-5, t.s.n., Aug. 27, 1975). They were guided to the
crime scene, where they met Sgt. Palomiro of the Theft and Robbery
Section who reached the place ahead of them. Sgt. Palomiro pointed to
Pat. Lucot, a yellow comb and fifty (P50.00) pesos in bills in the ditch and
P1.20 in coins. The bills consisted of one (1) P20.00 bill, one (1) P10.00
bill, and four (4) P5.00 bills (pp. 5, 9-10, t.s.n., Id.). The police
photographer took pictures of the comb, the money, the footprints, shoe
marks and tire-marks still fresh on the ground. This place was along the
Hacienda road and was deserted. The house nearest to it was about 200
yards away and no public utility vehicle passes through this Hacienda road
(pp. 14-16, t.s.n., Id.).
"In the morning of March 21, 1975, Detective Ramon Iligan received
information that the suspect went to the house of a certain Isidoro Naranja
in Bo. Arabay. Isidoro Naranja is the uncle of the accused, Albert Newman.
Together with Det. Jose Belocura they went to Bo. Arabay and contacted
Naranja who informed them that Albert Newman, with a companion later
identified as Dionisio Tolentino, arrived at his house at past one o’clock in
the morning of March 20, 1975. Albert Newman washed his clothes there.
Later, the two left his house. Following the information they received that
Albert Newman was working as a cargo truck driver of Mr. Cusi in
Hacienda Gerardo, they proceeded in the evening of March 21, 1975, to
Sitio Tambocal where Hacienda Gerardo was located (pp. 28, 60-61, t.s.n.,
Oct. 21, 1975). At the Hacienda they first saw Dionisio Tolentino whom
they found resting in a hut inside the plantation (p. 32, t.s.n., Oct. 9,
1975). Patrolman Iligan asked Tolentino if he had any participation in the
stabbing of Efren Bantillo. The latter said that it was his companion Albert
Newman who actually stabbed Efren Bantillo (p. 5, t.s.n., Oct. 21, 1975).
Tolentino pointed to Newman who was working some 200 yards away in
the sugar plantation. Confronting Newman, Pat. Iligan asked him, if he
(Newman) was responsible for the stabbing of a PU driver at Bo. Granada.
Newman admitted that he was the one who stabbed the driver. Later,
Newman stated that he took the watch of the victim. The policeman
retrieved the watch from the pocket of Newman’s trousers which he left on
the front seat of his cargo truck (p. 7, t.s.n., Oct. 21, 1975). They also
recovered from Dionisio Tolentino the driver’s license of Efren Bantillo, but
they noticed that the ID picture of Efren Bantillo was already removed and
substituted with the ID picture of Dionisio Tolentino (p. 37, t.s.n., Oct. 9,
1975). The policemen took the two accused with them to Bacolod City (p.
35, t.s.n., Oct. 9, 1975).
"Police investigator Jose Belocura declared that he was one of those who
apprehended the appellants in the company of Cpl. Ramon Iligan (pp. 17-
18, t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975). He further declared that from the younger
brother of Albert Newman they got the information that Albert washed his
clothes with bloodstains in their house. He affirmed that after arresting the
appellants and taking them to the Bacolod City Police Department, they
investigated the two thoroughly (p. 21, t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975). According
to him, in the morning of March 22, 1975, they went to the scene of the
crime together with the two appellants and some members of the police
department. Appellants reenacted the crime with him acting as Efren
Bantillo (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975). Photographs taken during the
reenactment were marked as Exhibits "Z," "AA" and "BB" (pp. 25-27, 29,
t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975). Upon their return to the office, the statements of
the two appellants were taken (p. 33, t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975).
"After the reenactment, Pat. Iligan took the written statements of the two
accused. Before he took their statements, he informed them of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and assistance of a counsel. Both
however admitted that they knew their rights but were waiving them as
they would only tell the truth. They agreed to sign a waiver of their rights
to counsel or to remain silent. He first read the waiver, Exhibit "Q," to
Albert Newman before the latter signed it (pp. 38-39, t.s.n., Oct. 9, 1975;
p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 21, 1975). Like Newman, Dionisio Tolentino also signed a
waiver of his constitutional rights and manifested that he was giving his
voluntary statement, Exhibit "R" (p. 30, t.s.n., Oct. 9, 1975). After the
execution of the waiver, he took the statement of Albert Newman, Exhibits
"S," "S-1" and "S-2" (pp. 41-42, t.s.n., Id.), and then the statement of
Dionisio Tolentino. These statements were subscribed and sworn by them
before Assistant City Fiscal Parreno. (pp. 44-45, t.s.n., Id.). Fiscal Parreno
asked them if they were threatened or manhandled and they answered
they were not (pp. 40-41, 44-45, t.s.n., Oct. 9, 1975).chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
"On the witness stand, assistant City Fiscal Parreno declared that on March
22, 1975 the appellants were brought to him to have their waivers and
affidavits sworn to. He first asked the affiants whether they were apprised
of their rights under the law; whether in giving their statement they were
threatened by the investigating officers of the Bacolod City Police
Department, and whether they were asked by the same investigating
officer if they desired to have a counsel before giving their answers. He
informed the appellants that the statement they were giving may be
utilized against them and asked them if they understood what they were
testifying to. Appellants affirmed to him that the statements they were
giving were all voluntary (pp. 4, 15, t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975). He asked if the
appellants knew how to read and if they understood the contents of their
affidavits. Appellants also answered in the affirmative. Then he told the
39
appellants to affix their signatures on the affidavits, which appellants did in
his presence (pp. 5, 15, 33, t.s.n., Nov. 20, 1975).
"In his affidavit, Newman admitted that he stabbed the victim. According
to Newman, he and Dionisio Tolentino boarded PU-500 driven by Efren
Bantillo at Gonzaga at about 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. They told Bantillo to
proceed to Bo. Granada and to stop near the Lizares Elementary School at
Bo. Granada. However, when they noticed that many people were going to
and coming from the school where a dance was then being held, they told
Bantillo to proceed to Hermilinda at the other side of the bridge. When
they reached the place he had indicated, Newman asked Bantillo to stop.
Then he told him that they had no money to pay for the fare. Dionisio
Tolentino got out of the car. Albert Newman however was left inside
because Bantillo held him by the shoulders. After a brief scuffle, Albert was
able to extricate himself from Bantillo’s hold and was able to get out of the
car. He pulled out a stainless knife from his left side trouser pocket.
Bantillo saw this and tried to wrest the knife from him. They grappled until
both fell to the ground. Albert was able to stand up and was about to run
away, when the victim held him again. Albert turned around and stabbed
Bantillo at the stomach. They continued to grapple for the knife until they
fell on the ditch. Bantillo kicked Newman on the thigh and the latter
stabbed him again, this time hitting him on the breast. When Bantillo
climbed up the ditch, Dionisio Tolentino jumped at him. Bantillo bit
Tolentino. Just then Albert Newman noticed Bantillo’s wallet on the
ground. He picked it up and together with Dionisio Tolentino, ran towards
the creek. The two proceeded to the school building. When Newman
opened the wallet he found no money but Bantillo’s driver’s license inside.
He gave Bantillo’s license to Dionisio Tolentino and threw the wallet in a
nearby sugar plantation. From there they went to the house of his uncle,
Isidoro Naranja in Bo. Arabay. In his uncle’s house, he washed his clothes
because it was smeared with blood. At about 4:30 a.m. the two left for the
house of Albert Newman. Albert replaced the knife which he used for
stabbing in the place where he got it, without telling anybody in the house
about the incident. Afterwards, he proceeded to his place of work as driver
in Hacienda Gerardo at Sitio Tabucol, Bago City. It was there where he
was arrested by the Bacolod City policemen (pp. 56-57, t.s.n., Oct. 9,
1975; Exh. "S," pp. 117-119, Rec.)
"Antonio Blanco, a printer, friend and co-member of Efren Bantillo in the
church of Iglesia ni Kristo, declared that the deceased who was his close
friend borrowed his Ceba wrist watch about two weeks before the incident.
The deceased had no watch and needed one badly to remind him of the
time and avoid being caught by the curfew (p, 4, t.s.n., July 9, 1975).
When he heard that Efren Bantillo was held up on March 19, 1975, he
visited the victim at the hospital the following day, but he did not see
Bantillo wearing his watch. Then on March 22, 1975, he was called by the
Bacolod City police investigator to identify the Ceba wristwatch taken from
Newman. He identified the said watch to be his (p. 29, t.s.n., Aug. 27,
1975." 3
While both accused executed extra-judicial confessions on 22 March 1975,
they have, however, repudiated them. The testimonies of the accused
Dionisio Tolentino and Carlos Newman (father of the accused Albert
Newman) make up the entire evidence for the defense. As summarized by
the lower court, these testimonies are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"DIONISIO TOLENTINO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the evening of March 21, 1975, he was apprehended by the Bacolod
Police at Hda. Gerardo in Bago City. The Police did not have any warrant of
arrest at that time. He was loaded in the service car of the police and
brought to the city hall where he was investigated. At about 8:30 o’clock
in the morning of 22 March 1975, he was brought to Barrio Granada for
the re-enactment of the crime. Before the reenactment, he was not
informed by the police about his constitutional rights. After the
reenactment he was brought again to the Bacolod Police Department.
Later he was let out of his cell and about three persons maltreated him.
Then he was again brought inside his cell. Later he was brought upstairs,
and when he arrived there he saw that they were already typing the
statements. He was not asked any questions (t.s.n., February 2,
1976).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"CARLOS NEWMAN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
He is the chief mechanic of the Bacolod City Fire Department. One of this
friends told him that his son, Albert, was there. So he went to the place at
about 8:30 o’clock in the morning of 22 March 1975, but he was not able
to talk to his son because he was being investigated by the secret service.
Neither was he able to talk to his son in the afternoon of the same day.
The first time that he was able to talk to his son after his arrest was in the
morning of 24 March 1975 (pp. 3-4, t.s.n., March 8, 1976)." 4
The main thrust of the arguments of the accused-appellants for the
reversal of the judgment and their acquittal from the offense charged, is
that they had not been duly informed of their constitutional rights. They
contend that their oral and written extra-judicial confessions and the
photographs showing the alleged re-enactment of the crime, are
inadmissible in evidence. They further claim that they were not accorded
the right to due process.
40
The Court agrees with the contention of the appellants that the questioned
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence against them.
In Albert Newman’s waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel, he
affirmed that, in connection with his investigation, he was first informed of
his right to remain silent, his right to employ the services of a lawyer to
assist him in the investigation, and that anything he would say in said
investigation may be used against him. He further stated in said waiver
that he understood these rights and would give his statement and answers
to questions that would be asked of him; that he did not need the
assistance of a lawyer, because he understood what he was doing; that he
was not promised anything, threatened or forced by whatever means. This
waiver was signed and subscribed to by him (Newman) before 5th
Assistant City Fiscal Gil B. Parreno on the 22nd day of March 1975, in the
City of Bacolod. 5 It was also on the same day that Newman executed and
swore to his affidavit which contained his extra-judicial confession of guilt.
The formal investigation of Newman was preceded by the following
questions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Investigator: You are now here under investigation for the crime of killing
Efren Bantillo y de la Cruz. Before you are asked, you are reminded of
your rights under our New Constitution, which are the following: You have
the right to remain silent, whatever statement you will give may be used
as evidence against you, you have the right to secure your own lawyer,
and if you cannot afford to get a lawyer you will be given a counsel to
attend to you before you will be investigated. Do you understand all of
your rights?
Albert Newman: Yes, I understand all these.
Investigator: Shall we continue with the investigation?
Albert Newman: Yes.
Investigator: Even though you do not have a lawyer?
Albert Newman: Yes, because it is my desire to tell the truth about what
really happened even though there is no lawyer to attend to me." 6
A waiver in the same tenor as Newman’s waiver was also executed by
appellant Dionisio Tolentino. 7 The same questions and answers prefaced
the formal investigation of the appellant Dionisio Tolentino. 8 The waivers
and affidavits (confessions) were in the native Visayan dialect (Hiligaynon)
which the appellants know and speak.
From all the foregoing, it would appear that the appellants were not
properly apprised of their constitutional rights before their custodial
examination took place. Hence, their extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence.
At the time a person is arrested it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for his arrest, and he must be shown the
warrant for his arrest, if any. Before his interrogation, he shall be informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing
and with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the foregoing procedure, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. 9
It can be gleaned from the record of the case that the advice as to
constitutional rights of the accused, given by the investigating officer, was
perfunctory and pro-forma, intended obviously to pay lip service to the
prescribed norms, through a recitation by rote of the sacramental advice.
10 This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated, has assumed the nature of a "legal
form" or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style
does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on
the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. 11 In the case at bar, the
two (2) extrajudicial statements and waivers carry the same quoted
prefatory statement. This, to the mind of the Court, indicates that lack of
zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly
inform the accused of their rights to remain silent and to counsel during
the custodial investigation. The "informing" done by the police in the case
at bar was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed
not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law, as to give a
semblance of compliance therewith. 12 The right of a person under
interrogation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel,
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an
understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been "informed" of
41
his rights. 13
The record also shows that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-denominated environment. When appellant
Newman gave his confession, his companions in the room were police
officers. And the only people with Tolentino when he "confessed" were also
police investigators. 14 Indeed, the Court is far from certain or satisfied
that the waivers of counsel and the subsequent confessions were indeed
voluntary and free.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The rejection of the extrajudicial confessions in the case at bar is called for
under the provision in the 1973 Constitution, specifically, Art. IV, Sec. 20
which includes, among the rights of the accused "the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such right." Any confession obtained
in violation of the provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. Thus,
even if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given. 15 Conviction, therefore, cannot be based thereon.
As to the reenactment of the crime, the Court notes that appellant Dionisio
Tolentino testified that he participated in such reenactment after he was
directed to do so by the policemen. Such reenactment was scripted, to say
the least. Besides, pictures reenacting a crime which are based on an
inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible. 16
With the exclusion of the confessions of Newman and Tolentino, there is
no necessity to deliberate on the appellants’ allegations of intimidation and
maltreatment which attended their execution.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, the guilt of the appellants has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their conviction must be affirmed.
Recovered from the accused Newman at the time of his arrest by the
police officers was a watch borrowed by the victim from his close friend
Antonio Blanco; on the other hand, taken from the accused Tolentino was
the Driver’s license of the deceased Bantillo but whose picture (ID photo)
was replaced with the picture of Tolentino. 17 In other words, the
accused-appellants were positively identified as the persons in possession
of the stolen properties — the watch and the Driver’s license. Both accused
offered no satisfactory explanation as to the fact of their possession of the
stolen properties. 18 Such evidence abundantly incriminates them and
proves that they took them with animus lucrandi. A disputable
presumption exists that a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act. 19 Appellants offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such
presumption. Not even an alibi was presented for their defense.
It is not also disputed that the victim, before he died, told both Rosita
Empio and Patrolman Yanzon that he was held-up by two men — one was
tall and stout and the other was a short fellow with long hair —
descriptions which fit the two (2) accused; that he was stabbed twice; and
that P60.00 were forcibly taken from his person. 20 The ante-mortem
statement, taken together with the other evidence, especially, the stolen
watch and the driver’s license of the victim found in the possession of the
accused, points to a conclusive finding that indeed the accused are guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The appellants contend, however, that the dying declaration was not made
by the deceased under consciousness of an impending death. The Court
holds otherwise. The victim was brought to the hospital in a very serious
condition. 21 The nature of the two (2) stab wounds was fatal. 22 When
the victim opened the bandage (towel given by Rosita Empio) his
intestines came out. 23
The connection between the appellants’ unexplained possession of the
stolen personal properties taken from the victim and the homicide
committed or the attack on Efren Bantillo, is too close and too obvious. It
can only lead to the inevitable conclusion that the men who stole the
wristwatch and driver’s license of deceased Bantillo were the very same
persons who stabbed and killed him. Logic and experience easily allow
such inference.
In one case, 24 Tan who was still alive when asked who attacked him, was
able to answer that "Kagui" (the name by which the accused was known)
was responsible. When the accused was searched, the pocketbook of the
dead man, with P92.00, his identification card and his memorandum book
were found in Kagui’s person. It was held that in the absence of an
explanation as to how one has come into possession of stolen effects
belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must
necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the
victim and of the robbery committed on him. A presumption of guilt arises
if the effects belonging to a person robbed and killed are found in the
possession of another.
Still in another case, 25 it was held that evidence which shows that certain
jewelry and money that were found to be missing from the house of the
deceased a short time after the homicide and that they were subsequently
found at a place indicated by the accused is sufficient to support the
inference that the same person who committed the homicide also
42
committed the robbery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellants’ claim of absence of conspiracy is without merit. Conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence, it may be inferred from the acts of
the assailants. 26 The circumstances of riding the PU Minica together as
passengers; the taking along with them of a stainless knife of Newman;
the militant dispatch and precision in stabbing the victim; their hiding
together in Newman’s place of work; the finding that they were together
immediately preceding the commission of the crimes up to the time of
their arrest two days later; their apparent haste in departing from the
crime scene after its perpetration to the point of leaving behind the wallet
of the victim containing P50.00; and the simple fact that they were
present together during the commission of the crimes, thus giving unto
each other moral and physical aid and assistance taken together — clearly
manifest a concerted action in the pursuit of a common design to kill and,
subsequently, to steal.
The finding that there were two (2) fatal and penetrating stab wounds of
three (3) to four (4) inches deep, one in the chest and the other just below
the navel, plus the stab wound in the left forearm and incised wounds at
the finger and thumb of the deceased, 27 would strongly indicate that one
accused was evidently holding back the victim to immobilize him while the
other accused was stabbing him; or at least such a circumstance would
reveal that appellants helped each other during the commission of the
crime. Such method of attack or manner of killing clearly indicates the
indispensable cooperation and spontaneous coordination between the
appellants. That the two (2) appellants divided the "loot" between them —
the wristwatch was taken by Newman while the Driver’s License of Bantillo
was appropriated by Tolentino is another indication of conspiracy to
commit the crime. The closeness of personal association, the community
of purpose and the concurrence of sentiment are plainly inferrable from
the circumstances above narrated.
Conspiracy being present, it does not really matter that the prosecution
had failed to show who as between the two (2) accused actually stabbed
the victim. Both Newman and Tolentino are liable as co-conspirators since
the act of a co-conspirator is the act of the other regardless of the precise
degree of participation in the act. 28
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Criminal Case No. 1572 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the indemnity, to be paid by the accused-appellants,
jointly and severally to the heirs of the deceased Efren Bantillo, is
increased to P30,000.00. With costs against the Accused-
Appellants.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 123450 : August 31, 2005]
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
MA. THERESA ALMONTE,Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special
safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as
after birth.1 In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage
of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the
single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private
respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.2 After
their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa's parents in Fairview, Quezon
City.3 Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth
to Jose Gerardo.4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's relationship turned out to be short-lived,
however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.5 He alleged
that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old.
She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never
lived with Mario at all.8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the
latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate
43
child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage
annulled. She held him responsible for the 'bastardization' of Gerardo. She
moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as
that portion of the - decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called
'visitation rights'' between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of
any Sunday."10 She argued that there was nothing in the law granting
"visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child."11She further maintained that Jose Gerardo's surname should be
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule
that an illegitimate child shall use the mother's surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the
retention of 'Concepcion' as Jose Gerardo's surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma.
Theresa's motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to
hurt the other, something they should never do if they want to assure the
normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor
needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to
recognize - something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the
Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy
would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with
his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other
on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as
amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of
the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it
is hereby DENIED.12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error
the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She
likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo's surname (Concepcion)
despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate
and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that
granted a putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the
appellate court affirmed the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by
the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t bottom, it (was) the child's welfare and
not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration
in granting visitation rights a few hours once a week."14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the
mother's surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother,
should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse
decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for
oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the
controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties,
the appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its
earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa
by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable - established by the evidence in this case - that
the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she
had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since
the so-called "marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo]
himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa]
was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was
born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo - under the
law - is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
illegitimate child of the void and non-existent 'marriage' between [Ma.
Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the
legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao
(Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that
[Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose
Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not
only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate
child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
44
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial
seal upon an illegitimate relationship.16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose
Gerardo's birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a
year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movant's argument that various evidence exist
that appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is
their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that
Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress." (Underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be
deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother
and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only
the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children
for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says
and not what a parent says it is.17 (Emphasis
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above
decision but the same was denied.18 Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.19 Article 164 of
the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy.22 We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case
of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals23 :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He
has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma.
Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case,25 his heirs, who can contest
the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs.27 Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception.28 To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could
have enabled the husband to father the child.29 Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child.31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be
such as to make marital intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for
instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they
were never together during the period of conception.33 Or, the husband
was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual
union took place through the violation of prison regulations.34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together
in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in
Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers
apart.
45
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also
that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between
them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma.
Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make
it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat
the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary.
There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in
favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa
and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in her answer35 to the petition
for annulment of marriage36that she never lived with Mario. He claims this
was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her
and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardo's argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa's statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This
declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ―
is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother
against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that
there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together
with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them.
All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that
nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the
time material to Jose Gerardo's conception and birth. Far from foreclosing
the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only
serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical
access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa's statement is to allow her to
arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a
proper case, his heirs.37 A mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain.38 Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law
to question Jose Gerardo's legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman
cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her
offspring is illegitimate.39 The proscription is in consonance with the
presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of
the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.40
Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue
both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The
fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose
Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an
agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate
that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to
make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to
the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband.
These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child.41 Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who
may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It
has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in
evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider
any evidence which has not been formally offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment
of his birth.43 Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as
primary evidence of the filiation of a child,44 as the status of a child is
determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child
born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be
established.45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack
as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the
husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of
proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein.46 As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record
46
of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not
conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein by the interested parties.47 Between the certificate of birth
which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy and the quasi-
conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more
weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in
consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press
for Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child's
interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a
legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the
legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to
bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full
inheritance.48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can
claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half
of that of his legitimate counterpart.49 Moreover (without unwittingly
exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a
'bastard' is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor.
Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose
Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter
squabble between the very persons who were passionately declaring their
concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly
for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially
tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year
old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this
time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to
his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him
since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his
legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.50 A person's surname or
family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on
from parent to child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose
Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name and effecting the corrections
of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation
should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article
49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived
of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right
of both parent and child to each other's company. There being no such
parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally
demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and
unequivocal:
Article 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. - In all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years.52 Through its
laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents,
to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and
members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family
acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
47
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995
and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 144268 : August 30, 2006]
DATALIFT MOVERS, INC. and/or JAIME B.
AQUINO, Petitioners, v. BELGRAVIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and SAMPAGUITA BROKERAGE, INC. Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In an action for ejectment filed by Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. and its
sister company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corporation, against the
herein petitioners Datalift Movers, Inc. and/or Jaime B. Aquino, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), of Manila, Branch 3, later the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 36, and eventually the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52189 are one in ordering the petitioners'
ejectment from the premises involved in the suit and their payment of
unpaid rentals, attorney's fees and costs. Undaunted, the petitioners have
come to this Court via this Petition for Review with application for a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to seek the
reversal of the affirmatory decision of the CA, including those of the courts
below it.
We likewise AFFIRM, but first the facts:
The premises involved in this case is a warehouse (bodega) used by
petitioner Datalift Movers, Inc. (Datalift for short) for its cargoes in
connection with its brokerage business. The warehouse stands on a
3,967.70 squaremeter lot owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR)
and located at No. 883 Santibañez Street corner Cristobal Street,
Pandacan, Manila.
Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc.
(Sampaguita, hereafter), pursuant to a written contract commencing on
July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990 for a monthly rental
of P6,282.49, subject to a ten (10%) percent increase every year.
Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister
company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corporation (Belgravia for
short) whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own
use. True enough, Belgravia did put up a warehouse occupying an area of
about 3,000 squaremeters of the lot. However, instead of using the said
warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift, represented
by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract of
lease 1 dated October 2, 1990, commencing on October 5, 1990 and
ending on October 5, 1991, subject to extension upon mutual agreement
by the parties. By the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a
monthly rental of P40,000.00 payable on or before the 15th day of each
month, provided an advance rental for two (2) months is paid upon
execution of the contract.
After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in
possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse, evidently by
acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties.
Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental
to P60,000.00 starting June 1994 to October 1994. Monthly rental was
again increased from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 beginning November
1994 onwards, allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR
on Sampaguita for the latter's lease of the former's lot whereon the
warehouse in question stands. Because of the rental increase made by
Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse.
Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the
latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to
vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. The demands having
proved futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila
their complaint 2 for ejectment against Datalift and/or its controlling
stockholder, Jaime B. Aquino.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, 3 the defendants interposed the
following defenses:
1) Sampaguita has no cause of action against them, not being a party nor
privy to the Datalift-Belgravia contract of lease;
48
2) Under the PNR-Sampaguita contract of lease over the PNR lot,
Sampaguita is prohibited from subleasing the property;
3) The same PNR-Sampaguita contract had allegedly expired;
4) Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because it was neither
the owner nor lessee of the lot whereon the warehouse stands.
By way of counterclaim, defendants Datalift and Aquino prayed for the
refund by Belgravia of the rentals they paid during the entire period of
their lease of the warehouse, plus exemplary damages and litigation
expenses.
In a decision 4 dated October 16, 1997, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 3,
rendered judgment for plaintiffs Sampaguita and Belgravia but reduced
the amount of rental arrearages to a reasonable level of P80,000,00 a
month, saying:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not persuaded or inclined to favor the
very substantial increase in the amount demanded by Sampaguita and/or
Belgravia upon Datalift, from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 per month. Such
increase is arbitrary, highly unconscionable and beyond the ambit of
equity and justice considering that the original agreed rental on the
premises in 1990 was only P45,000.00 per month, the latter increase
to P60,000.00 per month. The unilateral increase of P70,000.00 making
the monthly rental P130,000.00 effective June, 1994, is, as earlier said,
beyond the conscience of man. Belgravia would be guilty likewise, of
unjust enrichment.
The increase in rental for P60,000.00 per month to P80,000.00 per month,
following the trend in the amount of increase during the previous years
would, to the mind of the Court be reasonable and justified. Thus, the
rental in arrears due and demandable upon defendants would
be P20,000.00 per month from June, 1994 to October, 1994, defendants
having paid already P60,000.00 per month during the five (5) months
period, the P80,000.00 per month from November, 1994 to the present.
In the same decision, the MeTC rejected the defendants' challenge against
Belgravia's title over the PNR lot occupied by the subject warehouse.
More particularly, the MeTC decision dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so hold that
plaintiffs have proven their case against defendants by preponderance of
evidence sufficient to grant what is prayed for in their Complaint with
certain modification and hereby renders judgment:
1) Ordering defendants and all persons, natural or juridical, claiming
rights, interest or title under them, to vacate and surrender peacefully to
plaintiffs that warehouse and the area/premises occupied by them located
at No. 883 Santibañez Street corner Cristobal Street, Pandacan, City of
Manila;
2) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff Belgravia the difference
of P20,000.00 from what had been already paid of P60,000.00 per month
for the months of June, 1994 to October, 1994 or a total of P100,000.00;
and the unpaid rentals at P80,000.00 per month from November, 1994 to
the present and until defendants vacate and surrender the warehouse and
premises subject of this litigation;
3) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff P30,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, and
4) To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Obviously dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the RTC whereat the
appeal was raffled to Branch 36 thereof. In their appeal, Datalift and its
co-defendant Jaime B. Aquino questioned the MeTC's finding that there
was an implied new lease between PNR and Sampaquita on the lot on
which the warehouse in question stands, and accordingly fault the same
court for ordering them to vacate the same warehouse and to pay rentals
as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
For their part, Sampaguita and Belgravia assailed the MeTC decision for
not ordering Datalift and Aquino to pay the increase rental of P130,000.00
a month beginning June 1994, and for not ruling that both defendants are
jointly and subsidiary liable for the amounts awarded to them.
In a decision 5 dated March 11, 1999, the RTC, reechoing the MeTC's
ruling on the authority of Sampaguita and Belgravia to institute the
complaint for ejectment as well as the same court's finding as to the
reasonable amount of rental in arrears due Belgravia, affirmed in toto the
assailed MeTC decision, thus:
49
In the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision of MeTC of Manila,
Branch 3 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
This time, only Datalift and its co-petitioner Jaime B. Aquino elevated the
case to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 52189.
Again, in a decision 6 dated August 4, 2000, the CA dismissed the
petitioners' recourse thereto and affirmed with slight modification the
challenged affirmatory decision of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila, dated March 11, 1999, affirming in toto the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, is hereby AFFIRMED,
except that the award of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Still unable to accept the adverse decisions of the three (3) courts below,
the petitioners are now with this Court via this Petition for Review on their
submission that the CA erred:
XXX IN HOLDING THAT AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN
PNR AND RESPONDENTS (i.e. SAMPAGUITA and BELGRAVIA) WHEN THE
FORMER DID NOT TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO EJECT THE LATTER FROM
THE SUBJECT PREMISES.
XXX IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO
QUESTION WHETHER AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN
PNR AND THE RESPONDENTS.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners first fault the CA for affirming the RTC and the MeTC which
ruled that the subject warehouse and the land and area which it occupies
rightfully belong to respondent Belgravia, not Datalift, for an implied new
lease was created between PNR, the acknowledged owner of the lot, and
Sampaguita, Belgravia's sister company, which, by virtue of a special
arrangement, Sampaguita allowed Belgravia to construct a warehouse on
the leased lot and sub-leased the same to Datalift.
At first glance, the petitioners' argument may appear to have some merit,
but it is still insufficient to warrant a reversal of the CA decision.
Relative to the first argument, the CA decision pertinently reads:
There is no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR and
Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. had been effectively terminated. As held by
the court a quo: "(B)y PNR not taking a positive action to
eject Sampaguita from the leased premises up to the present, again, there
is a tacit renewal of the lease contract between PNR and
Sampaguita.(Emphasis in the original.)
The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as
lessor, from being questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its
title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the
existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred from
assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. - - The following are instances
of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. (Underscoring ours.)
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any
contrary proof however strong." 7 As long as the lessor-lessee relationship
between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as
lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession
to the subject leased premises than they have.
It was superfluous on the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity
of Belgravia's title or right of possession over the leased premises as
against the petitioners as lessees in this case. If at all, Belgravia's title or
50
right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case rentals from November 1994 in the amount of P80,000.00 until they
between PNR and Belgravia, but not in the present case. Any ruling which vacate the leased premises.
the court may render on this issue will, at the very least, be an obiter
dictum, if not outrightly ultra vires. No pronouncement as to cos

The apparent error made by the MeTC will, however, not affect the result
of the judgment rendered in this case. In fact, the application of the rule FIRST DIVISION
on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted Section 2, Rule 131
strengthens the position of the MeTC that the petitioners may be validly BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, G.R. No. 169737
ordered to vacate the leased premises for nonpayment of rentals. INC.,
Likewise, the logical consequence of the operation of this conclusive Petitioner,cralawcralawPresent:
presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have the
personality to question whether an implied new lease was created between PUNO, C.J., Chairp
PNR and the respondents, because so long as there is no showing that the erson,
lessor-lessee relationship has terminated, the lessor's title or better right SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
of possession as against the lessee will eternally be a non-issue in any - v e r s u s -cralaw cralawCORONA,
proceeding before any court. AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Additionally, as correctly pointed out by the CA, being non-privies to the
contract of lease between PNR and respondent Sampaguita, the petitioners NEOMI* and DANILO
have no personality to raise any factual or legal issue relating thereto. OLIVARES,
cralaw Respondents. Promulgated:
Despite non-merit of petitioners' arguments, and notwithstanding the
petitioners' failure to assail the accuracy of the dates when the increase of February 12, 2008
rental from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 was effected, in the interest of
justice, the Court shall correct this plain error, and adjust the rental due in x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
accordance with the facts as borne by the evidence on record. The Court ------x
readily noticed that the MeTC decision erroneously reckoned the effective
date of the increased rental of P130,000.00 from June 1994 instead of the
correct date of November 1994, which shall cause an overpayment DECISION
of P100,000.00 by the petitioners. It is clear from the records that the
rental due and demandable, and which the petitioners already paid to CORONA, J.:
respondent Belgravia from June 1994 to October 1994 was
only P60,000.00. It was only when Belgravia drastically increased the
monthly rental from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00, effective November
1994, that the petitioners altogether stopped paying rentals. Thus, the cralawThis is a petition for review on certiorari [1] of a decision[2] and
order to pay unpaid rentals in the adjusted amount of P80,000.00 should
be reckoned only from November 1994 until the time that the petitioners resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 29, 2005 and
finally vacate the premises. There are no unpaid differentials
of P20,000.00/month due from June 1994 to October 1994. September 21, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84163 which

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED with affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch
the MODIFICATION that the petitioners are ordered to pay only the unpaid
61 dated February 2, 2004 in Civil Case No. 03-1153,[4] which in turn
51
reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Makati City, certification from her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was

Branch 66 dated August 5, 2003 in Civil Case No. 80867.[5] not caused by a pre-existing condition.[9]

cralawRespondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program She was discharged from the hospital on December 3, 2002. On December

with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care, Inc., a health maintenance 5, 2002, she demanded that petitioner pay her medical bill. When

firm. For the period October 16, 2002 to October 15, 2003, [6] she paid the petitioner still refused, she and her husband, respondent Danilo Olivares,

amount of P11,117. For the same period, she also availed of the additional were constrained to settle the bill.[10] They thereafter filed a complaint for

service of limitless consultations for an additional amount of P1,000. She collection of sum of money against petitioner in the MeTC on January 8,

paid these amounts in full on October 17, 2002. The application was 2003.[11] In its answer dated January 24, 2003, petitioner maintained that

approved on October 22, 2002. In the health care agreement, ailments it had not yet denied respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr. Saniel's

due to pre-existing conditions were excluded from the coverage.[7] report.

cralawOn November 30, 2002, or barely 38 days from the effectivity of her
cralawIn a letter to petitioner dated February 14, 2003, Dr. Saniel stated
health insurance, respondent Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at
that:
the Medical City which was one of the hospitals accredited by This is in response to your letter dated February 13,
2003.[Respondent] Neomi T. Olivares called by phone on
January 29, 2003. She stated that she is invoking patient-
petitioner. During her confinement, she underwent several laboratory
physician confidentiality. That she no longer has any
relationship with [petitioner]. And that I should not release
tests. On December 2, 2002, her attending physician, Dr. Edmundo any medical information concerning her neurologic status
to anyone without her approval.Hence, the same day I
Saniel,[8] informed her that she could be discharged from the hospital. She instructed my secretary to inform your office thru Ms.
Bernie regarding [respondent's] wishes.
incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34,217.20. Consequently, she
xxx xxx xxx[12]
requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a letter of

authorization in order to settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to

issue the letter and suspended payment pending the submission of a

52
cralawIn a decision dated August 5, 2003, the MeTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action. It held:
xxx the best person to determine whether or not the
stroke she suffered was not caused by pre-existing
conditions is her attending physician Dr. Saniel who
treated her and conducted the test during her
confinement. xxx But since the evidence on record reveals
that it was no less than [respondent Neomi] herself who
prevented her attending physician from issuing the
required certification, petitioner cannot be faulted from
suspending payment of her claim, for until and unless it
can be shown from the findings made by her attending
physician that the stroke she suffered was not due to pre-
existing conditions could she demand entitlement to the
benefits of her policy.[13]
On appeal, the RTC, in a decision dated February 2, 2004, reversed the
ruling of the MeTC and ordered petitioner to pay respondents the following
amounts: (1) P34,217.20 representing the medical bill in Medical City
and P1,000 as reimbursement for consultation fees, with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; (2) P20,000 as moral
damages; (3) P20,000 as exemplary damages; (4) P20,000 as attorney's
fees and (5) costs of suit.[14] The RTC held that it was the burden of
petitioner to prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from
the coverage of the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing
condition. It was not able to discharge that burden.[15]
cralawAggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court in the CA. In a decision promulgated on July 29, 2005, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It denied reconsideration in a
resolution promulgated on September 21, 2005. Hence this petition which
raises the following issues: (1) whether petitioner was able to prove that
respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and
therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health care agreement
and (2) whether it was liable for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
The health care agreement defined a pre-existing condition as:
x x x a disability which existed before the commencement
date of membership whose natural history can be clinically
determined, whether or not the Member was aware of such
illness or condition. Such conditions also include disabilities
existing prior to reinstatement date in the case of lapse of
an Agreement. Notwithstanding, the following disabilities
but not to the exclusion of others are considered pre-
existing conditions including their complications when
occurring during the first year of a Members coverage:
I. Tumor of Internal Organs
II. Hemorrhoids/Anal Fistula
III. Diseased tonsils and sinus conditions
requiring surgery
IV. Cataract/Glaucoma
V. Pathological Abnormalities of nasal septum or
turbinates
VI. Goiter and other thyroid disorders
VII. Hernia/Benign prostatic hypertrophy
VIII. Endometriosis
53
 IX. Asthma/Chronic Obstructive Lung
disease Respondents counter that the burden was on petitioner to prove that
X. Epilepsy
XI. Scholiosis/Herniated disc and other
Neomi's stroke was excluded from the coverage of their agreement
Spinal column abnormalities
XII. Tuberculosis
XIII. Cholecysitis because it was due to a pre-existing condition. It failed to prove this.[18]
XIV. Gastric or Duodenal ulcer
XV. Hallux valgus
XVI. Hypertension and other Cardiovascular We agree with respondents.
diseases
XVII. Calculi
XVIII. Tumors of skin, muscular tissue, bone In Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA,[19] we ruled that a health care
or any form of blood dyscracias
XIX. Diabetes Mellitus agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance.[20] It is an established
XX. Collagen/Auto-Immune disease
rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on
After the Member has been continuously covered for 12
months, this pre-existing provision shall no longer be
applicable except for illnesses specifically excluded by an liability, they should be construed strictly against the insurer. These are
endorsement and made part of this Agreement.[16]
contracts of adhesion the terms of which must be interpreted and enforced

stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. This doctrine
Under this provision, disabilities which existed before the commencement
is equally applicable to health care agreements.[21]
of the agreement are excluded from its coverage if they become manifest

within one year from its effectivity. Stated otherwise, petitioner is not cralawPetitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent

liable for pre-existing conditions if they occur within one year from the Neomi's stroke was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely speculated

time the agreement takes effect. that Dr. Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi, based on her

invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable

Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel from submitting
presumption at best.
his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi. Hence, it contends

that the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse cralawSection 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:

if produced should apply in its favor.[17]

54
 Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. ― The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
cralaw
the strict standard required under our jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx

(e)cralawThat evidence willfully suppressed would be

adverse if produced. Next, petitioner argues that it should not be held liable for moral and

exemplary damages, and attorney's fees since it did not act in bad faith in

Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is denying respondent Neomi's claim. It insists that it waited in good faith for

at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is Dr. Saniel's report and that, based on general medical findings, it had

merely corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an reasonable ground to believe that her stroke was due to a pre-existing

exercise of a privilege.[22] Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow condition, considering it occurred only 38 days after the coverage took

the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was privileged effect.[25]

communication between physician and patient.

We disagree.

cralawFurthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of

The RTC and CA found that there was a factual basis for the damages
the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way as to
adjudged against petitioner. They found that it was guilty of bad faith in
preclude it from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they should be
denying a claim based merely on its own perception that there was a pre-
scrutinized by the courts with extreme jealousy[23] and care and with
existing condition:
cralaw
a jaundiced eye.[24] Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception
cralaw[Respondents] have sufficiently shown that [they]
were forced to engage in a dispute with [petitioner] over a
to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent legitimate claim while [respondent Neomi was] still
experiencing the effects of a stroke and forced to pay for
Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending her medical bills during and after her hospitalization
despite being covered by [petitioners] health care
physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to program, thereby suffering in the process extreme mental
anguish, shock, serious anxiety and great stress. [They]
have shown that because of the refusal of [petitioner] to
issue a letter of authorization and to pay [respondent

55
 Neomi's] hospital bills, [they had] to engage the services
of counsel for a fee of P20,000.00.Finally, the refusal of
petitioner to pay respondent Neomi's bills smacks of
bad faith, as its refusal [was] merely based on its own
perception that a stroke is a pre-existing condition.
(emphasis supplied)
This is a factual matter binding and conclusive on this Court.[26] We see no
reason to disturb these findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 29, 2005 decision
and September 21, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84163 are AFFIRMED.
Treble costs against petitioner.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 157177 : February 11, 2008]
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, v. JESUSA P. REYES
and CONRADO B. REYES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to annul the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution2 dated February 12, 2003,
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453,3 requiring Bank of
Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and
Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the amount of P100,000.00 plus interest
and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial
court, to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together
with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM
account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling
every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a
car as its prize to be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by
Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of
the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having
homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made
to sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from
her exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-
2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip
for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with
said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of
the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was
filling up the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned
to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the
withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only
and then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her
signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces
of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan
56
witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip
for P200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new
account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of
her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount
of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from
said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States
(Exhs. "T", "U" - "U-1") and returned to Manila on January 31, 1991 (Exhs.
"V" - "V-1").
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her statement
of account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM account only contained
the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager
assured her that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her
employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI with the
folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of said
passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the
same was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover
was removed and validated at the back portion thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the
latter saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated,
whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will be investigated
into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs.
Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer demanding return of
the missing P100,000.00 plus interest (Exhs. "B" and "C"). The same was
received by defendant on July 25, 1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down
and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted
to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this
instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine Island
admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the amount
of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the express teller
account she opened on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. "3" to "3-C"), however,
it was the only amount she deposited and no additional cash deposit
of P100,000.00 was made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer
of P200,000.00 but the balance in her account was not sufficient and could
not accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the
amount to be withdrawn from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiff's
signature superimposed on said corrections; that the original copy of the
deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, however,
instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of the bank, in
this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes had
already left without signing the deposit slip. The documents were
subsequently machine validated for the amount of P100,000.00 (Exhs. "2"
and "4").
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the
transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in the
bank's teller tape (Exhs."1" to "1-C").
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie
detector test, the latter passed the same with flying colors (Exhs. "5" to
"5-C"), indicative of the fact that he was not lying when he said that there
really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went
to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged
that they even went to the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim
would not be given credit (Exh. "6") considering that no such transaction
was really made on December 7, 1990.4
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision5 upholding the versions of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
57
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff
Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against defendant Bank of the
Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per annum
from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees.6
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited
only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy; that what should
control was the deposit slip issued by the bank to respondent, for there
was no chance by which respondent could write the amount
of P200,000.00 without petitioner's employee noticing it and making the
necessary corrections; that it was deplorable to note that it was when
respondent Jesusa's bankbook was submitted to be updated after the
lapse of several months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was
corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that a deposit
is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same;
that under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely
and to return it when required to the depositor or to his heirs and
successors or to the person who may have been designated in the
contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision dated
October 29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision with modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the
missing P100,000.00 can stand some modification. The interest thereon
should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12, 1991, the last day of
the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-appellees' counsel under the
first demand letter dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B), or counted from May 7,
1991, the date when defendant-appellant received said letter. Interest is
demandable when the obligation consist in the payment of money and the
debtor incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages to a
reasonable sum of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not intended to enrich
a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable
the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. The award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The absence of malice and bad faith, as in this case, renders the
award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a reasonable
sum of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case has not been attended
with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the judgment
appealed from is in all other respects AFFIRMED. Without costs.7
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that
the RTC correctly gave credence to the testimonies of respondent Jesusa
and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund transfer
of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa also made a cash
deposit of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is
unlikely for these two to concoct a story of falsification against a banking
institution of the stature of petitioner if their claims were not true; that the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this,
juxtaposed with the fact that it was not machine-validated and the original
copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with
the altered amount "validated," is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was
bank employee Cicero Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood
her ground and categorically denied having any knowledge of the
alteration therein made; that petitioner must account for the
missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that banks are
engaged in business imbued with public interest and are under strict
obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing with its clients, in seeing to
it that the funds therein invested or by them received are properly
accounted for and duly posted in their ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
58
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the
amount of P100,000.00 representing an alleged additional deposit of
respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
by resolving the issue based on a conjecture and ignoring physical
evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as it is
contrary to law, in holding BPI liable to respondents for the payment of
interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as it is
contrary to law, in holding BPI liable for moral damages and attorney's
fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively.8
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the
RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit
of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account on December
7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower courts.9 As a rule, the findings of fact of the
trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the
record or are based on substantial evidence.10 Such rule however is not
absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment
of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.11 We hold that
this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to
resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own
affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law.12 In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence,13 or that evidence which is of greater weight
or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not
mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is
more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of
truth is on one side than on the other.14
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for
determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must
first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses
testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having
heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would
not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the
witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence
presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully
prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an
initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset,
respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller
account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and
transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and
that she had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions
are not borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not
59
refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip15 for P200,000.00. This is PB BALANCE ERROR
contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to
make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the BAL. 229,257.64
Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed
the withdrawal slip. We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00
from her savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
***200000.00
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip
without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for BIG AMOUNT
respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of business
and taking ordinary care of her concerns,16 would make sure that she 151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her
signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature ***200000.00
is very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words and
figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the
amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00. 151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388

The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount ***200000.00
of P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller
account was further established by the teller's tape presented as TOD
petitioner's evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the
teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions. 151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145

The teller's tape,17 Exhibit "1" unequivocally shows the following data: ***2000.00

151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299 151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299

151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 ***22917.00

***200000.0018 151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388

BIG AMOUNT ***100000.00

151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388 BIG AMOUNT

***200000.00 151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388

151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 ***100000.00

***200000.00 151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388

60
***100000.0019
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.0020
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
***2000.00
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the second
column shows the date of the transactions; the third column shows the
bank transaction code; the fourth column shows the teller's code; and the
fifth column shows the client's account number. The teller's tape reflected
various transactions involving different accounts on December 7, 1990
which included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388 and
her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that respondent
Jesusa's initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00,
from her Savings Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12
minutes and 45 seconds as shown in Exhibit "1-c."
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when
she was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount
of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was
a discrepancy;21 thus, the word "BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big
amount" means that the amount was so big for her to approve,22 so she
keyed in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to
process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's
approval.23 The letter "J" appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to
show that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount
of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her
computer rejected the transaction, because the balance she keyed in
based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong;24 thus appeared the
phrase "balance error" on the tape, and the computer produced the
balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal
of P200,000.00.25 Since it was a big amount, she again had to override it,
so she could process the amount. However, the withdrawal was again
rejected for the reason "TOD, overdraft,"26 which meant that the amount
to be withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there was a
debited amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook,
reducing the available balance to only P198,322.48.27
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of
respondent Jesusa's balance.28 Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to
the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage,
Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of
61
overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just
withdraw P100,000.00.29
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition
of the figure "1" on the figure "2" and the change of the word "two" to
"one" to show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's
savings account was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself
signed the alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00
by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but
since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and the
withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27
seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's
new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's
original intention to withdraw the amount of P200,000.00, and
not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be
transferred as her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account, the
insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund
transfer of the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her
new Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to the
teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer
terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary
course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been
purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter,
that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund
transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip30 was in the amount of P200,000.00 and
bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show
that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the
deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown
portion for the specific denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes
the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is
convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business.
She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal
slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the
deposit slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new
Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a
balance of P249,657.6431 as of November 19, 1990.32 Thus, at first glance,
these appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal
of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark,
stamped it on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the
duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original copy33 of the deposit slip
was left in her cage.34 However, as Torneros started processing the
transaction, it turned out that respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient
to accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip
and had already left the teller's counter thereafter and Capati was still
inside the teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit
slip and the latter told her, "Ok naman iyan,"35 and Capati superimposed
the figures "1" on "2" on the deposit slip36 to reflect the initial deposit
of P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and
signed the alteration. Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip.
Thus, the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, which bore Torneros's stamp
mark and which was given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of
her transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original copy of the
deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by
Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a violation of the bank's
policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction,37 nevertheless, we
find that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of
evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00
deposited to the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.38 We have, on many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule
that the physical evidence should prevail.39
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for
respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a false story against a
banking institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises, which we
cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of
evidence.
62
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other issues
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution dated February
12, 2003 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner, is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9268. November 28, 1959.]
VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., Respondents.
Eddy A. Deen for Petitioner.
Ricardo S. Inton for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; DEATH COMPENSATION; PRESUMPTION OF
DEATH OF PERSONS ABOARD A VESSEL LOST DURING A SEA VOYAGE;
ARTICLE 391 OF NEW CIVIL CODE WHEN APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. —
Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of
death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to cases
wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is
unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word
"lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as
"missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking
both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the
same sentence. Where, as in the case at bar, none of the foregoing
conditions appears to exist, the rule does not apply. Instead the rule on
preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death.
2. ID.; ID.; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; NOTICE OF
HEARING; FAILURE OF EMPLOYER TO FILE REPORT OF ACCIDENT ON TIME
AND TO ALLEGE RIGHT TO CONTROVERT CLAIM, A WAIVER OF
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS. — The failure of the employer to file with the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission the employer’s report of the
accident within the period prescribed by section 45 of Act No. 4328, as
amended by Republic Act No. 772, and to allege its right to controvert the
claim resulted in the loss of the right of the employer to controvert the
claim for compensation or jurisdictional grounds.
3. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER’S NEGLIGENCE WHICH WILL EXCEMPT EMPLOYER
FROM LIABILITY; BURDEN OF PROOF ON EMPLOYER; CASE AT BAR. — The
kind of negligence on the part of the employee which will exempt the
employer from liability for injuries suffered by the former is notorious
negligence. Such negligence must be proved, the burden of proof resting
on the employer. The correct presumption to be followed is that when a
warning of danger is given, the laborer by instinct of self-preservation
takes precaution to avoid such danger unless an intention is attributed to
end his life. In the case at bar, P.I., in jumping overboard upon walking up
and finding the vessel on fire, was not guilty of gross negligence because
his act was rather impelled by fright or by the instinct of self-preservation.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J. :
On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner, was
sleeping on board the latter’s vessel, M/V "Miss Leyte," when it caught fire.
Awakened by the fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard. Since then, he has
not been heard of. The employee was unmarried, receiving daily P4.00
with meals estimated at P1.20, and respondent Juan Icong, his father, was
his partial dependent. On April 30, 1954, the latter filed with the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the petitioner a notice of claim
for death compensation. The petitioner reported the matter to the
Commission only on August 17, 1954. The Commission rendered an award
in favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus P200.00
for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee.
The petitioner has appealed to this Court for the review of the award and
has presented three points of law, namely: I. That Article 391 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines was not applied in determining whether or not
Pedro Icong should be considered dead; II. That Section 49 of Republic Act
No. 772, providing for the right of the employer to notice and hearing of
the claim against him, was disregarded; III. That Pedro Icong should have
been held guilty of notorious negligence in jumping overboard.
63

The petitioner contends that in the absence of proof of the death of Pedro
Icong, the nearest approach to the matter, from the facts of his case, is
the provision on the presumption of death established in Article 391 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, according to which the person to be
presumed dead must be unheard of for at least four years; that inasmuch
as Pedro Icong had been missing for only a few months from the alleged
accident, there is as yet no legal presumption of death on which to base
any award for compensation.
The petitioner next contends that it never had its day in court, because no
notice of any hearing was ever served upon it; and as this error affects its
substantive rights, the decision under review was without jurisdiction.
It is lastly contended that although there was admittedly an alarm of fire;
no person other than Pedro Icong jumped overboard; that the usual
course of a prudent man under the circumstance would be to resort to a
life saver, life raft or life boat and to await instructions from the captain
and his officers; that the act of Pedro Icong was in complete disregard of
adverse consequences constituting gross negligence which is a bar to the
right of compensation.
The respondent Commission obviously did not apply the rule on
presumption of death because in the employer’s report of the accident
submitted by petitioner, laborer Pedro Icong was reported as the only
casualty, and in transmitting said report petitioner’s counsel had implicitly
admitted the fact that Pedro Icong’s death. We agree with this conclusion.
Quite recently, in the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. v. Nieves Baens
del Rosario, Et Al., G. R. No. L-13130, promulgated Oct. 31, 1959, we
reproduced with approval the explanation of the respondent Commissioner
therein that Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to
presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage
applies to cases wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or
when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch
as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same
meaning as "missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the
persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule
expressed in the same sentence. In the instant case, none of the foregoing
conditions appear to exit. The fate of petitioner’s vessel is not unknown. It
was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been definitely
destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that
when petitioner’s vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and
since then had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on
presumption of death does not apply. Instead the rule on preponderance
of evidence applies to establish the fact of death. In the same case of
Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. supra, we said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might
probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again,
though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may
be drawn." (Brownlee Et. Al. v. Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident
Association, 29 Fed [2nd] 71).
As to the alleged lack of notice of hearing, the records disclose that the
petitioner did not file with the respondent Commission the employer’s
report of the accident within the period prescribed by Section 45 of Act No.
4328, as amended by Republic Act No. 772, and that neither was its right
to controvert the claim ever alleged. Under the law such failure results in
the loss of the right to controvert the claim on jurisdictional grounds; the
employer cannot be subsequently heard to complain that the law was
strictly construed against him.
We rule that the act of Pedro Icong in jumping overboard upon waking up
and finding the vessel on fire is not constitutive of gross negligence.
Respondent Commission correctly termed it as "rather impelled by fright or
by the instinct of self-preservation." "The kind of negligence on the part of
the employee which will exempt the employer from liability for injuries
suffered by the former is notorious negligence. Such negligence must be
proved, the burden of proof resting on the employer. The correct
presumption to be followed is that when a warning of danger is given, the
laborer by instinct of self-preservation takes precaution to avoid such
danger unless an intention is attributed to end his life." (Francisco’s
Comments on Labor Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 888.)
In view of what has been said, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Endencia,
Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-60101. August 31, 1983.]
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. JOSEPHINE
64
 LUCERO, NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
Valera, Cainglet & Dala Law Office for Petitioner.
Jose R. Millares for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; ABSENCE; PRESUMPTION OF DEATH; WHERE
THE RULE OF PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE CONTROL; CASE AT BAR. —
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstance attending the loss
and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing
facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead to a moral certainly that the
vessels had sunk and that the persons abroad had perished with it. Upon
this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the
Civil Code must yield to the tale of preponderance of evidence. As this
Court said in Joaquin v. Navarro (93 Phil. 257) "Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence
controls."
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petition for review filed by the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. to set aside the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the
judgment rendered by the National Seamen Board, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant her
monthly allotments from March, 1980 up to the amount of P54,562.00
within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. Respondent is likewise
further ordered to pay complainant her future monthly allotment up to the
arrival of the M/V EASTERN MINICON in the port of Manila or after four (4)
years when the presumptive death established by law takes effect."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On October
31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc., Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel
M/V Eastern Minicon, plying the Hongkong/Manila route, with the salary of
P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits. Under
the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e.,
the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at
the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the
captain’s salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his
wife, in Manila.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to
Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero
sent three (3) messages to the Company’s Manila office:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
First Message: 1
"February 16, 1980 0700 GMT Via Intercom
EMINICON
Urgent
Eastship Manila
REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS WEATHER WITH
STRONG NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE
VESSEL ROLLING AND PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15
TO 20 DEGREES PORT FEARING MIGHT JETTISON CARGO ON DECK IF
EVERYTHING COME TO WORSE SITUATION HOWEVER TRYING UTMOST
BEST TO FACILITATE EVERYTHING IN ORDER STOP NO FIX POSITIONS
FROM NOON 15th UP TO 0600 HRS TO DATE NEED ASSISTANCE
APPROXIMATE DR POSITIONS AT 0600 HRS 10TH WITHIN THE VICINITY
LATITUDE 20-02, ON LONGTITUDE 110-02, OE COURSE 120 DEGREES
REGARDS . . .
LUCERO"
Second Message: 2
"February 16/80 1530 GMT VIA INTERCOM
EMICON
EASTSHIP MANILA
65

RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO ON PORT SIDE
AND HAD BEEN WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE
REGRET WE HAVE TO JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO
IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL NOW ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL
POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL STILL LABORING VIOLENTLY REGARDS.
LUCERO"
Third Message: 3
"FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E SEAWATER
ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF
POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING
TO ABANDON ANYTIME
MASTER"
Acting on these radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the
following steps:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately reported the
matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and rescue operation and
the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air Force based at Clark Air Base.
Respondent also released radio messages to all vessels passing the
Hongkong/Manila route requesting them to be very cautious and vigilant
for possible survivors and to scan the area whether there are signs of
debris from the ill fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered.
In the meantime, two (2) vessels of the respondent were also dispatched
to the area last reported by the Master for search and rescue operation,
but the collective efforts of all parties concerned yielded negative results."
(p. 79, Rollo)
Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon,
through its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the
Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew
members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the
same.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National Seamen
Board, Board for short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of
P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for
continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have
returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of
employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a
voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon
the vessel’s arrival in Manila.
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no
longer entitled to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had
already confirmed the total loss of the vessel and had in fact settled the
Company’s insurance claim and [b] the Company, with the approval of the
Board, had likewise paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of
the other seamen. The Company further invoked the provisions of Article
643 of the Code of Commerce, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost, by reason of
capture or wreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both as regards the crew
to demand any wages whatsoever, and as regards the ship agent to
recover the advances made.
. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of
Mrs. Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held
that the presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year
period provided for by Article 391(1) of the Civil Code had not yet expired;
and that the payment of death benefits to the heirs of the other crew
members was based upon a voluntary agreement entered into by and
between the heirs and the Company, and did not bind respondent Mrs.
Lucero who was not a party thereto.
On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirmed
the said decision. It held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Within the context of the foregoing circumstances, the only recourse is to
presume the vessel totally lost and its crew members dead. But in this
connection, the question that comes to the fore is: When will the
presumption arise? Article 391 of the Civil Code provides the answer, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art, 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss
66
of the vessel or aeroplane; . . .
"By the aforequoted law, it is quite clear that the person to be presumed
dead should first "not been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel" before he can be presumed dead for all purposes. Applied to Capt.
LUCERO, it is evidently premature to presume him dead as four years has
not yet expired. Thus, even in Judge Advocate General v. Gonzales, Et Al.,
(CA) 48 O.G. 5329, the very case cited by the respondent herein, the
court said in the case of the missing soldier that although nothing was
heard of him since 7 May 1942, the fact of his death is not presumed until
seven years after 1942.
"Since Capt. LUCERO cannot yet be presumed dead as demonstrated
hereinabove, it logically follows that as of now, he is presumed alive. It is
of no moment to Us that the vessel was conceded by the Lloyds of London
to have been totally lost which, in the first place, was admittedly merely
based on presumption as even the whereabouts of the vessel remains
unknown. Similarly, even the agreement, which formed the basis of the
Decision of the NSB ordering payment of death benefits to the heirs of
some of the crew must have been predicated upon a presumption of death
of the crewmembers concerned. Such circumstances do not suffice to
establish the actual death of Capt. LUCERO.
x x x heard from. The question, moreover, is not whether it is impossible that
"Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his
engagement terminates upon the return of the vessel at the Port of Manila.
He is considered to be still working entitling his spouse to allotment until
the vessel returns or until it is officially declared totally lost, or until the
presumption of his death becomes effective in which case the burden of
proving that he is alive is shifted to his wife for purposes of continuing her
allotment."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the
respondent NLRC.
It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three
(3) radio messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon,
the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for
immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger" : "sea water was
entering the hatch" ; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and
they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.’ After this message,
nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present
time.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the
loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The
foregoing facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead Us to a moral
certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had
perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death
under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin v. Navarro 4
"Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls."cralaw virtua1aw library
Of similar import is the following pronouncement from American
Jurisprudence: 5
"Loss of Vessel. — Where a vessel sets out on a voyage and neither the
vessel nor those who went in her are afterward heard of, the presumption
arises, after the utmost limit of time for her to have completed the voyage
and for news of her arrival at any commercial port of the world to have
been received, that the vessel has been lost and that all on board have
perished. The presumption of death in such cases does not rest on the fact
alone that the person in question has been absent and unheard from for a
specific length of time, but also on the fact that the vessel has not been
the person may be alive, but whether the circumstances do not present so
strong a probability of his death that a court should act thereon. The
presumption of death from absence of tidings of the vessel on which the
absentee sailed is strengthened by proof of a storm to which the vessel
probably was exposed. The presumption is even stronger where it appears
affirmatively that the vessel was lost at sea, that nothing has been heard
of a particular person who sailed thereon, and that a sufficient time has
elapsed to permit the receipt of news of any possible survivors of the
disaster."cralaw virtua1aw library
In People v. Ansang 6 where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a vinta
ignited three home-made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by
the victims, and the said boat was later washed ashore and the
passengers thereof were never heard or seen again by anybody, this Court
convicted the appellant of multiple murder, holding that the victims were
dead.chanrobles law library : red
Similarly, in People v. Sasota, 7 the claim of the appellants therein that
there was no conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body
was never found was overruled by this Court in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
67

"In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body
or to show where it can be found. There are cases like death at sea, where
the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the
death and the criminal agency be proven. There are even cases where said
death and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be
presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.
"Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cases decided
by this Court, where besides the act of treason the accused is held
responsible for the death of persons he had arrested or tortured and later
taken away, where the victims were never later seen or heard from, it has
been presumed that they were killed or otherwise criminally disposed of or
liquidated by the accused, this, for the purpose of fixing the
penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction
must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not
applied and the fact of death was deemed established, with more reason is
this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Indeed, We cannot
permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts established
in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero
died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on
February 16, 1980.
In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to
discuss the other issued raised in this case, they being mere adjuncts to
the principal issue already disposed of.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set
aside, and the complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed.
However, Mrs. Lucero is entitled to death benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33397. June 22, 1984.]
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Commissioner of Land
Transportation, EDUARDO DOMINGO, CARLOS RODRIGUEZ and
PATRICIO YAMBAO in their capacity as ANCAR Agents, Petitioners,
v. HONORABLE AMADOR E. GOMEZ, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, THE SHERIFF of Quezon
City, and LUCILA ABELLO, Respondents.
Coronel Law Office, for Petitioners.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; RIGHT OF PURCHASER IN GOOD
FAITH OF CHATTEL OR MOVABLE PROPERTY. — The acquirer or purchaser
in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be respected
and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the
possessor in good faith can not be compelled to surrender possession nor
to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel,
whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an
information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa
from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not
warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION; POWER
OF THE COMMISSIONER TO SEIZE AND IMPOUND MOTOR VEHICLES;
BASIS FOR EXERCISE THEREOF. — The provision of Section 60 of Republic
Act 4136 of the right of the Commissioner of Land Transportation to seize
and impound subject property is only good for the proper enforcement of
lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission may issue
a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against motor vehicle for
collection of unpaid fees for registration re-registration or delinquent
registration of vehicles.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Subject matter of this case is a 1968 model Volkwagen, bantam car,
Engine No. H-5254416, Chassis No. 118673654, allegedly owned by Lt.
Walter A. Bala of Clark Airbase, Angeles City, under whose name the car
68
was allegedly registered on May 19, 1970 at the Angeles City Land
Transportation Commission Agency, under File No. 2B-
7281.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The Office of the Commission on Land Transportation received a report on
August 25, 1970 from the Manila Adjustment Company that the
abovementioned car was stolen on June 29, 1970 from the residence of Lt.
Bala, at 63 Makiling Street, Plaridel Subdivision, Angeles City. Petitioners
Eduardo Domingo, Carlos Rodriguez, and Patricio Yambao, agents of Anti-
Carnapping Unit (ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the
Land Transportation Commission, on February 2, 1971, recognized subject
car in the possession of herein private respondent Lucila Abello and
immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen property. Likewise,
herein petitioner Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land
Transportation, seized the car pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act 4136
which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for delinquent registration
aside from his implicit power deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of
said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or otherwise not properly
registered."cralaw virtua1aw library
On February 15, 1971, herein private respondent Lucila Abello filed a
complaint for replevin with damages in respondent court, docketed as Civil
Case No. 82215, impleading herein petitioners, praying for judgment,
among others, to order the sheriff or other proper officer of the court to
take the said property (motor vehicle) into his custody and to dispose of it
in accordance with law.
On February 18, 1971, respondent judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila issued the order for the seizure of the personal
property. Solicitor Vicente Torres, appearing for the herein petitioners,
submits that the car in question legally belongs to Lt. Walter A. Bala under
whose name it is originally registered at Angeles City Land Transportation
Commission Agency; that it was stolen from him and, upon receipt by the
Land Transportation Commissioner of the report on the theft case and that
the car upon being recognized by the agents of the ANCAR in the
possession of private respondent Lucila Abello, said agents seized the car
and impounded it as stolen vehicle. With respect to the replevin filed by
private respondent Lucila Abello, respondent Court of First Instance Judge
found that the car in question was acquired by Lucila Abello by purchase
from its registered owner, Marcelino Guansing, for the valuable
consideration of P9,000.00, under the notarial deed of absolute sale, dated
August 11, 1970; that she has been in possession thereof since then until
February 3, 1971 when the car was seized from her by the petitioners who
acted in the belief that it is the car which was originally registered in the
name of Lt. Walter A. Bala and from whom it was allegedly stolen
sometime in June 1970.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Finding for the private respondent, respondent judge held that —
"The complaint at bar is for replevin, or for the delivery of personal
property, based on the provisions of Rule 60, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules
of Court. All the requirements of the law are present in the verified
averments in the complaint, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That plaintiff is the owner of the automobile in question.
"2. That the aforesaid property was seized from her against her will not for
a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, not under a writ of execution or
attachment against her properties;
"3. That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendants, who
allegedly seized it from her on February 3, 1971, ‘allegedly for the purpose
of verifying the same’ (see par. 3, Complaint), but have refused since then
until now to return the same to the plaintiff.
"4. That plaintiff was ready to put up a bond in double the value of the car,
and has in fact already put up an P18,000.00 bond to the defendants for
the return thereof to the latter, if that shall be the ultimate judgment of
the court, and to pay defendants damages that they may incur.
"The issuance therefore, by this Court of the order of seizure of the said
chattel by the sheriff and for the latter to take it into his custody, is
precisely pursuant to the existing law, governing the subject.
"If defendants object to the seizure, the remedy provided for by law is set
out in Section 5 of Rule 60 and that is for them to put up a counter-bond
for the same amount of P18,000.00, which is double the value of the car in
question. Defendants may not ignore the law under the claim that, on
complaint of a certain party, the Manila Adjustment Company, they have a
right to seize the same as it appears to be the property that was stolen
from Lt. Walter A. Bala several months ago." (p. 19, Rollo)
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the
purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner
thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the
true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the
chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing
of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through
69
estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor
does not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will
of the possessor.chanrobles law library : red
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize
and impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. — Any balance of fees for
registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of a motor vehicle,
remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall
constitute a first lien upon the motor vehicle concerned."cralaw virtua1aw
library
is untenable. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic
Act 4136 that the Commissioner’s right to seize and impound subject
property is only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor
vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of
constructive or actual distraint against motor vehicle for collection of
unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of
vehicles.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174436 : January 23, 2013
JUANITA ERMITAÑO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
ISABELO ERMITAÑO, Petitioner, v.LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617.
On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner, through her
representative, lsabelo R. Ermitaño, executed a Contract of Lease wherein
petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square meter residential lot
and a house standing thereon located at No. 20 Columbia St., Phase l,
Doña Vicenta Village, Davao City. The contract period is one (1) year,
which commenced on November 4, 1999, with a monthly rental rate
of P13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent paid
petitioner P2,000.00 as security deposit to answer for unpaid rentals and
damage that may be cause to the leased unit.
Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received
information that sometime in March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the
subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same
was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on February 22, 2000.
Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property to respondent.
Respondent entertained the said offer and negotiations ensued. On June 1,
2000, respondent bought the subject property from Yap for P950,000.00.
A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of
the contract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the
property was still subject to petitioner's right of redemption.
Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a
suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as
the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale which was issued after the
disputed house and lot were sold on foreclosure.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000, petitioner sent a letter demanding
respondent to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased
premises. A second demand letter was sent on March 25, 2001.
Respondent ignored both letters.
On August 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Davao City, a case of unlawful detainer against respondent.
In its Decision dated November 26, 2001, the MTCC, Branch 6, Davao City
dismissed the case filed by petitioner and awarded respondent the
amounts of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as appearance
fee.
70
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
City.
On February 14, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the case for
unlawful detainer but modified in that the award of attorney's fees in
defendant's herein respondent's favor is deleted and that the defendant
respondent is ordered to pay plaintiff herein petitioner the equivalent of
ten months unpaid rentals on the property or the total sum
of P135,000.00.
SO ORDERED.3?r?l1
The RTC held that herein respondent possesses the right to redeem the
subject property and that, pending expiration of the redemption period,
she is entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income derived from the
property.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review
with the CA.
On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing,
thus:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS as follows:cralawlibrary
(a) Private respondent's obligation to pay the petitioner the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P135,000.00) equivalent
of ten (10) months is hereby DELETED;
(b) Attorney's fees and litigation expenses were correctly awarded by the
trial court having compelled the private respondent to litigate and incur
expenses to protect her interests by reason of the unjustified act of
petitioner (Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 365
SCRA 326), Thus: litigation expenses of only TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) not TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00); and
(c) Attorney's fees REI NSTAT ED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) instead of only TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00). ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
SO ORDERED.4?r?l1
Quoting extensively from the decision of the MTCC as well as on
respondent's comment on the petition for review, the CA ruled that
respondent did not act in bad faith when she bought the property in
question because she had every right to rely on the validity of the
documents evidencing the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated August 16, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following
assignment of errors:cralawlibrary
A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BY RULING THAT A SHERIFF'S FINAL
CERTIFICATE OF SALE WAS ALREADY ISSUED WHICH DECISION IS NOT
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH EVEN IF SHE
WAS INFORMED BY PETITIONER THROUGH A LETTER ADVISING HER THAT
THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT WAS SHAM, FICTITIOUS AS IT
WAS A PRODUCT OF FORGERY BECAUSE PETITIONER'S PURPORTED
SIGNATURE APPEARING THEREIN WAS SIGNED AND FALSIFIED BY A
CERTAIN ANGELA CELOSIA.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH WAS DELETED BY RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO
CITY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPLANATION AND/OR
JUSTIFICATION IN THE BODY OF THE
DECISION.5?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question
that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and
not to the possession de jure.6 It does not even matter if a party's title to
the property is questionable.7 In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue
71
for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party presumptions:cralawlibrary
litigants.8 Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the
courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to xxx
possess the property.9 The adjudication is, however, merely provisional
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time
involving title to the property.10?r?l1
of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them. (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner
for the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap,
It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped
the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in sustaining the
from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject
of the landlord-tenant relation.13 If the title asserted is one that is alleged
property in favor of Yap as well as the presumption of regularity in the
to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation,
performance of the duties of the public officers who subsequently
the presumption will not apply.14 Hence, the tenant may show that the
conducted its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale.
landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he
Based on the presumed validity of the mortgage and the subsequent
is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted
foreclosure sale, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA also sustained the validity
by title paramount.15 In the present case, what respondent is claiming is
of respondent's purchase of the disputed property from Yap. The Court
her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent
finds no cogent reason to depart from these rulings of the MTCC, RTC and
to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and
CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving the issue as to who between petitioner
petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the
and respondent is entitled to possess the subject property, this
Rules of Court does not apply.
presumption stands.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from

Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied.11 In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence,
the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.12?r?l1
In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her first and second
assigned errors is that she remains the owner of the subject property.
Based on her contract of lease with respondent, petitioner insists that
respondent is not permitted to deny her title over the said property in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court does not agree.
The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as
follows:cralawlibrary
denying petitioner's claim for rent, her basis for such denial, which is her
subsequent acquisition of ownership of the disputed property, is
nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to
petitioner.
There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's
rights over the subject property, petitioner's right of redemption as a
mortgagor has not yet expired. It is settled that during the period of
redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of
the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a
purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of
redemption has expired without the right being exercised.16 The title to
land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his
grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by
the master's deed.17 Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon
the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor
having made use of his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land
sold becomes consolidated in the purchaser.18?r?l1
Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate right and not the
72
absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents.19 He
only becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed
during the redemption period.20?r?l1
Pending expiration of the period of redemption, Section 7 of Act No.
3135,21 as amended, provides:cralawlibrary
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the
property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof
during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such
petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex parte
motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered
under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of
the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a
mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in
accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court
shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in
paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered
Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight
hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond,
order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
Thus, it is clear from the abovequoted provision of law that, as a
consequence of the inchoate character of the purchaser's right during the
redemption period, Act. No. 3135, as amended, allows the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale to take possession of the property only upon the filing
of a bond, in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period
of twelve (12) months, to indemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown
that the sale was made in violation of the mortgage or without complying
with the requirements of the law. In Cua Lai Chu v. Laqui,22 this Court
reiterated the rule earlier pronounced in Navarra v. Court of Appeals 23 that
the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale has a right to the
possession of the property even during the one-year redemption period
provided the purchaser files an indemnity bond. That bond, nonetheless, is
not required after the purchaser has consolidated his title to the property
following the mortgagor's failure to exercise his right of redemption for in
such a case, the former has become the absolute owner thereof.24?r?l1
It, thus, clearly follows from the foregoing that, during the period of
redemption, the mortgagor, being still the owner of the foreclosed
property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereof subject to the
purchaser's right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a
bond pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
The mere purchase and certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to
the possession or beneficial use of the premises.25?r?l1
In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that
respondent, as purchaser of the disputed property, filed a petition and
bond in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. In
addition, respondent defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absent
respondent's filing of such petition and bond prior to the expiration of the
period of redemption, coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not
have the right to possess the subject property.
On the other hand, petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not
only to the possession of the disputed house and lot but also to the rents,
earnings and income derived therefrom. In this regard, the RTC correctly
cited Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides as
follows:cralawlibrary
Sec. 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending redemption. The
purchaser or a redemptioner shall not be entitled to receive the rents,
earnings and income of the property sold on execution, or the value of the
use and occupation thereof when such property is in the possession of a
tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from the property pending
redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the expiration of his
period of redemption. (Emphasis supplied)
While the above rule refers to execution sales, the Court finds no cogent
reason not to apply the same principle to a foreclosure sale, as in this
case.
The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the
redemption period on February 23, 2001. Since there is no allegation,
much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within
one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent
became the owner thereof. Consolidation of title becomes a right upon the
expiration of the redemption period.26 Having become the owner of the
disputed property, respondent is then entitled to its possession.
As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was
rendered moot when the period of redemption expired on February 23,
73
2001 without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon
expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the
same. Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can enforce is his
right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical
possession of the subject property that is from May 2000 until February
23, 2001.
In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings of the MTCC that, based
on the evidence and the pleadings filed by petitioner, respondent is liable
for payment of rentals beginning May 2000 until February 2001, or for a
period of ten (10) months. However, it is not disputed that respondent
already gave to petitioner the sum of P27,000.00, which is equivalent to
two (2) months rental, as deposit to cover for any unpaid rentals. It is only
proper to deduct this amount from the rentals due to petitioner, thus
leaving P108,000.00 unpaid rentals.
As to attorneys fees and litigation expenses, the Court agrees with the RTC
that since petitioner is, in entitled to unpaid rentals, her complaint which,
among others, prays for the payment of unpaid rentals, is justified. Thus,
the award of attorney' and litigation expenses to respondent should be
deleted.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77617, dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006,
respectively, are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1)
respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner P108,000.00 as and for unpaid
rentals; (2) the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses to
respondent is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209137, July 01, 2015
EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Eduardo Celedonio (Celedonio) assails the April 8, 2013
Decision1 and the September 17, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18, 2011 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 35668-MN.
The Information,4 dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime
of Robbery with Force Upon Things, the accusatory portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means of
force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein
complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside,
take, rob and carry away the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00
(3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00
(2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00
(1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00
(1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00
(1) one sun glass Guess P Php5,000.00
(1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00
(1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00
(1) one calculator Php1,500.00
(1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00
(2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills
(22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills
(2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00
74
(2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00
(2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00
(1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00
(1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00
(1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00
(3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00
(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00
(60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00
(100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00
(15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00
owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the
damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the aforementioned
amount of Php223,000.00.
Contrary to law.5
Version of the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21,
2007, a certain Adriano Marquez (Marquez) witnessed the robbery
perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De Guzman) while
she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was
left in the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De
Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified
Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman
reported it to the police and requested that Celedomo be investigated for
possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.
Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1
Roque) and SPO2 Adrian Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez.
They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for the
possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way,
Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si
Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1
Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and
just bowed his head.
SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him.
Celedonio still remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked
him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his
motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of
the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD
player and a wristwatch, among others.6chanrobleslaw
PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter
answered, "Iyan po."7 Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of
his constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the
police station.
Version of the Accused
After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to
Evidence (with leave of court) citing as his ground the alleged illegality of
his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The RTC denied the
demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of Celedonio's arrest had
been mooted by his arraignment and his active participation in the trial of
the case. It considered the seizure of the stolen items as legal not only
because of Celedonio's apparent consent to it, but also because the
subject items were in a moving vehicle.8chanrobleslaw
In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife,
sleeping, at the time of the incident. His wife corroborated his statement.
In its Decision, dated August 18, 2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things.
The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision9 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of Robbery with Force
Upon Things as defined and penalized under Article 299 (a)2 of the
Revised Penal Code, he is therefore sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of Php108,000.00 which is the worth of what has
not been recovered from the loss she suffered by reason of the robbery.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that:
1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3)
several of the stolen items including cash were found in Celedonio's
possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession
of the stolen goods.11chanrobleslaw
75

Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), arguing that the RTC erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite
the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in not finding that the
search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in
not finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in
testifying against him.12chanrobleslaw
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of
circumstances warranted the finding that Celedonio was solely and directly
responsible for the crime.13chanrobleslaw
In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio's argument that he was
illegally arrested and that the items seized should be excluded as
evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not arrested when he voluntarily
opened the compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the
police for investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his
motorcycle compartment.14 Further, Celedonio's failure to raise the issue
before his arraignment constituted a waiver on his part to question the
legality of his arrest.15chanrobleslaw
Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES
I and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE
PETITIONER'S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE
PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES
RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.
III
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO
MARQUEZ WAS ILL-MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.
The petition lacks merit.
Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only
matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does
not ipso factobar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the
prosecution establishes the accused-appellant's participation in the crime
through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the
inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter
should be convicted.16chanrobleslaw
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than
one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.17chanrobleslaw
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that,
when taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a
reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The CA opined
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are:
accused was a next door neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by
another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses
was inside complainant's house as all of them were at the wake of private
complainant's recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the
items discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the
compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when
accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by
the complainant as her stolen property; during the trial accused denied
that the stolen items were found in his possession and claimed that they
were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery.
In short, the accused could not explain his possession of the recently
stolen items found in his sole possession.
xxxx
We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial
evidence factually and legally tenable, as the facts from which the
aforementioned circumstances arose have been proved through the
positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, POi Rommel Roque and Carmencita
de Guzman.18
76
The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery.
In fact, Celedonio himself acknowledged that the prosecution's
circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and inconclusive,
established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed
recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in his
possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the
stolen goods.19 Celedonio, however, still insisted that he cannot be
convicted of the crime of robbery because 1) he was not caught in
exclusive possession of the stolen items; 2) the search conducted on him
was illegal thereby rendering the seized articles inadmissible; and 3) the
witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.
These arguments, however, do not hold water.
First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the
stolen items when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during
their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to
his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, is owned by him.
Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged
stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment which he had
control over, the disputable presumption of being the taker of the stolen
items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed to
give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario
that could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.
Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police
officers asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a general
inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did
not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen
items were in Celedonio's motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any
showing that the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his
motorcycle. There was no showing either of any force or intimidation on
the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio
himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he
was asked if the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed
it.20 The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse but to
take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police
officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He
did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items.
Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving
vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.
Third, contrary to Celedonio's argument, Marquez was a credible witness.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the
witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed
that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.21chanrobleslaw
In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once
had a fight over a water meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however,
such allegation was too insignificant that it could not destroy whatever
credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus,
posited:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached
by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is
bad. However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction by final
judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe
shown to impeach him.
More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness,
but only the mere say so of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement
in a quarrel with him over a water meter. Furthermore, no testimony was
presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth, honesty or
integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution
witness Marquez that might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-
appellant Celedonio.22
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can
strongly support his claims that the items were "planted" and that it was
physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's house other than the
mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses cannot prevail
over the strong circumstantial evidence.23chanrobleslaw
Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA
did not commit any reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence
of any indication that the RTC and the CA overlooked facts or
circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court
will not disturb their factual findings.24chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
77
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 149576 : August 8, 2006]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land
Registration Authority, Petitioner, v. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and
August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52948 in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick
Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some
parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was
dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent
justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It
presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No.
17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondent's titles with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of
the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its
ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondent's
titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on
September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and
cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso
Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly
signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons,
the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication
against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes
of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions to
dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural
matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of
legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the
legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused
on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of
those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondent's former counsel. He
testified that he prepared respondent's answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent's president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature
appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his
behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos' revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent
motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default, 2predicated
on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the
person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor
even known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading.
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a mere scrap
of paper and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the
Republic's motion.4 It found respondent's answer to be sham and false and
intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the
answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and
allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case
and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999
resolution but the trial court denied it.
78
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari 5 seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999
resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court
erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It
found Atty. Garlitos' statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable
since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court
also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos' acts after the filing of the answer 6 and
concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in
his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have
had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondent's petition
for certiorari . It directed the lifting of the order of default against
respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch.
The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's order which
declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it
did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's
statement.7 Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously
assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him.8 This is the essence of the principle
of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the other person.9 By
adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the admission of
the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when
a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by
another;10
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make 13 or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built
its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former
counsel's statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos'
testimony as well as its implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the
answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for
being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was
neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was
immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the
party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general
authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty.
Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no
moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This
was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may concern"
such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known
beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned
its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent
to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's February 19, 1999 resolution. And again
in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the
comment 15 and memorandum it submitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos' statements as its
own. Respondent's adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission
which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading is one that is signed
either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this
matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him.
79
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one
that is signed.
Counsel's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He
may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read
the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay.16 Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer 17 but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by
unqualified persons, 18 something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted
to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was
likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by
Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows
that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another "as
long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such
self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for
just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that
respondent's answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the
Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that
even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading,
the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as
mere technicalities have their own valid raison d' etre in the orderly
administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in
arbitrariness and injustice.19
The Court's pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules.
And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for
the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure.21 In this case, respondent
failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from
strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by
Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he
should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001
decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999
resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring
respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of
disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible
unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.
80
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205966, March 02, 2016
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. FELICIANO P.
LEGASPI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45,
dated March 13, 2013, of petitioner Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated August 15, 2012 and
Resolution3 dated February 18, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals (CA)
that reversed the Order4 dated January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City, Bulacan regarding a complaint for
annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages (with application
for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction) filed by petitioner BSP against
Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr. Ramon C.
Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent Feliciano P.
Legaspi, the incumbent Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan at the time of the
filing of the said complaint.
The facts follow.
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of
certificate and damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary
injunction) against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De Leon,
Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent
Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent,
together with his fellow defendants, filed their Answer to the complaint.
Thereafter, the RTC, on May 13, 2008, issued an Order mandating the
issuance of preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants Engr. Ramon C.
Angelo, Jr. and petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, and persons acting for and
in their behalf, from pursuing the construction, development and/or
operation of a dumpsite or landfill in Barangay San Mateo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, in an area allegedly covered by OCT No. P858/Free Patent No.
257917, the property subject of the complaint.
Herein respondent Legaspi filed a Motion to Dismiss dated August 15,
2008 alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner BSP because the suit is unauthorized by petitioner BSP itself
and that the counsel representing petitioner BSP is not authorized and
thus cannot bind the same petitioner. Respondent Legaspi also alleged
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action because the complaint is prima facie void and that an illegal
representation produces no legal effect. In addition, respondent Legaspi
asserted that the complaint was initiated without the authority of the
Monetary Board and that the complaint was not prepared and signed by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the statutory counsel of
government agencies.
In opposing the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner BSP argued that the
complaint was filed pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 8865,
dated June 17, 2004, and that the complaint was verified by Geraldine
Alag, Director of Asset Management of the BSP, who stated that she was
authorized by Monetary Board Resolutions No. 805 dated June 17, 2008
and 1005 dated July 29, 2005. Petitioner BSP further claimed that it is not
precluded from being represented by a private counsel of its own choice.
After respondent Legaspi filed a Reply, to which petitioner BSP filed a
Rejoinder, and against which, respondent Legaspi filed a Rejoinder, the
RTC rendered its Order denying respondent Legaspi's motion to dismiss.
In denying the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC ruled that it had acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner when the latter filed with the
court the Complaint dated April 10, 2008. Furthermore, the RTC adjudged
that in suits involving the BSP, the Monetary Board may authorize the
Governor to represent it personally or through counsel, even a private
counsel, and the authority to represent the BSP may be delegated to any
other officer thereof. It took into account the feet that the BSP's complaint
dated April 10, 2008 was verified by Geraldine C. Alag, an officer of the
BSP being the Director of its Asset Management Department and the
Secretary's Certificate issued by Silvina Q. Mamaril-Roxas, Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Secretary of BSP's Monetary Board attesting to
Monetary Board Resolution No. 900, adopted and passed on July 18, 2008
containing the Board's approval of the recommendation of the Asset
Management Department (AMD) to engage the services of Ongkiko Kalaw
Manhit and Acorda Law Offices (OKMA Law).
Respondent Legaspi filed a motion for reconsideration, adding as its
argument that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action
because the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value of
81
the subject property. As an opposition to respondent Legaspi's additional
contention, petitioner BSP claimed that since the subject property contains
an area of 4,838,736 square meters, it is unthinkable that said property
would have an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 which is within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. Petitioner BSP further stated that
a tax declaration showing the assessed value of P28,538,900.00 and latest
zonal value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint.
The RTC, in its Order dated April 3, 2009, denied respondent Legaspi's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, respondent Legaspi elevated the case
to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA, in its assailed Decision, dated August 15, 2012, granted
respondent Legaspi's petition. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 20, 2009 and
April 03, 2009 Orders are SET ASIDE and the complaint of BSP is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner BSP moved for reconsideration, but the CA, in its Resolution
dated February 18, 2013, denied the same motion. Hence, the present
petition with the following grounds relied upon:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
The Regional Trial Court of Malolos City has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 209-M-2008.
II.
BSP lawfully engaged the services of [the] undersigned
counsel.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The principle that it is well settled that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
provides that only questions of law shall be raised in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court admits
of certain exceptions,7 namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.8 Under the present case, the RTC and the CA have
different findings of fact, hence, there is a need for this Court to address
the issues raised by petitioner BSP.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve
title to possession of real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).9Petitioner BSP insists that the property involved has an
assessed value of more than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax Declaration
attached to the complaint. Incidentally, the complaint,10 on its face, is
devoid of any amount that would confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the
property, however, is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax
declaration (Annex "N" in the complaint) of the property in question
showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be
emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and should
be considered together with the complaint.11 In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-
Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa and Partners Co., Ltd.,12 this Court ruled that
in determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also
consider the attachments to the complaint, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of
cause of action if it appears clearly from the complaint and its attachments
that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse is also true. The
complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from
the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
relief.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax declaration showing the
assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the complaint and
should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking
judicial notice of the assessed value of the subject property. A court will
take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its
82
own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of
related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same
court.14 Since a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was
attached to the complaint, the same document is already considered as on
file with the court, thus, the court can now take judicial notice of such.
In holding that the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of the land, the CA cited this Court's ruling in Quinagoran v.
Court of Appeals.15 This Court's ruling though in Quinagoran is inapplicable
in this case because in the former, the complaint does not allege that the
assessed value of the land in question is more than P20,000.00 and that
there was no tax declaration nor any other document showing the
assessed value of the property attached to the complaint. Thus,
in Quinagoran, the assessed value of the land was not on record before
the trial court, unlike in the present case.
Moreover, considering that the area of the subject land is four million eight
hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-six (4,838,736)
square meters, the RTC acted properly when it took judicial notice of the
total area of the property involved and the prevailing assessed value of the
titled property, and it would also be at the height of absurdity if the
assessed value of the property with such an area is less than P20,000.00.
Anent the issue of the legal representation of petitioner BSP, the CA ruled
that the BSP, being a government-owned and controlled corporation,
should have been represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
or the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and not a
private law firm or private counsel, as in this case.
Under Republic Act No. 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, the BSP
Governor is authorized to represent the Bangko Sentral, either personally
or through counsel, including private counsel, as may be authorized by the
Monetary Board, in any legal proceedings, action or specialized legal
studies.16 Under the same law, the BSP Governor may also delegate his
power to represent the BSP to other officers upon his own responsibility.
As aptly found by the RTC, petitioner BSP was able to justify its being
represented by a private counsel, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
BSP's complaint dated April 10, 2008 was verified by Geraldine C. Alag, an
officer of the BSP being the Director of its Asset Management Department.
It has been explained that this was authorized by the Monetary Board, as
per Resolution No. 865 dated June 17, 2004, which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To approve delegation of authority to the Director, Asset Management
Department (AMD), or in his absence, the Officer-in-Charge, AMD to sign
all documents, contracts, agreements and affidavits relating to the
consolidation of ownership, lease, cancellation of decision, redemption and
sale of acquired assets, and all documents to be filed in court upon
clearance by the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services x x x.
Also submitted to this Court is the Secretary's Certificate issued by Silvina
Q. Mamaril-Roxas, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Secretary of BSP's
Monetary Board attesting to Monetary Board Resolution No. 900, adopted
and passed on July 18, 2008, which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3. At the regular meeting of the MB on 18 July 2008, the MB adopted and
passed MB Resolution No. 900, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Board approved the recommendation of the Asset Management
Department (AMD) to engage the services of Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit and
Acorda Law Offices (OKMA Law) as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. To act as counsel for the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in a
complaint to be filed against the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary, et al., before the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan, involving a BSP-acquired property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 48694 P(M) with a total area of 483.87 hectares in
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and under the terms and conditions of the service
engagement and the fees as shown in Annex G of the memorandum of Ms.
Geraldine C. Alag, Director, AMB, dated 8 July 2008; and
2. To act as true and lawful attorney-in-fact of the BSP, with full power
and authority, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. To represent the BSP in the pre-trial conference and trial of the case;
b. To negotiate, conclude, enter into and execute a compromise or
amicable settlement of the case, under such terms and conditions as an
attorney-in-fact may deem just and reasonable;
c. To agree on the simplification of issues;
d. To file and/or amend the necessary pleadings;
x x x.
Thus, the filing of the instant suit and the engagement of the services of
counsel are duly authorized.
It is significant to note that neither the Governor or General Counsel nor
83
the Monetary Board of BSP has come out to disown the authority given for
the filing of the instant suit and for the engagement of the services of
BSP's counsel of record in this case.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Therefore, as discussed above, in cases involving the BSP, the Monetary
Board may authorize the BSP Governor to represent it personally or
through a counsel, even a private counsel, and the authority to represent
the BSP may be delegated to any of its officers.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dated
March 13, 2013 of petitioner Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is GRANTED.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 15, 2012 and Resolution dated
February 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Orders dated January 20, 2009 and April 3, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED.
Let this case, therefore, be REMANDED to the trial court for the
continuation of its proceedings.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
EN BANC
G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PABLITO
ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, Accused-Appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused
of the crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means
of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes
against her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in
order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the
victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said
victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her
body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her
death.
Contrary to Law. 1
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M.,
in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty
years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing,
left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She
was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne
wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two
bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure
as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody
was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen,
brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant
dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and
left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who
was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered
on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a
vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted
and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot.
When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He
heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he
pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a
shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of
Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her
brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty
with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died
of "traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
1. Abrasions:
84
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from 5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd
right to left. incisors.

2. Abrasions/contusions: 6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.

2.1 temple, right. 7. External genitalia

2.2 cheek, right. 7.1 minimal blood present.

2.3 upper and lower jaws, right. 7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and
exposed vaginal wall.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left. showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February
22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches
in width, from right MCL to left AAL. CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions
due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look
3. Hematoma:
for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found,
the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral. what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a
pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right. bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed
the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the
4. Lacerated wounds: stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but
that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the
police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch. short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain,
and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5
inches.
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
5. Fractures: Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a
police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house.
5.1 maxillary bone, right. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him
with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in
85
the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin
and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He
also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
Marianne. 6 Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and
Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the
police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned
over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which
were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs
were taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police
headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical examination was
conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran. 8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with
abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along
index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at
the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor
Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk
privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell
you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the
door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since
no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of
the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt.
He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the
place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and
Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings
against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his mind because of
the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After
his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to
help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the
media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the
mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He
testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's
house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He,
his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while
he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke
up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect
some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he
helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in
the afternoon and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was
picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag.
In one of the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and
kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and
killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl
and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed
to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw
two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go
to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the
flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court
also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt
of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and
penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11,
Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of
Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne
Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review of this case and
the decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
86
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22
of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION,
THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of
the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and
four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral
confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of
appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the
policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made
during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section
12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed
of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule
is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of
custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to
"[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when
the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from
the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by
police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the
municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a
general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents'
house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the
police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did
this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the
backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at
the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other
companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be
found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
87
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we
learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went
there, found him there and investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to
the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags
recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the
investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these
bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where
did he point these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags
beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2)
bags were located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what
did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would
know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed
to the place where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he
really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to
the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day,
Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant
confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness.
Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the
Chief of Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin
mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So
when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened
the door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked
him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was
even covered by a television camera. 30
xxx xxx xxx
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell
you something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of
the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne
...
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! Ako ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he
told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone
and the second one was before the media people, sir.
88
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of
Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from
making further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear
what he was going to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made
in response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not
know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer,
his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional
rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the
crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by
the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to
Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The
interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child
and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on
Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified
that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the
place where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your
interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside
the police station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I
have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one
who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim
was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was
responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him
whether his admission was voluntary or that there was a threat,
intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because I knew
that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was
admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was
under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was
the uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I
cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it
is the place of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra
resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station
Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature of
investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able
to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he
was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of
accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and
everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission
from the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the
Baliuag PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
89
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad
and some of the relatives of the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was
recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or
less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and
crying at that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the
Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion,
Baliuag, Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the
crime was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of
that old house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to
narrate to me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of
Marianne Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP
Baliuag up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by
you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the
proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own
investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the
deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday
Badiday and several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor
presented the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was
the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are
you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is
a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he
said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he
repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while
ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take
some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several
others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions
from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused
answered you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba
talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot
nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol,
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay
Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx xxx xxx
90
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil
gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were
the pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to
him, reads almost everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the
court and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito
Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was
really down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was
no tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on
February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you
the permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from
Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief
of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed
the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people.
There were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were
people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife
also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was
really the wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and
from the questions that I asked from the people there they told me that
she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they
around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May
we know what question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
91
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim
aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed
her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed
the victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be
discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news
item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side
of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from
any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted
as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not
acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to
check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to
grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In
fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed
him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence.
Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all
the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by
his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the
interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill
of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of
the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that
may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the
duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of
Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the
medical evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist
with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no
spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994
by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but
revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
Hymen - contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6
and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have
been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim
was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His testimony is
as follows:
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock
and 6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
92
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of
the lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the
cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was
autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina
could have been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous
autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the
victim which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of
lacerated wounds could produce blood because there is no more
circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when
the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor,
vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is
impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those
instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a dead
person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with
clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained while the
victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the
lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just
drawn and indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found
the clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound
at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are
found on the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted
into that small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of
the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those
lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina does not negate the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that
there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr.
Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations
found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have
been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by
appellant are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained
from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road
near appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother
were not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's
house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the
grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had
been dragged over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that
she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry
hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were
found positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type
of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her
93
parents had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains
which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to
explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the
incident and were later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other
circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence.
His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of
the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers
away from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half
an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-
appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 123137. October 17, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PO2 ALBERT
ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOSDOS, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated May 17, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 for murder
and CBU-33664 for illegal possession of firearms, finding appellants Albert
Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on Illegal
Possession of Firearms. Its decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-30350 for Murder, the Court finds accused
Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos, GUILTY of murder
beyond reasonable doubt and each is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the
heirs of deceased Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000.00; actual damages
of P30,000.00, representing a reasonable amount for the embalming, vigil,
wake, and burial expenses; P30,000.00 for attorneys fees; and to pay the
costs.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Gaudioso Navales is hereby
ACQUITTED with costs de officio.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-33664 for Illegal Possession of Firearms,
accused Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos, are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months and to pay the costs.
The .38 caliber revolver, SN P08445 and the two .45 caliber pistols with
SN PGO 13506 and SN 52469, are hereby confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government and accordingly, the Clerk of Court of this Branch
is directed to turn over the said firearms to the Chief of Police, Cebu City,
or to the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP Region 7, upon
proper receipt.
94
The Cebu City Chief of Police is directed to release immediately upon
receipt hereof, the person of Gaudioso Navales, unless there be any other
valid reason for his continued detention.
SO ORDERED. 1cräläwvirtualibräry
This judgment was the culmination of proceedings beginning with the
Amended Information dated September 6, 1993, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-30350, wherein appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and
PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1993, at about 11:50 P.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with handguns, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with treachery
and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, did
then and there shot one Alejandro Flores alias Alex with the said
handguns, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him the following physical injuries:
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK AND
HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS
TO THE TRUNK AND THE HEAD
as a consequence of which the said Alejandro Flores alias Alex died later.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2cräläwvirtualibräry
At the time of the incident, appellant Abriol, a policeman previously
detailed as a jailguard at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC)
in Cebu City, was himself a detention prisoner in BBRC. He was charged
with murder, a non-bailable offense, in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14. 3cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had served time
for grave threats. 4 The warden then, Chief Inspector Navales, 5employed
him as his personal driver and general factotum. 6 Navales was found
guilty of grave misconduct in Administrative Case No. 01-93 for allowing
Abriol and Dosdos out of BBRC on the day of the murder and was
summarily dismissed from the police force.
Dosdos had been convicted by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, of
highway robbery in Criminal Case No. CBU-18152 but Navales failed to act
on the mittimus ordering Dosdos transfer to the national penitentiary, and
he remained in BBRC. 7 Abriol and Dosdos enjoyed special privileges at
BBRC as the wardens errand boys 8 or trustees.
The victim, Alejandro Flores alias Alex, was a former policeman. He was
dismissed from the PNP in August 1992 after testing positive for prohibited
drugs. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos were also indicted for illegal possession of
firearms in Criminal Case No. CBU-33664. The charge sheet reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 1993 at about 11:48 P.M. in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with deliberate intent, did then and there keep under
their control and possession the following:
1. one (1) .38 cal. revolver (Armscor) with SN P08445 with
six empty shells;
2. one (1) .45 cal. pistol (Colt) with SN P6013506 with 9 live
ammunitions (sic);
3. one (1) .45 cal. Pistol (Colt) with SN 52469 with five live
ammunitions.
without first obtaining a permit or license therefor from competent
authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. Since
the indictments arose from the same incident, the cases were jointly tried.
The facts of the case are as follows:
At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news
reporter then aboard his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in
P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when he heard a couple of gunshots. He
looked around and saw a man running unsteadily towards the intersection
95
of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmea Boulevard). The man
was shouting Tabang, tabang! (Help! Help!). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red Jiffy
make a U-turn near the gate of the city central school that nearly ran over
the man shouting for help. The man turned back and staggered towards
the direction of Bacalso Avenue and Urgello Private Road, but after a few
meters on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.
Meanwhile, the Jiffy followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a tall,
thin man alighted. The man fired several shots at the prostrate figure. He
boarded the Jiffy which sped away towards Leon Kilat Street. Romeo Sta.
Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights on the victim.
In the meantime, PO3 Alexander Rustela was at a vulcanizing shop near
the intersection of Bacalso Avenue and Leon Kilat Street, when he heard
gunshots coming from the north. He ran towards where the gunshots
came and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, the Jiffy with three
persons on board sped past him and made an abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat
Street. Rustela immediately radioed for assistance. Minutes later, patrol
car No. 201 with PO2 Herbert Ramos on board arrived. Rustela boarded
the car and they followed the Jiffy, while broadcasting an alarm to police
headquarters and other mobile patrol cars.
On nearby Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana and PO2 Romeo Abellana
were cruising aboard patrol car No. 208, when they heard a radio message
that the suspects in the shooting incident were aboard a Jiffy. As they
turned left at Leon Kilat Street, they saw the Jiffy heading towards Carbon
Market. They pursued the Jiffy which stopped in front of the Don Bosco
Building near BBRC, when police car No. 205, with PO Eugenio Badrinas
and PO2 Gerald Cue aboard, blocked the Jiffys path. Cue fired a warning
shot and three persons alighted. The driver was appellant Astellero, whom
Cue had recognized and seen before at the BBRC. Abrigana and Cue
approached the trio who stood a meter away from the Jiffy. SPO1 Abrigana
frisked Abriol and seized from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with serial
number PO8485 with six (6) empty shells in its cylinder. 11 Under Abriols
seat, the police also found a .45 caliber pistol bearing serial number PGO
13506 with nine (9) live rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber
pistol with serial number 52469 loaded with five (5) unfired
bullets. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
While the patrol cars were chasing the Jiffy, another police team
proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm. This team from
Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the victim to the
Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station
No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from the
victims body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain, and
submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics
testing. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory
autopsied the victims body. He found that the cause of the victims death
was cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to
multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head. 14 Dr. Diola recovered a
.38 caliber slug from the corpse, which he later submitted for ballistics
examination.
SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported the
following:
1. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-1 to JA-3 possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45
with SN: PGO13506;
2. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-4 and E-69-6 possesses similar
individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from
cal .45 pistol with SN: 52469;
3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked JA-5 possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN:
PGO13506;
4. Fired cartridge cases marked E-45-1 to E-45-6 possesses similar
individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from
cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;
5. Fired bullets marked as JA-6 and LD possesses similar individual
characteristic markings with the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN:
P8445.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The following day, appellants underwent a paraffin test. The hands of
appellants were found positive for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test
on the firearms showed that the three handguns were also positive.
Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP Region
7 Crime Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms had been
fired, 16 and that appellants had fired the guns within a period of seventy-
two (72) hours prior to the examination.
96
The widow and relatives of the victim testified on the possible motive
behind the killing. They claimed the victim, a confessed drug user, may
have been rubbed out on the orders of Navales for failure to remit P31,000
as proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. After failing to deliver the drug
money to Navales, for whom he was repeatedly pushing drugs, the victim
went into hiding, but later returned to Cebu City because he missed his
family. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellants deny the accusations. Abriol averred that he and Dosdos were
among the several trustees at BBRC assigned to work in the kitchen.
Appellant Astellero, who was the wardens driver, was also in charge of
marketing for the prisoners food. On the day of the incident, Astellero
realized that there was no money for the next days marketing so he asked
Abriol to accompany him to the house of Navales, but since he was not in,
they returned to BBRC and saw Navales an hour later. After they received
the money from Navales niece on their way back to BBRC, Dosdos heard
gunshots. Abriol ordered Astellero, who was driving, to turn back. Then
Abriol claimed he saw a tall, slim man alight from a Jiffy and shoot at a
prone figure on the ground. Seconds later, the gunman returned to the
Jiffy, which sped off. Abriol said he ordered Astellero to chase that Jiffy but
it had too much of a headstart and they lost sight of it. Abriol ordered
Astellero to proceed to BBRC. At Colon Street, they heard gunshots behind
them and the blaring siren of a police car. They explained that since they
were detention prisoners, they had to evade meeting the police. They
heard more gun shots. Upon reaching BBRC, the gates were closed, so
they drove to the old airport. On their way back to BBRC several police
cars blocked them and arrested them. SPO4 Eleazar Abrigana frisked him
and took the .38 service revolver from his waist. 18cräläwvirtualibräry
Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC
Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder
in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and
it was returned to him for repair by Armscor, and upon repair he handed it
over to the BBRC armory. The armorer returned it to him since there was
no place to keep it. He said that although he was a detention prisoner, he
had yet to be discharged from the service. He was assigned guard and
escort duties by the warden. 19 Abriol said that on the day of the incident
he was, as a BBRC jailguard, authorized to carry his service firearm. 20 He
presented a Memorandum Receipt 21 authorizing him to carry the
government-issued .38 revolver. 22cräläwvirtualibräry
On the witness stand, Astellero and Dosdos narrated a similar version of
the incident as did Abriol. Both vehemently denied having any knowledge
of the two .45 caliber pistols found by PO3 Cue in the
Jiffy. 23cräläwvirtualibräry
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the
Cebu City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which
might have caused the gunshot wounds of the victim. Relying on the
Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna declared that wound
nos. 1 and 2, which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may have been
caused by a .38 caliber firearm. As to wound nos. 3 and 4, which each
measured 0.5 cm. by 0.5 cm., it was possible that a .38 handgun was
used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna opined that a .45 pistol could
not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the entry points were too
small for a .45 caliber bullet. With respect to the grazing wounds found on
the victims body, Dr. Cerna testified that it was impossible to determine
the caliber of the firearm used. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court found appellants version of the incident neither convincing
and credible and, as earlier stated, it believed the prosecutions version.
Petitioners were convicted of the offenses charged.
Hence, this appeal, with appellants assigning the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
DESPITE THE FLIMSY AND UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
At issue is whether the prosecutions evidence, which is mainly
circumstantial, suffices to convict appellants for murder and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, beyond reasonable doubt.
A. Criminal Case No. CBU-30350
97
On their conviction for murder, appellants argue that the prosecutions
circumstantial evidence against them is weak, ambiguous, and
inconclusive. Specifically, appellants contend that they should be acquitted
because:
First , eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., did not personally identify them as
the culprits. At no point in his testimony did eyewitness Sta. Cruz, Jr.,
positively identify any of the appellants or appellant Abriol as the gunman.
Sta. Cruz, Jr. only gave a general description of the assailants, despite
attempts to make him give a categorical identification. He admitted he
found out the name of Abriol from television and news reports and could
not identify Abriol as the one whom he saw shot the victim. The transcript
of his testimony is revealing.
Q: Then after the Jiffy stopped in front of the fallen victim, what happened
next?
A: I saw that there was a man who disembarked from the Jiffy. He was a
tall, thin fellow who disembarked from the Jiffy and at the same time, he
shot the fallen victim.
Q: How many times did he shoot the victim?
A: I cannot count attorney but I saw him shooting the victim.
Q: In your affidavit, you said that the person who disembarked from the
Jiffy, whose name you know later on as PO2 Albert Abriol, PNP, shot the
victim in the different parts of his body. If Albert Abriol is now in the
courtroom, will you please point to him?
A: I will know him attorney because of the TV shows and newspapers.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q: You are referring to the name of that man who disembarked from the
Jiffy and fired several shots at the fallen victim?
A: Yes, I know his name Your Honor on (sic) the news cast.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q: Alright, forget the news. The man you saw when he alighted from the
Jiffy and poured (sic) several bullets on the fallen man, look around if he is
in the courtroom?
A: I cannot identify Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: You cannot?
A: But [because] what I saw is a man who is tall and thin because it was
dark.
xxx
Q: How many persons fired a shot at the fallen man?
A: I only saw that man Your Honor who alighted from the Jiffy.
Q: Did you see his physical features?
A: Only (t)his, I can only tell his height, he was tall and his body build is
thin. Tall and thin. (Emphasis supplied) 25cräläwvirtualibräry
Since the sole eyewitness could not identify the gunman and his
companions, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence from which
the trial court could draw its findings and conclusion of
culpability. 26Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon, as in this case,
when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.
Second , appellants assert that the paraffin tests are judicially recognized
as unreliable and inconclusive. A paraffin test could establish the presence
or absence of nitrates on the hand. However, it cannot establish that the
source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms. Nitrates are also
found in substances other than gunpowder. A person who tests positive
may have handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction
for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals,
tobacco, and leguminous plants. Hence, the presence of nitrates should
only be taken as an indication of a possibility that a person has fired a
gun. 27 However, it must be borne in mind that appellants were not
convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test.
98
Third , appellants claim that the autopsy report of prosecution witness Dr.
Ladislao Diola revealed serious ambiguities. 28 Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, using
the same autopsy report, said that the gunshot wounds measuring 0.6 x
0.6 centimeters could not have been caused by a .45 caliber pistol because
an entrance wound of that size was too small for a .45 caliber bullet. 29 Dr.
Cerna claimed that a wound inflicted by a .45 pistol would have an entry
point of anywhere from 1.1 to 1.3 centimeters. He declared that it was
with more reason that an entrance wound measuring .5 x .5 centimeters
could not be caused by a caliber .45 bullet. 30 Since no firearm smaller
than a .38 caliber pistol was seized from appellants, they claim the
observation of Dr. Cerna only shows that they could not have shot the
victim.
We note, however, that during cross-examination, Dr. Diola carefully
explained that a firearms caliber is not the only basis for determining the
cause of the gunshot wound. He said:
ATTY. REMOTIQUE:
Q: So, normally the size of .5 cm x .5 cm which is the point of entry of
gunshot wound No. 3 this may have been caused by a firearm of lesser
caliber than caliber .38?
A: Not necessarily. There is a very small difference in the size and this
does not preclude that gunshot wound No. 3 may have also been caused
by the same firearm which caused gunshot wounds Nos. 1 and 2. There
are factors which often affect the size of the wounds at the time of the
examination, perhaps a recission (sic) of the skin in the area where
gunshot Wound No. 3 was inflicted so that gunshot wound becomes
smaller.
Q: Did you not say that normally the point of entry of the gunshot wounds
vary with the caliber of the firearm which caused it, so that the point of
entry caused by one firearm of a particular caliber may be bigger than the
point of entry of a gunshot wound caused by another firearm of lesser
caliber?
A: I told you of other factors that often affect the size of the entry of the
bullet although the caliber is one basis of the size of the wounds.
xxx
Q: Will you explain further on that because my understanding is that .5 cm
wound must perforce be caused by a firearm of lesser caliber than that
which caused the .6 cm wound?
A: As I said there are ranges in the size of the wounds. The variance in the
size of the wound when it is minimal does not exclude the possibility that a
wound with a .5 cm size and .6 cm size could have been caused by the
same caliber. (Emphasis supplied).31cräläwvirtualibräry
The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diolas testimony is
supported by Dr. Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book
entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could make the wound of
entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near
fire; (2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might
have entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the
bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller than the firearms
caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet
before entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of the
skin (stress supplied). 32 Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could
have caused the grazing wounds on the victims head and
extremities. 33Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diolas findings in this
regard. 34 Such expert opinions disprove appellants theory that the .45
caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in
killing the victim.
Fourth , appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser,
the prosecutions ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant
about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and
pressure barrel. 35 (2) He is not conversant with the required references
concerning ballistics, particularly books on the subject by foreign
authorities. 36 (3) He could not scientifically determine the caliber of a
bullet. 37 Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in
ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges
matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime
was not reliable. Appellants also assail Casers failure to take the necessary
photographs to support his findings.
An expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which
the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special
knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an
opinion. 38There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill
or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert.
It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and
education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case;
99
and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is proof of motive becomes essential to a conviction only where the evidence
based. 39 The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an of an accuseds participation in an offense is circumstantial.48 A careful
expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial perusal of the States evidence reveals that the prosecution had established
court.40cräläwvirtualibräry sufficient motive why appellants killed the victim, independent of any
grudge which Navales may have had against the latter. At the time of the
In giving credence to Casers expert testimony, the trial court explained: incident, appellants Abriol and Dosdos were both BBRC detention prisoners
during Navales term as warden. Abriol and Dosdos were treated as highly
favored trustees of Navales and were never locked up. Abriol and Dosdos
The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and
were even allowed to go out of BBRC to do the marketing for the prisons
identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of
kitchen. Appellant Astellero, a former detention prisoner, was also a
his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied (with) Casers
recipient of Navales favors. Navales hired Astellero as his personal driver
examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope.
after the latter served his sentence. Navales and the victim, a former
Casers conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the
BBRC jailguard, were associates in dealing with prohibited drugs, until they
impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired to
had a falling out allegedly after the victim failed to remit to Navales
have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the
proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs amounting to P31,000. Appellants
crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his
apparently killed the victim to return the special favors Navales had
victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him
showered them. Lack of a motive does not necessarily preclude conviction.
inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every bullet its
Persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all, and friendship
characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These
or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a
marking might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing
crime. 49cräläwvirtualibräry
their origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the
print left by the human finger.41cräläwvirtualibräry
Sixth, in the present case, appellants contend that the PNP cannot be
presumed to have done their work since it committed errors and blunders
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics
in transferring possession and custody of the physical evidence. They
expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command
allege there was a possibility that the evidence was tainted, planted, or
and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in
manufactured. Besides, appellants point out that the presumption of
Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had
regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence
previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27)
of the accused.
murder and homicide cases all over the country. 42 An expert witness need
not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to
support his findings. 43 Examination under a comparison microscope The record shows that the police officers did not issue acknowledgement
showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the receipts in some instances. However, minor lapses do not mean that the
same gun is sufficient. 44 Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found State had failed to show an unbroken chain of custody of the subject
similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs. firearms and ammunition, nor that said firearms and ammunition were
tampered. The slugs and spent shells recovered from the scene of the
crime and the victims corpse were plainly identified in open court by the
Fifth , appellants aver that the prosecution failed to show any plausible
PNP investigators. The ballistician testified that the bullets and cartridges
motive for appellants to kill the victim. The prosecution tried to prove that
recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the subject handguns.
their co-accused Navales instigated them to kill the victim because Navales
Under these circumstances, we must respect the presumption of the
had a grudge against him. However, as Navales was acquitted, appellants
regularity in the performance of duties.
insist that Navales acquittal should redound to their benefit since no
motive was imputed on their part.
Seventh, appellants insist that the prosecution failed to show that the red
Jiffy used by them and seized by the police officers was the same vehicle
Motive is not an essential element of a crime, 45particularly of murder. 46It
used by the gunmen who killed Alejandro Flores. Appellants point out that
becomes relevant only where there is no positive evidence of an accuseds
PO3 Rustela, who was aboard police car No. 201, testified that they lost
direct participation in the commission of a crime. 47 Stated otherwise,
100
sight of the red Jiffy while chasing it along Leon Kilat Street. Appellants
argue that the Jiffy which was chased by patrol car No. 208 until it was
cornered near BBRC by the other pursuing patrol cars was not the same
vehicle originally sighted and tailed by patrol car No. 201.
In rejecting this theory, the trial court stated that:
PO3 Rustela who was nearby, immediately ran to the scene of the crime
and met the red jiffy with three persons on board, that speedily passed by
him proceeding towards Leon Kilat Street. Car 208 readily picked up the
trail and pursued the red jiffy from Leon Kilat, then making abrupt turns
on downtown streets until other patrol cars joined the chase and captured
them in Lahug, near the BBRC. The identity of the red jiffy was never
interrupted. Members of the Mobile Patrol Cars identified in court without
batting an eyelash, the red jiffy which was the object of the shooting
alarm. There was no interruption, no let-up in the chase, right after
Alejandro Flores was shot and there was no other red jiffy that the crews
of the (pursuing) patrol cars noticed.
The Court rejects their claim of innocence, for their very acts belied the
same.
Astellero could have stopped the jeep upon noticing that patrol cars were
already running after them with sirens, blinkers and warning shots fired.
From Leon Kilat Street to Lahug airport, there were several police stations
that they could have sought shelter and police assistance. Guilt has many
ways of surfacing. Instead of stopping, Abriol ordered Astellero to
accelerate their speed. Their obvious purpose was to elude the patrol cars.
Flight is indicative of guilt.50cräläwvirtualibräry
But, in this case, is the totality of the circumstantial evidence relied upon
by the trial court sufficient to support a conviction?
Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. For
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other possible, rational hypothesis, except that of guilt. 51 An accused can
be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence where all the
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the culprit. 52cräläwvirtualibräry
In our assessment, the prosecutions evidence constitutes an unbroken
chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of
appellants. First, the fatal shooting of Alejandro Flores occurred at around
11:50 P.M. of June 5, 1993 in front of the ABS-CBN compound in Cebu
City. The gunman, who was tall and thin, alighted from a red Jiffy, pumped
several bullets into the prone victim, and got back aboard the Jiffy which
then sped towards Leon Kilat Street. Second, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz,
Jr.s description of the gunman as tall and thin perfectly matches the
physique of appellant Abriol. Third, PO3 Alexander Rustela, who was close
to the crime scene, heard the gunshots and ran towards the place where
the sound of gunshots emanated. A red Jiffy with three persons aboard
whizzed by him and abruptly turned at Leon Kilat Street. After Sta. Cruz,
Jr. informed him that the gunmen were aboard a red Jiffy, Rustela boarded
patrol car No. 201, radioed an alarm, and commenced a pursuit of the
fleeing vehicle. Police car no. 208 received the alarm, and on turning into
Leon Kilat Street, encountered the speeding red Jiffy. They immediately
chased the Jiffy but failed to catch it. Police cars Nos. 208 and 205
cornered the vehicle in front of the Don Bosco building near BBRC. PO2
Gerald Cue, on patrol car no. 205 fired a warning shot at the vehicle and
directed all those aboard to disembark. Three men got out, with their
hands raised. SPO1 Abrigana, on patrol car no. 208 and PO2 Cue
approached the trio. Abrigana frisked the man who was seated in the front
passenger seat, who turned out to be appellant Abriol, and recovered from
his waist a .38 caliber revolver with six empty shells. Cue searched the red
Jiffy and found two loaded .45 caliber pistols under the front seat where
Abriol had sat. Other police officers immediately went to the crime scene
where they found the victim barely alive. PO3 Seville retrieved four .45
caliber slugs and two deformed slugs at the spot where the victim was
shot. The autopsy of the victims remains showed that he died of cardio
respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot
wounds. A deformed metal jacket of a .38 caliber slug was recovered from
the corpse. Ballistics tests showed that the bullets and cartridges had
identical individual characteristics with those of the test bullets and
cartridges. Paraffin tests conducted on each of the appellants, one day
after the incident, revealed that all were positive for gunpowder residues.
The subject firearms were also chemically examined and found positive for
gunpowder residue. Before the shooting incident, appellants were seen at
Navales house until around 7:30 P.M., when they left aboard Navales red
Jiffy with Astellero driving, Abriol in the front passenger seat, and Dosdos
in the back seat. 53 Appellants seating arrangements were exactly the
same, several hours later, after they were pursued and cornered by police
cars near BBRC. Appellants admitted that they dropped by the Navales
residence at around 7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.
101
These unbroken chain of events prove not only appellants identities but
also their participation and collective responsibility in the murder of
Alejandro Flores. They reveal a unity of purpose and concerted action
evidencing their conspiracy to kill him. Against this matrix of facts and
circumstances, appellants bare denials cannot stand. Their story of chasing
a red Jiffy is merely a disingenuous diversion of no evidentiary value for
the defense.
Finally, the information for murder alleged treachery and evident
premeditation. We note, though, that the trial court did not state which
circumstance qualified the killing into murder.
A review of the record would reveal that there was no evident
premeditation. There is evident premeditation when the following are
shown: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (c) a lapse of time between the determination to
commit the crime and the execution thereof sufficient to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 54 Evident premeditation
indicates deliberate planning and preparation. Nowhere in the record is it
shown when and how appellants planned and prepared to kill the victim.
Concerning treachery, however, it was shown that: (1) the means of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. 55 These twin requisites were adequately proved.
Appellants had superiority in numbers and weapons. The victim was
without any means to defend himself as no weapon was found or even
intimated to be in his possession. The victim was running away from the
Jiffy prior to the killing. That he was warned or threatened earlier is of no
moment. Even when the victim is warned of danger to his person, if the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate, treachery can still be appreciated. 56 The victim was lying
prostrate on the ground when he was deliberately and mercilessly riddled
with bullets. The weapons used, the number of assailants, the swift and
planned manner of the attack, and the multiple number of wounds inflicted
upon the victim all demonstrate a determined assault with intent to kill the
victim. No doubt there was treachery.
B. Criminal Case No. CBU-33664
On their conviction for illegal possession of firearms, appellants contend
that the handguns and ammunitions allegedly taken from them by the
police officers were illegally seized. They assert that the police had no
warrant to effect a search and seizure, such that these illegally seized
firearms were inadmissible as evidence, and it was error for the trial court
to admit them.
There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is
valid. They are: (1) consented searches; 57 (2) as an incident to a lawful
arrest; 58 (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration,
customs, and drug laws; 59 (4) searches of moving vehicles; 60 (5)
searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the
prohibited articles are in plain view; 61 (7) searches of buildings and
premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) stop
and frisk operations. 62cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject handguns
and ammunition is valid for two reasons. It was a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting, and pursuit of a fast-
moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and a more than
reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects
aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need
of the police to take immediate action in the light of the foregoing
exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under
the Rules of Court. 63 Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
firearms and ammunition which they were not authorized to carry,
appellants were actually violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid
arrest under the Rules. 64cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in convicting
appellants Astellero and Dosdos of illegal possession of firearms. They
point out that the .38 caliber revolver was recovered from appellant Abriol,
who as a policeman was authorized to carry and possess said firearm, as
evidenced by his Memorandum Receipt (MR), which had not been recalled,
cancelled or revoked until the time of the trial of these cases. Appellants
claim that the two .45 caliber pistols could have been left in the vehicle by
PNP personnel assigned at BBRC, considering that the red Jiffy was
generally used as a service vehicle by BBRC personnel. They also argue
that the prosecution failed to prove appellants ownership, control, and
possession of the .45 caliber pistols, considering that appellants were six
meters away from the Jiffy when said handguns were allegedly found.
To sustain a conviction for violation of P.D. No. 1866, the prosecution must
prove two elements of the offense: (1) the existence of the subject
firearm; (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess it.65 These
102
the prosecution did. It presented a .38 caliber revolver with serial number
PO8445, a .45 caliber pistol with serial number PGO 13506 Para
Ordinance, and a .45 caliber pistol with serial number 52469. The .38
caliber handgun was recovered from appellant Abriol, while the two .45
caliber automatics were found and seized from under the front passenger
seat of appellants vehicle. SPO4 Aquilles Famoso of the Cebu City PNP
Metropolitan District Commands Firearms and Explosive Unit testified that
appellants were not listed as licensed firearm owners in Cebu City. 66 The
prosecution also presented a certification from P/Senior Inspector Edwin
Roque of the Firearms and Explosives Division of PNP Headquarters at
Camp Crame, Quezon City that appellant Abriol is not licensed to hold any
firearm; that the .45 caliber pistols were unlicensed; and that a
certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm, proves beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of illegal possession of firearm. 67cräläwvirtualibräry
Abriol insists that he had a valid MR authorizing him to carry the .38
revolver. We agree with the observation of the trial court that:
The claim of Abriol that .38 caliber was issued to him, as evidenced by the
corresponding receipt (MR), is of no moment. While an MR is an authority
of Abriol to possess the government firearm that was issued to him, when
he was charged and detained at BBRC for an earlier case of murder, other
than the case at bar, he was already then at that moment a detained
prisoner and therefore, (un)authorized to carry a firearm. A military man
or a member of the PNP who commits a crime, is immediately disarmed
upon his arrest and stripped of all the rights and privileges that go with
the function of his office, and this includes, in the case of Abriol, his MR.
Thus, when he shot Alejandro Flores with his .38 caliber revolver, this
firearm was already unauthorized and its use and possession
illegal.68cräläwvirtualibräry
Even if Abriols MR was valid, said authorization was limited only to the .38
caliber revolver and not the two .45 caliber automatic pistols found under
the front passenger seat of the Jiffy. Appellants were still in the unlawful
possession of the .45 caliber pistols. Under P.D. No. 1866, possession is
not limited to actual possession. 69 In this case, appellants had control
over the pistols. They were all liable since conspiracy was established and
the act of one is the act of all. 70cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellants claim that they were six meters away from the Jiffy when it was
searched and the two .45 caliber pistols were seized. They suggest that
the policemen who searched the vehicle could have planted said firearms.
The trial court found that they were in fact only one meter away from the
vehicle. Findings of fact of the trial court, when supported by the evidence
on record, are binding and conclusive upon appellate
courts. 71cräläwvirtualibräry
All told, on the charge of illegal possession of firearms, no reversible error
was committed by the trial court when it found appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Office of the Solicitor General recommends that although appellants
were charged with and convicted of two separate offenses of murder and
violation of P.D. No. 1866, R.A. No. 8294, which amended said decree,
should be applied to appellants retroactively, citing People v. Molina, 292
SCRA 742, 779 (1998) interpreting R.A. No. 8294.
We agree. We ruled in Molina that with the passage of R.A. No. 8294 on
June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is
not a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance. This
was recently reiterated in People v. Castillo, G.R. Nos. 131592-93,
February 15, 2000. 72 Appellants are thus guilty only of murder with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua cannot however be
modified since the murder took place before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659.
A final word on the damages. In addition to the award of P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, the trial court awarded P30,000 in actual damages,
representing a reasonable amount for the embalming, vigil, wake and
burial expenses, and P30,000 as attorneys fees. To be entitled to actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof, and on
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. 73 No such evidence was
offered. The award of actual damages must, therefore, be deleted.
However, temperate damages may be awarded since the family of the
victim has demonstrably spent for the wake, funeral and burial
arrangements. The amount of P20,000 should suffice as temperate
damages. In addition, we find an award of exemplary damages in order,
pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 74 The killing was attended by
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
Moreover, the public good demands that detained prisoners should not
abuse their status as trustees. Had the police been unsuccessful in their
pursuit of appellants, the latter would have used the BBRC as shelter and
as an alibi that they could not have committed the crime since they were
then in detention. Thus, we find an award of P10,000 as exemplary
103
damages in order. Accordingly, the award of attorneys fees is
sustained.75cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE , the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 and CBU-33664 is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and
Januario Dosdos are hereby found GUILTY of murder, qualified by
treachery, with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided for by law. Appellants
Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000 as death
indemnity, P20,000 as temperate damages, P10,000 as exemplary
damages, and P30,000 as attorneys fees, as well as the costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 138085 : November 11, 2004]
AZOLLA FARMS and FRANCISCO R. YUSECO, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS and SAVINGS BANK OF MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision dated February 19, 1999 rendered by the
Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53076, which reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 83-20514, and the
Resolution dated March 31, 1999, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Francis R. Yuseco, Jr., is the Chairman, President and Chief
Operating Officer of petitioner Azolla Farms International Philippines
(Azolla Farms), a corporation duly organized under existing laws and
engaged in the development, exploitation, production, manufacturing,
promotion, marketing, and sale of natural, organic minerals, including its
by-products, with the ultimate objective of utilizing said products for the
promotion of food production.2
In 1982, Azolla Farms undertook to participate in the National Azolla
Production Program wherein it will purchase all the Azolla produced by the
Azolla beneficiaries in the amount not exceeding the peso value of all the
inputs provided to them. The project also involves the then Ministry of
Agriculture, the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran, and the Kiwanis. To
finance its participation, petitioners applied for a loan with Credit Manila,
Inc., which the latter endorsed to its sister company, respondent Savings
Bank of Manila (Savings Bank). The Board of Directors of Azolla Farms,
meanwhile, passed a board resolution on August 31, 1982, authorizing
Yuseco to borrow from Savings Bank in an amount not exceeding
P2,200,000.00.3
The loan having been approved, Yuseco executed a promissory note on
September 13, 1982, promising to pay Savings Bank the sum of
P1,400,000.00 on or before September 13, 1983.4 The net proceeds of
P1,225,443.31 was released to FNCB Finance, the mortgagee of a 548 -
square meter lot with residential house owned by Yuseco. With the release
of the proceeds, FNCB Finance released the mortgage,5 and in turn, the
property was mortgaged to Savings Bank as collateral for the
loan.6 Yuseco and Francisco Bargas also executed an assignment of their
shares of stock in Azolla Farms as additional security.7Yuseco then
executed two other promissory notes on September 27, 1982 8 and
January 4, 1983,9 both for the amount of P300,000.00.
However, the Azolla Farms project collapsed. Blaming Savings Bank,
petitioners Yuseco and Azolla Farms filed on October 3, 1983 with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 25), a complaint for damages. In
essence, their complaint alleges that Savings Bank unjustifiably refused to
promptly release the remaining P300,000.00 which impaired the timetable
of the project and inevitably affected the viability of the project resulting in
its collapse, and resulted in their failure to pay off the loan. Thus,
petitioners pray for P1,000,000.00 as actual damages, among others.10
Respondent Savings Bank filed its Answer denying the allegations in the
complaint. It contends that there was evidence that Yuseco was using the
loan proceeds for expenses totally unrelated to the project and they
decided to withhold the remaining amount until Yuseco gave the assurance
that the diversion of the funds will be stopped. Respondent bank believed
that the 90-day interval between the two tranches could not have impaired
104
the operation of the project, and petitioners' subsequent receipt of the
proceeds confirmed their agreement to the terms of the loan.
Trial ensued. After respondent, as defendant, rested its case, petitioners
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint alleging that the testimony of
defense witness Jesus Venturina raised the issue of the invalidity of the
promissory notes and the real estate mortgage.11 Petitioners sought the
amendment of the complaint to conform to the issues and evidence
presented. Their Amended Complaint contains the following amendments:
That defendant bank acts in unilaterally reducing the agreed amount of
FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00) to TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) and in unreasonably delay (sic) the release of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) novated the promissory
notes nos. 2491, 2510 and 2669 and also novated the real estate
mortgage dated 6 September 1982 executed by plaintiff Francis R. Yuseco,
Jr.;12
and in their prayer, petitioners seek that the promissory notes and real
estate mortgage be declared novated, invalid and unenforceable.
Petitioners also amended the actual damages sought, increasing it to
P5,000,000.00.13
Respondent objected to petitioners' motion,14 but the trial court
nevertheless admitted the Amended Complaint.15
On June 17, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision annulling the
promissory notes and real estate mortgage, and awarding damages to
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
DECLARING - -
(a) the promissory notes and real estate mortgage executed by plaintiff
Yuseco novated, if not unenforceable; (b) any subsequent foreclosure or
sale of the real estate property, without any binding effect;
ORDERING - -
(1) the defendants to return full, uninterrupted and complete possession
and ownership of the subject real estate property to plaintiff Francis R.
Yuseco, Jr.; (2) the defendant to pay plaintiffs: (a) P1,000,000.00 as
actual damages; (b) P200,000.00, as moral damages for the personal
sufferings, mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation of plaintiff
Yuseco; (c) P50,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and (d) legal
interest on the actual damages herein awarded from date of filing the
Complaint until fully paid.
The Counterclaim interposed by the defendant in its Answer is hereby
dismissed, for lack of merit.
Costs against the defendant.16
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
Finding merit in respondent's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the trial court's decision per its Decision dated February 19,
1999, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 83-20514 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is
hereby entered declaring the promissory notes and real estate mortgage
executed in favor of defendant-appellant, as well as the extrajudicial
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property, as valid and binding.
Defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff Azolla Farms
International Philippines, Inc. the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as nominal damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, the herein petition filed before the Court, alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.18
Two issues are involved in this case: first, whether the trial court erred in
admitting petitioners' amended complaint; and second, whether the trial
court erred in nullifying the promissory notes, the real estate mortgage,
and its extrajudicial foreclosure.
In their motion to amend complaint, petitioners allege that:
105
2. During the direct examination of defendant bank's witness Jesus
Venturina, he testified and identified various documents relating to the
invalid and illegal foreclosure on plaintiff Francis R. Yuseco, Jr.'s real
property subject of the real estate mortgage dated September 7, 1982 and
marked and adopted as Exhibit N for the plaintiffs. Moreover, he testified
and identified the promissory notes, marked and adopted as Exhibits L, M
and Q for the plaintiffs evidencing the incomplete and invalid consideration
of the said mortgage. As a result of the testimony thus given and the
documents adduced during said hearing, the issue of the foreclosure on
said property has been raised which, therefore, necessitates that the
pleadings in this case, the complaint, be amended to conform to the issues
raised and the evidence presented;19
The trial court granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the trial court should not have
admitted the Amended Complaint because it altered petitioners' cause of
action. Apparently, the Court of Appeals treated petitioners' amendment of
the complaint as one involving amendments after the case is set for
hearing under Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,20which is not
however applicable to the present case.
The amendment of the complaint was made pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court, governing amendment of pleadings to conform to
evidence, to wit:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence .
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The
court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.
In Mercader v. Development Bank of the Phils. (Cebu Branch),21 the Court
explained that the foregoing provision envisions two scenarios - - first,
when evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the pleadings and
no objection was interjected and second, when evidence is offered on an
issue not alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection was
interpolated. In cases where an objection is made, the court may
nevertheless admit the evidence where the adverse party fails to satisfy
the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a
continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the
evidence.
As can be gleaned from the records, it was petitioners' belief that
respondent's evidence justified the amendment of their complaint. The
trial court agreed thereto and admitted the amended complaint. On this
score, it should be noted that courts are given the discretion to allow
amendments of pleadings to conform to the evidence presented during the
trial. Thus, in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,22 the Court stated:
There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the
necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validly
awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the
facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no
amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant
had himself raised the point on which recovery was based.23 The appellate
court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence
although the pleadings were actually not amended. Amendment is also
unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial matters are
involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Laguna (48 Phil.
5). In Co Tiamco v. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on
amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or
prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that
where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to
conform with the evidence.24
Verily, the trial court cannot be faulted for admitting the amended
complaint as it had the discretion to do so.
However, whether the evidence introduced by respondent, indeed,
supported the finding that the promissory notes, the real estate mortgage
and the foreclosure sale, are invalid, is a different matter altogether.
As alleged by petitioners, the testimony of respondent's witness, Jesus
Venturina, established the novation of the promissory notes and the real
106
estate mortgage, and the illegality of the foreclosure of petitioner Yuseco's
property.25 The trial court agreed with petitioners, ruling that there was a
novation of the promissory notes and real estate mortgage, which
rendered them unforceable, to wit:
The promissory notes and real estate mortgage executed by plaintiff
Yuseco appears to have been novated and, therefore, rendered to be
unenforceable since there was a change in the parties (from Credit Manila,
Inc. to Savings Bank of Manila) and, of course, in the amount of the loan
applied for (from P5 Million to P2 Million) which, upon instruction of Mr. de
Guzman - - was applied as follows:
It would, therefore, be imporper (sic) to consider and treat the promissory
notes and the real estate mortgage as relating to the separate loan of
plaintiff Yuseco so made and pursued for the same purpose and nature, all
inuring to a specific project - - the Azolla Project!26
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held that there was
no novation, hence, the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage
are valid and binding.
We agree with the appellate court.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or
change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or
modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or,
by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor.27 In order for novation to take place,
the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable:28
1. there must be a previous valid obligation,
2. there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,
3. there must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and
4. there must be the validity of the new contract.
All these requisites are patently lacking in this case. In the first place,
there is no new obligation that supposedly novated the promissory notes
or the real estate mortgage, or a pre-existing obligation that was novated
by the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage. In fact, there is
only one agreement between the parties in this case, i.e., petitioners'
P2,000,000.00 loan with respondent, as evidenced by the 3 promissory
notes dated September 13 and 27, 1982, and January 4, 1983, and the
real estate mortgage. As the Court of Appeals held:
'There was only one single loan agreement in the amount of P2 million
between the parties as evidenced by the promissory notes and real estate
mortgage - how can it be possibly claimed by plaintiffs that these notes
and mortgage were "novated" when no previous notes or mortgage or loan
agreement had been executed? What transpired was an application for
loan was filed by plaintiffs with Credit Manila in an amount greater than
the P2 million eventually granted. This loan application was endorsed to
defendant Savings Bank of Manila, processed by the latter and eventually
approved by it in the amount of P2 million.
It cannot be said that the loan application of plaintiffs or their initial
representations with Credit Manila's Michael de Guzman was already in
itself a binding original contract that was later "novated" by defendant.
Plaintiff Yuseco being himself a banker, cannot pretend to have been
unaware of banking procedures that normally recognize a "loan
application" as just that, a mere application. Only upon the bank's
approval of the loan application in the amount and under such terms it
deems viable and acceptable, that a binding and effective loan agreement
comes into existence. Without any such first or original "loan agreement"
as approved in the amount and under specified terms by the bank, there
can be nothing whatsoever that can be subsequently novated.29
Moreover, records show that petitioners were well aware of the conditions
of the loan application. In its August 31, 1982 Board Resolution, the Board
of Directors of Azolla Farms authorized Yuseco to "borrow from the
SAVINGS BANK OF MANILA, Head Office, sums of money in an amount not
exceeding P2,200,000.00."30 The promissory notes signed by Yuseco were
respondent Savings Bank's promissory notes, and the real estate
mortgage was likewise respondent Savings Bank's standard real estate
mortgage form. Obviously, this case is an attempt by petitioners to
extricate themselves from their obligations; but they cannot be allowed to
have their cake and eat it, too.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals' Decision dated February 19, 1999, together with its Resolution
dated March 31, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53076, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
107
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 96177. January 27, 1993.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARI MUSA y
HANTATALU, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-
buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected
this claim. In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively
claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he
said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for
T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani
hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former
"something." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

Pablo L. Murillo for Accused-Appellant.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
DIRECT EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CRIME COMMITTED. —
SYLLABUS Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain
that what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana because of
the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct
evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing. The corroborative
1. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (R.A. 6425); ILLEGAL SALE
testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt.
OF MARIJUANA DRUGS; FAMILIARITY BETWEEN BUYER AND SELLER, NOT
Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers
MATERIAL. — The contention that the appellant could not have transacted
who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the
with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is without merit. The
appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will
day before the buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he
not be fatal to the prosecution’s case provided there exists other evidence,
successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through
direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is
this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant’s
sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug.
confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following
day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM AGAINST
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN
seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but
VIOLATION THEREOF. — Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the
their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures.
marijuana.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in
Stonehill v. Diokno, (G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE, NOT CRUCIAL. — The
declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom
appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin
and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH & SEIZURE; SEARCH
of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial and the
INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST. — While a valid search warrant is
presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not
generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected,
necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court
exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, the Court
observed in People v. Paco, these factors may sometimes camouflage the
stated that" [t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search
commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other
warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."
people inside the appellant’s house are known to the appellant may have
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
given him some assurance that these people will not report him to the
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. There is no
authorities.
doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes
the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF PEOPLE VS. ALE, NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that" [a]n officer making
BAR. — The case of People v. Ale does not apply here because the
an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or property found
policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were certain
108
upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in
the trial of the cause . . ." Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to
entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked
money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest
even without arrest and search warrants.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF "PLAIN VIEW." — The warrantless
search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. — The "plain view" doctrine may
not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It has
also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the
"plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of
the object. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the
instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the
living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to
find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic
bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain
view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The
NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents
saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue
as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained.
When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the
police officer’s eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not
forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain
view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the
plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain
view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain
view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED IN
CRIMINAL; SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — By virtue of the testimonies of
Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by
the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the
decision, dated August 31, 1990, 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant
reads:jgc:chanrob les.c om.ph
"That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers
containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not
guilty. 3
109
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1)
Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of
Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation
made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th
Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team
leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the
Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of
Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was
summarized by the trial court as follows:
chanrobles vi rt ualawlib ra ry chan roble s.com:c hanrobles. com.ph
"Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989,
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team
based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct
surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga
City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa
was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani,
another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a
NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the
civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also
described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy
one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh.’E’) for P10.00. Sgt. Ani
returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped
marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned
over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was
planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which
purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The buy-
bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a
receipt (Exh.’L’ & ‘L-1’). The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as
back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt.
Ani’s raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana.
The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian
vehicles. Belarga’s team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt.
Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa,
while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic
places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa’s house. T/Sgt. Belarga
could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he
was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani
what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa
the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went
back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and
inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani
walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two
NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani
joined Belarga’s team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons
inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom
Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa’s wife. The second
time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa’s house, the
woman, who was later known as Mari Musa’s wife, slipped away from the
house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00
marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was
and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who
had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed
under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani
turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had
earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs.’C’ & ‘D’). c ralawnad
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa.
Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name - Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga
turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-
bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and
the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt.
Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory,
Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the
marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-
request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh.’B’), which was stamped
‘RECEIVED’ by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh.’E-1’) on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime
Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her
three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results
for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her
examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14,
1989, (Exh.’J’, ‘J-1’, ‘J-2’, ‘J-3’, ‘J-4’ and ‘J-5’). Mrs. Anderson identified in
court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the buy-bust on
December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen
written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs.’C-1’ and ‘D-1’). She also
identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy
on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh.’E-1’). Mrs. Anderson
also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh.’J’ & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana
110
through his initial, the words ‘buy-bust’ and the words ‘December 14,
1989, 2:45 P.M.’ (written on Exhs.’C’ and ‘D’). Belarga also identified the
receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh.’L’), dated
December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh.’L-1’). He also
identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the
PC Crime Laboratory (Exh.’B’) and his signature thereon (Exh.’B-2’) and
the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked ‘RECEIVED’ (Exh.’B-1’)." 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-
appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court
summarized the version of the defense, thus: jg c:chan rob les.com. ph
" [O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was
in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara
Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a
male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was
being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their
house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari
Musa’s house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask
permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were
NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa’s house and
Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents
were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose
contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the
plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his
father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari
Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM
agents told him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM
Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa
was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced
into writing. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in
Tagalog. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa
and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because
the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that
he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the
NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his
right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The
NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari
Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building.
The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was
on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal’s Office by three
NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him
and he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to the
City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been
maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be
maltreated in the fiscal’s office. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents’ charge that he had sold two
wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00
bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he
was afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana
was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to
support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana
before. 5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following
disposition:jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of
Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the
fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary imprisonment."
6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is
not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani
nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or
vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two
wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant
whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7
He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8
Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust
operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate
vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to
the place of operation, which was the appellant’s house located in Laquian
Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of
T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt.
111
Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be
used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at
strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the
appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some
more marijuana. 12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the
appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers
containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position,
Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and
made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand. 15 The NARCOM
agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the
arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked
money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to
his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt.
Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension,
prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid
and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the
material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani
because they do not know each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully
bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous
transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant’s confidence for the
latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-
bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an
existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the
parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana. 17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues
that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife,
cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of
the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and
the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not
necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court
observed in People v. Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage
the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other
people inside the appellant’s house are known to the appellant may have
given him some assurance that these people will not report him to the
authorities.
chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani’s credibility, also questions the
credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt.
Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the
appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant
invokes People v. Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of
10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette
from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And
since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends
that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for
his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case
testified that he and his companion were certain that the appellant therein
handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance
of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
jgc:chanroble s.com.p h
"This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with
inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were
marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary
cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November
13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of
rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were
observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters." 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he
saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that
there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant
portion of T/Sgt. Belarga’s testimony reads: 22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of
Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma’am.
112
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt.
Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the
road and he was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa who
was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani
handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa and went
inside the house and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for
T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani
hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former
"something." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain
that what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana because of
the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct
evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt.
Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani
to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at
Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1939; 23 (2) later that same
day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation
and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt.
Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the
following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of
NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt.
Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the
buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the
appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned
themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an
exchange of articles took place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct
evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact
that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to
see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their
distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution’s case 30 provided
there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of
the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the
sale of the prohibited drug. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a
plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the
appellant’s kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged
signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the
appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked
money but didn’t find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he
gave the marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and
Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described
as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get
a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial,
the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the
marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these
are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in
Article III, Section 2, the following:
jgc:chanrob les.com. ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in
Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in
violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and
seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in
Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that" [t]he most important exception
to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as
an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:chan rob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary
SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the
person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that" [a]n officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or
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property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the
crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with
the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as
evidence in the trial of the cause." 38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation
conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize
the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after
the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the
appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then
searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic
bag hanging in a corner.cha nrob les vi rtualaw lib rary c hanro bles. com:chan rob les.com. ph
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful
arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the
"plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California, 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant
but having information that the defendant husband was selling marijuana
from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to
defendants’ apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant
husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen,
and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the
open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon
which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which
he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The
admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme
Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the
officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the
defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of
marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what
was placed before him in full view." 43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the
"plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as
part of the prosecution’s evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory
search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
the following limitations on the application of the doctrine: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges." 46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain
view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object
where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
"plain view" of the object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of
a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in
the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to
find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic
bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain
view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The
NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen
and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this
case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for
more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask
the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California,
where the marijuana was visible to the police officer’s eyes, the NARCOM
agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the
contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then,
that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object
in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
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apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that
the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious
to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain
view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
chan robles v irt ual lawl ibra ry
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in
any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by
virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two
wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other
pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 12778. August 3, 1917. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONG SIU
HONG, Defendant-Appellant.
Williams, Ferrier & SyCip for Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF. — The main
purpose of the constitutional provision against compelling a person in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions
from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.
2. OPIUM LAW; WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF. — Forcing an accused to
discharge morphine from his mouth is not compelling him to be a witness
against himself.
3. ID.; PENALTY. — The court address to the doctrine announced in U. S.
v. Lim Sing ([1912]) 23 Phil., 424); U. S. v. Sy Liongco ([1915] 33 Phil.,
53) ’and other cases that the appellate court will, in the exercise of its
discretion, impose the minimum penalty provided by law upon a person
convicted for the first time of having a small quantity of opium in his
possession.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, particularly
relative to the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, members of
the secret service. One point only requires consideration.
Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused
was compelled to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this
was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his
mouth. No case exactly in point can be found. But, by analogy, the
decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. v. Tan
Teng ([1912] 23 Phil., 145), following leading authorities, and the
persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force
a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as
requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence
papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his
absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of
the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced
construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to
hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of
crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime. (Harris v. Coats [1885], 75
Ga., 415.)
Following the practice of this court in cases of this character, the judgment
115
of the lower court is modified by imposing the minimum penalty provided
by law, i. e., three months imprisonment and a fine of P300 or, in case of
insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, with costs. (U. S. v. Lim
Sing, [1912] 23 Phil., 424; U. S. v. Sy Liongco, [1915] 33 Phil., 53.) So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

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