G.R. No.
L-62339 October 27, 1983 for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered opinion of this
SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.
Amado G. Olis for petitioners.
Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.
ESCOLIN., J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is
called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential Decree
No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory
process of arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, Petitioners
contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only
by the city and municipal courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts,
but also by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents
would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan
trial courts and municipal trial courts.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go
filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol,
Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money
plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege
prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as
the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had
been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated October 3,
1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of
Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or
arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification of
the award or for execution of the same, and considering that from the provision of
Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a complaint as provided
Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by
the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, of the
order of September 2. 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied.
[Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].
From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December 2, 1982, We
required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-
22154.
We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.— No complaint, petition,
action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty
calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support
pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of
Limitations
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
 [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding formally organize and institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at the
P200.00; barangay level.

[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party; There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together
the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ,"
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as
justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives
Local Government. would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority
to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior
municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:
disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation
imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest
cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is
comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the situated.
rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not
distinguish. 2 By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases involving real property or
barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always been vested in the courts of
court litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and first instance [now regional trial court].
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is
likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the law speak of the
dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the
city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or
authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of
arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a
this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in
limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is
an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to
clearly established in Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent
place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory
judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the
requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets
barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass
only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more
upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards
serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating
legislation. issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there
is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in
other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial resources
would promote the speedy administration of justice and implement the constitutional
mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen the family as a TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
basic social institution; COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR
CLERKS OF COURT
WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes
heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a
SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
deterioration in the quality of justice;

Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government
WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby
and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective
enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to
jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of
 the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons.

Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro is to that extent modified.

This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has
been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts
of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations,
now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president
Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of
which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in
the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of
cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and
offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."

Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation process at
the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is
compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying petitioners' motion
to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further proceedings in
Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, CJ Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ concur.

Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., reserves his vote.

De Castro, J., is on leave.

 An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for
conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon. According to
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, G.R. No. 167261 the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the
Petitioner, parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as provided under
Present: the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an
Arbitration Award is rendered.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10 May
CALLEJO, SR.,* 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses Manacnes of the
CHICO-NAZARIO, and amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the
CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of NACHURA, JJ. land. Aggrieved, Leoncios widow,[7] Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her
LEONCIO MANACNES and FLORENTINA repudiation was rejected by the Lupon.Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished with copies of the
MANACNES, Promulgated: Arbitration Award.
Respondent.
March 2, 2007 On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the MCTC for the
resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession and praying that the
MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.
DECISION
Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the
latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC
denied Florentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that since
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period provided for under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final
and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an Order
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award. On 31
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019, dated 9 February August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the
2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch Award.
36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and reinstated the Resolution[3] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province dismissing herein petitioners action for Enforcement of Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein
Arbitration Award and Damages. petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration Award which was
sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses.[8] The heir of the Manacnes spouses
The instant petition draws its origin from an Action[4] for recovery of possession of real argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for
property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner before the MCTC Arbitration not having been personally signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award
of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November 1994, against the having been written in English a language not understood by the parties.
spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein respondent.
In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for Enforcement of
On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective Arbitration Award in this wise:
counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration
in accordance with the provisions of the KatarungangPambarangay Law.[5] Consequently, the x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon
proceedings before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for Tagapamayapa concerned?
resolution.[6]
The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the the lupon concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook
refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence that rule that a null and void act could always be questioned at any time as the action or
the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as the records of the case, defense based upon it is imprescriptible.
were forwarded to the MCTC.
 The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse
the pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:
Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings,
agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of
the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x x x
The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which
provides:
Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In
all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear
in person without the assistance of counsel or representative,
except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in
conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the
execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties
themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who
signed the agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another
person. Thus, it is very clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and 415 of
RA 7160 are violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the
agreement per instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must
still be in the negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a
party is entitled to an assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a
minor or incompetent. Here, there is no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were
incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides
is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.
Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney
in favor of their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the
agreement to arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which
mandates the personal appearance of the parties before the lupon and likewise
prohibits the appearance of representatives.
In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned
agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions
of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the respondents-
spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.
The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced
effective? Much to be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a
consequence. Considering that the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier
declared, it follows that the arbitration award which emanated from it is also
inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration Award by itself, granting arguendo that the
agreement to arbitrate is valid, will readily show that it does not also conform with the
mandate of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto
which provides:
Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in
writing in a language or dialect known to the parties x x x.When the
parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the
settlement shall be written in the language known to them.
Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by
mediation, conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a
language or dialect known to the parties. x x x
It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the
scenic and serene community of Sagada, Mt. Provincewho speak
the Kankanaey language. Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been written in
the Kankanaey language. However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written in
English language which the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is
hereby dismissed.[9]
Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an Appeal
before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and remanded the case to
the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:
As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on
page 51 of the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by
the Pangkat Chairman of the Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was
signed by the respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of
the Appellee in the instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures
of her aforesaid predecessors-in-interest therein were not personally affixed by the
latter or are falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the document on the
ground that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by
fraud. Indulging the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the
truth of the matter, the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that
neither did said original defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the
Agreement in question in accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within
five (5) days from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418,
RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such
failure is deemed a waiver on the part of the defendants spouses Manacnis to
challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on the ground that their consent thereto is
obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules). Corollarily,
the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now deceased original defendants should have
not been permitted by the court a quo under the equitable principle of estoppel, to
 raise the matter in issue for the first time in the present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103
Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10,
1995, written in English, attested by the PunongBarangay of Dagdag and found on
page 4 of the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that
the English language is not known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who
are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written
in Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2,
KP law, Sec. 11, KP Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously
concluded on the basis of the self-serving mere say-so of the representative of
the Appellee that her predecessors did not speak or understand English. As a matter
of judicial notice, American Episcopalian Missionaries had been
in Sagada, MountainProvince as early as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place
by turns, co-mingling with the indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating
them, and converting most to the Christian faith, among other things, until the former
left about twenty years ago. By constant association with the white folks, the natives
too old to go to school somehow learned the Kings English by ear and can effectively
speak and communicate in that language. Any which way, even
granting arguendo that the defendants spouses Manacnis were the exceptions and
indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the Arbitration award in issue
on such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of the Appellee Heirs with
the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10, 1995, the date of the
document. Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the Arbitration Award acquired the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA 7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec.
13, KP Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07)
and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.
In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for
Arbitration and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in
the first place been given due course by the court a quo. In which case, it would not
have in the logical flow of things declared both documents inefficacious; without
which pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.
Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the
Resolution appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.[10]
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the appellate court rendered
the herein assailed Decision, to wit:
After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would
show that the spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with
respondent Pang-et. Thus, We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award
sought to be enforced by respondent Pang-ets subsequent action before the MCTC.
There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended
and the same remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which
was allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels
during the pre-trial conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that
the agreement to arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More
importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix
their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should
instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a certificate
to file action.Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to render an
arbitration award. This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the
late Beket Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed
property. While Pang-et offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the
spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right
to the subject property.Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration
award which favored respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same
was again remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnesremained firm in not entering into
any compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes
of the Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the
foregoing, We find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the
case for arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no
showing that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance
with Rule V of the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of
the Pangkat, Rule VI, thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to
hear the case. However, according to the minutes of the hearing before
the lupon on 9 April 1995, the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were
absent for the hearing.
Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or
the Pangkat Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the
settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two
hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to
anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period
to repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since
the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily
entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement
validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an
action or defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot
but agree with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and
void. Similarly, the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the agreement is
also void.
 WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, the MCTC Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement
of Arbitration Award is REINSTATED.[11]
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et filed the
instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked material facts that resulted in
reversible errors in the assailed Decision. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the
fact that the original parties, as represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually
agreed to submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa
of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner insists that the parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their
counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement as any representation made by the lawyers are
deemed made with the conformity of their clients. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that if indeed the
spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an amicable settlement, then they should have raised
their opposition at the first instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC
ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that, during the
initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes declined to sign the
Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No.
83 must continue. As reflected in the Minutes[12] of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995,
the legality of the signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed
the Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be
the spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve the issue,
the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they wanted the arbitration
proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration
form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes spouses did not want to sign such agreement and
instead insisted that the case go to court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the
refusal of the Manacnesspouses. Indicated in said Certification are the following: 1) that there was
personal confrontation between the parties before the Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and
2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the personal confrontation before
the Pangkat failed likewise because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration
and insist that said case will go to court.[13] Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the
records of the case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an arbitration award, explaining that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an
Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled
case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may
now be brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be
sanctioned by the court.[14]
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is
the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into
by the parties.[15] Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without
enduring the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle
their controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free
to instead find recourse in the courts[16] in the event that no true compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the
dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding
upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of a court. [17] Absent this voluntary submission
by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there
cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the
MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration
proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the
controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for
arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the
very nature of the proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the
principle of voluntary acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a
confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a certification
be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to by
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication. [18] In other words, the only
necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may
be filed before a court is that there has been personal confrontation between the parties but despite
earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be emphasized
that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon during the initial hearing for the
conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have
signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon
ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed because the
spouses Manacnesrefused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case should
go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery of
possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the
case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels agreement
to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable settlement is imprecise. What
was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was the remand of the case to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As
stated earlier, the parties may only be compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for
the necessary confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to
sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally appeared during the
initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had already complied with the agreement
during the pre-trial to submit the case for conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing
is already their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to the Lupon for
conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual confrontation between the parties despite the
fact that no amicable settlement was reached due to the spouses Manacnes refusal to sign the
Agreement for Arbitration.

Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses Manacnes to submit
the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind the spouses.As reflected in Section
413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an
arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award
of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to
arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding
upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it.[19] In view of the fact that upon
verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to settle the issue of whether or not they intend to
submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark
on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for
Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any agreement
submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil
Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of the same
with deliberate dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented G.R. No. 157830 of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.[2]
by REYMEL R. SAGARIO,
Petitioner, Present: To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] on
two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local
PANGANIBAN, Chairman, Government Code,[4] she contending that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the
SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,* barangay court before the case was filed in court.
-versus- CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,[5] Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas granted
GARCIA, JJ. respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:

MARILOU M. PASCUAL, Promulgated: . . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang
Respondent. Pambarangay provides under Section 409 All disputes involving real property or any
November 17, 2005 interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
x-----------------------------------------------------------------x portion thereof is situated. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A.
7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is involved, the dispute
DECISION shall be filed before the barangay where the property is located, regardless of the
residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not
CARPIO MORALES, J.: residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela,
and he substitute (sic) Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the dispute before
Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on motion of herein respondent Marilou M. barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. In the case of Royales
Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470, Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
represented by his attorney-in-fact Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the
conciliation provision-pre condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
Government Code). lack of cause of action or prematurity.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his attorney-in- Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[7] of the above-said order was denied by Order of March 24,
fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271656
issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered
Land (Dec. No. 639; Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or
Reconveyance at the appropriate court;
2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;
3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of
payment/and/or dispute resolution;
4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be
necessary relative to the above acts.
x x x[1]
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a complaint
entitled Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and Register of Deeds, Defendants,
2003:[8]
xxx
Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions of
the Special Power of Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is
therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real party in interest.
xxx
Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring the necessary
complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and appear in person as if he is the
owner of the land.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition questioning the palpable legal errors of the RTC.

Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and since
he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real
property, he citing Agbayani v. Belen.[10]
Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the Local Government
Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same Code the latter of which provides that
[a]ll disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property is located, hence, the use of the word shall makes it mandatory for the bringing of the
dispute before the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers, respondent argues in
any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon, for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue
or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal,
being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.
Respondents submissions do not lie.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of
each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon; and
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest
of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon
under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to
the lupon concerned for amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay .
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at
the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which
may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to
may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative
whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis supplied)
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,[11] this Court held that where the parties are not actual
residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to
submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508
(Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction
over disputes where the parties are not actual residentsof the same city or
municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each
other. (Underscoring supplied)
In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,[12] this Court, noting that the Tavora ruling, reiterated in
other cases including the 1996 case of Agbayani[13] cited by petitioner, was decided under the
provisions of P.D. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which were, except for some
modifications, echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local Government Code which took effect on
January 1, 1992, held that the Tavora ruling remained.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact
of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in
interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3[14] of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same
Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the
barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their
dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well as the March
24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela
at Roxas is SET ASIDE. Said court is accordingly directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its
docket and take appropriate action thereon with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296 6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also
Complainant, with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was
Present: read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant
because only her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She also signed
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, as saksi in the minutes .
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and 7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay
GARCIA, JJ. dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal Counsel
of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated: added.)
Respondent. November 22, 2005
x----------------------------------------x
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline,
directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint,
RESOLUTION otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
GARCIA, J.: Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring
respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4]

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of
(IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong
the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known
(LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer
appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them
settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated that the charge of complainant
of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that basis, recommended
conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. On
Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the
respondents appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-
lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a 235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:
lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not
as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A";
respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent's
complaint: [2] actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and
representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-
5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.
the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that
[complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon .
Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A
Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:
 Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance
of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be
assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties
in katarungan pambarangayconciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The
rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and
direct information about the facts and issues,[8] the exception being in cases where minors or
incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to
conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling
assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. [9] Worse still,
the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to
prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not,
to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not
apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who
thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that
complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay
justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the
latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan

barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to
filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before
the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as
chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes
between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination
that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its
recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct
tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What
compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her
continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991
with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 146195 November 18, 2004
AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA-NICOL, SONNY NICOL, TERESA ZAMORA-UMALI,
CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO ZAMORA, ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA,
MICHELLE ZAMORA and RODRIGO ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS of CARMEN IZQUIERDO, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ANITA F.
PUNZALAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1 2
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 12, 2000 and its Resolution dated December 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541, entitled
"Avelina Zamora, et al., petitioners, versus Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo, represented by the executrix, whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b),
Anita F. Punzalan, respondents."
The records show that sometime in 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal
stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units located at 117-B General
Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the
leased premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs,
herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease wherein the rental was increased from
P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month.3 However, petitioners refused to sign it.
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children (two of whom have
their own families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment unit. However, they refused
to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System
(MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a written consent from the owner is
required for such installation, she requested respondents' attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the
latter declined because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on
the use of the premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying business and allowing three
families to reside therein.
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay
16, Sona 2, District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against Anita Punzalan (respondents'
attorney-in-fact), docketed as "Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa
Pagpapakabit ng Tubig."
On August 24, 1997, during the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner Avelina Zamora declared
that she refused to sign the new lease contract because she is not agreeable with the conditions
specified therein.
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter4 informing her that the lease is being
terminated and demanding that petitioners vacate the premises within 30 days from notice.
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their dispute amicably.
Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action dated September 14, 1997. 5
Consequently, on October 2, 1997, respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 23702.6 Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss7 the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for
conciliation. First, they alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action "is fatally defective"
because it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents' attorney-in-fact to give her
written consent to petitioners' request for installation of water facilities in the premises. And, second,
when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the
Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before
Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 71608 (otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991), which reads:
"SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.–
(a) x x x
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman – Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman9 shall,
within the next working day, summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for
them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If
he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties
before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with
the provisions of this Chapter." (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents opposed the motion to dismiss,10 the same being prohibited under Section 19 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. They prayed that judgment be rendered as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, pursuant to Section 611 of the same Rule.
On July 9, 1998, the MTC issued an Order12 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and considering the
case submitted for decision in view of their failure to file their answer to the complaint.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,13 contending that a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under Section 19 of
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which partly provides:
 "SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions, or petitions litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.19 To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the precondition to filing a complaint in court, thus:
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section [referring to Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation]; "SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.– No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon
x x x." shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication,
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the
14 pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or
On August 26, 1998, the MTC rendered a Judgment in favor of respondents and against petitioners,
pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x." (Underscoring
the dispositive portion of which reads:
supplied)

"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted
defendants, ordering defendants and all persons claiming right under them:
conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners'
contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents'
1) To vacate the leased premises located at No. 117-B General Luna Street, attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the premises, but also
Caloocan City and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff; petitioners' violation of the terms of the lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for their
photocopying business and their failure to pay the increased rental. As correctly found by the RTC:
2) To pay the amount of three thousand six hundred (P3,600.00) pesos per month
starting January, 1997 until the premises being occupied by them is finally vacated "The records show that confrontations before the barangay chairman were held on January
and possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff; 26, 1997, February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3,
1997, August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997 wherein not only the issue of
3) To pay plaintiff the sum of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as and for attorney's water installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution of
fees; and a written contract relative thereto. It appears, however, that no settlement was reached
despite a total of nine meetings at the barangay level.
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by defendant-appellant Avelina
SO ORDERED." Zamora because herein plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the
authority to bring her grievance to the Court for resolution. While it is true that the
Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled 'Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, rendered its Decision 15 dated Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig', this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the
February 15, 1999 affirming the MTC Judgment. Subsequently, it denied petitioners' motion for proceedings.
reconsideration.16
Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the filing
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would
54541. On September 12, 2000, it rendered a Decision17 affirming the RTC Decision. be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get
to settle their differences amicably."20
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated December 1, 2000.18 We cannot sustain petitioners' contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding
before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section
Hence, the instant petition. 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what
I happened in the present case), or the Pangkat.

21
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b)
included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the number of court of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation
efforts," the same "Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law
(quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case." Here, while the
Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay
Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also
petitioners' violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with
the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.22

II

We hold that petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section
19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, quoted earlier. Section 19(a) permits the filing
of such pleading only when the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint "to
the Lupon for conciliation" prior to its filing with the court. This is clear from the provisions of Section 18
of the same Rule, which reads:

"SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. – Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant." (Underscoring supplied)

As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Obviously,
petitioners' motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is bereft of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541 sustaining the Decision of the RTC which upheld the MTC Judgment is
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.] Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu
City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES, Respondents.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the deceased’s name,
Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner. located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied by petitioner Petra
Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the
Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents. month.

On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a
SYLLABUS resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals
corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As
petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the
1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; former in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-
ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for 23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent judge.
filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand to
vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want of
146, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter- jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in
demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September the complaint, petitioner contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for
16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No.
(11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the
Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this
nine (9) months-ample time indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court should wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to
believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the "The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the acceptance from
Barangay Lupon. (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil
division of this court could be considered as meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so,
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. — Under Section 4(a) of PD the Clerk of Court would not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there is a standing
1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction
"individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or of the President of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain exceptions must not
institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13,
the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or Rollo).
intestate, estate, etc.
Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this petition
3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON, for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted not having availed
NOT REQUIRED. — In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is himself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section
suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be
Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for barred by the Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.
whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in
Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code,
person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file the complaint the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from
directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration. demand to vacate the premises. 2

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment
DECISION was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed,
ESCOLIN, J.: thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of
the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the
conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60
days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months — ample time indeed — within which to bring his
case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as
private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of
Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition
precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No.
22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to
desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority
of said Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library

While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he nevertheless
chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the
requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the
operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the
performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome
by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or
Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4

Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral
of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An
"individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously,
the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows
the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the
intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator
may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for
arbitration.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide Civil
Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino J., concurs in the result.

 G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989.* hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report to the Manila office recommending division of the lot to the
parties. Nevertheless, on March 13, 1981, the Board denied the protest because the case had already
NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner been decided by the court.

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND ARMIE ELMA, respondents.
Camilo Cariño Dionio, Jr. for petitioner.
Cedo, Ferrer & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
However, a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably considered by the
Board in Resolution No. 233, Series of 1981 dated July 8, 1981. Thus, the Board directed the chief of
LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and area of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that
only private respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division
of the property between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 14, 1981, the Board passed Resolution No. 272, Series of 1981 approving said
recommendation by dividing the lot equally between the parties at 135.5 square meters each to be
disposed to them by negotiated sale.

Both parties appealed to the Office of the President but in a decision dated March 25, 1984, both
GANCAYCO, J.: appeals were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on May 29,1984.

The familiar story in the Old Testament is of how King Solomon settled the dispute between two Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the issuance of a patent. In
women over a child by deciding that the child be cut into two for them to share. The real mother full of Resolution No. 185, Series of 1985 adopted on October 7, 1985, the Board gave due course to the
love implored that the King not kill the child and give the child to the other woman. The latter asked the application of private respondent and for the issuance of a patent to 1/2 portion of the lot. Petitioner
King not to give it to either of them and to go on, cut the child into two. was also advised to file his application and pay for his portion. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
4261 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-5139 were issued to private respondent.
This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between the parties. But
the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private respondent is happy with his half. On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed an action for "Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of Lot
This is the impasse that must be resolved. 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and
185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void" against private respondent and the Board. The suit was
The center of controversy is Lot 5989, Ts-217 with an area of about 270 square meters situated at docketed as Civil Case No. 3270 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
Dadiangas, General Santos City. This lot was titled in the name of Paulino Elma under Original
Certificate of Title No. (P-29947) (P-11503) P-1987 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of On February 11, 1985, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
General Santos City and Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-635. A reversion case was filed by the grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) petitioner has no capacity to sue; (3)
Republic of the Philippines against Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato petitioner is not a real party-in-interest; and (4) the action is barred by prior judgment. Private
docketed as Civil Case No. 950, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on January 29, 1973 respondent added another ground (5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential
declaring the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same was ordered cancelled. The lot was Decree No. 1508. The motion was granted in an order dated March 18, 1986.
reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving preferential right to its actual
occupant, Napoleon Gegare. On April 3, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an opposition was filed by
private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order of April 21, 1986 and
This decision was affirmed by this Court when We dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed private respondent was required to file his responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer.
by the heirs of Elma on March 13, 1974 in G.R. No. L-38069. Thereafter, the writ of execution was On July 10, 1986, private respondent asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to
issued and the title of Elma to the property was cancelled. dismiss in his affirmative defenses. This was denied on July 24, 1986.

Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the Board of Liquidators (Board
for short) in 1975. On June 15, 1976, Resolution No. 606, Series of 1976 was passed by the Board
disposing of the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in
Civil Case No. 950. Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner and on August 8,
1978, the Board adopted Resolution No. 611, Series of 1978 denying private respondent's protest for
the same reason. A request for reconsideration of private respondent was referred by the Board to Mr.
Artemio Garlit, liquidator-designee, General Santos Branch, for verification and investigation. After
Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals
questioning the said orders of the trial court dated April 21, 1986 and July 24, 1986. In due course, a
decision was rendered by the appellate court on March 16, 1988 granting the petition, declaring the
questioned orders null and void, and directing the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of
jurisdiction, without pronouncement as to costs. An urgent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied in a resolution dated May 31, 1988. 1
Thus, the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues--- Under the second and third assigned errors, petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in giving
due course to the petition that assailed the two orders of the court a quo which are interlocutory in
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR character and in holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3270.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CA-G.R. SP It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it acts without jurisdiction or
NO. 12183 WITHOUTFIRST SERVING SUMMONS AND A COPY in excess thereof or if the trial court judge otherwise acted with grave abuse of discretion that the
OF THE PETITION TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE extraordinary writ of certiorari or prohibition is afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is available even
SAID CASE (NOW PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE), in respect to interlocutory orders. 8
THUS, DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The appellate court correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with purely administrative
matters rendered by administrative bodies or officials acting within the scope of their power and
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR authority. The discretionary power vested in the proper executive official in the absence of
arbitrariness or grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary
judgment or control of the courts and is treated with finality. 9
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE
TO THE PETITION OF ARMIE ELMA IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) ORDERS SUBJECT When Board Resolution No. 272 was passed in 1981, petitioner appealed to the Office of the
MATTER OF THE PETITION ARE INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE. President. After his appeal was denied on March 26, 1984, he did not file a petition for review in this
court. Thus, the said decision became final and it was duly implemented. We agree that when
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 3270, the trial court should have refrained from interfering with said
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
administrative disposition of the chief executive absent any showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower court. The real party-in-
3270. interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant is the government or the state. 10

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Under the fourth and last assigned error, petitioner argues that it was erroneous for the appellate court
to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for failure to comply with a provision of
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 3270 said case for one of the parties therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof
FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH THE which is excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.
PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 1508 BEFORE FILING HIS
COMPLAINT IN COURT. 2
True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private respondent who
are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of
The petition is devoid of any merit. Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides---

Under the first assigned error, petitioner alleges that he was not served summons and a copy of the Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition,
petition so that he was deprived of due process and the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
over his person. provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
Private respondent disputes this claim by showing that it was at the address of petitioner appearing in parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant and Disco Pub, Ilang-Ilang Street, General Santos City, has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary
where petitioner was served a copy of private respondent's "Manifestation and Motion for Early attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
Resolution. 3 Petitioner's counsel was also served a copy of the resolution dated June 28, repudiated.
1987, 4 "Motion for Restraining Order" dated July 28, 1987 and Manifestation dated December 1,
1987. 5 Indeed, petitioner's counsel filed a motion dated April 4, 1988 seeking a reconsideration of the The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the
decision of respondent court 6 which was denied on May 31, 1988. Obviously, petitioner voluntarily other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within
submitted to the jurisdiction of the respondent court and was never deprived of due process. 7
the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be
undertaken among the other parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004]
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Resolutions[2] dated 2
July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite (RTC), denying petitioner Edwin N.
Tribianas (Edwin) motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent
Lourdes Tribiana (Lourdes).
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their
union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza).
Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four
(4) months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana
(Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the
Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming that there
were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order
requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998.
The appellate court also denied Edwins motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action
attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a
compromise but failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412 (b) (2) of
the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not required in petitions
for habeas corpus.
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition for habeas corpus that the parties
exerted prior efforts to reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petitions
dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] Edwin maintains that
under Article 151 of the Family Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable
condition precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Edwins arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not
dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that
the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the
petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family
Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a
condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allegecompliance with a
condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts
under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5] It would have been a different petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.
matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial of his motion to dismiss
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional merely states a blanket allegation of grave abuse of discretion. An order denying a motion to dismiss is
defect.[6] Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve. If a party interlocutory and is not a proper subject of a petition for certiorari. [14] Even in the face of an error of
fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. [7]Such defect is curable judgment on the part of a judge denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a
by amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive remedy to correct errors of procedure.[15] The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to
pleading.[8] A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.[9] More importantly, an amendment dismiss is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to
alleging compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice
cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect consists and fair play where resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.[16]
of the failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the
amendment of the complaint.[10] Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on technicalities. This is
multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies between the parties. [11] precisely what has happened in this case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint of the slightest
abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court of Appeals. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender by the sheer expediency of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of
age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. grave abuse. More importantly, any matter involving the custody of a child of tender age deserves
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.[12] This rule immediate resolution to protect the childs welfare.
has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of
otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional
the mother. Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in resolving the petition
for habeas corpus pending before it. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional ground the
exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) on barangay conciliation, which SO ORDERED.
states:

(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:

xxx

2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;

xxx.

Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas
corpus proceeding in two instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either through
illegal confinement or through detention. The second instance is when custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to such custody. The most common case falling under the second
instance involves children who are taken away from a parent by another parent or by a relative. The
case filed by Lourdes falls under this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas
corpus proceedings where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In such a case, Section 412
expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court without need of any conciliation proceedings.
There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.[13] Thus, the Court of Appeals did
 G.R. No. 160032 November 11, 2005 b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand One Hundred Fifteen and 63/100
Pesos (₱135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in arrears to the present;
ESTELA L. BERBA, Petitioner,
vs. c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100 Pesos
JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA, Respondents. (₱4,562.63) per month representing monthly rent on the premises for the year 2001 until finality of the
judgment;
DECISION
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) by way of attorney’s fees;
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos;
Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in f) to pay costs of suit.
Civil Case No. 170639.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the premises.7
Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of a parcel of land
located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng
No. 63726. A house was constructed on the lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo* and the Heirs Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.
of Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration,
the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying rentals because of
financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain if the plaintiff was the owner of the
By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was ₱3,450.00. The lessees failed to pay the rentals due, property. By way of special and affirmative defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of
and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to ₱81,818.00. Berba then filed a complaint for eviction and action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon.8
collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999,
Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:
During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite earnest efforts, no
amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as whether or not the plaintiff had a
Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na nasasakop ng valid cause of action for unlawful detainer against the defendants.9
Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking tinitirahan
ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong Piso ₱3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog
sa aking pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang ₱81,818.00 na ang nasabing In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her and Pablo,
halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako which appeared to have been approved by Punong 10
Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales of Barangay 873,
rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, as well as other members of the Lupon, duly approved by the Pangkat. She also appended a
Statement of Account indicating that the defendants’ back rentals amounted to ₱135,115.63. 11
ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay
magbabayad ng halagang ₱3,450.00 bilang aking upa sa aking tinitirahan.3
In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence, Berba’s complaint was premature. They also
By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of ₱71,716.00. As of May 1, 2001, the total
averred that the increase in the rental rates imposed by the plaintiff was unjustified and illegal.
arrearages of the lessees amounted to ₱135,115.63.4 On May 2, 2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote
the lessees, demanding payment of the said amount and to vacate the house within 30 days from
notice, otherwise she will sue them.5 The lessees ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a Certificate to File
a complaint6 against Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the Metropolitan Trial Court Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, while the defendants
(MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana, Manila.
in her favor:
On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering
defendant (sic) – WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants and all
persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila and
a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of Manila; restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of ₱135,115.63
representing monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of ₱4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for the succeeding months until with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and
finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced amount of ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that she failed to comply with the Local Government
plus the costs of suit. Code’s requirement of prior referral of their dispute to the Lupon.

SO ORDERED.12 After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the RTC
decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision, which proved futile.
The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff, the RTC issued an order
for the execution of the decision pending appeal.13 The defendants filed a motion for the recall of the In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:
Order,14 but before the court could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession
of the property to Berba on May 20, 2002.15 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS
In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berba’s action in the MTC (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon. They also THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO
claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the rentals for the house. 16 Berba, on the other hand, averred THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
that there was no need of a prior referral to the Lupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT.26
Section 408(f) of the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in Malate, 8
kilometers away from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and the Palanca heirs resided.17 The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and whose only source of
income are the rentals generated from the property, which she also uses to pay her medical expenses.
On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting aside the appealed She avers that the continued denial of her right to the fruits of the subject property is highly unjust and
decision. The fallo of the decision reads: contrary to the spirit behind the enactment of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.27

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is also ordered The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of the CA, she would have
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court a quo pending appeal to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous, process of going back to square one; that is,
is also set aside. referring the dispute to the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be rendered useless considering
that respondents had already been validly and effectively ejected from the leased premises. She would
SO ORDERED. 18 then have to go through the rungs of the judicial ladder a second time to vindicate her trampled rights.
She further claims that the CA’s affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a "legal
anomaly." She points out that the very purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes
The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who reside in the same
between members of the same or adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes will not reach the
city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go through conciliation
19 20 doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted process as suggested by the RTC
proceedings in the Lupon. The court cited the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go, and Vda. de ruling and affirmed by the CA.28
21
Borromeo v. Pogoy.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was estopped from relying on
Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration22 of the decision, which the RTC denied in its
23 the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because
Order dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, where she
the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca were not parties thereto. The respondents maintained that the
averred:
petitioner must bear the blame for her failure to comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she
insisted that there was no need for prior referral of the dispute to the Lupon, claiming that she resided
a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral to the Barangay Court by the in a barangay other than where the respondents resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and
respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and invoked the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the
respondents aver, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioner’s action for unlawful detainer
b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with respect to referring her because it was filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when the
complaint before the Barangay Court.24 petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the action should be
one for recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).
Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,25 Berba claimed that Section 408 of the Local
Government Code should be construed liberally together with Section 412. She further averred that On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file
29
she had complied substantially with the requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings their respective memoranda. The parties complied.
before the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply
The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of the RTC reversing the inclusive of those already due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement was executed. The action of the
decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer without petitioner against respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.
prejudice.
The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June 5, 1999
The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement on June 5, Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the complaint as against such
1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and ordered her eviction from the leased
agreement; hence, such agreement of the parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final premises.
judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v. Escueta,30 the settlement of the parties may be enforced
by the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within The Court thus rules that the petitioner’s complaint against respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca was
six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by the petitioner as parties-respondents
an action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo.
Code: Moreover, the said respondent heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not
bound by it. Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of
We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the settlement to the complaints in court, to wit:
appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish
the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement which is not SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. – No complaint, petition, action,
repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Lupon through the Punong or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in
Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between
the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or municipal court as the parties before the luponchairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which reads: reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman
or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
SEC. 417. Execution. – The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by
the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the (b) Where parties may go directly to court. – The parties may go directly to court in the following
settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal court. (Italics supplied). instances:

Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the enforcement of a settlement (1) Where the accused is under detention;
of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable
settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong
Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled (2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the
proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of (3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and
voluntarily complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. – The customs and traditions of
Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement by indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural
the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC communities.
to enforce the settlement. The raison d’etre of the law is to afford the parties during the six-month time
line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.31 Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound
to submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of repaying the therein:
back rentals of ₱81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to
enforce the Agreement against her and move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. – The lupon of each barangay
filing a motion before the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner filed an amicable settlement of all disputes except:
action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals,
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of the case, it is not
without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which would require the petitioner to start
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his again from the beginning. The facts of the present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To
official functions; grant the petition under these circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local
Government Code and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do that.35
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand
pesos (₱5,000.00);
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
SO ORDERED.
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are
filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable
settlement.

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code, such
complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.32

The petitioner’s reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals33 is misplaced. In that
case, there was a confrontation by the parties before the Barangay Chairman and no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, the Court held in that instance that there was substantial
compliance with the law. In any event, the issue in that case was whether the failure to specifically
allege that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of
that defense. Moreover, no such confrontation before the Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful
detainer suit against Josephine Pablo before the MTC.34

In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the City of
Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent heirs was
thus a matter within the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer
and the collection of back rentals should have been first filed before
the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an opportunity to settle the case amicably.
However, the petitioner filed her complaint against the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with
the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature. The execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement
between petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial compliance to the
requirements of the Local Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.
 G.R. No. 191336 January 25, 2012 On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, the respondent raised the
same issues cited in his Answer. In its March 14, 2007 Decision, 6 the RTC affirmed the MeTC
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, Petitioner, Decision, disposing as follows:
vs.
JERRY D. MONTANEZ, Respondent. WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED, and the DECISION appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety for being in
DECISION accordance with law and evidence.

REYES, J.: SO ORDERED.7

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the CA raising two issues, namely, (1) whether or not venue
Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel (Miguel) seeks the reversal and setting aside of the September 17, 2009 was improperly laid, and (2) whether or not the Kasunduang Pag-aayos effectively novated the loan
Decision1 and February 11, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100544, agreement. On September 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
entitled "Jerry D. Montanez v. Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated
Antecedent Facts March 14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is entered dismissing respondent’s complaint for collection of sum of money,
without prejudice to her right to file the necessary action to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-
Three Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (₱143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until 8
February 1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot SO ORDERED.
located at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Anent the issue of whether or not there is novation of the loan contract, the CA ruled in the negative. It
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent ratiocinated as follows:
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a
Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount Judging from the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, it is clear that no novation of the old obligation
of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral has taken place.1âwphi1 Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there was no reduction of the term or
is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed period originally stipulated. The original period in the first agreement is one (1) year to be counted from
to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in February 1, 2001, or until January 31, 2002. When the complaint was filed before the barangay on
court in favor of the petitioner. February 2003, the period of the original agreement had long expired without compliance on the part
of petitioner. Hence, there was nothing to reduce or extend. There was only a change in the terms of
On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch payment which is not incompatible with the 9
old agreement. In other words, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
3
66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim, the respondent merely supplemented the old agreement.
raised the defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong,
Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal. The CA went on saying that since the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before the Lupon
ng Barangay, such settlement has the force and effect of a court judgment, which may be enforced by
After trial, on August 16, 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,4 which disposes as follows: execution within six (6) months from the date of settlement by the Lupon ng Barangay, or by court
action after the lapse of such time.10Considering that more than six (6) months had elapsed from the
date of settlement, the CA ruled that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the execution
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Jerry D. of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not for collection of sum of money.11 Consequently, the CA
Montanez to pay plaintiff the following: deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue on venue.12

1. The amount of [Php147,893.00] representing the obligation with legal rate of interest from The petitioner now comes to this Court.
February 1, 2002 which was the date of the loan maturity until the account is fully paid;
Issues
2. The amount of Php10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs.

SO ORDERED. 5
 (1) Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner, such settlement within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local
notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos;13 and Government Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly,
the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local
(2) Whether or not the CA should have decided the case on the merits rather than remand the Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon
case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.14 his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad
application of Article 2037, viz:
Our Ruling
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said
agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can 21
insist on his original demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum of money is the proper In the case of Leonor v. Sycip, the Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to explain this provision of
remedy. law. It ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the
breach of compromise agreement, may just consider it already rescinded, to wit:
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that she should have followed the procedure for
enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same Code, which speaks of "a
instead of filing a collection case. The petitioner points out that the cause of action did not arise from cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos but on the respondent’s breach of the original loan agreement.15 annulled or rescinded" for the cause therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or
rescission, said Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or the
right to "demand" the rescission of a compromise, but the authority, not only to "regard it as
This Court agrees with the petitioner.
rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his original demand". The language of this Article 2041,
particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no action for rescission is required
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the in said Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been
perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a
public order and public policy.16 This is in accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil judicial declaration of rescission, for he may "regard" the compromise agreement already
Code, viz: "rescinded".22 (emphasis supplied)

A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 23 a party's non-compliance with the
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. amicable settlement paved the way for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may
either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has Pambarangay Law, or consider it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To quote:
the force and effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved.17 It transcends being a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
accordance with the Rules.18 Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code,19 such amicable enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in
months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate regular form, which remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from
the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local Government Code and the execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or
Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure
upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.
and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the
settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the
amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance
force and effect of a final judgment.20 paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the
compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when
under the first or the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of
advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Respondent was not limited to
claiming ₱150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the "Kasunduan," it is axiomatic
that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a
dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal
concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of
losing. Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible
claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is
undisputed that herein petitioner did not.24 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the
respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for
which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the
provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of money,
the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of
the CA to rule that enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the
circumstances.

Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed rescinded by the non-compliance of the
respondent of the terms thereof, remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of said
agreement is clearly unwarranted.

The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos as it prolonged the process, "thereby putting off the case in an indefinite
pendency."25 Thus, the petitioner insists that she should be allowed to ventilate her rights before this
Court and not to repeat the same proceedings just to comply with the enforcement of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos, in order to finally enforce her right to payment.26

The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper
remedy, and therefore erred in its conclusion that the case should be remanded to the trial court. The
fact that the petitioner opted to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos means that she is insisting upon
the undertaking of the respondent under the original loan contract. Thus, the CA should have decided
the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by
remanding it to the trial court. Pertinently, evidence abounds that the respondent has failed to comply
with his loan obligation. In fact, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the well nigh incontrovertible proof of
the respondent’s indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed precisely to give the respondent
a second chance to make good on his undertaking. And since the respondent still reneged in paying
his indebtedness, justice demands that he must be held answerable therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City, dated March 14, 2007 is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.