#21 LO CHAM V. OCAMPO, 77 PHIL. 636, 638
138570
Facts: Gregorio Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer,
Acting Chief, Medico-Legal Section, Division of
Investigation, Department of Justice, was given an
assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon
Quisumbing as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila. In line
with his appointment, the sole question is whether or
not he had the authority to sign informations as only
assistant city fiscal.
Held: It is fair to presume based on Sec. 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, that if the legislature had
wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the
fiscal, to sign informations, make investigations and
conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or indicated
its intention by clear implication.
The power to sign informations, make investigations and
conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power "to assist"
a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the
Administrative Code. It does not emanate from the
powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General
conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary
of Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself.
The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the
appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative
or an addition to the authority to sign informations,
which is inherent in his appointment.
#22 APRUEBA V. GANZON, 18 SCRA 8
Facts: Petitioners filed a case for mandamus against
respondent City Mayor of Iloilo for having ordered his
policemen to close their leased stall in the Iloilo Public
Market for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 93, s.
1947. The said ordinance prohibits a person other than
the lessee of a market stall from conducting business. In
the case at bar, lessee Aprueba allowed Motoc to make
use of the said stall for business.
Held: The refusal of respondent to allow reopening of
the cafeteria is predicated on the provision of Sec 10 (m)
of the City Charter which grants the City Mayor the
power to grant and refuse municipal licenses and to
revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon
which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or
municipal ordinance are being committed under the
protection of such licenses or in the premises in which
the business for which the same have been granted is
carried out, or for any other good reason of general
interest.
The privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the
permit rested on the sound discretion of respondent
and refusal on his part to grant the continuance of the
privilege cannot be the subject of an action for
mandamus. In a long line of decisions, this Court had
held that mandamus will not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act.
#22 BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No.
Facts: Validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement.
Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring
the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
Held: As regards the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the Constitution vests the
same in the President, subject only to the concurrence
of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive
acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful
exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers
granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself.
Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude,
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
It is the Court’s considered view that the President, in
ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the
Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and
limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It
is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his
wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that
the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for
concurrence under the aforementioned provision.
Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be
imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA
and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied
in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President
merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a
prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his
office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the
Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section
21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted
or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing
an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and
capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to
decide, such as those relating to national security, it has
not altogether done away with political questions such
as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.[54]
The High Tribunal’s function, as sanctioned by Article VIII,
Section 1, “is merely (to) check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or has a different view. In the absence of a showing… (of)
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power…It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error.”
#23 FIRST PHIL HOLDINGS CORPORATION V.
SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 88345
Facts: The PCGG prayed for the return, reconveyance,
accounting and restitution with damages of certain
funds and properties which were allegedly acquired by
private respondent Romualdez through abuse of right
and power and through unjust enrichment. This
included some 6,299,177 sequestered shares of stock of
PCI Bank, allegedly acquired in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices, through purchase from petitioner
by private respondent using dummy buyers. Petitioner
filed its motion for leave to intervene but respondent
Court denied petitioner’s motion.
Held: We have no doubt that petitioner has a legal
interest in the shares which are the subject of the
controversy. At the very least, it is "so situated as to be
adversely affectted by a distribution or disposition of the
(sequestered shares) in the custody of the court".
In resolving to deny petitioner's motion for intervention,
respondent Court abused its discretion because, clearly,
the question of ownership of the shares under
sequestration is within its jurisdiction, being an incident
arising from or in connection with the case under its
exclusive and original jurisdiction. Indeed, as held in the
above-mentioned cases, the respondent Court has
jurisdiction to entertain both complaints and answers in
intervention over properties under sequestration by the
PCGG. With the denial of its intervention, petitioner is
deprived of a remedy in law to recover its property
alleged to have been taken illegally from it.
As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2 (b), intervention shall
be allowed "in the exercise of discretion" by a court.
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a
discretionary act. But where there is "gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to
which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue.
#24 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. RICHARD CRUZ, GR
No. 187858
Facts: Respondent was a storekeeper of the City of
Malolos Water District (CMWD). He was charged with
grave misconduct and dishonesty by allegedly uttering
false, malicious and damaging statement against GM
Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors. GM
Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15
days. Before the expiration of his preventive suspension,
however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD
Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service. The
respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his
dismissal to the CSC, which absolved him of the two
charges and ordered his reinstatement. On appeal, the
CA found merit in the respondent’s appeal and awarded
him back salaries from the time he was dismissed up to
his actual reinstatement.
Held: The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the
period of suspension pending appeal, of a government
employee who had been dismissed but was
subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction.
The Court’s starting point for this outcome is the "no
work-no pay" principle – public officials are only entitled
to compensation if they render service. We have
excepted from this general principle and awarded back
salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or
unjustly suspended employees based on the
constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law"; to deny these employees
their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment
after they have been exonerated from the charge that
led to their dismissal or suspension
To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two
conditions before an employee may be entitled to back
salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the
charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The
reasoning behind these conditions runs this way:
although an employee is considered under preventive
suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal,
the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for
a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed
period is unjustified and must be compensated.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled
to any compensation if he has not rendered any service,
and the justification for the payment of salary during the
period of suspension is that the suspension was
unjustified or that the official was innocent. Hence, the
requirement that, to entitle to payment of salary during
suspension, there must be either reinstatement of the
suspended person or exoneration if death should render
reinstatement impossible.
In Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., we ruled that
the payment of back salary to a government employee,
who was illegally removed from office because of his
eventual exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to
the ordered reinstatement.
It should be distinguished from the case of an employee
who was dismissed from the service after conviction of a
crime and who was ordered reinstated after being
granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to
back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed nor
acquitted of the charge against him.
Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, if the public official or employee is acquitted of the
criminal charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to
reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In the case of Cristobal vs. Melchor, when "a
government official or employee in the classified civil
service had been illegally dismissed, and his
reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so
that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that
accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held."
However, the mere reduction of the penalty on appeal
does not entitle a government employee to back salaries
if he was not exonerated of the charge against him.
#25 FAROLAN V. SOLMAC MARKETING, GR No. 83589
Facts: Solmac is the assignee, transferee and owner of
an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products
(Polypropylene film). It presented the Board of
Investment (BOI) authority for the importation of
polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination, it
was found to be oriented polypropylene, the
importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited.
Petitioner Parayno, then Chief of Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Dicision, wrote the BOI asking for the
latter’s advice on whether or not the subject
importation may be released to Solmac. On the other
hand, Solmac filed the action for mandamus and
injunction praying for the unconditional release of the
subject importation. The trial court ruled in favor of
Solmac. However, prior to said decision, petitioners
have already released said goods in line with the advice
from BOI.
may have caused as a result of such an erroneous
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum
absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by
public officers are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. 21 After all, "even
under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good
faith.
In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it
may be, that an official duty has been regularly
performed23 applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia
praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All things
are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was
private respondent's burden to overcome this juris
tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it has
been able to do so.

On appeal to the CA as to the damages, petitioners were

ordered to pay Solmac for damages in their personal
capacities. Hence, the present petition.

Held: We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully

and we did not see any clear and convincing proof
showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the
contrary, the record is replete with evidence bolstering
the petitioners' claim of good faith.

When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds

himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and
to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily
for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his
duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and
attention which careful men use in the management of
their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that
petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite
guidelines regarding the disposition of the various
importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and
polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of
Customs.

Consequently, the petitioners cannot be said to have

acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the
import goods without first obtaining the necessary
clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers,
the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law
they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was
faithfully complied with.

It is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers

are not hampered in the performance of their duties or
in making decisions for fear of personal liability for
damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they