Gonzales vs Comelec
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified
FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately
by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration
of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967,
the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended
so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from
a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that
each province shall have at least one (1) member.
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections
to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be
amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective
seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by
the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act
fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to
be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for
the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC
from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also
assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
Ruling: Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the people
— as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11
— to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power.12 Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members
of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the
people, when performing the same function,13 for their authority does
not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all
powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court,14 the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-
making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting
as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially
justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to
the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in
accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be
proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress
for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately" is necessary. And "such amendments shall be valid as part
of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have
been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This,
notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void
because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose
amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose —
amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both
— that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention — at the
same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution
shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a
general election, in which officers of the national and local
governments — such as the elections scheduled to be held on
November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which
proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for
ratification, must be held under such conditions — which, allegedly,
do not exist — as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have
a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments.
Imbong vs Comelec
FACTS:Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and
both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On
March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which
shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17,
1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No.
2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates
with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August
24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914
which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the
validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while
Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said
R.A. 6132.
Ruling: Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions,
we sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by
Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-
making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because —
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art.
XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by
a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but
voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional
convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary
authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to
fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the
delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the
election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional
Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation
of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by
the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A.
No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within
the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive
legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly
or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution
from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such statutory
details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they
are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a
constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which
authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by
Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be
vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such power
in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or
Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a
resolution prescribing the required implementing details.
Occena vs Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a
prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang
pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes
was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with
the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No.
3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by
a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such
resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the
following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its
amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The
1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments
similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in
character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To
dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is
of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the
present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is
no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment'
includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At
any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised
or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose
amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The
language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote
is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as
well when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by
the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The
three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April
7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
Tolentino vs Comelec
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on
November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June
1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A
RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18."
On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the
mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together
with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main
thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary
implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling
and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised
by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented
to the people for ratification separately from each and all other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971
Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.
HELD:NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a
Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form
a harmonious whole.
In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a
few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
Sanidad vs Comelec
FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies
(“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial
law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D.
1033) to specify the questions that are to be asked during the
referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the
citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the
approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control
of the national referendum in October 16.
Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with
preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to propose
amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan
sought to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative
to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert
that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite
is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of
time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial
Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of
the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue,
and that the issue raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be
reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this
state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the
authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.
Province if North Cotabato vs GRP
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the
government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the
government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and
decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which
resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.)
security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain
aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of
the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).
The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its
body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE
of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in
favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the
territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well
as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the
aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to
governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority
between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The
relationship was described as ―associative. With the formulation of
the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of
the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to
information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and
laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
Ruling:While the President does not possess constituent powers as
those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner
that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power
to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the
President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as
a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what
President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent
consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally
proposed through initiative.
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath
of office,[178] only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new
legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for
Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the
more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly
State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover,
the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the
budget prepared by the President, which for all intents and purposes is
a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.
Santiago vs Comelec
FACTS: In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition
to amend Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by
people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise
said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country.
The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all
elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 )
and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article
8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by
at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition.
Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable
by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act No. 6735
provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left
to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.d.
People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a
revision.e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet
appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments
to the Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such
intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for
amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide
for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as
to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust
of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The
argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not
accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III,
the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved,
but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law,
or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized
exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the
President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3]
Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments;
and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi
judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.
It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of
the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is
a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right
to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon
the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number
of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as
UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
wasted its time, energy, and resources. Therefore, Republic Act No.
6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
Lambino vs Comelec
FACTS: On August 25, 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735. The Lambino
Group claims that their petition has the support of 6,327,952
individuals satisfying the requirement that the signatories of the
petition constitute 12% of all registered voters with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group’s initiative petition modifies Sections 1-7 of Article VI and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII of the Constitution and adds Article XVIII
entitled ‘Transitory Provisions” to it shifting the country’s form of
government from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral-
Parliamentary. Days later, the Lambino Group filed an amended
petition with the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued its
resolution denying due course to the Lambino Groups’s petition
invoking Santiago v. Commission on Elections, which found RA 6735
as inadequate, in stating that there is no enabling law governing
initiative petitions such as that of the Lambino Group to amend the
Constitution. The Lambino Group is petitioning for the issuance of
writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution of August 31, 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give
due course to their initiative petition. The petitioners and supporting
intervenors hold the view that COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. Opposing intervenors maintain that
Santiago is a binding precedent and they also challenge:
The Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition
The validity of the signature gathering and verification process
The Lambino Group’s compliance with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution The nature of the proposed changes as revisions and
not mere amendments.
The Lambino Group’s compliance with RA 6735 limiting initiative
petitions to only one subject.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complied
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution – NO.
2. Whether the Court should revisit its ruling on Santiago v.
COMELEC which declared RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause proposals to amend the Constitution – NO
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition – NO.
RATIO: 1. The Lambino Group failed to comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
a. The petition is not directly proposed by the people.
The Lambino Group’s Initiative does comply with the requirement that
the amendment be “directly proposed by the people upon a petition”
because the Lambino group failed to present the full text of the
proposed changes to the Constitution to the signatories and thus it
cannot be assumed that the signatories had knowledge of the full nature
and effect of the changes they were supporting. Given that the Initiative
first gathered signatures without showing the full text of the proposed
amendments, it can be seen as a “gigantic fraud on the people.”
While Section 2, Article XVII does not explicitly state that the full text
of proposed amendments to the constitution should be presented to the
people before they sign the petition, as shown on the record of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it was the intent of the
framers that an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
A signature requirement would be meaningless if the signatories have
not first been informed of the full extent of the proposal he/she is
signing, and that the attachment of the full text proposal would provide
the assumption that people would be informed in their decision
whether to sign or not.
Moreover, the signature sheet submitted by the Lambino Group to the
Court does not contain the full text of the proposed changes to the
Constitution; instead, the signature sheet merely asks whether the
people approve a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government.
The petitioners alleged that they circulated the draft of their 30 August
2006 amended petition during the signature gathering from February
to August 2006, having the Court believe that they prepared their
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 and
even before they filed their 25 August 2006 petition. While Aumentado
gives as evidence ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, as proof that the
amended petition was circulated six months before the petitions were
filed, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner
Aumentado to prepare the petitions, rather, it only states that ULAP
“supports the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter
Change” which are vastly different from the proposals of the Lambino
Group, thus the ULAP Resolution does not establish that the Lambino
Group circulated the draft of the petition.
There is inconsistency in the story of the Lambino Group as it was first
stated that they circulated both the 25 August 2006 petion and the 30
August 2006 amended petion; however, Atty. Lambino later changed
the story stating that only the amended petition was circulated.
Even with the assumption that the amended petition was indeed
circulated while the signatures were being gathered it could still be
concluded that there would not be enough copies of the petition for all
the signatories to see. As per Atty. Lambino’s own admission only
100,000 copies could be confirmed to have been printed as these were
printed by Lambino himself. Assuming that each signature sheet,
which had space for 10 signatures, was attached with a copy of the
petition, there would be enough copies for only 1 million people, far
from the 6,327,952 signatures gathered by the Lambino Group.
Having proved that majority of the signatories were not able to see the
full text of the of the proposed changes proposed signing, they could
not have known the full nature and effect of the proposed changes
which include three controversial amendments: The lifting of term
limits on the members of the legislature.
The interim Parliament will continue to function indefinitely until it
decides to call for parliamentary elections thus enabling its members
to determine when they will end their term.
Within 45 days after the proposed changes, the interim Parliament
will convene to propose further amendments to the constitution.
This provision is determined by the Court to be totally unrelated to the
stated objective of the initiative and is considered logrolling.
Logrolling refers to the incorporation of an unrelated subject matter in
the same petition thus creating two propositions within one petition
thus putting the people in a dilemma where since they can only say yes
or no to the whole petition they cannot agree to one proposition without
also agreeing to the other.
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.
While Atty. Lambino states that this provision is not necessary and
should thus be ignored, the Court does not agree since this provision
could effectively invalidate the whole exercise of the people’s
initiative as through this provision the interim Parliament could, in
theory, propose amendments not agreed upon by the signatories of the
initial petition.
b. People’s initiative can only be done for constitutional amendments
and not revisions.
Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the
framers intentionally made a distinction between amendments and
revisions. It was the intent, as is written, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention can propose revisions while a people’s
initiative is limited only to the proposal of amendments.
A revision implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution while amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes, without altering the basic principle of the constitution. A
change in a single word could already be considered a revision as long
as it overhauls the structure of government and the ideological basis of
the Constitution.
There are two tests to determine whether a change is an amendment or
a revision:
Quantitative test – examines the number of provisions, not the
degree of change, in order to test how extensive the proposed changes
are.
Qualitative test – based on qualitative effects, asks whether the
proposed changes create far reaching changes in the nature of the basic
governmental plan thus amounting to a revision.
The prosed changes by the Lambino Group significantly alter the basic
plan of government as it would effectively alter the separation of
powers through the abolition of the Office of the President and merging
of the legislative and executive, and alter the system of checks and
balances within the legislature through the abolition of one chamber of
Congress.
Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes constitute a revision and not simply an amendment
as it “radically alters the framework of government set forth in the
Constitution.
The Court states that since the proposed changes constitute a revision
and would require far-reaching amendments in not just the specified
articles and provisions but also in several others, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings would be the best vehicle to undertake
them, as was intended by the framers and is stated in the constitution,
and not a people’s initiative.
2. There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago since an
affirmation or reversal of the said ruling would not change the outcome
of this petition.
Even if it is assumed RA 6735 is valid, contrary to the ruling in
Santiago, the outcome of the Lambino Group’s petition would not
change since before referring to RA 6735 a petition must first comply
with Section 2, Article XVII, and as was previously established, it does
not.
The Lambino Group’s petition also does not comply with RA 6735.
Indeed, It violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requiring that the
signatories, consistitng of 12% of the total number of registered voters,
sign the petition since it has already been established that the 6 million
signatories only signed a signature sheet and not the petition itself.
It also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735, which states that no more
than 1 subject can be embraced by a petition, through its provision
which mandates the interim Parliament to propose further amendments
which as determined earlier is unrelated to the subject of a shift from
presidential to parliamentary form of government.
3. The COMELEC did not commit a grave of abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Lambino Group’s Initiative petition.
Since the COMELEC merely followed the Court’s ruling in Santiago,
the Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion.