Beyond project

management
New perspectives on the
temporary - permanent dilemma
Beyond Project Management
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To Rolf A Lundin from
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 Table of contents

Preface

INTRODUCTION
I The Scandinavian School of Project Studies
KERSTIN SAHLlN-ANDERSSON AND ANDERS SODERHOLM
Key features of the Scandinavian School of Project Studies 11 /
A projectified society 14 / Project portfolios in their corporate context
18 / Relating the temporary and the permanent zo / Project manage-
ment reconsidered 21 / Beyond project management 23

A PROJECTIFIED SOCIETY
z How project management got carried away
TOMAS BLOMQUIST AND ANDERS SODERHOLM
Projcct management as management knowledge 25 I Within industries,
via engineering professionals, and abetted by industry-specific require-
ments 27 / Among industries through consultants: Expanding the scope
and adding generic value 28 /Volume through professional associations:
Picking up the latecomers with success stories and offers of professional
identity j o / Long-term survival through standardization bodies, scien-
tific research, and university training: Creating normative pressure 34 1
Carry on into the future 36

3 The temporary society and its enemies:

Projects from an individual perspective
JOHANN PACKENDORFF
The individual in the projccticised society 39 1 Project work from an
individual perspective - a typology 41 / Project-hased work (type I) 44 1
Renewal project participation (type 11) 46 / Temporary work (type 111)
48 /Independent entrepreneurs (type IV) 51 /Project work forms and
life in the projecticised society 53 / Who are the enemies of the tem-
porary society? 57

4 Contracts of work in a project-based economy

ESKIL EKSTEDT
Introduction 59 1Towards a project-hased economy 60 /Time aspects
of organizations and employment 62 / From the permanent to the
temporary 67 1 Market relations, transaction costs and contractual
forms in different kinds of organizations 70 / Conclusions 77
 TABLE O F CONTENTS

PROJECT PORTFOLIOS IN THEIR CORPORATE CONTEXT

5 Stickiness and leakiness in inter-organizational innovation projects 81
MARIA BENGTSSON AND JESSICA ERIKSSON
Introduction 8 1 / Inter-organizational innovation projects 83 / Flows
in different contexts of innovation projects 84 / Four innovation
projects and their contexts 88 / Contextual influence and flows in
innovation projects 97 / Discussion 104

6 Information sharing among partnering project organizations 108

JEFFREY K. PINTO AND ZORICA NEDOVIC-BUDIC
Benefits of informamon sharing 109 / The potential for information
sharing 111 I Challenges and dynamics of data sharing 112 /
Conceptual framework 118 / Improving the prospects for data
sharing among project organizations I r z

7 Projects and core values

STEN J ONSSON
Introduction 126 / Observations of premium product design in
context 128 1 The company history is the source of values 129 /
With Gyllenhammar a new era began 130 I Empirical observation
of value based product development14~/ Analysis 145 I The strong
narrative solution 146

8 Intensive innovation context and design system dynamics

The case of car Information Communication Entertainment (ICE)
systems 151
CHRISTOPHE MIDLER
Part one: The product trajectory: history and characterizat~on153 /
Part two: The innovative firm odyssey 161

RELATING THE TEMPORARY AND THE PERMANENT

9 Organizing in two modes
On the merging of the temporary and the permanent 170
BARBRO I. ANEI.1. AND TIMOTHY L. WILSON
Introduction 170 / A framework for discussion 172 / Observations 175 I
Merging of the temporary and permanent 182 / Reflections 18s

10 Regenerated professionalism
The librarian who went out on her own 187
ELISABETN SUNDIN
Introduction 187 1 The Swedish public sector 189 1 Entrepreneurs and
librarians 193 1 Why the librarian went out on her own 196 1Shifts in
practice 197 / Shifts in theory 199
TABLE OF C O N T E N T S

11 Moving beyond the rhetoric of the post-modern corporation

Some observations on complementarities in innovative forms of
organizing 205
TOMAS MULLERN
Introducing the theme of innovative forms of organizing 205 I
Building the argument 207 I The Saab case 211 I The Cisco case214 I
Concluding reflections 21 8

12 Bridging the gap between temporality and permanency

HENRIK C.J. LINDEROTH
Action and the temporary organization 224 I Thc theory of the
temporary organization 226 / Building networks and translating ideas
into action 228 I The theory of the temporary organization meets
actor network theory 234 1 Concluding remarks 240

PROJECT MANAGEMENT RECONSIDERED

r j Project management as boundary work
Dilemmas of defining and delimiting
KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON
The attractiveness of projects: Controllability and adventure 241 I
Boundary work 244 I Temporal, task, and institutional boundary
work 245 I Project definition as boundary work 259

14 The futile dream of the perfect goal

MATS ENGWALL
Project failures and unclear goals 261 1 The goal - the core of
every project assignment 263 I The necessity of goal ambiguity 267 I
The irrelevance of goals to project execution 271 I Project execution
- a process of goal formation 275

r5 What goes on in projects?

O n goal-directed learning processes
LARS LlNDKVlST AND JONAS SODERLUND
Introduction 278 I Scandinavian views on project processes 280 I
Project organization 285 / Project organizing 285 I A process model
286 1 Conclusions 290

16 The life of a project researcher

BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA

References

Author presentations
 Preface

Room for new thought styles

In this anthology I find several important steps taken towards a new
style of thinking about projects. The first is the challenge of projects as
being completely planned activities. If we put the temporary activity
called project in a context marked by uncertainty it is self-evident that
in some way planning will not be complete. Those arguing for good
project planning will try to make the planning as completely rational
as possible.
The other way around taken here is to look at what happened to the
context when people started to have work and life organised in pro-
jects. Projectisation of society is a reality today. So is the organisation
of work in corporations. We face a swarm of new issues and problems
for research and studies in this new landscape generated by the ideas
created in the first generation of project thinking and its applications.
From an individual perspective it is a revolution of work and life so
far-reaching that it "has reshaped the conditions for family life in con-
temporary society" (Johannn Packendorff). The combined individual
effects are already noticeable in the Swedish society and economy.
The second step I here can see leading to a new thought style (in the
meaning of Ludwik Fleck) is the understanding of changing relations
between corporations and customers in their joint project work devel-
oping more complicated and unique products. "Exit mechanisms dom-
inating the market relations of traditional industrial organisations are
exchanged for voice and sometime even loyalty in project based activ-
ities" (Eskil Ekstedt).
The reader will certainly find other examples of steps taken here
making room for a new, much more sophisticated, stylised thinking
about projectified contexts.

Life as a project
Maybe also life itself could be a project context. However, while read-
ing Barbara Czarniwska's interview with Rolf Lundin "A Life of a Pro-
ject Researcher" in this book, a story came into my mind: A man was
asked to explain the diversity of his experience in work and in private
life. He answered, "There was no plan I just dived down and swam
around". It sounded strange to his friends in the field of project prac-
tise. He almost regretted his spontaneous answer.
Rolf's comment in his Post Scriptum could have been comforting for
the man: "It also appears that too much of feelings and whims rather
than planning took over my past life".
With my background as a mathematical economist during a long
period of my life I dare trying to formulate a general rule: Looking
back on a person's trajectory of life you always end up falsifying the
hypothesis that it could have been part of a project process. Along the
same modelling line of thought I remember that smooth trajectories
might in a more detailed resolution be of fractal character as in chaos
theory. Changing perspectives means entering new worlds.
Putting project studies and practises in contexts, that really matters,
does also mean opening doors to new worlds of thought.

The project academy as context

One new world of thought is the exploration of the contexts in which
projects are in action. Getting in touch with reality beyond project
management models is a necessity and a natural task for scholars in the
field. The Swedish Project Academy, and its current chairman Rolf
Lundin has formed such an arena for a growing host of practitioners in
industry and consulting firms and of university scholars seeking to
explore these broader issues. The aim of the academy is to enhance the
interchange of ideas and thoughts between people from different
spheres involved with project work.
This mixture of professionals was also the starting point for a clus-
ter of projects named Project Sweden, which sought to combine prac-
tical experience with scholarly analyses. It is too early to say anything
about how successful this scheme can be. It depends certainly upon
how deep the projects can deal with sensitive issues in the practical
world. But the scheme has potential to generate more complex context-
project issues where the new perspectives presented in this volume can
be put on trial.
This book honouring Rolf Lundin is written in a spirit resembling
that of the Swedish Project Academy and of Project Sweden. By com-
bining various experiences and professional perspectives, it opens up
new venues for project studies and for project activities, and I hope it
will rouse many to new project activities in new contexts.

Jan Odhnoff
Professor Emeritus, Teleinformatics, Royal Institute of
Technology, and founding chairman Swedish ProjectAcademy
 The

Key features of the Scandinavian School of

Project Studies
New insights and understandings are often gained as experiences and
lessons from various fields are combined and translated into new set-
tings. This is certainly true for what we here term "The Scandinavian
School of Project Studies". The Scandinavian School of Project Studies
has developed an understanding of projects primarily by combining an
organization theory perspective with theories on entrepreneurship and
industrial development, and with in-depth empirical studies of how
projects unfold in practice.
This line of theorizing has grown from an interest in the rapid
expansion of projects in a variety of settings. Projects abound in organ-
izations, industries, and inter-organizational settings with long trad-
itions of project work, as well as in arcas in which more bureaucratic
and seemingly permanent and routinized organizations used to dom-
inate (e.g. Lundin & Soderholm, 1995; Engwall, Steinthhrsson & Soder-
holm, 2002; Sahlin, 1996). Scholarly writings on project management
have grown with the expanded use of projects - by organized efforts to
perform defined tasks within a time-limited period and with some type
of resource restrictions (e.g. financial, staff). It is not easy to prove that
the use has expanded. Projects cannot be counted as easily as legal cor-
KERSTIN S A H L I N - A N D E R S S O N A N D ANDERS S O D E R H O L M

porations. But, several indicators show that this expansion has taken
place, that it has spread among different industries, and is used for
more varied purposes (see Ekstedt, Lundin, Soderholm & Wirdenius,
1999; Engwall, 1995; Chapter z in this volume). And the forming of
projects in practice is influenced and inspired by widespread writings.
Such reciprocal development of practice and theory is common in the
field of management, for management theory has usually developed in
close interaction with practice and with theoretical developments in
other scientific fields (Engwall, 1992; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall,
2002).
Many writings on project management have echoed practical man-
agement, and have taken the form of recipes and handbooks on "How
to Manage Better". Such writings have provided valuable inputs to the
discourse and development of new managerial tools. However, they
appear to focus too narrowly on management of the individual project
to be of value to people who are primarily interested in understanding
how projects contribute to and are related to longer-term and wider
developments in organizations, industries, and society. Furthermore,
many of the handbook-type writings in project management assume
ideal conditions for management and change that are seldom found in
practice. Fuzzier and more ambiguous conditions often characterize life
in organizations and society.
The Scandinavian School of Project Studies has taken a wider, and at
the same time closer approach in their studies (see e.g. Soderlund zooob;
Engwall, Steinthbrsson & Soderholm 2002 for different research per-
spectives in this field; Packendorff, 1995). We point to three key featu-
res of the Scandinavian School. First, it has widened the scope of pro-
ject studies beyond that of single projects. Its aim has been to reflect on
and thereby contribute to the understanding of the way in which pro-
jects are contextually related. This broadened view has been triggered
by questions such as: Why has the use of prolects expanded? How are
projects formed from longer-term developments in organizations and
society? How do they contribute to these long-term developments?
How are projects that are pursued simultaneously or sequentially con-
nected with or disconnected from each other? How can one best learn
from one project to another?, and How can one avoid repeating
unwanted procedures from one project to another?
These studies, in other words, analyze the development of projects in
relation to more general organizational and societal changes. With the
 THE S C A N D I N A V I A N SCHOOL O F PROJECT STUDIES

elaborated analysis of the ways in which projects relate to their contexts,

it has also become clear that the formation and management of individ-
ual projects are contextually dependent. Hence, even when focusing on
individual projects, the relevance of understanding wider contextual
contingencies is repeatedly demonstrated (Lundin & Soderholm,
7998).
This broadened analysis of projects, when compared to more trad-
itional and "mainstream" writings in project management, is related to
the second key feature of the Scandinavian School. As previously men-
tioned, studies of the Scandinavian School are theoretically based. The
view pursued by the Scandinavian School on the relevance of context
parallels developments in organization theory in which we have lear-
ned the importance of understanding organizations as open systems
that are affected by their environments and by organizational fields.
These project studies of the Scandinavian School have added to theo-
retical developments in the theoretical fields to which the analyses are
related. The analyses have highlighted and added to the theoretical
understanding of temporality, commitment, innovation, boundaries,
and change more generally.
Third, the Scandinavian School of Project Studies is empirically
based. It is primarily based on close qualitative studies of how projects
actually evolve, rather then on wishes for how they would evolve in the
best of worlds. The in-depth studies have led to a strong awareness of
the fact that projects vary. Variations follow from differences in tasks,
but perhaps more importantly, from differences in context, history, and
process. Even though projects are temporary organizations, they spring
from historical processes and from the specific contextual circumstances
in which they develop. An important topic for analysis, then, is the way
in which projects are related to these contextual conditions. Obviously,
in-depth empirical work also nurtures the theoretical development and
further emphasizes the importance of project processes and the short-
comings of generic models for effective project management. Processes
and activities are commonly more important for results than for formal
structures. Moreover, it suggests that one must be cautious in formulat-
ing general normative how-to models for running a successful project.
Rased on these key features, this book provides a multifaceted an-
alysis of the emergence and management of projects under various con-
ditions. We provide theoretical frameworks, analyses, and thorough
empirical illustrations of projects in a wider theoretical and empirical
KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON AND ANDERS S O D E R H O L M

sense. The chapters deal with different projects in different settings.

Using a broad variation of project studies built upon the common
ground presented above, we demonstrate and deepen the knowledge of
the embeddedness of projects. In this way we go beyond project man-
agement to reconceptualize projects as they appear in their corporate
and temporal context.
We continue this introductory chapter by exploring the common
ground of the various studies in greater depth. We begin with a reflec-
tion on the expansion of projects in society and we provide a few
explanations for this recent trend. We then elaborate on two aspects of
the contextuality of projects: the corporate context and the relationship
between the temporary and the permanent. As mentioned above, this
has been - and remains - an important theme in the Scandinavian
School of Project Studies. And the discussion serves partly as an intro-
duction to the following section, in which we use some findings from
the Scandinavian School as an analytical tool to narrate the history of
how the Scandinavian School was formed and how it has invited us to
reconsider project management. Finally, the chapter summarizes a few
lessons in practical project management that the Scandinavian School
has provided.
The label "Scandinavian School of Project Studies" does not exclude
contributions from outside Scandinavia. The label merely reflects the
origin of this research tradition in Scandinavia. If one should identify
one person as its founder, that person would surely be Rolf A. Lundin
- a Scandinavian. Professor Lundin published some influential early
work in this area (see e.g. Lundin & Wirdenius 1989; Lundin, 1992;
Ekstedt, Lundin & Wirdenius, 1992) and has continued to bring orga-
nizational analysis into the worlds of projects and temporary organ-
izations (see, e.g., Lundin & Sijderholm, 1995; Ekstedt, Lundin, SGder-
holm & Wirdenius, 1999).

A projectified society
Projects abound. There has recently been a great deal of talk about
such concepts as project organizing, project management, project dev-
elopment, to such an extent that one can talk about project organizing
as a management fad or fashion (see Abrahamson, 1996; Ravik, 1996;
Chapter 2, this volume). Also, one can speak of the projectification of
 T H E S C A N D I N A V I A N SCHOOL OF PROJECT STUDIES

society (Chapters 3 and 4, this volume; Bennis & Slater, 1968).

If, however, we d o not focus so much on the labels that management
practitioners and management theorists use, but on the practices of
organizing activities, it is clear that projects are not new. One may
argue, with Engwall, Steinth6rsson & Soderholm (zooz), that the most
significant accounts of humankind can be regarded as projects. The
reconstruction of Europe after World War I1 and the American Apollo
program come immediately t o mind, and there are historical examples,
including Columbus' explorations to West India and the building of the
pyramids and the Chinese wall.
When we label these undertakings as projects, the main features on
which we focus - that define them as projects - are the temporal and
task-oriented components of the exercises (even though, when accomp-
lished, the tasks may turn out quite differently than planned). In each
example we can envisage the task demanding a certain organization -
an organization that is no longer required and is ideally dismantled
when the tasks are accomplished. The project is, in other words, a temp-
orary organization (Lundin & Soderholm, 1995). It is not always the
case, however, that a task forms the foundation of the project. A team
may alternatively form the stability and coherence of the project and
the task and the goals may change over time (Chapter 14, this volume).
Projects, then, not only develop differently in different contexts, but
the same procedure of events and activities may sometimes be defined
as part of a project, sometimes not. It is not uncommon for projects t o
be defined differently from time t o time and from situation t o situation.
For example, a construction project usually involves various groups of
experts such as architects, engineering consultants, real estate firms,
construction companies, and politically appointed decision makers
from several organizations. Sometimes this whole team and their acti-
vities and resources are described as the project, but each of the org-
anizations involved also treats its team and the resources it allocates to
this endeavor as a separate project.
If we abandon the simple way of establishing what a project is, then
the basis for defining and analyzing projects needs to be reconsidered. A
project cannot be distinguished from other forms of organizing solely by
one criterion, such as a certain technical content or a specific formal
structure. Project organizing is a perspective that is developed relative
t o certain activities, processes, and tasks. The expansion of projects,
then, does not only constitute a new or expanded empirical phenom-
KERSTIN S A H L I N - A N D E R S S O N A N D ANDERS SODERHOLM

enon calling for studies and reflection. It is also an emergent perspecti-

ve that is put on all sorts of aspects of a society that appears to be more
projectified today than it was only 10 years ago (Ekstedt, Lundin,
Soderholm & Wirdenius,rgqg).
In part of the management literature, managers are told t o organize
their company as a portfolio of projects, thereby bringing tasks and
accomplishments to the fore (Arenius, Artto, Lahti, & Meklin, 2002).
Such proselytizing has also been evident in public organizations and is
closely associated with the loud call for rationalistic reforms in the pub-
lic sector during the past few decades (see Leijon, Lundin & Persson,
1984; Brunsson & Olsen, 1990; Jacobsson, 1994; Blomquist & Pack-
endorff, 1998b; Sahlin-Andersson & Soderholm, 1987). In the public
sector, projects tend to be presented as means of breaking with stabil-
ity and bureaucracy (Lundin & Soderholm, 1997; Chapter 10,this
volume). Projects are thought to provide greater flexibility, and the
flourishing of projects has followed hand-in-hand with an enhanced
emphasis on flexibility.
For private commercial corporations, projects, and the attractiveness
of projects, have a stronger association with something planned, well
defined, delimited, and controlled. When activities or organizational
assignments are organized as projects, they appear to be easier to con-
trol, delimit, terminate, and follow up (Engwall, 1995; Berggren &
Lindkvist, 2001; Sahlin-Andersson, 1989; Sahlin, 1996). Thus, the pro-
liferation of projects harmonizes well with a striving for action, visibi-
lity, and evaluation.
In addition, many projects seem to be created as ways for organ-
izations to acquire extra resources. Particularly in times of frozen or
downsized funds and supplies, an organization may redefine part of its
daily operations as specific projects, in order to acquire project money
from various sources. As is true for many management trends more
generally (Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, zooz), projects expand as
integral or additional parts of other ideas, technologies, resources, and
financial assistance programs (Chapters z and 12, this volume).
As with many strategies, many projects are actually post-rationaliz-
ations. What turned out to be the outcome is tempting to explain in
linear terms as having followed from a well designed plan and a delim-
ited task. Projects then become a narrative genre (see Czarniawska,
1997) - a way of accounting for and making sense of what has happ-
ened or will happen. When viewing the mushrooming of projects in
 THE SCANDINAVIAN SCHOOL O F PROJECT STUDIES

this light, we can assume that the development partly follows on an

escalated demand for documentation in the world of organizations.
In light of these features, it may seem tempting to organize and pre-
sent not only enterprises, but one's whole life, as a project. The notion
of life as a project encourages one to plan, to be task-focused, to fulfill
means, and to be in control of one's own destiny. And many life stories
now so popular in research tend to be based upon and to further this
view. The reasoning seems to be that in order to understand the out-
come - or where someone ended up - the entire project must be under-
stood: when was the plan put to work, when was it designed, and so
on. The interview with Professor Lundin in Chapter 16 shows, how-
ever, that even though he is a man of many projects, he cannot see his
life as a project. It merely happened to him. He seized opportunities as
they occurred, but not according to a predefined plan. And his under-
standing of organizations follows the same route. He convincingly
shows - as do the authors of this volume - that neither personal life nor
organizational life is best seen as one project with a predefined plan,
but as a collection or series of more or less coupled projects. One pro-
ject may lead to another, but more often different projects have diff-
erent roots, and the challenge for many organizations - and many per-
sons - is to find some order and relationship among them. Such rela-
tionships among projects is accomplished either by connecting projects
with each other or by distancing and disconnecting them in order to
maintain each project as a separate endeavor.
When we speak of a projectified society, we point to the mush-
rooming of projects, both in the sense that activities are, to an increa-
sing extent, organized as projects; and in the sense that many processes
are presented and understood as projects. Both these aspects have con-
sequences, for individuals, for organizations, and for society as a
whole. Even though many projects were not aimed at changing labor
relations and work conditions for individual workers, the effects on the
labor market and on individuals can be dramatic, as shown in Chap-
ters 3 and 4 of this volume.
KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON AND ANDERS S O D E R H O L M

Project portfolios in their corporate context

With the wider focus on projects that is portrayed above, and with
insights used from organization theory, the theorizing of the Scandina-
vian School of Project Studies has been especially important in devel-
oping an understanding of projects as temporary and delimited organ-
izational settings (Lundin & Soderholm, 1995; Lundin & Midler, 1998a;
Ekstedt, Lundin, Soderholm & Wirdenius, 1999; Lundin & Hartman,
zoooa). Placing projects in an organizational or corporate context indi-
cates a willingness to acknowledge that projects are embedded in wider
structures and processes. Projects are not isolated islands (Engwall,
2002) independent of outside events (Kreiner, 1995). And it is clear
that the understanding of the manner in which a project may contri-
bute to organizational or societal changes demands a thorough analysis
of the ways in which projects stem from and relate to their context. Just
as has been the case with organization studies more generally, this line
of analysis calls not only for specifications of the project in focus, but
also for more elaborated analyses of the context of projects and the
aspects of these contexts that affect, and are affected by, the project (see
Chapters 5 and 6, this volume).
In part these contexts consist of other projects, and hence the inter-
relation between projects is one important aspect of the project-context
relationship. Taking this cross-sectional perspective, we can analyze
how projects that are carried out at the same time are related to and
dependent on other projects (Sjogren Kallqvist, 2002). Projects may
also be interrelated over time, and lessons from one project can be used
in the next (see Chapters 7 and 8, this volume).
One organization is usually conducting or is involved in several pro-
jects simultaneously. These projects may be interrelated - a situation
implied by the term "project portfolio", which calls for information-
sharing efforts among projects (more about this topic in Chapter 6, this
volume). Even projects that seem to be separate and independent may
compete for resources, attention, commitment, and legitimacy (Sahlin-
Andersson, 1989; Eskerod, 1996; Sjijgren Kallqvist, 2002). Hence, the
managing of the relationships among projects and with the wider con-
text is one important aspect of project management. But it is an aspect
that is often difficult to control, and it is not always the responsibility
of appointed project managers. Many project management researchers
have focused on the project manager. With such a focus, they have delim-
 THE SCANDINAVIAN SCHOOL O F P R O I E C T STUDIES

ited their analysis to the perspective of the project manager. For this
reason, the interrelationships of projects and their relationship with the
wider corporate context, have been under-explored in the project
management literature (Engwall, Steinth6rsson & Soderholm, 2002).
The studies that form the bases for Chapters 5 to 8 in this volume do
not focus primarily on the activities or responsibilities of the individual
project manager, but take a broader view of the ways in which projects
emerge. They demonstrate the development of relationships among
projects and they analyze the effects of these interrelationships on the
unfolding of the individual project.
The embeddedness of projects in wider corporate contexts is multi-
layered and changing. It is not in the hands of individual project man-
agers to control, and it may not always be desirable from the viewpoint
of the individual mangers to integrate and co-ordinate projects too
much. Our analyses of constellations of projects and of the embedded-
ness of projects in their corporate context points to other, often more
difficult issues of management and governance than do studies that are
restricted to individual projects. The fruitfulness of not restricting stud-
ies and analysis to individual projects and the importance of not taking
formal structures as given are clearly shown throughout this volume.
This demonstration of the gains of more contextualized designs of stud-
ies parallels findings in neighboring areas; for example, the develop-
ment of more field-based analyses in organization theory (see Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995; Scott et. al., 2000) and the development
of more governance-based rather than government-based studies in
political science (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992).
When analyzing the embeddedness of projects in their corporate
context, it also becomes apparent that the management of these pro-
cesses is neither simple nor clear-cut. The analysis points to dilemmas
in the ways that projects should be related to their wider context. One
such quandary can be termed the attachment-detachment dilemma.
The basic concept of project organizing is usually to detach a certain
task or a certain procedure from its wider context to allow specific pro-
cedures to develop (as discussed in Chapter 13, this volume). Project
organization may also be a way to separate various parts, objectives,
and relationships of the corporation. Thus, they may be used as a way
to separate activities in order to handle potentially conflicting demands
and objectives (c.f. Cyert & March, 1963). At the same time, concepts
such as project portfolios show, as do Chapters 5 and 6 of this volume,
K E R S T I N S A H L I N - A N D E R S S O N A N D ANDERS SODERHOLM

the importance of co-ordinating projects and transferring and sharing

information among them. This coordination not only involves the frame-
work of a single organization; it is equally important to include part-
ners, networks, competitors, or authorities as part of the analysis as
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Relating the temporary and the permanent

Projects are the primary example of a temporary setting, whereas a trad-
itional and hierarchical functional organization is the most obvious
example of a permanent setting. Even though there are examples of pro-
jects, such as Apollo, that lasted far longer than some functional organ-
izations (such as new IT start-ups), the preconception guiding the organ-
izing efforts are different between the two. A project is supposed to end,
and is therefore organized in terms of an effort that is running from "un-
finished" to "finished". The functional organization is set up to maintain
a flow of similar and repetitive activities for the foreseeable future. Based
on this perspective, projects are believed to be more appropriate for
change, flexibility, and action orientation than are functional organiza-
tions. Functional organizations, on the other hand, are supposed to guar-
antee stability, maintenance of core values, and long-term development.
Obviously, relating the long-term ambitions of the functional organ-
ization and its advocates to the short-term action-orientation of pro-
jects and their supporters is a necessity in any modern organization.
Relationships of this kind, however, include more than relating flexibil-
ity to stability. As shown in Chapter 9 of this volume, it seems that
permanent and temporary organizations pick up some characteristics
from each other (see also Kadefors, 1995).
Projects become less focused on flexibility, as routines for running a
project or standardizing project models become better known in a par-
ticular company. Diffusion of project management knowledge and norm-
ative pressure from professional associations further underlines the
importance of routines and standard approaches in projects (as discuss-
ed in Chapter z, this volume). Thus, projects are less innovative and
less flexible than some managers may believe. Actually, when projects
have been used as a major organizing principle for some time, the main
renewal problem may very well be the inertia embedded in the project
organization (see Ekstedt, Lundin & Wirdenius, 1992).
 THE S C A N D I N A V I A N S C H O O L O F PROJECT STUDIES

Likewise, the functional organization is subjected to changes. It

becomes less focused on stability and maintenance of previous rout-
ines, as requirements for flexibility and change are more emphasized.
The development of individual competence, the use of temporary
employment, recurring changes of technology, and ways of increasing
experiential learning are only a few cases that might result in greater
flexibility and less stability in the functional organization.
Relating the temporary and permanent setting is, therefore, more
than a way of relating flexibility to stability. The relationship is far
more subtle and multi-layered where tasks, organizing principles, time
frames, management styles and overall corporate strategies influence
the permanent as well as the temporary organization and the relation-
ship between them. Chapters 11 and 12 of this volume elaborate on
this concept using two case studies (Chapter 11) and in relation to
actor-network theory (Chapter 12). Chapter q provides a general
discussion on ways to relate temporary and permanent settings.
The relationship between temporary and permanent settings is also
interesting to analyze on an individual level. Based on the discussion in
Chapter 3 , it is obvious that individuals can suffer as well as benefit
from an extended use of projects in working life and personal life. In a
professional context, individuals need to relate to both temporary and
permanent settings, as they wander from project to project or from func-
tional units to projects, for example. Being employed in a public organ-
ization with a bureaucratic tradition is often seen as not being the best
foundation for an entrepreneurial effort. Nevertheless, Chapter 10pro-
vides a good example of how this can be achieved, thus highlighting
one aspect of the temporary-permanent dilemma.

Project management reconsidered

In the introduction, we pointed to three key features of the Scandinavian
School: it has broadened the analysis of project management; it is theo-
retically based; and it is empirically based. These key features have
eventually contributed to a reconsideration of project management.
The reconsideration is not necessarily based on a view that the norm-
ative models dominating the literature on project management are
wrong or unnecessary. Instead the Scandinavian School demonstrates
that these models are incomplete if we are to understand how projects
KERSTIN SAHI.IN-ANDHRSSON A N D ANDERS SODERHOLM

reproduce, how projects relate to each other and to their broader con-
text, and how individual projects evolve. The close focus on project
progress and the contextualized character of projects point to great
variation (see Hellgren & Stjernberg, 1995, for an empirical study
illustrating this issue). Not all projects can be managed according to the
same recipe.
Both in practice and in the normatively oriented project management
literature, we frequently find comments about projects that unfold in
less ordered and less clear-cut ways than those assumed and prescribed
in the handbooks. However, such examples tend to be regarded as
exceptions to the assumed ideal models. The question is: "How often
should we encounter an exception before accepting it as the normal
state of affairs?"
The comprehensive empirical studies that have been conducted
within the Scandinavian School tradition find that the less ordered and
less clear that projects are, the more frequent the perfectly clear and
ordered projects are desired in many normative models and project text-
books (Larson, 2000; Blomberg, 1998). It seems reasonable, from such
findings, to modify commonly spread project management models
based on empirically observed conditions that deviate from the perfect
situation presented in many textbooks.
The insights gained through research of the Scandinavian School of
Project Studies, invite us not to take the nature of a project for gran-
ted, but to continuously open the black boxes of projects and project
management, as demonstrated in several chapters in this volume.
Chapter 13 broadens the content of project definition processes beyond
planning and active management actions, thus providing us with an
enriched picture of the creation of projects. Project goals are discussed
along similar lines in Chapter 14. Project goals are commonly assumed
in the project management literature to be the result of a comprehensive
planning process and to form the basis for the implementation of those
plans. Chapter 14 reviews the validity of this conclusion and provides
valuable insights into other aspects of the goal-formulating process in
project contexts.
From the project studies pursued by the Scandinavian School, we
learn that in order to understand the outcome of a process, it is of value
to learn about the process - a lesson inspired by empirical studies as
much as by theories of decision-making processes (see e.g. March,
1981; 1994), social interaction, and social psychology (Weick, 1979).
 THE SCANDINAVIAN SCHOOL OT: P R O J E ( : T S'rllDIES

Chapter 1 5 of this volume develops this notion further, as the authors

provide an alternative approach to understanding "what goes on in
projects" (see also Lindkvist, Soderlund & Tell, 1998).
When we talk about this tradition of project studies as a school, we
point to the three common features that form the basis of these studies.
Moreover, a school indicates that the knowledge and perspective pro-
vided by the individual research projects have been enhanced through
interactions with other researchers in the school. Even though we ack-
nowledge Professor Lundin's impact on the formation of a Scandi-
navian School, we do not want to portray it as a formalized or goal-
directed process. The Scandinavian School has not, in other words,
been pursued as an ordered, delimited, and goal-directed project. As
becomes clear from the interview with Rolf A. Lundin (Chapter 16, this
volume) the Scandinavian School resulted from curiosity about projects
and a willingness to learn about a phenomenon, rather than from a
preconceived idea of what the lessons would look like in the end.
Hence, the formation and development of The Scandinavian School of
Project Studies in many ways resembles the features that students of
this same school have found in their studies of projectified settings
more generally.

Beyond project management

The interview in Chapter 16 also demonstrates that knowledge dev-
elopment in this area has evolved in close contact with practitioners and
with the researchers' own practical experiences. The role taken by Rolf
A. Lundin and his colleagues has not been one of experts who seek to
teach ready-made models to practitioners. Rather the knowledge has
developed in an interactive dialogue among scholars and practitioners
in various fields. An important drive for the researchers of this school
can be summarized with a quote from Rolf A. Lundin: "I need new
ideas, I need to get out to do some interviews". Many Swedish com-
panies are project-based. It has also shown to be the case that organiza-
tional changes of the Swedish public sector have tended to be pursued
as separate projects, rather than as all encompassing programmatic
changes (see e.g. Olson & Sahlin-Andersson, 1998; Chapters 10 and
1 3 in this volume provide examples of such project driven transform-
ation of the Swedish public sector). For these reasons it may not be so
K E R S T I N SAHLIN-ANDERSSON A N D ANDERS SODERHOLM

surprising that empirically oriented Swedish management researchers

have been so active in developing knowledge on project management
and beyond.
However, it is also safe to claim that the attitude in Scandinavian
companies is fairly open and that many companies handle a large num-
ber of projects and they are constantly seeking inspiration on ways to
organize their efforts. In so doing, both company representatives and
consultants are open to new approaches and to unorthodox advice. It
is sometimes claimed that because the Scandinavian economies have a
large number of companies that differ from the role models presented
in project management textbooks, they are more likely to look and list-
en for approaches that go beyond project management. Because so
many Scandinavian companies are project-based, and other types of
organizations have pursued multiple projects, these organizations also
search for knowledge that goes beyond management of the individual
projects. The Scandinavian school offers one simple lesson: in order to
utilize the complete potential of project organizing for enhancing con-
trol, flexibility, and change, more systematic attention must be paid to
the ways in which projects develop relative to their corporate and temp-
oral context. By reconsidering projects and project management, this
volume offers reflections and concepts for such a context-dependent
management of projects.
Project management as management knowledge
Many fields of management theory and practice have grown strong
over the past several decades. MBA programs have become standard
around the world, management consultancy firms have spread globally,
and the use of management models is a hot topic in magazines, bus-
iness schools, and among practitioners. Concepts and recipes have spr-
ead via books, management gurus, and consultants into every corner of
the corporate world (Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002). Acronyms
such as TQM, BPR, and HRM are well known and widely used. For
management theory to have grown, of course, requires managers, and
management as a profession has grown considerably. Positions with a
management function are to be found far down in the organizational
structure and even assigned fairly narrow tasks.
The increased supply and application of management models and
knowledge and the growing number of increasingly similar managers in
increasingly similar corporations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) are crucial
to the creation of management as a global field of professional know-
ledge. This is also true of project management. A number of indicators
show that this field is becoming increasingly established as a management
field in its own right: professional associations exist; it is marketed as a
core method for general and functional managers alike; the field is being
standardized through specific examinations; and project management is
slowly entering the core curricula of business and engineering schools.
TOMAS BLOMQUIST AND ANDERS SODERHOLM

This chapter analyzes the flow of project management knowledge

between nations, industries, and tasks. We will explain how management
knowledge has expanded in the particular field of project management,
how it has been diffused, translated, and applied indiscriminately; in
other words, how project management got carried away.
One approach t o explaining current developments is to focus on
either the various carriers of management knowledge (cf.the discussion
in Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002: 16-ff.), such as accountants,
consultants, or business schools (cf. E n p a l l & Zamagni, 1998; Waller-
stedt, 2002; Ruef, zooz), or the vehicles, such as magazines, books, or
MBA programs used for this knowledge diffusion (Furusten, 1999;
Mazza, Sahlin-Andersson & Strangaard Pedersen, 1998).
This chapter, however, aims to cultivate an understanding of how
project management has been spread or has diffused. It is insufficient
to focus simply on particular carriers (such as project management con-
sultants) or vehicles (such as educational programs in project manage-
ment). Consequently, we will explore the knowledge flow itself, anal-
yzing the waves of diffusion, to find out why ideas connected with pro-
ject management have met with such wide acceptance (Rclvik, 2002,
Strang & Meyer, 1994). Knowledge flows can be viewed as either ration-
al or instrumental bench-marking processes. More interestingly, how-
ever, is to discuss how such flows can be regarded as creators of insti-
tutional legitimacy, as ideas are translated and adopted in many diffe-
rent contexts (Abrahamson, 1991; Czarniawska and Sevon, 1996;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suddaby & Greenwood, 1999).
Focusing on either carriers or flows is not to view two mutually
exclusive perspectives: flows comprise interaction among carriers, and
carriers are needed to explain the flows. For example, as project rnana-
gement is diffused from the private to the public sector, consultants
play a major role. Business schools contribute, as carriers, to the "legi-
timization" flow of project management models as schools appoint
professors of project management.
As pointed out by Czarniawska & Sevon (1996), management ideas
do not necessarily flow easily or automatically. They need to be active-
ly applied by organizations, and thus it is necessary for them to be
translated or adapted for local conditions. Such flow is facilitated when
interaction among organizations is frequent and intensive, thus prov-
iding many openings for the transformation of ideas. If institutional
mechanisms, such as strong normative or mimetic pressure from govern-
 HOW P R O J E C T MANAGEMENT GOT C A R R I E D AWAY

ment or professional associations, are present as well, the flow is fur-

ther facilitated and accelerated (cf. Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall
(zooz:z6-ff.). Also, if an idea is itself connected to the rational values
currently prevalent in society, the flow is further assisted (Rmik, zooz;
Meyer, 1996).
In this chapter, we will briefly describe four processes, or flows, that
have carried project management from being solely a U.S. government
contract requirement for military deliveries, to becoming a concept
applied even by elementary schools making efforts to change their
organization. As will be shown, institutional pressure has evolved as
professional organizations have grown stronger; ideas on effective, yet
flexible, project management fit well with current ideas, and project
management concepts have been adopted by many consultants as these
ideas became increasingly popular. It seems as if the several com-
ponents needed for successful knowledge flow have been put in place.

Within industries, via engineering professionals,

and abetted by industry-specific requirements
The evolution of project management tools began in weapon systems
development in the U.S.A. in the latter part of the Second World War
and in the following Cold War era (Morris, 1994, Engwall, 199~:90
ff.). Organizations that were important in this process were the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD)and NASA. They developed methods for
processes such as network planning and control, and had their supp-
liers use these methods as well. Most important was the development
of PERT - Program Evaluation and Review Technique - developed in
1957 to control and evaluate continuously the progress of large, com-
plex development projects.
Supported by U.S. DoD requirements, PERT became well-known
among companies bidding for military orders. By 1964 almost 1,000
books and articles on PERT had been published, and the technique had
become almost synonymous with project management (Morris 1qq4:g I ).
Also, other countries' defense authorities picked up the method via eng-
ineers and military officers who had spent time in the U.S. PERT was used
in the Viggen project in Sweden (a 1960s military aircraft project), since
many of the engineers taking part had been trained in U.S. engineering
schools or, in some cases, had participated in Pentagon training.
TOMAS BL0,MQUIST A N D ANDERS SODERHOLM

One of the first companies to use a similar method to control large

projects was DuPont, with its Critical Path Method (CPM) method,
applicable in the petrochemical industry in the U.S.A. This was in the
late r q ~ o s and
, a couple of years later over eighty industrial compan-
ies in the U.S.A. were using the same type of network planning tool to
plan projects (Engwall, 1995). Reports from U.S. contractors and
government agencies have indicated difficulties arising from PERT, even
though project management enthusiasts in North America, Europe, and
elsewhere have implemented such project planning techniques with
commitment and energy (Morris 1994:79).
Later on many large companies developed their own procedures for
how to organize, control, and manage projects. Handbooks, routines,
forms, in-house training, and similar efforts are examples of means by
which such knowledge can be diffused throughout the company and to
newcomers. Ericsson, the Swedish telecom company, has developed
"PROPS." PROPS is said to be a generic method, and it is applied both
to development projects and customer delivery projects. Project spon-
sors, project managers, and team members are all trained in PROPS,
and the method has also been made available to other companies as
well. PROPS has become a "product" that has been commercialized by
Ericsson via their project management (PM) consultants. ABB, the
electrical engineering company, offers ongoing education for project
managers in its subsidiaries. This education is linked to a career path,
since a certain number of courses is a requirement for becoming a sen-
ior project manager.
Both Ericsson's PROPS and ABB's education programs represent
powerful ways of consolidating PM within a company and maintaining
a general project "language." Engineers leaving the company for pos-
itions in other companies of course become carriers of PM.

Among industries through consultants:

Expanding the scope and adding generic value
PM is today used in many different industries. Consultants have been
major carriers of PM among industries, as there are many PM consul-
tants. The growth of PM can be explained in three different ways.
First, some of the engineers who were involved in various large mil-
itary projects were later hired by other industries or, in some cases,
 HOW PROJECT M A N A G E M E N T GOT C A R R I E D AWAY

started their own businesses as project management consultants. Eng-

ineers who had earlier worked on the Viggen jet fighter project at Saab
in Linkoping (Sweden), for example, founded the Wenell Group.
Today, Wenell Management is the largest independent PM consultancy
firm in Scandinavia.
Second, firms originally founded in other fields have expanded into
PM as demand for such services has increased. Large firms such as
Price & Waterhouse can be included in this category since they now
offer services within PM.
Third, firms active in specific knowledge areas have applied PM as a
part of their existing services. This is true of many consultants - for
example architects and technical consultants - who direct their services
towards the construction sector.
As PM consultants become established another pattern of diffusion
emerges. Consultants need to attract customers and, furthermore, it is
likely that they will try to make their areas of expertise as valuable as
possible to customers. This has two consequences. First, when trying to
attract customers they do not limit their market to the areas where PM
started, i.e., military industries. Instead, they look around for other
industries where the application of PM methods could make a diff-
erence. All manufacturing companies that have some interest in product
development are obviously eligible. PM has thus spread, with the help
of consultants, into new industries. This spread was also facilitated by
the fact that customers have often learned of PM concepts during their
professional training or in earlier positions in other companies. There
is thus both a pull and push of PM into new industries.
Second, consultants also try to apply PM to other issues than just
complex product development. Companies delivering products or
systems that are fairly standardized can thus organize their design-pro-
duction-delivery processes as projects. As more projects are "discov-
ered" this way in an endless number of companies in many industries,
the scope of PM extends into new areas and industries.
Consultants also need better-developed PM theoretical tools, so as to
convince potential customers that PM is a well-founded way of organ-
izing business. Consultants are thus interested in making PM more
conceptual, to help them point out the general benefits of PM. PM
models have become more generic and the value of PM has become
more clearly identified. In this way, consultants have added value by
making industry-specific models generic and generally attractive to
TOMAS BLOMQIJIST AND A N D E R S S ~ D E R I T O 1 . M

companies wanting to increase effectiveness and efficiency. PERT,

CPM, and E N (Earned Value) are examples of specific PM models
made generic.

Volume through professional associations:

Picking up the latecomers with success stories
and offers of professional identity
The ascension of PM as a management device in the 1960s gave a lot
of people of varied backgrounds - mainly engineers - a common
interest. These PM specialists needed an arena for cooperation and
mutual self-recognition, so the Project Management Institute (PMI)
was founded in the U.S. in 1969, and Internet was founded in Europe
1965. Since the term "Internet" eventually became associated with
other areas than PM, the association changed its name to the Internat-
ional Project Management Association (IPMA) in 1994. The Swedish
association, Foreningen Natplan ("Network Planning Association"),
changed its name to SvensktProjekt Forum ("Swedish Project Forum")
in 1968, and is now a member association of IPMA.
Both PMI and IPMA are membership based. PMI members can join
and create local chapters that form PMI's local networks. IPMA con-
sists of a number of national associations in which both individuals
and corporations can hold memberships. IPMA is in this sense less
centralized than PMI. Building local networks is a major concern of
both PMI and IPMA. In 1999, PMI had over r4o chapters in over 45
countries, while IPMA had national associations in 29 countries. In
1989, PMI had 5,000 members; this number increased to 17,000 in
1995, 32,000 in 1998, 45,000 in 1999, and IOO,OOO in 2002. IPMA
membership has also increased, reaching 20,000 members by 2002.
One reason for this growth has been the desire to accredit project
managers professionally, making them part of a "project profession".
Consequently, both PMI and IPMA run professional certification pro-
grams for project managers. PMI issues the title "Project Management
Professional" (PMP) to those who pass their exams. A PMP also recei-
ves special recognition at their annual congresses.
The congresses of PMI and IPMA are important events for the organ-
izations. PMI's world congress is held annually, while IPMA's confer-
 H O W PROJECT MANAGEMENT C O T CARRIED AWAY

ence is held every second year. Between world congresses, both organi-
zations hold national conferences and smaller, focused conferences and
workshops. Nordnet is, for example, the name of an annual conferen-
ce organized by Nordic project management associations.
In these conferences, practitioners, consultants, and scholars meet to
share success stories and practical know-how. The conference themes
indicate a shift from engineering-oriented planning to more general
management issues. One difference between PMI and IPMA is that
PMI conferences over the last ten years have largely focused on inter-
nal project management topics. A number of the themes of PMI and
IPMA conferences are presented in the tables below.

Table 2:1 Themes and locations of PMI conferences, 1983-ZOOZ.

TOMAS BLOMQUIST AND ANDERS SODERHOLM

Table 2:2 Themes and locations of IPMA conferences, 1967-2000 (see Eriks-
son, 1997).

Eriksson (1qq7:29) identifies three distinct periods in PMT and IPMA

conferences. In the first, 1967-1972, the focus was on network plan-
ning and the cases examined were drawn from the defense and con-
struction industries. A great deal of attention was paid to finding opti-
mal solutions for planning schedules, costs, and resource use. Planning
was still an important issue in the second period, 1979-1982, but some
of the participants had started to question the possibility of finding the
one-and-only, perfect planning method. Other issues, such as teams,
culture, leadership, and project life cycle, began to achieve more pro-
minence. At the PMI conference in 1980 ("Communication in Project
Management"), several presented case studies highlighted projects as a
means of organizing "normaln work and daily activities. In the third
period, 1992-1996, it became more common to discuss the basic con-
ditions for project organization and projects as part of company struct-
ure. "Management by Projects," the IPMA conference held in Vienna
in 1990, is one example of this. Risk, context, and leadership are other
issues given specific consideration during this period.
 H O W P R O J E C T M A N A G E M E N T G O T C A R R I E D AWAY

A fourth period can possibly be identified at the turn of the millen-

nium. Since 1997, the two associations have been making even greater
efforts to increase the scope of PM, and more industries (such as pub-
lic-sector organizations) and more tasks (including non-engineering
tasks) have been included in PM generics. The PMI conference in 1999
and the IPMA conference in 2000 illustrate this tendency.
The official PMI 1999 registration brochure reads as follows (p. 2 ) :

"Learning, Knowledge and Wisdom... the Evolution of an Idea".

In 1969, PMI was founded by a few visionary individuals who shared

a belief that project management skills would increasingly be needed
for success in the global marketplace. PMI and its members have taken
their learning experiences over the last three decades and built a foun-
dation of knowledge for the profession. As the Institute celebrates its
thirtieth anniversary, the vision of its founders has never been more evi-
dent than in the 160% attendance growth rate at PMI Annual Semi-
nars & Symposium over the last five years. Today, PMI is the most
recognized source of project management professional wisdom in the
world...and its Annual Seminars & Symposium has become the prem-
ier project management event of the year!"
The PMI 1999 conference was organized around twenty-two topics,
ranging from aerospace and defense, to women in project management.
In the first announcement and call for papers for IPMA zoo0 in Lon-
don, the general theme for the conference was declared to be "Univer-
sal Project Management from engineering through business and
be yond.. .." Five streams were announced:

T) "Management across the organization: All levels - from project

manager through chairman and beyond.. ."
2) "New frontiers for project management. All organizations - from
industry through commerce and beyond.. . "
3 ) "Meeting the challenges of diversity and change. All nations - from
developing countries through developed and beyond ..."
4) "Case studies. All projects - from Polaris through YzK and
beyond ..."
5 ) "Facing the new millennium with new skills. The professions - from
process through competence and beyond.. ."
TOMAS BLOMQUIST A N D ANDERS SC)DERHOLM

The organizers were possibly attempting to make PM into an all-

embracing approach that should engage every employee in every organ-
ization in the world, and that should apply to all imaginable efforts.
Finally, it should also be mentioned that both PMI and IPMA publish
lournals and books. The publications made available through PMI and
IPMA range from academic writings to handbook-type material.

Long-term survival through standardization

bodies, scientific research, and university
training: Creating normative pressure
A fourth process and a fourth set of carriers comprise organizational
bodies that claim to act on behalf of many in their efforts to make PM
knowledge available and more substantial. Universities, colleges, and
other educational institutions have incorporated PM into parts of their
curricula over the past few decades. In Sweden, PM was first introdu-
ced at the two major schools of technology: the Royal Institute of Tech-
nology in Stockholm, and Chalmers School of Technology in Gothen-
burg. The Royal Institute of Technology appointed Sweden's first pro-
fessor of PM in the early 1980s.
By 1999, a large number of Swedish universities, university colleges,
and engineering schools were offering courses in PM - from LuleP in
the north to Lund in the south. Several of the schools and universities
offer PM courses in several departments (e.g., the Royal Institute of
Technology offers PM courses in four departments). PM courses are in
most cases short - typically a five-week course is offered as an option
to final-year students - and are not integrated into traditional pro-
grams of study, and no degree programs with a major in PM are offer-
ed to undergraduates. Two schools, Linkoping University, and Chal-
mers School of Technology in Gothenburg, offer professional, masters
degrees in PM to students with several years work experience after
their bachelors degrees.
Even though more PM courses are offered today than a decade ago,
still only a few business or engineering graduates have received any PM
education. This opens up the market for consultants who organize
training courses and in-house education in multi-national corpora-
tions. ABB, for example, offers an "academy" that provides employees
 H O W PROJECT M A N A G E M E N T COT CARRIED AWAY

with a three-step training program in PM, organized in cooperation

with U.S. partners.
Research efforts have increased, and a number of PM-related disser-
tations have been presented in Sweden over the past decade, mostly at
Chalmers School of Technology, Linkoping University, the Royal Inst-
itute of Technology, and Umed School of Business and Economics.
These dissertations mainly cite research with a basis in organizational
theory and management, and they tend to be descriptive and analytical
rather than normative. Research programs involving researchers rang-
ing from Ph.D. students to professors have been launched in schools
in UmeH and Linkiiping, among others, and national and Nordic Ph.D.
program courses arc also being offered. The situation is similar in Nor-
way and Finland: Norwegian schools involved in PM include NTNU in
Trondheim and BI in Oslo; in Finland, Abo University and Helsinki
School of Technology have more formal research programs.
For the long-term survival of a field of study it is important that it
he represented at universities. When a field is granted its own chairs or
dcpartments, it is also natural that research efforts will be organized on
a long-term basis and that courses will be developed and offered to stu-
dents at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. So far this has not
happened in Sweden, but there are substantial activities going on that
might result in a more formalized status for PM in the near future.
Also ensuring the long-term survival of the field are the standardiz-
ation bodies. When PM creates its own standards and rules of conduct
it will also acquire a more established identity among other professions,
which each have their own rules, hierarchies, and professional gather-
ings. PMI (see earlier section) publishes the Project Management Body
of Knowledge (PMBOK) and also organizes PMP testing. PMP (Project
Management Professional) is the title given to those passing the tests
based on PMBOK. The first PMBOK was published in 1987; a second
edition was published in 1996 and a third in 2002. Considerable effort
has been devoted to consolidating PMBOK, and in the PMI 1997 con-
ference, 24 of the 200 papers dealt with the latest thinking on PMBOK.
PMI's Swedish chapter translated PMBOK into Swedish in 1998, and
arranges PMP testing in Sweden. Similar routines have been established
in other countries, thus spreading PMI standards as the de facto stan-
dard in the field. Last year the Swedish association SvensktProjekt
Forum emphasized TPMA's project management certification. Compa-
red to the PMI certification program, IPMA's is the more ambitious one.
 Certification and standardization also evolve from organizations
outside the large project management associations. Other organiz-
ations want to influence project management and how practitioners
carry out projects. One such organization is the International Organ-
ization for Standardization (ISO), that over the last five years has dev-
eloped I S 0 I 5 I 8 X:ZOOI - Project management guidelines for termin-
ology standardization, I S 0 1ooo6:1997 - Quality management: guide-
lines to quality in project management, and ISO/IEC TR 16326:1999 -
Software engineering: guide for the application of ISOAEC 12207 to
project management. In this process of developing engineering stan-
dards for measuring and assessing organizations' project maturity, one
of the first project management models is the capability maturity model
of the Software Engineering Institute. Similar models have become
popular even among organizations outside the field of engineering and
software engineering. The Project Management Institute has for the
last couple of years also looked with greater interest into this type of
project management model, as a means for describing and assessing
organizations as t o how they are managing projects.
It is obvious that the process of standardization is well under way.
So far, not many companies require employees acting as project man-
agers to be certified by IPMA, PMI, or any other certification organiz-
ations, and contractors do not require this of their partners (at least not
in Sweden). Standardization thus has yet to be transformed into formal
rules and requirements. But some consultants do, however, offer cour-
ses that enable participants to become certified according t o PMBOK,
which is known and established as a general framework for PM. Late-
ly, certain Swedish consulting firms have begun providing courses and
assessment for the IPMA certification. This is a first step towards stan-
dardization, and a manifestation of normative pressure for P M know-
ledge to be of a recognized type.

Carry on into the future

This chapter has discussed four processes or flows that have contrib-
uted to the spread of P M knowledge. Each process has its own organ-
izational bodies that are the actual carriers of the knowledge. Even
though it can be difficult to differentiate them, each process has spec-
ific characteristics that are outlined below.
 H O W P R O J E C T MANAGEMENT G O T C A R R I E D AWAY

FLOWS CARRIERS SOME MODES OF CARRYING

1. Within industries Industrial companies Specific training

Engineering professionals Experience
making careers Formal requirements

2 . Expanding scope Consultants Concepts

Generic models

3. Increasing volume PMI and local cha ters Conferences

IPMA and nationor Publications (books and
associations iournals)
Professional identity

4. Long-term survival Universities Courses

Standardization bodies Research
Standards

Table 2:3 Flows, carriers, and modes o f carrying.

PM has spread from local and specialized contexts in the defense

industry, to global and generic contexts through the processes discuss-
ed in this chapter. Of course, this spread has also changed the actual
content or structure of the knowledge carried. PM was initially con-
cerned with network planning, but as it spread some elements were
added while others were dropped. As mentioned earlier, PM is now
more of a management ideology than a tool.
The four flows are interrelated and interdependent and they also
illustrate layers of the institutionalization of society, all with functions
in the flow of knowledge from projects to industries, from consultants
to other industries, from practitioners to academia, from project
manager to certified project manger and from practice to standards.

Legitimacy + Standardization + Project Control

Success

t ProFessionalization 1 +Commercialization
+ Volume
Figure 2:1 Flows of project management knowledge.
TOMAS BLOMQUIST AND ANDEKS S C i O E K H O L M

These flows also represent the diffusion of project management knowledge

from application in individual, large projects to application in multi-pro-
ject environments in large and small organizations. The diffusion and use
of project management are today regarded as a standard set of solutions to
managerial problems. To illustrate the institutionalization of project man-
agement as a field of knowledge and the various roles project management
carriers play in this process, the figure above shows how these flows of pro-
ject management knowledge are carried by particular mechanisms. The
first process or flow, which took place within individual industries, was
originally initiated t o spread core project management methods, such as
PERT and CPM, for the purpose of gaining better control over projects.
The knowledge carriers supported large projects that demanded specific
methods for controlling projects. Second, the successes stories told by pro-
ject mangers and consultants expanded the scope of PM and commerciali-
zed the concept. Third, with a larger scope, the number of organizations
and people coming into CO~tactwith project management concepts expan-
ded, increasing the volume of affected projects and project managers. The
development of project management associations gave project managers
an identity, and encouraged them to certify and professionalize themselves
as a new social group. The fourth and final process is the pursuit of long-
term survival, which depends on project managers having common values
pertaining to the content of projects and project management. Contrib-
uting to this survival arc standardization bodies, academic research, scienti-
fic journals, and university degree programs, all of which give the field legi-
timacy. Project managers and organizations can, through standardized cer-
tification programs and certified project management procedures, demon-
strate that they are members of the project management community and
are organized in an up-to-date way. Ultimately, all this aims at making new
projects easier to control, more likely to achieve their project goals, and in
the end become success stories.
It is important to note that the four processes identified d o not take
place singly, in sequence; rather they are overlapping and more or less
parallel. This is to say that industrial companies, consultants, eng-
ineering professionals, professional associations, universities, and
others are all involved simultaneously in the diffusion of PM; what we
have attempted to delineate in this chapter are the differences among
these carriers and flows. We can also see that the notion that "projects"
are only large-scale endeavors managed by project managers has
changed; now, nearly anyone can call himself a project manager, and
the smallest of tasks can be called a project.
 The individual in the projecticised society
Since the middle of the 196o's, it has been repeatedly claimed that our
society - and thus also our lives - is becoming increasingly projectici-
zed, i.e. organized in terms of time-limited sequences of action and inter-
action (Miles, 1964; Bennis & Slater, 1968). This development was
expected to imply an increased use of the project work form, but also
an increasing tendency to view ongoing processes as limited in time and
scope. When discussing reasons for this development, authors usually
referred to a general increase in the speed of change in society in com-
bination with an increased complexity. For organizations, the solution
t o a reality in which most relevant factors changed and interacted at
the same time was t o organize the flow of events into discrete projects,
limited in time and space.
As a trend in the development of work organization, projectization
is usually expected t o imply increased task focus, better conditions for
learning, renewal and flexibility, less bureaucratic forms for manage-
ment control etc. (cf Ekstedt et al, 1999; Bcrggren & Lindkvist, 2001).
In complex settings, a project-based leadership strategy is often said t o
be preferable over classic, all-encompassing ones (Lundin, 1990). Even
though there are some dangers of projectization - such as short-term
J O H A N N PACKENDORFF

thinking strategies and increased de-coupling of organizations (Blom-

quist & Packendorff, 1998a) - this trend is mainly perceived as a pos-
itive one for contemporary organizations. The basic reason for this per-
ception seems to be that the project - viewed as a task specific and
time-limited form of working - is perceived as a way of avoiding all the
classic problems of bureaucracy, inertia and rigidity with which most
"normal" organizations are struggling (Pinto, 1996). In that sense, pro-
ject-based work is a part of the wave of 'new organizational forms' that
has entered most industries during recent decades (cf Kerfoot &
Knights, ~ 9 9 8 ) .
In many industries and companies, the project is now the normal
work form. This is obvious in cultural life, advertising, consulting,
R&D, IT etc., but also in several large corporations which execute
numerous projects both externally and internally. Given this trend, one
might assess that work life for many people is becoming increasingly
"projecticized", i.e. that substantial parts of individuals' work lives are
spent in projects and similar temporary forms of organizing. This is
especially evident where individuals working in project-based firms are
concerned, i.e. firms where almost all operations take place in projects
and where the permanent structure fills the function of administrative
support.
What hamper this development are the taken-for-granted views of
industrial organizations as dependent on routines, hierarchies and tech-
nologies rather than flexibility, teamwork and customer orientation
(Ekstedt et al, 1999). Still, just a small portion of contemporary organ-
izations actually organize work with both decentralization and organ-
ized knowledge development in mind (Karlsson & Eriksson, 2000).
Many of the calls for new organizational forms and a strengthened civil
society can be analyzed in a similar manner - if people are liberated from
their structural chains, they can create wonders together (cf Kiddel; 1981;
Grantham, 2000). Most research on individual work satisfaction and
commitment also support these claims (Karlsson & Eriksson, zooo).
The silent proponents of traditional industrial organizing should
thus he the enemies of the temporary society, failing to see the necess-
ities of projectization at all levels of society and business. Or are they?
Let us ask the alleged victims of the old industrial society and the inten-
ded beneficiaries of the new projecticised one - the individuals. Is it
really so that projectization has implied better working conditions, in-
creased possibilities for personal development, and more freedom in
 T H E TEMPORARY SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES

choosing individual lifestyles? Is the projecticised society the solution to

the problems that inhabitants of the bureaucratic society experienced?
The chapter starts out with a discussion of what project work means
- as compared to "traditional" work forms -, and a classification of diff-
erent 'project workers' is presented. In the next sections, we meet diff-
erent individuals from these different 'classes', and some important con-
sequences of project work are discussed through their narratives. Then,
we turn to the question of how project work affects life in general, more
specifically what kinds of life forms are constructed by project working
individuals, again through the narratives of the individuals. The paper
ends by a discussion on what kind of society that people working and
living by projects construct together - could it be so that the enemies of
the temporary society are the same people that created it...?

Project work from an individual perspective

- a typology
From the perspective of the individual, the development toward pro-
jectization has implied important consequences for work and life.
More and more people spend their working days in different kinds of
project organizations, and even more people are involved in projects as
a part of their otherwise routine-based employment. Besides being
organized into all kinds of projects during work hours, there is also a
tendency to perceive processes at work and in life in general in terms
of projects (Kunda, 1992; Blomquist & Packendorff, 1998a; Lindgren
et al. 2001). While there are theoretical expectations of different kinds
in the literature, there are actually few empirical studies carried out on
how individuals handle a projecticised reality. The project has usually
been viewed as a planning task, and large parts of the project manage-
ment literature are in fact just as de-personalized as organization theo-
ry once was. And if individuals have indeed been studied, they have
exclusively been project managers, a category that is actually just a
small portion of the total population of project workers. Moreover, this
line of research rests upon quite a weak empirical base; while there is
a lot written about how project managers should behave, there are very
few descriptions of their actual behavior (Perlow, 1997; Lindgren &
Packendorff, 2001; Rapp Ricciardi, 2001). Given this position, the aim
of the paper is to critically analyze how individuals construct projects
JOHANN PACKrNDORFF

- both projects that they are organized into and projects that they con-
struct themselves in their everyday life. In this analysis, examples of
individual narratives on projects and projectization will be included,
individuals working in the IT sector, in the cultural sector, as entre-
preneurs, as consultants, and even as voluntary community workers.
The problem of this kind of general reasoning is that there are many
different types of projects. Project work is actually not just one homo-
genous work form; it means different things depending on the situation in
which it is performed. The necessity of identifying different types of pro-
jects has also been widely acknowledged in literature during the past
decade (cf Turner & Cochrane, 1993; Packendorff, 1995; Ekstedt et al,
7999).
In the same way as there are many different types of projects, there
are thus also many types of project work situations, ranging from 'per-
fect projects' where the individual works full-time for one single pro-
ject and can devote all of her time to that, to all sorts of 'imperfect' pro-
ject work situations where life is more complicated. We will therefore
look more closely into different sorts of project work situations from
two different dimensions, dimensions that have been important in
understanding the narratives of the individuals interviewed:

I . To what degree the individual's work situation is tied t o the tem-

porary project or the permanent organizational context
2. To what degree project work is routine or exception to the indiv-
idual

The question of whether the individual actually represents a project or

an organization in her work is not always that easy to answer, but indiv-
iduals often tend to make such narrative separations (Lindgren &
Packendorff, 2001).If you are employed in a firm and work by pro-
jects, you are of course primarily to be regarded as an employee. From
time t o time, you will also act as primarily being a project member.
Like the project manager, who always has to represent her project in
relation to colleagues, other projects and stakeholders, project team
members must also quite often view themselves primarily as project
members. Often, there is a matrix problem behind this - i.e. that the
individual serves two masters and has dual loyalties.
A second dimension of importance in this discussion is whether pro-
ject work is routine or exception t o the individual. Projects have always
 T H E TEMPORARY SOCIETY AND ITS E N E M I E S

been described as unique once-in-a-lifetime-events, far away from eve-

ryday repetitive boredom. Consequently, project work has also been
seen as something unique and exciting, where the individual will per-
form new and different tasks in the pursuit of ambitious and innovat-
ive goals. The project thus becomes a kind of temporary system, in
which you can work unusually hard, have unusually fun, being unusu-
ally creative. Against this, one might depict a modern reality in which
projects are not only repetitive, but also the work form around which
the entire operations of firms are built. As mentioned above, the pro-
ject-based firm is an increasingly common phenomenon, and many
individuals spend their entire working days on different projects. This
does not mean that all projects are identical, but that they are executed
using standardized procedures - every product is still unique, but the
process of 'assembling' the product is the same.
From these two analytical dimensions, it is possible t o identify diff-
erent types of project work. It can be everything from work situations
implying repetitive project worlc for an organization, to situations
where projects are unique and independent of all other work. To this,
we can also add work norn~allynot labeled projects, but functioning
like projects in practice - such as renting episodes for employees in staff-
ing firms. It should therefore be possible to describe the main types of
project work - and thus project workers -in the following way:

AFFILIATION
The project Organisational context
4 *
I. Project-based
work

PROJECT
WORK AS

Exception
1
IV. Independent
entrepreneurship

Figure 3:1. A typology of project work situations.

II. Renewal pro-
ject participation
JOHANN PACKENDORFF

In the upcoming sections, these four types of project work will be

discussed in more detail, and analyzed through narratives from indivi-
duals.

Project-based work (type I)

This is what most project working individuals do most of their time,
and it implies that the individual spends all or most of her time working
in different projects within a stable organizational framework. Since the
project form is well accepted in the organization, each single project is
not that unusual to the individual - it is rather a natural part of an on-
going employment relationship. The individual thus also views herself
mainly as a representative for the organization rather than the project -
something that from time to time also can be said about the project
manager. Project work in this form may be contract based customer pro-
jects, but many R&D operations are also organized in this fashion.
For the individuals constantly working by projects, work means
'starting over again' all the time. While the respective project managers
focus on their respective projects at hand, the individuals working by
projects experience a long-term trajectory consisting of a long series of
projects. The conclusions one might draw from viewing each project as
a separate entity are thus not always the relevant ones from an indiv-
idual perspective. One consequence of this is that projects are rarely
designed taking previous experiences and workloads of the individual
into account:

"...even though I was not as interested from the beginning, since I

was still very tired from the previous project. I felt quite apathetic, I
must say. I didn't feel fun, not new or anything. Then we ran into
some problems on the road that we had not expected at all. It was a
bit hard for me t o do something about those problems. I knew exact-
ly how t o d o most things, but I was too tired t o commit myself.
Otherwise, I am very committed - let's do it, damn it!" (Carl,
systems expert)

While the project form of work rests upon the assumption that team
members shall be committed and motivated from the start of each pro-
ject, individuals often feel that not all projects are interesting enough to
 THE TEMPORARY SOCIETY AND ITS PhTEhlIES

awaken a sense of commitment. A related problem is that there is hard-

ly any time for reflection and learning between projects due to over-
optimistic time schedules and a constant shortage of resources:

"In May and June we worked long evenings and weekends in order
to finish the project. Then it was not finished anyway, and we post-
poned it into the autumn, when the next project was supposed t o
start. And now during autumn, we worked in the new project during
day-time and went over t o the old customer company in the even-
ings. The project was miscalculated from the beginning, it became
much larger than we had expected." (Matthew, computer program-
mer)

Usually, most projects are quite interesting despite the time strains,
since each new project is always different from the previous ones in at
least some dimension. What happens is that many individuals start
t o wonder about their professional development and what kinds of
careers that they might be able t o pursue. The 'reward' for committing
oneself t o a demanding project is often expectations on an even higher
degree of commitment to another demanding project. In their current
occupation, the future is perceived as an endless row of new projects,
and it is not unusual to find young people who want to leave the pro-
ject-based operations (i.e. the revenue generating activities of the organ-
izations) for 'strategic' and often less profitable tasks:

"Between us, I've told my bosses that I have now been project man-
ager for eight years, and that I find it damn boring. I don't want t o
d o this full time, anymore, so we have been discussing other tasks.
And one task is projects. Another task is knowledge development,
quality development, methods development, coaching junior consul-
tants and so on." (Edith, project manager)

If conceived in an unrealistic manner, each project becomes an urgent

matter for the team members. The team members, whose main respon-
sibility is t o deliver the project according t o specifications, must then
find ways to speed up the project process (i.e. by working more hours
per day). In some consultancy companies, consultants are also respon-
sible for generating a certain income, i.e. by charging the customers a
specific number of hours per year at a fixed hourly fee. If the market
JOHANN PACKENDORFF

price for consultancy hours falls below that fixed fee, it means that
consultants will have to add free hours in order t o generate the same
income. The result is often a vicious circle, where urgent situations are
resolved through heroic action, and heroic action becomes the taken-
for-granted solution to urgent situations (cf Perlow, 1997). No one
questions why the urgent situations appeared in the first place.
In order to enhance project-based work for the individual, most people
point at the importance of realistic expectations on each new project
and the necessity of working with only one project at a time. The task
should be interesting and stimulating t o the team and also important
and wanted in the project environment. Moreover, projects should not
be too large andlor too long, and the individual should be able t o con-
trol her own working hours. In addition, finally, someone other than
the individual andlor the project manager should assume some respon-
sibility for career development and other long-term issues, getting an
overview of the individual's entire work situation. Most H R M proced-
ures have been designed for permanent organizations where each indi-
vidual. has a position, not for project-based organizations where pos-
itions are non-existent or are changed all the time (ECOSIP, rqy3).

Renewal project participation (type 11)

Except for the 'ordinary' repetitious project work (type I), it is also in-
creasingly common that individuals are involved in all sorts of renewal
projects in and in between organizations. For the participant, these
rcncwal projects are often unique efforts that are something different
as compared t o the everyday work situation, and usually the intention
is that the organization is to be brought to a higher and better level
through a temporary process (cf Blomquist & Packendorff, 1y98a).
Renewal projects often emerge from some sort of intentional strategy
to improve the functionality of the organization, often inspired by curr-
ent fashion in the management-consulting sector. Examples of such
are T Q M projects, quality certification projects, BPR projects and
Balanced Scorecard projects. In addition, there are also renewal pro-
jects emanating from the eternal need t o adapt the organization to new
external circumstances, such as merger projects, training projects, re-
organizations and closedowns. What are common t o all these episodes
is that they are a part of the everyday work in the organization and that
 THE T E M P O R A R Y SOCIE'I'Y A N D ITS E N E M I E S

only a few individuals represent each project. For some managers, the
incessant handling of such projects may lead to a work situation resem-
bling the one in Type I, i.e. a situation in which most of the time is
spent implementing renewal projects (cf I,undin, ryyo).
The usual point of departure for the individual that becomes a par-
ticipant in a renewal project is that she should be able t o perform her
ordinary job while temporarily committing herself t o the project. For
the individuals that are attracted to the renewal effort by interest, this
is easier than for those who are automatically involved due to a certain
position in the organization. In any case, there are always time conflicts
between ordinary work and renewal project participation:

"Well, my priorities are with curing the patients, hut on the other
hand the management control systems must be redesigned, so...
Lately, I have been working ISOX,which is not good, you can't take
it for too long. I have green clothes on me, I might be called to surg-
ery any minute. I always work with the management control system
in the morning, but then I am on emergency duty. Sometimes I sit at
home working before the evening duty, so I hope that this manage-
ment control projcct can be finished somc day, so that everything
works again. It's the same though, for everybody." (George, clinic
head)

Of course, there are also several advantages for those who participate.
One important such advantage is that a renewal project is an opportun-
ity for the participant to widen her competence and show her abilities
t o others. In that way, these projects can become both learning exper-
iences and career steps:

"Concerning my managerial work here at the clinic, I have had the

worst three months ever. Nicole, my administrative assistant, was
headhunted t o a private company in the health care sector, and sudd-
enly I had to do everything myself. But I'm happy for Nicole. She
was an ordinary nurse when I employed her in the re-organization
effort, and she then proved to be an excellent clinic administrator.
Now she is country manager here in Sweden for a Danish firm.
Luckily, 1 have now been able to find a new assistant." (Barbara, clin-
ic head)
JOHANN PACKENDORFF

A problem with renewal projects is that there often tend to be too

many of them in contemporary organizations. In complex organiza-
tions such as health care, many parallel renewal projects with different
'senders' often end up on the middle managers' desk at the same time,
and for non-managerial participants it might look like the organization
is just processing an incessant flow of new change projects that never
become as revolutionary as they are supposed to. The 'good renewal
project', from an individual standpoint, is based on an important cause
and well planned from the beginning so that participants can make the
necessary adjustments in their ordinary schedules. It is also a project
that actually ends in a manner that can be subject to evaluation, and it
is important that all participants feel recognized for their efforts.
Voluntary participation is, of course, an advantage, but it often leads
to problems for the renewal project manager:

"One of the main problems is that I have the duty to implement this
project, but I have no authority to force anyone else to participate if
they don't want to. I f Sophie says that she has to take care of a sales
conference instead, I just have to accept that. It does not happen all
the time, but there are some clear drawbacks with voluntary partici-
pation. What I can do is to be damn nagging. As the project goes on,
I just become increasingly nagging and persistent. Everyone else has
something else to do, this is not their main concern, so to speak."
(Bill, public relations manager)

The individual is thus often left on her own balancing the ordinary job
and the renewal project. Unlike the case of project-based work (type I),
there are often no clear indications from management on how to be-
have in these situations, and many individuals feel that they never prior-
itise the right things. For some, this dilemma is temporary by nature,
since renewal projects tend to fade out after a while. However, those
who are recognized for good performance in renewal projects are usu-
ally those that are asked anew when new reforms are initiated.

Temporary work (type 111)

'Temporary work' refers to a work situation in which the individual
works in and by similar projects on a regular basis, but where the organ-
 THE TEMPORARY SOCIETY A N D ITS ENEMIES

izational context is less important or even non-existent. For example,

this is the case for many self-employed and/or free-lancing individuals
who assume responsibility for temporary assignments - consultants,
journalists, actors etc. In this category we can also include 'temps' (here
used in the sense introduced by Garsten, 1999); individuals who are
not necessarily involved in projects, but who work with temporary
assignments in their ordinary work. This means that they have some
formal organizational affiliation to some sort of consulting firm, but
that they spend their whole time in different customer organizations as
temporary employees with routine assignments. Many temps work
mostly by themselves without being surrounded by a team, and they
are not expected to become permanent members of the customer organ-
ization, which means that they keeplare kept at some distance (cf
Garsten, 1999; Lindgren et al, 2001). This kind of projecticised work
is not usually subject to deadlines, but it is still limited in time and
implies a high degree of social discontinuity for the individuals. In this
type, project work is still routine-based, since the individual learns how
to handle new projects and perhaps builds up long-term relations with
some customers and project owners (i.e. makes the situation more sim-
ilar to type I).
Even though the most obvious example of temporary workers are
those who only get temporary jobs or those who are permanently
employed in a staffing firm but temporarily "rented out" to customer
companies, there are also many others that are mainly affiliated to pro-
jects - such as consultants spending all their time at the customers' off-
ices. While project work in this respect shares many of the attributes
mentioned above, there are also some specific ones for this kind. One
important such attribute is the lack of organizational affiliation, imply-
ing a kind of loneliness and shifting social contexts at work:

"Loyalties are a bit moved there. Concerning the big telecom com-
pany, it's an old account that we have been building up for three years,
and we have not switched people there often enough. We cannot have
the same people in the same customer's office too long, because then
they start to identify themselves with the customer's organization. We
had one guy who quit, he is still there but he is not with us anymore.
Now, we have taken care of that problem -half a year with the same
customer is the upper limit." (Douglas, project manager)
J O H A N N PACKEYDORFF

Except for a lack of close relations and friendship at work, not being a
permanent member of an organization also means a lack of expect-
ations on long-term contributions to the organization. They are not
expected t o be present for a long time and they do not expect that from
themselves either - the result is a temporary, detached, superficial organ-
izational membership cpisode. Temporary workers are there to fulfill a
task or deliver a project, and it is up t o them to handle their own
competence development and find career opportunities. In addition,
aside from the lack of social affiliation, temporary workers with tem-
porary employment contracts are also exposed t o an economic preca-
riousness:

"It depends entirely on their status, who they are. There is a pro-
letariat of unemployed actors with very little to do. At least where live
theatre is concerned, therc are always a lot of movies and commer-
cials produced. But in live theatre, it's sad - of course you can live
on it, but you have to work with contacts everywhere, d o commer-
cials et cetera." (Stephen, theatre director)

Among temporary workers, it is not unusual to strive for a situation

where permanent employment contracts and/or affiliation to a perma-
nent organization can be achieved (i.e. type I). Alternatively, the indi-
vidual may try to develop a specific competence that she can bring t o
the market herself, i.e. moving towards independent entrepreneurship
(type IV). It is hard t o d o both things at the same time, since it means
combining short-term execution of income-yielding projects with long-
term networking and competence development. In that sense, tem-
porary work as it has been described here is not a stable mode of work
for the individual (which is also the case in renewal project participa-
tion, i.e. type 11). This is also something that many employers of tem-
porary workers, such as staffing firms, have realized:

"...a lot of those who we rent out are employed by the companies to

which they are rented out, and suddenly they realize something. This
is actually not that bad, you can try two or three companies during
a year and then you can feel for yourself if you would like to work
for that company or not. You learn how the company works, you
broaden your network, and then you might be offered employment.
Then the employer and the employee have tested each other, it be-
 'THE TEMPORARY SOCIETY A N D l'l'S E N E M I E S

comes like a mutual test employment during the renting period.

Then you become employed and everything is fine." (Neil, staffing
firm employee)

Independent entrepreneurs (type IV)

independent entrepreneurs, finally, are often also working as consul-
tants for customer firms, but they can also be specialists or artists who
do temporary work for others on a self-employment basis. People that
voluntarily commit themselves to different sorts of non-salaried work
or community work are also t o be found in this category. Since the
tasks can vary a lot, each project is an exceptional one, and requires a
lot of experience and creativity. The freelancing entrepreneur can fill a
usual consultant role, but helshe can also serve as sub-contractor to
larger project organizations. They lack any organizational affiliation;
instead, they commit themselves to each project and build a profession-
al network of other individuals in their "industry". This means a high
degree of social discontinuity, and usually also deadline-related stress
and an "invoicc pressure" to generate enough revenues to keep the per-
sonal economy going even during periods between projects or in com-
petence development. Their life is flcxible and full of exceptions, and it
can sometimes be hard t o combine with a re-utilized private life. In a
way, it resembles the classic entrepreneurial life path, but with the
exception that they do not always start firms (cf Kupferberg, 1998).

"I think that I've always done that - if I had no money, I lust took
any job I could gct. I worked during holidays in some ski resort or
distributed newspapers in the mornings and things like that. So there
are always jobs available if you want some money. I think like that
now also, with my new company, that if I get no assignments I could
always jump in as schoolteacher or so. There are plenty of jobs that
I could have for a while - not until I'm 65 of course, rather to make
sure there is some money." (Sheila, consultant)

The main motivator for independent entrepreneurs is usually a burning

desire t o make an idea come true. If it appears that it is not possible t o
transform the idea into a real project within the boundaries of perm-
anent organizations, the individual feels that the wisest thing to do is
J O H A N K PACKENDORFF

to do it outside these boundaries. The project itself may have deadlines as

identified in funding application procedures or seasonal target market
variations, but the main restriction is often the time and the resources
that the independent entrepreneur can put into the endeavor. Conse-
quently, the progress of the project is usually a result of the individual's
ability to organize scarce resources in terms of money, time and (often
voluntary) human resources in her social network:

"When first came to this school with my daughter, this old feeling
came over me from the time when I went here myself. The house, the
classrooms, the old-fashioned pedagogy. I did not want that for her,
so I decided that I just had to contribute something to the school. I
am a doctor, and I have worked with drug problenls for many years.
So, I became a board member of the parents association and initia-
ted several projects. Right now, it is not easy, because I have a lot to
do at work and I also have this 'prom project' where a group of
parents try to organize and attract sponsors for the best student ball
ever. But then, I will start again with the drug issues. It is just
something that I have t o do, since the school cannot make it on their
own." (Claire, parent)

As a professional career, independent entrepreneurship does not imply

a predictable, straightforward path - it is rather to do like the nomads
(Cadin et al, 2000); to do what seems interesting and get increasingly
immersed into relevant social networks that can provide some sense of
belonging and economic security (cf Jones, 1996). One consequence
might be that the individual is offered a somewhat permanent position
based on her experience and previous performance, a position that can
always be left if something else appears:

"I have always worked by projects, except for my new firm - so far
at least. Somehow, I think this is a consequence of starting my pro-
fessional life in the cultural sector. You don't get many permanent
jobs there, rather short assignments. Therefore, I have just slipped
into different ventures from time to time - events, exhibitions, husi-
ness advising, regional development, and voluntary work. I actually
enjoy working in ventures where I know that my effort is limited in
time - I cannot imagine working at the same place until I am 6 5
years old. In a way, my career is thus a result of my personality. It is
 T H E TEMPORARY SOCIETY A N D ITS ENEIMIES

satisfying t o see the results of your actions, but I am often anxious

when we are approaching deadlines - what am I t o d o afterwards?
There could be a transitory period before the next project starts. I
often think that I should actually enjoy a permanent position if the
work content was the right one -if you don't like it, you can always
quit." (Sheila)

Project work forms and life

in the projecticised society
Given the multitude of projects t o which modern individuals are expo-
sed, one might ask if this is "just" a work form without connections t o
life in general. No, it is not. One reason for this is the temporal conn-
ection between work and private life. Projects must be delivered on
time, and the individual must therefore be ready t o allocate the necess-
ary time to them - time that must be taken from somewhere else, usu-
ally from private life (Eaton & Bailyn, 2000).
Another - more subtle - reason is that projects have become a fig-
ure of thought, implying that life can and will consist of a number of
temporary efforts, critical incidents, adventures etc., that are stimula-
ting and sometimes leads onwards and upwards. The individuals con-
struct these temporary efforts in order t o increase the ability t o affect
their life paths in desired directions, and they often become milestones
in their subjectively constructed life stories (Lindgren et al, 2001).
Examples of experiences thus subject t o projectization are employ-
ments, organizational affiliations, moves, holiday activities, episodes in
the raising of children or in the marriage, social activities etc.
These life form implications of project work are, of course, not
always evident. Establishing a narrative connection between long work-
ing hours and a lack of time for family life is easier than claiming that
a projecticised work situation implies a tendency towards viewing eve-
rything in life in terms of temporary sequences of action. It is also not
often possible to relate different forms of project work to different sorts
of projecticised life forms, since many of the consequences of project
work to private life are the same. In all four types of project work
discussed above, individuals are exposed to time limits (urgency) and
increased demands on generating own income (self-marketing). The
work situation thus becomes a result of the individual's own priorities,
JOHANN PACKENDORFF

made in an often ambiguous context (self-responsibility).What is diff-

erent is how different individuals handle these work characteristics in
relation to life in general, but before going into that question, we will
briefly return to our narrators concerning how urgency, self-marketing
and self-responsibility affect their life forms in general:

Self-responsibility means flexible working hours. A common experience

of many project-working individuals is that it is up to them to decide
how to allocate their time and efforts - the individual in the workplace
is becoming increasingly de-contextualized. In the traditional debate
about industrial working conditions, this has been depicted as an ideal
to strive for, but for many project workers this is actually a problem.
The individual is always under the command of one or several project
managers naturally wanting the best for their respective projects, and
there might be other managers demanding attention for different tasks.
Often, there is no one else but the individual herself that monitors her
entire work situation, and she must thus be able to negotiate against a
number of superiors with sometimes fuzzy and conflicting claims while
still giving the impression of being ambitious and career-oriented
(Eaton & Bailyn, 2000). Since that is not always possible - even in a
rather non-hierarchical country like Sweden - the individual is often
left on her own to prioritise between different tasks and allocate time
to them, respectively. In the end, this usually means flexible working
hours, i.e. a flexibility to work extra hours when someone else needs it.

Flexible work hours mean flexible family hours. Working extra hours,
often at short notice due to emergencies, also means that these hours
must be taken from somewhere. Sincc most individuals need a fixed
amount of sleep, the extra hours must be taken from the time that
would otherwise have been spent with families and friends. In the wake
of such behavior, divorces and an eroded social network follow. In
addition, since the individual spends most of her time working, work
also tends to occupy the mind - even when home with the family, the
individual reflects upon work and discuss it with her spouse and frie-
nds.

"...the important thing at my previous job was that when the new
legislation was issued, thc projects should be delivered. There, I led
some small projects and also a project big as hell with a large bud-
 TIIF, T F M I ' O K A R Y SOCIETY A N D ITS ENEMITS

get and a team of 16 people. That broke me down, I could say,

because I worked 65 hours and six days a week. And that was about
the third time that I had no friends left - you lose them, because you
are not very outgoing when you are always at work." (Edith, project
manager)

Flexible family hours imply a need for family projects or a need for
nothing. Given the quite unpredictable and often short time periods
that many project workers can spend with families and friends, there
often evolves a deeply felt urge t o make as good use as possible of the
few precious hours actually available. Otherwise, time will just pass
without being devoted to something special, something that could at
least partially make up for the usual absence. And what is the best way
of achieving something special given a short amount of time and a stream
of everyday routines that can easily consume all the time available? To
organize projects, of course!
One - quite evident - alternative t o create family projects as a
response to work projects, is t o do nothing. Constantly being under a
high and complex workload may deprive the individual of the energy
and creativity needed to initiate something special in her private life,
and off-work hours will thus be spent relaxing and recovering:

"Mostly I spend timc with my family, with my spouse and our kids.
Those outside that... I see my brother occasionally, some close frie-
nds now and then, but they don't get much time, they are in the
outcr layer. But all our acquaiiltances have small children, they know
how it is [laughter]. When you come home you are so damn tired of
order, planning and structures, you don't want to accept that at
home. You cannot be a project manager at home also." (Douglas,
project manager)

Single life and non-employment - ways to handle flexible work hours?

Among our project workers, a substantial portion seems to have reali-
zed that it is quite hard to combine project-based work wlth traditio-
nal life forms such as the core family. Earlier, one individual could usu-
ally support a family, that was taken care of by the other parent during
work hours - i.e. the traditional life form combination of salaried work
practice and housewife practice (Jakobsen & Karlsson, 1993). Today,
this life form has changed into a dual career practice in which both
JOHAPV'N PACKENDORFF

parents pursue professional careers while at the same time trying to

find time to raise children and preserve the mutual love that once was
the basis on which their family was founded (Andersson, 1993). If one
or both are also then involved in work practices such as project work,
this might be too hard for many to handle with satisfying results. In-
stead, individuals choose alternative life forms in order to escape the
strains. One such life form of growing importance is single life, i.e. life
without a partner:

"I live as a single downtown - I like to be out, see people, read, take
in pictures, go to the opera. When I work I am totally into it, I can-
not do it otherwise. Then there are some things that have to be put
aside, and that is not so damn funny. Smart guys don't fall down
from the sky [laughter]. But this is quite acceptable. Of course there
is always the hunting season, and I am a part of that, to find the right
guy. But living as a single is not that strange anymore, quite accep-
ted, actually." (Edith)

"A colleague of mine in another authority, Jenny, she has told me

what has happened there as the workload became even heavier.
Couples with children actually divorce, because then they know that
they will at least have every second week available for work only!"
(Mary, project leader)

An alternative life form is to choose family life over professional life,

establishing a non-costly life that does not presuppose high and ever
increasing incomes. This is sometimes the case among independent en-
trepreneurs, who find their life form outside established career practi-
ces:

"Our house was a cheap one, and we have almost no debts on it.
And a very old, very cheap car. And when my husband was to start
his company, we did not calculate on how much he could earn. We
calculated backwards; how much did we need each month to keep
the family going? We also realized that we could skip some costs -
we did not need any childcare since we were both to work from
home. Things like that, counting on a life style, sort of." (Sheila)
 THE TEMPORARY SOCIETY .AND ITS E N E M l h S

Who are the enemies of the temporary society?

The basic question discussed in this chapter is if the projectization of
society has implied a better life for individuals, at the workplace and in
life in general. What is clear is that work has changed - not for all, but
for many. The range of different forms of employment and work organ-
ization is wider than ever, and project-related work forms are just one
aspect of this development. What is also clear is that changes in work
practices has implied new possibilities for individuals t o re-construct
their lives, even though the remaining institutional structures in socie-
ty has made such re-construction a marginal phenomenon so far. How-
ever, it is also clear that these changes are not making life easier for the
inhabitants of the temporary society - unless they make conscious
efforts to escape them.
From the empirically informed discussions above, we can identify
some features of life in the temporary society from an individual per-
spective. First, in its clear-cut form, temporary society will imply an
increased de-coupling of the individual from her context. Both work
and life in general will be episodic by nature, and there will be an in-
creasing lack of permanent structures, organizations, core families,
bases for social identity construction etc - parts of the context will
disappear in its current forms. Second, the temporary society will be
more open, less predictable, and thus more risky to live in. To an in-
creased extent, the individual will assume responsibility for personal
success and failure herself, which points towards an increased inclina-
tion to view life as a risky path that must be analyzed and calculated.
Third, the remaining permanent structures in society will require even
more co-construction by individuals and organizations in order t o sur-
vive - structures that we still want, structures that provide a sense of
security and belonging. We still want organizations, families, old friends
- all which make life somewhat habitual, not only changing. In this
defense of permanence, organizations of today are not always support-
ive when designing working conditions for individuals. If they do not
want to become temporary phenomena themselves, they should be.
When Karl Popper wrote his essay "The open society and its enem-
ies" (1945),he challenged Plato's philosophies and Marxism by dispu-
ting their scientific claims and advocating a society where free indivi-
duals changed things stepwise in interaction. Of course, neither Plato
nor Marx could directly be seen as enemies of open society at that time.
Rather, the enemies were those who fought for their - according to
Popper, totalitarian - ideas in the allowing comfort of the very society
that they wanted to do away with.
The individuals behind the narratives quoted in this chapter have
chosen different ways to work and live, and they have different exper-
iences of living in the temporary society. At the same time, they all find
projcctization problematic. While work secm to have become partly
more stimulating and individualized, it has also colonized the lives of
individuals and left them on their own. In many ways, the enemies of
the temporary society could be the individuals that construct it - the
very same individuals that we thought to be its proponents and its
beneficiaries. It is as if we like the idea of leaving the hierarchical mass
society behind, without wanting to live with the consequences of its
alternative. Just as in the classical conflict between 'open' and 'closed'
societies, the temporary society cannot win without losing its attrac-
tiveness. To individuals, projects imply a lot of hardship but also
something different, exciting and entrepreneurial. Rut we d o not want
that all the time. do we?
 Introduction
There are many signs that economic activity is becoming organized in
a looser way. The traditional hierarchical organization is being trans-
formed and in many cases replaced. Temporary organizational solu-
tions are used to an increasing degree. Sometimes these solutions repla-
ce permanent flow-process organizations but more often project-organ-
ized activity is combined with permanent organizations. This ongoing
transformation is likely to have an impact on many aspects of econo-
mic life, not least the institutions. The formal and informal rules and
roles, which have been molded by a society dominated by traditional
industrial companies, are challenged.
In this article I will discuss how the increased use of projects will
affect the relations between different actors in the economy. New cost
profiles for transactions will change the conditions for contracts of
work. Even if changed relations between organizations and customers
(the market) are the likely driving forces in this process, the transform-
ation will also influence the contractual relations between the organ-
izations and the individuals. In the last years a lot of attention has been
paid to thc increasing numbers of non-permanent employment ("pro-
ject work") and the deterioration of formal contractual relations
(Aronsson, 1999; Quinland et al., 2000). In this article the focus will
be on informal contractual relations. These are, of course, harder to
grasp than the formal ones and also much less studied. Still I think that
they have a profound and long-run impact on how, when and where
people will work. The change from one kind of transaction costs to
another will affect the preconditions for the logistics, the timing and
the location of economic activity. But before entering the discussions
on contractual relations some tendencies of the general organizational
transformation must be outlined.

Towards a project-based economy

In yesterday's economy the industrial companies were the role models
of organizing. Today industrial robots and computerized procedures
have taken over much of the physical production, which in turn
accounts for the trend that direct industrial employment is decreasing
in most developed countries, while industrial production is still going
up (Vivarelli & Pianta, 2000). The percentage of the work force in
industry (manufacturing sector) in the most industrialized countries
has decreased during the last decades. At the same time there has been
a long run increase in what is called production services in e.g. USA,
UK, Canada, France, Germany and Sweden since the 1920s (Singel-
man, 1978; Aoyama & Castells, 1994; Castells, 1996; Myrholm & U11-
strom, 1997). The most rapid expansion in the last decade is to be
found in the data consulting industry (Johansson, 2001). These com-
panies are deploying services directly supporting industrial companies.
Consequently the reduction of industrial employees (at least in relative
terms) is actually compensated for by a rapid increase of persons occu-
pied in industry-close service companies, i.e. independent companies
working with project assignments for industry (Eliasson, 1992; Illiris,
1996). The activities of the service sector are thus first of all a comple-
ment t o industry and consequently not compensating for industrial
activities, contrary to the ideas put forward in the debate on the Ser-
vice Economy (Gurshuny & Miles, 19 8 3).
Resides these changes at the macro level there are also signs of a
more extensive use of projects inside organizations. All in all one can
say that this "neo-industrial" develo p ment goes with another kind of
organizing between as well as inside economic units. In other words,
we are not experiencing the end of industry, or of industrial produc-
tion, but we see that industry is changing and taking on new, alterna-
tive forms where production per se is less in focus as compared to
 CONTRACTS OF WORK I N A PKOIECT-HASEU E C O N O M Y

previously. The demand side, for example, marketing, customer focus

and creation of brand names occupy management more and more (Ek-
stedt et al., 1999).
The use of projects or temporary organizations is one of the main
features in the described neo-industrial economy. By projects, one can
of course understand different things. As a minimum they seem, how-
ever, t o have the three t's in common: time, task and team. Projects are
mostly defined by the task they are supposed to fulfill during a specific
time. The resources available for the task are often described in terms
of a team (Lundin & Soderholm, 199s). In most cases members of a
project understand the meaning or the intent of the organizational set-
up, while it is common that members of a permanent organization only
understand parts of its activity and goals. Projects and temporary organ-
izations are superior to permanent organizations in some crucial
respects. They are action oriented and focused, at the same time as they
allow for flexibility. They are however generally inferior to permanent
organizations in other areas. The decision oriented permanent organ-
izations have mechanisms for knowledge formation that enables them
t o act on solid grounds. The apparatus for rhetoric production in these
organizations helps them strengthen their brand name. A Company
with a strong brand name may on the other hand harbor and create
many projects (Ekstedt et al., 1999). In theory it therefore seems to be
a natural division of work between permanent and temporary organ-
izations, while in practice this division often is hard t o accomplish.
The more extensive use of projects and temporary organizations
coincides with changes in formal work contracts in many countries.
Some authors have tried t o measure the changes of contractual rela-
tionships on a European level. The variations in concepts and defini-
tions make such an effort difficult, however. Yet, by avoiding expre-
ssions like "precarious" workers, project work and "contingent" labor
and instead focusing on general concepts like non-permanent work,
part-time work and self-employment it is possible to come to some con-
clusions about the development of formal time-contracts. In the 1980s
and 1990s there was an increase in part-time jobs and non-permanent
jobs. The number of non-permanent contracts in the EU reached a peak
of 1 5 percent in the middle of the 1990s Since then it has stabilized or
even decreased (Goudswaard & Andries, zoor). To estimate the num-
ber of self-employed is more complicated as the distinction between
self-employment and wage employment is rather weak. One author
(Letourneux, 1998) calculates that self-employment accounts for 18
percent of total employment in the Union, while others (Goudswaard
& Andreis, 2001) who refer to the Third European Survey on Working
Conditions, conclude that the proper figure should be around 10 per-
cent. These differences give rise t o questions about definitions. For
example, t o which category, does a self-employed person, who only
works for one company, belong?

Time aspects of organizations and employment

Two major tendencies have been focused on up t o now. O n the one
hand an increasing use of project organized economic activity can be
seen in the long run and on the other an expansion of temporary (non-
permanent) employment in the short run. Both are likely t o have an
impact on the contractual relations of working life. There is certainly
no simple relation between project organization and temporary (pro-
ject) employment. There are for example persons who have a perma-
nent job in project-organized activity. Most consultants work under
this type of arrangement. In those industries, as well as in others, there
are also those who are temporarily employed for a specific project,
while others could be self-employed. In the Swedish construction
industry, workers are not employed for a particular project, but by the
Construction Company. In other countries, for example England, crafts-
men are often seasonally employed. Actually there seem t o be several
forms of flexibility in operation at the same time (Atkinson, 1984).
In the following I will try to structure the discussion around these
relations. In the book " Neo-industrial organizing - renewal by action
and knowledge formation in a project-intensive economy" we combi-
ned forms of organizing (flow-process operations versus project opera-
tions) and forms of employment (permanent employment versus tem-
porary employment) (Ekstedt et al., 1999). This model is going to be
further elaborated in this article with respect t o changed market rela-
tions, changed transaction costs and changed contractual relations.
The starting point is the four idealized types of organizations one recei-
ves from the above-mentioned combination. We name them respective-
ly: Industrial organizations, Non-permanent activity, Project-based
organizations and Self-employed professionals. These relations are pre-
sented in figure 4: I :
 C O N T K A C ' r S OF W O R K IN A PROJECT-BASED ECONOMY

I PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

lndushial Organizations B. N o n ermanent activity

FLOW-
PROCESS
- Traditional industrial compa-
nies, call centers, component
OPERATIONS producers and public services.
Characterized by: Assembly
line production, multi-level
managerial decisions, stationary
real capital, bureaucracy.
Strong PO and weak TOs
- lndivi B
uals on temporary
assignment in A or C.
- Temporary agencies which
lease out staff to client compa-
nies: E.g. typewriting/office/-
specialist service.
Characterized by: PO with
broker function

C. Project-based organizations D. Selfemployed professionals

PROJECTIZED - Commissioned companies;
OPERATIONS technical, organizational, IT,
management consultancies and
subcontractors.
Characterized by: Recurring
pro'ects operations. Weak PO
d
on strong TOs
- Contractors hosting and crea-
ting projects; Construction, ICT
and entertainment companies.
Characterized by: Small PO
with strategic functions,
harboring project teams for
development and production
- Individuals who sell their
services to A and C, or who
create projects ('free agents'):
E.g. Freelance writers/
journaIists/artists/craftsmen,
consultants, construction
workers
Characterized by: Absence of
PO

( PO = Permanent organizations, TO = Temporary Organizations

I
Figure 4:1 The relationship between the organizational form o f economic act-
ivity and the time-contract between the organization and the individual.

The characteristics of the organizations in the different categories of

the model and the examples discussed in the following are based on the
findings from three major empirical research projects recounted in
three different books. The first one deals in depth with organizational
forms and knowledge formation in the capital intensive paper and pulp
industry, the labor intensive construction industry and the knowledge
intensive IT-industry ( Ekstedt, 1988). The second is about knowledge
formation and renewal in the construction sector (Brochner et al,
1992). Besides more than 60 interviews with actors from different parts
of the Swedish construction sector, also Japanese, American, French
and British companies were interviewed. In the last book we have
ESKIL EKSTEDT

closely followed renewal projects over long periods of time in both

flow process and projectized organizational contexts (Ekstedt et al.,
1999). Some of the organizations are multinational companies and a
number of the interviews have taken place outside Sweden. Since 1999
1 have also conducted a large number of interviews about the organ-
izational structure in ICT companies, manpower-leasing companies
(temporary agencies) and in call-center activities.
Permanent employment is a standard for organizations that mainly
organize their activity as flow-process operations and the A quadrant
is thus the typical combination for the industrial organizations. A large
part of public service production and call-center activity for example,
also belong there. The production of standardized products or equiv-
alent services in long series provides a foundation for stable relations
between actors. In heavy industry the stability is further strengthened
by immobile machinery, built to function for many years.
The car factory has often been seen as the role model for traditional
industrial companies. The discussion about "lean production" which
had a great impact on organizational change in many branches in the
1990s stems from examples of Japanese car manufacturing. After
reconstruction and a further division of activities in industrial comp-
anies the subcontracting producers of components remain an important
category in quadrant A. The structural changes also develop into other
kinds of support activities. The growing ICT and media sectors have a
great demand for instant customer support. Different kinds of "call
centers" have been established in many places. The telephone or IT-
based services these factory-like companies offer in most cases only
demand short introductory training. In areas severely hit by transfor-
mation of traditional industry, like the mining and forest industries, the
reduction of employment opportunities has been compensated by this
kind of activity. In some places there even seem to be clusters of comp-
anies in this branch (Ljusdal). There are companies in small cities with
as many as 1000 persons under the same roof (Karlskoga).
Even if traditional industrial organizations are dominated by perma-
nent organizations they d o run projects themselves. Project organiza-
tion is particularly frequent in connection with development work. Per-
sons from different parts of the hierarchy can participate in projects.
But so can also persons from other companies, like subcontractors,
customers or independent consulting companies. In, for example, the
forest industry these constellations often include members of special-
 CONTRACTS O F W O R K IN A PROJECT-BASED ECONOMY

ized international companies dealing with both technological and orga-

nizational aspects of the trade (Ekstedt, 1988).
The combination of flow-process operations and temporary employ-
ment is less common, but seems to be gaining ground. We name the B
quadrant Non-permanent activity. It includes both organizations and
individuals in temporary employment. More and more companies,
which lease manpower t o other companies, are established. These firms
have a broker function; their customers eliminate costly search proce-
sses to recruit staff for tasks that are only of short duration. But there
are also other arrangements belonging to this group. With modern
"distance-bridging" technology permanent or part-time "homework"
and work in a specific tele-workplace is a potential way of organizing
economic activities in many areas. There are estimations that around
30 percent of people working in an office will work part-time or full-
time in a tele-workplace in 2010 (Cuhls, Blind & Grupp, 1998).
The manpower-leasing companies (temporary agencies) have prim-
arily occupied themselves with rather routine activity, such as typing and
office service. The spheres of activity seem to become broader as well as
more advanced at the present time, however. Individuals with long for-
mal education and training are hired. It is not uncommon that various
economic and bookkeeping functions are offered (insourcing). Special
agents are also working with the leasing of physicians and nurses. This
organizational form requires a short period of acclimatization, though,
and the work tasks consequently have to be rather standardized or per-
formed by independent professionals as in the case of the physicians.
The scale of this activity seems to vary between different countries.
In Sweden hardly one percent of the labor force is involved in this
group, while in the Netherlands the corresponding figure is much higher
(according to the Dutch Employers Union statistics). Figures for all of
Europe are difficult to estimate and even if there has been a rapid in-
crease in most countries they still rarely exceed 2 percent (Gouds-
waard, 2001).
The fast growth of individuals working on short assignments in diff-
erent companies is much greater than work in temporary agencies. In
Sweden the number of males in this kind of activity has increased from
less than 3 percent to almost 8 percent from 1989 to 1999. The corres-
ponding figures for females are somewhat higher (Statistics Sweden).
The figures for Europe are around I 5 percent, as mentioned before.
It is towards the combination of projectized operations and perma-
nent employment that the long-run development is directed in the first
place. For the sake of simplicity we name organizations in the C
quadrant Project-based organizations. The construction companies
have worked in this way naturally and by tradition. In one single work-
ing site up to one hundred organizations in a sub-contracting system
can be engaged. There are however, variations in the organizational
solutions of the construction sector even if they mostly belong t o this
quadrant. A traditional solution is when a general contractor uses both
in-house and hired units for a project (Sweden, Germany). But the solu-
tion gaining ground in many places is the project management model
(USA). In this model the management company uses subcontractors for
all activities but the relations t o the customer and the management of
the projects. Their main resource is knowledge of project management
(BrGchner et al., 1992; Ekstedt, Lundin & Wirdenius, 1992). The organ-
izational solutions in the construction sector can be seen as the role
model for all projectized activity. It is common that experienced project
managers from the construction sector are recruited t o run projects in
other parts of the economy.
IT, management and technical consultants are examples of specialist
companies that carry out assignments within their specialist field in
large companies. An advanced consulting activity has been a natural
and increasing part of a successful industrial activity. In these compa-
nies there are just a few people dealing with long-run overhead func-
tions. Most of the action, especially that close t o the customer, takes
place in projects. But also in some of the major companies the focus has
been altered. The new core activity, like development and the creation
of unique solutions for customers has been projectified. Large, former
industrial companies have therefore actually moved to the C quadrant.
Small permanent organizations with strategic functions and a strong
brand name harbor project teams for both development and produc-
tion consisting of persons affiliated to a lot of different organizations.
Even if the concept Project-based organizations tries to describe rela-
tions inside organizations there seem t o be similarities and also links t o
the concept of cluster, which describes relations bctween companies
and branches (I-'orter,rqq8). When a contractor designs a project the
team members often represent many different but related organiza-
tions. The team members are chosen within a cluster of a specific
knowledge sphere. But the links between the companies in an industrial
park can also be of help when forming a project. The small scale ski-
 CONTRACTS O F W O R K I N A F R O J E C T ~ B A S E DE C O N O M Y

lift producer "Liftbyggarna" in Odenskog industrial park in Ostersund

has transformed its activity in a dramatic way during the last ten years.
In the beginning of this period the personnel of the company designed,
produced, installed and sold the equipment all by themselves. Today,
most of the production is outsourced to small engineering companies
in the park. The top manager now and then walks by his neighbors t o
encourage them to deliver in time, glad not t o be responsible for the
supervision and organizing of that work. Instead he and his fellow co-
workers can concentrate on designing lift system solutions according to
their customers' expectations and with a good knowledge of the place
where the future consumers will enjoy skiing (Ekstedt, 2 0 0 ~ ) .
In the combination of projcctized operations and temporary employ-
ment self-employed professionals can be found. And this is accordingly
our designation of the D quadrant. To stand a reasonable chance of
contributing to a project, the participants need t o have a good basic
knowledge on which to rely, but that is not sufficient. The individual
must also be renowned for keeping up with the competition in the mar-
ket. The reputation is usually due to the fact that the individual has
shown an extraordinary ability in some respect. To attain marketable
knowledge is often connected with heavy investment costs in the form
of extensive training in the "hard school of life", yet the reward may
be great. Being a well-known personality may itself be a part of it. For
writers, sportsmen in individual sports, freelance professionals within
different dominions or self-employed, the lack of permanent affiliation
to an organization could be a highly valued freedom.

From the permanent to the temporary

To sum up one can say that the organizational changes follow some
distinct patterns. First of all there has been an increased use of project
organized activity for several decades in most industrialized countries.
The growing number of people working in quadrant C is striking.
There is also an evident trend running from A t o B. One also has the
impression that the D quadrant is expanding, even if it is hard t o quan-
tify activities that are partly outside the open labor market. Still, per-
manent organizations will not disappear, as there always is a need for
long lasting structures, a kind of strategic infrastructure supporting
economic activity. They are for example superior when it comes to
E S K I L EKSTEDT

knowledge development and transfer (Ekstedt et al., 1999). Permanent

organizations are also needed to host temporary organizations and
there is still a lot of standardized production run by subcontractors
who are permanently organized. A main challenge for the managers
will be t o cope with the division of roles between the permanent and
the temporary.
The trend towards the temporary can also be noticed inside large
companies. The launching of ABB's Tso program not only emphasized
the need to make the production side more efficient. Methods of radi-
cal reduction of throughput times were introduced together with
efforts t o better meet the customers' demands (Boman, 1992). The first
goal, t o improve the lead time, was adopted by many actors, including
those in the public sector. The second goal, t o focus on customer
demands is signaling a more profound organizational change of trad-
itional industrial companies. The large hierarchical organizations
obviously found it increasingly difficult to engage their members in the
problems of their customers. This situation was once more stressed
when the telecom company Ericsson officially stated that they were t o
be seen as a "service" and not an industrial company; a message for the
market aimed t o put pressure on the co-workers of the organization.
This new road has since then been followed by Ericsson. Many pro-
duction units have been sold out. Small cities like Karlskrona, Soder-
hamn and Ostersund are becoming dependent on the international
(American) component producers of Flextronic, Emersson and
Solectron respectively. This kind of externalization or outsourcing is
even more pronounced in other branches. In the case of the aeroplane
producer SAAB Aircraft one can see that every new plane model has
been produced in a more externalized way. When it comes t o the last
models, SAAR Aircraft mainly holds a kind of systems responsibility. A
dominant part of the production is performed by subcontractors from
all over the world, while the company itself, deals with logistics, design,
research and development, marketing and finance (Henning & Nor-
gren, 1992). Today responsibility for the system has moved to even
larger actors, like Airbus.
The reasons for the expansion of the project organization can be
found on both the demand and the supply side of the economy. O n the
demand side one can point t o long run changes in consumer patterns.
The individualization process in industrial countries increases the need
for close contacts between the actors of the market (Ingelhart, 1990;
 CON'L'KACTS O F WORK IN A PROJECT-BASED E C O N O M Y

Ester, Halman & de Moor, 1994; Scott & Meyer, 1994). Customers
want to be able to influence the design and quality of goods and serv-
ices. Increased purchasing power together with the new demand patt-
erns call for more complex and advanced products. Material goods are
linked up with various types of unique services. Consequently, the com-
panies are offering products with an increasing experience and know-
ledge content. Direct dialogue or negotiation between the actors of the
market becomes more common. Unique demand can be met by advan-
ced knowledge specially designed or developed by the team members of
a project. By organizing the knowledge production in the form of a
project it is possible to exploit contributions stemming from different
specialties and traditions (Lundin & Midler, 1998b). A project team may
consist of people from the R&D department, the subcontractors, the
customers, the consultant companies and the universities. A "pluralis-
tic integration" of this kind opens up a development potential not ima-
ginable inside a development department with a permanent staff.
If the changed consumer patterns promote project solutions, they are
facilitated by the great flexibility that comes with the development of
the information and communication technology (ICT). Adaptation to
specific demands of individual customers becomes possible. ICT is a
tool able t o change both time and space aspects of the economy. It facil-
itates the interaction in work life and makes it possible t o gain instant
information on what is happening anywhere on earth. Modern control
engineering makes possible immense variations in the design of pro-
duction. Products and services can be combined in many ways (Beni-
ger, 1986). But the rapid development of ICT also influences the design
of organizations indirectly (Orlikowski, 1992). The division of labor
inside and between organizations can be altered: the physical potential
of decentralization knows almost no bounds. Managers may control an
economic activity where geographical distances are of little importan-
ce. Individuals performing the same work task can be separated, al-
though the exercise of supervision and power remains the same. Pro-
ject organized management, design-teams and development activity can
be combined with outsourced neo-tayloristic production of compo-
nents. Mentally, the decentralization of organizations may come t o a
limit, however, when direct human interaction and the organizational
identity which unites people fade away.
 Market relations, transaction costs
and contractual forms in different kinds of
organizations
The increased use of projects and temporary organizations is likely to
affect the contractual relations between companies (organizations) and
customers (the market) as well as between companies and individuals.
The question is how. The change of the formal contract is in most cases
rather easy to describe, as this is re p orted in regulations and legal texts.
The changed relation between permanent versus non-permanent
employment, for example, is in itself a reflection of changed formal
working contracts, at the same time as the increased use of temporary
employees is an indication of a growing importance of informal
contracts. The increased use of project organizations is an even strong-
er indication in that direction. Most informal contracts are however
very difficult to grasp. In the following I will approach this problem by
discussing the relations between organizations and customers and
between the organizations and the individuals in a theoretical context.
The relations between the organizations and their customers are impor-
tant as changed consumer patterns, as already discussed, can be seen as
the driving force in today's general transformation process. Changed
relations between companies and customers are also in many cases a
background to organizational changes inside companies.
Hirshman's categories of exit and voice will be used t o structure this
relation as they directly show informal contractual relations between
the two parties. The exit option is described as: "Some customers stop
buying the firm's products or some members leave the organization".
While voice is a totally different option:" The firm's customers or the
organization's members express their dissatisfaction directly to manage-
ment or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or
through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen". In
both cases the management must be engaged to search for the causes and
possible cures of customers' and members' dissatisfaction (Hirshman,
1970). The internal changes will in the following be illustrated by the
way in which transaction costs are distributed. This distribution of costs
is also a way of showing what kind of economic ties (informal contracts)
are at hand (Coase, 1988; North, 1990; Sjostrand 1993). These informal
contracts structure economic activity and are, for example, guiding the
actors when it comes to how, when and where to work.
 C O N T R A C T S O F WORK I N A PROJECT - RASED E C O N O M Y

This thinking will in the following be applied t o each of the four

quadrants of the model presented earlier. By pointing at the market
relations and transaction costs a framework for discussing informal
contractual forms evolves.

A. Industrial organizations
This model of organizing is first of all adapted to the production of
long series of standardized products. The market tests the attractive-
ness of the outcome. Exit mechanisms of a "take it or leave it" charac-
ter dominate even if there are exceptions. Some component producers
and call-centers are linked to one or just a few buyers. Other compo-
nent producers live in tough international competition dominated by
regular exit mechanisms. In the typical case of quadrant A there is a
minimum of relations between producers and customers. Consumers
are buying commodities without knowledge of how it was produced. A
lot of the components in, for example, electronic equipment are pro-
duced in developing countries under conditions of which we have lim-
ited knowledge. There can also be long periods of time between pro-
duction and purchase. In slack periods the companies' stocks build up.
Organizations in this quadrant are characterized by a hierarchical
decision system that keeps transaction costs down for intra-organiza-
tional search processes and time-consuming internal negotiations. The
organization can be efficient with a limited interaction between levels,
departments and individuals. This system is marred by considerable
monitoring costs, however. Decision-makers build up many levels
between themselves and those who in fact perform the economic act-
ivities. Special functions for supervision and control are built into the
system.
Long lasting formal contracts (often collective) have dominated this
kind o f organization in most industrial countries. This order has been
challenged in some major industrial companies during the last decade.
When for example ABB, at the end of the 1980's introduced the TSO
model (aiming at a reduction of lead time by 50 percent), one of the
most important tools was "the goal-directed groups", which can be
seen as a dramatic change of the working contract. Instead of being
exposed to colltinuous control the employees got the responsibility of
a whole working sequence; from order to delivery. This change could
ESKIL E K S T E D T

also be understood as a projectification process. ABB became more like

the companies in quadrant C (Ekstedt et al., 1999).
In the harsher economic climate in the middle of the decade and
among component producers, the development seemed, however, to be
going towards the opposite direction. One can even talk of neo-taylor-
istic tendencies. Sophisticated methods to measure time and work
efforts were developed (for example; demand flow technology). Some-
times, these models seem strikingly similar to traditional industrial
relations (Engstrand, 2001).

B. Non permanent activity

In this quadrant a substantial number of people with short work
assignments dominate. As we have seen, around 15 percent of the
labor-force in the EU are temporary employed. The rules are still for-
malized for most of these people, but apply only for shorter periods
and differ between groups of workers. For some groups there are even
obvious threats to the formal contracts. In Sweden, for example, there
are signs that some temporary employed do not dare to make use of
their legal right to five weeks of vacation (Aronsson, 1999).
A much smaller but growing category are those who work for
employment agencies. The agencies work as brokers, with close con-
tacts with the client companies. The contractual relations of these
companies are different from those of other companies. The individuals
are hired by the agency, while he or she is supervised by the client-
company. The agencies therefore have high search, information and
negotiation costs, while the monitoring costs are minimal and transf-
erred to others. The personnel hired solely are fully paid when wor-
king. During periods when no work is offered they consequently recei-
ve less compensation. How much less is regulated in some countries.
Work in this quadrant is characterized by flexibility. It is more or less
taken for granted that the employees shall show up at an appointed
workplace at short notice. The expected flexibility also includes comm-
uting to different places. For specialized labor, like physicians, it is not
unusual to commute to remote places where it is difficult to attract
individuals for permanent employment.
 CONTRACTS OF WORK IN A PROJECT-BASED E C O N O M Y

C. Project-based organizations
Traditionally, the industrial company participated in all kinds of act-
ivity; from production to market relations. It controlled the internal
resources, the subcontractors, the consultants and it also hosted the
development projects. The company was truly the nexus of all con-
tracts. It was also the bearer of the brand name; a brand name nec-
essary for success in the market. The expansion and spread of project-
based organizations challenge these structures of organizing. Most pro-
ject-based organizations work in close contact with their customers.
Commissioned companies form projects together with, for example,
development, design, planning and personnel units of industrial com-
panies. The economic activity is often closely related to the way in
which the demand of the customers is expressed. It is common that
sellers and buyers work together on the same projects. The exit mech-
anism of the market is to a noticeable extent being replaced by voice
and t o some degree loyalty. Loyalty or trust (a word frequently used
these days) may develop into situations where competition and market
relations are threatened. This dark side of the intimacy of economic
transactions has in periods been debated in the Swedish construction
sector, for example, but have almost been forgotten in modern discuss-
ions about networking (Brochner et al., 1992).
Some of the more successful companies have developed sophistica-
ted negotiations methods to handle the voices of their customers. The
multinational contractor Skanska performs most detailed contractual
discussions with its subcontractors. High negotiation costs in the early
planning stages of a project will be reimbursed if it contributes to fewer
mistakes when the whole production apparatus is involved later on
(Ekstedt & Wirdenius, 1995).
The relation to the customers is directly reflected in the internal
organization of project-based activities. Costs for monitoring (super-
vision) are minimized, as it is in the interest of the project members to
perform the assignment according to the description of the aims. They
of course want to be engaged also in future projects. Instead there are
high costs associated with contracts and negotiations. It is also likely
that collective contracts must make room for individual negotiations,
to support the project members in the unique situation of each project.
The ability of employees to negotiate will consequently be of immense
importance for their work conditions (Ekstedt et al., 1999).
 The project organization implies that both the spatial and the time-
based relations between the actors will be manifested in a number of
different arrangements. The work is performed in a great variety of
ways, in a great number of different constellations, and at a great num-
ber of places. Also the rate of working can vary quite a lot. Certain
periods in a project are characterized by low activity, while others are
marked by working round the clock. In many projects influence and
responsibility are to a great extent delegated irrespective of the kind of
formal rule system. Therefore this way of working could be experien-
ced as a threat to the present relations of the labor market. In the pro-
ject organization the work is goal and problem directed instead of rule
directed. Fulfilling the goals according t o a given agreement is the
central endeavor; how this is accomplished is left more open. A detail-
ed regulation of the relations between the actors could be perceived as
a hindrance.
The change from traditional industrial organizing to project organ-
izing may consequently be expressed as a shift from monitoring t o neg-
otiation costs, which has a dramatic impact on the contractual forms.
The formal contract has to be designed in a general way and make
room for individual specifications and negotiations. Contracts of how,
when and where to work must to a high degree be informal and impli-
cit. In the construction sector it is common t o talk ahout professional
codes guiding the members of a team in the different phases of a pro-
ject. The individuals adapt to these codes by long lasting practical exp-
erience and from working with individuals knowing the trade (Polanyi,
19j8;Brochner ct al., 1992).
In other project-based branches these kinds of implicit rules have not
developed yet. Management and IT companies follow a different
approach. They try to induct tacit contracts by convincing the custom-
er t o use their concepts and follow their specially designed programs.
Many consultant companies have taken great pains to develop special
methods for working and for solving problems. Before entering the
market the personnel have t o be trained and convinced of the ideas. It
can be both costly and time-consuming t o replace staff who already are
a part of this special company culture. The investments in human cap-
ital may pay off, however, as the models used are company specific,
which make it possible to keep the customers - and the employees -
locked-in for some time (Ekstedt, zoo^).
Other actors of the C quadrant are independent enough t o create
 CONTRACTS O F WORK I N A I'IIOJECT-BASED E C O N O M Y

new informal rules. I am hinting at the organizations which define and

create new fields of action; the spiders of the networks of projects.
These spiders must be as shining and attractive as butterflies; able t o
guarantee trustworthiness and t o attract all kinds of business partners
and customers. They are in a sense like the project management com-
panies in the construction sector, but with superior capacity t o create
new business ideas through an attractive brand name and a great
potential of development and innovation activity. Some industrial com-
panies seem to be moving this way through extensive outsourcing of
plain production functions. Some may succeed in developing these new
capacities. But the risks of failing are many, not least if the transform-
ation process leads to unemploy~nentand thus damages the brand
name.
The independent Polish division of Skanska can illustrate the phen-
omenon of a "shining spider". They are quite aware of their special
role and name themselves a developer and not just a contractor. It is
easy t o understand why. The top management starts a comprehensive
business project by buying an attractive lot. They then design a com-
plex of buildings in dialogue with the local authorities, often in com-
petition with other companies. The next step is to get financial institu-
tions interested in financing the project. At this phase of the project the
well-known brand name is very useful. After the period of planning
contractual discussions begin. In most cases Skanska takes care of the
construction management role themselves, while a lot of both interna-
tional and local subcontractors are engaged t o erect the building.
During this phase they are also trying to find the right tenants for the
exclusive offices they are constructing. At the end of the project the
developer starts looking for a new business opportunity. When a new
project is on its way the old buildings are sold - if the right customer
shows up (Ekstedt, 2001).
In projectized activity it is not only essential t o have a good know-
ledge about the tasks involved but also to have good relations and
knowledge of potential project members and business partners. Consid-
erable costs are spent on the search for information and knowledge in
the process of forming a project. Closeness to the customers makes it
easier to discuss with them and to develop unique economic solutions.
Closeness to other team members both in space and culture facilitates
the process of team building and knowledge formation. Successful pro-
jects are often created in a specific knowledge intensive environment,
E S K l L EKSTEDT

e.g. an industrial system. Concepts like systems of innovation, clusters,

networks and development/knowledge blocks relate to this idea (Por-
ter, 1998; Maskell et a]., 1998). System thinking concentrates on the
relations between permanent organizations, however, while projectized
economic activity aims at forming new organizations. But the stress on
knowledge formation is shared by the two approaches and is also in
line with modern economic growth and development thinking in gen-
eral (Romer, ~ 9 9 ~ ) .
Project based organizing consequently also has a local side. The eco-
nomic activity, i.e. the production and the exchange of services, takes
place where production establishments and people are to be found. The
ever greater service content in almost every activity creates a need for
closeness. The work of the companies is performed in direct interplay
with the customer, where he is active. This entails, among other things,
that the commissioned companies tend to locate local branches with
far-reaching independence in smaller cities. International companies,
like Skanska and Cap Gemini, have settled down in many Swedish
medium-sized and small cities. There they participate in projects to-
gether with industrial companies, municipalities and county councils.

-
Global renommCe is paired with local presence (Ekstedt et al., 1999).

D. Self employed professionals

The absence of an affiliation to some organization forces the individ-
ual to answer for the negotiations with other actors himself. It is not
uncommon, therefore, that the individuals in this exposed situation try
to strengthen their position, in a market that in many respects is short
of rules and clear roles, by seeking support in professional organiza-
tions. In certain professions, like boxing, specially designed promotion
companies appear. At any rate a loud voice - it could be a hired one -
is necessary to make oneself heard in the actual markets.
The costs of making a name for themselves might be lower for the
professionals in densely populated center areas. When the individuals
are already known, distances are of lesser importance. The opportunit-
ies of being updated and in close contact with the market is increasing in
pace with the IT-revolution. The technology promotes full- or part- time
home working. Professionals like journalists, writers, and architects etc.
can live wherever they like and still be connected when needed.
 CONTRACTS OF WORK I N A P R O J E C T-B A S E D ECONOMY

Market relations, transaction costs and contractual forms in the four

types of organizations discussed above are summarized in figure 4:2:

PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

A. lndushiol Organizations B. Non permanent activi?.

FLOW- - Exit-mechanism dominating
PROCESS market relations, limited rela-
OPERATIONS tions between market and
internal organization
- Limited negotiation and search
costs and great monitoring
costs inside organizations
- Formal contracts (collective)
- Closeness to production
resources
- Persons in temporary
assignments are meeting
exit-mechanisms
- The organizational arrange-
ment reduces negotiation and
seorch costs in the labor market
- Formal contracts, but shorter
and less secure than in A
-To be available at different
locations

C. Project-based organizations D.Self-employed rofessionals

PROJECTIZED - Voice and loyalty dominating
OPERATIONS market relations, tight relations
between market and internal
organization
- Limited monitoring costs and
substantial contractual and
negotiation costs inside organi-
zations
- Informal contracts and indivi-
dual negotiations im ortant.
P
- Closeness to know edge
intensive environment [other
team members) and customers
P
-Voice; Great e orts to make
a name for themselves in the
market and to keep updated
- Limited transaction costs as
organizational set up is almost
missing; costs for professional
affiliation
- Professional codes may guide
the way of working
- Contact with the market

Figure 4:z Market relations, transaction costs and contractual forms in diffe-
rent kinds of organizations.

Conclusions
Work contracts are closely related to the way economic activity is organ-
ized. The presented model gives a rough but useful picture of the char-
acteristics of different organizational forms. By pointing at the changed
prevalence of the four main categories it is possible t o discuss the con-
tent of the organizational transformation in some depth. The dramatic
change of market relations and transaction costs when moving from
onc category to another gives a platform for describing the changed
contracts of working life. It is even possible t o discuss the development
of informal rules (contracts) guiding the actors when it comes to how,
when and where t o work.
The organizational changes follow some distinct patterns. First of all
there has been an increased use of project organized activity for sev-
eral decades in most industrialized countries. The growing number of
people working in project-based organizations and project-based activ-
ity is striking. There is also an evident expansion of people working in
non-permanent activities. The expansion of temporary agencies is part
of this. The number of self-employed professionals is probably also in-
creasing. However, this does not mean the end of industry, but it does
point to the developnlent of new, often temporary, forms of organizing.
Permanent organizations will certainly not disappear, but they will take
on some new roles. They are needed to create and host temporary organ-
izations and there is still a lot of standardized production run by sub-
contractors who are permanently organized.
Many industrial companies, which at one time had almost all activ-
ities under the same roof, have been transformed into - or lend their
name to - a co-ordinating organization which assemblies, designs and
develops systems of articles combined with services and externalized
component production. One can actually see both projectification and
neo-taylorism at the same time: there is both an increasing use of tem-
porary organizations in the form of projects, and a growth of a minute,
global work division specializing in manufacturing of different compo-
nents. The organizational spheres are, however, much looser in their
composition than the traditional industrial companies and they can
also q ~ ~ i c kchange
ly in size owing t o a varying supply of projects. In
some fields of action, ICT for example, the spheres may also be very
sensitive t o fluctuations of economic demand.
The changed relations between the companies and their customers
are one of the major driving forces in the projectification process.
When developing more complicated and unique products the relations
between producer and consumer become tighter. Exit mechanisms
dominating the market relations of traditional industrial organizations
are exchanged for voice and sometime even loyalty in project based
activities. The closer ties of the economic activity also made their marks
on the internal organizing of the companies. Traditional industrial
companies were characterized by limited internal negotiation and search
costs and great monitoring costs, while the cost profile of the project-
 C O N T R A C T S O F W O R K I N A PROJECT-BASED E C O N O M Y

based organization seems t o be the opposite. Limited monitoring costs

are accompanied with substantial contractual and negotiation costs.
The low monitoring costs make it ~ o s s i b l eto build up very large organ-
izational spheres, but also, without too much effort, t o change the size
of the activities. The organizations boundaries are fading out.
The structure of the transaction costs gives a good indication of
what the contractual relations loolz like in different kinds of organiza-
tions. In industrial organizations the contract is set in formal rules
(negotiated with the unions) and the employees know what is expected
in the longer run as well. With a development towards more tempora-
ry employment, the rules are still formal, but they are also less secure
and apply for shorter periods only. There are also marked differences
between groups of worlzers. With the development towards project-
based organizations, the formal contract becomes more general and
will be repeatedly renewed a t the beginning of each project. Individual
negotiations become more important, as well as the ability of em-
ployees to negotiate. These changes undoubtedly have implications for
labor relations and the role of unions. In fact, it is likely that many
institutions of traditional industrial society will encounter difficulties
when much of the economic activities take place outside the boundar-
ies of its core organizations, the industrial companies.
What is expected of the co-workers in project-based organizations is
more implicit than in industrial organizations. Ideas of how, when and
where to work are molded by informal contracts. There are long tradi-
tions of project organized activities in for example the construction sec-
tor. The work methods have been transferred from one generation t o
another. Other industries are looking for new methods of how t o work
in projects and the number of courses in project management at uni-
versities and other educational institutions have expanded dramat-
ically. The traditional tacit lznowledge formation of work methods is
exchangcd for articulated knowledge, packaged in different kinds of
certificates. The implicit contract also suggests when and where to
work.
The time and space dimensions of project-based activity are very diff-
erent from those of the production of standardized products in long
series at stationary factories. There is an end to a project even if it is a
recurrent activity. Project members are aware of this. They are also
aware of that participating in project-based activity often means work-
ing at different places; e. g. in a knowledge dense environment, at the
customers' premises or where a special event takes place. The time and
space dimensions of project organized economic activity can be illus-
trated by the carnival "Storsjoyran" that takes place in July every year
in the northern city of ostersund in Sweden (Ekstedt, 2001). A perma-
nent organization of four individuals transforms into a temporary
organization of several thousands for a few weeks. Actually this event
gives a substantial income contribution to a lot of indiviuals in the
area, but also t o individuals from elsewhere. The permanent organiza-
tion is a small scale shining spider, a project management organization,
with a capacity to create a project with such a strong brand name that
it attracts investors, performers and customers from all over the
country. This kind of economic activity is indeed differently organized
when compared to that of industrial organizations. How, when and
where t o work will be decided under very specific conditions.
 Introduction
It is widely recognized today that projects are a vital part of our indust-
rial society, both as a tool for planning and as an organizational form.
Although much of the project literature deals with aspects of planning
and completion of projects without incorporating contextual dimen-
sions, it is apparent that the environment poses a problem for projects.
Lundin and Soderholm (1995) point out the need, during the project,
to delimit or decouple the project from the environment in order to be
able to complete it. Projects as defined by a time limit during which a
specific delimited task should be accomplished by a certain group of
people (Packendorff, 1993; Lundin & Soderholm, I yq 5 ) emphasize
this desired separation from the environment. The separation and
decoupling of projects from the environment may, however, be both
difficult and undesirable, especially for inter-organizational innovation
projects.
Innovation projects are often dependent on information, knowledge,
and resources that are not in the possession of a single firm (cf. Teece,
~ 9 8 0Jones
; & Smith, 1997). This dependency renders the decoupling
of projects from their context difficult. Studies of project management
have also demonstrated a lack of learning in projects (Ekstedt, Lundin,
Soderholm & Wirdenius, 1999) that can be connected to decoupling
M A R I A BPNGTSSON .4KD JESSICA ERIKSSON

and separation. The ambition to decouple projects from other activit-

ies can contribute t o the difficulty of transferring knowledge and com-
petencies developed in other projects or the environment into a new
project. Many innovations are also strongly dependent on innovations
and systems that are controlled by other firms (cf. Chesbrough &
Teece, 1996; Shenhar, 2001). These systems are embedded in business
relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors, and others (Grano-
vetter, 1985: Gnyawali & Madhavan, zoor). The link and match
between a specific innovation project and its embeddedness in compe-
titive and cooperative relationships are therefore closely related to the
organizing and success of projects (cf. Kreiner, ~ 9 9 5 ) .
An innovation project must be linked to its context and such links
develop if there is a flow of information, knowledge, and physical
resources into and out of the project and context. This flow can be char-
acterized by both "leakiness" and "stickiness" (cf. Szulanski, 1996;
Brown & Duguid, 1998). An innovation project requires an easy flow
or leakiness of relevant knowledge and resources into the project.
Innovation projects also require prevention of a negative leakiness with
an undesired flow of information, knowledge, and resources from the
project to competitors. Stickiness is the opposite of leakiness and refers
to mechanisms that hinder the flow. Stickiness is thus important t o pro-
tect new ideas and innovations from spreading to competitors, but if
stickiness hinders the flow among partners in a project, the stickiness
is negative for the project.
In an inter-organizational project, there is, on the one hand, addition-
al complexity in the flow of information, knowledge, and resources,
as the participants have to accept a certain lack of control and run the
risk of confronting opportunistic behavior by other firms. O n the other
hand, inter-organizational networks are sometimes described as facili-
tators of innovation (Hamel, 1991; Teece & Pisano, 1994). The advan-
tages of inter-organizational projects include the possibility of accom-
plishing a joint creation of knowledge or a joining together of comple-
mentary knowledge (cf. Hamel, 1991; Inkpen & Crossan, 1996). This
possible contradiction suggests that the potential positive and negative
effects of stickiness and leakiness in innovation projects are complex
and require further elaboration.
The purpose of this chapter is thus to discuss the contextual influ-
ence on inter-organizational innovation projects, by analyzing the
stickiness and leakiness of knowledge, information, and resources. An
 STICKINESS A N D LEAKINESS IN INTER-ORG4NIZATIONA1, INNOVATION PROJECTS

explorative analysis of four inter-organizational innovation projects in

different contexts is conducted and propositions are made about the
stickiness and leakiness in the different contexts.

Inter-organizational innovation projects

Before turning to the main question posed in this chapter we must
further elaborate on inter-organizational innovation projects, which is
the unit of analysis in this study. Even if we focus on this specific type
of project, its nature can vary. The problems related to flows and
embeddedness in different cooperative and competitive relationships
are related t o the nature of the project. Shenhar (2001)distinguishes
between assembly projects dealing with single components, system pro-
jects dealing with a collection of interactive elements, and array pro-
jects dealing with a dispersed collection of systems. His distinction is
similar t o an often-used distinction between innovations rather than
projects; ( 1 ) autonomous innovations that can be pursued independ-
ently of other innovations, and ( 2 )systemic innovations that are depend-
ent 011 other innovations (Chesbrough & Teece, 1996). The degree and
type of embeddedness in relationships with customers and competitors
can be assumed to differ anlong the different innovation projects ment-
ioned. Autonomous innovations can he integrated with existing tech-
nology by the use of information and knowledge codified in industry
standards. Systemic innovations require non-codified information and
knowledge that is shared, coordinated, and adjusted within the entire
product system. Autonomous innovations can be assumed to be easier
to demarcate and decouple from other activities; whereas the system
dependency inherent in systemic innovations makes them open t o influ-
ences from the environment.
Furthermore, the nature of the project can vary during the innova-
tion process, and the contextual influence can coilsequently vary. Bres-
man and Solve11 (1997) argue that the process of innovation consists of
an initial phase with scanning or monitoring that provides information
and ideas, a creative phase in which the generated pieces of information
are combined in novel ways (cf. Schumpeter 1942), and a final phase
of commercialization or implementation. What at one time or in one
phase, is a more autonomous process may at another time or in another
phase have greater systemic interdependency.
MARIA BENCTSSON AND J E S S I C A HRIKSSON

The leakiness and stickiness in different phases of an innovation pro-

cess is related to the type of knowledge that is in use. Szulanski (1996)
describes the difficulty of transferring non-codified and implicit know-
ledge as the stickiness of knowledge. Hansen (1999) distinguishes
between simple and complex knowledge and argues that simple know-
ledge (explicit and independent) can be transferred in relationships
with weak ties, as it is more leaky; whereas complex knowledge (impli-
cit and system dependent) must be transferred in relationships with
strong ties, as it is 'stickier'. We conclude that contextual influence may
be of greater importance for systemic innovations and that both the
character of the innovation and the contextual influence can vary over
time. With that in mind, we turn to our main issue: the contextual
influence on innovation projects.

Flows in different contexts of

innovation projects
Having stated that contextual influence can vary among different inno-
vation projects, this section deals with different contexts and their poss-
ible effect on the flows of information, knowledge, and resources. The
partners in an inter-organizational innovation project have relation-
ships with customers, complementors, suppliers, and competitors, and
these relationships influence and circumscribe the project (cf. Nalebuff
& Brandenburger, 1996; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).The leakiness
and stickiness of flows in innovation projects embedded in different
cooperative and competitive relationships can differ among contexts.
Here, we focus on two interrelated contextual characteristics of impor-
tance for the flow of information knowledge and resources: the degree
of certainty in networks, and the coordination and governance of the
relationships.
First, the degree of certainty in a business network is related to the
proximity and understanding that exist among actors. Brown and
Duguid (1998) stress that leakiness of knowledge is most pronounced
in local environments or "communities of practice" anlong proximate
organizations. Similarly, the proximity among competitors in innovative
clusters, it is argued, enhances the flow of information, knowledge, and
resources. (Porter 1990). A common history of interaction among
actors makes it easier for competitors to monitor each other and redu-
 STTCKINF,SS A N D 1,EAKINESS IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION PROJECTS

ces the time required to identify relevant counterparts with whom

experiences and knowledge can be exchanged. A history of interaction
can give rise to a common language that can be linked to a region or a
specialist area of knowledge or practice. The development of a shared
language and other codes of communication and interaction improve
the fluidity of knowledge in all relationships. The local environment
thus offers means of communication, social bonds, norms, values, and
institutions (North 1990; Meyer & Scott 1992) that contribute to the
certainty of the relationships. This certainty can add to the process of
accumulated learning and ease creativity in an innovation project.
Brown and Duguid (1998) argue that the leakiness is high when rela-
tionships among groups with similar practice and overlapping member-
ships are dense enough to facilitate the spread of knowledge. This is in
line with Powell's (1998) argument that knowledge facilitates the utiliz-
ation of greater knowledge as the capability to assimilate and use
knowledge in the environment is embedded in routines and practices of
projects, units or organizations. Brown and Duguid (1998) stress the
stickiness of knowledge among units within an organization, and
explain it with the indivisibility of practice and know-how. Knowledge
develops through practice, and as different practices are separated
through the division of labor, the knowledge becomes sticky. Similarly,
if activities in business networks are decoupled, the division of know-
ledge may give rise to stickiness.
Second, the degree of certainty in a business network is also related
to the stability of a business network. In many industries, rapid and
unpredictable change has led to a continuously changing competitive
landscape (Eisenhardt &Martin, 2000) and to a growth of inter-organ-
izational collaboration among firms (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr,
~ 9 9 6 )Powell,
. Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996)argue that learning is, to
a great extent, generated through cooperative ventures. In such fast-
paced contexts, leakiness, it is argued, is high (cf. Abernathy & Clark,
~ 9 8 5Nagarajan
; & Mitchell, 1998).
The context in which a project is embedded can also be stable. If
strong ties develop among actors this contributes to the stability in the
relationships surrounding a project (cf. Granovetter, 1985). Long-last-
ing relationships contribute to the stability, and such relationships can
be found in the organizing of projects. It has for example been shown
that some projects have permanent characteristics (Ekstedt, Lundin,
Soderholm & Wirdenius, 1999). New projects are organized among
 ,MARIA BENGTSSON AND lESSlCA ERIKSSON

the same partners, utilizing the same type of knowledge and involving
the same individuals. Within the frame of such stable relationships
there is leakiness (despite the noted lack of learning in projects), but
only within the frames of the project. New information and knowledge
is not obtained, as there is limited input from actors outside established
relationships.
Thus, the greater the overlap and similarities in technology and
expertise shared by the partners in an innovation project and the
stronger the ties ainong the partners, the more certain is the context for
.-
the partners. These bonds, common language, norms, and values, can
enhance the flows of information, knowledge, and resources and in-
crease stability in the networks. In contrast, the joining of two different
technological fields in an innovation project, which is common in fast-
paced industries, implies that the project is performed in a newly
established context. Relationships in newly established networks arc
characterized by uncertainty through a lack of expertise and common
routines and practices. One can therefore assume that flows of inform-
ation, knowledge, and resources in newly established contexts will
differ from flows in well-established contexts.
- The second contextual dimension argued t o be of importance for the
stickiness and leakiness of knowledge is the coordination and govern-
ance of business contexts. The coordination and governance of mar-
kets can be driven by both political and market forces and the strength
of these forces can differ in different industries. An interventionist polit-
' '
ical discourse prevailed in Sweden during the 1930s to the 1g8os,
especially in industries argued to be of importance for the welfare of
the nation, such as many service industries. Political forces toward in-
creased joint coordination and cooperation prevailed in these industries.
Market forces dominated the coordination and governance of other
industries, such as the manufacturing industry. In some industries these
market forces steered toward concentration and a low intensity in com-
petition whereas rivalry and intense competition prevailed in other
industries. The political influence on industries changed during the
1990s and competition rather than cooperation became the recipe.
However, different types of governance have impacted o n the structure
of industries and the development of mental structures with the
industries. Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) state that collec-
tive conceptions or mental models develop over time, affecting compc-
titive behavior. The different structures in the context supporting either
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS IN I N T F R - O I I L A N I Z A T I O N ~ ~INNOVATION
L PROJFCTS

cooperation or competition influence the leakiness and stickiness in

contexts.
Political interventions and institutionalized organizing forms arising
from such interventions have historically supported collective actions,
and their remains still exist, even though deregulation and a belief in
market forces have been widely spread during the ~ g y o sIn . addition,
trade associations and infrastructure providers are vital in some
industries (cf. Melander, 1997) because they set rules that have conse-
quences for the interaction within the business context and the organ-
izing of single projects. Some industries are also characterized by exten-
sive standardization efforts (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000) that can
cause conformity on some aspects of innovation.
Market forces are not related to political and institutional actions
and interventions, but to the actions of competing firms within the
network. Actual competition occurs in imperfect markets, which im-
plies that business opportunities can be imperfectly exploited by comp-
anies within the industr y (Dickson 1992). These opportunities tend t o
be constailtly challenged by market forces pushing toward increased
competition. Competitors can be partners in one project and compet-
itors in another, and the actors' roles can shift over time. Competitive
advantages developed through innovations in the past cannot be
sustained, because they are destroyed through new innovations. Firms
in such industries need a constant development of new, independently
unsustainable, competitive advantages (cf. D'Aveni, 1994; Hamel &
Prahalad, 1994; Makadok, l y y 8).
Competition is, however, not only rivalry. Easton and Arajou (1992)
argue that relationships among competitors differ depending upon the
competitors' motives for action and the distance among competitors.
Distance can be related t o the degree of dependence, and competitors
tend t o avoid rivalry if they are mutually dependent (Caves & Porter
1977). Easton and Arajou (1992) differentiate among five competitor
relationships: cooperation, competition, conflict, co-existence, and coll-
usion. In some contexts we can have relationships among competitors
consisting merely of cooperation, and in other business contexts we can
have relationships among competitors consisting merely of competi-
tion. The contextual influence and the flow of information knowledge
and resources can be supposed to be different, depending on the type
of relationships that exist among competitors.
In this section two characteristics of the context assumed to affect
MARIA BENGTSSON A N D JESSICA ERIKSSON

the stickiness and leakiness of knowledge in inter-organizational inno-

vation projects have been discussed. However, the contextual influence
on the flow of information knowledge and resources is ambiguous, and
the research presented focuses on contexts and organizations rather
than on temporary inter-organizational projects. We will further study
inter-organizational innovation projects in order to enhance our
understanding of the contextual influence on projects in terms of the
stickiness and leakiness of information, knowledge, and resources.

Four innovation projects and their contexts

The contextual influence on the organizing of innovation projects will
be illustrated through an analysis of four innovation projects in their
respective contexts. As discussed earlier, the context consists of rela-
tionships with customers, complementors, suppliers and competitors.
The clarity and stability in innovation clusters, as well as the govern-
ance supporting cooperation and competition was argued to affect the
flows of information, knowledge, and resources. The cases studied
represent well-established and newly established contexts, contexts in
which political forces historically created governance structures supp-
orting cooperation, and contexts were market forces created govern-
ance structures supporting competition. We have, therefore, used these
dimensions to distinguish among four different contexts, as illustrated
in Figure S:I.

CERTAINTY OF THE BUSINESS CONTEXT

Well-established Newly established

'n+
$
3+
5 Supporting The Fiber-optic
The FMS Case
competition Loser System Case

The Recyclable
Plastic Beer Bottle The Pro Viva Case
Case

Figure J:I Contextual characteristics of the four cases.

88
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION PROlECTS

Well established with supporting competition

The first innovation project is the development of a Flexible Manufac-
turing System (FMS), part of a new production line entailing a new
combination of different technologies in a well-established context.
The business context is the automobile manufacturing industry, in
which market forces are pronounced in governance structures support-
ing competition. Competition among manufacturers affects the organ-
izing of the project. The network system into which the innovation is
to be implemented is well known and is characterized by the auto-
mobile company's selection of appropriate suppliers.

Newly established with supporting competition

The second project concerns the development of fiber-optical laser
systems. It resembles the FMS project in that the governance structures
within the automobile industry influence the organizing of the project.
It is also affected by the governance structure developed through inter-
actions among global and local manufacturers of laser systems, also
supporting competition. The project represents a newly established
network created through the joining of two different technological fields.
One of the two partners is a manufacturer of laser sources, whereas the
other is a highly specialized manufacturer of fiber optics and laser
systems. Furthermore the products are sold in a third field - to the
automobile industry.

Well established with supporting cooperation

The third innovation project, the development of a recyclable plastic
bottle for beer, is organized within the context of the Swedish brewing
industry. The industry is a traditional manufacturing industry and al-
though it is undergoing change due to its opening for new manufac-
turing licenses and the EU membership, the case depicts a project in
which the business context of customers and suppliers is common and
well established. The project is strongly affected by firmly established
and longstanding cooperation among competitors on distribution
systems supported by political regulations.
M X K l A B t N G l S S O N AND TESSICA ERIKSSON

Newly established with supporting cooperation

The final innovation project is the development of a fruit drink in a
cooperation between a biotechnology firm and a dairy company. The
innovation is the combination of two technological fields of know-
ledge, linking new technology and old markets. The Swedish Dairy
industry is, like the brewery industry, undergoing de-institutionaliza-
tion following deregulation. Still, the era of regulation has put decisive
marks in the industr y and the project is performed in a context of pre-
vailing, albeit weakened cooperation in the distribution among compe-
titors.

Process development in an
established production system
The first project studied is the development of a Flexible Manufac-
turing System (FMS) for cutting and welding for AutoNova's new plant
where the Volvo C 70 series was manufactured. AutoNova contracted
a German firm, Carman, for the design and assembly of the production
line, but Volvo and AutoNova decided which firms were to engage and
co-operate within areas where new methods and equipment were to be
examined. The development of the FMS was such a project. The FMS
was used to cut holes in the coach to assemble the front suspension unit
and the antenna and to weld the roof, the back, and the back shelf.
Volvo had agreements with three robot manufacturers that had deli-
vered robots for different plants: ABB Robotics, Kuka, and Prima.
Kuka also designed production lines, and ABB was at the time expan-
ding its business into assembly lines and these two firms were, there-
fore, competitors to Carman. For each installation Volvo compared the
three manufacturers and chose the one that provided the best offer and
technological solution at the time. Volvo contacted the Swedish firm,
ABB Robotics. It was argued that the geographical proximity of Volvo
to ABB and Permanova, the other partner in the project, was important
for the project's efficiency.
Volvo had conducted extensive research on laser technology, but not
on ways of using and integrating the laser with other equipment. Volvo
had earlier encouraged ABB to develop its business into this field. ABB
responded to its request by developing a laser unit at the firm, but it
 STICKINESS A N D LEAKINESS IN IXTEK-OKGANIZATIONAL lNNOVATlOK PROJECTS

did not measure up to standards and the unit was closed. AutoNova
therefore contacted Permanova, known as a leading firm in fiber-optics
(an important part of the robot laser system). The core competence of
Permanova's unit for development of production systems was its abili-
ty t o design and integrate laser systems with very different technolog-
ies and products. Volvo had earlier worked with Permanova in several
tests and experiments, and Permanova provided services for some of
Volvo's laser equipment. Volvo and thus AutoNova knew that Perma-
nova was able t o deliver service in a very short time. Rofin Sinar par-
ticipated in the project, but AutoNova's contacts with Rofin Sinar were
made through Permanova because it was smoother t o make Permanova
responsible for the entire laser system.
As a participant in the project, Permanova accepted responsibility
for service and documentation of the installation, guaranteeing securi-
ty and the running of the system. It was therefore necessary to learn
about the entire production line and the other equipment used. Auto-
Nova and the actors involved in other parts of the production line also
needed to learn about the laser system and the FMS installation. Per-
manova therefore offered training programs and manuals on the
systems they developed.
ABB Robotics and Permanova's earlier interaction primarily consis-
ted of the delivery of products in accordance with detailed specifica-
tions, but with limited joint development. The interaction between the
two firms is however described as intense and extensive. Engineers
from both firms came to know each other well through the project,
which was seen as a prerequisite for more comprehensive cooperation.
The involvement and cooperation between the firms and the risk that
was associated with the interaction resulted in a formal cooperative
agreement between the two partners defining their relationship. It was
agreed that if ABB Robotics were to be involved in projects in which
lasers were needed, Permanova should be approached; and if Permano-
va needed robots for laser systems, ABB Robotics should be contacted.

The development of fiber-optical laser systems

A research and development project was established when Rofin Sinar,
a German manufacturer of laser sources, and Permanova, a Swedish
manufacturer of fiber-optics, decided to combine their efforts and devel-
M A R I A BENG'TSSON A N D JESSICA EKLKSSON

op lasers equipped with fiber-optics. The project concerned core tech-

nology of strategic importance for both firms, which implies that the
interdependency between the firms was high. They had to work close-
ly in the development, because the technology for laser source and fiber
optics are intimately related. Initially the cooperation was problematic,
as the firms had difficulties in knowing with whom t o communicate
and how. To facilitate the desired co-operation, an engineer and one of
the founders of Permanova spent half a year at Rofin Sinar working
with the joint development. He developed a close relationship with
engineers at Rofin Sinar, which was of importance for continued comm-
unication. Engineers from the two firms also traveled and met each
other face to face several times. Certain routines for the communica-
tion concerning adjustments and development of the product were
developed.
Later in the process, co-operation between the firms rested on
agreements of different kinds. Formal legal agreements were made
through the use of cross-wise patents of the developed products: Per-
manova acquired patents for some parts and Rofin Sinar for others.
Consequently, neither of the firms had proprietorship of the entire pro-
duct, which reduced the risk of opportunistic behavior and increased
the stability of the relationship. Agreements built on personal relations
among individuals were also of importance for the project.
Organizing within the project was not possible t o completely
decouple from other activities, and thus was affected by the context of
the two firms. Permanova's relationships with actors in other projects,
such as Permanova's development of pre-designed production systems
for the automobile industry, was a potential threat for the project. The
customers within this industry are large, powerful firms that, to a con-
siderable extent, can determine with whom Permanova should interact.
For example, Permanova had developed a detector that can be used t o
determine when the protective glass in front of the optical lens system
is dirty and needs to be changed. Volkswagen wanted Permanova t o
test the equipment in Volkswagen's production line, but decided that
the equipment should be tested with a HAAS laser instead of a Rofin
Sinar laser. In another case, Volvo chose t o install a Rofin Sinar laser
and Permanova's fiber-optics for one production line. Two years later,
however, a Trumph laser was chosen for another production line, mean-
ing that Permanova was forced by its customers t o deliver fiber-optic
systems or parts of the system t o Rofin Sinar's competitors.
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS I N INTFR-ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION PROJECTS

Hence, Permanova's cooperation with Rofin Sinar was sometimes

inconsistent with its cooperation with other actors in the value net. It
was sometimes difficult to realize their two ideals: not to harm any
relationship through actions undertaken by the firm and to fulfill all
the demands of a specific project. Permanova chose to develop two diff-
erent products for the same purpose in order to preserve its relation-
ship with Rofin and its customer. It is difficult, however, to separate the
development of products that are, in reality, almost identical. Rofin
Sinar and Permanova therefore developed informal or implicit rules
about how to interact with each other and with others in the value-net.
These rules primarily stipulated that the two firms continuously inform
each other about other projects and give the partner the opportunity to
react if too much information and knowledge of importance for their
cooperation is spread to other partners.

The development of a recyclable plastic beer bottle

The development of a recyclable plastic beer bottle was a joint project
between the small brewery Zeunerts and one of its suppliers and part-
owners, a manufacturer of bottles and production equipment. The
part-owner manufactured other bottles for Zeunerts. It also produced
bottle carriers and production equipment for Zeunerts and many other
companies within the industry. Zeunerts had approximately I percent
market share in an industry dominated by 4-5 companies accounting
for more than 90 percent of the market shares. Still, Zeunerts acted
more in competition with the larger breweries than with smaller brew-
eries and microbreweries.
The aim of the project was to develop a higher quality plastic bottle
using the new materials; beer products could not be sold in the tradi-
tional soft drink PET-bottles, due to taste reduction and shorter shelf
life. The project was motivated by a need for differentiation and a be-
lief in creating environmentally-friendly products. The bottle manufac-
turer was described as an entrepreneur and a strong force behind the
project. He used his knowledge of Zeunerts and his own network to
create a new bottle. Concerns at this stage were primarily how to fit the
product into the production system and how to fit it into Zeunerts's
profile. There was limited need for transfer of knowledge between the
two organizations, because the owner had ample access to the brewery
M A R I A TITN(.T55OY 4NL) [ESSICA E R I K S S O N

and the production facilities. Due to the interrelated ownership struc-

tures, trust was pre-established, and was more important than any
contracts governing the project. The entrepreneur emphasized the need
for him to separate the development for Zeunerts from his production
for competitors and the information he had concerning competing pro-
jects. The project was kept within the entrepreneur's organization so
visitors to the brewery could not discover the development process.
A similar product with different technical solutions was being devel-
oped in Denmark, and all Swedish breweries were monitoring the
effects. The larger breweries seemed reluctant to introduce new bottles,
because that always caused uncertainty within the existing systems for
bottles and for recycling. These systems were coordinated by the trade
association and related companies, which provided larger breweries
with power in the development of and control over these systems. Swe-
dish law demands that plastic bottles be part of a recycling system, and
for a smaller brewery, that would find it costly to develop a separate
system, it is important that its bottles be allowed into existing systems.
At the final stage of the project, when the project was to have been
launched, it became important for the part-owner that it be implemen-
ted and commercialized; he had invested his money and his commit-
ment into the project. A political and competitive interaction process
commenced. The industry did not accept the solution. They claimed
that it threatened the entire existing system for the distribution of bott-
les and carriers because Zeunerts had developed a bottle that could not
be used in the existing systems due to layers of different materials in the
bottle. The limited leakage of information during earlier phases in the
development may have contributed to the problems with commerciali-
zation that ensued. In earlier projects, Zeunerts had been able to mar-
ket its solutions, but this time it had t o withdraw its bottle some time
after the launch. The bottle had been introduced on a limited scale, and
did not account for any larger sales at the time, but it was still a major
setback.
All the larger breweries and the Brewer's Association advocated a
ban of the new bottle. After negotiations with the Swedish Environ-
mental Protection Agency and representatives of the coordinators of
the systems, Zeunerts was forced to modify its bottle so that it fit the
existing recycling and distributions systems. At that time, the largest
competitor, Pripps, had a similar product on the market that was com-
patible with existing systems. The industry's (and also the customers')
 SI'I(:KINPSS AND LEAKINESS IN I N T E R - O R G A N I L A I I O N A L INNOVATION PROJECTS

resistance to competing systems and Zeunerts' failure t o settle this issue

before implementation, lost Zeunerts its first-mover advantage. But,
the negotiations concerning the Zeunerts case also made the conditions
under which a plastic beer bottle could be introduced transparent.
Other breweries soon had similar bottles.

The development of the fruit-drink, ProViva

The ProViva innovation project in the dairy industry parallels the
industry's development throughout the 1990s. Following deregulation
and EU-membership, competition has increased and product devel-
opment has become an important concern for dairies. Competition is
most significant for products such as cheese, butter, and fruit yogurts
that can be more easily transported than milk, and hence can be offer-
ed to a larger market. Despite increased competition, remnants of the
regulations still affect the organizing of the industry. The earlier co-
operation in distribution and the territorial division of the market
implies that each dairy is still mainly responsible for distribution within
its regional areas, i.e. the area from which producers deliver to a certain
dairy. It is therefore crucial t o persuade other dairy companies to
accept prestigious innovations into their own distribution, in order to
reach a larger number of consumers. New products must be innovative
and competitive in order to be accepted by competitors, which is necess-
ary in order to meet the costly development of such products.
The Swedish dairy company, Skinemejerier, chose t o adopt a net-
work strategy for product development centered on a number of inter-
organizational projects. To this point, the most successful innovation
project is the development and commercialization of the fruit drink,
ProViva (a so-called Functional Food with qualities claimed t o be bene-
ficial t o health). This project originated within the medical industry
and was initiated by researchers from Lund, who formed the firm
Probi. When the researchers developed their initial product, the bacter-
ium, they looked for ways to implement it. Cooperation with Sk2ne-
mejerier came about through personal contacts and recommendations.
The R&D lnanager at Sklnemejerier was recommended t o consider
this project; he trusted the expertise and knowledge of this particular
group of researchers and decided that the project was worth pursuing.
People at Skdnemejerier claimed that it was important that they had
MARIA BENGTSSON A N D JESSICA ERIKSSON

previously initiated a failed project with an oat-based product. Some of

the sales managers still believed in oats and were therefore open to the
new concept. The emerging norms within the industry toward more
product development also contributed to acceptance of the project
within Skinemejerier.
After several attempts, an oat-based fruit drink was developed, and
during the creation phase the project was gradually transferred into
Skdnemejerier. Sksnemejerier's task was to ensure process production
of sufficient quality. During this transfer, patents and formal agree-
ments governed the rights to the bacterium (retained by Probi) on the
one hand, and the exchange of knowledge and the rights to the finali-
zed product on the other. This commercialization phase was predomi-
nantly a task for Skinemejerier, although Probi remained important in
the launch into foreign markets and in contacts with the research comm-
unity and the medical community. Here, Sksnemejerier needed to
establish appropriate distribution channels. However, some dairies
were initially reluctant to sell ProViva. For example, Sksnemejerier had
to create alternative routes to stores in Arla's "territory" until Arla
truly began to accept the product.
Because biotechnology and Functional Foods are new areas, there is
little knowledge about them. These types of products are restricted by
test requirements and by marketing regulations (product-specific
claims about positive health effects in advertising are not allowed).
Probi provided research on Proviva's beneficial effects, conducted in
Probi's medical network. Through alliances with physicians and resear-
chers in medicine, the researchers behind ProViva explored the posi-
tive effects of the fruit drink, and contradicted the competitors' poten-
tial negative statements about its effects. Also, in the mid-~gqos,the
researchers behind ProViva caused alarm over the possible hazardous
effects of a competing Danish product launched in Sweden by Arla.
Since this is a very new area, the general public must make up its own
mind, a process that is often left to headlines and differing statements.
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAI. INNOVATION PROJECTS

Contextual influence and flows in

innovation projects
All four projects presented in this chapter were inter-organizational,
but the positive and negative leakiness and stickiness differed, depen-
ding on the context of the project. In this analysis, we elaborate on the
stickiness and leakiness in the projects described earlier, in order to
develop our understanding about the ways in which these different
contextual dimensions affect the flow of information, knowledge, and
other resources in innovation projects. The different contextual dimen-
sions and the observed positive and negative stickiness and leakiness in
each context are illustrated in Figure 5:2. The flow of knowledge
changed with the phases of the projects. The numbers in the boxes
illustrate the differences among the three phases: the initial phase, the
creative phase, and the final phase.

CERTAINTY OF THE BUSINESS CONTEXT

Well-established Newly established

1. Positive leakiness due to sociol 1. Negative stickiness due to

structures, functional systems and
power positions
2. Negative stickiness of implicit
knowledge and positive leakiness
of explicit knowledge due to well-
known and separable tasks
3. Negative leakiness due to com-
petitive plays and power positions
unawareness of role distribution
and work practice and functional
systems
2. Positive leakiness of implicit and
explicit knowledge due to trans-
lators and access to networks
3. Negative leakiness due to com-
petitive plays and power positions

1 . Positive leakiness due to social 1. Negative stickiness due to

structures, functional systems and
power positions
2. Negative stickiness of implicit
knowledge and positive leakiness
of explicit knowledge due to well-
known and separable tasks
3. Negative stickiness and leakiness
due to a pressure towards
conformity and power positions
unawareness of role distribution
and work practice and functional
systems
2. Positive leakiness of implicit and
explicit knowledge due to trans-
lators ond access to networks
3.Negative stickiness and leokiness
due to a pressure towards confor-
mity and power positions

Figure 5:z Observed differences in the stickiness and leakiness of information,

knowledge and resources.
M A R I A RENGTSSOK A N D TESSICA ERIKSSOK

T h e initial phase: Positive leakiness and

negative stickiness
A positive leakiness was observed during the initial phase in the two
projects performed in a well-established technological context: the
development of a FMS, and the development of recyclable plastic beer
bottles. The leakiness in both projects was supported by social struct-
ures and larger functional systems that facilitated the establishment of
the projects.
In the FMS case, the initiators at Volvo had experience working with
I ermanova and ABB in similar projects. Trust in the participants'
J

technical capabilities was inherent in the relationship among project

members from the three organizations. In the development of recyclab-
le plastic beer bottles, the person initiating the project was working
within both participating organizations. He was therefore familiar with
the organizations and their employees. All participants in the project
also considered the entrepreneur trustworthy. Hence, trust, experience,
and social relationships seem to be important in explaining the leaki-
ness of information, knowledge and resources in the initial phases of
these two projects.
Proposition I: In the initial phase of an innovation project, previous
experience, familiarity, and trust between the initiator and the partner
increase positive leakiness.

The character of the systems that the innovations were dependent on

or related to, and the stability of these systems, can also explain the in-
itial leakiness. The context of the FMS project was stable. The firms
involved had experience with the functional systems (i.e. production
lines for car production) in which the FMS was to be implemented.
This pre-existing functional system eased the flows of knowledge. Simi-
larly, people involved in the development of beer bottles were cogni-
zant of the production systems into which the product should fit. Thus,
both projects were performed in stable and well-established technolo-
gical systems that were familiar to the actors involved, which explain
the leakiness in the initial phase. The power structure in both cases
contributed to the certainty and stability. The entrepreneur in the
recyclable beer bottles project and Volvo in the FMS project had the
power to initiate and design the projects. The entrepreneur derived his
power position from being a part owner of Zeunerts and Volvo had its
power position as a large and important customer.
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS IN I N T E R-O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L INNOVATION PROJECTS

Proposition 2: In the initial phase of an innovation project, the existen-

ce of ( a ) well-known functional systems and (b) an actor with a strong
power position increase positive leakiness.

In the other two cases, initial negative stickiness was observed. The
negative stickiness can be explained by the lack of an established con-
text for the project. In both the development of fiber-optical laser
systems, and the development of the fruit drink ProViva, two different
fields of tech~lologywere integrated. The joining of two technological
fields added complexity to the interaction among project participants.
The possible contribution of the knowledge provided by the other
party was difficult to evaluate and the flow of information between the
parties was often hindered. In the fiber-optic case, the geographical
distance between the two firms added to the difficulties perceived. The
initial difficulties in the ProViva project were easier to solve, due to the
geographical proximity between the partners. Differences in and
unawareness of the role distribution and work practice of its partners
can explain the negative stickiness during the initial face in the two
projects. Lack of earlier experience and established relationships
among participants contributed t o the unawareness.
To give an example, Permanova communicated with the people who
were considered to be the most knowledgeable members of the Rofin
staff. The Permanova staff also believed that the information and
knowledge they provided would be incorporated into the design of
parts in the joint product. When it turned out that the information was
not used, the interpretation was that the partner firm was ignorant, and
the relationship was, of course, harmed. Communication was ineffec-
tive, and gave rise t o misinformation causing anxiety and mistrust,
making the process sticky.
Proposition 3: In the initial phase of an innovation project differences
among technological fields, lack of experience and lack of established
relationships hamper communication and lead t o misinformation and
mistrust, which in turn gives rise t o negative stickiness.

Neither of the two projects was organized within the frame of one func-
tional system. Instead, several technological fields and adhering func-
tional systems needed to be matched. Furthermore, the high technolo-
gy involved was characterized by change and uncertainty. The partici-
pants in the projects lacked knowledge of their partners' functional
MARIA BENGTSSON AND I E S S I C A ERlKSSON

systems. Ideas developed in the biotechnology had to be adjusted to

food regulations and t o the production process within the dairy
industry. Problems occurred when high-technology components were
to be used in new products manufactured in existing process produc-
tion and distribution systems. Similarly, ideas and knowledge about
fiber optics had to he adjusted to the production, construction, and use
of lasers. The projects were dependent on different functional systems,
but there were few people with knowledge about all the systems invol-
ved. This lack of knowledge and instability contributed to negative
stickiness.
Proposition 4: In the initial phase of an innovation project, lack of
knowledge about all functional systems involved gives rise to negative
stickiness.

The creative phase: Positive and

negative leakiness and stickiness
In the creative phase, the partners had overcome initial obstacles and
worked together with the actual development of the innovation. Posi-
tive leakiness was observed in all four cases, but a difference can be
noted between innovation projects in more or less established contex-
ts. A leakiness of implicit knowledge developed only in projects within
newly established contexts, whereas negative stickiness of implicit
knowledge developed in projects within well-established contexts.
In both the FMS project and the plastic beer bottle project, standard-
ized and codified information leaked into the project. Permanova and
ABB Robotics developed the fiber-optical system and the robot within
the frame of their respective organization and adjoining networks with-
out mediating the knowledge creation to each other or to Volvo. By
dividing the project into subprojects, the partners were freed from the
need to gain intimate knowledge about each other's development. To
make the integration of different technologies in the FMS possible and
to make the system work in the production line, knowledge about the
subsystems was documented. The suppliers developed instruction
manuals and courses to increase the leakiness of explicit knowledge
about the systems into the project.
Similarly the plastic beer bottle project was confined to one of the
partner organizations. In this case, the knowledge was so specialized
 STICKINESS A N D LEAKINESS I N I N T E R -O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L INNOVATION PROJECTS

that Zeunerts had limited interest in gaining technical knowledge from

the project, and had limited technological competence to contribute to
the project. Because the actual creation of the technological solution
took place in both cases at each partner's site, the transferred know-
ledge was codified, explicit knowledge.
Implicit knowledge that could be of importance to success was,
however, never translated into the projects as a whole. This lack cre-
ated problems in the final phase of the project when the innovation was
to be commercialized. From the perspective of the entire project, not
only the creative phase, the stickiness of implicit knowledge must be
described as negative, even though it provided efficiency in the creation
of the solution.
Proposition 5 : In the creative phase of an innovation project, it is
possible to divide the project into several subprojects that (a) give rise
to negative stickiness of implicit knowledge and (b)foster codification
of knowledge and a positive leakiness of explicit knowledge.

The other two projects - the fiber-optic project and the ProViva project
- were performed in newly established contexts and the projects were
mainly characterized by positive leakiness of implicit knowledge into
the projects. The knowledge provided was experimental rather than
standardized. The flow of implicit knowledge was possible due to the
presence of a translator who understood both parties and mediated
knowledge among the involved firms into the project. A two-way
translation of work practice, functional systems, routines, and norms
that prevailed in each technological field made the leakiness of implicit
knowledge possible.
In the Fiber-optic case, an engineer from Permanova spent six month
at Rofin Sinar. Through his interaction with their technicians, an
understanding of the functional systems and routines was received.
With this knowledge, he was able to initiate his colleagues at Perma-
nova into the functional systems of Rofin and to mediate knowledge
about routines of Permanova to Rofin. It was thereby possible to devel-
op shared routines and agreements about the continued flow of inform-
ation, knowledge, and resources between the two different technolo-
gical fields. In the ProViva case, the R&D manager at Skinemejerier,
having knowledge of both the scientific community and the functional
systems of Skinemejerier, helped to mediate the two knowledge
systems into the respective organizations.
MARIA BENGTSSON AND JESSICA ERIKSSON

The interaction between the partners also gave access to a broader

scientific community, as different technological fields were incorpora-
ted in thc project. The partners were willing to mediate knowledge
developed through the organizations' interaction within their respec-
tive local network, which included both the scientific community and
suppliers. Both partners contributed to the leakiness of knowledge by
translating the working practices in their respective local environments.
The knowledge generated in these environments was then shared and
utilized in the joint project.
Proposition 6: In the creative phase of an innovation project, (a) a
translator of practices contributes t o positive leakiness of explicit and
implicit knowledge and ( b ) the emergence of shared practices gives
access to a broader scientific community.

T h e final phase: Negative leakiness and stickiness

As the projects progressed toward the final phase, market conditions
and the actions of competitors became pertinent for the projects and
their completion. During the iinplementation and commercialization of
the innovations, a positive leakiness as well as a positive stickiness of
information and knowledge were important.
The FMS project and the fiber-optic project were organized in a
business context with structural conditions supporting competition
and providing a potential for negative leakiness. The car producers
argued that a continuous exchange of suppliers and partners over time
was necessary. It was argued, for example, that different firms lead the
development of lasers at different times, and that it is important to
choose the best solution at the time. It is also held that suppliers are
continuously played against each other when alternatives are compa-
red, an advantageous situation for the car manufacturers, which gave
rise t o negative leakiness in the FMS project. The car manufacturers'
actions were also of importance for the fiber-optic project, as the inno-
vation, a new fiber-optical laser system, was to be sold to customers in
the automobile industry.
In the FMS project, Volvo had previously cooperated with competi-
tors of the participating organizations, ABB Robotics and Permanova.
They mediated previously gained knowledge to the partners in this spec-
ific project. If Volvo changes partners again in the future, knowledge
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS IN INTER-ORG.4NIZATIONAL INNOVATION P R O J E ( ' T S

that the firms have shared with the car manufacturer can be transfe-
rred t o competitors. The fiber-optic project was embedded in the same
competitive context and exposed to the "playing" of suppliers in the
automobile industry. Another dimension was of importance in this
case: Volvo's power position as a large customer, which allowed it t o
force Permanova into interaction with Rofin Sinar's competitors, and
vice versa. Rofin Sinar considered it t o be a problem when Permanova
utilized knowledge gained from their mutual project in cooperation
with other laser source manufacturers. The negative leakiness of know-
ledge in the fiber-optics project could render further commercialization
of the innovation more difficult and harm the relationship between Per-
manova and Rofin Sinar. In order to secure their relationship and t o
avoid negative leakiness, the firms initiated new innovation projects
that might provide benefits from negative leakiness in order t o stay
ahead of the competitors.
Proposition 7 : In the final phase of an innovation project, ( a )contin-
uous exchanges of partners and ( b ) actors' power positions can give
rise to negative leakiness.

The plastic beer bottle project and the ProViva project were organized
in a business context with structural conditions supporting coopera-
tion. The dairy and the brewery industries were heavily influenced by
political decisions, old patterns of interaction, and systems for distri-
buting goods. Despite a deregulation, some conditions that arose
during the regulative era remained, albeit weakened, in the dairy indus-
try. A number of different systems were entwined in both industries,
particularly in the brewery industry.
The cooperation within the brewery industry indicated that the de-
pendency among competitors, the trade association, and customers
was complex, which strongly circumscribed Zeunerts's ability t o act.
Resistance from the customers - political as well as industry pressures
to conform and not to challenge the system - hampered positive leaki-
ness (negative stickiness) when the plastic beer bottle innovation was to
be commercialized. The power positions of some breweries were also
of importance. Larger breweries that strongly influenced the distribu-
tion system were not keen to accept a new plastic beer bottle that pro-
ved t o be totally incompatible with the existing systems. Instead, the
leakiness from the project became negative. When the bottle was intro-
duced and then stopped, knowledge about the technical solution, as
M A R I A B E N G T S S O N A N D JESSICA ERIKSSON

well as the attempt to adjust the bottle to the existing system, were
open for competitors to copy.
In the dairy industry, Skinemejerier had to sell ProViva through the
channels of its competitors, because all dairies remained as distributors
of dairy products to the grocery stores in the respective regional area.
For the commercialization, Skinemejerier was dependent on coopera-
tion with its competitors. Some of the other dairies whose regional dis-
tribution placed them in power positions, hesitated to sell ProViva, per-
ceiving the product t o be a threat. It was thereby possible to hamper
positive leakiness from the project in the final phase.
Proposition 8: In the final phase of an innovation project, estab-
lished and enduring cooperation enhanced by significant actors' power
positions or supported by rules and regulations fosters conformity,
which gives rise to (a) negative stickiness and (b) to negative leakiness,
if competitors can capitalize on the knowledge provided.

Discussion
In our analysis of the four inter-organizational innovation projects, the
phases have emerged as important in understanding contextual influ-
ence on projects. A certain context can have a positive effect on sticki-
ness and leakiness during one phase, but the same context can have a
negative influence on the project in other phases.
First, we have found that a well-established context contributes to
the necessary leakiness of information, knowledge, and resources
during the initial phase. In well-established innovation contexts there
are familiarity, experiences, and supporting systems that allow for effi-
cient communication. This reasoning is in line with Bounty (zooo),
who argues that strategic resources and intellectual capital leak among
R&D scientists across organizational boundaries if acquaintance and
mutual trust develop among the interacting individuals. In well-known
contexts, actors who have previously interacted with each other and have
good "chemistry" form strong relationships (c.f. Larsson, Bengtsson,
Henriksson, & Sparks, 1999). Thus Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, and
Sparks, (1999) argue for the need of a communicative capacity to in-
crease the ability to disclose knowledge to other organizations. A comm-
unicative capacity includes routines and systems for communication,
and such routines and systems exist in well-established contexts.
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION PROJECTS

Second, we can conclude that such a communicative capacity does

not exist in newly established contexts, which give rise to a negative
stickiness in the initial phase. Because no common language or other
communicative means exist, communication is ineffective in the initial
phase. In accordance with Bresman, Birkinshaw, and Nobel (1999) we
argue that misinformation can cause anxiety and mistrust, which
makes the flow sticky. Lack of familiarity in newly established contexts
can be the result of differences among technological fields as well as
cultural and geographical distances. Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson,
and Sparks (1999) state that geographical distance and its expression
in the social context including foreign languages, customs, and tradi-
tion disturb communication among partners. We argue that distance
can also be valid for partners from different technological spaces,
implying, for example, that the distance between Rofin and Permanova,
being both geographical and technological, was doubled, which made
the communication difficult during the initial phase (cf. Bengtsson &
Soderholm, 2002).
Third, our study indicates that the initial positive leakiness in well-
established contexts becomes negative in the creative phase, and that
the negative stickiness in newly established context shifts and becomes
positive during this phase. Familiarity, experiences, and supporting
systems in well-established contexts allow efficient communication of
explicit knowledge. Zander and Kougut (1995) found that knowledge
that can be coded and taught is possible to transfer rapidly. This rea-
soning is in line with that of Schulz (ZOOI), who demonstrated that the
fluidity of knowledge increases if it is codified, rendering the innova-
tion process relatively simple, even though the solutions may be tech-
nologically advanced, because there is limited need for learning among
the organizations. As the projects were broken down into subprojects,
a so-called learning substitution occurred, in which a certain group
within a project frees a partner organization from the responsibility of
having to learn about a certain area (c.f. Levinthal & March, 1993).
This situation, however, gives rise to a negative stickiness in the flow of
implicit knowledge, which is akin to Powell's (1998) statement that
knowledge facilitates the utilization of greater knowledge, and Brown
and Duguid's (1998) reasoning o n the stickiness of knowledge among
units due to division of practice.
In contrast, leakiness of implicit knowledge developed in newly
established contexts during the creative phase. One explanation for the
M A R I A BENGTSSON A N D J E S S I C A FRIKSSON

leakiness was the existence of a translator. Cohen and Levinthal (1990)

argue for the need t o have a person monitoring the environment, iden-
tifying the knowledge needed, and translating it into the different units
within an organization (cf. also Szulanski, 1996). We argue that this
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) is needed for the flow
of information, knowledge, and ideas among partners in an inter-organ-
izational project. This reasoning is in line with Inkpen's (1998) argu-
ment that cross-boarder knowledge transfer often requires personnel
transfers, visits, and face-to-face contact in order t o overcome the com-
plexity and distance. Intimate knowledge about the partner appears t o
be of importance, following Uzzi's (1997) discussion, as such know-
ledge can allow for better understanding of the partner's problems and
therefore contribute to better solutions.
Furthermore, interaction among partners in inter-organizational
projects gives access t o a broader scientific community and scientific
progress that otherwise would have been beyond the reach of the firms
(c.f. Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Liebeskind, Lumerman, Zucker, &
Brewer, 1996). In newly created innovation contexts, there are many
sources of knowledge, physical assets, human resources, and inform-
ation, and thus many sources for potential leakiness that contribute
positively to the combination of knowledge in novel ways. In order to
combine knowledge in novel ways, there is a need for a transfer of
practices that can be obtained if actors simultaneously participate in
several communities of practices, and thus contribute to the evolving of
overlapping routines. The development of routines and common prac-
tices can be similar to Goes and Park's (1997) finding that administra-
tive links in inter-organizational relations accelerate learning and pre-
vent mistakes.
Fourth, cooperative and competitive governance structures in the
market cause both stickiness and leakiness in the third phase. Politi-
cally induced cooperative structures contribute to a negative stickiness
that makes the introduction of new solutions and innovations difficult.
Cooperative contexts with formalized routines and shared systems
become "barren", to paraphrase Szulanski's (1996) reference t o an in-
ability in such contexts t o accept new knowledge and ideas. This barr-
enness is akin to Uzzi's (1997) discussion of the ways in which "over-
embeddedness" may hinder actions in networks when social norms
becomc overly important. Forces toward conformity hinder the imple-
mentation of new innovations, because they are perceived as breaches
 STICKINESS AND LEAKINESS I N INI'EK-ORGANIZATIOKAL INNOVATION PROJF.C:TS

against shared norms and accepted behavior (c.f. Gnyawali & Madha-
van, 2001).The familiarity and integration among competitors makes
it easy to gain knowledge rapidly about new ideas and to adapt them
t o the rules and norms that prevail. Hence, negative leakiness also is
present in the context.
Competitive governance structures in the market also cause negative
leakiness in the final phase. Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001) suggest
that dense networks are characterized by increased fluidity of resour-
ces. Dense networks will cause increased structural similarities among
potential competitors, making conflict avoidance more difficult and
being expressed as negative leakiness. If there are dynamic competitive
relations pressuring the firms, they could provide an increased flow of
resources from a project considered to be positive within the industry,
and contribute to learning in a wider context. From the point of view
of the firm contributing knowledge, it may he negative leakiness, but it
stimulates further innovativeness. However, if the knowledge generated
within the projects and their value-nets are implicit, the knowledge
translated into the project context also provides the project with some
degree of stickiness, hindering the leakage of knowledge into the exten-
ded network (c.f. Schulz & Jobe, 2001).
Our analysis has focused on contextual influence on the flows of
information, knowledge, and resources in inter-organizational projects.
From our analysis some propositions about the flows have been gene-
rated, and some tentative conclusions have been discussed. Based on
this discussion, we can conclude that the contexts of projects matter,
and that the contextual influence may vary during the course of the
project. A more distinct definition of different types of flows in inno-
vation projccts is needed, however (see e.g. Zander & Kogut's [19951
definition of knowledge as one attempt to do this). This study also
demonstrates that the embeddedness in cooperative and competitive
relationships must be acknowledged and further developed.
Increasingly, a characteristic of many project organizations is the move
toward developing strategic alliances and partnering arrangements
with other ~roject-basedorganizations. Examples of such working
partnerships are ubiquitous, ranging from the multi-partner consortia
working to construct Hong Kong's Chek Lap Kok airport, the Three
Gorges Dam in China, develop the latest generation Airbus model
A380 in Europe, and advance innovative wireless applications in comm-
unications. Although the reasons for promoting such relationships
are numerous, including risk management, economies of scale, and so
forth, little is known about the motivations promoting the push toward
such alliances, the mechanisms by which these alliances are propagated
and reinforced, and the outcomes of cooperative relationships. This
chapter will develop a framework for analyzing the nature of interor-
ganizational cooperation, particularly as it applies to information shar-
ing across organizational boundaries. Using case study examples from
recently initiated information sharing initiatives for planning and devel-
opment projects within the United States, we will examine the nature

' Portions of this chapter were adapted from Nedovic-Budic, Z. and J.K. Pinto, (r99y),"Interor-
ganizational GIS: Issues and prospects," A n m k of Regional Science, 33, 183-195. This resear-
ch was supported by NSF Grants ILS - y81z5zo and IRI - 9630634.
 I N F O R M A T I O N SHARING A M O N G PARTNERING PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS

of cross-organizational cooperation and propose a conceptual model of

multi-partner project information sharing that can serve as an initial
point into investigating methods for promoting and improving such
collaborations in the future.

Benefits of information sharing

There are a number of reasons why independent organizations actively
seek to develop collaborative working relationships with other project-
based firms (Ekstedt, Lundin, Soderholm, & Wirdenius, 1999; Lundin,
2000). Although some reasons are obvious (e.g., the desire to make use
of the technical expertise or capital reserves of other organizations that
can offset a particular short-coming), other reasons are not so clear. For
example, long-term competitors may be called upon at times to colla-
borate in a project of mutual interest; the best recent example may be
the partnership between Rolls-Royce and General Electric's Jet Engine
Groups in developing the engine systems for the U.S. Government's
Joint Strike Fighter program. In these circumstances, competitors are
placed in the unique position of having t o cooperate, provide each
other with potentially valuable intellectual capital and technical data,
and work jointly to create a project of which they both have direct
ownership. Hence, the process of information sharing and cooperation
across organizational boundaries may, at times, make perfect sense
while at other times appear counter-productive or, at least, potentially
damaging t o long-term competitive advantage. What then, are some of
the primary motivations project-based organizations may feel that
impel them toward interorganizational cooperation?
Risk Sharing - One of the key risk mitigation strategies for firms
engaged in projects fraught with high uncertainty is t o determine if it
is possible t o either transfer or, at a minimum, share risk (Chapman &
Ward, 1997). Risk, of course, can encompass a number of forms, inclu-
ding financial risk, technical risk, and managerial risk. Essentially,
however, risk refers t o methods for addressing, understanding, and
minimizing the negative effects of project uncertainty. In this manner,
sharing risk represents a strong motivation for interorganizational co-
operation and data sharing.
Economic - A number of industries have huge economic barriers to
entry due to the cost of initial start-up. The commercial airframe
JEFFREY K . P I N T O AND Z O R I C A NEDOVIC-BUDIC

industry, for example, is one with such high financial barriers that the
European consortium that formed Airbus needed active and liberal
funding from member countries to first incubate and eventually create
a viable competitor t o Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas.
Technical - As project organizations often specialize in specific engin-
eering functions or technical operations, a project that requires mul-
tiple forms of technological innovation is usually simply beyond the
capabilities of any one organization. Firms, then, will routinely engage
in joint partnerships with other technical organizations to gain their
expertise, offset their own limitations, and present the client with a
stronger proposal, based o n the ability to offer a full range of services.
From a product perspective, Ford Motor Company has maintained a
long-term link with Mazda of Japan, t o the point of acquiring a min-
ority stake in the company. Ford gains the superior aluminum, small-
block engines that Mazda produces and Mazda benefits through For-
d's excellent car body integrity.
Strategic - Another important motivator for interorganizational coll-
aboration refers to the need t o create strategic alliances (Lundin &
Hartman, zooob). There are any number of reasons why such alliances
are beneficial, including the opportunity to penetrate previously closed
businesses, industries, or even countries, the advantage of gaining
technical benefits from the partner, and the effect of synergies through
the linking of organizations internationally. For example, many western
project firms seeking to gain infrastructure projects in countries that
have historically been difficult to penetrate, such as China or India, will
routinely partner with local companies as a necessary first step to gaining
access to these foreign markets. General Electric first sought to penetrate
the market to supply jet engines to Airbus through developing a strate-
gic partnership with SNECMA, the French engine manufacturer.
In sum, there are a number of practical reasons why project organi-
zations may seriously consider interorganizational collaboration and
information sharing, even with potential rivals. In developing a model
of the motivations and mechanisms for such information sharing
across project organizations, the balance of this chapter will draw
directly from the authors' recent research investigating interorganiza-
tional information sharing within the context of IS projects. Obvious
parallels can be drawn between this form of project and other cases in
which there is strong incentive for project firms to collaborate.
It is useful, before proceeding too far into this discussion, to briefly
 INFORAlATTOU S H 4 R I N C ; A M O N G PARTNERINC P R O J E C T O R G A N I Z A T I O N S

define the idea behind the term "collaboration." Due to the inherent
similarities among terms such as collaboration, cooperation, coordina-
tion, and integration, the concepts are often used interchangeably and
indeed, in our discussion, we will at times substitute one term for anoth-
er. Nevertheless, the underlying nature of the construct is t o suggest
joint behavior toward some common goal of interest. This definition
comes from Pinto, Pinto & Prescott (1993) who synthesized the work
done by multiple authors employing these varying terms. Their findings
suggested that regardless of the terminology used, their implicit nature
essentially illuminated the same underlying construct.

The potential for information sharing

In theory, coordinating information sharing among organizational pro-
ject partners offers notable advantages through cost savings, producti-
vity, improved decision making, and better customer service (Brown &
Brudney, 1993; Dawes, 1996). Dueker & Vrana (1995) identify effici-
ency (existing operations performed at lower per-unit cost), effective-
ness (enhanced capabilities, new or better quality products), and enter-
prise benefits (new responsibilities, broader mission) as potential gains
from information sharing. The effects on problem solving, decision-
making, and better understanding of technical issues are perceived as
the most valuable effects of data sharing. Finally, coordinated cross-
organizational project teams hold the promise of stimulating inter-
organizational cooperation and collaboration, and building inter-organ-
izational alliances and relationships (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996). The
overall succcss of each organization can be improved dramatically by
sharing information between them.
Given the potential benefits, however, information-sharing
arrangements to date offer a mixed result. While some partnerships
have been fruitful and profitable t o all parties involved, in other cases
a general unwillingness t o actively collaborate or share proprietary
information across organizational boundaries has led t o less than opti-
mal project performance. Such lack of sharing impedes the optimal
developillent of projects in specific cases (Pinto & Onsurd, 1995), and
also hinders the development and utilization of a project technology's
full potential (Frank, 1992). The impediments to sharing are of both a
technological and organizational nature, with the latter often being
J E F F R E Y K. P I N T O A N D Z O R I C A N E O O V I C - B l l D I C

harder t o overcome. Campbell (1991) points out the following prob-

lem areas: (a) variations in priorities between participants; (b) differen-
ces in the ability t o exploit technical issues; (c) differences in the level
of awareness and technical skills; and (d) inability t o achieve agree-
ments over access to information, leadership, sharing protocols, equip-
ment and training. Masser and Campbell ( ~ 9 9 5further
) concluded that
"organizational and political factors apparently offset in many instan-
ces the theoretical benefits to be obtained from structures which seek
t o promote information sharing" (p. 247). Thus, while few might argue
that, in broad terms, information sharing is both necessary and useful
t o collaborating project firms, there are a number of barriers that nega-
tively affect the ready flow of necessary information among partner
firms. This chapter proceeds with a discussion of some of the major
issues that affect the deliberate strategy of coordinating information
sharing among industrial partners in project settings.

Challenges and dynamics of data sharing

In order to promote sharing across project organizations, it is of ulti-
mate importance to understand the motivation that drives various
firms t o engage in inter-organizational relationships. Although the
organization's structural characteristics are often the primary determin-
ant of the amount and elements of interorganizational interaction
(Levine & White 1961), cost savings is probably the most common rea-
son for seeking relationships across organizational boundaries. This is
particularly true in times of increased fiscal pressures on organizations
and resource scarcity (Pinto & Onsrud, 1995).
While the economic arguments are the most compelling, Kumar &
van Dissel (1996) argue the importance of technical and socio-political
elements in explaining collaborative alliances. In addition t o cost, the
partnerships are motivated by organizational needs and capabilities,
creating synergies, and appeals to professionalism and common goals
(Obermeyer, 199s). The commonly held or "superordinate" goals
which are important for all involved organizations, but are hard to
achieve independently, are also put forth by Tjosvold (1988) and by
Pinto, Pinto & Prescott (1993) as one of the most prominent reasons
for information sharing. Coordination in general can also be based on
authority (deriving from a sense of duty); common interest (valuing the
 INFORMATION S H A K I N G A M O N G I'AKTNERING PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS

same goals); or exchange (receiving something in return) inducements

(O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). Nevertheless, spontaneous interorganiza-
tional coordination is rare and monetary or other incentives may be
necessary t o "push" or "pull" the organizations into the sharing rela-
tionship (Azad & Wiggins, 199s).
Such coordination among various organizations is recognized as a
necessary ingredient in attaining a goal of common interest (Lundin &
Soderholm, 1995). "Coordination consists of protocols, tasks, and
decision mechanisms designed to achieve concerted actions between
interdependent units" (Thompson, 1967; Kumar & van Dissel, 1996,
p. 284) and assumes benefits accrue t o all involved parties (Cook,
1977). Project implementation in multi-participant settings is a com-
plex process that confronts diverse organizational functions, tasks,
resources, motifs, interests, and goals. The process involves continuous
discussion and agreement over the joint activities. The success of for-
ming an inter-organizational relationship primarily depends on the par-
ticipants' willingness to negotiate and compromise, on establishing the
relationship of trust (Hartman, zooo), general quality of the relation-
ship (Pinto & Onsrud, 1 9 9 5 ) ~and on their commitment t o sharing
(Meredith, ~ 9 9 ~Interestingly,
) . good teamwork, facilitated by proper
communication channels, is seen t o be even more beneficial for inter-
organizational dynamics than having good leadership (Evans, 1995).
Organizations entering into an inter-organizational relationship have
to build a level of mutual understanding. Communication between
organizations is a critical factor in enabling sharing partnerships. Harvey
(1996) promotes a concept of boundary objects as successful for design-
ing information systems in heterogeneous cultural settings. According
to this author, successful communication between different participants
starts with clarifying the semantic differences and commonalties, and
then proceeds with negotiated construction of coherence between the
groups.
Finally, there is some indication that the success of coordination
depends on the number of participants involved. Greater numbers of
participants entering a partnership diminishes the likelihood of success
(Brown et al., 1996). Alternatively, however, according to Azad &
Wiggins (1995), a critical mass of participants is required t o build
momentum for establishing and reinforcing the processes necessary t o
exchange information steadily, rather than sporadically. The presence
of a skilled leader, support from managers, and administrative officials
J E P r R E Y K. P I X T O A N D Z O R I C A N E D O V I C - B U D l C

are seen as essential in the maintenance of such an interorganizational

relationship (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1981; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984).
Highlighting the above discussion, a number of diverse challenges
must be addressed and, where possible, resolved prior to creating an
environment that is conducive to freely sharing information across
organizational boundaries. Among the challenges that must be consi-
dered are: 1)the impact of organizational factors, 2 ) the need for data
standardization, 3) the cost of information collection, storage, and diss-
emination, and 4 ) the importance of creating mechanisms for interor-
ganizational information exchange. Each of these challenges will be
considered in turn.

Challenge one: The effect of organizational factors

Entering an interorganizational project relationship leads t o increased
interdependence among the organizations. Organizations engaging in a
sharing arrangement have to be prepared to undergo modifications and
adapt to the situation. Primarily, they should be ready t o forgo some
autonomy while entering an inter-organizational relationship (Azad &
Wiggins, 1995). The authors found that the extent t o which the organ-
izational autonomy is affected determines the probability of establi-
shing the relationship. For example, in some instances, officials tend to
form relationships that would least affect their autonomy, thus mini-
mizing their loss of power (Cook, 1977). In effect, they seek a collabo-
ration of the lowest level; that is, one in name only with little suppor-
ting behavior. O n the other hand, a pre-existing state of organizational
interdependence is said t o favor inter-organizational sharing (Meredith,
199s). Therefore, organizations that by their very operations require a
collaborative environment to implement projects are more likely to
continue t o engage in sharing activities as a matter of course. For
example, in soliciting bids for large (multi-billion dollar) defense-rela-
ted contracts, governments often start with the expectation that reason-
able bids must involve a consortium of partnering organizations. Addi-
tionally, with the rapid increase in the use of external suppliers and
project supply chain management, many project organizations contract
with numerous other partners as a matter of course. This in-creased
interdependence and need for cooperation can in many situations lead
to power shifts (Stern & Craig, 1971), "turf" (Dawes, 1996), and con-
 INbOI1MATION SHAKING A M O N G PARTNERING PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS

flicts (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996) over authority, jurisdiction, and dis-
tribution of power.
Various organizational and environmental factors affect inter-organ-
izational exchange. Those include: stability of the environment; homo-
geneity of organizations; concentration of resources; resource capacity,
domain consensus among the organization, turbulence1 change, and
mutability of organizations in the environment (Cummings 1980).
Organizational connectivity is also related t o organizational internal
factors such as: centrality, formalization, complexity, and intensity (i.e.,
frequency of information flows and amount of resources shared; Van
de Ven and Ferry, 1980; Brown & Brudney, 1993).Calkins et al.,
( 7 9 9 ~present
) five organizational factors that could impact the dec-
ision t o institute standards for data sharing: bureaucratic practices and
standard operating procedures; degree of cross-functional cooperation;
organizational structure; political environment; and corporate culture.
Another factor is the project capacity of the organization, which refers
to "an overall index that measures the proficiency, and effectiveness of
conducting a series of implementation tasks" (Brown & Brudney,
1993).
The change and adaptation that an organization has t o go through
is yet another vital issue in the sharing process. This feature is particu-
larly relevant for project firms that are contemplating engaging in inter-
organizational exchanges for the first time. Any information sharing
effort will involve redefinition of existing tasks and structures and the
establishment of new ones. Institutional inertia and resistance to
change are a common reaction to innovations (Newton et al., 1992;
Craig, 1995). Mcrcdith (1993) identifies ambiguity and complexity as
causes of the organizational resistance t o change and cooperation. The
resistance to structural changes and institutional inertia, however, tend
to diminish as the expected benefits increase (Dueker & Vrana, 1995).

Challenge two: The need for

information standardization
In information exchange, it is vital that data standards be agreed upon
as soon as possible in that these standards often describe the practical
mechanics of the information sharing process. Standards are necessary
for data models, content data, feature delineation, data collection, refer-
J E F F R E Y K . I'LNTO A N D Z O R I C A NPDOVIC-BUDIC

encing, data quality, data transfer and use (Guptill, 1994). The need for
standards increases with the data sharing activities as they become
necessary for determining the fitness of data for different users (Rush-
ton & Frank, 199s). Therefore, setting standards to facilitate sharing
has been widely acknowledged as a critical activity that can reduce the
costs of sharing data (Moyer & Niemann, r q q j ; Bossler, 1995). Inter-
organizational systems may require standards on project information
of a wide variety of types, including planning data (PERT charts, Risk
assessment and abatement procedures, Scope analyses, and WBS) as
well as control documentation (Earned Value Analysis and Configura-
tion Management). The key lies in creating a data standard that allows
all parties to correctly interpret status reports, updates, and other per-
tinent information.

Challenge three: Information costs

Sharing information across organizations involves costs incurred t o
coordinate the effort, to negotiate, and t o develop the common inform-
ation database standards. Sharing the costs, not only for project devel-
opment, but also for database development is the most obvious advan-
tage of interorganizational cooperation. It is important t o note, how-
ever, that the "costs" associated with information sharing come in
many forms, only one of which is applied t o monetary costs. Inform-
ation sharing and coordinating project activities lead to "administrative
costs" as well (Dawes, 1996). Transaction costs are among these admin-
istrative expenses, which "are the costs of managing the interaction
while keeping the opportunistic behavior under control so that ongoing
operation between the units can be sustained" (Kumar & van Dissel,
1996, p. 283). Due to the transaction costs and delays caused by the
coordination process (Brown et al., 1996), the costs of sharing inform-
ation, both in monetary and administrative terms, may be significant.
Loss of autonomy and investment of energy are also real cost to organ-
izations (Van de Ven, 1980).
 INFORMATION S H A R I N G A M O N G I'AKTNERING P R O I E C T ORGANIZATIONS

Challenge four: Creating mechanisms for

information exchange
Sharing mechanisms implies the establishment of particular structures
and policies that are designed to facilitate the free exchange of inform-
ation. The structure of an interorganizational relationship is defined by
specifying roles, obligations, rights, procedures, information flow,
data, analysis, and computational methods used in the relationship
(Kumar 81 van Dissel, 1996). Structure reduces the ambiguity by form-
alizing the form, process and content of the relationship and by
implying a level of agreement about mutual expectations. There is
some debate as to whether a simple or complex structure is favorable
for setting up a multi-participant project environment. Meredith
(199s) postulates that less complex and unambiguous structures lead
t o less resistance to inter-organizational sharing. Brown et al. (1996)
acknowledge that complex structures are an impediment, but did not
find evidence that the converse is true; that is, that simple structures
necessarily secure positive outcomes.
Establishing interorganizational coordination mechanisms is a
necessary precondition for a multi-participant project team (Meredith,
~ 9 9 ~Olsen
) . (1981) cites four ways to coordinate: "by rules and pro-
cedures, by substantive rules, by ad hoc interactions, and by autono-
mous adjustment." Mechanisms for project partnerships usually inclu-
de setting up information exchange and organizational integration.
The creation of overarching bodies, in the form of program manage-
ment or committee structures, is seen as a way to help coordinate the
project implementation, aid in the setting up of standards, and arriving
at data and cost sharing agreements (Ventura, 1995). Finally, sharing
policies need to be clearly defined as important elements in establishing
and institutionalizing the information sharing relationship. Nedovic-
Budic & Pinto (1998) group the sharing policy issues into five areas:
nature of data t o be shared; responsibility/ownership; cost; incentives;
and formalization of the interorganizational relationship.
J E F F R E Y K. PINTO A N D Z O R I C A N E D O V I C ~ B U D I C

~ ~ G - E Q ~ S D
>

Interorganization 4
ol Relationship
History
-Shored system
- Quolity - J o n t project
lnterdependenclei

Intensity
COORDINATION
1. A~titude
v
Attitude & - Dotabare, hoidwore Negotlotlon
PERCEIVED
Commitment ,
,h,
,, .rs, 1, ~~~~~~~k BENEFITS
- Infarmotion - Commitment/focur
rpoce, - Proied efficiency

- -
sharing applocotioni Perr~rtence - Enhanced decision-
[proprietory,
- Number, stotus ond mle - Communication making
open) of participants t -Client
-Coordination 2. Responsibilities responsiveness

Reasons
* Overarching - Accepmnce
-Backing by resources
-Synergy
- Econom~esof scale
- Overarching g m l r ~ ~ n ~ ~ n o g e m e n t =lorib
- Enhanced
Resources
-Leadership -Rewards collaboration
- Mondote/poiti=o .~ ~ ~ .Match with
~ organizational
/ ~ -Technology
~ ~ ~ i ~
Commiiieer mssion and functonr transfer
Other Factors
-Resources Organizational 3. Perceptions of equity
- Needr
Forms and fairness
Stobllty
-Centralized - Information
- Decenhazed/ - Accerr to data
distrfbuted Decision-moking
- N e w organizationsl -Contribution
processes and forms - Benefits

IMPLEMENTATION
top support, funding, project
scope, management (Bming,
expectations, progress],
ogendas
pol~t~cr/perronol~t~ei/P~iiite

Fzgure 6:1 Conceptual Framework.

Conceptual framework
The above discussion forms the backdrop t o the development of a con-
ceptual framework that incorporates a variety of salient issues that
must be addressed when contemplating the prospect of interorganiza-
tional project collaboration. While the incentives t o engage in these
sharing relationships are strong, there are also significant challenges
that must be addressed in order to gain maximum benefit from cross-
organizational cooperation. The conceptual framework in Figure One,
addresses some of the key concerns that are relevant to creating a positi-
ve and fruitful relationship across organizational lines. Broadly speaking,
and following our discussion above, we have categorized four sets of
issues that should be addressed in order to promote better project inform-
ation sharing: context, structure, process, and outcomes.
 INFORMATION S H A R I N G A M O N G I'ARTNERING PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS

Context addresses four elements that can contribute to or detract from

the organizational sharing process. These include the nature of the inter-
organizational relationship, the attitude and commitment among the
project partners, their reasons for sharing information, and other con-
tributing factors.
I. Interorganizational relationship - obviously, a key contextual vari-
able affecting the likelihood of successful information sharing rela-
tes to any past history of interorganizational relationship. Do the
potentially cooperating firms have a history of collaborative rela-
tionships or have they been contentious? Are there natural interde-
pendencies among the organizations that can be exploited? As
Pinto, Pinto & Prescott ( ~ 9 9 3 noted,
) past cooperative efforts
directly shape the nature of future initiatives in the form of psycho-
social outcomes.
2. Attitude and commitment - Another important contextual issue
relates to the prevailing attitude and commitment level of each
potential partner entering the information sharing arrangement.
Clearly, when one partner misconceives their role relative to the
others, there is a strong likelihood of tension and poor communica-
tion. Likewise, if project firms begin a data sharing initiative unwill-
ingly or without showing a willingness to coordinate their activities,
the relationship is likely to fail.
3. Reasons - This issue refers to the motivations of all parties entering
the collaboration. Do they do so under duress or through immedia-
te perceived need? Do the partners have the shared goals so necess-
ary to make this process work? The nature of the cause for the ini-
tiative - mandate, needs based, and so forth - clearly identifies who
the willing participants are, how much collaboration each partner is
likely to offer, and whether the relationship is positively focused or
likely to quickly dissolve into acrimony.

Structure focuses on the nature of the organizational control systems,

the nature of the data to be shared, and the hierarchy established to
oversee the sharing process. These structural factors play a key role in
establishing the nature of the cooperative effort.
I. Objective - The objective refers to the purpose of the information-
sharing consortium. Typically, in project-based organizations, the
J E F F R E Y K . PINTO A N D Z O R I C A N E D O V I C -B U D I C

objective is aimed at establishing a jointly owned program, in which

each industrial partner contributes their "value-added" component.
2. Intensity - The intensity of the sharing relationship refers to the
number of partners, their individual and mutual roles, and individ-
ual status, relative t o each other. As we mentioned previously,
research tends to suggest that the number of partners in a sharing
consortium can lead to greater complexity and difficulty in main-
taining an open flow of communication. O n the other hand, small-
er consortia, composed of a limited number of partners, may have
the tendency t o act in a manner similar to small group dynamics
research, which has suggested the prevalence for a dominant part-
ner t o overwhelm and control the partnership. At a minimum, care
should be taken in determining the o p timal number of partners in
sharing consortia and any adverse effects of this intensity must be
taken into consideration as part of the consideration given to the
cooperative structure.
3. Overarching entities - One important component of structure con-
cerns the manner in which oversight will be established t o best ensu-
re the smooth flow of communications across the project partners.
Among the options that can be considered are using a joint man-
agement scheme, a central leadership role, user or special interest
groups to serve as the impetus for controlling the flow of information,
or even an oversight committee. Research into the Project Office sugg-
ests that establishing a central oversight group t o serve as the flow
of information on project management throughout the organization
can be very beneficial (Block and Frame, 1998).

4. Organizational Forms - A last key element in structure that must be

considered relates t o the type of structure, or organizational form,
that will be used as an overall hierarchy for the collaboration.
Because partnering organizations are often establishing a decentra-
lized, temporary organization t o cooperate with external partners,
the structure that is established can be quite complex and often
cumbersome. Project-based firms recognize that their ability to
simplify the organizational structure relative t o customers and coll-
aborators is a strong incentive to promoting information flow in a
timely fashion (Pinto & Rouhiainen, 2001).
 INFORMATION S H A R I N G A M O N G PARTNERING PROJECT O R G A N I Z A T I O N S

Process represents the implementation, or active communication stage

of the information sharing relationship. Once context and structure
have been established and care taken to best ensure that they will work
in a positive manner toward promoting information sharing, project
firms must address the nature of coordination and implementation as
process variables.
I. Coordination - A number of issues are relevant to establishing a
positive relationship among business partners, including their atti-
tudes toward the process, clearly demarcated responsibilities, and
perceptions by all members of equity and fairness. The degree to
which a positive attitude, based on teamwork, shared commitment,
and persistence is developed and reinforced, serves as a key link in
the creation of a coordinated effort for collaboration. Likewise, it is
imperative that individual responsibilities, including clear roles and
rewards, are developed and circulated as early as possible. Further,
their linkage to current organizational mission and functional state-
ments can help facilitate each member of the partnership in quickly
assimilating their roles. Finally, it is important that there be a clear
sense of equity among the project partners. Equity may not simply
mean that all partners are equal; in fact, there typically is a lead
partner to most consortia. However, it is important to emphasize
that each partner will be treated fairly, as an equally committed pro-
fessional with a stake in the final project outcome.
2. implementation - Implementation issues refer to the various mana-
gerial elements that can influence, either positively or negatively, the
process of project development and collaboration among the part-
ners. For example, the existence of clear top management support
for information sharing, adequate funding to support the project's
development, and the management of project progress are all clear-
ly linked to successful information sharing.

Outcomes of a partnering effort must clearly relate to the myriad out-

comes from a project's development. They may be commercial, reflec-
ting the market success of a new product, they may be enhanced deci-
sion-making, greater project efficiencies and cost savings, or better client
satisfaction. Clearly, for a project to be considered successful, some
aspect of all these elements is necessary evidence to consider. Ultimate-
ly, the partnering process is not an end unto itself. Partnering for pro-
JEFFREY K . P I N T O .4ND ZORICA NEDOVIC-BUOIC

ject development is a conscious, strategic decision that organizations

enter into in order to maximize the likelihood that they will create a
successful project. In this manner, all efforts aimed at creating the best
possible environment for interorganizational collaboration are simply
an attempt t o create the best possible environment for planning, devel-
oping, and implementing a project.

Improving the prospects for data sharing

among project organizations
Sharing information across organizational boundaries is vital for cre-
ating a circumstance in which effective project partnering can proceed.
The bottom line of data sharing, however, lies in its promise to increa-
se provision of better information for project management and strate-
gic decision-making. Among the many perceived advantages, the bene-
fits in cost savings and positive effects on establishing better interorgan-
izational relationships are already recognized in some studies.
Although the special nature of project partnering is often brought
about due t o the need to work in collaboration with rn~~ltiple firms in
order to develop a project, its inherent nature also leads to many imped-
iments. Among many issues that are involved in sharing data, organ-
izational (including political), institutional, economic, and technologi-
cal factors are seen to play a major role. The need for partnering firms
t o share information continues t o rapidly increase, but it is an effort
that is complicated and fraught with numerous difficulties of manage-
rial, technical, political, and structural natures. In short, the merits and
motivations behind information sharing are laudable; however, the diff-
iculties too are significant and should not be underestimated.
From the perspective of gaining buy-in t o interorganizational data
sharing for project development, recent research has investigated the
impact of thc various components of the research model in terms of
their impact on improving the likelihood of establishing cross-organ-
izational collaborative relationships (Nedovic-Budic & Pinto, 2002).
Although preliminary in nature, the research offers some interesting
views of the data sharing model and the best mechanisms to enhance
positive coordination. Further, their results present some useful guide-
lines for project organizations as they begin to investigate methods for
 INFORMATION SHARING AMONG PARTNERTNG P I t O J E C T ORGANIZATIONS

enhancing the likelihood of effective data sharing. Some of the key sugg-
estions include the following:

I. Early in the relationship, establish firm guidelines for data sharing.

"Guidelines," in this case, refers to the need to make a deliberative
effort to identify the expected contributions from all corporate part-
ners. Ambiguous statements that support data sharing, but do not
specify the types of information, amounts of information, or other
structural mechanisms are not nearly as helpful as a straightforward,
a priori policy that identifies data sharing partners, the information
they will provide, and as clearly as possible, establishes the nature
and frequency with which data sharing will progress.
z. Data sharing requires clear leadership from all partners. Among the
multiple roles that project leaders must embrace is to serve as the
impetus for requiring data sharing and monitoring information
transfer. There is a natural organizational inertia that can inhibit the
willingness of partners to provide data willingly; further, there are
often bureaucratic barriers that serve as communications road-
blocks across organizational boundaries. Having strong leadership
is extremely important for maintaining the momentum to collabo-
rate with multiple project partners. Such leadership, to be most
effective, should be distributed; that is, it is highly desirable to have
project champions impelling an atmosphere of open communication
within each of the members of the consortium.
3. In the absence of data sharing mechanisms, it is often necessary to
create them. Many project organizations, faced with the need to
engage in systematic and sustained information sharing, find them-
selves without the means to collaborate most effectively. There are a
number of reasons for this lack, but primarily the cause can be traced
to a ) technical and, b) interpersonaVbehaviora1 reasons. From a techni-
cal perspective, many organizations lack the technology needed to
share data; for example, they may use different processing plat-
forms, have incompatible software or transmission capabilities, and
so forth. At a minimum, an audit must be conducted to determine
whether the corporate partners possess the technical means to share
data effectively.
Alternatively, as we have noted above, the very act of sharing
data across organizational boundaries may fly in the face of estab-
JEFFREY K. PINTO AND ZORICA NEDOVIC-BUDIC

lished cultural norms, create politicaVpower imbalances, or threaten

established rules and procedures within each firm. It is necessary to
analyze objectively the behavioral capacity for free information
sharing and, in the event that clear obstructions exist, begin to devel-
op a program whereby organizational or behavioral objections can
be identified and eliminated.
4. Clearly establish the superordinate goals by which the project's part-
ners will have incentive to share information. Past research on super-
ordinate goals in projects focused on their effect on inducing cross-
functional cooperation (Pinto, Pinto & Prescott, 1993).The impli-
cation of that work was to suggest that a clear motive, identified
with a sense of overall goals impels coordinated effort among dis-
parate groups. The same idea of superordinate goals can serve in
this case as a unifying motive for bringing together corporate part-
ners. The value of superordinate goals lies in their ability to create a
shared vision for the project, but also one that cannot be achieved
by any one member of the team. Hence, they serve as both the vision
for the project and a motive for data sharing.

It is important to remember, that for information sharing to occur, the

organizational motivation has to be positive and in this, the attitude of
the organization that is taking part in the sharing relationship is cru-
cial. More intensive sharing of information resources will come about
when the agencies that are involved are committed to sharing, willing
to negotiate, and work on the different issues related to sharing in a
cooperative way. Proper coordination mechanisms and communication
channels between organizations, establishing overarching bodies, and
setting up sound policies regarding data quality and ownership, access,
provision of metadata, and sharing of costs and revenues are crucial for
the success of any partnership. The involvement in inter-organizational
partnerships leads inevitably to changes in the existing structure and
functional characteristics of the organization, as well as promoting
shifts in existing power balances. This change requires minimal resi-
stance, openness to organizational learning and adjustment, flexibility,
and the readiness to deal with some loss of organizational autonomy,
and control.
Another factor that can strongly affect sharing of information is the
attitude toward the data itself. Viewing project information as a comm-
on resource rather than as owned by an organizational entity would
 INFORAMATION S H A R I N G A M O N G P A R T N E R I N G P R O J E C T ORGANIZATIONS

promote its sharing (Sussman, 1993). In their recently completed case

studies looking at shared IS data, Nedovic-Budic & Pinto (1999) found
that lowering unreasonable expectations regarding proprietary data is
beneficial, and tends t o facilitate interorganizational data sharing.
hIoreover, as information continues t o become widespread, and many
organizations turn toward project partnering ventures, the power equa-
tions between organizations with regard to access to technology and
information should change and further facilitate sharing among organ-
izations. Case studies of successful partnerships will also contribute to
lowering the barriers and reservations for interorganizational interac-
tion with respect t o sharing technical and other data among project
partners.
Ongoing improvements in the enabling technologies, and the de-
creasing cost of developing and maintaining information would also
enable productive sharing in the future. Advances in computer hard-
ware and networking technologies, like the changes from centralized
configurations t o distributed clientlserver architectures (Orthner et al.,
1994). and the increasing presence of World Wide Web-based access to
technical data in particular, have already affected these data sharing
dynamics.
This chapter noted that, for a variety of logical reasons, more and
more project-based organizations are moving toward strategic partner-
ships in bidding and implementing projects of a wide variety. The result
of this impetus toward interorganizational data sharing is profound
and offers some important implications for research into communica-
tions, joint ventures, and strategic stakeholder management, among
other avenues. To date, little research has directly investigated either
the causes or effects of project partnering behavior, particularly as it
relates t o sharing information with a variety of external organizations,
some of which are often in direct competition with each other in diff-
erent settings. Future research should continue to address the root cau-
ses of information sharing as well as its outcomes in order to offer pro-
ject-based firms a better, more comprehensive understanding of the fac-
tors that can facilitate effective information transfer in ways that bene-
fit all members of the project partnership.
 Introduction
I will try to argue the case for a strong narrative in support of premi-
um products as a crucial strategic factor. I shall be selecting empirical
illustrations from a study of product development projects in thc Volvo
Car Corporation, a company that now is a Ford subsidiary after a peri-
od of alliances (with Renault and Mitsubishi) in the rggos. H o w can a
company keep its soul in a context of rapidly shifting principles? Do
company cultures and brand values help or get in the way of premium
design? And what about customer satisfaction? Claimed to be the sour-
ce of every sound business strategy; or was it shareholder value?
First I need t o establish the quality conception behind the argument.
We find in most of the literature on quality a concept that is related to
different tools of asymptotic improvement like TQM, Kaizen, etc., a
concept that is statistical in character and denotes absence of deviations
from the product specifications. This is the concept of quality that
Juran taught and I S 0 promotes. It is based in production, could be call-
ed "congruence quality," and we could not live without it. However,
when we ask on what grounds product specifications should be
established we approach the concept of "design quality".
 PROJECTS A N D C O R E VALUES

Customer
values -
t
Product
specifications -
t
Product
properties

a
Figure 7:1 The total quality concept.
Congruence

Product specifications should relate t o customer values or needs, but in

industrial design, and especially in competitive markets like the car
industry, one cannot easily ask the customers what they think about a
model that will be on the market 5 years from now. As a matter of fact
we have not met one design engineer (in the widest sense of the word)
during our three years in the field who gave us any other type of comm-
ent than "If we ask the customers they will tell us that they prefer a
car like this year's model!" This means that there has t o be a substitute
for the input of direct customer opinion in the design work. Such a sub-
stitute is provided by the "brand values" and the articulation of needs
of the selected customer group. The problem is that current brand val-
ues contradict each other. Furthermore, the temporary project charged
with the development of a premium product is not independent of the
"line organization" in which it is embedded. It is subjected to influ-
ence from finance, production, strategy, marketing, R&D, etc. It is also
likely that the company will havc "company values" that are dissemi-
nated through brochures and seminars throughout the organization.
All these influences carry with them restrictions on the freedom of
design. The complexity of the information flow needed to accommo-
date all these constraints is overwhelming. The question is how d o pro-
ject members cope, and what kind of support could help them cope? It
is assumed that it is not a feasible approach to demand a stable, non-
contradictory set of goals and constraints as any proper economist
would do.
 0bservations of premium product design
in context
We want to know how competent people accomplish what they do in
their area of competence. It is not likely that we can achieve this
through interviews, since interviews will contain information that is
probably twice interpreted when presented to the interviewer. Direct
observation is required in order to have a referent for interpretation
and coding. This is the argument of ethnomethodologists like Garfin-
kel (1967),Sacks (199z),& Silverman (1998). We do not want to test
whether the product developers work the way we think they should
according to our theories. We want to understand how they actually
work. We also want to avoid being too influenced by our own theories
when we interpret or code the data we collected from the field, and for
that purpose we want to elicit the help of the participants them-
selves in interpretation. This has been accomplished by first video
recording project management meetings, and then editing short
sequences from the recorded meetings. These sequences have been
played back to participants individually with the question "What is
going on here?" The comments have been audio recorded and tran-
scribed. These recordings and comments on them provide the main
basis for identification of communication issues. A large number of
interviews, and measures of work climate on 3 occasions over a j-year
period, provide background information.
Focus will be on the effects on communication in a product dev-
elopment team of contradictions between brand values; in this specific
case how members deal with noise (a quality variable) caused by prio-
rity being given to "joy of driving." First I will try to show how the
brand values have developed over the last 20 years as a consequence of
initiatives to solve strategic problems for the company. Then I will
illustrate the communication problems caused by "noise" as a "pro-
blem" for a couple of car projects aiming to improve the "joy of dri-
ving" factor of the product by installing more powerful engines and
related systems. Finally I will discuss how project management could
cope with the complexity and knowledge intensity of this kind of very
large project.
 PROJECTS A U D CORE VALUES

The company history is the source of values

The heroic individuals, depicted under the heading "Our heritage" in
contemporary brochures, and presentations of brand values, and com-
pany philosophy, are usually the founding fathers. Volvo had two.
Assar Gabrielsson, the outward-looking sales director of the SKF ball
bearing company, with French experiences of the car industry as custo-
mer, and Gustaf Larsson, who had experience of the British car
industry before joining Assar Gabrielsson in their project to produce
cars in Sweden. The arguments for a likely success were that wages
were relatively low in Sweden, steel was of high quality, and the Swe-
dish roads required a more robust design than was usually the case in
imported cars. The business idea from the start was to "build cars in
the Volvo way." This meant that Volvo relied on long-term agreements
with sub-contractors, which reduced the amount of capital tied up in
the company at the same time as those sub-contractors and their expe-
rience became committed to the cause.
After the Second World War the Volvo organization grew as a result
of success of the small car Volvo 444 and acquisitions of former supp-
liers. Gunnar Engellau, who took over in 1956, invigorated product
development and developed the sales organization. Focus was on com-
fortable ownership of a long-lived car. The guarantee, first introduced
in 1954, and at first thought to be an illegal form of competition, was
the first step in this direction. A further boost to the Volvo image was
the sports car P 1800. Launched in 1961 it was "placed" as the car
used by "The Saint" in the popular TV series. But growth and man-
power shortages moved personnel turnover to centerstage in the 1960s
as Gunnar Engellau prepared to leave the CEO job to his son-in-law
and become chairman of the Board. This first period had brought
robustness, safety, customer guarantee, successful expansion and an
organization that took pride in good citizenship. Pehr G. Gyllenhamm-
ar, the son-in-law, started with a good platform to deal with the stra-
tegic problems that came about as a consequence of the democracy
movement and oil shortage.
 With Gyllenhammar a new era began
Mr. Gyllenhammar soon initiated a series of studies of the effects of diff-
erent changes in the work environment that, in time, resulted in the
design of the famous Kalmar plant. This focus of attention was in step
with the movement since 1968 toward "economic democracy" perso-
nified by the Prime Minister, Olof Palme. The oil crises generated infla-
tion rates that were unheard of after the war. Mr. Gyllenhammar had
strategic problems. The whole period that followed was characterized
by the aim to find a larger resource base to carry the burden of the
rapidly increasing product development costs.
One of Gyllenhammar's first moves was to reach an agreement with
the Dutch DAF-company, first in 1972 to acquire 3 3 % of the shares,
and then, in 1975, 75 %. The idea was to expand the product port-
folio with a small car to help exclusive Volvo dealers to survive. Later,
in ~ 9 8 1 the
, Dutch state invested in the company in order to uphold
employment in a district in southern Holland where mining had been
a large source of employment. The plant in Born, outside Maastricht
was to become the site of the Mitsubishi - Volvo alliance in 1992.
During the first half of the 1970s it was the truck division that kept
Volvo's financial results up, but by 1976 things turned down for the
whole group and 1977 promised to be even worse (still profitable, but
barely). There wasn't enough of a cash flow to carry the burden of a re-
newal. New partners were needed. In January of 1977 Marcus Wallen-
berg, the strongman of Swedish industry was approached for a discuss-
ion of the future of the Swedish vehicle industry. These discussions
resulted in a proposal the same year that Volvo and Saab-Scania should
merge. In the meantime the Co-determination act of 1977 came into
force. It stipulated that any significant change of the work environment
had to be negotiated with the unions. The different unions could not
agree on the terms of the merger and the leadership of Saab-Scania
grew more and more sceptical. The merger plans had to be terminated.
In November 1977 Volvo approached the Minister of Industry for a
discussion of how Volvo's project for renewal could be financed. The
minister responded that such a discussion would have to include other
parties (Saab-Scania) to ensure equal treatment. These plans to involve
the Swedish government were abandoned before any discussions had
been held.
Next the Norwegian Prime Minister, Oddvar Nordli, was appro-
 P R O I E C ' S S A N D C O R E VALUES

ached. The result was a PM to the Norwegian government in January

1978 proposing that an issue of new shares in Volvo should be direc-
ted towards Norway. Initially the Norwegian government should gua-
rantee the issue but later the shares should be privatized. Volvo would
be listed on the Norwegian stock exchange and Norwegian ownership
would amount to 40 %. Volvo would receive oil concessions in the
North Sea and the company would also participate actively in the
industrial development of Norway required for the time after the oil
period. An agreement to this effect between the Norwegian govern-
ment and Volvo was signed in December 1978. It required acceptance
by an extraordinary shareholders' meeting (scheduled for January 30,
1979; a two-thirds majority was required) and the Norwegian Parlia-
ment. The most intensive debate ever held in Sweden on industrial poli-
cy followed. The Public Relations department of Volvo logged more
than 20.000 articles in the press on the issue. Soon it was clear that
large shareholders were sceptical. It would not be possible to gather the
required majority. The Norwegian Prime Minister was informed. The
deal would not float. Volvo was a Swedish institution that could not be
sold.
Next, contacts with Renault intensified. Renault had already made
clear that it wanted to be a partner in the Swedish-Norwegian venture.
As it failed to materialize, discussions on a Renault participation in the
Volvo group started. Soon they focused on a Volvo Car, and in Decem-
ber 1979 it was announced that Renault would buy 20 % of Volvo Car
in a three-step deal. This provided an injection of new capital. Further-
more, since the shareholders rejected the Norway deal, it was only fair
that they should compensate in a new, successful, share issue. Finally,
the second oil crisis that struck most truck producers in the world had
spared Volvo and Scania. Both companies did very well in heavy trucks
in the Middle East. Armed with strong finances Volvo could take offen-
sive steps to reduce its vulnerability to the business cycle. A truck com-
pany in the USA (White Motor) was bought as well as a risk reducing
conglomerate (Beijerinvest). In 1982 Volvo wass in a very strong posi-
tion. Mr. Gyllenhammar had proven himself as a strategist. It should
be noted that the state authority responsible for industrial policy
published a study in 1979 ("Swedish car industry - facing the 1980s")
that wrote off both Saab and Volvo as doomed.
 Good citizenship
Mr. Gyllenhammar was successful in establishing Volvo as a national
asset. His political writings at the time (e.g., Gyllenhammar, 1973)
demonstrated his ambition for the company to be a good citizen. One
of the topics discussed was the work environment and the efforts to
deal with those problems by designing the work organization to sti-
mulate learning and teamwork. This was realized in the Kalmar plant
where job enlargement, long work cycles, and teamwork were built
into the "work station" design of the assembly plant. The new plant
was opened in 1974 and got worldwide attention for its trust in
teamwork as the carrier of the joy of work. The Kalmar plant was pre-
sented as a place to learn things that could be implemented in other
plants. Later the new Uddevalla plant was designed on the experiential
basis generated by the Kalmar plant. Also in its institutional character
Volvo exhibited good citizenship. Not least, Volvo organized a dialogue
with the unions that helped it take the strategic issues through its own
organization without too much turbulence in the troubled times of the
oil crises. Gyllenhammar was an institutional leader (Selznik, 1957)
building a basis in values (safety of the car, a good work environment
for the employees, industrial development for Sweden etc.) rather than
in shareholder value arguments.

Market positioning
Volvo was one of the first companies in the world to reduce the pro-
duction rate in 1974. These were serious times for many carmakers,
British Leyland was bleeding, Volkswagen reported huge losses, Auto-
bianchi and Lancia were taken over by Fiat, Alfa Romeo by the state,
Citroen went bust and the French government helped finance a solu-
tion together with Peugeot. A strategy study in Volvo at the time pre-
sented two main options:
to broaden the car program (quickly) to include more than one
model
to invest more aggressively in developing Volvo's other business
areas, primarily the Truck division.

A combination was chosen in the sense that an accelerated growth of

 PROJECTS AND C O R P VAI.UF.5

the truck division was combined with a broadening of the car program
(Lindh, 1984). However, the new car project, P172, was stopped
because the car was considered too big and costly in the current oil crisis
that seemed permanent. The only addition to the car program was the
Volvo 340 developed for the DAF-plant. This car was not up to Volvo
standards when it was released. It did not help. Otherwise the only
option was to prolong the life of the 240 series. Among other things an
alliance was formed with Peugeot and Renault to develop engines.
When the market turned to growth again the internal discussion on
market strategies, which had to a large extent been set in motion by the
current quality problems - not least with the Volvo 661343 in Holland,
ended in a decision to move Volvo towards the prestige segment. This
would be accomplished by leading the way for new car models by
introducing the prestige version first (and cheaper versions later). The
first application of this was the Volvo 760. In the meantime Volvo pre-
sented a number of experimental cars (a taxi, a safety car, a gas turbi-
ne car). The design work for the safety car went into the 760. At this
time product development costs for Volvo Car were as high as 10 % of
sales which was far too much. The new car was developed with an eye
to the American market and with extensive testing of customer tastes
in several countries. The launch in nine places at the same time went
well. The "boxy" look of the new car deviated from what Mercedes,
Audi and Ford presented at about the same time in 1982, but in fact
the aerodynamic measures were quite favorable for the 760. Many
interesting technical solutions were included. Sales surpassed expecta-
tions (in 1983 the 760 accounted for 12 % of total sales, a large figure
for a new car in a higher price bracket). In 1984 the less luxurious 740
was introduced. It was helped to a quick start by the success of the 760.
In the middle of the 1980s Volvo Cars stood very strong with a succ-
essful launch of the 700, with the estate version, 745, still to come.
The strength was in the products with their excellent safety records
and robustness. The latter aspect had been an argument since the very
beginning and the former had come gradually with the 240 and then
with the 700 series. The Lambda-sond had been an early, significant
step in emission control. The quality control system, with results tied
to an employee bonus system, had improved quality to top standard.
New forms of production organization were under development.
Strategically the Volvo focus was now on the development of the
Renault alliance. In product development a new direction was staged
by the futuristic Galaxy project initiated in the late 1970s. The task
was to look I 5 years ahead and see what cars were needed beyond the
~ 9 8 0 s One
. of the first things that were discovered was that the custo-
mers voted for front-wheel drive (a difficult concession given the age-
old quarrel on the issue with SAAB colleagues).
The Galaxy project bifurcated into two paths. First came the new
400 series with the first front-wheel drive version (480 ES), in 1986,
which, after a host of quality problems, stabilized nicely. The second
path from Galaxy was the 850, which was the big car supposed to
supersede both the 700 and the 240 series. The project had been going
on for about 10 years when the 850 was launched in 1991. Part of the
explanation for this delay was that both the 240 and the 700 refused
to die. Sales continued at a decent level. Also the solutions in 8 SO requi-
red a comprehensive redesign of the industrial system. The new car had
front-wheel drive and an aluminium engine positioned sideways. It
constituted a large strategic step as it manifested the introduction of
"joy of driving" as a core value. Still a daring "distinct and attractive"
design was largely missing. The 850 was a success from the start with
enthusiastic comments by motor journalists. Volumes rose quickly. The
young project leader, Peter Augustsson, received a lot of attention and
stories about the project began t o emerge as narratives with a "point."
One such story was that at one point in time project members started
to worry that the project dead line would not be met. A meeting was
called t o request that the launch date be postponed. But the project lea-
der had arranged with the CEO beforehand that when he, the project
leader, asked for postponement the CEO would use abuse and a loud
voice in denying a delay and declaring project dead lines sacred once
and for all. The theatre performance worked and the launch date was
kept. Peter Augustsson "got away" with the gambit of deceiving his
fellow project members. He had tried t o obtain a postponement and he
had taken abuse for the team, now they had to help him to deliver since
he was in disgrace with his boss.
The 850 was a strategic project in many ways. As mentioned it marked
a successful shift to front-wheel drive. This manifested "joy of driving"
as a core value for the brand. The movement to a higher price level had
started and the brand image needed re-articulation as well as the com-
pany philosophy and this needed t o be shared among employees in a
new "dialogue." As the dialogue progressed in articulating the compa-
ny philosophy the alliance with Renault kept growing more intimate.. .
 PROTECTS A N D (:ORE V A L l J E S

The Renault affair

For Volvo the alliance with Renault, signed in June 1991,was not
uncontroversial, but there had been cooperation on engines for more
than zo years and close links had been developing on the financial,
commercial and technical areas for a long time. It was obvious that the
intention was to develop an even closer partnership. Better start bru-
shing up your French! In September 1993 a merger was announced.
Renault was doing well at the time. It had had a remarkable comeback
with a cost and quality revolution towards the end of the 1980s; its
Clio model had won the Car of the Year Award and Formula I racing
was succcssful. This was in stark contrast to earlier times when its cars
were considered charming but unreliable, unsafe and rust-prone by
Swedes. The Renault organization, which prides itself on its thorough
analysis of all competing cars with detailed data on every component,
had never analyzed a Volvo car. Renault people made jokes about the
Volvo obsession with safety. Volvo's "voiture a survivre," was a con-
trast to the Renault "voiture de vivre". A car should be optimized by
weighing safety against weight, design and joy of driving. One should
not be fundamentalist on one variable (safety) like Volvo was. Volvo
engineers in the Engine department had recent experience from the
joint development of a &cylinder engine with Peugeot and Renault. It
was rather negative. The Renault organization was considered bureau-
cratic, formalistic and francophone. The working style was seen as
"strange" and the attitude was that they (the engine department) had
little to learn from Renault on engines. This kind of pre-alliance expe-
rience was not gathered and analyzed systematically in Volvo.
Both Renault and Volvo discussed deeper cooperation from the
recognition that the future car market would require a faster pace of
model changes and the costs for product development had to be shared.
At the same time Volvo Car Corporation (VCC) was working on a
solution to another problem of economies of scale. A survey in Europe
demonstrated clearly that a majority of the Volvo dealers could not
uphold enough volume on the basis of the large Volvo. The smaller
Volvo 400, built by what used to be the Dutch (70 % state owned) Daf,
was no solution since it was not considered to meet proper Volvo stan-
dards. A new small Volvo had to be developed, if nothing else to save
the European dealership network. If the partner in this project had
been Renault it is likely that the production facilities in Holland would
have been liquidated and that was unacceptable to the majority owner,
the Dutch state. Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC) had been
approached at the Frankfurt Motor Show in 1989 and showed an
interest since it needed a foothold in Europe. The joint venture with
Mitsubishi was designed as a learning project. The idea was to design
a production facility that could produce two competing cars on the same
assembly line. The new small Volvo was to be built on an existing plat-
form, the one used for Mitsubishi's Carisma. Most Volvo engineers had
difficulties making a connection between the Renault and Mitsubishi
projects. Renault representatives tended to see the Mitsubishi alliance as
treason.
A key idea in the alliance between Renault and Volvo was "kquilibre"
(balance) and a large number of committees with 50150 representation
were established. The worries among Volvoites about how equilibrium
could be upheld with a partner 2.5 times bigger were soothed by Mr.
Gyllenhammar pointing to the strong brand name of Volvo, its most
valuable asset. As real outcomes of the implementation of the "kquili-
bre" principle became manifest in the first jointly owned units, "GIEs"
(Purchase department, Quality department etc.), and these were hea-
ded by French managers, this was, to French and Swedish managers
alike, an indicator of what the post-merger organization would look
like. As all Swedes know, the project to turn the alliance into a merger
failed to win the approval of the shareholders in December 1993 and
Mr. Gyllenhammar resigned. The public debate focused on the "golden
share" to be held by the French government, and which would give it
veto power. But in the opinion of the present author it was the internal
"betrayal" of Mr. Gyllenhammar's strategy that was the main cause of
his frustration...

The alliance from the inside

The inner events, the experience of doing actual work with the French
colleagues, had a dynamic of their own. Few activities were undertaken
to prepare people for the differences in culture and ways-of-working in
the alliancelmerger. You had to learn from experience. One such arena
for learning by doing was the concrete work of the Pq project, the comm-
on platform for the next generation of larger cars. At the start of the
project Volvo engineers felt that they would not be able to defend the
 PROJECTS A N D CORF. V A L U E S

core values of the Volvo brand. The initial allocation of responsibility

for the design confirmed this. Also, even if there was agreement on the
core values for the project (Safety, Qualit y and Environmental Con-
cern) with profile values for the two brands to be built on the platform
(Renault's "pleasure to drive," "strong styling," "innovative solutions"
and "strong concepts wherever possible" and Volvo's "durability" and
"distinct styling"). In the case of Volvo those added values remained
supporting, while in the Renault case, Renault entertaining the phi-
losophy that values have to be optimized in each project on that pro-
ject's premises, it was not clear what the core values were. After a nego-
tiated start the Pq project was fully operational from the summer of
1993 There were cultural difficulties in communication but the P4
project managed to maintain a team spirit, largely due to the Swedish
project leader refusing to allow fractions in the project, e.g., the Swedes,
to organize separate meetings and also to rely on sound "engineering
rationality" which was demonstrated when early decisions were
changed on the basis of test results. The project cared for its autonomy
and because of this there was some positive learning o n both sides.
When summing up its Renault-experience the evaluators on the
Volvo-side draw the conclusion that a niche producer like Volvo has as
its first obligation to defend and cultivate its core competences and core
values. This applies also to social values and brand image.

The breakdown of the alliance

As late as September 1993 internal surveys in Volvo indicated that
there was broad support for the alliance in spite of the dissent over the
decision to give responsibility to Renault for developing parts and func-
tions that were critical to the Volvo brand image. However, dissent was
growing and it came to be articulated via the engineers' union. Already
at a union meeting with top alliance managers in April 1993 there were
criticisms that top managers of Volvo did not back up the Volvo values.
Did they not respect the competence in their own organization? Did
they not realize that this would demoralize the Volvo team? At the time
Volvo was at its lowest level in financial results while Renault had reco-
vered nicely after the earlier crisis. In response to this criticism Volvo
top managers pointed out that the new car, the Volvo 850, which was
the pride of the development engineers, had been developed at greater
expense of money and time than their competitors. When union repre-
sentatives responded that the 850 contrary to Renault models was
doing well in the US market the answer was that according to the voice
of the American customer the Volvo engineers had a lot to improve
before they could aspire to give lessons to others. Instead they should
pay proper respect to the high level of competence of the engineers who
had built a car like the Safrane. After this incident, it is reported, the
engineers' union found that it had to defend the honor of the Volvo
engineers who felt deserted by top managers. ("We realized that they
had lost faith in VCC - in us! Gyllenhammar wanted t o sell us off. If
these messages were meant to make us more sympathetic to the merger
plans, it was an odd way (to d o it)"). O n a more concrete level the plea
for a reassessment of the allocation of responsibilities in the P 4-project
was ignored. From that April meeting on the managerial problem at
VCC was the management of dissent. A seemingly direct consequence
was that the formerly "leak-free" Volvo Company started t o "leak"
information t o journalists.
Looking back at this experience one can point to the central issue of
core value fundamentalism that seems to run through the whole story.
Fundamentalism in the sense that one consistently refers to "tradition"
in one's arguments, but also in the sense of not compromising ("opti-
mizing") core values. If a safer car has to be heavier so bc it. This aspect
of premium car development should be taken very seriously and the
consequences have to be worked out in order for communication inside
the organization as well as with its environment to be effective. The
problem is that some values are highlighted a t certain times and others
at other times. It takes some rhetorical skill to weave it together into a
convincing argument. Accusations of hypocrisy (saying one thing and
doing another) may easily be provoked. Especially when coupled to the
celebrated principle that the company must be true to its brand values
in all its activities the problem is rendered conspicuous. One solution
might be t o talk about different values in different arenas and at diffe-
rent times (Brunsson, 1989). This can probably be accomplished by a
continuous production of a narrative about the origin and goal of the
current activity (e.g., designing a new car model) that refers to different
aspects of the core values and thus provides "entries" for holders of
different values. Once "entry" is gained into the unfolding story of the
activity in focus the member can participate in the further elaboration
of the adventure. Mintzberg (1989)describes strategies as emergent;
 PROJECTS A N D CORE VALUES

yes! N o plan is ever "implemented" as anticipated (and the same goes

for preliminary product specifications).

Summary
The "point" of this rather lengthy account of the history of the Volvo
core values is that they are related to critical situations in the company
history. They are emotionally loaded and public. Robustness was a
core argument from the start. Assar Gabrielsson, one of the founding
fathers, is reputed to have pointed out that it is people who drive the
car and that they need protection. Safety became a key success argu-
ment with the 240 series. A car model that would not die served to
build that core asset in the Volvo brand name. It also established Volvo's
lead in the estate car segment, which landed it squarely in the family
car business. The Lambda-sond justified Environmental concern as a
core value. The 700 series constituted a continuation. It added a distin-
ct design that seemed daring at the time even if there were a couple of
cars in the USA with a similar look. The 850 model, launched in 1991,
added the "joy of driving" dimension that was necessary as the brand
strategy was to move the Volvo further up toward the premium car seg-
ment. It also marked a significant break with the earlier argument
against front-wheel drive. The interesting thing about this is that it was
the customer who had the final say. Even if most of the development
engineers still preferred rear-wheel drive they took the Galaxy findings
to heart and acted accordingly. Large changes in the production pro-
cess and component design (especially engines and transmissions) were
required. With this Volvo Car was firmly set in the Premium Car direc-
tion. When Mr. Gyllenhammar signaled that he did not believe that
VCC could make it (save its soul, as it were) on the basis of its new core
values the organization rebelled. The values, contradictory as they may
seem, were shown to be charged with emotional energy. It is against
this background of emotionally loaded and partially contradictory
brand values that our study of argumentation in car development pro-
ject meetings has been conducted.
 The problem: Fundamentalist arguments and
project management
The issue then is: how can a fundamentalist approach to certain of the
brand values be combined with effective communication, and mainte-
nance of the customer appreciation of the brand?
The nature of consensus among competent peers on complex issues
could be described using the following constituent ideas (Moscovici &
Doise, 1994, p. 3 ff.):
When consensus develops in a social situation it is typically based on
choice. When facing choice, the group, through the confrontation with
arguments pro and con, are made aware of the danger of error, which
could he eliminated by consensus. We resort to consensus to overcome
the doubt, but also to end divisions and misunderstandings between
defenders of different positions. We believe strongly in the benefits of
mutual criticism and free examination of arguments t o reduce prejudice
and subjective judgment on our way towards a sound decision. But as
we approach choice and action there is a convergence of individuals to
associate with others, to demonstrate commitment t o a shared attitude
towards the contemplated action so that others can rely on us to d o our
part, include us in their plans, group and project. Action presupposes
unity of intention and discipline in pursuit of a common fate.
Consensus goes beyond acceptance or agreement. It binds the team
together - even if everything can be discussed and questioned there is
an underlying obligation t o conclude an agreement that will be kept.
An agreement that is obviously brought about by external pressure
cannot be considered consensual. Consensus is built on common
understanding (Habermas, 1984). Furthermore, there is a link between
consensus and the cultivation of reason. In the end people have a comm-
on principle of intelligence that will bring them in harmony toward
reasoned solutions, enlightened solutions in spite of clashes of interest
or opinion.
We thus have three central conceptions underpinning consensus for-
mation; choice (and the elimination of the danger of error), trust (arri-
ving at an agreement that will be kept), and reason (intelligence through
free exchange of ideas and opinions).
Moscovici & Doise (r994) claim that the premises of classic theories
(that, I . Consensus is best achieved if the group has precise inform-
ation and everybody participates, and, z., it is arrived a t through com-
 PROJECTS A N D CORE VALUES

promise) d o not hold. Instead "group polarization" is a common phe-

nomenon. The concept was first introduced by Moscovici & Zavalloni
(1969) t o describe the finding that group members, during their discuss-
on arrive at extremist consensus and that individual attitudes had be-
come more extreme than they were previously. This result has been
reproduced in a large number of experiments since then. If it is true
then the group rather than the individual is the key to organizational
change.
The typical experiment design was that participants were intervie-
wed individually about their opinions on some complex issue and then
the group was charged with the task of arriving at a common opinion.
After the group had reported the result of their discussion the members
were interviewed individually about their opinion again. It was found
that the groups tended t o arrive at extreme positions in relation t o
those members brought with them into the group. Also, individual opi-
nions after the group discussion tended t o have moved towards the
extreme position of the group consensus. Had the group, due t o restric-
tions on the group discussion, e.g., time limits or a fixed agenda, arri-
ved at a common opinion through compromise, individuals tended t o
return to their original opinions after the experiment.
It was Stoner (c.f. 1968) who discovered that groups, contrary to
conventional wisdom, tend towards taking more risks than individuals
do. He explained this phenomenon by the dilution of responsibility
that the group carries with it. The practical conclusion is to use groups
when risk taking is desired and individuals when caution is called for
(the problem is whether a group or an individual should decide here!).
But with Moscovici and Zavellani's results showing that the group
effect appears also in non-risky tasks a new theoretical dimension is
introduced. Moscovici & Doise ( ~ 9 9 4 point ) t o a mobilization of
"intellectual and affective potentialities of each one of its members by
making them participate in a collective action, not in order t o increase
cohesion, but to allow them t o breach together the barrier of norms
from which, if faced alone, they would recoil" (p. 41). Still it remains
t o be explained why, in a group where there is first dispute and then
agreement on a common position, there is genuine individual change in
opinion. This change seems t o be related to the intensity of involvement
(c.f. Csikszentmihaly's, 1996, "flow") and the displacement of opinion
is not a divergence from the mean position of group members but a
shift towards the dominant position (understood as the position of the
most involved member, i.e., the member who argues with the most
intense commitment). Further, the shift will be more extreme the more
directly involved the individual member is in the discussion, the more
marked the differences, and the more valuable what is a t stake in the
discussion is perceived t o be.
What is at stake, as mentioned by Moscovici and Doise, may be seen
as a common ground for the bond of loyalty between the members of the
group (for instance the "core values" that constitute what is to be consi-
dered a new car model that lives up to Volvo-standards). Such values, in
order t o have the proposed effect (organize consensus), must be shared
t o some extent by the members. They are social representations.
Potter & Wetherell (1987, p. 142 ff.) challenge this theory of social
representation and the thrust of the critique is directed ( I ) towards the
assumption that the community of representations establishes group iden-
tity. This assumption is problematic because it creates a vicious circle of
identifying groups through representations and representations through
groups. There are also ( 2 ) empirical problems connected with the under-
lying assumption that there is consensus in representations for the per-
sons in a group. Such presuppositions will tend to smooth over internal
diversity. Specifically there are distinctions t o be made between the actu-
al use of a representation ("the riot was caused by poor housing") and
the mention of available representations ("the left wing press have clai-
med that the riot was caused by poor housing") and between use in
generalized formulations (about police behavior in riots) and in specific
situations (police behavior in this riot). Finally ( 3 ) there is the issue
whether social representations should be operationalized as cognitive or
linguistic. We have chosen a linguistic approach in that we have video-
recorded project management meetings and elicited the help of partici-
pants in two product development projects in interpretation of what is
going on. This has amply demonstrated that there is internal diversity!

Empirical observation of value based

product development
Our study followed the installation of turbo engines and low profile
tires in the smaller SN 40 models for 1998 and the further develop-
ment aiming a t the US market in 1999. The problem is that when you
increase the "joy of driving" by increasing speed and "sportyness" you
 P R O J E C T S A X D C O R E VALUES

also. increase noise - road noise as well as wind noise. These conse-
quences were expected. There was a noise expert on the development
team in the first of the projects. He divided his time between noise
reduction projects for the Quality department and this project where he
was responsible for "Properties." This meant that he was a quality
assurer regarding the specification written into the contract between
the project leader and top management for this car model. "Properties"
was one of the functional managers in the project who gathered in the
PMG (Project Management Group) meeting half a day every second
week t o follow up the status of the project and take decisions o n pro-
posed solutions to outstanding design problems. The project was loca-
ted away from headquarters, in Holland, at the joint venture production
plant with Mitsubishi. The context for the project was rather complex
due to the facts that the new car was built on Mitsubishi's Carisma plat-
form (modified to reach Volvo safety standards but still focused on
common parts to gain economies of scale) and that production was
"outsourced" to the Dutch joint venture NedCar. The reader may ima-
gine the amount of negotiation with outside parties added to this pro-
ject on top of the traditional problems with interfering functional
departments (cf. Womack et al, 1990). Here we are focusing on contra-
dictions between brand values.
The PMG meetings are long, intensive meetings and the group is large,
about 2 5 people, because of the philosophy developed in Volvo t o achieve
coordination by keeping many members well informed about all aspects of
the project. The consequence of this is that meetings tend to become semi-
nars rather than decision-making occasions. The meetings may be ineffici-
ent, as most respondents complained, but the project can be well coordi-
nated. To solve this problcm the project had a Technical Management
Group (TMG) meeting on the afternoon before the PMG meeting.
Three episodes, involving noise consequences, from the video-recor-
ded PMG meetings have been replayed to participants individually and
their responses t o the question "What is going on here?" have been
audio-taped and transcribed. The episode itself and about 15 interpre-
tations by participants for each episode have been analyzed. Two comm-
on factors emerge. It seems like conflict betwcen core values initiates
discussion on responsibility, and that these discussions tend to push
members towards the periphery of the group. These were the episodes
(forgive the brevity):
Episode I: The noise expert had driven his test car at high speed on the
German "Autobahn" and discovered a wind noise probably stemming
from the trim molding around the windshield and/or sunroof. He
thought he should sound the alarm and he had brought up this quality
problem in the previous day's T M G meeting. The discussion there had
focused on fixing the trim molding and that would be the task of the
"Exterior" lead engineer. In the PMG meeting the project leader, who
was not present at the T M G meeting questioned whether this belonged
to the project. The Quality department should deal with this since it
was the geometry of the base car that was the root of the problem. The
counter argument was that it was the high speed that caused the noise
and it was a strategic issue since customers buying the turbo version
were likely t o drive fast. Anyway there was a simple solution (that in
fact had already been initiated by Quality) and that was to fix the trim
molding better. Now Exterior was anxious to define the problem as a
fixing-the-trim-molding problem rather than a noise problem (you
never know what can happen with noise problems). In the interview
afterwards the noise expert commented that he felt let down by the
project leader; when you bring up strategic issues like this people
should take them seriously and initiate a proper study of the sources
and not jump at simple solutions like this. People will not want to bring
issues up if they are ignored like this (Colleagues indicated that they
thought that he should have known that Quality was already at work
on this problem). Colleagues described Exterior as a person who has
little tolerance for ambiguity and the episode confirmed this view of
him. It was concluded that both the noise expert and Exterior lost posi-
tion in the team in this episode. (Centrifugal move).

Episode 2: The noise expert is reporting in the PMG meeting on the sta-
tus of a large quality project to reduce road noise. A large number of
improvements have been identified, each rendering the odd decibel of
improvement. He is talking about an experiment with a different stiff-
ness in some rubber bushings in the wheel suspensions. He mentions,
in passing, that the current ones deviate from specifications. The pro-
ject leader seizes upon this and asks: How come that we have reject
parts in current production? After moving over possible suspects the
gaze stops at Purchasing, who must admit that he does not know. He
feels accused. It turns out that an earlier discussion with the alliance
partner had ended in a decision that was not registered as a specifica-
 P R O J E C T S A N D CORE VALUES

tion. Purchasing had acted correctly; the specification had not been
updated. N o apology. Purchasing felt left as an outsider.

Episode 3: The lead engineer for Interior is reporting on the status of

his area of responsibility and takes the opportunity t o get a formal
decision on work t o introduce a noise reducing insulation solution for
the firewall. It was sponsored by Quality for the diesel engine version,
but could be used to improve also the petrol engine versions. The supp-
lier could do the CADICAM work. A subordinate had given this
excellent idea t o Interior just before the meeting. The project leader had
approved, here was an overhead slide with the required figures. It was
just a formality. The problem was that the project leader was not pres-
ent at this meeting that was led by his deputy. There were questions
Interior could not answer. Most devastating was the Controller's ques-
tion about who was paying. Interior stood there like a fool when Pro-
duction Control took the opportunity to attack this young engineer for
sloppy work. The request was tabled. Interior had lost face.

Analysis
Even if these situations, and other ones we have observed, are never
clear cut due t o the complexity of the specific embeddedness of the pro-
ject I claim that a common factor when the project deals with conflicts
between brand values is that member positions in the team shift. It is a
matter of moving towards a more peripheral position because of failure
t o assume, or not being given, responsibility, or the opposite. In another
set of episodes where the project faced constraints from the environ-
ment (cost reviews or time schedule changes) it was found that the
team tended t o band together in the fight for the integrity of the pro-
ject and members who stood up for the project could gain position
(centripetal moves).
There was little reference to the brand values (implicitly taken for
granted) in argumentation, but there were these gains and losses in
position (or social capital). This agrees with a theory of membership
work as presented by Munro (1996),which consists of two aspects:
identity work and alignment.
In order t o be a (competent) member of the team we have to have a
role in the team as a constructive contributor that is recognized by the
others. We work out an identity in the context of the team and the mea-
sure of our success may be some kind of centrality in the group. Then
we are trusted to speak on behalf of the group and make binding com-
mitments. A member that loses face will be under observation. This
seems t o be a strong driving force in premium product design projects.
The other aspect of membership work is "alignment" where acts of
the member are aligned to the common quest of the team. A first requi-
rement for this t o happen is that the common quest is articulated and
that the aligning member has an opportunity to contribute. The articu-
lated common quest is a narrative under construction. It provides the
context (ground) against which the contemplated contribution (figure)
is given meaning, - by the proposer as well as by the assessing mem-
bers of the team. In order for the project narrative to invite the mem-
bership t o work it must exhibit subjunctivity (Bruner, 1986). Subjunc-
tive verbs introduce conditionality, for example, if a student asks me to
become her thesis advisor my answer could be: "You write me a thesis
proposal" indicating that I am inviting her but my action will be con-
ditional upon how I judge her action. In this sense subjunctivity invites
t o membership but introduces possibilities (possible worlds) rather
than certainty.
Another aspect of the articulated narrative is that it helps members
avoid misunderstanding since they work out "implicature" (Grice, 1967)
from a common ground. Grice introduced the Co-operative Principle
meaning that any conversation is a co-operation between participants
who have to follow a large number of rules to accomplish an enjoyable
conversation. The principle is broken down into four maxims (quality,
quantity, relation, manner), and by breaching these maxims a speaker
can signal that there is something behind what is said, an implication.
The co-produced narrative mentioned above provides a joint basis for
sense making and, in this way, for working out implications once the
signal is given.

The strong narrative solution

There remains to account for how the narrative is co-produced by team
members:
The first requirement is to abandon the speaker's intention as the
starting point. The fact that a speaker loses control over the meaning
 PROJECTS AXD CORE VALUES

of a text as soon as it is uttered (and hearers go to work attributing

meaning to it) introduces uncertainty in communication. The speaker
goes "public" with a speech act and is exposed to the risk of "misin-
terpretation." Cooren (2000) points to the fact that utterances are
actions in the sense that they have narrative form. He adopts the semio-
narrative theory of Greimas (1987) to provide a canonical form of a
narrative and adds the idea of "actant" (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1996).
Utterances of two kinds are required: utterances describing a state and
those describing doing to arrive at a canonical form of a narrative sche-
ma (figure 7 : ~ ) .

Manipulation Competence Performance Sanction

-wonting to do - being able to do - doing Recognition of

- having to do - knowing how perfomance
to do

Figure 7:2 Canonical form of a narrative schema (Cooren 2000)

The point with this schema is that it depicts speech acts as action cast
in a narrative, project shape. When we understand each other's speech
acts in this way it is only natural that we shape our contributions to the
exchange in alignment with, or in opposition to, that narrative. An utter-
ance produces a communicative situation that links people together, via
an object (the text), i.e., somebody is addressing somebody else. This
link is formed when the text does something to the recipient (The sign
"Beware of dog!" gives me a warning; it is an actant). In this way the
recipient attributes what the text is giving t o her by relating the text to
other texts to form a reasonable interpretation (never certain). These
productionlattribution dimensions determine the types of transforma-
tions that are implied. To each of these types of acts can be coupled
ideal conditions of satisfaction (like sincerity).
Next we turn to rhetoric to identify the two strategies (liaison and
dissociation) we use to make people accept our discursive objects. Some-
times persuasive rhetoric is not required since there are procedures that
render conventional what is otherwise not conventional (like contracts
or difference in rank) - silent rhetoric.
Through rhetorical devices, or silent rhetoric, my narrative may get
inserted in your narrative; I will give a contribution t o your project, if
the parties accept such an insertion. Such a mechanism is possible if we
can mobilize the missing link, the instrument that is used in accompli-
shing the narrative. Here Cooren has already laid the ground by sepa-
rating the text from the speaker and point to the text as "actant."
(Latour, 1996). If we look at the contribution (sub-mission) t o the pro-
ject (mission) as an actant we can also see that it is quite possible t o
work under the mission (alignment) without being totally committed t o
all its goals (like the academic can submit a paper t o a journal). If,
however, a participant wants to link hislher identity t o the project (for
career reasons) membership work is the central aspect. We are likely t o
find varying identification with the project among participants in pre-
mium product development. Shifts in their position in the project are
illustrated in the three episodes listed above.
My claim is that the project narrative can accommodate internal
diversity and still maintain team cohesion. Such a narrative I call
"strong." Some properties of a strong narrative are:
I. A strong narrative contains instantiations of the core values of the
organization that the team producing the narrative represents.
This means that the narrative is a carrier of values as applied to
the current and to the expected future time. The story, through the
relations of its constituent parts, presents its meaning, like the bibli-
cal story about the merciful Samaritan presents the virtue of merci-
fulness (cf. also Weick's, 1995, views on sense-making as enactment).
Bruner (1986, 1990) argues that there are two modes of thought,
both irreducible to each other because they have different operating
principles, criteria of well-formedness, and procedures of verification.
One mode, the paradigmatic or logico-scientific builds on conceptua-
lization and formal operation ila the syllogism. It is the traditional
scientific mode of thought with deductive reasoning as ideal and with
a tendency towards universal statements. This mode of thinking leads
to good theory and is suited for arguments applying instrumental
rationality t o demonstrate that a proposed solution is the best given a
clear goal. The other mode, the narrative mode, leads t o a good story
and is well suited for arguments based on value judgment in complex,
multi-goal situations. Judgment of the goodness of a story is based on
its sequentiality (Bruner, 1990, p. 43), the unique sequence of events,
mental states and happenings that involve human beings as actors.
The configuration of the actors in the plot gives them meaning.
 PROIECTS A N D CORE VALUES

2. A second feature of a narrative is that it can be "real" or fictional

without loss of power as story; it has a structure that determines its
overall configuration (or plot). It has only a metaphorical relation
to reality.

3. A third feature is that it "specializes in the forging of links between

the exceptional and the ordinary" (Bruner, 1990, p. 47).
This is a crucial point in need of comment here since it relates the
story to its context. A culture is a set of norms that determine what
is ordinary, or what is canonical. It tends t o endow the traditional
or the conventional wisdom with legitimacy and authority. But it
must also have procedures for rendering departures from those cul-
tural norms meaningful. This is where stories come in. When you
encounter something out of the ordinary and ask somebody what is
going on that person will usually tell a story that contains reasons
for the occurrence - that make sense of it. The story will be an
account of a possible world where the happening makes sense.
"The function of the story is to find an intentional state that miti-
gates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical
cultural pattern." (Bruner, 1990, p. 49, italics in original)
There is also a dramaturgical quality in narratives. Burke (1945)
provided the famous pentad of the anatomy of drama; an Actor, an
Action, a Goal, a Scene, and an Instrument, plus TROUBLE (an
imbalance between any of the five components). The drama consists
of the deviation from the canonical and its consequences. This
means that stories will relate to values, i.e., what is morally valued,
appropriate or uncertain. The well-formed narrative will usually
dwell on the concurrent intentions of the actor and the develop-
ments of the real world, the struggle between the two. In detective
stories we see this duality in the plot of the murderer's actions being
gradually uncovered by the detectives in the second plot of his acti-
vities t o find clues and draw conclusions (Czarniawska, 1999).

4. A strong narrative has subjunctivity that invites interpretation.

Subjunctivity, as mentioned, makes a statement open to alternati-
ve readings. The Webster Dictionary explains subjunction as: "rela-
te to, or constituting a verb form or set of verb forms that represents
an attitude toward or concern with a denoted act or state not as fact
but as something entertained in thought as contingent or possible or
viewed emotionally." Write in "I suggest he write a letter!" is a sub-
 junctive form that lets the rest of the story be dependent upon whet-
her he chooses t o write that letter or not. The point is that subjunc-
tivity invites the reader or hearer to enter into the story and help
complete it. It generates an uncertainty that we tend to want to eli-
minate by joining in co-producing the narrative. This property of a
narrative of enlisting the reader in the "performance of meaning
under the guidance of the text" (Rruner, 1986, p. zj) is built on
three features according t o Bruner:
triggering of presupposition, i.e., the creation of implicit rather
than explicit meaning,
subjectification, i.e., thc depiction of reality not through an omni-
scient eye that views a timeless reality, but through the filter of the
consciousness of protagonists in the story.
multiple perspective, i.e., beholding the world not univocally but
simultaneously through prisms each of which catches some part of it.

5 . A strong narrative provides for alignment by implicature.

The narrative has more meaning then it says. The narrative has
implications (or "implicature" to use Grice's, 1989, term) that have to
be worked out by the participants in the dialogue on a project as it is
progressing in co-production among participating specialists. The dia-
logue on proposed solutions to design tasks is a cooperative game and
participants are well advised to apply the Co-operative Principle
(Grice, 1989). To illustrate what this means refer back to the evalua-
tion of the Renault-Volvo alliance. One point made by the Renault
engineers about their Volvo colleagues was that they tended to go for
the suggested solution directly without the proper laying out of rele-
vant criteria and possible alternatives. After all designing a car is an
optimizing exercise where choice must be weighed on its merits in
relation to the set of relevant goals. You have to be aware of how pri-
oritizing one goal affects others. How can you take knowledgeable
decisions any other way? The Volvo-engineers tended to think that the
Renault engineers put on their performance again and again, repea-
ting what had already been agreed on, and not getting to the point.
After all a project meeting is a decision-making forum not a seminar.
The function of the strong narrative in the attribution of meaning
t o statements and submissions in the project is that it will serve as
the common context used to work out implications (when an utte-
rance means more than what is said).
 mmunication
stems

CHRISTOPHE MIDLER

Recent literature o n innovation strategy and organizational change has

challenged the classical punctuated equilibrium pattern (Abernathy &
Utterback, 1978) that alternates long periods of stability with short
bursts of radical change in the dominant design of products. Research
into high-tech sectors such as the computer industry (Brown, 1997)
and into the mass-production sector (Chapel, 1996) has addressed the
issue of repeated radical innovation trajectories and proposed theoreti-
cal patterns for "neo-industrial organizations" (Ekstedt and al., 1999),
"intensive innovation-based strategies," and "design-oriented organi-
zations" (Hatchuel, 1999; Midler, 2002).
This chapter analyzes such ever-changing contexts. We try to demon-
strate that such innovation trajectories cannot be analyzed as merely a
succession of product projects, but rather must be tightly connected to
deep transformations in the "permanent" organization where they are
found. Our conceptual framework in analyzing such dynamics is based
on the basic concept of deszgn system, defined as consisting of three
components (Mahmoud-Jouini & Midler, 1999): the company's strategy,
the knowledgellearning management system, and the project manage-
ment process for new product development. Such a conceptual frame-
CHRISTOPHE MIDLER

work is very similar t o the action/knowledge formation process theo-

retical framework for analyzing neo-industrial management (Ekstedt
and al., 1999). We will attempt t o demonstrate how keeping track of
intensive innovation trajectories over the long term requires the perio-
dic reshaping of the design systems of a firm, and, consequently, leads
t o deep a renewal of such internal organization processes as reframing
boundaries and relations with markets and other companies.
Our case study will examine a major European automotive supplier
of car radio equipment that offers a paradigmatic case of major, repea-
ted breakthroughs over the last four decades. The company we studied
has, by dint of repeated and significant changes, managed to remain a
worldwide leader in its field throughout the period in question. Its
name and shareholders have changed on several occasions. The com-
pany has carried out numerous far-reaching internal reorganizations,
and its relationships with automobile manufacturers have been simi-
larly transformed.
In the first part of this chapter, we analyze the successive changes of
the product, from the first car radio developed by the firm in the late
1950s~t o ongoing new generations of "in-car, multimedia equipment."
These products involve technologies as varied as advanced radio
systems, information technology, and GPS (global positioning systems),
that provide services such as communication, navigation, security, and
entertainment.
The second part of the chapter analyzes the various steps in the fir-
m's evolution from initially being a spin-off of a major European elec-
tronic company t o redefining the customer interface t o meet the after
sales-OEM transition, internal organizational restructuring of product
development and technology management, and financially merging
with another major first-tier automotive supplier and service provider.
This chapter is based on a series of interactive research studies which
began in 1994 (Kesseler, ~ 9 9 8 ) ,(Midler, 2000) (Lenfle & Midler,
2002). These studies are part of a research program within the Centre
de Recherche en Gestion de 1'Ecole polytechnique on innovation stra-
tegy and project management which analyzes design system transitions
in various industrial contexts (Benghozi and al., 2000).
 INTENSIVE INNOVATION CONTEXT AND D E S I G N SYSTEM DYNAMICS

Part one: The product trajectory:

history and characterization
There has been a series of major transformations in the world of car
audio since the rgfos, in terms of technology, architecture, and func-
tionality. Vacuum tubes have been replaced by transistors and integra-
ted components, and software development has moved to the fore-
front. Architecture has evolved in terms of definition of internal elec-
tronics system components, the systern/control interface, system inte-
gration into the automobile, distribution of components between those
built into the system and those available via remote control. Functions
increasingly removed from the original purpose have been incorpora-
ted, such as, CD and cassette players, telephones, navigational systems,
emergency aid. Markets too have evolved, as distributor-based marke-
ting t o the consumer market has been replaced by the supply of prem-
ier equipment to manufacturers. Today, the simple act of naming a pro-
duct, or even calling it a product rather than a service or system, is pro-
blematic.

I. From car radio to Information-Communication-

Entertainment (ICE) systems
The history of car radio began in 1929 with Motorola. Philips develo-
ped its first car radio in 1934. The technology, based on that of tradi-
tional radios, used vacuum tubes with all the associated problems of
power supply and volume. As a result, the first car radios were of poor
quality, hobbled by problems of interference, unreliability, bulkiness,
and high energy consumption.
Until the I ~ ~ O Sproduct
, innovations were mainly tied t o develop-
ments in electronic components, notably the replacement of vacuum
tubes with transistors in the 1960s (Philips introduced the first car
radio to use only transistors in ~ 9 6 ~With
) . this technological develop-
ment, service quality improved while costs declined, and product archi-
tecture could be transformed so that all product functions could be
incorporated into the standard-format "box".
Beginning in the 1q7os, the innovation dynamic accelerated and
diversified (see Table 8 : ~ )New
. functional improvements in radio ope-
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 prognosis

User perceptible Simple radio Radio Radio with Radio integrated with RDS (Radio Data System) Integrated with in-car PC
product volue integrated compact CD player & TMC (Traffic Message (car phone, navigation
cassette Rodio with interface for Channel) system, speech recognition,
Stereo analogue car phone Radio connected email, fax, phone, TV, CD
Digital (LCD) Remote control on steering CD changer ROMj
display column Digtal Sound Processor Digital Audio Broadcasting
External display on Rodio with digital car
dashboard phone

Additional feature Receiving music Ploy recorded Simultaneously receive Receive specific, filtered Inteructivity; Multimedio;
regarding and information information music, information and traffic inbrmation Customization of products
information transfer smple data

Technological Tubes used since Transistors Additional module: Integrated circuits Speed and capacity of Speed and capaciiy of
progress the beginning of Tape Deck Additional module: CD microprocessors microprocessors
car radios Laser technology: digital Obiect oriented
data compression; robust programming
micro mechanics Communication busses
Flat screen displays

Frequency ronges Short Wove (SW); SW, MW, LW, SW, MW, LW, SW, MW, LW, SW, MW, LW, SW, MW, LW,
Medium Wave Frequency FM FM + subcorrier FM + subcarrier FM + subcurrier and DAB
[MW);Long Wave Modulation (FM] transmission bonds
ILWI

Selection of radio Manually with Manually and Manually and Electronic search of Fully electronic search Electronic with various
stotions rotary button mechanical pre- mechanical pre- stations (Phase Looked [outortore, alternative feotures depending on
[capacitor select buttons select buttons Loop] frequencies, program type selection by customer
technology) recognition, ...I

Product destination France Europe Europe Europe World World

region
 INTENSIVE INNOVATION C O N T E X T A N D DESIC;N 5 Y S T t M DYNAMICS

ration were introduced, including digital displays, preset stations, RDS,

and TMC. New functions were increasingly added t o the basic radio
function, functions such as cassette and CD players, GSM
telephonetradio receivers, GPS-based navigation technology, on-board
computers, and today, dynamic navigation, and Internet access. Car
radios have been transformed into information-communication-enter-
tainment (ICE)systems. Product architectures have also changed great-
ly. As chip-based components were integrated into the box, platform
architectures could be steadily redefined and increasingly complex func-
tions added without a need for more space or additional cost. Software
then became more important, and the number of hardware compo-
nents decreased. Finally, the electronics "box" became detachable from
the faceplate, to provide enhanced security (removable front panels).
The architecture transformation also involved the inte-gration of ICE
systems into the car. Increasingly, the box is no longer subject t o the
constraints imposed by standard formats and connections: e.g., stee-
ring controls and some information displays can be moved, front panel
design can be integrated into that of the dashboard, CD changers can
be located elsewhere in the car.

2. Description of the product trajectory

We will use four characteristics to describe the innovation dynamic for
the product: technology, product architecture, use functions and distri-
bution methods.

A process based o n rapid and far-reaching changes in technology

Clearly, technological advances, in this and other areas of the electro-
nics industry, have driven the dynamic governing car audio products,
including those of the electronics components (vacuum tubes, tran-
sistors, components, chips), communications protocols, and computer
technologies that play an increasing role in car audio systems.
We will highlight three consequences of this well-known phenome-
non of ongoing change in electronics and computer technology. First,
the dynam~cgoverning innovative product offerings in car audio
systems is largely based on continuous cost reductions, the concomi-
tant increase in system power, and the more compact size of new tech-
nology. This primarily applies t o economic dynamics driven by product
CHRISTOPHE M I D L E R

70 -
60 --
m
9 50 --
C
.-

-- 1

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
year

Figure 8:1.Transition from Hardware to Software. (Source: Kesseler r998)

offerings. Next, the trend towards smaller size supports a system archi-
tecture dynamic that constitutes a major challenge for the various
industry players. We will address this issue below. Finally, the perma-
nent nature of these redefinitions ensures that, although electronics
plays a crucial, strategic role for car manufacturers, they have never
been able t o master research into the field on their own (witness initi-
al attempts that ended in failure). In the 1970s France's Renault, in par-
ticular, attempted t o develop a subsidiary but had to abandon the idea
because it was unable to maintain the appropriate electronics experti-
se in an environment of constant change.
Consequently, trends in car audio systems are primarily driven by
companies providing electronics technology. This explains the current
problems described in the next section, where we see that enhanced
understanding of how products are used is increasingly essential to pro-
iect success.

Constant changes in system architecture

Product architecture is another field marked by major changes, changes
that fall into three categories: the architectural dynamic of the internal
"box," the architectural dynamic of integrating the system into the car,
and the architectural dynamic of the relationship between integrated
components and components outside the car. These three dynamics are
closely intertwined.
Internal system architecture has been subject t o two co~~comitant
trends. The emergence in 1993 of the concept of the platform as a
stand-alone technical entity provided a way t o reduce technical diver-
 INTENSIVE I N N O V A T I O N C O N T E X T AND DESIGN SYSTEM DYNAMICS

sity while maintaining the capacity to produce a wide range of finished

products.
A trend towards modularization (Baldwin & Clark, 1997)is gradu-
ally establishing an engineering architecture based on functional defi-
nitions, as shown the figure 8:2.

Antenna
L Central Unit

-- Abbreviations:

-
Tuner -o Key
board GPS: Global Positioning System
provides exact position OF vehicle
using satellite information
CD

- --
GPS -t, GSM: "Global System for Mobile
CD ROM telephony": Used in Europe but
not in the US &Asia (AMPS
GSM standard]

- -- phone
W:Television
CD: Compact Disc
CD ROM: CD containing software
loud- Tope: Tape Deck
TV speakers

Driver

Figure 8:2 Technical architecture of an ICE system in 2001. Source: Kesseler 1998

Architecture of the combined car audiolautomotive system has been

subject to three different trends. First was a trend towards the con-
centrationlintegration of technical components within the box, using a
standard format and interface, a phase which finished in the 1960s.
Then came a reverse trend towards relocating certain box functions
elsewhere in the car, a process that began in the late 1y8os, as, for
example, radio controls were moved to the steering wheel, dashboard
displays were converted to digital displays, technical functions were
integrated into other locations in the car (e.g., tuners in the antenna,
CD changers under the seat or in the trunk). At the same time, a trend
towards stylistic integration of the system into the car's interior design
was also evident.
 Architecture between built-in functions and functions accessed remo-
tely is a recent but important area of change. The available services are
determined by the complementary nature of built-in functions (nor-
mally the radio receiver) and functions provided by outside service ope-
rators (typically, radio transmitters). This distribution of roles is under-
going major changes. Built-in functions that have so far been mostly
passive (such as a radio receiver) are now becoming more activc, so
that users can define services (such as telephones or geographical loca-
ting services) based on information generated by the vehicle itself. As
telecommunications data travels at higher speeds, a number of ele-
ments that in the past had t o be stored in the vehicle itself, either phy-
sically or as software, could be moved outside the vehicle, such as CD
ROM-based navigational media.
All of these major architectural changes have had profound effects in
terms of value distribution and the relationships between the firms that
design and operate these systems.

The functional dynamic

The following five points summarize the nature of this functional dynamic.
At the outset, an approach in which new usage indicators are adop-
ted from fields other than the automotive field. The use of functional
components is defined and understood outside the automotive setting
before these components are adopted for use there. This was the case
with the car radio itself as well as with cassette players, CD players, car
telephones, and minidisk players. In this way, manufacturers can rely
on the customer's previously acquired understanding of how the pro-
duct operates. These components must be significantly adapted when
they are imported into an automotive environment, so as to cope with
vibration and interference, adapt t o the ergonomic and safety require-
ments for their use with a conductor, select automatically the best
transmitter frequencies (RDS), etc.
A major expansion in areas for exploration. Whereas initially only
radio was involved, companies today define their field as one of infor-
mation-communication-entertainment (ICE) systems. By bringing
together tuner technologies (radio communications), GPS (locating
systems), GSM (telephone services), television, processors, CDs and
CD ROMs on a single platform, manufacturcrs have greatly enlarged
the scope of potential uses for these systems, for purposes including
navigation, tourism, traveling assistance, communications, and games.
 IXTENSIVE INNOVATION C O N T E X T A N D D E S I G N SYSTEM D Y N A h l I C S

Today, one of the major difficulties for companies in this field is to

explore this burgeoning array of new functions, in areas that diverge
from the traditional fields in which electronics engineers and manufac-
turers operate.
Accelerated creation of new usage indicators specific to the world of
cars. In addition to this process of adopting functions from other domains,
functions are increasingly being created specifically for use in automobiles.
Navigational systems are the best-known current example of this, but other
services to assist drivers include tourist guides, communication with manu-
facturer after-sales service departments, and fleet management.
The point we wish t o emphasize is that, in the past, the adaptation
of functions from other fields benefited from the fact that customers
could apply skills learned outside the automotive setting. This conside-
rably reduced the risks in assessing the value of these functions in the
eyes of potential customers, and greatly accelerated the adoption of
these functions for use in cars - i.e., no learning curve. However, this is
decidedly not the case when it comes to entirely new functions. The sig-
nificant learning curve required of customers today is a major obstacle
to deploying new innovations in cars, since it calls into question tradi-
tional methods for marketing new products, which innately consist of
building company notoriety and educating potential customers.
New competition between services integrated into the car and "por-
table" services. Along with this expansion in the number of fields t o be
explored, another notable factor is the emerging competition from por-
table products such as portable CD players, telephones, and notebook
computers that provide users with capacities that formerly only built-
in electronics could offer.
A redefinition of distribution methods with regard to innovation. At
first specialized distribution channels were used for car radios. This
situation changed in the 1970s: on the one hand, the energy crisis of
that decade led t o the disappearance of most specialized dealers, while
on the other, vehicle distribution networks demanded that car audio
systems be distributed as an after-sales accessory (the Parts and Acce-
ssories business). Finally, in the 198os, distribution via OEMs (Origi-
nal Equipment Manufacturers) expanded, as car audio manufacturers
shifted their sights from the consumer market to supplying products t o
car manufacturers. The table below indicates the spectacular growth in
this market.
CHRISTOPHE MIDLER

rnAftersales

Table 8:2 Evolution of turnover of O E M and after-sales activity. Source:

Kesseler 1998

The growing significance of OEMs relative to after-sales service invol-

ved not only market share but also the role played in the innovation
dynamic. Until the early 199os, innovations were first tested in the
after-sales department before being transferred to the OEMs. Today,
this time lag is decreasing, and innovations are emerging among OEMs
at an increasingly early stage (see table below).

Boldface type: Initial marketing of the innovation. Regular type: Subsequent marketing

Table 8:3 Innovation trajectories in car audio systems. Source: Kesseler 1998
 IXTENSIVE INNOVATION CONTEXT A N D DESIGN S Y S T E M D Y N A M I C S

Part two: The innovative firm odyssey

Design cooperation patterns and innovation management dynamics
The car audio "product" has been profoundly transformed several
times over the past 40 years. During this time, the organization we stu-
died has been one of Europe's leaders in the ongoing revitalization of
car audio technologies, functions, and markets.
How has this firm been able to withstand the repeated crises arising
from the successive redefinitions of the product? We will argue in Part
Two that the firm's durability can be traced to its ability to redefine its
design system to ensure that this system remains highly effective for the
range of designs that arise from product evolution. We will break down
this dynamic into four stages, and describe the salient aspects of the
related design system model for each.

I. Stage one :Separate design, the importance of

integrators and of standards
The most notable aspect of the prevailing model during the early sta-
ges of car radio was that radio designers were distinct from car design-
ers. The car radio seemed to be a variant of traditional radio products
and was designed in the research centers of firms such as Motorola or
Philips. The integration of the radio into the car rested on two avenues
for convergence, one gradually replacing the other:
O n the one hand, there was the integrating player who would com-
plete the design of the combined curlcar audio system, which was
incomplete up to that point: i.e., the network of specialty distributors
mounting radios in cars. Until the rg7os, integration of the radio into
the car was in the hands of specialists. This was partly a matter of phy-
sically installing the radio, antenna, and speakers into the car, but it
also involved resolving the numerous problems created by interference
generated by the vehicle's electrical equipment. Components had to be
added to this equipment in order to eliminate static. In the 197os, this
integrating player would change: on the one hand, the energy crisis of
that decade led to the disappearance of most specialty craftsmen, while
on the other, vehicle distribution networks demanded that car audio
systems be distributed as an accessory (the Parts and Accessories busi-
ness). At first, this transition was not a smooth one, as the network of
(:HRISTOPI-IT:MIDLER

car distributors did not have the electronics expertise t o handle pro-
blems arising from the incorporation of radios into cars. But it had a
major consequence, in that in the eyes of their customers, manufactu-
rers, by virtue of their networks, became responsible for car radio per-
formance. After-sales service gave rise t o a design phase focusing on
improving the compatibility of the car and its radio.
O n the other hand was the emergence a gradual standardization pro-
cess for the car's and the radio's functional and engineering specifica-
tions, whereby each could anticipate the dynamic of the other without
explicit coordination. This standardization involved both the radio's
design constraints to be observed and the evolution of manufacturers'
car specifications, including integration of the DYN format into the
dashboard design, interference suppression in electrical equipment,
provision of necessary connections for powering the radio, and speaker
and antenna prewiring.

2. Stage two: the development of O E M products

and platform-based design
OEM' distribution would clearly pose a significant challenge in terms
of design. Whereas, under the previous model, the radio was integra-
ted into the car after production and sale, now this step could be taken
beforehand. The key notion behind this second stage is one of a "fully
equipped car." This means offering the customer a level of quality
newly validated in the prototypes, at an attractive price that takes into
consideration the cost of incorporating the radio mounting process into
the production line.
However, it should be noted that this model was still far from the
comprehensive design of a car with built-in radio. As was generally the
case at the time, the relationship between the car manufacturer and the
supplier was primarily driven by the manufacturer's purchasing depart-
ment and the supplier? (new) OEM sales department. There was little
cooperation between the engineering departments of the two firms.
For the manufacturers of car audio equipment, this new distribution

' On thc French market, rhe first car radios marketed by OEMs with new cars appeared in 1981
for Renault and in 1989 for Peugeot.
 I N T E N S I V E INNOVATION CONTEXT AND D E S I G N 5YbThM D Y N A M I C S

channel represented both a major growth opportunity and a new fac-

tor to be adapted to. Car-manufacturing customers attempted to impose
particular specifications for their product ranges and the array of spe-
cifications exploded. The concept of a platform was t o become the
means of integrating this new diversity while preserving the economies
of scale that are essential in the electronics field. In 1993, the studied
firm grouped its products into families: one up-market product line,
two mid-range lines and two low-range lines. In a still later generation
of products, manufacturers could concentrate on just two platforms -
high-range and low-range - that generated all OEM and after-sales
products.

aTechnology
IIPlatform Application

n x Consumer
market
("Aftersales"]
products

n x OEM
products

Figure 8:3 The three-step model of technology integration. Source: Kesseler

1998

3. Stage three: The co-development of the

joint car/lCE system.
A third phase, initiated by car manufacturers, got underway in the
early ~ q q o s ,with their development of enhanced project processes
(Midler, 1993). This development was t o entail multiple changes in the
design process, two of which should be emphasized. O n the one hand,
there was a much greater need for integration among various project
contributors, in order to arrive at a higher-performance and more stable
design compromise, with a resulting cost reduction and shorter time-
frame. One consequence of this strategy was to increase the power of
CHRISTOPHE MIDLER

suppliers as major players in the design of automotive products. On the

other hand was a need to account for the distinct nature of each pro-
ject, so as to enhance its differentiating value. Innovation plays an
essential role in this regard.
The rapid increase in the power of these new key players in the
manufacturers' design process was to accelerate in the early 1990s with
the creation of relationships described in management literature as co-
development (Garel, Kesseler & Midler, 1997) or black box sourcing
(Clark & Fujimoto, I Y ~ I )triggering
, a crisis among suppliers involved
in the internal OEM design model (Kesseler, 1998).
The demands for innovation, specificity, and incorporation into the
car ran up against the "push" engineering logic prevalent among supp-
liers (technologies - platform - product). The platform logic had the
paradoxical effect of delaying the introduction of innovations in the
OEM market, as neither the interface nor the supplier's internal organ-
ization provided a means by which project requirements could be
redirected back to the designers who could address them.
Based on this analysis, in 1994 the studied firm undertook a thorough
revision of its design procedures (Kesseler, 1998). It created "Lines of
Business" (LOBs)specific to each manufacturer, and having close eng-
ineering relationships with car project teams and provided with design
and engineering capacities so that the product could be adapted to spe-
cific elements of each project. It reorganized the internal relationships
between platform designers and LOBs so as to eliminate the inertia
associated with this dual design approach and to allow those involved
earlier in the process to incorporate the manufacturers' expectations
more effectively.
Thus, three years after addressing this serious crisis, the firm was the
first supplier to its major customer to obtain certification as a partner-
supplier. Various products provide concrete evidence of this ability to
incorporate a built-in system into the vehicle's design much more tho-
roughly (see Figure 8 : ~ )in terms of design, controls, and functions.
 INTENSIVE INNOVATION CONTEXT AND DESIGN SYSTEM DYNAMICS

4. ccCo-learning"of innovative offerings in

built-in services
The experience of the years 199o-rgq~ broadly validated the signifi-
cance of this model but also revealed its limits. The framework gover-
ning development projects was too limited to allow for the exploration
of truly new functions or technologies. In addition, the principle behind
co-development was to create a cooperative design process addressing
a defined functional target: the definition of this functional specifica-
tion fell outside the scope of this process, and went hack to the pre-pro-
ject planning or research stages.

Co-learning: challenges and scope

During the second half of the 1990S, various pre-project cooperative
design experiences were initiated, building in most cases on the success
of prior relationships arising from co-development. Thus, in 1996, the
studied firm created an entity of its own in cooperation with Renault,
the "Multimedia Data Communications Planning Group," whose pur-
pose was to pave the way for the introduction of innovations in auto-
motive projects.
We will define this approach as the co-learning concept (Midler,
2000). The objective of co-development is to foster cooperation on a
new product with the goal of enhancing the expertise of each partner
regarding value-enhancing functional targets and the technical solu-
tions with which they can be attained. Co-learning, on the other hand,
is geared towards coordinating methods for exploring innovations and
creating expertise regarding product use and technology that will prove
useful in subsequent projects.
More precisely, co-learning can be defined as cooperation in three tasks:
Exploration: In the area of built-in ICE systems, we have seen that
the number of potential services has exploded, including services
such as navigation, "low-cost" navigation, television, videogames,
and the Internet. The first task of the co-learning process is to explore
this growth as exhaustively as possible by monitoring advances in
technology.
Sorting: The second task is to sort through these potential services
and identify pertinent innovations, with a view towards extracting
the greatest value from the innovation, as defined previously.
CHRISTOPHE MIDLER

Bringing these concepts or half products (1,e Masson & Weil, 1999)
to maturity: The third task is to bring the innovation t o a mature
form, so that it can be incorporated into the project without unduly
delaying the release of the final product or endangering production
quality.

The challenge to the supplier and manufacturer as they carry out these
tasks in cooperation with each other is, of course, t o reduce costs as well
as the associated risks of such early exploration. The compatibility pro-
blems that arise in the later stages of a project, when supplier and manu-
facturer fail t o coordinate on a "road map" in such a rapidly developing
area, are significant, as is the risk of duplicate exploratory work.
We must emphasize the twofold aspect of this co-learning process: it
simultaneously involves defining innovative functional specifications
that have the potential for further development, and mapping out the
technological path by which they can be given concrete shape.

New participants in the co-learning process

One consequence of defining this learning field is the need to open up
the co-learning process to new players essential to ensuring the success
of the tasks defined above. Such players include the service operators
who will invent innovative content built into these systems, and distri-
bution networks, which play a key role in Stage One but whose role in
design all but disappears thereafter.
The involvement of service operators. In October 1997, the studied
firm, which was a subsidiary of a major electronic group, was trans-
ferred t o a German group, one of the largest telecommunications firms
and service providers in Europe. The firm contributed its terminal
expertise to link automotive systems t o the network offerings and ser-
vices of its new owner. The German group is a European manufac-
turing firm active in dashboard instrumentation, a field in which the
studied firm had no presence, so this step was consistent with a move
towards reconfiguring ICE system architecture within the automotive
cockpit module as well as between cars and external service providers.
This consistent approach was not to survive the battle over portable
telecommunications among firms in the field. O n being bought out by
one of its competitor, the German group was forced t o sell its auto sub-
sidiaries in order t o finance the growth in GSM. They were purchased
by Siemens, another major electronics firm, but one lacking experience
 INTENSIVE INNOVATION CONTEXT AND DESIGN SYSTEM DYNAMICS

in service. Note that this story is not an isolated example of coopera-

tion between telecoms and automotive firms: for example, in zooo,
PSA created a joint venture with Vivendi Universal to develop built-in
data communication services.
The return of the distribution network as a key factor in innovation.
We noted in the preceding section a trend away from the use of exis-
ting functions (typically radios and cassette and CD players) towards
the creation of new functions specific t o the automobile (typically navi-
gation). The issue of teaching customers these new functions seems to
be a key element in making these innovations succeed, as measured by
the speed with which they are adopted.

Internal organizational dynamics associated with co-learning

As in the previous stages, the implementation of the new co-learning
model entails both a reorganization of the relationship between coope-
rating companies and internal transformations without which this rela-
tionship cannot function.
The primary trend on the part of manufacturers is to revamp their
research departments, w h ~ c hhave so far been only minimally integra-
ted into the design operating cycle, and which are now assuming a role
in the co-learning process.
O n the part of suppliers, the organization into I>OAs, which can
naturally integrate these new areas of cooperation with manufacturers,
must be thoroughly revised insofar as the challenge is now t o provide
direction for the general dynamic o f the company's product portfolios
and technologies, rather than to customize "semi-products" (Weil,
1999; Le Masson & Weil, 2000).
Finally, the control of such learning processes calls for new manage-
ment principles to meet the specificities of such projects (Lenfle, 2001;
Lenfle & Midler, 2001): such projects d o not lead t o marketable pro-
ducts but new knowledge which only acquires value in product projects.

Ensuring solidarity and equity to face the risk

Co-learning brings a cooperative dcsign process into play in an area
where the level of uncertainty is considerably greater than is the case in
co-development. The traditional problems relating to the theory of
agency and contracts analyzed in the economic literature, problems
such as moral hazard or adverse risk selection, play an important role.
One significant problem, currently the subject of research, is that co-
CHRISTOPHE M I D L E R

learning is spreading from the cooperative planning of isolated projects

t o the joint direction of project portfolios. The question of dynamic
balancing of risk in this portfolio is obviously a critical stumbling
point.
Finally, in order to keep the cooperation active and fruitful, the play-
ers involved in such co-learning situations have t o evaluate and conti-
nuously control the process in terms of equity. In a co-development
project, the cooperation can be clearly framed by the target of the comm-
on project and the rather explicit prior contract between the partners.
Such framing is impossible in co-learning situation, because the results
are multiple, indefinite, and changing, and the term of the relation
unfixed. Cultivating feelings of equality among the players involved in
the cooperation appears, therefore, to be a key and difficult challenge
in co-learning situations. For Piron ( Z O O O , Z O O I ) inter-firm equity com-
prises three ways in which justice or equity finds practical expression:
distributive, procedural and interactive. Distributive justice involves
the search for balanced proportionality between the partners - a "fair
return," in Piron's words. The point is, for the firms to find a fair dis-
tribution of goods and powers based on the goals sought and the
resources committed by each. Procedural justice refers to the feeling
that procedures have been fair. The point is for the participants to
judge a decision-making process relative to a reference that is well-
known and considered legitimate. The factors that influence this inclu-
de a feeling of participation in decision-making, an explanation of deci-
sions, and clarity concerning expectations and the rules of the game, all
of which influence whether the participants feel they have been treated
fairly and equitably. Finally, interactive justice refers to individual inter-
actions based on fairness in behavior, which makes it possible for a
decision to be considered doable. Hence, respect and courtesy between
allies prove to be important in fostering a positive atmosphere for inter-
personal relations during the co-operation process.

Conclusion
By emphasizing the "renewal paradox" of non-innovative, project-
based construction firms, Ekstedt, Lundin and Wirdenius ( ~ 9 9 2poin-
)
ted out the importance of a "permanent" organizational context in
providing a sustainable environment for innovative projects over time.
 I K T E N I I V E I N N O V A T I O N CONTEXT AND D E S I G N SYSTEM D Y N A M I C S

In line with this thesis, this chapter illustrates how, over 30 years, the
multiple and diversified innovative breakthroughs in the car ICE
systems trajectory are linked with major changes in the internal organ-
ization of the studied firm in relation to its operating environment.
In the transformation process of the innovative design system of the
firm, the "co-learning," inter-firm cooperation model appears to be the
final, promising but also problematic step in meeting the challenge of
the intensive innovation context. The co-learning situation can be
described in the following matrix. It describes a situation where the
partners of the innovative cooperation are confronted by both impor-
tant economic stakes, in terms of market shares and investment, and
p e a t uncertainties with regard to the possible results. Such a situation
differs from that of a co-research partnership, where the stakes are less
important, and from a co-development alliance, where the focus on the
planned target is a key resource for inter-firm coordination.

Uncertainties and risks

Low High
Economic stakes
(market & costs)

Low Research partnerships

High Cedevelopment Celearning

Table 8:4 Different cooperation situations in innovative design processes.

Source: Midler 2000

We pointed out in our last section some of the characteristics of and

conditions for efficient co-learning management; these include multi-
projects, multi-horizons management, immaterial results, loosely fra-
med relations and commitments, and shared feeling of equity among
the participants. Such characteristics clearly cannot be described by tra-
ditional project management models. The opportunities for research
into innovative project management in the new millennium are still
great.
 modes
porary

BARBRO I. AN Y L. W I L S O N

Introduction
It has been suggested that we are witnessing a marked drift in the way
enterprises are perceived. In his brief essay Lundin (2000) observed
that enterprises exist at two levels - a relatively "permanent" one that
might be considered "traditional" in an organizational sense and a
relatively transient one, where teams were assembled t o carry out tasks
within certain budget constraints of a monetary and temporal nature.
The expressed view was the permanent organization is intended to live
on for an indefinite period of time, while the temporary one was plann-
ed t o have a limited lifespan. It was also implied that permanent organ-
izations achieved stability through routinization of its operations.
Looking backwards into the history of organizing human ventures,
it is easy t o point out that temporary organizations must have been
abundant. Most of them could be associated with what might be call-
ed "one-of a kind" projects, such as Stonehenge and the pyramids, or
making trips to collect Danegeld. Yet these projects were not wholly
unique. There are other stone-settings like Stonehenge. Likewise, there
are many pyramids and variations on pyramids such as the ziggurat.
Further, we know of many Viking chieftains who went south, bent on
trade and plunder. But in these cases the enterprise and the project were
synonymous. The permanent, routine-based organizations are no
 ORGANIZING I N TWO MODES

modern inventions either. The Roman army and the Catholic Church
are often being mentioned as outstanding examples. These organiza-
tions, of course, also ran projects in a sense. Every new campaign,
every new cathedral could be seen as a project, even if the constraints
on the project were more vague than those of modern projects.
Indeed, it is not clear that projcctification is necessarily a trend. It
might rather be a symptom of the present situation in the global eco-
nomy. Twenty or twenty-five years ago it was fashionable to talk about
Kondratieff waves (c.f, Mensch, 1979). That is, the economies of
industrialized nations were winding down a "long wave" of develop-
ment that would bring about a significant change from stagnation at
that time to unlimited opportunity. Without making a judgment on the
use of these waves in economic forecasting, it seems to us that those
predictions have materialized. New industries have been formed, e.g.,
software and biogenetics, and old ones have reinvented themselves to
accommodate new technologies. Future economic historians thus will
likely look back on this period as a turbulent one in which a new long
wave was formed.
Nevertheless, the issues that Professor Lundin has raised with regard
to temporary and permanent organizations serve as a framework for
understanding how organized entities, organizations, enterprises, or
public agencies apparently are in the process of evolving. The discuss-
ion in this paper is oriented toward how projects are embedded in such
organizational settings, and how learning takes place in the two types
of organizations that were mentioned earlier, namely routine-based
ones and project-based ones. The suggestion that is presented is that
modern enterprises are mixtures of "the permanent" and "the tempo-
rary." This observation has been described as projectification, etc., and
appears to be a mixture of old and new phenomena. In this regard,
most research fails to provide a good understanding of how the per-
manent and the temporary are distinguished and how they are inter-
linked. The reason for this oversight is that theorizing has tended to be
overly concerned with formal or informal structures for grouping activ-
ities. A better way of viewing this matter, we suggest, is to picture both
the temporary and the permanent organization as comprised of flows
of activities.
Our feeling is that observations support the suggestion that tem-
porary organizations and permanent organizations appear bonded
more closely than present theory indicates. That is, routine-based organ-
B A R B R O I. A N E L L A N D T I M O T H Y L . WILSON

izations appear to be growing more projectified and the temporary

ones growing more routinized, i.e., taking on characteristics from the
routine-based organizations. In this changing picture, the concept of
"structure" itself might be re-examined. The concept of evolution
would better be pictured in the ways
in which the flows are bundled into functions or processes,
how the bundles are related to each other and
how the activity flows are governed, for instance in divisions or in
work groups and how these change over time.

This merging process is discussed in this paper.

We would further like to reflect on the "learning dilemma" of pre-
sent theory. That is, temporary organizations produce knowledge, but
permanent organizations have a difficult time in capturing it.
Something appears to be overlooked in arriving at this conclusion. It
would seem that learning between the two modes of organizing is an
important factor when bridging the gap between the two extremes. In
other words, project-based organizations, being around as they have,
would seem to have reacted to a need to learn from their projects.
Thus, some observations are made in this area.

A framework for discussion

So when did the permanent organization and the project organization
develop into separate categories, making it worthwhile to study pro-
jects in their own right? One hypothesis might be that we are talking
about a social construction.' This observation is based on the fact that
for a long time researchers and practitioners alike have been focusing
their interest on organizational stability, and mainly on structures for
grouping activities. These interests were consistent with organizations
as they appeared to exist in the study environment; Wilson (1977), for
instance, describes how difficult it is for theorists to disengage them-
selves from their social environment - a social definition of reality as it
were. For many years, finding the one best way of developing the opti-

' Othcr hypotheses are of course possible. The one presented here, of course, is the one that we
think is most consistent with observations.
 O R G A N I Z I N G IN T W O MODES

ma1 organizational structure occupied the minds of both managers and

researchers. The classical literature offers a good selection of examples.
For example, the early writers on organizational theory, such as Taylor
(1911); Gulick & Urwick (1937); Weber (1947) and Fay01 ( 1 9 4 9 ) ~
painted a picture of the organization as a very stable one. They thus
concentrated their effort on prescribing how this stability might be
maintained and enhanced. Another factor behind the interest in struc-
tures and stability might also he the amounts of fixed capital needed in
companies engaged in mass production for mass markets. The rigidity
of the production facilities in combination with high costs and econo-
mies of scale favored large organizations and work routinisation. In
relatively stable environments, there was no premium on flexibility and
learning. In Figure 9:1 below, the main thrust of the earlier theorizing
and study of organizations would be placed in sector A.
Modern organizations, however, might better be described as flows
of activities. These organizations and their descriptions can be under-
stood in terms of settings and foci. Two types of settings can be defi-
ned - routine-based and project-based. Likewise, two foci appear rele-
vant - routines and projects. The matrix illustrated in figure I descri-
bes four fields of organization studies, where field A represent the class-
ical focus on actual or optimal routines in the permanent, routine-
based organization. Field B, which so far has attracted rather few stu-
dies on how project-based are managed or should be managed, is asso-
ciated with permanent, flexible organizations, while field C represents
the focus on project management. Field D., finally, represents the focus
on the cases where the organization as an entity and the project are
one, that is, the types of unique projects that Stonehenge or Viking
expeditions represent.

SETTING ROUTINE-BASED PROJECT-BASED

FOCUS
I

A. The permanent, stable B. The permanent, flexible

ROUTINES organization. organization.

1 PROJECTS
C. The temporary
organization.
D. The "one of a kind"
organization. I
Figure 9:1 Organizational Settings and Foci of Modern Organisations.
B A R B R O I. A N E L L A N D T l M O T l l Y 1.. W I L S O N

The classical literature on organization theory reflects the early fasci-

nation with stable structures, (the A field). Chandler studied close t o a
hundred of America's largest corporations when formulating his thesis
about thc connection between strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962).
Rlau ( I ~ s s when
) , trying to find the connection between size and struc-
ture, studied government agencies, universities and large department
stores. Woodward (1965), when trying to link technology t o structure,
studied approximately a hundred companies, the smallest having about
250 employees and the largest having more than ~ , o o oemployees.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) studied ten firms in three industries -
plastics, food and containers - in their search for the relations between
the environment and the efficient organizational structure. They do not
disclose the size of these companies, but as they interviewed between
3 0 and 50 upper- and middle-level managers in each firm, one might
surmise that they were not small ones.
Mass production in its Fordian sense lost its appeal in societies
where affluence grew and was shared by almost all, as decreed by the
current political doctrines. The ability t o turn out a variety of products
and services and t o he constantly renewing the offerings became a com-
petitive advantage for companies in this turbulent environment. The
developments in technology strongly supported this trend. Time - as in
time to market, delivery just in time and so o n - was seen as one of the
central measures of performance. Flexibility became a word of praise
and flexibility was seen by the new gurus as the only way for a com-
pany t o cope with the turbulence global competition and electronic
media were blamed for causing. (Peters, 1992). Likewise, turning activ-
ities of public agencies into projects was a way to enhance flexibility.
Consequently, we see projects virtually everywhere as well as the emer-
gence of project-based organizations. (Fields B and C in the matrix).
Although numerous, the project-based organizations have not yet att-
racted the same interest from researchers and practitioners as the rou-
tine-based ones.
In developing this picture, we naturally have drawn on ongoing
work in the area of projects and temporary organizations. In thc lit-
erature on projects, a distinction has been made between the "hard"
project, the purpose of which is to create material artifacts such as buil-
dings, bridges, boats, engines, and the "soft" projects, that purports to
change the socially constructed reality, for instance making an enter-
prise switch organizational templates from functional specialization to
 O R G A N I Z L N G IN TWO MODES

process, or t o change the leadership style from authoritarian to parti-

cipative (c.f. Turner, ~ 9 9 9 esp.
, 25-27). Projects in both private and
public settings have been studied in what has become known as the
Scandinavian school (c.f. Esktedt, et al. 1999; Rlomquist & Packen-
dorff, 1998b; Ostergren & Miillern, 1995). Likewise, Soderlund
(zoooa) has developed a typology of temporary organizations that
reflects employment with the parent organization and the relative
structure of any given group in a 2x2 matrix.

0bservations
An organization, any organization, is (supposed to be) a tool used by
people individually or in groups to accomplish a wide variety of goals.
Its existence is not an end in itself. In other words, an organization
embodies the collective knowledge, values, and visions of people who
are consciously (and sometimes unconsciously) attempting t o obtain
something they desire or value. An organization is a response to and a
means of creating value that satisfies some human need. New organi-
zations are spawned when new technologies become available and new
needs are discovered, and organizations die or are transformed when
the needs they satisfied are no longer important or have been replaced
by other needs (Jones, 1995). In this section we reflect on three of the
quadrants in Figure 9:1 - the fourth, one of a kind organizations, is of
lesser interest at present.

Activity systems in permanent, stable organizations

During these turbulent times, authors have produced a variety of struc-
tures meant t o capture current organization forms. In a conceptual
nature, Mintzberg (1983) pictured a range of structures that look like
sections through chess pieces - each associated with a class of organi-
zation. The mid-nineties, however, may have been a crest for thoughts
on structures. Handy (199 5 ) suggested that the modern organizational
structure would be condominium-like with the vertical modules being
projects. March ( 1 9 9 ~ bindicated
) that he saw companies in Silicon Valley
that were disposable, i.e., the temporary and permanent had become
interchangeable. Then there are the ideas that companies are but nodes
BARBRO 1. ANELL A N D T I M O T H Y L. WILSON

in a larger web of cooperating firms, e.g., the network organization

(c.f. Achrol, 1997; Ashkenas et al., 1995). Ekstedt et al. ( ~ 9 9 9focus
)
not on structure, but on processes, most importantly the processes that
may be used t o regenerate the permanent organization. The structure
that might be associated with such a picture would be some hybrid on
permanent organization in which an ability to cope with temporary
change organizations has been wed.
Bill Gates (1995, 135 ff), who has some experience in building an
organization, suggests that a worldwide business transformation is
occurring. With friendlier software, networks can reach every employee
and beyond - into the world of suppliers, consultants and customers.
This vision would be consistent with Porter's (1980) idea of competiti-
ve nichers or even the concepts of network organizations (c.f. Achrol,
1997; Ashkenas et al., 1995). Gates' perception is a movement toward
smaller, more effective companies. In the longer run, he suggests many
businesses will decentralize and disperse their activities. The creation of
virtual organizations has been seen as one path to the future. At least in
the automobile industry, perhaps the archetype of "old" industry
change, that appears to be happening (Economist, zooza).
Against this background, but recalling the basic definition of an
organization, it might be prudent t o keep an open mind about structu-
res. Instead, a "permanent" organization might be seen as flows of activ-
ities that transform input t o output, or, as complex sets of routine cyc-
les, that turn input into output, depending on the technology of the
organization (Thompson, 1967; Nelson & Winter, 1982). The reper-
toire of cycles varies from firm t o firm. Some firms have a limited cycle
set, while others have wide sets, where different subsets of cycles might
be set in motion by different inputs. In these cases, it also happens that
the same cycle set is called forth, whatever the input.
Routine-based organizations, of course, do a lot of things. They
develop processes t o accomplish their ends. They, or more properly
individuals in these organizations, plan, make decisions, transform in-
puts to outputs, craft the organization's identity, serve as a birthplace
for projects, lend stability t o these projects, and provide a depository
for knowledge. But even the most seemingly stable routine-based organ-
izations have t o develop and evolve to survive in a changing environ-
ment. The evolution process in this case takes place at the routine level
when old routines are replaced. Evolution in this context must not be
understood as meaning exactly the same process as in biology. Routines
 O R G A N I Z I N G IN TWO MODES

are not genes. An individual cannot change his or her genes, but an
organization can change its routines.
For evolution t o take place, four processes are of critical importan-
ce. One leads to the creation of variation, intentional or unintentional.
The second one, retention, leads t o some variations being favored, that
is repeated in the case of routines, while others fade away and are
extinguished. The third process, that of retention, leads to incorpora-
tion of the selected variations in populations, for instance in routines
in organizations (Nelson & Winter, 1992:Aldrich, 1999).The favorably
selected variations may spread by a process of diffusion (Dawkins,
1976). These processes occur in a setting where competition for scarce
resources occurs. The processes of selection and retention might also be
understood as a form of learning.
Variations might be generated from several sources, for instance
from planned changes, from simple mistakes, or from random inci-
dents. In such a situation, doing things by projects offers possibilities
for learning, by introducing variations that the permanent organization
can select and maintain. In this way, the project might be seen as a
quasi-experiment, that is, as a part of the trial and error way in which
organizations explore existing possibilities. In this regard, it has been
suggested that one characteristic of "excellent" firms is that they con-
tinually conduct these experiments (Peters & Waterman, 1982). One
might perhaps say that the permanent organization has learnt
something from the temporary one when changes in routines, routine
cycles, or sets of routine cycles are changed.'
The "planned change" approach can, however, produce errors o r
failures. Turner (~qqq), in fact, suggests that these types of projects
carry with them a high failure rate. That is, the output of these simple
trials cannot be completely controlled and might introduce more harm-
ful than helpful variations. From an output assessment standpoint,
the organization has learned little if the projects leave no traces of
changes, preferably improvements, in existing cycles of routines or in
the routines themselves. Many change projects in organizations cause
a temporary uproar, but after a while, the normal mode of operations
is restored.

Other criteria for learning of course also exist, such as changes in the common value and belief
systems.
B A R B R O I. ANELL A N D T I M O T H Y L. WILSON

Activity systems in permanent, flexible organizatiorts

These firms operate through projects. A typical example might be the
consulting firm. The firm as an organization with an identity is (inten-
ded to be) permanent, but its mode of production is dominated by pro-
jects. Managing portfolios of projects has not received so much atten-
tion as managing sole projects. That is, the projects studied in the
beginning of the tradition of research on projects mainly concerned
projects within routine based organizations. Now the field has been
widened to include the management of several projects or project port-
folios (Anell, 2000; Payne, 1995; Wheelwright & Clark, 1y9za) as well
as projects with independent organizations as participants (c.f. Gates,
1996 for the approach at Microsoft). This type of organization might
be seen as consisting of a "corporate roof" covering several "project
condominiums", which are "based on prescripts", that is codified
knowledge, but also on a set of comparatively stable structures and
routines (Wilson & Anell, 2001). For instance, the personnel and the
finance functions in a project-based organization are often clad in rou-
tines. The routines might be learnt or copied from routine-based organ-
izations. These offer a variety of routines, which means that the same
problems of selection and retention, that plague the routine-based
organizations trying to learn from projects, are felt by the project-based
organizations trying to implement efficient routines. However, the pro-
jects within the project-based organization are also becoming imbued
with routines and assume a more cycle-like character. There are several
reasons for this. One might speak about the learning curve associated
with repeating similar types of projects. Competition forces organiza-
tions to be both effective and efficient, which means that the project-
based organizations cannot afford to make the same mistakes any
number of times. One might also speak about the increasing codifica-
tion of project management knowledge into prescripts, such as the PMI
Handbook or Microsoft Projects (Anell & Wilson zoooa), as well as
the increasing professionalization of project managing, which is now
taught even at universities.
The central issues in managing a project organization concern, of
course, the generation of profitable projects and the successful delivery
of the expected results, be they hard or soft. Problems worth addressing
continue to exist, however, such as initiating projects, allocating
resources to projects, linking projects to each other or de-linking them,
 ORGA I Z I N G IN TWO MODES

and delivering the project's output t o the clients which often causes
problem in soft projects, and, of course, concerning human resources
management in all its aspects.

Activity systems in temporary organizations

Lundin and Sijderholm (1995)have described the structure of projects
from an organizing perspective and labeled their concept the tempora-
ry organization. Four concepts were introduced in their seminal article
that served t o separate the temporary organization from other organi-
zed settings - time, task, team, and transition. Time was seen as an
essential distinguishing feature of temporary organizations. The very
fact that projects were by definition "temporary" indicated that this
aspect of their existence was of fundamental importance. In fact, in the
figure summarizing the interrelatedness of the concepts, time was pla-
ced at the center. The authors saw these four concepts as defining a
space, or arena, in which action occurred. Soderlund (zoooa) has exten-
ded the typology of temporary organizations t o include employment
and structure stability. In terms of this typology, the more interesting
ones would appear to be the ones in which employment with the parent
organization is "permanent," but structure of any given group is tem-
porary, i.e., the project organizing quadrant of his matrix (see also
Adler, 2000).
In their theory of the temporary organization3 Lundin and Soder-
holm (1995)largely left the structure of temporary organizations
unspecified. They discussed instead a generic "team" as a temporizing
structure devoted t o task fulfillment. Two concepts were associated
with these teams. They were task fulfillment and the relationship
between the team and its environment. Commitment t o the task was
essential, whereas legitimization was cited as being a key element in the
relationship with the environment. Project teams would normally be of
greatest interest in projectification discussions, and in fact, project

' This theory has served as the basis for much of the prolect-assoc~atedwork of the Scandinavian
school of project studies. At the Calgary meeting of IRNOP in 1998 seven of the nine papers on
the trmporary organization cited this work (Hanman et al., 1998). It is interesting, however,
that in a lecture t o one of the author's (TLW) courses Professor Lundin (2002) stressed it was
"a" theory, not specifically "the" theory. He thus left open the possibilities for redevelopment
o r modification. Perhaps this book will take some steps in that direction.
BARBRO I . A N E L L AND TIMO'I'HY L. W I L S O N

handbooks were cited as background sources for information on moti-

vation, communication and commitment building. Task forces and
cross-functional teams would fall within the provisions of this defini-
tion, but command groups and self-managed work teams generally
would not (c.f. George and Jones, 2002, 324-325).
A point that we attempted to stress in an earlier paper (Anell & Wil-
son, zooob) is that it may not be time that is central to temporary organ-
izations, but perhaps transition. That is, the action that these organ-
izations bring about is central to their reason for being. In so far as rege-
neration projects are concerned, this argument would seem especially
relevant. One conclusion from the literature on organizational change
and on specific change models, such as business process re-engineering
is that most change projects of this type turn out to be failures (Ekstedt
et al., 1999, Anell 1998). After the initial programs have finished, the
organization has reverted, more or less, to the old mode of operations,
which means that once established routines are very difficult to repla-
ce. These studies also give hints why so little change or learning occurs.
The change programs are often based of an implicit model of the diff-
usion of contagious diseases. One or a few members take part in trai-
ning programs or in projects outside their own immediate environ-
ment. They are expected to spread the knowledge they have gained to
the other members as they come back. What happens instead is that the
new ideas do not take hold; they are overrun by the established ways
of sense-making and working. Nelson & Winter (1982) maintain that
routines have a gene-like function in organizations, that is, the infor-
mation coded into them allows reproduction. Hence status quo is
reinstated. Organizations as well as other social systems have a way of
coping with change that means that they adapt as little as possible
(Schon, 1971).In other words, they have an immune system that pro-
tects them from (most) mutations.
In a general sense, we distinguish four typcs of activities in tem-
porary organizations - routines, projects, 1,indblomian action, and
boondoggles. Routines and their establishment have been discussed
above, and most of the readers of this text will tend to associate tem-
porary organization and projects. The definition of a project in a class-
ical sense presupposes the ability to specify an objective in advance. In
many cases, however, this objective can only be specified qualitatively,
e.g., an improvement in efficiency or quality. Such activities require
feedback from results to indicate what can be achieved. These process-
 O R G A N I Z I N G IN TWO ,MODES

es of course can be associated with Lindblom's (1959) classic "mudd-

ling through" treatise. Although the original article was written to
account of certain aspects of administrative decision-making, these
processes apply equally well to certain project^"^ undertaken by tem-
porary organizations. Indeed, a fair number of regeneration projects
may be of this type including some reported by Ekstedt et al. (1999)
and perhaps some observations made by Gersick (1988).
One thing that becomes clear in discussions of projects and project
organizations is that not all people are not talking about the same
things. That is, the term "project" gets applied in common usage in a
manner that does not apply to projects at all. Even more insidiously,
the word "project" may be used in the title of a boondoggles, e.g.,
"Zero Defects - Project I."
Projects have clearly specified goals, a time period for achieving
them, a team commissioned to achieve these goals with someone clear-
ly in charge and, in commercial organizations, a budget for not only
expenditures, but revenues as well. Projects carry with them review
mechanisms. These reviews not only monitor technical progress, they
monitor expenditures and revenues as well. Projects also are subject to
controls. If milestones are not met, either effort or plans must be modi-
fied. Projects are a means for getting things done. Projects are best
exemplified by the task-oriented, customer-specific activities of busi-
ness-to-business (B2B) project organizations.
Boondoggles, on the other hand, have a title and a source of funding.
If a budget exists, it estimates expenditures. Time is not necessarily a
scarce resource in a boondoggle unless of course it represents a dead-
line for spending money. More generally, a time period may be estima-
ted, but it can be extended with proper persuasion. Both technical and
financial results are anticipated in only the most general, but frequent-
ly glorious, manner. Leadership and organization tend to be nebulous,
especially when accountability is called into consideration. Meetings
that are held discuss progress in only the most general terms. Because
milestones do not exist, control is impossible. Whereas projects are a

The term "project" gets applied t o virtually everything temporary organizations do. In a prac-
tical sense this practice is understandable. The very tem "projcct" in general usage implies
something will ger done. Thus, who in their right mind would say they were planning some
Lindblomian action, or even worse yet, a boondoggle?
' Wehster (The American Cullcgc Dictionary) has the following definition for a boondoggle -
slang: work of little or no practical value.
B A R B R O I. A N E L L A N D TIMOTHY L. WILSON

means for getting things done, the only thing sure about boondoggles
is that they will cost money.
Naturally there is a continuum between "real" projects and boon-
doggles. B2B project organizations depend upon projects for their
income. They thus must be competitive in their bids, develop relation-
ships with their customers, and produce the results they promise.
Because these organizations receive ongoing reviews from their custo-
mers, their projects must be specified in terms of customer understan-
ding and be generally successful. Boondoggles represent wishful think-
ing. Anyone can get involved in a boondoggle, and the less the experi-
ence an organization has in planning projects, the better the possibility
of a boondoggle resulting.
It should be noted, however, that boondoggles are not the sole
responsibility of project initiators. Two parties are required to produce
a contract. There must be a funding source as well as a provider. Some
of the best boondoggles have "deep pockets," a funding source with
infinite resources and little inclination to ask about results. It follows
that state and federal governments make good customers for boon-
doggles. Agencies have budget allocations that require spending, and
agency budgets tend to be historically determined. That is, the expen-
ditures from the previous year are used to set the budget level for the
coming year. Programs are rarely evaluated. Thus, a timely report is an
adequate result of a central government project.
Government agencies, on the other hand, do not have sole title to
boondoggles. Certainly industrial organizations support their share of
boondoggles. Of special interest are those unique "projects" that firms
enter into that promise their renewal. It has been suggested that these
projects are rarely successful (Ekstedt, et al., 1999, 118). Without a
clear definition of a task to be fulfilled and an explicitly defined time
limitation, success as it is generally defined could hardly be expected.

Merging of the temporary and permanent

Even if the hunt for the one best way to organize has been called off,
the hunt for a better way of organizing still goes on. The manifold pic-
tures that we presently have for permanent organizations are perhaps
symptomatic of this search. As an efficient way of getting things done,
however, setting time and budget constraints for a certain task to be
 O R G A N I Z I N G I N T W O MODES

completed seemed t o have universal appeal. The social construction

"project management" has assumed status as a profession as well as an
academic discipline (Packendorff, 1995). At present, PMI lists 24 uni-
versities in the U.S. that grant graduate degrees in project management
and 19 outside of the U.S. Professionals thus are being educated not
only in how to run projects, but how to structure them. Temporary
organizations thus appear to be taking on some characteristics of per-
manent organizations, at least in structure; with professional manage-
ment available, effectively designed organizations would appear to be
closely associated.
At the same time, permanent organizations appear to be taking on
some of the characteristics of temporary ones. Aside from March's
(1995b) observation of disposable organizations, the fetish of some
U.S. firms for being one quarter sensitive t o financial performance is
well known. In other words, the operation of the permanent organiza-
tion has become a series of three-month projects in some firms. O n the
other hand, some of the flexibility attributes of temporary organiza-
tions may be captured in the newer emphasis on flexibility in strateg-
ies that appear to be gaining present support (c.f. Economist, zooza,
special section: 16-18). That is, if the U.S. model of structure following
strategy (Chandler, ~ 9 6 2 then
) structures of permanent organizations
would appear to be destined t o be becoming more flexible.
In an earlier paper we argued that temporary organizations and per-
manent organizations were not easily separated (Anell & Wilson,
zooob). Specifically, we suggested that employees associated with tem-
porary organizations would carry with them priorities associated with
the permanent organizations from which they came or to which they
were going. Recent developments in U.S. industry seem t o validate two
of these observations. Rather ironically, the two cases were exactly the
ones used as examples - an inde p endent audit and a transition audit
team. That is, the extraordinary situation existing between Enron and
Arthur Andersen as its auditing firm is now epic (c.f. Duffy & Dicker-
son, 2002). In a conceptual sense, it supports the observation that indi-
viduals in an "independent" temporary organization might carry with
them priorities from their permanent organization. Clearly, Mr. Dun-
can, the project manager from Andersen, appeared affected by the $27
million in consulting fees associated with the $z5 million in auditing
fees. It also seems relevant that the shredding of evidence may have
been associated with Andersen's wellbeing (Eichenwald, 2002). The
R A R R R O 1. ANEI.1. A N D T I M O T H Y 1.. WI1.SON

other case we would now cite is Hewlett Packard's merger with Com-
paq. A merger team has been assembled to oversee that transition. Its
dedication toward the permanent organization (our hypothesis) is cap-
tured in its "clean team" designation (Economist, zoozb). Further,
members of that team will stay with the merged organization after it is
confirmed (Lohr, 2002).
With regard to learning, it is interesting to note that although ques-
tions of learning from projects to routines has received concern (Sijder-
lund, 2000, 68; Ekstedt. et al., 1999, 124-154),the question of lear-
ning from routines to projects is seldom discussed. Both types of know-
ledge might be needed to improve performance in organizations. We
thus would like to reflect on the "learning dilemma" of present theory.
It would appear that this concern might be exaggerated. March (1994)
has suggested that learning and knowledge accumulation are evolutio-
nary processes. Additionally, he and his co-workers (March et a!.,
1991) would seemingly argue that not only does the permanent organ-
ization learn from a project, but its competitors would also. Simply
put, this philosophy suggests learning and knowledge accumulation are
not outcomes, but paths that lead to outcomes. Thus, looking for evi-
dence that a project team has stored its knowledge somehow may be
the wrong model in learning and knowledge assessment.
The definitions of individual learning are built on changes in cogni-
tive structures, which are difficult to observe and on changes in beha-
vior, which are less difficult to measure (Bjijrkegren, 1989; Ostergren
& Miillern, 1995). Translated to organizational learning, changes in
cognitive structures might be likened to changes in central common
perceptions and values and changes in behavior to changes in impor-
tant routines (Bjorkegren, 1989). Two types of learning from projects
therefore might be surmised. On the one hand, there is learning about
project management, i.e., the organization becomes more proficient at
running projects. On the other hand, there is the learning to utilize
results from the output of projects. An example of the first type of lear-
ning could be that the organization grows better at running product
development projects, while an example of the second type of learning
might be that the organization becomes more proficient at creating new
products or product variations.
Culture, of course, is important in encouraging team members to
share information, and successful project organizations appear to be
"good" places to work (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). In these atmos-
 ORGANIZING IN TWO MODES

pheres interpersonal communication tends to be non-problematic.

Nevertheless, the basic challenge in project organizations may not be
the transfer of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge as generally
assumed, but the "bumping up" of knowledge one level so that it beco-
mes part of the decision-making process of the organization. Conse-
quently, formal systems are set up to share this information. People
who have worked in project organizations know of the weekly-month-
ly-quarterly-annual-phase reports and review meetings. Management is
kept apprised of progress in its important projects. Knowledge is coll-
ected and disseminated continuously. It is part of the control system of
the permanent organization and complies with the goals set by it. With
the adoption of IT technology, this communication becomes wider
spread and close to instantaneous. Gates at Microsoft is reported to
receive monthly project reports by e-mail and respond in kind (Gray &
Larson, 2000). There are a number of successful project organizations
that illustrate this point. Lynn (2000) has looked at IBM, Apple and
HP with regard to team learning and found that to be a common char-
acteristic among these firms. The processes at Toyota (Sobek, et al.,
1998) also have been studied with similar observations. Boeing has
enjoyed 8 5 years of success in a competitive aerospace industry (Wil-
son & Anell, 2001). The organization not only has learned from pro-
jects, it specifies a project approach for its vendors and subcontractors.

Reflections
Looking hack, economic historians may see these times as a period of
turbulence in the world economy. Amidst this turbulence, projects and
project organizations have emerged as a means for getting things
accomplished. It will be interesting to see what these historians have to
say about these times - in particular what they have to say about the
use of projects to get organizations to adapt to their environment. We
think the various pictures that have been developed for organizations
are symptomatic of this period.
We see organizational adaptation as an evolutionary process. The
nature of evolutionary processes is that some entities, e.g. organiza-
tions, will cease to exist. Others will modify and continue to grow. The
utilization of regenerative projects is but one option for creating varia-
tion, and there are no guarantees that the variation that is created will
B A R B R O I. AiiELL A N D TIMOTHY L. W I L S O N

be a useful one. Indeed, there may be just as great a probability that

something injurious may develop as something helpful. Nevertheless, it
appears in general that permanent organizations have learned from
temporary ones and vice versa. At least, permanent organizations
appear t o be becoming more flexible and project-based organizations
as well as projects as such seem to be developing greater structure.
Likewise, permanent organizations might be seen as a flow of trans-
formations from input t o output. That definition appears to engender
a picture of integrated temporary organizations - "transformations"
being the common feature in each.
If one studies projects, it would appear prudent t o utilize the defini-
tions that have been developed for this topic. It is clear that not all so
called projects offer opportunities for learning new routines that might
be useful for the permanent organization. Certainly, liberties have been
taken in the general application of the term. Simply the use of the label
by an organization does not a project make. Particularly in regenerative
projects there may a good deal of muddling, if not boondoggling. Of
course, those team members who are participating in muddling or
boondoggling might become more adept at doing it, but the knowledge
they import into the permanent organization might be harmful, if not
downright dangerous. That is, the organization may become less, not
more, effective as a consequence of these activities.
A key area of understanding is the interaction that must occur
between temporary and permanent organizations. To treat them sepa-
rately is a severely limiting approach and in our view, it is this area of
research that will be the next breakthrough in understanding organiza-
tions. Permanent organizations commission the efforts of temporary
organizations. That part of the process seems clear. It is the reverse, the
understanding of the incorporation of temporary activities into perma-
nent processes, which seems t o be a problem. March's group (1991)
has posited that organizations, even their competitors, learn from sing-
le activities. Perhaps the understanding of these processes, the focusing
up of project organizations, will be the next effort of the Scandinavian
school.
On 18 August rqq3 readers of Ostgota Cohespondenten, a local Swe-
dish newspaper, could find the following headline: "Pilot project in
Linghem. Library being run privately". The summary on the first page
read as follows: "The first private library in Linkijping has opened in
Linghem. The Parapraxis Company, with librarian and new 'director'
Gun Aronsohn Nordin, takes over a branch of the municipal library.
She explains, 'I will serve the residents of Linghem in a way that I think
is better than that of a central bureaucrat. he profit from my involve-
ment cannot be counted in kronor och oren (dollars and cents)"'. In the
article there is also an interview with the chairman of the Education
Committee, the committee that made the decision to grant the contract
to the librarian. "Gun is enterprising and committed, and this is a diff-
erent form for operating a branch of the library". That statement was
very true. Nothing of the kind existed. In this article is presented a
'snap-shot' of the 1,ibrarian and her initiative. By following a sole lib-
rarian, we meet other individuals, groups and organizations that reflect
a number of changes within organizations in working life and business
during the latter 1900s. The possible theorekical 'eye-glasses' are many.
Here we choose to present the Librarian as an entrepreneur using the
opportunities. But her actions taken can also be looked upon as reali-
zing a project.
The Librarian (1 will write "Librarian" with a capital "L" and also
ELISABETH SUNDIN

the "Library" she runs with a capital "L" in what follows) submitted
a tender for the local branch of the city library where she was working,
in competition with the head librarian of the municipality. This was at
the beginning of the ~ q g o s i.e.
, a time when changes were sweeping
over the public sector, of which the library was a part. Her tender att-
racted great attention, practically created a stir, in the municipality,
both among other librarians and the civil servants and politicians who
dealt with the tender and decided who was to be granted the contract
to be the provider. Even among the most zealous advocates of privati-
zation, her tender aroused confusion (Sundin, 2000).
The story about the Library and the Librarian includes many of the
key questions of our time regarding organizational change. It is
through the latter, i.e. organizations on both the private and public
sides, that society, work, business, etc. change. All changes take place
within them and through them. There is no business outside of organ-
izations and no public sector that is not accommodated within an orga-
nization. In this case it is primarily the municipality as organization,
library service as organization and finally the specific Library in ques-
tion that are of relevance. These units of description and analyses are
closely connected constructed by and constructing each other. How-
ever - the position of these organizations and the scope of action for
the actors are influenced, perhaps even directed, by decisions taken on
the national level. Another important precondition, both for the organ-
izations and for the individuals, is history. This is one of the reasons
that attention has to be paid to the growth of library activities and to
librarians as a group. Over time, the culture of organizations and the
identity of occupations and individuals are created and developed.
Neither culture nor identity is easily changed.
This case touches on several theoretical fields and on reliable ways
of describing and understanding society and organizational change. In
this article I will focus on a few aspects. Both the course of events and
the result are "a child of its time" - a time when the public sector was
transformed in the direction presented here. The central distinction
between the private and the public sector seem to be far from unam-
biguous and perhaps obsolete.
The municipality in which the Librarian is active is not unique, even
if unusually ideologically motivated. The will for change existed
throughout the country. The municipal actors sought change. An in-
creased number of entrepreneurs and increased entrepreneurial spirit in
 REGENERATED PROFESSIONALlSM

the municipality were seen as a means of achieving change. An increa-

sed use of private companies as suppliers of goods and services, which
was unwittingly viewed as the same as entrepreneurship, was encoura-
ged. The surprise that the Librarian's tender gave rise to in the munici-
pality has to do with the fact that librarians and entrepreneurs would
seem to be the opposite of each other.
The prerequisite of change was to organize the organizational struc-
ture of the community inline with NPM (New Public Management)-
models. The model used in the community had many similarities with
projects: restrictions in time, scope and resources.
Librarians, whom the article deals with, are an occupational group
that can be characterized as a semi-profession. Semi-professions, very
broadly speaking, aspire to become professions, and they try to defend
their positions and their status. In the present case, two diametrically
opposed ways of doing this - that of the Libkarian and that of her coll-
eagues - are examined. This is the point of departure for the discussion
of the role of the occupations and the professions in the new political
and economic climate. The aim of the article is to present an under-
standing of the 'Library being run privately' with the concepts entre-
preneurfship, projects and semi-professional strategies in an organiza-
tional context.

The Swedish public sector

The Swedish public sector has been in a stite of significant transfor-
mation for a couple of decades. This is the case for the public sectors
of other countries as well. Neither the descriptions of the problems nor
the proposed solutions are unique Swedish phenomena or unique Swe-
dish innovations. There were, however, clear elements of political ide-
ology in the discussions and solutions, and a driving force in Sweden
was the coming to power of some non-socialist governments after deca-
des of social democratic rule. Sdeological inspiration was provided by
theories of public choice that were developed in the U.S. in the 1g5os
and their application in New Public Management. A fundamental the-
sis in these was that market mechanisms were best suited to manage the
allocation of resources, which entails that the public sector, ultimately
under political direction, should be reduced. One means of achieving
this was by contracting out. Increased choice for the general public,
ELISABETH SUNDIN

savings in the public sector and innovativeness in the economy would

hopefully be achieved. (Blomqvist, ~ 9 9 6 ;Blomqvist & Rothstein,
zooo; Deakin & Walsh, 1996; Ferlie, Ashburncr, Fitzgerald & Pettie-
grew 1996; Noren, 2001). In this article the Swedish variant of this
international phenomenon is examined. Nonetheless, the Swedish, or
perhaps Scandinavian, public sector may have certain specific elements
due to the great role it has in the construction and maintenance of the
welfare state (Esping-Andersen, r99 I ) .
It is worth recalling how the public sector is defined in order to
understand what this transformation entails. Common ownership is
one criterion of the public sector. Others are that it involves areas of
responsibility that are in some way common, for example by being
compulsory, that it involves areas in which a democratic influence is
guaranteed and that it involves areas that should be readily accessible
and not run for profit (Ringqvist, 1966). These criteria are sometimes
difficult to assess in practice. For example, should the label "public sec-
tor" require that ownership, financing and provision all be public, or
would it be enough if two of these criteria were met? Or perhaps only
one of them? The difficulty, even arbitrariness, with these delimitations
is illustrated by the fact that affiliation with a given sector shifts over
time and space. Many of these definitional difficulties are found in the
case of the Library and the Librarian.

Changes in the public sector towards

a project-oriented model
'What' is transformed and 'why' is a politically charged question, the
answer to which varies with one's fundamental political view. There is
more often agreement over the descriptions of the problems. Repeated-
ly it is emphasized that changes in the public sector were and are com-
pelled by problems of finance, management, democracy and legitimacy
(Montin, 1996). A number of measures have been initiated and innova-
tive programs adopted throughout the country in order to find solutions
to these problems and reform the sector. The goals are often formulated
in terms of achieving a more comprehensive democracy, greater freedom
of choice, higher efficiency, better service, less bureaucracy and the same
or better quality. The means of achieving these formulated goals vary to
some extent, but frequently the following are found:
 REGENERATED PROFESSIONALISM

Decentralization, for example through IodaI units, goal management

and a new managerial role I

Differentiation, primarily between the political and the operational

Marketization, i.e. exposure t o competition, which is presumed t o
provide new incentives resulting in economic rationalization as well
as new terminology. (Montin, 1996) ,
The means proposed regularly involve organizational changes. Given
political realities, these changes are manifested internally through pro-
jects and externally through reductions in activities run under the
auspices of the municipality and an increased utilization of so-called
alternative providers. Even the use of alternative providers can be looked
upon as an extended use of many of the characteristics of projects: A
given task, restrictions in time and money and measures for evaluation
(Packendorff, r g q j ) . Often the project-term is used for complicated
tasks with many individuals andlor organizations involved (see Berg-
gren & Lindkvist, 2001). The Librarian is one person and her Library a
small organization. Despite that we can seemany similarities between
projects and the way she transformed the task in an entrepreneurial
way. The similarities are obvious concerning the social construction of
the extraordinary in projects. Size is not the only dimension (cf. Sahlin-
Andersson, 1998).

T h e changed strategies of the muntcipality under study

The municipality in which the Librarian lives and works is among those
that have most quickly and resolutely adopted changes of the kind men-
tioned above. One of the leading politicians in the municipality was also
one of those setting the ideological tone on the national level.
By the end of the 1980s a decision was made to undertake a com-
plete review of the activities of the municipality with the aim of achie-
ving economic savings, changes, etc. A consdlting firm was comrnissio-
ned to assist in the work, which was headed by an inter-party executi-
ve group. Work was intense during the whole of rgqo. At the beginn-
ing of 1991 the municipal council adopted principles for what the new
organization should look like. One of the consultants was appointed
project leader with the task of implementing the ideas. O n I January
1992 the changes formally came into force.
ELISABETH S U N D I N

Before the reorganization the municipality operated in a traditional

manner, with a large amount of preparatory work being done in the 24
municipal committees. These were partly specialized and partly struc-
tured on the basis of geographical principles. Civil servants were linked
to the committees on the central level, at the municipal office, and out
in the field. Thus the head librarian, for example, was viewed as
belonging to the Education Committee and vice versa - the head libra-
rian viewed politicians in the Education Committee as defenders of the
libraries. In this way, ties within various sectors arose. In the inunici-
pality there is one main library and about 10so-called branches loca-
ted in different parts of the municipality. The Library under study is
located in a community about 10 kilometers from the center of the
municipality.
With the new system, a purchaser-provider model was adopted. The
main features of the model are:
The municipal organization should be divided so that two different
roles clearly stand out. One is the role as purchaser. The other is the
role as providerlproducer.
The two roles are to be separated organizationally.
Political direction is to be exercised by the committees doing the pur-
chase and entering into contracts with the providers. (Minutes of the
meeting rqq I-02-12. Linkijping Municipality. Dnr 87.5 54)

A result-unit model introduced earlier was used also after these

changes. The model can be described as an intensified use of projects.
For ideological reasons the leading politicians in this municipality pre-
ferred non-municipal providers. Employees going into business within
their previous fields were particularly appealing to the politicians. They
imagined a strong desire among the employees to go into business on
their own and to free themselves from "the yoke of the municipality"
and find an outlet for their creativity and innovative capacity. To
encourage this, those in charge of business in the municipality arranged
for information on and training in "starting your own business". In
general, these efforts met with limited success. National and interna-
tional companies quickly became the most prominent new providers,
for example in the fields of cleaning and elderly care (Sundin, 1997).
However, one of the exceptions was the Librarian. She submitted a ten-
der for the branch of the library where she was head librarian.
 REGENERATED PROFESSIOh-ALISM

Entrepreneurs and librarians

The intention of the municipal representatives, as mentioned, was that
employees would go into business on their own. In that respect, priva-
te business was equated with entrepreneurship, i.e. form with content,
something that is very common in public discussions. 'Entrepreneur'
and 'entrepreneurship' require an element of innovation. In the Swe-
dish National Encyclopedia key words, such as "concrete action",
"path-breaking methods", "innovativen and "experimentingn and "risk-
taking", are referred to. These are characteristics that are also found in
the scientific literature on the subject (Chell, 1991; Landstrom, 2000).
In addition, it is often said that entrepreneurs have a strong drive to be
on their own, to be their own boss.
Many of those who run their own companies are not particularly
innovative, and their activities are in no respects path-breaking. They
are not, according to the definition, entrepreneurs.
Many studies have been conducted on what gets people to go into
business on their own. The results can be described as being analogous
to what has been observed when people radically change their lives in
other respects. There are so-called push reasons and so-called pull rea-
sons (Sundin & Holmquist, 1990). People transforming themselves
from employees to owner-managers could belong to both these groups.
A person going into business on his or her own due to a presently poor
situation has push-reasons. Enterprise motivated by unemployment is
a typical example of this. Pull-reasons, like really wanting to be on
one's own, are positive reasons. These are the reasons that are usually
attributed to entrepreneurs, and it was reasons of this kind that the
municipal actors thought existed and wanted to encourage. How do
librarians fit into these expectations?

Libraries and librarians

Swedish libraries are considered to have an important place in the
hearts of the Swedish people. They "are loved by all, in principle",
according to the preface to FRN's (Forskningsridsnamnden - the Swe-
dish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research) publication
on "The library as service company" (Biblioteket som serviceforetag.
Kunden i centrum) from 1992. In their present form, primarily muni-
ELISABETH SUNDIN

cipal, libraries are a relatively new phenomenon. This form was not
fully implemented until the 1960s. Previously there were parish librari-
es and libraries run by popular movements.
Library science became an academic subject with a clear occupatio-
nal orientation at the beginning of the 1970s when the School of Lib-
rary and Information Science was founded. Before that, librarians were
sometimes the local elementary school teacher or upper-class women
who worked in their spare time (Olsson, 1991; Aberg, 1979). The local
elementary school teacher was usually a man, and upper class women
were, obviously, women. Thus, the work of' librarian has not had as
unambiguous a femalc gender label as it does today. Entrepreneurship,
on the other hand, has a male gender label (Jonson-Ahl, 2002; Sundin,
2002).
According t o AKU 2001 there are presently almost 7,000 librarians
in the country, about 80% of which are women. The percentage of
women among municipally employed librarians is even higher. Librari-
an is a low-wage occupation, considering the long education that lib-
rarians receive. Women, as so often is the case, earn less than men and
less than nurses and secondary school teachers, two other low-wage
occupations in which women are over represented (SCB AWLA Tabell
11, 2000).
The role of libraries is: culture, information and education (Audun-
son, iyy5). "This conception of the library as a universe of knowledge
is deeply rooted in the self-understanding of librarians". The idea of
general education seems t o live on, something that can also be seen
with the Librarian. As a group, librarians have been the bearers and
advocates of a democratic view of culture. A part of this has been felt
by many to mean that libraries should he owned, administered and run
by the public sector, that they should be a part of the modern welfare
state. Profit and other economic concepts do not fit in well with that
self-understanding and characterization (Sundin, zooo).
Librarians have a strong belief in the importance of their own work,
something that is considered t o characterize professions. Librarians
meet several of the other general criteria for professions as well: they
have an approved academic education, they hold the leading posts
within their sector and they have their own culture. Other criteria for
professions are not met by this group. Among those are not being in
control of their own sector - there are libraries that are run without lib-
rarians and library activity that is "thrown together" with other activ-
 REGENERATED PROFESSIONA1.ISM

ities, such as recreational facilities. All in all, I find it apt to refer to lib-
rarians as a semi-profession with intimate knowledge in their field and
a strong occupational identity (Etzioni, 1969; Hagerlind, 1991; Selan-
der, 1989).
Librarians are often described as devoted t o their occupation and
their work. As a rule, those who become managers and are put in charge
of economic matters see themselves in the first place as librarians. This
leads to a task-oriented organizational culture and attempts t o remain
aloof from strategic and economic considerations. Such considerations
are considered t o be narrow-minded and an obstruction t o the work of
bringing culture t o the people (Egerdal, 1992). From this follows that
librarians according to Egerdahl describe themselves as "passive, intro-
verted, obedient, humanistic oriented and interested in cultural". He
adds that as "a trade group they are really on thin ice in terms of man-
agement ability, drive and organizational talent". Given such characte-
ristics, librarians have difficulties promoting themselves and marketing
their activities. The activities are also very difficult to evaluate. They
are typical non-profit organizations that are difficult to conceive of
making a profit. They seem to lack what is necessary for adopting a
result unit type of model.
In the quotation from Egerdal ( ~ q g z )as , well as from others, the
characteristics of librarians would seem to be the direct opposite of entre-
preneurial characteristics and, moreover, of male characteristics.
However both the Librarian and many of her occupational colleagues
work for and in their libraries in a way that has to be characterized as
innovative, i.e. entrepreneurial. A devotion and love of the library is a
strong force. This is considered to be one of the strengths of the pro-
fessions, and it is found among librarians.
Libraries are and have been located together with other recreational
facilities, like sports, in some communities because they are seen as
variations on the same recreational theme. To the librarians there are
unique and valuable characteristics of libraries which can be threatened
if libraries have t o cooperate or compete with recreational activities.
ELISABETH S U N D I N

Why the librarian went out on her own

Why did the Librarian submit a tender for her library? She was already
managing her branch of the library and could, therefore, make a lot of
decisions. (It should be pointed out that this branch is small. In terms
of number of people, there are approximately two full-time positions -
the Librarian and two others on a half-time basis). This is one of the
reasons given by many of her colleagues at other branches for not sub-
mitting tenders. Another strong reason is ideological. Most of her coll-
eagues are of the opinion that libraries should be run under the auspices
of the public sector, as was discussed above. The Librarian drew a diff-
erent conclusion. Why she did so will become apparent in the following
section, where we follow the Librarian's thoughts about working con-
ditions and changes in the municipality.
The changes in the municipality outlined above had the aim of
making operations better and more efficient. However, the Librarian,
as the majority of her colleagues, felt that the results were the exact
opposite. It is important in this context to note that the reorganization
took place at the same time as cut-backs were imposed. The municipal
library was to reduce its costs by 20%. The demands for savings would
have been devastating for the Library. Operations were already so limi-
ted that it could not bear further reductions. The politicians in the local
council district agreed with that assessment. The Librarian tried to
reduce the costs of the premises by cooperating with the local school,
but she felt that all of her efforts were thwarted by sluggishness on the
central level: "Premises that I had managed to find slipped out of my
hands". She felt that she could not continue under these new austere
conditions. "Had I not felt so constrained, I would probably not have
submitted a tender".
It was not only the cut-backs that created problems but also the new
organization. Many decisions were decentralized but central manage-
ment and control increased at the same time. This is how the Librarian
describes it: "I was not even entrusted to write an invoice. And I was so
used to doing my own budget.. . I received orders that I did not have the
authority to sign an agreement. I was only allowed to work out agree-
ments, but then they would sign them". This description fits in well with
Czarniawska's account of "the paradoxes of the public sector" (Czarni-
awska, 1992). She formulates one of the paradoxes as being precisely
"that in order to decentralize, it is necessary to centralize".
 REGEKERATED PROFESSIONALISM

The Librarian displayed typical entrepreneurial characteristics. She

wanted to be her own boss and control her life and her work. The pos-
sibility of submitting a tender was a result of the new policy of the
municipality - but that the Librarian judged it necessary to do so was
also a result of the new policy of the municipality. The increased free-
dom that was supposed to follow from the new models, led, in practi-
ce, to a lack of freedom, in the Librarian's opinion. In order to be able
t o continue working with what she considered to be most important,
library activities, she submitted a tender for her Library. For the same
reasons, her colleagues refrained from doing so. To them, libraries
belong, by definition, to the public sector and should be operated
under the auspices of the public sphere. These differences are important
and are below analyzed with Soderlund's (zoooa) typology.

Shifts in practice
The invitation to submit tenders was preceded by a specification of
conditions from the politicians in charge of procurement. The period of
time for submitting tenders was short, and the decisions were made
late. Everyone involved complains about this leading to short-term
thinking and risks of discontinuity. In addition to the Librarian, the
municipality also submitted a tender via the head librarian. The tenders
differed not only with regard to price but also with regard to the con-
tent of the service to be offered. The Librarian wanted very much to
have a branch in a nearby village, which would be more costly. After
some discussions and a certain amount of turbulence, the Librarian's
proposal was accepted -however, she had been forced to "give in" on
the issue of the branch.
The formulation of the contract follows the characteristics of pro-
jects; time, money, aims and means. It was stated what services were to
be offered to the general public at the library and in conjunction with
the library as well as under what conditions. In the conditions there
was no mention of the work having to be performed by trained libra-
rians. (The demand for occupational training is, however, mentioned in
relation to schools and childcare). What is to be offered through the
library are books and media services and activities designed to promote
reading. In her tender the Librarian specified various target groups,
such as childcare and a book service to nearby villages. Among the con-
ditions, for example, are opening and closing times. It can seem as if
the conditions do not leave very much leeway for innovation and crea-
tivity.
In the tender the prices of the services offered are specified. The peri-
ods of time for inviting tenders roughly coincide with election periods.
The follow-up of whether the terms of the contract are being adhered
t o takes place both formally through reports submitted and informally.
Both the village where the Library is located and the municipality are
so small that rumors of possible problems spread. In this case, the other
librarians in the municipality also act as "watchdogs".
When the Librarian won the contract, her Library was removed
from the area of responsibility of the main librarian. This is a conse-
quence of the result unit model that was implemented. However, this is
simpler in principle than in practice. A number of problems involving
lines of demarcation and questions that had not been anticipated arose.
Would the Librarian, as had been the case previously, get access to the
book collections at the other libraries in the municipality, and, if so, on
what conditions? Who would pay for the transportation of books
when borrowers at the Library wanted books that had t o be brought
from one of the other libraries in the municipality? Would the Library
be included among the municipal libraries listed in the brochure of the
main library, and, if so, who would pay for this?
Certain practical problems followed directly and indisputably with
the new regime. Insurance had t o be acquired, alarms installed, book-
keeping arranged, etc. The Librarian also began looking for new part-
ners t o collaborate with in order to increase the volume of purchases
and trying t o attract new readers and visitors to the Library. The latter
was done in a number of ways - by cooperating with schools, daycare
centers, medical centers and the local swimming pool.
Some of the decisions that were taken and measures that were imple-
mented by the Librarian had the aim of decreasing costs. It should be
remembered that among the motives the municipality had for resorting
t o alternative providers were and are economic considerations, i.e.
there was and is a desire t o keep costs down. In order to bring about
lower offers in tenders and lower costs, modifications of existing activ-
ities are generally required. The Librarian tries to reduce costs by review-
ing each specific expenditure. She is on the lookout for favorable
contracts for everything: for purchases, for transportation, for book-
keeping, for cleaning, etc. She always considers performing duties, like
 REGENERATED PROFESSIOKALISM

cleaning, herself. The difference between what the municipality believes

is acceptable service and what she can achieve for the agreed upon
amount provides increased leeway for her andlor a better economic
result.
The Librarian was already established in the local council district
when she submitted her tender. She was already cost conscious and
devoted t o the importance of good books. The relationship between
costs and activity has become more evident t o her than it was during
the municipal period. There is a direct relationship between "smashed"
windowpanes and the size of allocations for books. She tries t o pass on
that insight to residents. She cannot ask for more money with referen-
ce t o such incidents. However, the question is whether other librarians
in the new economic situation can do so either. Even among them cost
consciousness has increased significantly over the years, promoted by
the established result unit model. However, the Librarian claims that
having won the contract provides a different feeling: a feeling of being
on one's own. This is the crucial difference between then and now
when it is expressed in concrete terms, even though it is so profoundly
abstract. Other librarians also refer to a feeling - but then it is a feeling
that libraries should be something in common, something within the
public sphere, the common sector.

Shifts in theory
The Librarian was not the only one to find herself working under new
conditions. As has probably become apparent, this was the case for all
of the other librarians as well. They were not only affected by demands
for decreased costs but also by demands for re-orienting their thinking
regarding what the relevant organizational unit is for them. Each lib-
rary became either its own result unit or became part of a result-unit
that was otherwise a school, daycare center, or recreational center of
some kind. Librarians were now to orient themselves toward the result-
units. This was completely foreign to most of the librarians. In their
professional way, they saw their responsibility as being broader and
oriented toward the reading public in general.
The new organizational model demanded new ways of thinking
challenging prevailing cultures and replacing them with a uniform one
characterized by economic criteria. The demands for change involved
ELISABETH SUNDIN

professions, such as architects, semi-professions, such as librarians who

are discussed here, and other occupational groups, such as cleaners.
(On the architects in the municipality, see Sundin 1995. and on clea-
ners in the municipality, see Sundin and Rapp forthcoming).
Prevailing values and conceptions of identity among librarians were
considered to be obsolete and inade q uate for the new economic situa-
tion and the new organizational model. I view identity here as it is used
in modern organization literature: "an abstract view of that what is
seen to form the consistency and continuity in a person's, a group's or
an organization's activities" (Aurell, 2001; Sahlin-Andersson, 1994).
Paradoxically, it seems to be the Librarian who went into business on
her own who has been most successful in preserving her professional
identity by creating the opportunity to perform her mission in most sig-
nificant respects as she did previously. She succeeded through using the
organizational forms implemented in an entrepreneurial way. I have
observed the same conditions with respect to other occupations and
professions working in the public sector. By operating an activity under
private management, the activity can be protected from demands for
change on the part of large organizations (Sundin 1997).

Which librarians are innovative,

entrepreneurial and victors?
In conjunction with the brief presentation of entrepreneurial theories,
it was emphasized that running a business on one's own is in no way
the same as creativity and innovativeness. The case that has been pre-
sented here may appear to support this observation. The Librarian
went into business on her own in order to be able to continue with
what she thought was most important and best - spreading knowledge
and culture to the residents in the local council district where she
works. However, the means she chooses for realizing these goals are
innovative in that they are at odds with the image librarians have of
themselves and their norms regarding how libraries should he run as
well as the image others have of what librarians are like. She is inno-
vative with regard to form but conservative with regard to content.
From a project-typology borrowed from Soderlund (1998)we could
distinguish the differences between the Librarian and her colleagues to
a structure dimension. Both are committed librarians convinced of the

importance of "libraries t o the
nent, but they put different em]
the librarians emphasize the im
nent, meaning publicly owned,
and temporary solutions as Ion
tity. These differences are label
versus project organizing and he
ected t o each typology. To the
bureaucratic andlor clan contr
fessional and/or clan control.
happened in the community st1
The observations and discu
entrepreneurial theories and ho
true to the reality of today. Thc
use the project form in line wit
do that as she is "protected" b
values. She is accepted by man;
rian. The resistance towards ot
pact. Classical entrepreneurial 1
text prior to the development c
theories that categorize reason
into push reasons and pull reasl
sented but in an unexpected w.
tender for her Library can be :
ble situation - not due t o her c
made the decision hecause she 1
to be able t o work as before t i
ty. For others the desire t o rerr
The tough economic conditio
municipality. Private alternative
perceived as a greater threat 1
reorganizations. These librariz
"Privatization is in principle w
on a non-profit basis". With ti
than remaining within the pub
activity there. This opinion is
the camp of advocates of prival
vatization" either. As expressec
"I would still think twice. or t
REGENERATE^ PROFESSIONALISM
I
)eoplen, their partic~pationis perma-
asis on the structurd. The majority of
~ r t a n c eof the structure being perma-
vhile the Librarian is positive t o new
as it is in line with Her librarian iden-
I by Soderlund pernianent organizing
rgues for different cohtrol forms conn-
:rmanent organizingttype he connects
and to the Project organizing a pro-
:I this seems to be in line with what
ied.
d
ions above should e integrated into
,fully contribute to niaking them more
.ibrarianYsentreprenkurial action is t o
her visions of a good library. She can
her (semi)-professional belonging and
~f her colleages as sHe is a good libra-
:r providers of library-services is com-
:ories emanate from a time and a con-
the welfare state. Tfie variant of these
for going into business on one's own
1s are useful in relation t o the case pre-
. The Librarian's dedision t o submit a
:n as her being forced by an impossi-
liking her work. O n the contrary, she
:d her work so mucd. It was the desire
r drew her away from the municipali-
In within the p b l i c sector is decisive.
"push" them even harder into the
in whatever way they are defined, are
xn the poor municipal economy and
s feel, very simply, that is it wrong.
ng. Certain things sAould be operated
t attitude there is ncr other alternative
: sphere and "fightidg" for one's own
ared by some politiLians deep within
ation. They cannot imagine "pure pri-
~y one of the non-stkialist politicians:
,ee times, about what consequences it
could have... there are differences in principle between different activi-
ties". Many also openly express a fear that the initiative taken by the
Librarian will begin a process from which there is no turning back.
"What will happen if people start submitting tenders for each other's
libraries?"
The Librarian who went into business on her own illustrates the diff-
iculties that are discussed in the literature attempting to describe and
analyze what the transformation of the public sector really entails. It
seems as if Barbara Czarniawska's (1992)conclusions about the para-
doxes of the public sector, which were mentioned above, are just as
applicable now as they were ten years ago when they were written.
Decentralization, for example, which was effectuated through a result
unit model, was implemented through centralization. This also means
that small organizations, such as the Library, and small organizational
units, such as the other branches of the library, are subordinated to lar-
ger ones, such as the main library. An increased number of small alter-
native providers is not a clear sign that the position of small organiza-
tions has been strengthened. It can just as well mean that the large
organizations are splitting potential opposition into many smaller
organizations.

Hereafter
The new principles for management and procurement in the municipa-
lity affected all of the librarians. They were all put in a more constrai-
ned economic situation. However, they dealt with this in different ways
- the Librarian by using the project form as a construction of an ent-
repreneurial possibility, others by resisting in both the participation
and structure dimensions. What are the implications for the future of
these strategies - mainly of the strategy of the Librarian?
The Librarian who went into business on her own had worked
within her occupation for many years when she submitted a tender for
her Library. She knew what libraries were and she knew what she wan-
ted to do with her Library. What she wants corresponds to what her
colleagues want - they are all part of the same tradition. There is no
difference to be found in that respect. The major distinction involves
who should be in charge of libraries, i.e. form rather than content. The
majority feel that libraries are and should be synonymous with publicly
 R E G E N E R A T E D PROFLSSIONALISLV

run activity. The Librarian feels it is the activity that is of central impor-
tance - not the form in which it is operated. Her professional partici-
pation and commitment is permanent, the adequate structure can be
ado p ted to the circumstances. She does see certain advantages of being
on hcr own -however, these involve a feeling, not the work or the atti-
tude toward borrowers. For many librarians the public employer is a
part of the nature of the occupation and, consequently, of one's own
identity. For these people, public ownership, which is strongly associa-
ted with profit or rather the lack of profit and economic incentives, is
of central importance. It is a part of the occupational identity. Interes-
tingly enough, it cannot be said that the union as an organization had
a negative view of the initiative taken by the Librarian. She was herself
active in the union. It was rather the occupational group with referen-
ce to professional criteria that was most vocal.
Librarians unquestionably display professional features - they borrow
their frames of reference from each other and, thereby, obtain their
legitimacy from each other. O n the central question in this article, that
of under whose auspices the activity should be run, the Librarian is
relatively alone in her view. With the concepts introduced above; she is
the only one to disconnect participation from structure. Or rather, she
is alone in accepting the practical consequences of her view - others
who, like her, emphasize the unique aspects of libraries are unable to
ignore the significance of public ownership - to them structure is as
important as participation. The opponents to the Librarian sometimes
argue by decreasing the differences: "What is really private with the
Librarian's library?", asks one of the other head librarians rhetorically.
All libraries, even the one run by the Librarian, receive all of their reve-
nue directly from the taxpayers. The content of the activity is the same
and, thus, the costs are of a very similar nature. To classify the Libra-
rian's activity as private and other municipal libraries as public is, in
many ways, difficult to justify. Despite that the majority of librarians
fear the consequences of the Librarian's initiative. Her small initiative
has implications of big institutional changes.
The Librarian and her colleagues are examples of a development
that we, probably, are going to see more of. The new management and
control systems that are applied by large organizations are going to
split the semi-professions and perhaps even the professions. The iden-
tities of groups and individuals are being shaken. There are many signs
that the librarians, as a group, can be the major losers in the negotia-
tions to follow in the tracks of the new municipal regulations. The new
organizational models and management systems are a threat to the lib-
rarians. We have seen, for example, that librarians are being replaced
by recreational directors, that the specification of conditions does not
contain requirements that there be trained librarians, etc. This has been
possible because librarians have not achieved the position of a profess-
ion and, thus, do not have the legitimacy to dictate conditions for
procurement. Neither have they managed to describe their competence
in concrete and convincing terms to decision-makers. As a result, they
are not seen as indispensable. By presenting her project the Librarian
handles a tool of change for institutional change of great significance.
By means of the Librarian who went into business on her own, a pic-
ture was presented of how an individual acts in order to deal with
changes that "befall" her as a result of decisions taken by a large organ-
ization. We also saw examples of other librarians acting in a comple-
tely different way. The differences are due to the possibility of making
several interpretations of the historical legacy and the professional
identity that developed as a result. The case is also a clear example of
how political decisions andlor decisions taken by large organizations
have direct consequences for the work and lives of individual people as
well as for the identity and negotiating strength of groups. Those
changes that took place also entail that established ways of viewing
societal phenomena may need to be revised and, consequently, even
social science theories. That the actions of large organizations influen-
ce the lives of people is nothing new. One of the circumstances that is
new this time, and that the libraries and the Librarian are a part of, is
that the public sector is contracting after a relatively long period of
expansion. Another thing that is new is that there is an attempt to
transfer the logic of one sector to another on the basis of political deci-
sions. These seemingly abstract changes influence the everyday lives of
individual people - in this case the everyday lives of the members of the
occupation more than the everyday lives of the citizens, at least so far.
 ementarities in

TOMAS M U L L E R N

Introducing the theme of innovative forms

of organizing
It is a common practice when writing on management issues to swee-
pingly characterize the world as changing. From a rhetorical stand-
point the rate and direction of change, be it globalization, de-regula-
tion, or technological breakthroughs, is described as 'proof' of the need
for renewal in the single corporation. New management models and
practices are developed t o deal with these changing conditions, with
the intent of creating more flexible, agile, and innovative organizations.
This particular way of arguing has produced a wide variety of classic
texts. Modern writers on management issues such as Ghoshal & Bart-
lett (1qq7:g) put this logic in the following eloquent way:
The last visit of Halley's comet [in 1986, authors comment] coincided
with the convergence of several important environmental forces that
were forcing most companies not merely t o adjust or adapt as they had
in the past but to confront the need for major transformational change.
 The invention of new management models is by no means a new
practice. When Henri Fayol in his Administration Industrielle et G6nC-
rale reflected upon his own experience as a manager in a French com-
pany, he launched ideas like the unbroken chain of command and the
principles of planning and control that have inspired coming genera-
tions of management writers. Though the literature is older than Fayol
he joined an unbroken and never ending parade of 'new' models and
concepts of managing and organizing.
With some historical perspective we soon realize that ideas have a
history and usually a long one. And this goes both for the rhetorical
underpinning of the need for change, as well as the actual presentation
of the change ideas. In fact, 'good' problems are highly useful and they
tend to outlive the new models and concepts. Hcre is Norman Angel1
in a quotation from r 9 r r :
The world economy has become so highly interdependent so as to
make national independence an anachronism, especially in financial
markets. This interdependence is being driven by science, technology
and economics.
And compare this to a quotation from 1999 in a speech by Lou
Gerstner from IBM:

But my message today is that the real revolution is not about tech-
nology. It is not about a new model of computing based on the
Internet. We are witnessing nothing less than the rise of a new econ-
omy - a digital economy - and a new global medium that will be the
single most important driver of business, economic and social
change in the coming century.

The technology (Internet) is new but the rhetorical figure remains basi-
cally the same: new technology creates a need for change. In this chap-
ter further consideration is given to the quest for organizing in compa-
nies to adapt to continuously changing conditions. The informed reader
should be well acquainted with the more fanciful labels currently in
vogue in the search for the holy grail of organizing, be it organizatio-
nal forms like networks (Nohria & Ghoshal, r997), cells (Miles &
Snow, 1996), and virtual corporations (Davidow & Malone, ~ q g z )or ,
management concepts like regenerating strategy (Hamel & Prahalad,
1994) and knowledge management (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). But
what is true and what is false in this ongoing discussion on management
 M O V I N G B E Y O N D T H E RHETORIC OF THE POST-MODERN C O R P O R A T I O N

and organizing? And how do we move beyond the totalizing and deter-
ministic rhetoric of Ghoshal & Bartlett in the quotation above?
This chapter draws on recent research into new and innovative forms
of organizing and develops a frame of reference that is applied to two
cases. The first case is a Swedish high-tech firm in the defense industry
- Saab Training Systems - renowned for its consistent implementation
of a team-based structure and a strong focus on HR-issues (including an
elaborate incentive system and a strong focus on learning). The second
case is the network giant - Cisco systems - with a special focus on the
implementation of the global network model in Sweden.

Building the argument

Recent research shows that nothing remains the same in the world of
organizing. The large research program Innovative Forms of Organi-
zing (INNFORM), led by professor Andrew Pettigrew at Warwick
Business School, has empirically documented far-reaching, though not
radical, changes in European, Japanese and American companies. In a
large survey sent to a random sample of 3.500 companies with more
than 500 employees in Europe (subsequently replicated in Japan and
US) Pettigrew et al. presented consistent evidence of changes in three
broad areas (Pettigrew & Fenton, 2000; Pettigrew, Massini & Numa-
gami, 2000; Whittington, et al., 1999).
The first area, structural changes, describes changes in the number
of hierarchical layers, decentralization, and the adoption of project-
based structures. In the INNFORM-survey, changes from the beginn-
ing of 1992to the end of 1996 were described. The second, changes in
processes, covers phenomena like horizontal and vertical communica-
tion, new HRM-practices, and investing in information technology.
The third deals with changes in boundaries, and it describes involve-
ment in strategic alliances, outsourcing and core competence.
In the three areas of the INNFORM-survey, the most far-reaching
changes are found in the areas of processes and boundaries. In the
structural category, the increase in project-based organization is more
noticeable with 5 I per cent of the organizations indicating changes in
that category. In the process area, 74 per cent of the organizations indi-
cate changes in horizontal linkages (including issues like sharing of
R&D knowledge across units, joint prchasing and shared marketing
information). An even more marked trend is the adoption of informa-
tion technology with 8 2 per cent of the organizations indicating
changes in that category. Clear changes were taking place in outsour-
cing and strategic alliances, in the boundary area, with 65 per cent of
the organizations showing changes in both categories.
An important result from the analysis of the survey data is the case
of complementarities. The majority of the organizations responding to
the survey make changes in one or maybe two of the three areas, and
a few companies indicate the full multidimensional raft of changes in
all three areas. The 4.5 per cent of the organizations doing that enjoyed
a performance premium of more than 60 per cent, showing that it pro-
duces negative results to get involved in partial changes. The comple-
mentarities argument emphasizes the systemic nature of the new, emer-
ging organizational forms. It elaborates on the concept of fit in con-
tingency theory (Donaldson, 1996) and the notion of holistic and
aggregated organizational forms in the configurational approach of
Miles & Snow (1978). It explains the configurational approach by
asserting that doing more of one thing increases the returns t o doing
more of another (Milgrom & Roberts, 199s). As maintained by Whitt-
ington et al. (rgqg), the performance benefits of one set of changes is
dependent on other complementary changes.
Based on the results of the INNFORM-survey and a number of case-
studies carried out in European companies, relevant changes - boun-
dary crossing and temporary forms of organizing - need further
expounding. The stress that the changes are related can be traced back
to the complementarities argument above, and it will be further devel-
oped and discussed in the case analysis below.

Boundary crossing
Several authors suggest that the multidivisional form is being superse-
ded by the so-called network form (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). A key
characteristic of the suggestion is the tendency to move beyond the
boundaries of the single corporation and develop more elaborate and
complex value constellations. The often discussed contemporary phe-
nomena of external networks, alliances, virtual and imaginary organi-
zations, etc., are all elements in a process of changing/dissolving the
single, unified organization as the central locus of interest. We see a
 M O V I N G B r , Y O N D T H E KHE'l'ORIC OF THE POST-AMODERN C O R P O R A T I O N

marked trend of companies performing increasingly important activities

in relations with customers, suppliers, and even competitors.
In the INNFORM-survey this was evident in the figures for strategic
alliances and outsourcing. In this respect the whole concept of an organ-
ization with clear boundaries becomes problematic. Even though few
companies take the full step towards building a virtual corporation, the
trend towards more open, boundary-crossing forms of organizing is
evident and clear. The label boundary-crossing indicates that the boun-
daries are still there but they are crossed to a larger extent. The case-
studies performed in the INNFORM-project verify the picture that
companies reach out and engage in different external relations at the
same time as they keep a strong focus on the internal operations. Strik-
ing a balance between the company's external and internal priorities is
the most important issue.
This marked trend towards boundary-crossing creates a need to
rethink traditional, functional and divisional forms of organizing.
Network characteristics are more conspicuous when dealing with the
complexity involved in partnering many actors around the core organ-
ization. The concept of network organizations highlights a number of
important features of innovative forms of organizing. Two important
aspects are worth highlighting - communication and learning. The
internal network organization is often described as a communicative
organization, with the more elaborate and complex systems of comm-
unication being a salient feature of the organization. In the INN-
FORM-survey this focus on communication was evident in the figures
for vertical and horizontal linkages where major changes were taking
place in European companies. Perhaps even more important is the mass-
ive investing in information technology and the break-through of the
Internet. And it is no coincidence that the Internet has been the proto-
type for how network organizations are viewed (Magretta, 1999; Tap-
scott, 1999).But it is dangerous to treat the network characteristics as
merely technologically driven, with close connection to the advances in
information technology. The network characteristics are also evident in
how we view the management of knowledge and learning.

Temporary forms
A central issue in the literature on innovative forms of organizing is the
need for building more flexible structures. Driven by the rapid devel-
opment of information technology, and not least the Internet, both the
need for and possibilities to develop more flexible structures and fast-
moving forms of organizing have increased. A common assumption is
that flexibility is enhanced by adopting more temporary ways of organ-
izing. Ekstedt et al. ( ~ q y y )Jessen
, (1yy6), Hamilton (1yy7), among
others, hold that the new architecture of the modern corporation is t o
an increasing degree an architecture of temporary organizing. This can
take the form of formal projects, and by paying attention t o process,
emphasizing horizontal and vertical networks transcending the single
organization, or focusing on the knowledge creating and utilizing
efforts in corporations. The literature on new and innovative forms of
organizing, and on human resource management, often stresses the use
of decentralized, group-based structures. Concepts like team-based
structures, project forms of organizing, and organizational learning are
often used to describe the features of new forms of organizing.
A marked trend in the literature o n new and innovative forms of
organizing is the focus on processes and dynamic aspects. From an
HRM-perspective, Mirvis (1997) holds that leading companies focus
more on organizing for innovation by involving employees, conducting
training and mentoring programs, using flexible work arrangements
and team-based work redesign. In the field of project management, it
is often maintained that companies organized by projects can be an
important arena for innovation (Andersson & Larsson, 1998) and learn-
ing (Lundin & Soderholm, 1997). The notion of the projectified society,
with an increasing number of companies organized by projects or other
forms of temporary organizations, draws the attention to processes in
companies, how they organize innovation and the on-going business
processes. O r t o quote Hastings (1996):
The resulting organization can be conceived of as a constantly chang-
ing kaleidoscope of teams, forming, delivering work and dissolving as
required.
The changes towards more networked and temporary forms also has
implications on how people in organizations are dealt with. It is often
argued that values change and that younger generations appraise
notions like freedom, work and authority/responsibility differently
than older generations. Together with structural changes in many
industries with a move towards more knowledge-intensive production
systems and products, the changes in values pose new challenges for
recruiting, training and motivating employees. Pfeffer (1998) says that
 M O V I N G DT.YOhlD T H E RHETORIC O F THE POST-MODERN C O R P O R A T I O N

the 'management of people' is a crucial and strategically important

issue in the modern corporation. Companies are experimenting heavily
with new HRM-practices such as new incentive systems, team building,
internal labor markets and corporate mission building.

The Saab case

This section describes the radical, company-wide, organizational
change in Saab Training Systems from 1992 up till 1998. Saab Training
Systems is a high-tech defense company, working as a prime mover in
the industry when it comes t o organizational renewal. The company is
fully owned by the Saab group, a Swedish corporation consisting of a
number of high-tech firms. The Saab group consists of 6 business areas
and more than 3 j companies (including Saab Training Systems). The
group's major product is the fourth generation combat aircraft JAS 39
Gripen. The case focuses on the change from a traditional functional
structure to a team-based structure with a number of features relevant
to the theme of innovative forms of organizing. Following a strategy of
concentration on core competence, the company, as a whole, compri-
ses a number of teams organized in line with the business process. The
company has experienced rapid growth in terms of turnover figures,
from I j million GBP in 1992 t o jo million in 1997: The number of
employees during that period increased from zoo to 260, and at the
beginning of 2002 it surged to more than 300. The company's special
niche is computer-aided training equipment for military purposes,
using visual laser-based simulation of different types of terrain and
situations.
In the early 1990s the company had trouble meeting important
deadlines for production and development. Production and develop-
ment relationships seemed to be especially crucial for the overall effec-
tiveness of the company. 'We have pointed at the difficulties with devel-
opment issues, and creating new products with insufficient resources'
(Interview with a team-leader). The company also felt a need to respond
quicker to environmental changes. The communication between diffe-
rent parts of the company was considered an important issue. The
managing director for some time had had trouble with the effectiveness
of the company. In ~ q q zhe
, took the initiative t o start an experiment
with a team-based organization. The underlying idea was t o create a
more flexible structure - 'All this requires that we develop new flexi-
 ble processes, communication patterns and a new organizational struc-
ture' (Interview with the former CEO).
The company's new structure can best be described as eam-based.
More than 40 teams report directly t o the managing director and the
management team. The number of hierarchical levels has been reduced
from three t o two. The ideal size of a team, according t o a number of
respondents, is 6-8 persons. If a team gets bigger than that it is split
into two or more teams. There are some examples of such cell-division
among product teams (Miles et al, 1997). The purpose of this organic
growth of the organization is to increase flexibility and adaptiveness t o
environmental change. When the new structure was implemented in
1992, the five types were given a lot of operational freedom compared
to the former structural arrangement. This freedom concerns especially
operational decisions in production and development in the product
teams. It is balanced by a very strong planning process in the company
with business teams responsible for the overall planning and the deli-
very team responsible for the production planning. When the team-
based structure was introduced, the company started an incentive
system based both on the overall result, team performance, and indivi-
dual outcome. This is done according t o an elaborate scheme develo-
ped in 1992, under which the performance of the company, the team,
and the individual is measured.
The team-based organization is structured according t o the basic busi-
ness process. At the beginning of the business process there are five busi-
ness teams in the market organization of the company. Each business team
is responsible for one or more products, and one or more geographical
areas. They are responsible for negotiating and controlling contracts with
the customers, and are economically responsible for each contract.
When a contract is signed, a production order is placed with a deli-
very team charged with planning logistics of each order. Besides plan-
ning the logistics, the delivery team is also responsible for final testing
of the product before shipping t o the customer. The production plann-
ing process also involves a purchasing team. This team has a central
function with an overall responsibility for purchasing.
For each contract, an application team is involved in adapting the
company's products t o the needs of the customer. The business team
responsible for a contract orders an application from an application
team. The application team's study functions as a blue-print for the diff-
erent product teams involved in the order.
 M O V I N G B E Y O N D THE RHETORIC OF THE POST-MODERN C O R P O R A T I O N

Design and production of the different units in a project is carried

out by one or a number of product teams (there are 14 product teams
in the company, 1 2 of them work in the product area of laser simula-
tors). The product teams are organized according to products, i.e.
optics, laser-simulators, sensor-modules. In addition to the teams invol-
ved in the business process, there are a number of central functions, i.e.
personnel, quality, purchasing and finance.
Because the structure for an order is temporary, coordination betw-
een the different teams involved in an order is very important. The mix
of teams involved in an order is dissolved as soon as the system is deli-
vered to the customer. Any product team can simultaneously be invol-
ved in a number of different projects at the same time. The responsibi-
lity for the process coordination is split between a business team
(having the commercial responsibility for each project) and the delive-
ry team (rcsponsible for production planning). Since the business teams
and the delivery team do not have the detailed knowledge necessary to
place orders with the product teams, they need application teams to
define the need for different parts in a system. This means that the
application teams fulfill a very important coordinating role in the busi-
ness process. The coordination needed in production and development
processes in the company has forced the different teams to intensify
cross-functional communication. Communication has also increased
between different teams, especially application and product teams, and
customers.
The need for more efficient planning in the new team-based struc-
ture forced the company to introduce an up-to-date computerized plann-
ing system. The system was introduced when the team-based structure
was implemented, which has been gradually refined since. The use of
IT has grown in importance due to shortened throughput times, and
the growing customer need for more frequent contacts.
The basic idea behind the team-based structure is to create an inno-
vative and learning organization. The product teams, for instance, are
responsible not only for producing their parts but also for construction
and product and process development. One reason for building this
organization in 1992was to foster a more entrepreneurial spirit. In the
word of the managing director 'each team should be capable of beco-
ming their own company'. It should be stressed though that the teams
are not profit-centers in the full sense. They are better described as
cost-centers, but with a high degree of operational freedom.
 The experience from the first five years of the team-based structure
shows a need for a project organization of development issues. During
1999, the company moved into a more project-based structure with
development issues organized in a project organization. The major diff-
erence between the team-based structure and the new project-based is
the temporary nature of the project groups formed in the new organi-
zation. It should be remembered that a team, though depicted in the
literature as a highly flexible organizational structure, is still a form of
departmental structure with the teams being organized for on-going
operations when compared to temporary operations. The major diffe-
rence between the team-based structure and the new project-based is
thus the temporary nature of the project groups formed in the new
organization.

The Cisco case1

In 1984, Cisco, named after the city of San Francisco, was founded by
Leonard Bosack and Sandy Lerner, a couple who worked as computer
specialists at Stanford University. The company started as a project to
connect computer networks on campus. They were first to develop a
network technology that allowed networks to communicate with each
other. It made linking networks across the world possible and was the
basis for the functionality of the World Wide Web. (Killick & Rawoot,
ZOOT; Saloner & Spence, 2002; Stockport & Chaddad, 2001; Tempest,

1999).
The Internet and Intranets grew in importance and so did Cisco.
Cisco's almost exclusive knowledge within this area at such an early
stage made it the leader of networking and by 1998 it became the num-
ber one supplier of routers and switches. Today, the company's product
line consists of a wide range of networking solutions and their core
products -routers and LAN and WAN switches. Cisco's wide product
range enables it to provide their customers with end-to-end network
solutions (Saloner & Spence, 2002; Tempest, 1999).
Technological advancements, which cannot be internally developed
within six months, are acquired by companies with the necessary

' The Cisco case has been prepared by Johanna Fnglert and Mikaela Graf.

214
 MOVING BEYOND THE RHETORIC O F THE POST-MODERN CORPORATION

knowledge (Byrne & Elgin, 2002). In the past eight years, Cisco has
acquired 73 companies, using its unique acquisition growth strategy. In
order to extract knowledge from the acquired companies, Cisco needed
a successful human resource management and an effective integration
of new companies without losing intellectual capital (O'Reilly & Pfeffer,
2000).
Cisco has adapted its products and technology to its future anticipa-
tion of how the organization should be run in the future. John Cham-
bers, CEO of Cisco, quoted in Morgridge & Heskett (zooo), said that
companies not only will connect themselves to a "New World
Network", but they will also be faced by changing assumptions conn-
ected to competition and the development of organizations. These
assumptions are: organizations will be oriented around networks, as
opposed to hierarchies, capabilities will be focused on technological
advantage, emphasis will lay on the interdependence of partners, and
organizations will be built on change rather than on stability (Ibid).
All employees within the organization are part of Cisco's networked
environment, which gives them a wide range of support systems. The
most important forms of employee support are the Internet-provided
learning programs. Cisco has an E-Learning Initiative site where the
employees can complete various courses and to satisfy the need for
Internet-qualified people, Cisco has also founded a network of acade-
mies that trains people in subjects such as network basics and trouble-
shooting.
Cisco's employees are connected by the "Cisco Employee Connec-
tion" (CEC), which is an Intranet designed to provide information and
services. According to Cisco, CEC's benefits are manifold, including
instant global communications, enhanced productivity, consistent busi-
ness systems, lower business costs, scalability, and facilitation of
employee acculturation (www.cisco.com, 2002; Rankin & Parent,
1997). "C~SCO Connection Online" (CCO) is a combination of Internet
and Intranet applications accessible to customers, partners, sharehol-
ders, prospects, and employees. The CCO gives these parties informa-
tion and services, such as software upgrades, technical assistance, order
status, seminar registration, documentation and training.
The CEC and the CCO are the contents of what Cisco calls its glo-
bal networked business model. This model facilitates information shar-
ing, the cultivation of relationships between various parties, increases
speed and minimizes costs, which are needed to succeed in a global
environment (www.cisco.com, 2002). In order to describe the Global
Network model of Cisco, a more detailed analysis of Cisco Sweden is
made below. The empirical material is based on interviews with the
CEO, the Information and PR manager and the H R manager at Cisco
Sweden. The number of employees at Cisco Sweden is approximately
zoo and they are divided into various departments, such as administ-
ration, sales, marketing and R&D. The R&D department is one of four
in Europe. The others are situated in Italy, Scotland, and Israel.
Cisco Sweden is connected to Cisco by the global networked busi-
ness model, which provides for a close co-operation between all parts
of Cisco. For example, the marketing department in Sweden consists of
only four people but to help them they have the other marketing
departments in Scandinavia, Europe, and the United States. The
network is used in all parts of the organization and it is the glue that
holds the organization together. Since Cisco is a vast organization with
entities in more than 67 countries, the network is an important tool to
ensure close co-operation (www.cisco.com, 2002). According to the
H R manager, the advantage of working with a network such as Cisco's
is 24-hour, seven-day access to all information. This can also be consi-
dered a disadvantage since it entails one has always to be available. It
is no longer important to be in the office to be reachable. There are no
office boundaries and one can be reached everywhere, e.g. at home,
abroad, or, of course, in the office.
All employees get an access card that works as a key to all of Cisco's
offices across the world. It is based on the concept that Cisco is their
employer and not the individual entities. It is possible for an employee
in Sweden to be reached at an office in England, if he or she happens
to be there. A Cisco employee can log on to any telephone or compu-
ter and can be as easily reached as if at hislher home office.
Innovative technology is one of the most important interests of
Cisco. To maintain the technology, knowledge-sharing and cooperation
are of paramount importance. This is, to a large extent, done cross-bor-
der and, therefore, necessitates the use of the global networked busi-
ness model. Since Cisco Sweden is one of four R&D departments in
Europe, it is part of a matrix from which knowledge is chosen depen-
ding on what is needed for the different projects. Cisco Sweden is curr-
ently working on a project together with entities in Italy, India, the UK
and the United States. This requires cross-cultural boundaries to over-
come and maintain a close contact within the project. During the course
 M O V I N G B E Y O N D THE KHE1'ORIC O F THE POST-MODERN CORPORATION

of the project there are various milestones that are set and each entity
develops different parts that must be completed at the set date. In order
for all parts to be compatible, it is important that information is shared
and communication is open.
Projects are initiated by requests from customers. When a customer
approaches Cisco with a problem, it is most likely that customers in,
for example, Germany and Italy will have it as well. The market is the
same regardless of the country. The problem generates an idea that the
local marketing department communicates to Cisco in San Jos6 where
decisions are taken whether to start up a project or not, and if so which
entities have the competence and resources needed to develop it. Eve-
rything in Cisco is customer-oriented and customer success is the main
goal. To ensure innovation and boost creativity, Cisco has a two-per-
son unit that works with compensation and benefits. Cisco has
something called CAP awards, which commends innovative employees.
Externally, Cisco also has adopted the concept of open communica-
tion. Their customers, partners and suppliers are all part of their eco-
system. The partners are connected to the global networked business
model and the suppliers are integrated into the supply chain manage-
ment from design to production, which results in a faster and more
efficient production of Cisco products.

Figure II:I Cisco's Ecosystem.

The inner circle consists of the Cisco organization, then come partners
and suppliers, followed by the customers and software partners. As a
service to their partners and customers, Cisco provides online informa-
tion regarding internally discovered product problems and solutions.
The company strives to do this before the problem occurs externally to
minimize damages. Cisco also informs its partners and customers of the
efficiency benefits that can be obtained when using their products. To
ensure that these numbers are correct, an independent accountant firm
is hired that provides them with the savings they have obtained due to
using their products. The CEO expresses this rare situation as follows:
"Networks are something we work with so we take our own medicine
daily".

Concluding reflections
The two cases described above, though very different, illustrate a num-
ber of points connected to the frame of reference presented earlier. In
the area of boundary-crossing, the two companies show some interes-
ting features, with the hard-working Cisco consistently trying to
expand the network of external contacts. The Cisco Ecosystem, which
is a concept widely spread in the company, describes the elaborate
network of relations in three layers. The boundary-crossing elements in
Cisco are balanced by a very strong focus on the technology, and with
a very strong core of the Ecosystem. In the interviews conducted in
Cisco Sweden, the respondents verified that the Headquarters in the
US work very hard at integrating the different parts of the company.
Another aspect of boundary-crossing in Cisco is the open technological
standard and the ambition that the Cisco products should work with
products from other suppliers. It is not a closed system, one of the
respondents said.
Cisco is clearly a living example of an internal network organization,
with a strong emphasis on IT-tools for running the network. The Global
Networked Business Model relies on the intranet CEC and the so-
called CCO where customers, partners, and many others can gain
access and receive information and services. The knowledge sharing,
experience, and open communication are important prerequisites for
the continuous innovation needed to survive in a highly competitive
industry.
 M O V I N G B E Y O N D 'I HE RHETORIC OF THE POST-MODERN C O R P O R A T I O N

The Saab case also highlights some aspects of boundary-crossing,

though not on the scale of Cisco. The primary element of boundary-
crossing in Saab Training Systems is the close and intensive cooperation
with the customers. Not only the marketing people meet the customer
but also members of the different teams involved in putting the pro-
ducts together. A further step towards extending the capacity of the
company was introduced in 1999 with a project-organization for inno-
vation project that could work in closer cooperation with customers. In
the Saab-case the strong focus on the business process and the flat struc-
ture with all teams reporting directly to the top management team
reflects a strong ambition to be more network-oriented. The major diff-
erence between the two cases is the way their network models are devel-
oped, with Cisco illustrating a strategy to build both internal and exter-
nal networks, and Saab relying more on the internal network form.
A theoretical remark should also be made concerning the boundary-
crossing in the two cases. Both companies are far from the ideals of
imaginary and virtual organizations, with a small core and an extended
external network. In both cases top management deliberately keep a
strong control over the company and integrate important functions in
the internal hierarchy. They both illustrate a hybrid form between
internal hierarchy and virtual organization.
The temporary aspects of organizing are very important in both
Saab and Cisco. Both companies share the idea of putting together lar-
ger teams for both production and innovation issues. In Saab, it takes
the form of one or more product teams working together with marke-
ting and application teams for a specific customer order. This specific
group of teams is dissolved when the customer order is met. In Cisco,
the matrix in Europe illustrates the same basic thinking - to put togeth-
er the best possible team for each occasion. This philosophy is often
used in innovation projects. It should be stressed though the organiza-
tion is only temporary t o a certain degree. In both cases the internal
structure is departmentalized, with each individual employed by the
company having a clear geographic and functional 'home'.
In both cases we find yet another aspect of time, namely the strong
focus on speed. Both companies work intensively with closing the gap
between customer needs and final delivery. In the Saab case the need
for quicker logistics was the whole rationale for the radical change
effort in 1992, and the competitive pressure during the 1990s has furth-
er enforced that need. The company has been very successful in improv-
TOMAS M i J L L E R N

ing the capacity to deliver on time, but a major challenge is to keep the
same tempo in innovation. Compared to Saab, Cisco has been more
successful in integrating production and innovation. A comparison
between the two companies shows that Cisco has succeeded in bringing
together and integrating a vast number of resources all over the globe,
buying companies and integrating partners and suppliers in the net-
work. The ability to cross boundaries and integrate different resources
in a network model seems to be a prerequisite for building an innov-
ative and flexible organization.
Saab Training Systems and Cisco put a lot of emphasis on human
resource management, and it is impossible to summarize all aspects of
this broad area within the scope of this chapter. However, it is worth
highlighting a number of the more prominent features. In the Saab case
knowledge management and motivation are two very important pillars
of the HR-philosophy of the company. The former CEO developed a
very elaborate learning philosophy in the early ~ g g o s with
, a strong
emphasis on the individual and group-level learning. The basis for the
learning philosophy was the idea of experiential learning, where expe-
riments and risk-taking were encouraged. The strong learning focus
was also strengthened by a complex incentive system based on indivi-
dual, group and company level performance.
In the Cisco case the integration of new employees and the integra-
tion of acquired companies is a high priority within the field of HRM.
The respondents in the interviews stress the need to have a 'cultural fit'
between the acquired company and Cisco. Though we have not been
able to verify the results of this cultural integration, the company has
high ambitions, and the strategies are thoroughly implemented. Lear-
ning is also a high priority in Cisco and one example of the different
tools used for that is the so-called E-learning Initiative Site where the
employees can take different courses within the Cisco Academy.
The highly developed thinking on human resource management in
both companies reflects an important insight concerning innovative
forms of organizing. More complex and dynamic forms of organizing,
where boundary-crossing and temporary aspects have been highligh-
ted, are usually found in highly competitive and knowledge-intensive
industries where people do matter. Both cases confirm the basic premi-
se of O'Reilly I11 & Pfeffer (2000)that companies need to create cul-
tures and systems in which people can actually use their talents for the
benefit of the company.
 LMOVING BEYOND THE RHETORIC O F THE POST-MODERN CORPORATION

The boundary-crossing and network-oriented models of organizing

and the temporary forms of organizing stand out as important features
of the two cases. One question remaining to be answered, though, is
the relations between boundary-crossing and temporary forms, and
how the complementarities work in the two cases. From a theoretical
standpoint the relations between boundary-crossing and temporary
forms are obvious. The tendency t o move beyond the boundaries of the
single organization creates a need for new forms of organization
beyond the internal hierarchy. Projects, and other temporary forms of
organizing, are clear answers to this challenge. But this also works the
other way round - projects are, by their very nature, cross-functional.
By organizing with projects opportunities are created to cross bounda-
ries. We could thus argue that there are important complementarities
between boundary-crossing and temporary forms of organizing, and it
is no coincidence that innovative organizations keep a dual focus on
both.
Following the complementarities argument of Milgrom & Roberts
(1995)it can also be argued that there are further performance bene-
fits to be drawn from simultaneously focusing on both boundary-cross-
ing and temporary forms of organizing. More specifically the following
aspects of complementarities are hypothesized and observed in the two
cases:
A close and intensive collaboration with customers requires a pro-
ject-oriented focus on production, product development and resear-
ch. The Saab case clearly illustrates how the close involvement of the
customers activates different parts of the team-based structure
depending on where in the business process a specific order is. The
internal network structure of Saab is made more flexible by the
team-based structure and the elaborate planning instruments. The
team-based structure also helps customers to follow their order
through the business process and simplify the communication with
key persons in the company.
The temporary forms of organizing seem t o be a necessary condition
for an extended external and internal network to gain momentum
and speed. The innovation projects in Cisco are good examples of
this point where Cisco manages to utilize widespread resources t o
bring products to market to quickly meet market opportunities. In
the Saab case the team-based structure and the network approach
TOMAS MULLERK

also allows for a more effective utilization of the company's capabi-

lities.
The flat and networked structures in knowledge intensive firms like
Cisco and Saab, require consistent and elaborate focus on human
resources. In the two cases some aspects of the HR-area were high-
lighted without going into detail. In the Cisco case learning and cul-
tural processes are two important areas on which the top manage-
ment deliberately place their focus. The consistent work by top
management to communicate core values in the company is arguably
an important part of the socialization of different actors in the
network. When it comes to learning, the e-learning initiative site is
an important instrument in creating opportunities for on-the-job
training and continuous development of the employees' competence.

More hypothetically the two cases illustrate two stylized forms of organ-
izing - one with an internal focus on building a network (Saab Training
Systems) and one with an external focus (Cisco). As described above,
the two cases differ in how they manage to draw on the complement-
arities between boundary-crossing and temporary forms of organizing.
The more open approach of Cisco creates possibilities and challenges.
We have seen that Cisco, compared to Saab, has managed to keep a
more explorative approach to learning, partly by adding to the internal
capabilities by buying companies. The major challenges are to keep
control over this complex network and manage to communicate between
its different parts. When it comes to coordination, Cisco relies a lot on
cultural control with the CEO being very active in creating a sense of
community in the company. This is further underpinned by the extend-
ed electronic network. The approach of Cisco is clearly more risky but
can also produce impressive results with tremendous growth.
The cases of Saab Training Systems and Cisco illustrates a number
of important elements in new and innovative forms of organizing. The
two areas of boundary-crossing and temporary forms were used to cap-
ture some aspects of the emerging innovative practices. The challenge
of organizing is, to a growing degree, a matter of organizing for flexi-
bility under conditions of complexity and change, and both cases show
that companies are rapidly adopting a number of network characteris-
tics to achieve that.
The Cisco concept of an Ecosystem is a good metaphor for the emer-
ging models of organizing. It illustrates the need to map the complexity
 M O V I N G BEYOND THE RHE'I'OKIC O F THE POST-MODERN CORPORATION

of the environment, multiply the internal resources by building exter-

nal networks and enhance learning and knowledge management in the
company. Although the two cases are neither representative nor gene-
ralizable, they still stand out as a testimony of the widespread and tho-
rough changes in how we conceive of organizing.
 Action and the temporary organization
In contemporary organizations projects and project management are
important issues. This is reflected in the projectification of the firm
(Midler, 1995) and that businesses are going on in a world of projects
(Lundin, 2000). Traditionally, projects have been described with distin-
ct stages such as development, implementation, and termination
(Waters, 1996; PMI standards Committee, 1987). However, during the
last decade the "normativism" in the theoretical field of projects has
been criticized and there is a need for a diversity of middle-range theo-
ries for different types of projects, or temporary organizations (Pack-
endorf, 1995).
One alternative to the "normativism" in the traditional project
management literature is suggested by Lundin & Soderholm (1995),
when they introduce the theory of the temporary organization, which
is based on a perspective from the inside of the temporary organization.
Lundin & Sijderholm take a point of departure in the criticism against
the implicit assumption that decision causes action (see e.g. Thompsson,
1967; March & Olsen, 1y76), an assumption that also seems to be an
underlying perspective in theories of project management. Lundin and
Soderholm suggest an alternative to the decision-making perspective by
using Czarniawska-Jorges' (1988) action-oriented approach, which
considers all kinds of organizational performance as different kinds of
action. Furthermore, from an empirical point of view, an action per-
 B R I D G I N G T H E GAP BETWEEN TEMPORALITY AND P E R M A N E N ( : Y

spective can be motivated by the fact that temporary organizations

exist in order to perform a specific action (Miles, 1964; Goodman &
Goodman, 1976) to achieve immediate goals (Palisi, 1970). Moreover,
if temporary organizations are seen as systems for implementation,
action will be an important feature (Borum & Christiansen, 1993).
In the theory of the temporary organization, Lundin and Soderholm
outline four basic concepts-time, task, team, and transition - and four
sequencing concepts - action-based entrepreneurialism, fragmentation
for commitment-building, planned isolation, and institutionalized ter-
mination. However, in the theory of the temporary organization and
other traditional perspectives on temporary organizations, there seems
to be a slippage between efforts made in a temporary organization and
the transfer of these efforts into a more permanent setting. In cases
where tangible products are delivered, this might not be a problem. But
in cases where the efforts of temporary organizations aim to renew
organizational work routines or organizational structures, there is a
need for an enhanced knowledge about the time span between the ter-
mination of the temporary organization and the incorporation of the
efforts made in the temporary organization into the permanent organi-
zation. The need for an enhanced knowledge originates from that fact
that it is not unusual that renewal efforts in contemporary organiza-
tions fade away, or end up as something that not was the original pur-
pose. This phenomenon is e.g. described in literature that addresses fai-
led IT projects (see Lucas, 1975; Lyytinen & Hirscheim, 1987; Holmst-
rom & Stadler, 2001). However, in the literature on temporary organi-
zations and project management there seems to be a lack of a concep-
tual framework that describes the gap between temporality and per-
manency.
One way of approaching slippage between temporality and perma-
nency can be to use concepts from Actor Network Theory (ANT).
ANT, which is generally associated with tbe works of Callon (1986,
1987), Latour (1986, 1987), and Law (1986),addresses action and the
creation of action. With a few exceptions (see Linde & Linderoth,
2002, 2000; Parkin, ~ 9 9 6 )ANT
, is not so commonly used in order to
analyze temporary organizations, or projects and project management.
But by using concepts from ANT it can be possible to bridge the gap
between temporality and permanency.
ANT has its origins in studies of science and technology. It is groun-
ded in a fairly simple observation, which social science and humanities
HENRIK C.J. LIKDEROTI-1

had ignored until the 1970s. Namely, how science actually is done -
not how it normatively is supposed to be carried out, and, the way
technological artifacts are actually designed and deployed - not how
textbooks in engineering instruct us (Monteiro, 2000). ANT is built on
the assumption that society (and organizations') is a completely inter-
woven socio-technical web that consists of a heterogeneous network of
actors, inscriptions, work practices, and institutional and organizatio-
nal arrangements (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1997:185). Furthermore,
ANT does not make an a priori distinction between the technical and
the social, while the theory was developed to analyze situations where
the separation of these elements was difficult (Callon, 1999). Thus, it
can be claimed that a temporary organization is an actor network
mobilized in order to solve a certain task. Moreover, the network con-
tains actors with different roles and relations, work practices, and insti-
tutional and organizational arrangements.
Given this background the chapter has two aims. First, Lundin and
Soderholm's (1995) theory of the temporary organization will be
discussed from an actor network perspective. Second, by that discuss-
ion, a basis will be formed to discuss how transition of efforts of the
temporary organization can be regarded, in order to bridge the gap
between tenlporality and permanency.
The further outline of the chapter is organized as follows. First, there
is a brief overview of the theory of the temporary organization. This is
followed by an introduction of some central ideas and concepts in ANT
that can be applied to temporary organizations. Next, there is a discuss-
ion of the theory of the temporary organizations and ANT. Finally,
there is a discussion about how transition of efforts made in the tem-
porary organizations can be considered by using concepts from ANT.

The theory of the temporary organization

Lundin and Soderholm (1995) consider action important in their pro-
posed framework for a theory of the temporary organization. Their
suggested framework is built around four basic concepts - time, task,
team, and transition - and four sequencing concepts - action-based
entrepreneurialism, fragmentation for commitment-building, planned

' Author's rcrnark.

 BRIDGING THE G A P BETWEEN TEMPORA1.TTY A N D PEKMANENCY

isolation, and institutionalized termination. The sequencing concepts

can be seen as alternatives t o the four basic phases of the project's life
cycle as it is described in the more normative literature (PMI, 1987:1ff).
From an action perspective, time can explain different acts in the
temporary organization such as different activities that are desirable
during the phases of the organization's life cycle. Lundin and Soder-
holm (rq95:440) claim that the temporary organization should:

"provide a highly organized way of dealing with time problems and

of acting according t o the perception of time as being scarce, linear
and valuable."

The definition of task is the raison d'dtre for the temporary organiza-
tion, and it is dependent on a limited number of defined tasks. The task
can be repetitive or a one time event. When the task is repetitive, actors
know what should be done and who should do it; however, when the
task is unique actors do not know immediately how to act (op cit:440).
When the team in temporary organizations is considered, the rela-
tionship between individuals and the team (participation in the team is
time limited) may imply that conflicting interests are accepted. Mem-
bership in the team depends upon common interest in a specific task,
force, or coincident.
The fourth basic concept is transition, which is described as follows
(op cit:442):

"An action orientation implies that something has to be transformed

or changed as a consequence of the existence of the temporary organ-
ization, and therefore, these changes are to be achieved before the
organization is terminated".

The four phases in the life cycle of a temporary organization are re-
named by Lundin and Soderholm to focus on the activities of each
phase. During action-based entrepreneurialism, the first phase, there is
an obvious need for an entrepreneur to initiate the temporary organiza-
tion. However, the skills of the entrepreneur are different depending on
whether there is a repetitive or unique task that needs to be performed.
The second step, fragmentation for commitment building, has the
following purposes (op cit:446f):
H E N R l K C.J. 1.INDEROTH

"it delimits the scope, simplifies the task, and provides a time hori-
zon to facilitate the handling of the task. O n the other hand, it works
as a mechanism for securing commitment among potential members
of the temporary organization".

In this phase, the task is spelled out and delimited, so success in some
kind of definition will be achieved.
The third step, planned isolation, is the phase where predetermined
actions, inscribed in plans, are supposed to be carried out in order to
complete the task. In this phase, it is also important to minimize distur-
bance, which can threaten the actions in the temporary organization.
The final step in the life cycle is the institutionalized termination, where
one of the essential components is bridging. Experiences gained during
the lifetime of the organization have t o be transferred to other tem-
porary or permanent settings. The suggested key to this transfer is indi-
vidual learning that would bridge the knowledge from the temporary
organization into the new settings (op cit: 449f).
The model outlined has brought valuable insights to the organizing of
temporary organizations by focusing on action. The question remains,
however, about how the transfer of results from the temporary organi-
zation can be effectively incorporated into a more permanent setting.

Building networks and translating

ideas into action
As stated in the introduction, the temporary organization can be regar-
ded as an actor network that is mobilized in order to solve a certain
task. However, according to 1,undin and Soderholm ( r 9 9 5 : 4 4 ~ )tem-
,
porary organizations can be characterized according t o whether they
address a unique or repetitive task. Processes in the organization will
come to have different characteristics with regard to the task that
should be solved. When a repetitive task is solved, the goals are imme-
diate and specified, experiences are in the organization and codified by
professions, and competencies are in codes or are tacit. When a unique
task is t o be solved, goals are visionary and abstract, there are no expe-
riences t o rely on, or it is outside the organization, and competencies
are diverse or unknown, which requires flexibility and creativity in the
organization. Thus, the actor network mobilized, will have different
 BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN T E M P O R A L I T Y AND PERMANENCY

characteristics concerning the task that would he solved. So, how can
the process of mobilizing the actor network be considered? By using the
language of ANT, the process can be viewed as a process of translation
where the interest of the different actors is translated into an interest
that is common for all of them. Translation can be understood as foll-
ows (Callon & Latour, 1981279):

" ... all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion

and violence, thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to
be conferred on itself, authority t o speak or act o n the behalf of
another actor or force. 'Our interests are the same', 'do what I want',
'you cannot succeed without going through me'. Whenever an actor
speaks of 'us', slhe is translating other actors into a single will, of
which sthe becomes spirit and spokesman. Slhe begins t o act for
several, no longer for one alone. Slhe becomes stronger. Sthe grows."

From the perspective of translation it can be assumed that the process

is more or less formalized in temporary organizations where the task is
repetitive. The formalization of the process implies that action is
restricted concerning actors' predefined roles and relations, and needed
skills and competencies are known. However, in cases where the task is
unique and goals are visionary, or not well specified, a formalization of
the whole process would be more difficult to achieve, since actors'
space for action and interpretation of goals is greater (Linde & Linde-
roth, 2000). This can be realized if different renewal projects or IT-pro-
jects aiming at changing organizational structures are taken into consi-
deration although the information in the early stages about outcomes
in these projects 1s limited (Christensen & Kreiner, 1991; Ciborra,
1996). Regardless of whether the temporary organization solves a repe-
titive or unique task, the question remains: what will happen if the
actor network is mobilized? The mobilization or the formation of the
temporary organization can be described by Latour's alternative per-
spective on diffusion of innovations (Latour, 1986:267):

"the spread in time and space of anything - claims, orders, artifacts,

goods - is in the hands of people; each of these people may act in
many different ways, letting the token drop, or modifying it, or
deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding t o it, or appropriating it".
HENRIK (:.I. I INDFROTH

During this process, it can be assumed that actors in the temporary

organization just adopt the idea and appropriate it according to their
earlier experiences from similar contexts if the task is repetitive. O n the
other hand, if the task is unique actors may modify or transform the
ideas into something that was unintended (Hanseth & Braa, 1998), or
they can neglect it, or they can build a competing network in order t o
avoid intended changes (Dolin, 1999; Linde & Linderoth, 2002). Thus,
irrespective of whether the temporary organization should solve a uni-
que or repetitive task, how can the project process be understood from
an ANT-perspective, if a deeper knowledge were gained about diffe-
rences in actors' space for action in the temporary organization?
The process of translation can be seen as a travel of ideas through
time and space where the ideas on such a journey are materialized into
objects or action (Czamiawska & Jorges, 1996). However, it is impor-
tant t o stress that it makes little sense to speak about translation in
general. A medium has t o be defined into which the translation can be
inscribed such as public discussions, texts, technical objects, embodied
skills, currencies, etc. (Callon, 1qq1:143). Furthermore, it is also
obvious that the temporary organization can be a medium where ideas
can be inscribed. Inscription refers to desired programs of action or
patterns of use that someone inscribes into a medium such as a techni-
cal artifact (Akrich, 1992:205):

"Designers thus define actors with specific tastes, competencies,

motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, and they
assume that morality, technology, science, and economy will evolve
in particular ways. A large part of the work of innovators is that of
"inscribing" this vision of (or prediction about) the world in the
technical content of the new object. The technical realization of the
innovator's beliefs about the relationship between an object and its
surrounding actors is thus an attempt t o predetermine the settings
that users are asked t o imagine."

Inscriptions can further be strong or weak with regard t o whether an

inscribed program of action has to be followed or not (Latour, ~ q q ~ ) ,
or flexible or inflexible with respect to what the inscriber has delegated
to the actors respective to the artifact. However, the strength or flexi-
bility of an inscription is not given per se. Latour (1991) describes how
an inscription can be strengthened and uses as an example o f this cour-
 B R I D G I N G T H E GAP BETWEEN T E M P O R A L I T Y A N D P E R M A N E N C Y

se of action a managing director of a hotel who wants guests to follow

a desired program of action. Hotel guests should bring back room keys
instead of following an anti-program, which is keeping room keys in
their pockets. First, the director inscribes the wish into a sign at the
reception desk, but the inscription is too weak and the actors do not
perform the desired act. After a series of translations, the director's
wish is finally inscribed illto a metal knob attached to the key. In this
way the inscription is made strong enough to encourage the guests to
follow the desired program of action (bring back the keys), instead of
the anti-program (keeping the keys in their pockets).
Another mode of strengthening an inscription is to link or align it to
large and complex actor networks in the surrounding context. For
example, inscriptions having an impact on actors' roles and relations
and how processes would be organized in a temporary organization
can be regarded as strong while they are linked to large and complex
actor networks such as PMI (Project Management Institute) and IPMA
(International Project Management Association). To regard PMI and
IPMA as actor networks is rather logical if Callon's (1q87:qj) descrip-
tion of an actor network is taken into consideration:

"...the actor-network is reducible neither to an actor nor a network.

Like networks it is composed of a series of heterogeneous elements,
animate and inanimate, that have been linked to one another for a
certain period of time".

PMI and IPMA have had a powerful influence on how action would be
carried out in a temporary organization by defining how projects are
organized and how roles of the actors are defined. These organizations'
views on how to organize temporary organizations are further mani-
fested through conferences about project management, literature
published on the topic, and certification of project managers. Taken
together these manifests of heterogeneous animate and inanimate ele-
ments are than an expression for a powerful actor network.

The process of translation

According to the ideas of translation, a project can be seen as an idea
of something that is translated and inscribed into a temporary organi-
HENRIK C.1. L I N D E R 0 T I - I

zation, and depending on whether a repetitive or unique task is mana-

ged in the temporary organization, inscriptions will have varying
strength and flexibility. The temporary organization can be seen as a
result of attention directed at an idea. However, a forum has to be cre-
ated for the continuing travel and materialization of the idea. This
forum can be expressed in terms of an actor network where the idea is
translated over time and space. In this process of translation, four
moments can be identified (Callon, 1986:zo3ff): problematisation,
interessement, enrolment, and mobilization of allies.
At the moment of problematisation, or how to become indispensa-
ble, an issue is defined as a problem by a group of actors. To solve this
problem, it is necessary both to identify which actors are indispensable
and their roles and relations in the problem-solving network. However,
actors can have different goals with their participation in the network.
Thus, it is crucial to find a question whose answer is of common
interest for the participating actors despite their different goals. This
question is called an obligatory passage point, which means that the
actors have to recognize that the answer to the question can benefit
each of them (Callon, 1986:zojff).
When a problem is defined and participating actors and their tenta-
tive roles are identified, the next step in the proccss is to stabilize the
network. Callon (~986:zo7f) describes the second moment, interesse-
ment, or how allies are locked into place:

"the group of actions in which an entity attempts to impose and sta-

bilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its proble-
matization".

It is important to stress that the actors' formulation of goals and iden-

tities do not appear in an independent manner, they are instead
adjusted and formed during action. This can also be realized if we con-
sider that an individual organization can be seen as part of a wider
system in society (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). At the moment of interes-
sement, Callon argues, it is important to weaken the actor's links with
other entities as these might negatively influence the identity of partici-
pating actors (Callon, 1986:108):

"To interest other actors is to build devices which can be placed

between them and all other entities who want to define their identi-
 BRIDGING T H E C A P BETWEEN TEMPORALITY AND PERMAXENCY

ties otherwise. A interests B by cutting or weakening all the links

between B and the invisible (or at times quite visible) group of other
entities C, D, E etc. who want to link themselves to B." .

If the intressement is successful, it will lead to the third moment, enrol-

ment, or how to define and co-ordinate roles. In the first moment of
translation, problematisation, the importance was stated to find a
question (the obligatory passage point) whose answer would be bene-
ficial for the participating actors despite their goals. At the enrolment
stage, this question has to be transformed into a series of statements
that are more certain. Callon (1986:211) describes enrolment as the
"multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany
the interessement and enable them to succeed" and a set of interrelated
roles are defined and attributed to the actors who accept them. How-
ever, a crucial problem in network building is how to enroll and control
others. Latour (1987:108ff) suggests some strategies to enroll others:
let them follow your interests on the way to their goals; suggest a short
detour when their pathways are cut off; reshuffle goals and interests by
inventing new goals or groups or becoming indispensable to others. If
the tactics to enroll others succeed, a black box will slowly be built and
actors are kept in line (McMaster et al., 1997). A black box can be
described as a situation where many elements are brought together and
act as one (Latour, 1987:131), or where things put in the black box no
longer have to be testified (Callon & Latour, 1981).
In the fourth stage, mobilization of allies, the question is raised wheth-
er the spokespersons for the actors are representative. Are they autho-
rized to speak legitimately for the rest of the actors? A critical point here
is to "silence" actors in whose name the spokespersons speak. If there is
a lack of authorization or if other actors are not silenced, the network
can be contested at any time. However, if the process of translation has
succeeded, a constraining network of relationships has been built, and
the room to maneuver has been limited for the entities concerned (Call-
on, 1986:214ff). This network of constraining relationships is also an
expression of the black box. However, at first glance it seems to be a pro-
blem if the process of translation were compared with the theory of the
temporary organization. In the temporary organization, termination is of
an axiomatic nature, and the actor network represents a state that would
be stable for at least awhile. Nevertheless, this contradiction might be
possible to solve, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
H E N R l K C . J . 1.INDEROTH

Using this brief description of some basic concepts in ANT and in

the translation process, the temporary organization can be seen as an
actor network, and the project process can be viewed as a translation
process. However, is it possible that ANT can contribute to the know-
ledge about temporary organization more than in an elementary mann-
er? It can be claimed that ANT has the biggest potential to contribute
to the knowledge about temporary organizations concerning those that
manage unique tasks such as different renewal efforts where the goals
are visionary and abstract. By analyzing these cases from an ANT per-
spective it will be possible to uncover in depth how different groups of
actors might translate project goals into their interests in order to
strengthen their power in different senses. A further strength of ANT,
which will not be elaborated on here, is that the theory is suitable for
analyzing IT-projects by using the concept of inscription (Dolin, 1999;
Hanseth & Monteiro, 1997; Holmstrom & Stadler, 2001; Linde &
Linderoth, 2002).

The theory of the temporary organization

meets actor network theory
If the theory of the temporary organization (TO) is compared with the
process of translation, striking parallels can be seen according to pha-
ses and the content in the phases; however, even if the models are not
blueprints. Over all, the T O can be seen as an actor network that has
a limited life span. At first glance, the theory of the T O and ANT might
appear incompatible because one end of the T O is termination and one
end of the actor network is a stable state, at least for some period.
However, this problem can be solved using the concept of black box
from ANT.
In the first phase, action-based entrcpreneurialism/problematisation,
the temporary organization, or the mobilized actor networks are regar-
ded as solutions to some problem. In temporary organizations that
manage repetitive tasks this form of organizing and roles of participa-
ting actors can be seen as institutionalized (an existing black box) and
role definitions and programs of action inscribed in project plans are
linked to powerful networks such as PMI and IPMA. Challenging these
networks and encouraging other modes of organizing projects and new
roles in projects implies that networks more powerful than PMI and
 B R I D G I N G THE G A P BETWEEN T E M P O R A L I T Y A N D PERMANENCY

IPMA need to be developed. In the T O that solves a unique task, actors

cannot rely on black box or institutionalized modes of organizing.
Instead, the organization must first gain legitimacy. Lundin and Siider-
holm (1995:446) claim that many renewal projects are launched because
of efficiency and effectiveness problems that need to be developed and
managed under time constraints. From an ANT-perspective, these re-
newal projects can be regarded as obligatory passage points. Actors
who are arguing for the need for the temporary organization translate
it to the only means for the organization to be e.g. more effective,
improve product quality or customer services.
In the second and third phase, fragmentation for commitment buil-
ding and planned isolation, respectively intressement and enrolment,
the T O or the actor network is developed by co-ordinating and defi-
ning the roles of the actors. TOs that manage repetitive tasks carried
out by actors are probabl y not questioned because of the black-boxed
role definitions. This can be realized if a construction project, for
example, is taken into consideration. In this project, the roles and rela-
tions of professional categories are institutionalized, and relations with
subcontractors and buyers are regulated through written agreements. If
there are disagreements about outcomes of the project, there are regu-
lations about how to solve such problems. However, in a T O where the
task is unique, actors cannot rely on earlier experiences that are more
or less black boxed. Roles are instead negotiated during the project
process and the outcome of the process depends on the degree proofs
can be delivered in accordance with claims made at the obligatory pass-
age point. For example, if the goal of the T O is to improve quality of
products, proofs are to be delivered how actions taken in the T O can
improve the quality of products, if the efforts of the T O were success-
ful in some sense. A further problem to be aware of when a task is uni-
que is that goals are abstract and visionary, which implies that groups
of actors in the T O and in the surrounding context can make their own
translations of the goals. These translations do not have to be in accor-
dance with management's intent. In the worse case, from the view of
the TO, competing translations can be promoted by powerful actors
who are building their own competing networks that can threaten the
existence of the T O (Linde & Linderoth, 2002; Dolin, 1999).
H E N R I K C.J. 1.INDT.ROTH

Black boxes us bridges between temporality

and permanency
At the first glance, the most problematic issue when the theory of the
temporary organization and the process of translation are compared is
the last steps, termination and mobilization of the allies. The mobiliza-
tion can be seen to occur when the actors in the network are perfor-
ming desirable acts, and possibilities to perform other acts are limited.
The obvious problem in the comparison is that the actor network has
an indefinite duration even if it can be re-defined, but the TO has a
definite termination point. However, the concept of transition, which is
closely connected with the termination of the TO, may indicate how
the tension between the last steps in both models can be solved. Lundin
and Soderholm claim that something has to be transformed or changed
before the termination of the TO. Thus, transition implies that some-
thing has to be delivered such as a developed product, a building, or
changed work routines. By using ANT terminology, the transition is
about the delivery of a black box or something that no longer has to
be taken into consideration. The black box that is delivered can then
be seen as a representation of a mobilized actor network. For example
does the actor network not have to be mobilized continually when a
developed product is used. Instead, the actor network is literally inscri-
bed into the black box represented by material artifacts, written texts,
or changed work routines. However, the black boxes can leak depen-
ding on the medium into which the actor network is inscribed. This
means that the persistence of the "result" transferred from the TO
depends on what is transferred. Moreover, the persistence of the
"result" transferred from the TO depends on assumptions made in the
TO about the context into which the "result" would be transferred.
By using the concept of black box in order to illustrate what happens
in the process of transition, it might be possible to enrich the theory of
the TO and bridge the gap between temporality and permanency.
However, by using the concept of black box, more than just theories
about temporary organizing can be enriched. This concept can also
shed some light on empirical problems of transfer efforts from a TO to
a permanent setting.
The following two examples - new car model development and the
implementation of a video conferencing system in a health care setting
- illustrate how the concept of black box can be used in order to build
 BRIDGING THE G A P B E T W E E N TEMPORALITY A N D P E R M A N E N C Y

a bridge between the termination of the TO and the post-project stage.

In the first example, new car model development, designers have tried
to close the black box rather carefully by delegating certain tasks to the
users, the technological artifacts, and skilled repair-people. This dele-
gation is done when actors in the TO inscribe their assumptions about
the context for use and the potential user into material artifacts and
written text. Tasks delegated to the user are driving the car in an appro-
priate way, filling up with petrol, and maybe some simple maintenan-
ce. However, the designer cannot wholly govern the acts of the car user.
There are no guarantees that speed limits are followed or that the car
is driven according to manufacturer's recommendations. However,
designers can direct the user how to chose the right type of petrol by
designing the diameter of the petrol tank hole to only fit the correct
petrol pump. A prerequisite for this inscription to be strong enough
and influence the actors to act in a desirable manner is that the inscrip-
tion is aligned with the surrounding network: the petrol stations and
the petrol pumps. Thus, in this case it is not only to close the black box
by designing a certain diameter of the petrol tank hole if the user acts
in a desirable mode. Instead, it is the strength of the inscriptions that
directs the actor to act as intended and not to consider alternative
actions, is dependent on whether thc inscription is aligned with the sur-
rounding actor networks.
In the case of the video conferencing system in a health care setting,
technology designers have delegated a relatively large degree of tasks to
the TO and the potential users, while the technology is a so-called
general purpose technology. T h s implies that the technology can be
used for the transfer of live or frozen pictures in real time, and the ques-
tion of when and how the technology would be used is delegated to the
TO and the future users. The task for the TO will then be to develop
appropriate fields of applications and try to discover how and if organ-
izational work routines are to be changed if technology use is to be
integrated into daily work routines. However, while the technology is
open to its character it will not be possible for actors in the TO to fore-
see all fields of application and organizational consequences of techno-
logy usage. First, there can be a slight or significant shift in role and
function in concrete situations of technology usage compared to the
planned, pre-defined, and assigned objectives and requirements irre-
spective of who plans or defines them (Ciborra, 1996). Second, it will
also be difficult for technology designers and managers to predict how
H E N R I K C.J. L I N D E R O T H

a complex technology will be used. The openness implies that organi-

zational members will learn more about the technology's features and
its fields of application over time (Rosenberg, 1982).Thus, the pro-
blems connected with the transition of efforts from the T O will be both
to seal the black box and keep it open, which means that the potential
users should use the technology, but they also have to further develop
appropriate fields of application. In cases where appropriate fields of
application are identified and organizational routines are adapted, the
black boxes are sealed if new tasks are routinised. However, at the
same time the black box does not have to be sealed if there are to be
further developments of technology usage. Nevertheless, the black box
can be sealed even if there are no strong inscriptions that impose the
actors to use the technology. But, what then happens is that no one
takes into consideration whether the technology is used or not while
the black box is sealed, and non use has become the only alternative.
Although the last example mirrors a special kind of TO, it highlights
problems that are common in all TOs where organizational change
processes are managed: we might not know how far the process has
reached when the TO is terminated. The next section describes how the
change processes can be considered.

"Perpetual" creation of black boxes

The discussion regarding temporary organizations shows that in some
kinds of projects the project process has to be continued even after the
formal termination of the temporary organization. However, for what
kinds of projects is this statement valid? Probably there has to be a uni-
que task, and the project would aim at making changes in the organi-
zation. These projects can be characterized as "fuzzy projects" (Linde
& Linderoth, 2000).This means that project-goals cannot be specified
on a detailed level in the planning stage of the project. Instead, goals
and sub-goals are developed in interaction between actors in the pro-
ject as well as in the project context during the project implementation.
Fuzzy projects aim at changes in work procedures and structures in
organizations, which implies that a large number of people are affected
and on whose co-operation the projects depend. A further characteris-
tic of these projects is the vague project organization with few people
engaged full-time or even part-time during the project life cycle. Never-
 RRIDGTNG TlTE GAP BPTWRCN T E M P O R A L I T Y AND PERMANENCY

theless, how can the project process for "fuzzy projects" be regarded if
the concept of black boxes is used in order to illustrate the transition
of efforts made in the T O into a more permanent setting?
Linderoth (2000) has implicitly argued that a project process where
open, or general-purpose technologies are introduced into an organi-
zation in order t o trigger change, cannot be discussed in general becau-
se it is not known how technology use will develop. Instead, there is a
need to view the process as a development of different fields of appli-
cation. This perspective originates from Gutek et al. (1984:234) who
claim that advanced IT consists of "a set of loosely bounded capabili-
ties that can be implemented in different ways". However, the diffe-
rence between Linderoth's and Gutek et al.'s perspective is that a
discussion about fields of application is more precise since it is known
what would be implemented, which is a result of the learning process
during the interaction between the technology and the user. Nevertheless,
the account for an ongoing learning process is not clear-cut. A study of
advanced manufacturing technology shows that there are windows of
opportunities for learning and technology adaptation (Tyre 81 Orli-
kowski, 1994). However, it is also claimed that usage of new IT-applica-
tions triggers changes in small invisible steps and after a while can lead
to a total transformation of work routines (Orliokowski, ~ 9 9 6 ) .
Thus, how can this discussion about the development of fields of
application be connected t o the discussion about black boxes as a
means for transition of TO'S efforts? As stated earlier, a black box does
not have to be sealed if a development of technology usage proceeds.
But against the background of the development of field of application
it may be more appropriate t o discuss this in terms of several black
boxes instead of one black box. The routinised use of a field of appli-
cation can be considered as the sealing of one small black box, which
implies that if a renewal effort is to be successful a number of black
boxes are t o be transferred and merged together and develop into a lar-
ger one.
The proposed project process of fuzzy projects gives new insights
into the process compared to models that consider the process as more
or less a straightforward process. Models proposing a straightforward
project process might be correct for less open technologies or when
tasks are clearly defined. However, in cases of open technologies, or
unique tasks, a process of learning has t o occur if fields of application
are to be developed and used.
H E N K I K C.J. L I N D E R O T H

Concluding remarks
The discussion in this chapter about actor network theory and the the-
ory of the temporary organization has showed that ANT can be used
to enhance the understanding of temporary organizations. The main
contribution of ANT to the theory of the temporary organization has
been to broaden the view of the transition concept by using the concept
of black boxes and fuzzy projects. Nevertheless, in this chapter a first
attempt has been made to combine ANT and the theory of the tem-
porary organization. Nevertheless, there is much room for studies to
combine ANT and the theory of the temporary organization. Further-
more, it has only been discussed how ANT can contribute to the theo-
ry of the temporary organization, but future research should examine
how the theory of the temporary organization can contribute to ANT.
Further studies in this area could be the ever-present issue of how to
preserve learning and knowledge after the termination of a project.
This topic could contribute to both the understanding of the tempora-
ry organization and to ANT with respect to the field of organizational
learning.
 The attractiveness of projects:
Controllability and adventure
The attractiveness of projects, claims Sahlin (1996), lies in their associ-
ation with both controllability and unpredictability. They are associa-
ted with something planned, rational and ordered, and at the same time
with flexibility, change and adventure. This double identity make pro-
jects attractive, but it may also present a dilemma t o project-managers.
This dilemma is more or less present in all organizing processes, where
one has t o strike a balance between freedom and control, but it takes
on a particular character when it comes to projects, because of their
delimited and temporal character. Of course, some projects are more
controllable while others are closer t o adventure, but it is common for
projects to give rise t o expectations of both.
Both aspects - controllability and unpredictability - follow from the
possibility of delimiting a project. One way of controlling a complex
situation is t o divide it into smaller pieces, or projects, each of which
appears controllable. By organizing an operation as a series of projects
centered on individual tasks of limited time spans and involving speci-
fic people with specifically allocated resources, control appears achie-
vable. So, creating a project through delimiting a specific time, task,
KERSTIN SAHLlN-ANDERSSON

and team (cf. Lundin and Soderholm, 1995) may be motivated by a

wish to enhance controllability. Projects may also be motivated by a
desirc to break with earlier habits in order to experiment, to allow for
flexibility, or to promote innovation and change (cf. Christensen and
Kreiner, 199 I ) .
As the delimitation of a project goes to the very heart of what a pro-
ject is, the setting of these delimitations is a strategic aspect of project
management. An oft expressed ideal is that projects should be clearly
demarcated and defined. First, projects need to be delimited tempo-
rally: they are supposed to have a specified starting date and a dead-
line or concluding date. The very idea of projects is that they - unlike
many organizations - should avoid the development of an interest in
the survival of the setting as such among the stakeholders. Moreover,
setting time limits helps focus attention and commitment (Lundin and
Soderholm, 199s). Second, a project is ideally formed around a speci-
fic task with a specified objective. Such delimitation of the project's
task is often combined with organizational and financial specifications.
Certain people are engaged for a project. In terms of accounting, a pro-
ject usually comprises a profit or result center, so that costs and reve-
nues from the project are specified. And third, projects are often insti-
tutionally demarcated. The idea behind many projects is to set aside
certain rules, routines, and norms as to how work is to he pursued, and
instead apply customized rules, policies and norms, in order to increa-
se controllability, adaptability, flexibility, and innovation as the project
unfolds.
But, of course, as is true of all organizing processes, a project is open
both to influences from its context and to influencing its context. Both
the project management literature and many critical studies of projects
point out the problems connected with ineffective, nonexistent, or too
flexible boundaries. Stories abound of how projects do not wind up,
but instead are delayed or even drift into becoming more or less per-
manent activities. Another problem, often commented upon, is the risk
of losing project specificity. Projects can be unduly influenced by and
gradually meld into the everyday operations of an organization, with a
resulting loss of focus on the task at hand. Overly porous institutional
boundaries mean that the project comes to bear the stamp of prior
habits and routines, which may result in a loss of innovative capacity
and flexibility.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to find examples of how pro-
 PROJECT M A N A G E M E N T AS B O U N D A R Y WORK

jects tend to become too isolated from their contexts, which may result
in unrealistic, inappropriate, or even disastrous results (Hall, 1980;
Sahlin-Andersson, 1986). Rigid boundaries may result in a project that
is so isolated from its context that project members develop unrealistic
expectations and plans that they then fail to realize (note the parallel to
"group think" as analyzed by Janis, 1972). Hermetically sealed boun-
daries can also prevent learning from being transferred from one pro-
ject to another. This may cause problems, especially in project-based
companies where there is a concern that experience gained in one pro-
ject should be applied in others in the future. Projects should thus not
be too isolated or delimited from each other. Project entrepreneurs and
project managers' have to strike a balance between delimiting and conn-
ecting the task, the time and the institutions of the project.
How then are such boundaries to be established and of what do they
consist? Just as with organizational boundaries (Scott 1998, chapter 8;
Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, zooo), project boundaries d o not
appear automaticall y as the project is formed, and are not set in stone
once and for all. Instead, they are socially formed, and boundaries have
to be continuously defined, sustained, or changed. This is why I suggest
that boundary setting, revision, and maintenance are such important
aspects that they deserve to be defined and analyzed as distinct aspects
of project management. In this chapter I will present a framework for
analyzing such project boundary work, and my discussion will point to
the considerations and dilemmas that project entrepreneurs face as they
pursue such boundary work.
I have borrowed the tern1 "boundary work" from Gieryn (1999). He
analyzed "how boundaries of science are episodically established,
sustained, enlarged, policed, breached, and sometimes erased in defen-
se, pursuit, or denial of epistemic authority" (p. xi). The boundary
work of science is primarily concerned with legitimacy and jurisdiction,
as it aims at distinguishing what is scientific from that which is not.
Seen in this light, the boundary work of science may seem to have litt-
le to do with that of project management. But just as the boundary
work of science is a discursive endeavor which aims to draw a rhetori-
cal boundary distinguishing outsiders from insiders, and where the acti-

When writing abour project entrepreneurs rather than only project managers, I would like to
emphasize that project boundar y work is not only, or even mainly pursued by appointed projcct
managers. As the examples below show, such boundary work is a more dispersed task encom-
passing a broad group of proponents, stakeholders and managers ot projects.
KEKS'I'IN S A H I . I N - A N D E R S S O N

vities, resources, norms, and regulations applying inside the boundary are
distinguished from those outside, so is the boundary work of project
management rhetorically drawn. Even though the boundary work that
Gieryn analyzes comes from a very different field and was done partly for
different purposes, his work suggests a way to specify both what boun-
daries are and how they are set. This motivates a brief account below of
boundary work as the concept has been defined and used by Gieryn.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, the concept of
boundary work is elaborated on and applied to projects. Second, three
types of boundaries - temporal, task, and institutional - are defined
and exemplified. Examples typifying boundary work are taken from a
series of case studies of large projects. These cases concern three major
projects that have been pursued by Swedish cities and counties: a sports
arena (Sahlin-Andersson, 1989); a research park (Sahlin-Andersson
and Soderholm, 1987; Sahlin-Andersson, 1990);and a theater (Lundin,
1980; Sahlin-Andersson, 1986). Using these examples, I will illustrate
how project entrepreneurs pursue boundary work, what dilemmas they
face as they seek to strike a balance between demarcation from and
connection with the context, and how this boundary work is related to
project entrepreneurs' seeking to attain controllability and/or "adven-
ture." The projects were all defined and perceived as major, even extra-
ordinary projects, and the studies of them partly focused on the mea-
ning of the definition of the projects as "extraordinary." I will expand
upon this central aspect of boundary work: the identification of the
project as it is defined and presented throughout the process.

Boundary work
Gieryn (1999) defined boundary work as "the discursive attribution of
selected qualities to scientists, scientific methods, and scientific claims
for the purpose of drawing theoretical boundaries between science and
some less authoritative residual non-science" (p. 5 ) . A cultural space in
which scientists can act and interact is delineated by the way in which
science is presented and represented. Boundaries define insiders and
outsiders, and separate scientific activities from other activities. These
boundaries are constantly being drawn and redrawn. And the bounda-
ries differ depending on who draws the boundaries, and against whom
and what. Hence, boundary work is an ongoing interpretive activity.
 PROJECT MANAGEMENT A S B O U N D A R Y W O R K

Project boundary work partly resembles scientific boundary work.

The boundaries around a project define certain activities, outcomes,
people, and costs as part of the project while others are excluded.
Boundaries define whose work and input is relevant for the project,
who is responsible, and what rules, norms, and habits apply. So project
boundary work is an ongoing interpretive and rhetorical activity. This
way of describing project boundaries differs from how the delimitation
of projects is usually described in the project management literature. In
much of this literature the identity of the project - what task it is to
handle, its temporal limitations, what rules and norms apply - is usu-
ally treated as a given. In the same way are definitions of projects as
major or minor, ordinary or extraordinary, as unique or representative
of a series of projects often treated as given. However, several studies
have shown that there are no "given" or inherent properties of any task
or issue; instead they are classified as big or small, important or trivi-
al, ordinary or extraordinary (e.g. Edelman, 1988; Hilgartner and
Bosk, 1988; Sahlin-Andersson, 1986, 1989).

Temporal, task, and institutional

boundary work
Three kinds of project boundaries were mentioned above: temporal,
task, and institutional boundaries. I argue that these delimitations indi-
cate what the project is and how it relates to its context. What, then,
constitutes such boundaries and how are they set?

Temporal boundary work

Temporal forms of control are vital in all kinds of organizational sett-
ings. Rhythms, sequences, time horizons, timing and temporal per-
spectives can largely explain many aspects, including relations among
various groups in organizations, the allocation of attention, and modes
of organization (Whipp et al., 2002). The setting of deadlines serves to
focus attention and mobilize action (Cohen et al., 1972). Although
plans may not always drive certain activities, they often serve as refe-
rence points when evaluating and accounting for particular activities
and their outcomes. Such temporal forms of control are also salient in
KERSTIN S A H L I N- A N D E R S S O N

projects, but are even more important: the very definition of a project,
in general as well as in particular contexts, is a temporal one. Projects
have been analyzed as temporary organizations (L,undin and Soder-
holm, rqqs), and the starting and ending time is what demarks a project.
Many projects are initiated in response to or in anticipation of major
events -just think of the many projects that were started in connection
to the millennium change. Major buildings are planned to celebrate
anniversaries of cities or companies, or to support Olympic games,
world championships, or other major public events. Such events moti-
vate projects and supply both a starting date and a deadline for the pro-
ject. They also tend to define the very meaning of or definition of the
project. Hence, when a project is motivated by or connected to an
event, the project is placed in a certain context and is delimited in cer-
tain ways relative to this context.
A recent, well-known public Swedish project is the construction of
what has become known as the "Stockholm Globe Arena". This pro-
ject provides an interesting example of temporal boundary work. This
arena was opened for the world ice hockey championship in 1989, and
has since been used for sports, entertainment, and other public events.
The arena takes the form of a spherical building with a roof height of
8 5 meters and a diameter of I 10meters. The building of this arena was
the result of a long process, including a project competition arranged
by the city of Stockholm. The project did not comprise just an arena,
but a whole block including a hotel, offices, and a shopping center.
The planning of this arena had, as is true of many major projects, a
long history. For many years the politicians saw it as a drawback that
Stockholm did not have an arena big enough to house the world hockey
championship, large concerts, or other major events. Municipal govern-
ment, however, found it impossible to build a new arena at public
expense. Two circumstances made it possible to start planning the
arena. In the early 1980s another public project was made possible
because a new financial model for financing the project was designed:
private companies were given the opportunity to build commercial
buildings on publicly-owned land in return for reconstructing the pub-
lic railway station. It was thought that a similar financial solution
could facilitate the construction of the sports arena, and project plann-
ing began. Moreover, there was a good chance that Stockholm would
be given the opportunity to host the world ice hockey championship
once they had an arena big enough - possibly in 1987.
 PROJECT MAKACEMENT AS BOUNDARY WORK

A project group of public officials was appointed, and in July 1984

the municipal government invited some 30 major Stockholm area com-
panies to enter a project competition concerning the design and finan-
cing of a sports arena and commercial buildings. Companies that wan-
ted to take part in the competition had to form groups combining
financing, real estate, construction, architectural, and other necessary
competencies. Interest seemed quite limited though, partly due to the
many uncertainties connected with the project. Not only was the finan-
cial model largely untested and the economic calculations uncertain; in
addition, municipal politicians had yet to specify the budget for the
project. Budgetary discussions also delayed the project somewhat, and
it became clear that ~ 9 8 was7 now an unrealistic deadline. However,
the linkage of the project t o the world hockey championship was kept
in place, since it was still possible to aim for the 1989 games. The tem-
poral boundary of the project was redrawn, but remained fixed in its
new position and continued to have important implications for how
the project was identified and how it proceeded.
This deadline focused attention, and exerted a certain time pressure
on the project. The somewhat ambiguous nature of the plans, directi-
ves, and proposed alternatives were accepted because of the time press-
ure. The argument was widely accepted that time was too short to cla-
rify everything that many people would have liked to clear up. I have
often encountered that leading actors in projects and other decision-
making processes refer to time pressure as a way of reducing interac-
tion with other stakeholders (Sahlin-Andersson 1986, 1990). They
claim that if the project is to meet the deadline there is no time for
excessive debate and questioning, or to inform all stakeholders. Such
references to time pressure were also found in the Globe project. Thus,
the connection of the project to a specific event helped drive it to its
completion. And the fact that the project group members and the pro-
ject entrepreneurs could refer to a deadline over which they appeared
to have no control, made the deadline an even stronger driving force.
Towards the end of the decision-making process, the time pressure
became even more pressing. If Stockholm was to be picked as the hos-
ting city for the world ice hockey championship, the design of the arena
in which the games were to be played had to be presented to the inter-
national hockey association by a certain date. This meant that the city
could waste no time choosing from among the alternatives presented in
competition. So finalizing the choice had to be rapid, and the city had
KERSTIN SAHLIN- ANDERSSON

little time to negotiate or ask for clarifications or revisions from the

competing consortia. The city had to relinquish some control of project
content in order to meet the deadline arising from the project's too-
close connection with a specific event.
The connection of the project to the world ice hockey championship
not only provided a deadline for the project, but also placed it in a par-
ticular context and defined its main task. Although Stockholm's lack of
a large arena for sports, pop concerts, and other public events in gene-
ral had long been regarded as a problem, with the particular timing of
the project, the task of building the arena for the world hockey cham-
pionship was emphasized. This meant that primarily people interested
in hockey were being mobilized, while other aspects of the project were
not as publicly debated. This case exemplifies how the temporal demar-
cation of a project is intertwined with how the task of the project is
demarcated.

Task boundary work

A project is usually formed to handle a particular task, such as the con-
struction of a building, the development of a product, the selling and
installation of a machine, or the restructuring of an organization. The
limitation of such a task demands continuous boundary work. We can
illustrate this with examples drawn from a major project, the building
of a theatre in UmeH. This theatre was built in the mid-1980s as a com-
bined theatre, convention hall, opera house, and community center.
This project had a long history, which entailed complex and active task
boundary work.
After the old theatre building in UmeH was destroyed by fire in 1913,
planning for a replacement immediately started. At the time, the task
of the project was defined in relation to the building to be replaced.
However, due to the war, the rebuilding of the theatre was postponed.
By the time the project was later resurrected, conditions had changed.
The estimated cost of the building had increased and new expectations
had been placed on it. Discussion on how to replace the old theatre
continued in the ~ y ~ o buts , now the task of building a theatre was
combined with the task of building a culture center. A committee work-
ed o n this project and considered various alternative locations, but
plans were not realized. Many other urgent projects called for attention
 PROJECT M A N A G E M E N T A S B O U N D A R Y WORK

and resources, and it seemed difficult t o garner sufficient support for

such a costly project as a combined theatre and culture center. Instead
plans were resented for building something temporary and less costly.
The temporal and task boundaries of the project, in other words, were
redrawn in order to gather support for its realization. However, this
building project was not realized either, as it did not fit with other city
plans.
Umed was a growing city and needed a new city hall. These needs -
for a new theatre, culture center, and city hall - were combined and a
new project committee a pp ointed in r q 5 q had the task of reconciling
these needs. The boundary work involved in combining various tasks
and thus broadening the project was thought of as a way t o expand
support for the project. Such a strategy, however, led t o a dramatic in-
crease in the estimated costs and also meant compromises had to be
made in order t o combine the various functions. The project seemed to
have been overloaded by the combination of tasks, and it was again
postponed as it was considered t o be too costly.
The boundary work of oscillating between shrinking and broadening
the task of the project continued, but without success. Provisional
arrangements were proposed but then turned down. New broad and
combined suggestions were proposed and turned down as well. Even
though the many suggestions never came t o realization they kept the
project alive, so that it could easily be regenerated.
One explanation for the continued failure t o complete the project
was task overload. Another was that broadening the project task was
combined with an emphasis on project boundaries. The group that was
assigned t o the project was quite committed to the idea of accompli-
shing something extraordinary. The project was defined and viewed as
extraordinary, and it was clear that project group members and the
many architects and planners engaged over the years spared no efforts
to live up to the high expectations. For many this was the largest pro-
ject they had been involved in, and they wanted it t o be something spe-
cial and unique. Thus, each time the project was resurrected it soon
grew and became much more expensive. When plans were then sub-
mitted t o the city council, to be voted on by people who were not that
involved or committed, they were rejected because of high costs.
In the mid-1970s a new combined project was suggested, this time
involving a theatre, a home for a recently established opera company,
and a community center. Again plans were submitted to city council for
KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSOh

approval, and once again it turned out that the project had been over-
loaded with tasks and expectations and had become too expensive.
This brief account illustrates a case where boundaries were partly
quite firmly drawn, with a clear demarcation between thc project and
its context. The appointed project group drew boundaries around the
task by referring to its long history, the implication being that such a
long history virtually demanded something "extra." The idea became
ingrained with repetition that UmeH would have no use for a smaller
theater: either a big and unique one or nothing at all. In part these same
boundaries did not detach the project from its context, as additional
tasks were repeatedly incorporated into the project. At the same time it
was clear that temporal boundaries were being redrawn, as the project
was presented anew each time it was restarted after rejection by the
municipal council. Temporal boundaries relative to the history of the
project were partly drawn. However, there were no temporal bounda-
ries for the completion of the project; it was not connected to any spe-
cific event and did not have to meet a fixed deadline.
What finally led to the building of a new theatre in Umed was the
revised boundary work of the project entrepreneurs. Instead of either
over-loading the project or proposing temporary solutions, the project
was divided in two. Temporary production premises for the opera com-
pany were built separately, and in this way the theatrelcommunity cen-
ter project was scaled down2. The location of the new theatre had been
established in the 1970s. Now, since opera production facilities were
eliminated from the planned building (the opera would still use the new
theater for performances), there would be space for a library - another
long planned-for establishment. However, the library was organized
and treated as a separate project, and had already been approved by
the time revised plans for the scaled-down theatrelcommunity center
project were finally being approved by the city council in the early
19sos.
As the task of the theatre project was redefined, the contextual rela-
tions of the project changed. It can work the other way too: task boun-
daries may be formed as the context of the project is defined and rede-
fined. Observations from a study of the establishment of a regional

This, however, also meant rhat the project was not completely removed from the local govern-
ment agenda. In the year zooo the building began on new premises for the opera. The new pre-
mises invcluded an opera theater and a concert hall.

250
 PROJECT MANAGEMENT AS BOUNDARY W O R K

development project in southern Stockholm illustrate this (Sahlin-

Andersson and Soderholm, 1987; Sahlin-Andersson, 1990).
For many years the industrial sector in the southern Stockholm region
had been shrinking, causing economic strain. As the planning office in
Stockholm county investigated the problem to find possible ways of sti-
mulating development, they came to describe it in terms of "an unba-
lanced region." Such labeling implied that what was defined as a pro-
blem for the southern part of the county was the way in which it diff-
ered from the wealthier northern part. Once the problem was percei-
ved in such terms, it followed that the designated solution was to do
away with the differences between the north and the south: to make the
southern part of the county as much like the northern part as possible.
Among the more obvious differences between the north and the south
were that an airport, a university, and most modern high-tech compa-
nies were in the north. Thus, when c o n t e ~ t u a l i z i nthe
~ project in terms
of an unbalanced region, the task of the project followed.
As the project unfolded, the first elements undertaken were those
that fell within or were closely associated with county jurisdiction. A
research park was established, and a railway station was built in conn-
ection with it so it would be easily accessible.' Other parts of the pro-
posed plans - the establishing of a new university and a new airport -
were mainly under state jurisdiction or municipal jurisdiction. These
tasks were not realized in the first round, but in the mid-1990s a new
university was established in connection with the research park. Even
though the university was established much later, and it was established
by the state, the way in which it was created partly followed on the ini-
tial definition of how to deal with the problems faced by southern
Stockholm county. The university project was connected with the reg-
ional development idea that had been pursued by the county a decade
earlier and it was also supported by the county. Thus the task of the
university project was at least potentially set by the context in which
the project had been pursued previously.
The hopes for the region, that were evoked as the project was for-
med by the county in the 1980's survived even after the project was for-

' The research park was built on county-owncd land, and research centers were cstahlished that
were closely connected with the hospital and the dental care unlts run under county authority.
Thc county had no authority over the national railway system, hut the county was the respon-
sible authority for regional trains.
KERSTIN SAHL IN -ANDERSSON

mally closed as parts of it were completed. Discussion of an "unbalan-

ced region" did not stop with the construction of the research park and
the railway station and with the ending of the county-led project. The
county-led project had been advocated in terms of regional develop-
ment, that it would support the development of new economic activity
in the southern part of the region. When the development did not meet
the expectations of the project proponents (to do away with regional
unbalances), the proponents could simply refer to the fact that the
whole package of projects proposed in the plan had not been comple-
ted. In this way, the partial realization of the earlier plan, and its lack
of success in terms of accomplishing regional growth, turned into an
argument for further investment in the area. This is an example of how
a portfolio of projects is formulated together so that individual projects
can support each other. The task and temporal boundaries around indi-
vidual projects were not fixed independently, but were integrated into
each other, organizationally, financially, and rhetorically.

Institutional boundary work

The often intertwined temporal and task boundaries of projects com-
prise the very basis of what a project is. The boundary work concer-
ning these aspects is, as shown above, a means of controlling the pro-
ject; but it is also a means of attracting attention and securing support
for a project. I will now elaborate upon a third, and less often discuss-
ed, feature of projects: they may be more or less institutionally demar-
cated. I propose that institutional demarcations are as important
aspects of projects as demarcations of time and task.
All organizational processes are institutionally embedded (Powell
and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995; Czarniawska and Sevbn, 1996) and
institutions evolve during the unfolding of all organizational processes
(Selznick, 1949, 1957). Scott (1995) defined institutions as "cognitive,
normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stabili-
ty and meaning to social behavior" (p. 33). They are "multifaceted
systems incorporating symbolic systems that shape social behavior.
Institutions structure the way in which activities are formed, under-
stood and related. These institutions are partly encoded in and carried
by written rules, regulations and policies. They are also carried by
authority systems and expectations and by categories, typifications and
 P R O J E C T M A N A G E M E N T AS B O U K D A R Y W O R K

identities" (Scott, 1995: 52). This definition implies that institutional

maintenance or institutional change only partly result from open nego-
tiations and settled policies; institutional change also depends on
changes in matters such as identity and typifications. Hence, as a pro-
ject is identified and classified in a particular way, the institutional fra-
ming of the project logically follows; another, different identification of
the project could put it into another institutional context.
Formulating tasks as projects may be motivated by a wish to break
with certain institutions, or by a wish to segregate particular activities
and make them less dependent on ingrained rules, regulations, norms,
and habits. Breaking with institutions may be desired when these are
thought to hamper the realization of the task at hand. Or it may be
motivated by a wish for more long-term institutional change. This is
the case, for example, when projects for organizational or regional
change are initiated. New or transformed institutions may at the same
time develop within the project.
The forming of a project may not always be primarily motivated by
the wish to accomplish a certain task, but this task can in fact be a
means for seeking to attain institutional change. Mendelssohn (1974)
suggested such an explanation as to why the Egyptian pyramids were
built. According to Mendelssohn "The object of the exercise was not
the use to which the final product was to be put but its manufacture.
Pharaohs could be buried and where, in fact, buried much more
cheaply. What mattered was not the pyramid, but it was building the
pyramid" (Mendelssohn 1974:196). How then did this building of the
pyramid, according to Mendelssohn, matter? He proposed that the
building demanded a large, and relatively permanent, workforce. By
forming the large pyramid projects the pharaohs formed a relatively
permanent workforce, and at the same time a relatively permanent
group of inhabitants of the region, over which they could have control.
The main object of the whole exercise was, according to Mendelssohn,
the attaining of control and stability, not the building as such.
Of course this is a highly functionalistic and, many would say, not
complete explanation to the forming of these historical monuments.
Still, the intriguing analysis reminds us of the relevance of process.
Moreover, it reminds us that objectives ascribed t o projects may differ
over time and among actors. In fact, many proponents of projects may
be more interested in the potential for institutional change than in the
announced task of the project.
KERSTIN S A H L I N - A N D E R S S O N

This calls for institutional boundary work, and the following section
describes how such work can proceed. Again, observations from the
Stockholm Globe Arena project serve as my main examples, as the for-
ming and managing of this project incorporated active institutional
boundary work. Few recent Swedish projects have attracted as much
public attention as the Stockholm Globe Arena project. Above all, it
seems that the big, spectacular, and extraordinary in both the form and
development of the project captured public imagination. By the time of
its completion, the project was claimed to mark a new means of city
planning. But when planning started, the project was not generally
regarded as being of any vital strategic value. "Most of the politicians
and managers in the city just saw it as building one more sports arena,"
said one of the planners. Thus the planning was assigned to rather low
levels in the city administration. The planners working on the project
were afraid that the whole matter would be forgotten: they understood
the delegation of the planning work to such low levels to mean that the
project was not of vital importance. In addition, the economic basis of
the project seemed weak. The only way the planners thought the pro-
ject could attract enough attention, so that it would not just be stowed
in a desk drawer, was to make it bigger, both in terms of the extent of
the planned business premises and by formulating the project as
"world class" and extraordinary.
The definition of the project, and the competition directives, display-
ed a somewhat mixed typification. Some of the directives were specific
and detailed: for example, the project location and deadline were fixed,
and the floor area of the proposed offices, shopping center, hotel, and
recreation areas were specified. In other aspects the directives left con-
siderable leeway for interpretation. While certain specifications were
predetermined, the groups competing for the contract were encouraged
to interpret the program freely, and come up with new ideas. At the
same time as the program purported to be "world class," other speci-
fications clearly signaled a low cost profile.
Only a few groups of companies responded to the municipal govern-
ment's invitation, and several of these found it difficult to get their
work started. They found the city council's competition directives, and
hence its project definition, to be unrealistic, inconsistent, and vague in
places. Compounding this was the fact that the project was to be loca-
ted in a less attractive part of the city: construction and real estate com-
panies were rather looking for possibilities to build in the northern part
 P R O I E C T MANAGELVENT AS BOUNDARY WORK

of the city where the demand for offices was high. One of the groups
that started working on the project soon disbanded.
During the initial work, however, the project caught the interest of
the architects participating in the group that later disbanded. They
were less bothered by the ambiguity, since many architects are used to
participating in design competitions. In such cases competition is the
important thing - an opportunity for architects to learn and market
themselves - while the actual construction of the buildings is not
always certain. So the architects started working on a design, and
having found an idea which was spectacular and clear enough, eventu-
ally managed to assemble a new group of companies, including real
estate, construction, and other interested parties needed to produce a
workable proposal for the competition. Again, the extraordinary
aspects of the project were being emphasized. This emphasis served as
a way to attract potential collaborators' interest, and it served as a way
t o break with institutionalized practices and relations in the field.
The new group, that was assembled in this way, worked under tight
time constraints, and had little time to work through either the group
dynamics or the model to present t o the city. Moreover, the group devi-
ated in important ways from the competition specifications, as their
alternative was based on the architects' concept of a spherical arena
combined with a much denser commercial area than was proposed by
the city (approximately 150,ooo vs. the specified 75,000 square
meters). As the group developed their alternative they modified the
proposed financial model too. They proposed that, in exchange for
building the arena, the commercial consortium should own rather than
rent the land for the commercial buildings. (In addition, the city was
asked t o pay SEK 80 nlillion of the costs, as had already been allocated
in the city budget). This latter deviation from the program was notab-
le, in that it ran counter to a long-standing city policy that municipal
land was in principle inalienable. Clearly this alternative - and the pre-
sentation of it - emphasized the extraordinary character of the project.
As the competition proceeded, four proposals were under considera-
tion; the city was under considerable pressure to make the decision in
time to meet the 1989 deadline. Even though another alternative follo-
wed the competition directives much more closely, several jury mem-
bers were attracted by the more spectacular but also more ambiguous
proposal with its larger commercial development, different financial
model, and spherical arena. The ambiguity of this proposal, and the
KERSTlN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON

fact that the financial model broke with institutionalized city policies,
were excused by referring to the extraordinary character of the project.
By defining and understanding the proiect as "extraordinary," those
favoring the project emphasized that it was an exception. Hence, even
though this particular case went against earlier policies, it did not mean
that the policy was being questioned or was up for revision.
Second, viewing the project as extraordinary meant it was seen as
unique, implying that no comparable objects or references existed. This
excused the lack of clear plans. The presentation of the project in quite
spectacular, extraordinary and at times unexpected ways also partly
buffered it from criticism. Some plans for the project appeared so diff-
erent, and for this reason were not taken seriously and hence were
neither much supported nor criticized.
The exceptional and multifaceted character of this project became
ingrained as the group of planners emphasized the extraordinary fea-
tures in order to make the project visible and attractive. At the same
time, this definition allowed those joining the project team to develop
their own views of it, and to emphasize the extraordinary character still
further. By defining the projcct as "extraordinary," the city opened up
the project to "adventure" and change, and gave up some of its con-
trolling capacity.
There were, however, recurring attempts to tone down the extraor-
dinary character of the project and instead emphasize its ordinary fea-
tures. Such definitions open up the boundaries between the project and
its context, enabling learning and comparisons. One attempt to seek to
understand and pursue the Globe project in more ord~naryterms was
found when the competition started. Several competition groups com-
pared the Globe project to other major city-planned projects and found
it to be much less clear and supported by fewer formal decisions. When
they asked the city planners for clarifications, but without getting any
clear answers, they read this as a sign that the project lacked broad
support, and this led several groups to withdraw from active participa-
tion in the project.
Another attempt to understand - and revise - the project in more
ordinary terms was made by the construction companies in the archi-
tects' group that advocated the spherical arena design. The way the
architects assembled the group and conducted the project, did, in many
ways, break with institutionalized field principles. For example, some
less-established construction companies were recruited to the group by
 PROIECT MANAGEMENT AS BOUNDARY WORK

the architects - an unwelcome move for the leading, established con-

struction companies already in the group. These usually dominant
large companies, as well as some real-estate interests, noticed that the
architects - who did not usually lead such projects - had acquired a lea-
ding role. Representatives of the construction companies described
how they had to "straighten things up" in the group, by emphasizing
parallels with earlier projects. As they gained more control over the
project, they excluded less-established companies and began to handle
the project in what they perceived as the "normal" way. Still, as nego-
tiations started between the city and the competing consortia, the
architects' group persisted in referring to the extraordinary character of
the project when proposing deviations from the competition directives
as well as from city policies more generally.
Deviations from the competition program, from municipal policies
and from "the traditional way of working with large construction pro-
jects" partly followed from the way in which the project was defined,
partly the way of working emerged incrementally as a result of unex-
pected and unplanned events. However, these deviations cannot only
be understood relative to the individual task at hand. In addition, devi-
ations were consciously pursued by those who saw a chance to disre-
gard and possibly even change the institutional framing of city plann-
ing and of the way in which the construction industry worked. As the
project was presented and perceived as extraordinary and as it was run
under time pressure, those actors who were interested in changing curr-
ent matters took the opportunity to pursue their way of working. They
used the identification of the project as extraordinary as an excuse for
not running the project according to the traditional rules and conven-
tions. In terms of boundaries, this can be described as a way of closing the
boundaries around the project so that the work among those most acti-
vely involved continued in a way that was buffered from other stake-
holders. Later, those interested in changing the system along the lines of
the development of the Globe project rather referred to this project as a
precedent - an early but ordinary example the could be followed.
The Stockholm Globe Arena project was implemented at a time
when, seen in retrospect, dramatic shifts were taking place in the con-
trol of the public sector and the way in which the private and public
sectors were related. The Stockholm Globe Arena project was an early
example of public planning and decision-making that was much more
intertwined with private interests than had previously been the case. Of
KERSTIN SAHLIN-A'JDERSSON

course, the Globe project did not itself cause these shifts, which were
global in scope. But for those at the time who were arguing for greater
private involvement in public planning, the Globe project served as a
good example. However, a project is a better precedent for future plann-
ing if it is not defined as so "extraordinary," so those using such a case
as an example will describe it as ordinary and normal rather than as
exceptional. Hence, to allow a project to create an opening for or to
support future institutional changes, the institutional boundary work
must continue. Initially and during the process a project that is defined
extraordinary draws new institutional boundaries so that earlier insti-
tutionalized patterns do not seem to apply. The definition of a project
as "extraordinary" allows for new or changed procedures and rela-
tions. In order for the project to influence future patterns, however, it
must be redefined as less extraordinary.
In similar ways, many change projects are defined and described as
"new", thereby signaling the break with earlier modes of operation.
This has clearly been the case with recent public service reforms around
the world. Such reforms have been presented - b y the reformers as well
as by proponents and analysts of such reforms more generally - as
"new public management". The definition of New Public Management
(NPM) is general rather than specific. What is more, it is sometimes
argued for and defined not as a new form of governing, but rather in
terms of what it is not - i.e., the old public administration and bureau-
cracy. This feature is most clearly captured by the word "new", which
signals that it is a way of managing that breaks with previous tradi-
tions. Even though parts of what is today included in NPM is not par-
ticularly new - in relation to previous ways t o administer the public
services or in relation t o theories and principles for management that
have been taught in business schools and practised in business (Jacobs-
son and Sahlin-Andersson, 1995; Furusten and Lerdell, 1998) - when
circulating these models under the heading of NPM, this label clearly sig-
nals a break with the past and the introduction of something new. The
emphasis of the "new" attracts attention, and makes the reform project
that are persued under this label interesting for those who want to break
with previous institutions. As the public sector was being questioned in
many western countries in the late So's, projects that so clearly signaled
a break with the past and the introduction of something new attracted a
lot of interest (c.f. Olson et al., 1998; Christensen et al., 2001).
 PROJECT MANAGEMENT A S BOUNDARY WORK

Project definition as boundary work

The above examples show how, and partly why, boundaries are drawn
by the way in which a project is defined and accounted for. Boundar-
ies are established in project specifications, as certain people and resour-
ces are allocated to the project, and as contracts are signed and tasks
and responsibilities set forth. And they are drawn by the way accounts
are formed as a basis for allocating costs and revenues. Boundaries are
further set by the way the project is defined and described in relation
to its context, and, as my examples show, such boundary work is acti-
vely pursued. I have particularly focused on two aspects of such pro-
ject boundary work. I have described how temporal, task, and institu-
tional boundaries are drawn through the way in which projects are
described and defined. I have emphasized the importance of defining
projects in relation to particular events. Moreover, I have pointed to the
importance of whether projects are described in terms of new or not
new, ordinary or extraordinary. The definition of a project as new and
extraordinary can detach it from certain institutional orders.
In this way, project boundary work can serve to facilitate more long-
term changes, or it can serve as ways of avoiding change and maintai-
ning stability. An identification of the project as new and extraordina-
ry opens it up for adventure, giving less control to those who seek to
control the project from within any certain institutional setting, and it
signals the break with earlier institutionalized orders as well as a break
with those institutional orders that apply in more "ordinary" situa-
tions. If a project continues to be identified as extraordinary or excep-
tional, the project does not provide any motives for more general or
future institutional changes. If, however, the project is redefined ex post
to be seen less as an exception and more as a new hut ordinary way of
proceeding, this opens up for further changes where the project can be
treated as an example to follow.
This analysis has focused on aspects of proiect management that are
not so often discussed in the literature or in practice. Partly this can be
explained by the fact that the project boundary work is not in the
hands of appointed project managers, but it is dispersed among a much
wider group of project facilitators and project entrepreneurs. The
examples show us not only how such boundary work proceeds, but
suggest why such boundary work tends to be a more or less concealed
aspect of project management. Boundary work is a rhetorical activity.
KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON

It is not in the hands of individual managers or decision-makers, but

the success of such boundary work is dependent upon many intertwi-
ned interpretations. Boundary work seems to be most effective when
the boundaries are regarded as given. This was described in relation t o
the temporal boundaries mentioned above, and it seems t o be true of
other sorts of boundaries as well. Hence, it is not in the interest of the
actors pursuing such boundary work t o display and elaborate upon it
as an important management activity. This is illustrated in the foll-
owing quotation from a newspaper interview with one of the leading
politicians behind the Globe project (my translation):

"The Globe project was 'speedy', time pressured, large, and difficult.
This kind of project always turns out to be more expensive than ini-
tially expected, said the Stockholm Commissioner, who also meant
that 'the great adventure' after all was worth all this."

And the interview continues with another comment from the politician
to the outcome of the project:

"But we had the guillotine over our heads, in that the Globe had t o
be completed for the world ice hockey championship in the spring of
1989."

If I were to use the metaphorical rhetoric of this politician, my comm-

ent would be that it was he himself and his colleagues who set up that
guillotine as part of their boundary work. It is our task as scholars to
go beyond the accounts given by managers of how they manage pro-
jects, and based on our independent studies, reveal how such work pro-
ceeds. Studies that go beyond the self-representations of managers need
to be assisted and guided by theoretical frameworks that also go
beyond the self-representation of the individual manager. In this chap-
ter, institutional theories and the sociology of science have helped me
go beyond project management. I hope this brief essay can inspire future
research into project boundary work and the institutional embedded-
ness of projects, and more generally, into combining in-depth empirical
qualitative studies with theoretical lessons from other fields.
 The the

Project failures and unclear goals

Delays and cost overruns seem to be something of a natural law in pro-
ject management. Reports from all over the world unanimously create a
very depressing picture. Regardless of industry, technical content, type, or
national origin, projects are reported to suffer from significant delays and
cost overruns with respect to set plans (Morris & Hough, 1987; Standish
Group, 1999). However, in spite of these reports, project management
and project organizing have become increasingly popular during recent
decades, both in business and public administration. This is a paradox. In
spite of its obvious failings, project-based management is believed t o be an
effective and dynamic alternative to traditional, and seemingly old-fashio-
ned, bureaucratic structures. How come? A continuously failing manage-
ment idea is expected to die, not become increasingly popular.
Analyses of project management failures usually deduce the cause as
one of three main categories. First, projects seem to fail due to deficien-
cies in their management, i.e. insufficient planning, lack of coordina-
tion, improperly chosen technical solutions, etc. (Pinto & Kharbanda,
199 5 ) . Secondly, projects seem t o fail because of environmental factors,
i.e. being opposed by important stakeholders, other projects having a
higher priority, or not obtaining sufficient resources, etc. (Cooper et al.,
1999; Selin & Selin, 1992). Thirdly - and mainly - a large number of
projects seem to fail because of their goals. Deficient contracts, vaguely
defined assignments, unclear specifications, or goals that change signi-
MATS ENGWALL

ficantly during project execution are frequent complaints (Kharbanda

& Stallworthy, 1992; Pinto & Prescott 1990). Similar criticism is also
frequent in newspaper articles and in reviews of public projects (c.f.
Von Porat, ~ 9 9 6 )In
. other words, too many projects seem to be initiated
without sufficient preparation, planning and feasibility studies. Too
many decision-makers seem to initiate projects without having made
clear what their intentions really are.
Criticism concerning imprecise project goals is nothing new. The
problem has been a matter of discussion for more than 3 0 years (Art,
~ 9 7 2 Avots,
; 1969). Neither is there a lack of proposals for solutions.
Almost every textbook or handbook in the field preaches the impor-
tance of clear and exact goals, how these goals should be formulated,
how projects should be planned, scheduled, and budgeted, and how
they should be assessed in terms of costs, benefits, and risks (Cleland
& King, 1968; Goldratt, 1997; Maylor, 1996; Turner, rgqy). The basic
message is that a project should never be initiated without sufficient
preparation. The same message is also taught during courses and training
programs, in corporate directives and guidelines, and in the quality
management systems companies use to control their projects (Mulder,
1997). So, why does the problem persist?
There are two possible answers to this question. Firstly, practice can
(still) be dominated by dysfunctional behavior. This means that the
actions of the practitioners have to be corrected so that they match the
ideal. Secondly, it could be the normative theory that is unreasonable,
i.e. the dominating role model might not correlate with the conditions
that practical project managers have to adhere to. If so, it is the theo-
retical models - not the practical actions - that have to be revised.
This chapter departs from the latter interpretation. It argues that an
unclear project goal is an intrinsic element of project management per
se. Without denying the need for appropriate preparations, we have to
accept that stipulated project goals can never be more than qualified
guesses about the future. Firstly, stipulated project goals have to be
understood as political products based on over-optimistic visions of
future conditions. Their primary function is to create project beginn-
ings, not to predict project ends. Secondly, the process of project execu-
tion is one of knowledge creation. While the stipulated goal defines the
project's demarcations, its content has to be created through practical
actions. Through the practical actions of project execution, expec-
tations regarding future outcomes are transformed; firstly because exper-
 THE FUTILE DREAM OF THE PERFECT GOAL

iences are gained from actions performed, and secondly because time
elapses and future outcomes gradually get closer. At project end, know-
ledge exists that was impossible to acquire at project initiation. At this
point, the meaning of the project's goal is reinterpreted and the demar-
cation of the project scope is often revised. Ex post, we always know
more than ex ante.
The rest of the chapter is structured in four sections. Firstly, the basic
conceptual model of project management is outlined and the ideal of
the project goal that constitutes and controls project execution is
discussed. This is the model that will bc critically examined in subse-
quent sections. In the second section, the political aspects of project
selection and goal setting are discussed, with the claim that ambiguit-
ies and inconsistencies are natural components of most project assign-
ments. The third section addresses the knowledge aspects of project
execution, emphasizing how practical actions change the way the sti-
pulated project goal was initially intcrpreted. In the final section, the
chapter concludes with a discussion o n how experiences from perfor-
med project actions influence expectations regarding project outcomes.
The point is that evolutionary features of project goals are intrinsic ele-
ments of every project execution.

The goal - the core of

every project assignment
Projects are initiated in order t o achieve something: to bring about a
change, to construct a building, t o develop a product, t o implement a
system, to execute a contract, or t o search for new knowledge.' The
basis for the decision to initiate a project is constituted by the expected
results following project termination. Thus, the goal is the core element
of every project's existence. The intentions behind the project legitimi-
ze the whole undertaking. In its purest form, all actions within a pro-
ject are related t o the project goal. If the goals change, the work of the
project changes, and if the project becomes obsolete, it gets ~ a n c e l e d . ~

The chapter primarily addresses projects which have a technical core, e.g. projects in product
dcvclopment or building consrroction. The discussion might he applicable to other types of pro-
jects as well, but thar is beyond the scope of this chapter.
In this way, Project Management IS one of the ultimate and most explicit forms of "Manage-
menr hy Objectives".
MATS ENGWALI

The basic model of project management

The basic conceptual model is simple: The project is an assignment
with limited duration - a contract - given by one actor to another. The
former actor is the client (other labels are project sponsor or project
owner); the latter actor is the project manager. While the client orders
and specifies what is to be accomplished at a certain point in the futu-
re; the project manager is in charge of the task's realization. Conse-
quently, project management means coordinating all the necessary acti-
vities towards the project goal; predicting future, potential problems;
choosing the appropriate technical solutions; and controlling that the
project work is on track and within the given scope.
According to the model, the project constitutes the intermediate
stage in a sequence of three stages:
(I) Project selection, through which the client defines the project.
( 2 ) Project execution, through which the objectives of the assignment
are realized.
( 3 ) Project assessment, where the final results are compared with the
original goals and intentions.

Thus, the project assignment is initiated through a client decision whe-

reby the goal is set and ended by a client decision when the final result
is accepted. Between these decisions, the project is being executed (see
Figure I ~ : I ) .

Client

Goal

Figure I The basic conceptual model o f project management.

~ : I
 THE FUTI1.E D R E A M O F THE PERFECT GOAL

The logics of project execution

The process of project execution has some characteristic dynamics in
relation to non-project operations (Archibald, 1976; Engwall, 199s;
Selin, 1990). For example, the consumption of resources is typically
unevenly distributed across the project's lifecycle. For most projects, a
diagram of the cumulative expenditure of resources during their execu-
tion resembles an S-curve (see Figure 1 4 : ~ )At
. the beginning of a project,
few resources are consumed, few people are taken on and the basic
planning does not require much expensive equipment or material.
While the work is being carried out, more people are taken on, mate-
rials and equipment procured and consultants, suppliers, and contrac-
tors are contracted. Resource expenditure increases radically. After an
intensive period, consumption typically decreases and, toward the end,
there are only a few people left to close down the project, carrying out
the necessary adjustment and reviews.

Accumulated Possible influence

resource expenditure within defined xope

Figure r4:2 Accumulated resource expenditure and the possibility of influen-

cing the end-result within the defined project scope.

However, the diagram outlining the possibility of influencing the end

result is usually described using an inverted S-curve. During the early
phases, when little work has been carried out, it is relatively easy to
change direction and it is still possible to choose from different alter-
native actions. These possibilities disappear as decisions are made, as
resources are consumed, and as calendar time elapses. At the end of the
project, when knowledge of the end result is at its best, there are only
limited possibilities of influencing the outcomes, within the specified
scope. During this phase, it is often very tempting to propose improve-
MATS ENGWALL

ments and changes. However, since these often mean changing a long
series of activities that have in turn been building on each other since
project initiation, late revisions are usually both complicated and cost-
ly to implement.

Goals demarcating the execution process

In order to gain control of this process, the strategy taught in most pro-
ject management literature is to reduce uncertainty as much, and as
early on, as possible during the process (PMI, 1996). Ideally, the pro-
ject should be so thoroughly planned that the objectives are stipulated
in detail and frozen, before any practical action is undertaken (for an
alternative view, cf. Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Iansiti & MacCor-
mack, 1997). The stipulated project goal should be explicit, specified
in detail, internally consistent, and stable over time. Furthermore, the
goal should be specified in three dimensions (PMI, 1996):
I ) Performance, what is to be done during the project (some authors
use the labels functionalit y or quality) -typically defined in a techni-
cal specification.
2 ) Tzme, when the work is to be finished - typically defined in a time
schedule, and
3 ) Costs, what amount and which type of resources are allowed to be
spent - typically defined in a project budget.

These goals should then he broken down systematically into clear and
consistent objectives, sub-objectives and milestones, which should sub-
sequently be translated into project activities and work-packages. Since
these work-packages are the basic input of project planning and sche-
duling, this kind of breakdown analysis is taught as the cornerstone for
all project planning and scheduling.
For practical project managers, this approach usually makes sense:
in practice, too many projects seem to be initiated without thorough
and well-prepared goals. Furthermore, the practical process of brea-
king down goals into objectives, sub-objectives, and work-packages is
a good collective exercise for the project team. By discussing the pro-
ject objectives in depth with each other, a conceptual structure of the
project assignment at hand is constructed. Problematic ambiguities in
the goal, differences in the interests of the stakeholders, and any misun-
 T H E FUTILE DREAM OF THE PERFECT G O A L

derstandings can be identified and sorted out. Since a thorough analy-

sis forces the team members t o declare their values and interests, it is
also a good team-building experience.
The belief that it is possible to define and freeze the project objecti-
ves once and for all at the beginning of a project is problematic. How-
ever, since the pre-project goal setting process has a significant impact
on project execution, this issue will be addressed in the next section

The necessity of goal ambiguity

The primary function of a stipulated project goal is to create a start,
not to predict final outcomes. At project initiation, it is necessary t o
have ambiguous goals that can unite stakeholders with different
interests in supporting one and the same undertaking. The ambiguity
makes it possible for different intentions and interests t o co-exist
during project initiation. Consequently, an ambiguous project proposal
can be instrumental in order to pass through the project selection pro-
cess. However, ambiguous goals outline visionary directions for the
future, but they provide few details about actions that are necessary at
present. Managing the path from goal ambiguity t o goal formation is
thus a core competency of practical project management.

Project initiation and rational decision-making

H o w goals are formed and decided upon is little discussed in the pro-
ject management literature. Instead, the project goal is treated as an
already-defined and established objective fact. In principle, all actors
are expected to be completely honest and to subordinate all their per-
sonal interests t o the overall project mission. A project under execution
is usually assumed to have been selected and initiated through a ratio-
nal decision-making process, wherein different alternative projects
have been assessed on the basis of realistically established plans and
calculations (Simon, 1957).The project is assumed t o be the logical
effect of the way in which the decision-makers have assessed the con-
sequences of each alternative. Thus, the chosen project is seen as the
best possible alternative for the situation in question.
In many normative theories (e.g. project management theory), the
MATS ENGWALL

model of rational decision-making has the status of a highly desirable

ideal for practice. The rationalistic ideal also impregnates the language
of modern business, politics, and public administration. However,
during recent decades, a large number of empirical research studies
have shown that the model is a very poor depiction of how decisions
are made in practice. This criticism has addressed all aspects of the
decision-making process: the formulation of the original problem, the
identification of the possible alternative courses of action, the descrip-
tion of the consequences of each alternative, the evaluation of the con-
sequences, the elimination of some alternatives, and final selection
from the remaining options (Brunsson, 1989; Cohen et al., 1972; Dani-
elsson & Malmberg, 1979; Jacobsson, 1987; Lindblom, 1959;March,
1988; Sahlin-Anderson, 1986).
In spite of the rhetoric, there are probably few projects in practice
that are the result of a rational decision-making process. Project pro-
posals are often controversial since projects are often visible, involve
changes for certain interest groups, and exploit resources that could
have been used in alternative ways. There is often a high degree of
uncertainty concerning both the consequences that the project initiati-
ve will have on the future and the way in which the project work
should best be managed. Consequently, gaining the necessary support
for a project proposal at the selection stage usually requires some form
of coalition of decision-makers representing different interests (Baier et
al., 1986). Coalition building usually means negotiations. Negotiations
normally mean compromises and compromises usually mean reformu-
lations, supplements and changes to the original proposal (Bauer,
1968). In other words, the methods of gaining support for a project
proposal are such that they in many ways contradict an efficient imple-
mentation process. Instead of precision and consistency, the logic of the
decision-making process seems to produce exactly the opposite.

The importance of imprecision

In decision-making processes, a proposal seldom gains support by
being precisely and clearly formulated, with all the possible conse-
quences formulated in every little detail (Sahlin-Andersson, 1989). This
is especially true for projects, where the positive and negative conse-
quences are usually unevenly distributed over time. The negative con-
 T H E FUTILE DREAM O F T H E PERFECT GOAL

sequences of project execution (costs, disruptions, and efforts on a rela-

tively short-term basis) are usually close together in time since they are
a necessity for creating the intended positive long-term effects of the
project. Consequently, the positive effects are often bound t o be visio-
nary rather than concrete. They can seldom be evaluated with the same
degree of certainty as the negative consequences.
Actually, the very presence of ambiguities can enable different stake-
holders t o support a project for different reasons and with different
expectations regarding the result. An ambiguous goal can be a means
of gaining support by allowing one and the same project t o be seen in
different contexts and t o be given different meanings. All differences in
interests, expectations, and preferences have to be suppressed during
the coalition building, particularly if the proposal risks being called
into question (Jacobsson, 1987). Thus, one instrumental strategy for
gaining support for a project proposal is formulating the proposal on
a principle, visionary, and non-detailed level which allows some ambi-
guity and inconsistency in the project's content (Sahlin, 1996). Conse-
quently, future sources of conflict are common outputs from project
selection processes.

The function of over-optimism

There is a considerable risk that a project proposal that has successfully
passed through the selection process is over-optimistic (March &
Olsen, 1976). This could be a deliberate, conspiratorial strategy by the
project's proponents in order t o get the proposal through the decision-
malting process As a professor of civil engineering is said to have
taught his students a t the Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden
during the late 19 50%:

"Boys, you have t o remember [...I that if you are going t o calculate
the cost of building a power plant, underestimate your calculations
so that construction work can start. There are no power plants that
are only half-completed." (Grennberg, 1998: 6)

Even though this comment concerned construction work, the principal

message is still valid for most projects. However, over-optimism in pro-
ject goals might not be deliberate. Since there is competition between
MATS ENGWALL

different alternative proposals at the selection stage, it is unlikely that

a proposal that is presented cautiously, with detailed, pessimistic cal-
culations and suppressed positive expectations, would gain sufficient
political support to be selected. Consequently, there is a much higher
level of probability that proposals which actually pass the approval
process are based on over-optimistic, rather than under-optimistic,
expectations and plans (Baier et al., 1986).
However, the observation that the decision-makers deviate, in prac-
tice, from the rational model does not imply that they are stupid, unta-
lented, or irrational - only that their behavior does not fit the theoretical
model. An alternative view is that decision-making should, in practice,
be understood as a means of initiating and achieving collective action,
rather than a choice between different alternatives (Brunsson, 1985).
Following this view, effective action requires actors who are comm-
itted, well motivated and confident in order that they will be able t o
manage the task. Furthermore, the action has to be seen t o be "right"
and the actors should have high expectations regarding the outcomes
of their efforts. The decision manifests the expectations and motiva-
tion. Through the decision, the decision-makers have explicitly comm-
itted themselves t o a particular option (for example a project). Conse-
quently, an effective decision-making process entails that only a few
project proposals are analysed, that only the positive consequences of
the selected project are considered, and that the competing alternatives
are presented so negatively that they are considered t o be unreasonable.
Often, an initial over-confidence seems to be necessary if a project is to
get under way at all. To maintain their level of enthusiasm, practical
decision-makers have no objection to being kept a little in the dark
(Andersson, 1981). Or, in the words of a senior consultant at a Swe-
dish engineering firm:

"My experience is that if we specify in detail, at project initiation,

what we are going t o do, the client usually becomes negative. It is
better t o be imprecise at the beginning and discuss the necessary
actions with the client during project execution".
 T H E FU'I'ILE DREAM OF THE PERFECT G O A L

The irrelevance of goals to project execution

The political negotiations do not end at project initiation - they only
move into another phase. Project initiation often means concrete
action. At project initiation, commitments are made, contracts are sign-
ed, resources are allocated, equipment is purchased, project teams are
formed, plans are drawn up, and the actors involved start to coordina-
te their future activities in relation to each other. During project execu-
tion, decisions and actions build upon each other in such a way that the
activities of the early phases constitute and create the prerequisites for
actions during subsequent phases. All actions within the project are
related to previous actions, and previous actions cannot be undone
afterwards. Thus, a project that has passed the point of initiation is
usually very difficult to stop (Sahlin-Anderson, 1986). Instead, it has t o
be changed or adjusted.
For instance, project execution usually entails a monopolistic rela-
tionship between a client and a contractor (Engwall, 1990;Stinchcom-
be, 1985). So when the client tries to raise the technical ambitions for
the outcome (within stipulated budget and time-limits), the contractor
usually tries to get more money (for a technically less ambitious pro-
duct). Consequently, the execution phase constitutes new rules for
negotiations. Facing the risk of a half-completed project, it is often easier
to acquire more time and resources for an ongoing project during
execution than for a project proposal during the selection phase. In a
similar way, there is usually a tendency among other stakeholders to try
to maneuver an ongoing project into line with their own opportunistic
interests. During project execution, there are often attempts by diffe-
rent stakeholders to attach problems and solutions that happen to be
in the environment at the same time as the project (Sahlin-Anderson,
1986).
These political processes primarily concern the demarcation lines
between the project and its environment. These processes are impor-
tant since they gradually define the exact extension of the project
scope. However, well-defined exterior demarcations are not enough. In
order to create an end-result, the project content has to acquire a mea-
ning. The originally abstract project goals have to be transformed into
concrete manifestations. Project execution is thus an evolutionary pro-
cess wherein expectations regarding the outcomes interact with experi-
ences gained from the performed actions. Gradually during the course
MATS ENCWilLL

of project execution, expectations and experiences become coherent

and, in the end, the goal becomes definite. Goal formation is thus a
core element of project execution.

The idea of an exogenous goal

In project management theory, the project goal (as well as its meaning)
is created outside the process of realizing it. As an initial input, the pro-
ject goal is assumed to be an independent variable of the execution pro-
cess: it influences the process, but is not influenced by it. Thus, the
practical actions of the execution process have no influence on the mea-
ning of the stipulated goals. Ideally, all the necessary knowledge should
be available during project selection and there should be no unplanned
learning during project execution. Consequently, we are supposed to
know exactly what we want to achieve and how to accomplish it, right
from the beginning.
This ideal of an exogenous goal is based on the idea that it is poss-
ible to fully specify the content of a project before it is executed in prac-
tice. This is a basic assumption about the nature of project man-
agement, which adheres to an old tradition in Western philosophy con-
stituted by the belief that true knowledge is the same as theoretical
knowledge (Molander, 1997) and that all this knowledge is possible to
articulate using exact and unambiguous language (Frangsmyr, ~ 9 7 4 ;
Goranzon, 1986; Toulmin, 1991). Adhering to this tradition, mathe-
matical knowledge - with its exact definitions, propositions, and logi-
cal deductions - is the ideal. The application of knowledge is also seen
as a separate (and subordinated) activity to the knowledge itself. In
other words: it is possible to possess knowledge, without necessarily
being able to apply it (Molander, 1996).

The learning component in goal realization

This separation of goal-formation from goal-realization might be a
good description for repetitive undertakings whose execution exploits
already existing and standardized knowledge. However, when applied
to undertakings comprising any kind of element new to the actors
involved, it becomes problematic (Schon, 1983). For such undertakings,
 THE FUTILE D R E A M OF THE PERFECT COAL

it is not possible to acquire important knowledge elements by planning

beforehand. Instead, they have to be acquired by means of practical
actions. In relation to planning and goal-setting activities, which only
consist of abstract thinking, project execution means a gradual interaction
between theoretical and practical knowledge (Engwall, 2002). During
project execution, learning occurs in the tension between the abstractions
(theories, goals, plans, etc.) and the experiences gained from the perfor-
med concrete actions (experiments, tests, prototypes, manufacturing, con-
struction, etc.). Through improved planning prior to project execution, it
is possible to create good knowledge of what ought to be possible to
accomplish within the project, which measures ought to be possible to
execute, which results ought to be possible to produce, and what conse-
quences ought to be the effects of performed outcomes. However, it is not
until during practical execution that it is actually assessed (with any
certainty) whether the planned actions were possible to implement in prac-
tice and, if this is the case, whether they had the intended effects or not.
Hence, during project execution, knowledge is developed with
regard to what the project "actually" means. The project goal acquires
a concrete (often even physical) gestalt. The participating actors acquire
hands-on experience of the project content. In this way, the project
execution process becomes a mutual experience. It becomes a shared
example (Kuhn, 1962) for the participators.

Practical actions and ex post discoveries of alternatives

In addition, the performed actions introduce inertia into the process.
Thus, since actions in turn build upon previous actions, it becomes more
and more difficult to change direction. Metaphorically, it is like a carpen-
ter sculpting a piece of wood; once the first cut has been made, the pro-
cess is irrevocable. Each new cut has to be planned and made with respect
to the outcome of the previous cuts. As Molander (1996,p. 17) describes it:

"The doing is one, irrevocable, definitive. [In advance,] you can

speculate about different possibilities and interpretations. Anyhow,
the action is the point when we leave the level of pure possibilities
and act in one way - the world changes, there is no way back."

Consequently, the closer the carpenter comes to the finished product -

MATS ENGWALL

the narrower the range of potential alternative cuts. However, project

work has an additional element. Since there is a specified deadline for
completion, calendar time is continuously elapsing. Thus, the range of
potential actions - within the stipulated project scope - is gradually
narrowing, even if no action is taken. For instance, an old rule of
thumb states that during the late project phases, when knowledge of
the end result is at most its sophisticated, costs can only increase; never
decrease (Selin, 1990). However, knowledge that was impossible to
acquire earlier might still emerge during the very late phases of a pro-
ject (Kreiner, 1995). In product development, for example it is not until
the first real sample of the new product has been launched onto the
market that it becomes possible t o obtain an actual test of how the pro-
duct is being received (independently of how many market surveys
have previously been conducted). Dependent on market responses to
these first samples, it might be necessary to adjust the project goals;
otherwise the project would not have been of any use at all. Further-
more, at that point, it is always easy to tell what one ought to have
known about beforehand (Engwall, zooz).
Finally, the preferences of the actors involved tend t o evolve over
time due to the learning process of project execution. While the project
is being executed, the actors gradually get a better understanding of the
practical consequences of the actions being performed (March, 1971).
While learning what the project goal means in concrete terms, they also
learn what the project does not mean. However, they also learn what
the project could have meant with a different history.
During the execution process, the participants gradually acquire
insights into what would have been possible to accomplish under diff-
erent conditions, e.g. if they had acted a little bit differently in the
beginning, if they had been assigned slightly more resources, but -
above all - if their knowledge had been a little bit different or a little
bit deeper right from the beginning. Thus, even if the wording of the
stipulated goal is exactly the same in the end as its initial articulation,
its wording will have another meaning in the end. At the end, the goal
is not just an abstract text anymore, instead referring t o practical expe-
riences gained from actions, outcomes, mistakes, and successes achie-
ved during execution. It is not until the consequences of decisions are
realized that it will be possible to understand, with any certainty, which
decision one should actually have taken (given that we have had the
knowledge beforehand). Ex post we always know more than ex ante.
 THE FUTILE D R E A M OF T H E PERFECT G O A L

Project execution - a process of goal formation

The discussion so far can be summarized in two paragraphs. First, pro-
ject goals are political products. As input into the project process, it is
natural that they comprehend ambiguities and inconsistencies, paving
the way for politics, negotiations, and interpretation. Second, the mea-
ning of the project goal evolves during the execution process. It is
impossible to know everything beforehand. Some insights are depen-
dent on practical experiences gained from execution. Consequently, it
is natural that previous ideas and actions are reinterpreted when they
are implemented. A stipulated project goal can never be anything more
than a hypothesis. In the best case, a goal is a qualified judgement
about future conditions and preferences. In the worst case, it is only a
guess.
The language of project management conjures up a picture of clear,
consistent, and stable goals waiting to be transformed into end-results
via a linear process implementation. It is the language of a partially fro-
zen world, where there is no environmental evolution during the pro-
ject's lifecycle and where there is complete and perfect knowledge prior
to project initiation. In practice, however, there are probably few pro-
ject managers who would recognize themselves in such a description.
In practice, the conditions of project management are much more cha-
otic, with goals that are continuously changing and where goal ambi-
guities and a lack of precision are the means of dealing with conflicts,
visionary thinking, but also concrete experience. Since projects have
time extensions, there is always a risk that the project environment will
evolve in another direction than the one expected, entailing that the
project will in the end be evaluated on the basis of premises and expe-
riences which differ from those in force at the time of project initiation.
One possible conclusion might he that stipulated goals are only
empty phrases and that goal setting is only a ceremonial charade in
order to protect the project from opponents in its environment. If so,
project goals are unnecessary, except for political reasons. However,
this would be neglecting the significance of goals for constituting pro-
ject dynamics. Goals can be, to varying degrees, open ended, but for
most projects, the stipulated goal is more than just an empty symbol.
The project goal provides direction. It focuses on a preferred state in
the future. It redirects attention from other issues to problems and solu-
tions related to the project. Furthermore, the goal constructs trajecto-
MATS ENGWALL

ries over time: it relates future outcomes to actions and activities carried
out today. Through the goal, the actors involved can create a common
future. It becomes possible to coordinate the actions of today with
expected outcomes in the future. However, in relation to other kinds of
goals, the time specificity of project goals makes them distinct.
Project goals have traditionally been discussed as a basis for defining
the demarcation line between the tasks that do belong to (or ought to
belong to) the project and those that do not. This is the function em-
phasized in most project management literature. Clear, consistent, and
realistic objectives are claimed to enable the project manager to gain
control over the project execution process. Simultaneously, they are
claimed to protect her from being blamed for failures and problems
outside the project work.
However, the project goal also creates expectations. A t project initi-
ation, there is a stipulated, abstract project goal; there are resources
allocated to the project; and there are expectations regarding future
outcomes, but also regarding the process of creating the outcomes.
Through the execution process, the goals evolve from abstract visions
into concrete experiences: words are interpreted, actions are perfor-
med, and the world changes. During the course of the process, expec-
tations regarding the project are transformed, due to experiences gai-
ned from performing actions in combination with the fact that (calen-
dar) time is elapsing and the predicted future is approaching.
Usually, the transformation of expectations has two effects on pro-
ject execution: ( I ) the project goal is reinterpreted and redefined, and
( 2 ) the project demarcations are renegotiated with the environment.
Thus, the distance decreases between experiences gained from actions
performed within the project and expectations regarding future actions
in the project. At the end of the project, experiences and expectations
are coherent. However, at this point, the expectations have a different
meaning to what they did at project initiation.
 THE FU'I'ILE DREAM OF THE PERFECT GOAL

-----------
Negotiations on dernorcd~ons
Definite goal

-
Ambiguous
1 Interpretations of content /
Resources + + De facto results
Expectation -----------
Experience through action

Negotiations on demarcations
Experience

) TIME

PROJECTEXECUTION

Ftgure 1 4 3 Project execution - a process of goal formation.

Consequently, instead of the image of a linear process whereby the ini-

tially stipulated goal is directly translated into a final result, project
execution is better understood as a non-linear process of goal forma-
tion, revolving around stipulated goals, evolving expectations, negoti-
ated demarcations and gradually gained experiences (see Figure 14:3).
The point is that the definitive goal of the end of the project is related
t o the experiences of execution and that these experiences are usually
not available at project initiation.
To conclude; the quest for the perfectly-stipulated project goal is
futile. Projects will always be initiated on the basis of vague and limi-
ted knowledge of the future and what is politically possible at the time.
Projects will continue to be delayed, they will overspend, and they will
change in relation to their original intentions. Consequently, there will
also be cries for better goals and more detailed specifications in the
future, too. However, an understanding that the process of goal for-
mation continues throughout the entire project lifecycle will bring the
true nature of project management t o the forefront. Project manage-
ment is not - as it is sometimes depicted in textbooks - the passive pro-
cess of implementing already-defined objectives. O n the contrary, it is
the active art of creating conditions, meaning, and expectations for the
future. Taking this into consideration, project execution is seldom a
process of implementation; rather it is a journey of knowledge creation.
 Wha l
o jects ?
-
Yocesses

ODERLUND

Introduction
The question of "what is" a project may be differentiated from that of
"what goes on" in a project. Broadly, we associate the first question
with ambitions to define and specify structural characteristics of pro-
jects, and the second with various ways of conceptualizing the activiti-
es or processes involved. Moreover, while there is considerable agree-
ment in the literature as well as among practitioners as to "what is" a
project and the accompanying structural arrangements, we contend
there is far less convergence of views of "what goes on" in projects.
One central issue concerns the relevance of "rationalistic" accounts of
the project process. Above all, it is the traditional "planning-oriented"
project management literature that has been criticized for advocating
too simplistic recipes and for resting on overly "rationalistic" assump-
tions. Instead, critics argue, we should acknowledge the prevalence of
the not-so-rational processes involved and be open to the fact that even
other, alternative "rationalities" are important. Despite the attacks,
however, the normative literature on project management still, largely
unconcerned, suggests the skilful use of sophisticated planning techni-
ques as a sine qua non for successful project performance.
Apparently the view of project processes that is depicted in this plann-
ing-oriented project literature is a very resilient one. This should per-
haps come as no surprise. The idea that careful and extensive planning
should precede action has long roots, not only in project management
 WHAT GOES O N I N PROTECTS?

texts, but also in other management literature. Very few would argue
that this is not part of the truth. What most critics claim is rather that
it is not the whole truth or the most important part of the truth about
project processes. In sum we have traditional allegedly rationalistic
accounts of these processes as well as a number of good arguments pro-
blematizing these representations and suggesting, to a greater or lesser
extent, what would provide a better view of project processes. Obviously,
these discussions relate to conceptualizations of processes at a high
level of generality. Staying with such a level of analysis we will not deal
explicitly with process issues, for example at the individual or project
group level.
Against this background we will continue these efforts to explore the
question of how to conceptualize project processes. In doing so we are
going to present how some Scandinavian authors have chosen to comm-
ent on the planning-orientation of the traditional literature and their
ideas of possible amendments. While recognizing the merits of these
attempts we believe that especially the implications of "uncertainty"
being a characteristic of project processes are still not very well spelled
out. In order to take a step forward we suggest here a conceptualiza-
tion of project processes as constituting problem-solving or knowledge
development processes. In this respect we build mainly on Popperian
epistemology and some of the writings of Weick and March.
Phrased in an evolutionary terminology, we also present a simple
three-phase model of the project process, incorporating a pre-selection, a
variation and a learning phase. Generally, this model aims at displaying
how uncertainty is being reduced in a trial-and-error manner, through
iterations, each of which includes this three-phase scheme. Unlike most
other critics of the planning-oriented literature this model stresses the
importance of specific and relatively stable goals. It also explicitly ack-
nowledges that error elimination and "reality-checking" are vital ele-
ments of these problem-solving processes. Such a framing, we believe,
is rather easily translated into project practice. Furthermore, the
aspects that are stressed in our model are highly significant in many of
the firm-specific project process manuals that are used in practice.
Finally, while it is true that our approach is a kind of rationalistic
endeavor, it is very far from the traditional planning-oriented rationa-
lism discussed above. Instead it relies basically on the idea of "critical
rationalism" - a view of epistemology dating back to the Pre-Socratic
era of Greek philosophy (Popper, 1998).
LAKS L l N D K V l S T A N D J O N A S S O D E K L U N D

Scandinavian views on project processes

Within the normative literature on project management there is a
strong tradition of placing great importance on systematic planning
and careful a priori specification of project activities to be carried out.
This has been discussed extensively e.g. in Morris ( ~ q g q )Engwall
,
( ~ y g j )Soderlund
, (2ooob)and Berggren & Lindkvist (2001). Below we
will refer to this idea as the planning-oriented view of project process-
es. Generally this view is often discussed and illustrated in connection
with the project life cycle as codified in PMI (1987). In the figure below
we have also included the somewhat changed terminology of PMI
(1996), as the second row in the four boxes.

Concept Development Implementation Termination

Initiating Planning Executing Closing
--
Figure I J : I Project processes. Source: PMI (1987); PMI (1996).

The basic assumption of such a view is thus that project success is very
much a matter of establishing clear, operational goals in the first phase
and plans including breakdown and specifications of activities in the
second phase. If these two pre-execution phases are well managed the
actual project work will run smoothly and predictably. As argued by
Christensen & Kreiner (1991), however, the project is then turned into
a bureaucratic procedure that may be carried out rather routinely and
unconsciously - and when uncertainty is a significant feature such a
planning-oriented procedure will tend to be counter-productive. When
uncertainty is high, they argue, a goal-setting procedure cannot reduce
uncertainty enough. Attempting to further openness, agreement and
operationalization as to what isfshould be the project goal would rather
be to conjure uncertainty than to deal with it rationally. Instead, they
maintain, the critical issue during the goal-setting phase is to "create
motivation". Similarly, in the second phase, realistic planning is not
seen as an option; the role of plans is rather to provide useful symbolic
input for further communication and (again) for bringing about moti-
vation.
 WHAT GOES O N I N P R O I E C T S ?

"The plan will match actual outcome, not because plans build on
correct experiences and valid assumptions about prevailing circum-
stances, hut because the plan in itself motivates the participants to
reach the planned outcome" (Christensen & Kreiner, 1991, p. 75).

These authors apparently think of projects with a high degree of uncer-

tainty; especially they point out the importance of contextual uncer-
tainty, i.e. uncertainty originating from changes in the project's envi-
ronment throughout the lifetime of the project. In line with this view
they also stress that the fourth phase should contain a future-oriented
evaluation of what was learnt during the life of the project. Their
discussion thus centers on the first two phases and the fourth phase
giving less prominence to the implementation or execution phase. Pro-
ject leadership (rather than management), creating a platform for the
"exploratory" work of the project team, is the appropriate mode rela-
ting to this phase, they maintain. How the actual project work is carr-
ied out is very much seen as a matter for the participants to find out.
According to Lundin & Soderholm (1995), a theory of temporary
organization should somehow mirror "the apparent action orientation
in society today" (ibid, p. 437). Rather than building on the rational
assumptions underlying the decision-making perspective the idea is to
outline an action-based theory. They thus take issue with views assu-
ming that decisions and goal-setting precede action, that decisions
cause action, etc. There may be no logical connections between deci-
sions and actions and decisions may well come after action.
More specifically Lundin & Soderholm (1995) note that the major
drawback of normative project management literature is that it treats
projects as repetitive, ruling out renewal and uncertainty, typical of
many project contexts. In a constructive vein they also suggest that the
PMI (1987) linear four-stage model of project life cycle phases (con-
cept, development, implementation and termination) should be repla-
ced by a model displaying four slightly different phases (action-based
entrepreneuralism, fragmentation for commitment-building, planned
isolation and institutionalized termination) that in addition are over-
lapping with their relative importance varying throughout the project's
life cycle. For the most part these changes involve a critique of the
rationalism of traditional project management literature in two
respects. First, the argument is that the traditional concept or goal-for-
mulation phase does not put due emphasis on the need for entre-
L A R S L I N D K V I S T AKD I O N A S S O D E R L U N D

preneurship and the need to present a convincing rhetoric in order t o

legitimize and constitute the temporary organization. Second, with a
focus more directly on the issue of planning, they say that "plans are
important as action generators, but not primarily in an instrumental
way." Instead, they stress the point that plans have symbolic meanings.

"Well-elaborated and elegant plans show that planners are compe-

tent and efficient and may be trusted with responsibility for the tem-
porary organization. ... Symbolic connotations are as important as
the instrumental ones" (Lundin & Siiderholm, 1995, p. 448).

Apart from the instrumental value of plans as celebrated in normative

project management literature, these plans, by virtue of their symbolic
nature, also provide a "space" for action and thus support a kind of
symbolically mediated action rationality.
Another prominent exposition of the Scandinavian critique of tradi-
tional project management rationalism is the edition by Sahlin (1996).
Based on their empirical findings, mainly from public sector projects,
the contributors argue that project processes display many irrationali-
ties compared t o classical decision theory. Instead of picturing the pro-
ject process as a sequential process of goal formulation, planning and
execution, they especially question the assumption of aprioric goals
and the guiding role of plans. Goals, they argue, are most often unclear
and shifting throughout the process. What the project is about may
then differ substantially among the actors involved. In her contribu-
tion, Sahlin-Andersson (1996) develops this idea further, making it a
part of a "strategy of ambiguity" which may be necessary in order to
establish the project. To be attractive and engaging, a project should be
formulated as being dramatic and magnificent, as providing something
new, unique and extraordinary. Such a "strategy of ambiguity", she
notices, would also benefit those who like to keep critics and oppo-
nents away leaving some discretion to those working in the project.
In the Sahlin edition, most contributors maintain that plans often have
no relation to the reality of project work. Instead of being a guide for
action they point at their role as an instrument of persuasion, their role
of providing a legitimizing formal (rather than real) control, etc. Actual
project work will then be effectively decoupled from both goals and
plans. The circumstance that projects do not reach their goals, they noti-
ce, does not mean that they do not produce results. The outcome may be
 WHAT GOES O N IN PROJECTS?

better or "newer" than what was planned, much more may be learnt and
it may not even have been possible to start the project if goals and plans
were to be clearer at the outset. In sum, the message announced in the
introduction of the book is that the rational model should be abandoned.

"Common to most contributions in this edition is that rationalistic

ways of understanding projects are rejected - with more or less em-
phasis and frenzy" (Sahlin, 1996, p. I S ).

A comment.
Taking a point of departure in the PMI four-phase model of "what goes
on" in a project, we are able to summarize the Scandinavian critique.
Apparently both Christensen & Kreiner and Lundin & Soderholm
broadly accept the idea of four sequential phases, although they ack-
nowledge that in practice there will be considerable overlap among
them. What they take issue with is the notions associated with each
phase and the general planning logic that the model implies. Common
to them is that they are uneasy mainly with the first two phases. Goals,
they argue, cannot or should not constitute a firm corner-stone for the
following process. Nor is it possible to carefully plan and specify a
priori what activities will have to be carried out. For Christensen &
Kreiner it is the high degree of "contextual uncertainty" that turns pro-
jects into much more open affairs, where issues of motivation and lear-
ning rather come to the forefront. For Lundin & Soderholm as well
uncertainty is underrated by traditional literature, leading to its inabi-
lity to acknowledge the need for entrepreneurship and rhetoric and the
symbolic functions of plans. In Sahlin-Andersson similar ideas are
displayed and developed more fully into a "strategy of ambiguity" in
which the benefits of unclear goals, plans decoupled from actual prac-
tice, are also recognized.
At a more general level, the critique appears to be directed at the deci-
sion-theoretic assumptions permeating traditional project literature and
the underestimation of the degree of "uncertainty" typically involved. In
order to understand "what goes on" in a project we are therefore well
advised to acknowledge the rationalities connected to rhetoric, symbo-
lism and action orientation - all of which would appear as "irrational"
from the point of view of classical decision-theoretic perceptions.
L A R S LINDKVIST AND J O N A S SODERLUND

These critical arguments and suggestions no doubt provide a much

richer framework and vocabulary for describing and analyzing project
processes. Obviously, projects must deal with uncertainty and may well
be preceded by many disputes, conflicts, or may involve parties with
hidden agendas. Moreover, plans may have a motivational effect or sig-
nal that all contingencies have been carefully considered, although little
realism is involved.

. .. and a continuation
In furthering the ideas described above, one alternative would be to take
seriously the fact that many parties are involved and discuss how issues
of power and interests are played out in project processes. Another
alternative is t o continue on the theme of uncertainty. We will enter this
second path and try to carry the discussion a step forward by framing
the uncertainty issue within a knowledge development perspective. In
doing so, we will adhere t o a definition of "what is" a project stressing
the point that projects are characterized by having specific goals. Very
much unlike the ideas related to the first of the four phases discussed
above, we will thus conceive of such goals as being vital for the process
of generating knowledge in projects. As outlined below we suggest that
project processes may be seen as goal-directed learning processes.
Regarding the second of these phases we d o not disagree much with
the arguments presented above; when uncertainty is significant an
iterative approach rather than aprioric planning will be efficient (Lind-
kvist, Soderlund & Tell, 1998). So, in our view of projects, while
"what" t o achieve is typically rather well specified, it is very much up
t o the team t o find out "how" t o accomplish this, during the project
execution phase.
In some contrast with the Scandinavian critics, we will accordingly
focus mainly on the reduction of operational uncertainty related to the
implementationlexecution phase. Essentially we thus delimit our
discussion to the project level, mirroring also the fact that the kind of
industrial product development projects we have experience of (see
Berggren & Lindkvist, 2001) are plagued by lower degrees of contex-
tual uncertainty than those which the Scandinavian critics presumably
have in mind.
 WHAT GOES O N IN PROIECTS?

Project organization
The conception of "what is" a project held by most practitioners is that
of a form of organization where there is a group of individuals who
should carry out a certain task or solve a given problem. Moreover, the
goals to be achieved are specified, including the time and money at the
project's disposal. While projects have quite specific goals or expecta-
tions, it is up t o the team t o find out how the problems should be
solved. Project teams thus typically enjoy a considerable amount of
autonomy within limits set. Such a view of projects as a kind of organ-
ization form is also typically adhered t o in the literature, and it is not
a new one.

"A project is an organization unit dedicated to the attainment of a

goal - generally the successful completion of a developmental pro-
duct on time, within budget, and in conformance with predetermi-
ned performance specifications" (Gaddis, 1959, p. 89).

Letting an organizational unit focus on only one task or problem, and

dissolve after its completion is a principle that differentiates the project
idea from other organizational forms, e.g. the permanent function
organization (see Wheelwright & Clark, 19gzb). Another defining
characteristic is that projects have rather clearly specified goals, which
differentiates them from other forms recognizing the benefits of goal
ambiguity, such as the Garbage Can form (Cohen, March & Olsen,
1972). It should be noticed that the Scandinavian authors referred to
above are inclined t o accept rather a lot of such goal ambiguity and still
refer to them as projects.

Project organizing
Given our view of projects as associated with fairly well specified goals
or expectations, it is thus the uncertainty surrounding the issue of
"how" t o solve the problem that is brought into focus. In the termino-
logy of Weick (r996), such situations are "weak" in the sense that there
is limited or highly ambiguous guidance as to what actions should be
undertaken. In these situations local trial-and-error processes may be
relied upon to reduce uncertainty.
LARS LINDKVIST A N D JONAS S O D E R L U N D

"People make sense of uncertainty on a small scale by a stable pro-

cess of collective trial and error that resembles an evolutionary
system (Weick, 1979). And it is this small and tight learning process
that imposes structure on larger and looser situations. Both stable
personality and the stable collective improvisation of local evolution
are sources of structure when situations weaken and work experien-
ces come in fragments" (Weick, 1996, p. 44).

Such processes may be characterized as "organizing", as self-organi-

zing cycles of enactment, selection and retention. Moreover, Weick
argues, projects may be seen as relatively pure instances of organizing.
Organizing thus shapes projects, and projects are the medium through
which organizing is expressed. Firms working in uncertain environ-
ments, where surprises are commonplace, react by creating small
groups or projects, dealing with these by improvisation and experi-
mentation.

"There is basically no substitute for trial and error in dealing with

surprise" (Weick, 1996, p. 54).

It is thus such processes of organizing that generate the necessary

degree of stability or order that is initially missing in weak or low
degree institutionalized contexts. In the projects there is a continual
interaction between phases of open interaction and phases where more
stable structures are established (Weick, 1995). Through a series of
such iterations one may thus, step-by-step, approach a successful solu-
tion t o the project problem.

A process model
Project organizing thus constitutes a way of dealing with uncertainty.
A project team with a specified goal t o achieve and granted enough
autonomy may establish an iterative learning process enabling action in
the context of uncertain "how" situations. This is done through a kind
of trial-and-error process, the characteristics of which we will consider
in more detail below. Consistent with our emphasis on the project goal,
we start by identifying some important functions of goals in a project
context. We then approach the issue of imagination and variety and
 WHAT GOES O N I N PROJECTS?

finally we turn to the importance of critical reflection and learning. A

simple figure of the project process is also provided as a summary.

I. O n pre-selection and the function of goals

Etymologically the term "project" may be traced back to the latin verb
projicere, which may be translated by "throwing forward" (Bergman,
~ g q o p.
, 458). Throwing forward we believe is a central characteristic
in the "project way" of dealing with problems and "capturing" the
uncertain future. The comprehensive goal of the project may here be
seen as a long throw into the future, which in turn constitutes a selec-
tion context for many shorter trial-throws throughout the project pro-
cess. Goals in this way establish a pre-selection context that guides and
stimulates the subsequent variety of trials or experiments undertaken.
In a somewhat different manner of reasoning, Kreiner (1999) sugg-
ests that goals are important in allowing project members to establish
a division of labor. Unlike in markets, where completely autonomous
actors adjust their plans when they collide with those of others, a gui-
ding friction between parties must be established by design. Goals
allow the team members to create a division of labor and, based on
frictions encountered, to continually suggest adjustments and compro-
mises.
In describing evolutionary processes and stressing their trial-and-
error character, it is common to identify phases of variation, selection
and retention. Such a sequence indicates a biologistic analogy of a rich
and spontaneous variation of species that are selected on the basis of
how well they fit in with the environment. But if this means "variation
first - then selection" the analogy does not fit squarely within the con-
text of firms and projects. Here we always have someone who wants
something. Evolution is not only driven by environmental selection but
to a great extent "driven from within" by the agents' aprioric aims and
understandings (Popper, i q g z ) or enacted (Weick, ~ 9 9 5 )It. is a matter
of "guided evolution" (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000) or "evolutionary engi-
neering" (March, 1994). This is why a pre-selection phase is identified
in the model.
L A R S L I N D K V l S T AND JONAS SODERLUND

2. On variation and guesses

Variation is a second process precondition. Without a rich variation,
selection processes have no material to work on. So, when goals or sub-
goals are established, there is a demand for imaginative and innovative
individuals, who dare to guess and try all the thousands of ideas that
are typically generated in a complex problem-solving context. That
goals or images of what to achieve are inspiringly formulated is then
important.
Anyway, as it seems, people in general are rather imaginative. But
unfortunately our guesses are frequently quite bad and nevertheless we
are often unwilling to abandon them. As discussed in Popper (1972),
we are strongly inclined to form beliefs in regularities; many times one
observation will be sufficient to generate expectations. We also stick to
our "theories" and are more interested in verifying them than in falsi-
fying them. Similar human "weaknesses" in the context of organiza-
tions are recognized by March.

"They are inclined to see historical events as necessary events,

..
...They use extremely simple rules for attributing causality, . They
tend to conserve beliefs by interpreting ambiguous histories as con-
firmation of their own prior understandings" (March, IqqSa, p. 29).

3 . O n critical reflection and learning

Exposing our guesses to a critical examination will consequently be
important. Following Popper (1999) we need to work according to a
methodology that involves conscious and systematic attempts to
contradict our beliefs or expectations. By confronting guesses and
actual outcome, deviations and surprises are generated, promoting
reflection, sense-making and learning. A precondition for such a pro-
cess of knowledge development through "error elimination" is that we
have "reality data" that can withstand our expectations and produce
deviations. What should constitute reality data is fundamentally a matt-
er of decision, but as argued by Wandkn (1981) in many cases there
are also "hard facts" that are too salient to be ignored or theorized
away. That this will often be the case in the context of industrial pro-
ject activity is a reasonable assumption. Although short-term manipu-
 WHAT GOES O N I N PROJECTS?

lation is always conceivable, in the somewhat longer run technical fai-

lures, delays, budget overruns, customer complaints, etc., are likely to
be rather easily detected.
The knowledge development and learning processes described above
require critical reflection. Nurturing and "institutionalizing doubt" is
thus necessary (Weick & Westley, 1996). To interrupt and interpunctu-
re the project process at certain time intervals is an important means of
supporting the individuals' reflective thinking. The frequent use of
deadlines, milestones, practical tests and other moments of feedback in
practice, may be seen as an expression of such a need for regular "rea-
lity tests" of whether expectations are valid or not (see e.g. Lindkvist,
Soderlund & Tell, 1998).
The trial-and-error learning taking place in projects is a matter of
practical learning. Unlike traditional research endeavors, it continues
only until a satisfactory result is reached. A related difference is that the
problem has to be solved within a certain time frame, or else a solution
may not be of any value whatsoever. This means that the process, alth-
ough imaginative guesses are a core element, must not only eliminate
errors but also provide more and more "grounded guesses". So, while
error elimination and selection are important in this phase, we must
also assume that better and better guesses are generated. Only then will
it become a rational and converging learning process. In order to stress
this element of "positive" learning, this third phase is signified as "lear-
ning".

4. A summa y figure
In the analytical model suggested there are thus three phases or types
of activities associated with each iteration in the problem-solving pro-
cess. First, the model underlines that projects presuppose that someone
has a problem, an interest or a goal - providing some direction to the
creative imaginative efforts. Second, it stresses the need to promote
imagination and the generation of a variety of ideas, perspectives, guess-
es, etc. Third, to compensate for our limited guessing abilities and dog-
matism a critical methodology is advocated. Such a model of how
knowledge is developed and practical learning takes place through a
series of iterations is of course very far from providing a picture that
closely resembles the richness and idiosyncrasy of real life project
LARS LINDKVIST A N D J O N A S S O D E R L U N D

work. We do believe, however, that there is also a need for such simpli-
fied accounts of project processes - provided they actually catch some
of the reality of "what goes on" in projects.

PROCESS PHASE PRECONDITIONS CORE ACTIVITIES

1. Pre-selection Agents and intentions Pr~blern/~oa

formulation
l

2 . Variation Imaginative project Guessing, division of

participants labor, experimentation

3. Learning Critical methodology Empirical observation,

error elimination, reflection

Figure The
IJ:~ project process model.

Conclusions
In this chapter we suggest that the issue of "what goes on" in projects
may be approached from a problem-solving or knowledge develop-
ment perspective. Moreover, relying on the ideas of Popper and Weick,
our way of signifying the project process - by identifying phases of pre-
selection, variation and learning - t o some extent mirrors evolutionary
terminology. In a sense, this process view suggests the possibility of a
project methodology, a specification of vital aspects that should he
recognized in carrying out a project. In this methodology the impor-
tance of goals or expectations is highlighted. In order to guide further
efforts they should be reasonably clear and specific. Furthermore, the
need for critical inquiry and reflection, promoted by various procedu-
res for "reality testing", is stressed. A basic assumption is thus that
expectations are clear enough t o be contradictable and that there is also
such a thing as "reality data" with power enough to provide deviances
vis-i-vis expectations.
Obviously, "what goes on" in a project may be analyzed in many
ways and at many levels of analysis. Paralleling the approaches in plann-
ing-oriented project literature and those of the Scandinavian critics,
the terminology used in this chapter is of necessity a rather abstract
one, placing many important questions outside of its scope and
interest. At the level of analysis chosen, one central issue is the rele-
vance of rationalistic accounts of project processes and possible alter-
 WHAT GOES O N IN P R O J E C T S ?

native rationalities. As discussed earlier, assuming a context of less than

negligible complexity and uncertainty, the kind of planning-oriented
rationality, essentially suggesting a two-phase model of "plan first -
then execute", is hardly appropriate. The Scandinavian contributors
here rightly point at anomalies and contradictions in front of such
simplistic images of project processes and suggest that symbolic featu-
res and action rationalities may be even more important. In this paper
we suggest that yet another kind of rationality should be recognized -
a critical rationality - operationalized in a three-phase model to be used
iteratively in generating knowledge in a trial-and-error fashion.
The following is an edited version of an interview conducted under
false pretenses. 1 told Rolf Lundin that I was collecting life stories of
scientists - which was literally correct. I merely failed to mention that
the size of the sample was I . After the preparation of the present book
could no longer be kept a surprise, I asked Rolf for his corrections and
approval. I kept the form of an interview, however, because an inter-
view is a genre in itself, as David Silverman always reminds us,' and it
is a genre of both interaction and utterance.

BC: Let's begin as one does in in-depth interviews in psychology.

"What was the first event that you remember that's connected to your
professional life and career?"

RL: You know, when you said that you want to talk "about my career"
I was ready to cancel, because I don't feel that I've had a career. I've just
lived my life, that's all. It sometimes becomes a straight line when you tell
it, but in reality, it just happens to you. It's in the accounting of it that
one introduces causal links. But, why not? I can do it like everybody else.
So let's start by saying that I come from social class three-and-a-half.=

' "Perhaps, we all live in what might be called an 'interview society', in which interviews scem
central to malung sense of our lives." (Silverman, r993, p.19)
' A now forgotten official classification of employzcs in Sweden: group one were people with high-
er education, group two qualified workers, group three unqualified labor.
 THE LIFE O F A P R O J E C T RESEARCHER

BC: ? ? ?

RL: My father was a miner and my mother did some cleaning jobs, so
we were rather hard up. I was born in Uppsala, but grew up in Danne-
mora, a mining town where my father had a job. But it was a tem-
porary job, so we soon moved to the region of Vasterls.
One early memory is my father telling me, "You know, you don't
have to have the same life I've had". Something like that. My parents
didn't have any opportunities, economically speaking, to shape their
life in a different way, so I felt that all hopes were centered on me.
Sometimes I wondered, as many children do: "Are these really my
parents?" At any rate, that's what he said: "You need not have the life
that I had". Nothing stronger than that. Just as if he'd been struck by
the thought.
Then there was the school. I was rather good at it, even if it was a
small provincial school - several classes in one classroom. The next
stage was secondary school. You must know that in my family there
was some cousin on my mother's side who graduated from high school,
and that was the closest that any of us had come to higher education.
The day I was to start secondary school, my mother said just before
I left (I needed to travel into Vasteris, because we lived in the country-
side): "You know, it's not too late to change your mind. You can finish
elementary school and get yourself a job, like everybody else...". So it
must have been my own achievement motivation, or something, hecau-
se they never said "You must fight for a better life!", never asked me
what happened at school.

BC: How many children were there in your family?

RL: I have a sister nine years older; so I grew up practically as an only

child. I remember how hard up we were. My father was a construction
worker; they scrap construction timber or clean it after it has been used
for casting - a dirty, heavy job. He was a big, strong man, who had no
other ambitions. When I was adult, he told me that sometimes he didn't
know how to get money to pay for my bus ticket - the school was
about 8 kilometers away and it was too far to bike, especially as win-
ters were very cold in the 1950s.
And then I went to school and started thinking in terms of a "career".
I couldn't really talk about it at home. I could speak to the teachers. I
BARRARA CZARNIAWSKA

was always on good terms with the teachers - most likely because I was
obedient, orderly, and helpful. What did I want to be when I grew up?
A teacher seemed to be a good choice. We admired them and I'd heard
that they made good money. At any rate, this was a different job than
working in the mine or on a construction site. Then I thought about
becoming an officer in the military - I don't know where this idea came
from, because there was no such tradition in our family. Perhaps it had
to do with the fact that I was taller than the other children and ran
more quickly. For a while, at least, because they caught up with me
very soon. But for a while I felt like Superman.
I finished school in 1962, and went into military service for nine
months in rq6zlrq63. I still don't remember what made me choose
business economics at university. There was a teacher I liked very much
- politically extremely right wing - who made us cheer for Karl the
XIIth. But he was very good at mathematics and physics, and so was I.
And then I had a chum who was called Bjorn Staberg; he didn't do mili-
tary service, so he started university earlier than the rest of us did, and
enrolled at Goteborg School of Economics and Commercial Law. This
could be the reason that my classmate, Christer As, and I applied to
Goteborg rather than Stockholm. Christer was very eager to learn, so
we studied all the time and didn't have much of a social life. I rarely
went out in the evenings and I didn't feel at ease when I did. Still, this
was when I met my first wife.
At high school I felt very insecure with girls. I never understood
them, and 1 must admit that this is true even now. I thought that I'd
better dedicate myself to studies. And then there was Christer, who
always challenged me in a sense, because he liked to compete and to be
best at exams. I still remember the last exam I took - I almost failed
one subject. It was called Contemporary Organization Theory and
Axel Targama was responsible for it. I had to take an oral, because my
written test wasn't good enough. I must admit that it felt nice to be the
internal examiner at his doctoral thesis defense some years later.
But then it was all over and I still didn't know what to do. My diplo-
ma thesis focused on communication as an organizational problem - a
speculative work that I did in relation to a project concerning simula-
tion of traffic lights at crossroads. There was a person who wrote a
licentiate thesis on this topic and wanted help with communication
problems. Now when I see a really bad piece of diploma work, I think
of my own - usually to conclude that mine was worse. Because it was
 THE LIFE O F A P R O J E C T RESEARCHER

truly bad. It was completely unconnected to any kind of reality - just

to my fantasies. Nowadays I'd go to some company, talk to a traffic
engineer, visit a municipal unit ... But it was accepted, and next thing
I knew I was invited to join another project that had to do with traffic.
Walter Goldberg, then professor and chair of Personnel Administration
section at Goteborg School of Economics and Commercial Law recei-
ved some funds from the municipality, and they were all interested in
how to make traffic more effective with help of simulation. At Siemens,
they'd done a simulation study where they'd shown traffic flow on a
screen in the form of white dots wandering from left to right or back.
Our idea was to connect one crossing to another, then introduce signals
at a frequency that would require the smallest number of stops and the
shortest waiting times. It was technically oriented, and we were in con-
tact with traffic engineers in Goteborg. Uno Larsson and I wrote our
licentiate thesis together in two years, which, then as now, is quite a
short time.
I remember when we had our first reunion for the class of 1963, and
I was the only one who had a licentiate title. I rather liked the feeling.
My colleagues were a bit envious, but I was envious of them, because
they were "in the real world" and knew how it was, whereas I was still
at school. But I must say that it was great fun, though, even if we worked
hard. Walter Goldberg helped us to obtain a stipend from Copen-
hagen's Technical School so we were able to use their computer, an
IBM 7090 located in Northern European University Computing Center,
as it was called. It was the biggest computer in Northern Europe at that
time. It was very impressive at any rate. Lots of people were employed
just to take care of it, and we used the perforated cards. The program
itself was a big box, and we could play with changing the numbers of
crossings, connections between them, distances, traffic rules, likely
behaviors, etc. Eventually we could move it all to Goteborg, when the
university received an IBM 360 - the first truly powerful computer in
Sweden - but we'd also complicated the model so much that it became
very slow. It took the computer one hour to process the simulated
events of one hour, so the model wasn't really useful. But we'd learned
a lot about simulations, models, operation analysis, and such.
After that, I was offered a job of an "extra lecturer" - the f i s t such
position at the School of Economics and Commercial Law in Goteborg.
It was a new position in ~ 9 6 9It. included teaching. And what a night-
mare that was! Walter's idea was that somebody who took a C-course
R A R R A R A CZARNIAWSKA

in administration should be able to teach the very same C-course in

administration a year later. So because I knew some things about com-
puters, I was teaching programming. How to make programs to simu-
late traffic. But then, because I was connected to the Personnel Admi-
nistration section, I was also teaching there. One course went very well.
I'm still proud of it. But I remember some other occasions that were
total disasters. Another course in simulation: I had four hours to fill,
but I wasn't very experienced. I just told them everything I knew, and
it took two hours. And then what? I'll never forget that sinking feeling.
I stood there - 23, 24 years old - and they all looked at me.
Computers were very important then, together with the belief that
mathematics and statistics were the keys to all the problems a compa-
ny could have. I was good at mathematics and physics, so Walter Gold-
berg encouraged me to go to the States and learn more about it. The
school had a contract with Carnegie Mellon, even if it was mostly in
the behavioral sciences. In 1989, Goldberg organized a symposium in
Aspenas with, among others, Victor Vroom3 and Herbert Simon, the
Nobel laureate. I remember a walk we took in the park. I was walking
under the trees, and I thought: "Just think! I'm in the company of the
great of this world!" I had an impression of being touched by the wings
of history. There was also a statistician, Morris De Groot, a short,
small person, but with an incredibly strong voice. I never thought sta-
tistics was very attractive, but listening to him one thought it was
enchanting. All this contributed to this wish to go to America.
Of course America was a promised land for many generations. My
paternal grandfather went to America to earn a living. In my genera-
tion we went there to study. With industry untouched by the war, they
had room to maneuver at the universities that we couldn't even dream
about. So I applied for a Ford fellowship and was called for an inter-
view. I traveled to Stockholm and I didn't have to pay for it myself - a
new experience for me at that time. The interview took place in a suite
in the Grand Hotel, also a new experience for somebody from social
group three-and-a-half. The net result was that I was to go to Chicago.
It was the autumn of 1970,and I already had two children by my first
wife.
I met my first wife when I was in my last year of high school. She
came with a friend to Vasteris to take a course on arts and crafts, and

A famous scholar of work motivation, see e.g. Vroom (1964).

 THE LIFE OF A PROJECT R E S E A R C H E R

we were married in the spring of 1964. Our first worry was how to find
a flat in Goteborg? I'd been promised a room at a teacher's place on
LinnC Street, but the landlady made a mistake and promised the same
room to someone else. She gave us another room, but we could only
stay there for a month. So I ran around and found a place in a small
back building on Upper Hussar Street - a small kitchen and a small
room, no heating, gas, no toilet of our own. After that I got a student
flat, but we had to leave it when I got my diploma. We moved to Vastra
Frolunda (a suburb of Giitehorg) where we at least had a new flat, and
we lived there until we left for Chicago. Our first daughter, Petra, was
born in 1966 and our second, Anne, in June 1970. SO Anne was three
months old when we went to Chicago. But I had a family fellowship
and it was enough to live on.
It was a shock to come to Chicago. I'd been to the States before,
when I was doing those simulations, and I took a tour in 1968. But
when we came in 1970, it was the end of August or the beginning of
September, and the heat and humidity struck us as if we'd banged into
a wall. We took a taxi to a YMCA hotel where we were to stay until
we could move into our flat, and the driver told us immediately: "What-
ever you do, don't leave your luggage on the street". Then we moved
to our flat on 5zndStreet and started to get used to the cockroaches.
There was no air conditioning, of course. You know, if you've been out
in the cold and come into the warmth of a room, you feel drowsy. We
learned that it works the other way around, too. Regenstein Library a t
the University of Chicago had air-conditioning, and it was so pleasant
to sit there and feel cool. But we felt drowsy and practically fell asleep.
Not good for studying.
Graduate education was very different in the States than in Sweden
at that time, where Walter Goldberg would say: "Read these books and
then come and take an exam". In the USA they had courses like in under-
graduate education. I chose Management Science because it was my
thing and I chose the University of Chicago because I'd met those people
from Carnegie Mellon already. But it so happened that many of the peo-
ple at Chicago came from Carnegie Mellon and had many contacts there.
So even though I was at Chicago, my advisor was from Carnegie: Tom
Morton - young and very enthusiastic.
But the first thing to do was to choose courses. I thought: "organi-
zation or personnel administration". But my adviser was against it.
Nobody took such courses in Management Science; the proper courses
BARBARA C Z A R N l A W S K A

were in Production Management. So I took those, but I took courses in

organization theory and sociology on the side as well.
One thing I need to mention is that I hear badly. I'd been in an acci-
dent - an explosion - and not only I do not hear well, but I also have
an impaired discrimination ability. So when I listened to the lectures
and discussions, especially in sociology, I had to guess what they were
saying. Management Science and mathematics courses were easier in
that sense. In one of those courses I got an idea that I wrote down and
showed to my adviser. He became incredibly enthusiastic, and after I
finished my dissertation we wrote some papers together. It turned out
that my idea could be developed in several directions, all of them use-
ful in Management Science. The idea was that for stock systems in pro-
duction with concave costs, one could calculate the optimal size of the
stock without complete information about the future. I left the paper
with my adviser in October 1972, and in April 1973 we went home,
my dissertation almost ready. We had three children when we left,
because we'd adopted a black baby who we called Par in the autumn
Of 1971.
I really wanted to go home. I hadn't even been talking on the phone
to my parents. We'd only exchanged letters, and we'd been gone for
two-and-a-half years. It was fun, even if I would never want to live in
Chicago again, but now it was time to go home. I could do the last
simulation at home, which I did. And I went back to Chicago in August
1973 to defend my thesis.
During our stay in the States, the shortage of flats in Goteborg had
developed into a surplus. We found a flat in Vastra Frolunda again,
and I had a research job at the School. I tried to continue writing about
Management Science, but somehow I didn't feel like it, although it was
supposedly my thing. Also, when 1 came back to the Department of
Business Administration in 1973, I noticed that everybody seemed
down. Everything seemed wrong. Everybody talked about crisis and
troubles. There were no students and no money, and Walter Goldberg
was away most of the time. I don't know what made me think of it, but
I decided to interview them. What was the trouble? When I left in
1970, everybody seemed to be on the top of the world. And now it was
exactly the other way around. Also, the interest in Management Science
seemed to be lost. On my way back from the States I'd been thinking,
"Here I come, a star, a graduate in two-and-a-half years, something
that has never happened before, even at Chicago Business School".
 THE LIFE O F A PROJECT R E S E A R C H E R

And here, instead of people partaking in my triumph, I found those

depressed teachers. "OK", I thought, "I will try to put it into numbers.
You say that you have fewer students. How many did you have last
year?" And then I drew a diagram.
So it all begun with statistics, as I thought that it would be easy to
compare what they said with facts. After all, there are registrations
figures, and such other numbers. But I soon noticed some interesting
phenomena. Everyone was of the same opinion: crisis, trouble, cata-
strophe, anxiety, uncertain future. But as to the reason, or at least the
background to these feelings, here I found a whole scale of explana-
tions. The actual facts behind it did not seem to interest anybody. I
really could see the social construction of reality, the importance of that
which people experience rather than that which is. I wrote a small
essay about it and invited people from the Personnel Administration
section to a seminar. They all came; or at least most of them came, list-
ened, said that it was interesting, and then left. Only Sten Jonsson
remained, and we talked for a very long time. Then he said, "What if
we do a study of organizations in crisis?" Sten had, at that time, done
studies of investment companies and had a lot of insights, but hadn't
done anything with them. And as we'd heard that the municipality of
Goteborg was in crisis, we studied it.
Goteborg had too few flats in the 1960s, so the municipality made
an enormous investment in the construction of new flats, creating a flat
surplus and a budget deficit. As a result, it landed in an economic crisis
that was supposed to be cured with changes in the administrative system.
We had no access problems because a great many of our colleagues from
School worked there. So we interviewed people and heard this story
that you've surely heard many times since: about overall budgets,
about the longest escalator in Europe that was to be built in Goteborg,
and so on and so forth. We were surprised, as we'd expected some kind
of an analysis of a present situation, and they'd regaled us with stories
of the past instead.
In the meantime, Walter Goldberg became the head of an institute
that was a part of Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin, and we went there
to write what was to become "Myths and wishful thinking as manage-
ment Perhaps I should not say so myself, but I think it is a very

' Jonsson, BC Lulldin (1977)

BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA

good article. My high evaluation might have to do with the fact that
for me it was a total relearning - writing in a completely different tra-
dition. On the one hand, it was only then that I understood that an
operation analyst is a very lonely person, at least an operation analyst
in the US tradition. It was pure mathematics that one did, sitting alone
in one's office. In operation analysis, one never had a reason to go "out
there", to the field of practice. On the other hand, there was a large
group of people who were interested in the results. Also, because I'd
graduated so quickly, I hadn't used up my fellowship, and I had enough
money left to go to a Management Science conference in Tel Aviv and
present my dissertation. Harvey Wagneri was in the audience, and I
remember that he came to me afterwards and said: "Yes!". I could
easily have stayed in that field.
Sidney Davidsson, who was then the Dean at Chicago School of
Business, called me in the autumn of 1973 and asked if I wanted a job.
I said that unfortunately I have promised to stay in Sweden that year,
but perhaps next year? But then I started to interview my colleagues,
and then we went to visit the municipality, so "next year" never mate-
rialized.
Sten and I didn't have any special analytical tool, although we tran-
scribed the interviews in detail. But most important for the analysis
itself, I thought, was the time that took us to drive home from the inter-
views. Luckily there were always red lights on A ~ e n u e ,so ~ we had
many chances to analyze the interviews. As you know, this essay was
published in Prescriptive Models of Organizations, and Bill Starbuck
made us revise it several times. He wanted us to write a text that was
short, direct, and well-articulated. Perhaps that's why I feel it was
good.
Walter Goldberg and Ulf af Trolle had also interviewed people in
Goteborg in connection with their work, "Need municipal taxes
g r o ~ ? " S. O~ between these two papers, Goteborg municipality was
being interpreted as a manic-depressive organization. The people we
interviewed liked it, and they liked "to be there", in the text. It created
an opportunity for a dialogue that I appreciated very much. Soon we
started doing it en masse, so to speak. There was the story of Vasterbs,

See e.g. Wagner (1969).

T h e main street in Goteborg.
Goldberg, 81 af Trolle ( ~ 9 5 8 ) .
 THE LIFE OF A PROJECT R E S E A R C H E R

the story of Malmo, and a similar one about Alingsls. The story about
Malmo was called "The Lord's anger is the birth of w i ~ d o m " .Stellan
~
Malmer and Bjorn Brorstrom went to Lulei and wrote "Lulei after
two days of hockey". Soon there was a small group. Perhaps it was Sten
Jonsson who kept us together. At any rate we began to receive money
for research, and that was new! The "myth and wishful thinking"
study was donc during working hours and fuelled by our personal en-
thusiasm.
When we were still in Berlin writing our paper, I received a letter
from my wife. She wanted a divorce. I couldn't understand it. Our
adopted son, Par, was only 4 years old, and our biological daughters,
Anna and Petra, were 5 and 10.I took this letter very hard, and tried
to work through it, but my heart wasn't in it anymore. I felt like I'd
been hit by lightning. When I came back, I was given custody of the
three children, and I lived alone with them in the house we'd bought in
Kungbacka. I went to the office, feeling that I wasn't taking proper care
of the children; then I went home, feeling that I wasn't doing what I
ought to at the office.
Even before I went to the States, I'd worked halftime as Director of
Studies, and later 1was asked if I wanted to be head of the department.
It seemed like a perfect job in the peculiar state of mind I was in then.
It was so easy, and I didn't need to care, didn't need to be deeply cornm-
ited - it worked smoothly anyway. It seemed that all that was needed
was to listen to what people had to say, then summarize it. It was very
different from my previous way of relating to my work with a total
commitment. I remember that we had a very sensitive recruitment pro-
blem, and the then-powerful professor of marketing was involved. I
asked him to come to a board meeting and invited him to present his point
of view, and then said "Thank you. Now we know what we needed to
know. Thank you for coming". I could hear him unloading his fury
outside in the corridor, but I couldn't have cared less. I knew I was
doing the right thing, that the conflict could have degenerated if he'd
been allowed to remain.
I was awarded the title of Associate Professor in 1976,~and soon
after began to apply for chairs. The first was close to Management

"Hermns fruktan ar vishetens begynnelse" is a motto wrirren on one of Malmoe's secondary

schools.
Docent; in Sweden, like in the traditional European system, it is a title, not a position.
BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA

Science; I believe it was called Production Management and was in

Goteborg. The second was in Lund, and the guy who got it was Head
of Personnel in Malmfalten during the big strike." Those of us who
didn't get the job used to joke that his main merit was his participation
in this historical event, and who knows if he hadn't caused it himself.
Jokes apart, at that time one had to give a trial lecture during the inter-
view for a chair, and it was a first for me. I came to Lund the day before,
but I couldn't sleep all night. The best I can say about my lecture was
that it ended exactly when it was supposed to end.
And then came the opportunity in Umed. It was sort of obvious to
me that I needed to become a professor - the achievement motivation
again, or something. Also, at that time I met my second wife. She was
perfectly beautiful, always attracting attention wherever she went. She
was also divorced, with two children, so all of a sudden we had five
children. We were married in 1978. We became very close, much clo-
ser than I was with my first wife. When my first wife left me, I disco-
vered that she was a person I did not know. I was so much closer to my
second wife, but she was very unstable, and it wasn't easy to have all
these children. But I applied for a chair in General Management in
UmeH, and I got it. My second wife lived there something like a year,
perhaps less. In the spring of ~ 9 7 she
9 returned to Goteborg.
It was not unproblematic to come to Umei. People were afraid that
I would start to introduce "Goteborg order". I was the only professor,
and I had a lot of teaching to do. The expectations were extremely
high, internally and externally. There were people there who hadn't
met a professor in a long time, and here I was - and the same age as
they were, too. I was 3 5 when I came to Umei, and most people at the
department were between 28 and 3 6.
The university was rather young, too; it had been founded in 1966.
There was money and there was room for initiative, but there were also
many conflicts. One thing I didn't like was that there were a great many
unfinished doctoral dissertations. So I saw to it that they were finished,
something that I'd already tried to do in Goteborg when I was an
Acting Chair there.
Then the idea of a School of Business and Economics - a section
within the Faculty of the Social Sciences - was born. It was an ambi-

'"In 1968, the workers in the mines went on strike against the Swedish state, the owner of the
mine, in spitc of the union\ decision not to.
 T H E LIFE O F A PROJECT RESEARCHER

tious plan. It was to be a big department - although small compared

with Goteborg, where Business Administration alone had three or four
professors. In Umed it was a small group, but with a lot of diverse ideas,
and not many outside contacts. It was as if there was nothing outside.
There were a great many students, many from the neighboring part of Fin-
land, who didn't have university economics. At any rate, in the mid-1980s
we had the feeling that we had to do something more distinct out of this
kind of education. Start recruiting people in the real sense of the word,
and see to it that students graduate in time. I was trying to instill this
thought about the School, and whenever there was a problem, I used to
point out that we could have avoided it if we had had a Business School.
I started to perceive that as a project, as a result of a random
exchange with Siiren Wibe, professor in economics. He came to the
cafeteria once and asked me: "So how are things with that School of
Business and Economics there?" He didn't mean much, I imagine, but
I thought: "I will show you all yet!" It wasn't easy, because the univer-
sity had a history of being "red", especially the sociology department.
The School of Business was automatically perceived as the capitalist
lackey, and all that. But people became more and more convinced. I
talked to Lars Beckman, then-President of the university, and asked his
opinion. "Hum," he said, "It doesn't sound bad, not bad at all." So I
mobilized myself, and called Sven Johansson, who was the County
Governor at that time. I said to him: "You know, I've been thinking
that we could start something like a Norrland School of Business and
Economics here. Could you imagine supporting such an initiative?" He
said, "Yes", without hesitation. To think that I rang him because I did
not dare to go and see him in person! What remained was to convince
people at the university, and this was not easy. The economists said:
"What's that now!" The business administration people were more
convinced when they learned that there was external help. It was very
important that the president's office was behind the idea. There were a
lot of letters to write and they did that.
Sven Johansson managed to mobilize all the important people in
industry around this idea of a School of Business and Economics in
Norrland." We went to LuleH, Ostersund, and Sundsvall and tried to

" For traditional reasons, degrees from professional schools are mure appreciated by Swedish
employers than those from universities. Thus faculties and deparrments at universities try to
exploit the old brand names, creating "schools", which, however, are now closer to the US tra-
dition (faculties) than to older European one (Hochschule).
BAKBARA CZARNIAWSKA

sell the idea of a multi-campus school with a center in UmeH, because

Umeg had the only complete university. They were not interested, and
forbade us to use the name "Norrland School", but the County Gover-
nor was not easily discouraged. We had often been to his residence at
8:00 on Saturday mornings. He was very enthusiastic and helped in
many ways. Handelsbanken donated SEK I 5 million and he soon turn-
ed it into 35. And don't forget that we are talking about the end of
1980s. That was a lot of money then. At that point the president's office
founded a formal organization called School of Business and Econo-
mics, basically against the will of the economists.
We also had advice from the then-President of Carnegie Mellon,
Richard M. Cyert, and his aide, Bernie Goldsmith. All in all, it became
quite conventional, but we did get donations; we could recruit new
professors; and we did create a brand.
I also remember, when I came to UmeH, that T was quite surprised at
the party-going life style that was prevalent - very different from Gothen-
burg. We had quite a few Finns, and when they party, they party! It was
very much a youth culture, and that time should have been past for me,
but I'd never been in a situation like that before. So I had to participa-
te, even if I didn't always think it was much fun.
But we had a big party when we inaugurated the School in 1990, and
that was fun. During all my time as the School's Dean I was very stingy,
but that party was big. We had a brass band and something like 1000
people in our biggest lecture hall. Representatives for the entire Norr-
land industry were there. It was a moment of triumph, although those
sour economists sat there making faces.
I almost forgot the journal! I don't remember exactly how it did
begin, but I had been thinking that Swedes publish so little in foreign
journals, it would be good if they could get a little training. We discuss-
ed it at a conference in Copenhagen in 1983, and then we contacted
Doxa, a publisher from Lund. The owner had a somewhat mixed repu-
tation, but he was enthusiastic, and wanted to publish something
"exquisite", he said. There were people from other Nordic countries,
but the Scandinavian journal of Management was mostly a Swedish
initiative: Sten Jonsson's, Lars Engwall's, and mine. I was the founding
editor, and did many things quite intuitively. When it came to the Edi-
torial Board, I contacted people who I'd gotten to know over the course
of years, and everyone with the exception of Herbert A. Simon agreed.
He said he had too many other things to do, but he thought that it was
 THE LIFE O F A P R O J E C T RESEARCHER

a very good idea. Jim March immediately sent a paper, and I didn't
know what to do with it. But I sent it to three independent reviewers,
who came back with very harsh comments. But you know what?

BC: Let me guess: they said that his English had to be corrected?

RL: No, no. Two of them thought I had written it myself. I was rather
pleased, but I was less pleased with my situation. They had quite a few
strong comments. So I sat down and wrote a letter to Jim, and told him
to react. I met him some years later, and he was so pleased: "You know,
I don't get enough criticism nowadays!" I really liked doing the editing.
I received heaps of submissions from Finland. It was as if they had all
those papers in their drawers waiting for an opportunity to let them
out. Some were good and some were less good, but I liked the job. It
was a bit like that with the School: had I only known what it really
meant before I even began thinking about it... But I hadn't, and maybe
that's the reason anything ever gets done. About four years later,
though, I felt that it was too much, and Sten Jonsson took over the editor-
ship.
At a certain point I was tired - with all internal conflicts, all the
work. But then I found a hole in the ice that let me slip up and catch
my breath. It was Anders Edstrom, who suggested that I could start
working for FA-rldet.lZI went to Stockholm and met Hans Wirdenius,
originally a psychologist, who was responsible for research in the con-
struction industry. We decided to do a study of a corporation called
Dios, a very well known construction company in existence since 19 I 8,
whose founder, Anders Dios, was still alive at that time.
It was a family firm that landed in trouble in the 1980s. They deci-
ded to recruit a managing director from outside - a construction engi-
neer whose name was Nils Nilsson. Really and truly, that was his
name. So we went to study this company. I've been shy all my life, but
what I did not expect was that Hans, who was 20 years older than I,
was even more shy, if possible. We sat there, at the FA-rldets office in
Stockholm, and waited for Nils Nilsson to come to be interviewed. A
couple of minutes before the appointment, Hans turned to me and said:
"Right! You run this, and I'll take notes". I didn't even know where

" An independent Council for Research on Enterprise and Work; it does not exist anymore
BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA

their money came from; I knew nothing about them, but I could see
that there was no way out, In came the guy, a military type if I ever saw
one, with steel gray eyes - I don't know if you know what I mean -
those eyes that look at you and you have the feeling that they can see
through you. It was the most difficult interview I have ever conducted.
Whenever I formulated a question, he would turn those eyes on me and
I would think, "What an idiotic question!"
We tried to depict Dios as Nils Nilsson saw it when he joined the
company. At that point, Dios employed five thousand people in Swe-
den and abroad, but everything was concentrated on and around
Anders Dios. It was a family firm: grandchildren all over the world
were the owners. We interviewed Anders Dios, too. It was very interes-
ting, because Diiis and Nilsson were opposites. It was also difficult
because if I have hearing problems, Anders Dios did not hear a thing.
We gave him written questions. He was very tall, almost two meters,
with arms that moved like windmills, 94 or 95 years old. He took our
questions and didn't pay any attention to them, just told his story. He
was totally uncontrollable. We learned that he was in his office seven
days a week. His driver worked for him for the whole week, and they
went visiting construction sites. He did it even after he fractured his
thighbone in the bathtuh. People at the site feared his visits but looked
forward to them. And then there was Nils Nilsson, whose main task
was to change the company and its culture. It didn't work: his rational,
bureaucratic, and analytical style was opposed from the very start.
Finally the twelve owners got together and appointed a new managing
director. Dios died, and the company turned into a real estate compa-
ny that still exists. Hans and I tried to describe all this in our book."
Nils Nilsson took a look at our manuscript and said: "I didn't think
you were going to write about me. 1cannot even show it to my wife!"
Eventually it came out right. I liked the book, and it gave me a break
from this work of organizing the School.'"
Hans was involved in the Project Management Institute since its
inception, and we went to several conferences to present our work on
Dios. We met with a very good response, and I became interested in

" Lundin, & Wirdenius ( ~ 9 8 9 )

" Project Management Institute (PMIB),founded in 1969, is a nonprofit professional association
in the area of Project Management. It has over 70,000 members worldwide (HYPERLINK
"http://www.pmi.org", accessed o r o j o g ) .
 THE LIPP, O F A PROJECT RESEARCHER

projects as a theme and a trend. We were joined by an economic histo-

rian, Eskil Ekstedt, and Anders Siiderholm from the School in UrneH,
and we applied and received money to study projects in Swedish busi-
ness and industry. The book published by Routledge is one result of
this." It was fun to write it, although it took longer than we planned.
We didn't live as we preached, but we had so many interesting discuss-
ions that I finally had to remind my co-authors that we had a contract
with Routledge.

BC: You seem to be forgetting the special issue of Scandinavian Jour-

nal of Management dedicated to project^.'^ I tell all my students to read
it.

RL: Yes, we did it on the side. We tried t o mobilize Swedish resear-

chers, so we organized a conference in Lycksele in 1994.At that tlme
we didn't know of many: Mats Engwall at Royal Technical School in
Stockholm, and then my doctoral students, Johann Packendorff and
Tomas Blomqvist. At that point we even got some money from the
Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research to make a sur-
vey of the area, and that was the basis for Johan Packendorff"~licenti-
ate thesis, which must be the most quoted ever. But then he writes so
well. So he wrote a paper for this special issue," and then Anders
Soderholrn and I tried to theorize around the issue, and this paper is
also quite well quoted.18 I even got a Frenchman to write for us -
Christophe Midler. He came to the Lycksele conference, too - 3 5 people
from all over the world. Some people still think it was the best work-
shop they have ever been to. And it wasn't a bad special issue, either.
Midler organized the next conference, in Paris, and already there
were 5 5 or 60 people. One of them was Francis Hartman from Cana-
da, so we suggested that the next conference should be in Calgary.''
The latest was in Sydney in zooo; the one in 2002 will be in Rotter-
dam, organized by Rodney Turner, who is the chair of the European

'' Ekstedt, Lundin, Sijderholm, &Wirdenius (1999).

" Packendorff (1995).
'; Packendorff (1995).
'' Lundin, & Soderholrn (1995).
'9 Both conferences have been documented in edited books: Lundin (1yg8) and Lunditl, & Hart-
man (zoooa).
BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA

equivalent of PMI. And PMI numbers 100,ooo members in zooz.

When I joined them in 1995 they had 17,000, and I thought that it was
the most gigantic conference there could be - thousands of partici-
pants. So you could say that the interest in projects was spreading.
Even in Umei, our numbers were growing. And all this happened
because I was tired of administrative duties and wanted to return to
research, and because Hans Wirdenius needed somebody to do the
Dios project. So it was a great sorrow to me when he passed away,
right in the middle of editing of that Routledge book. I miss him a lot.
But there is another culprit who helped to send me the way of pro-
jects: my partner, Laila. I met her after I went through my second divorce,
sometime during the summer of 1979. She's an architect and she took
her job home quite often. I don't mean to say that she worked at her
drawing-table, but she talked about construction projects: how diffi-
cult it was to realize them, how people withdraw from their commit-
ments, or how things get muddled up.. . I remember a beautiful winter
day, sparkling snow, when we walked and she told me about her work,
and then 1 thought, all of a sudden: "Here is a potential study object!
Construction companies are responsible for projects, and we used to
study companies, but why not study projects?" In this way, we ended
up having a common professional interest, even if she wonders over the
idea of studying it. What is there to study? After all, it is obvious. But
we talk about it a lot. Besides, she's a very good watercolor painter,
practically professional - she has had exhibitions and such. One exhi-
bition had a theme, or rather I christened it "Gnarled houses" - all
these dream houses she isn't allowed to draw at her job. So you see this
topic is an extension of our jobs into our personal lives, and a connec-
tion between us. We get along together very well, she and I.

BC: Do you live together?

RL: Yes, since 1984. We were meeting regularly since 1979, but at first
it was too complicated to move together, with children and all. She has
one son and one daughter. But we have been living together a long
time, and I know her family very well. Her mother was an exceptio-
nally good person. I don't think she ever spoke with malice about any-
body in her life. She died at the same time as Hans. It was difficult to
get used to the thought that they left.
 T H E LIFE OF A PROJECT R E S E A R C l l E R

BC: So, what are you going to do now?

RL: (laughing) If I only knew! I've studied projects quite a while now
- it'll be something like a ten-year anniversary soon. I have a black
notebook where I write down all my good ideas. There aren't many
pages left in this notebook. I don't know. The project theme attracts
much attention and many people, so it becomes almost overcrowded,
if you see what I mean. Then it also becomes more and more specific,
so we're back where we started - at the engineering level. What was a
bit exotic now becomes omnipresent. But I'm still keen on co-organi-
zing that international conference, because it is stimulating. This con-
tact network that we have all over the world is very special, and the
combination of scholars from economic sciences, social sciences, and
engineering is special too. The other summer PMI had its first research
conference. Previously the meetings were mainly for practitioners. I
was an invited speaker at that conference.

BC: Does this mean that you're not afraid of public speeches anymore?

RL: No, not any more. 1 believe that the fear had to do with my
upbringing. My mother and my father weren't shy at home, but it was
only my father who was somewhat outgoing. He would play a sort of
a charming urchin, especially after few drinks, while I was much more
inhibited. I remember those frightening experiences when I had to
make a presentation at school or stand up in the front of the class. I
remember that my best friend told a story of Little Red Riding Hood
and the wolf and everybody laughed at him. He was 12or 13 years old,
and he felt destroyed. Luckily for me, I could play the accordion. I
could take it and play a piece, and what could they say? At the most,
the teacher would say: "Didn't you tap the rhythm a bit too fast with
your foot?" That was about all the criticism 1 got.
But it has always been difficult to speak to a bigger audience. I tend
to think of myself as a very bad lecturer. All my energy goes into sur-
viving the experience of standing there in front of an audience. But now
I've got over it. I've noticed that in some contexts I'm really quite good
at it. I was president of a Rotary Club at the end of the 1980s, and it
was part of my duties to introduce every meeting, so I had to find
something new to say every time. And I noticed that it wasn't so diff-
icult after all. It's easy to get people to laugh and to relax. So now I
BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA

actually like to give speeches at celebratory dinners and such. I don't

speak for long, but I try to do it well. One of the members in the Rotary
Club tells me whenever I meet him: "You were the best president we
ever had."
It could also have to do with the fact that for a long period I had so
many troubles and sorrows that I simply could not care less. When
people told me to give a talk or teach a course I would think: "If they
don't like what I do they can take somebody else." Whereas before, I
tried to be perfect, and it didn't work. I watch my son, Par, with a cer-
tain envy. He's such a happy-go-lucky type; he never worries. He plays
football like a god. Not only does he look like a god, but also plays
football divinely. Like I dreamed about being able to play. The inhibi-
tions of youth weigh heavily over life. But with age, people are more
prone to listen, as well. When I began to serve as the adviser for the
Swedish Council of Humanities and Social Science Research, in a group
where everybody was very loquacious, it wasn't easy to get my ideas
across. Now I've noticed that people listen to what I have to say. This
is a new feeling. It hasn't been my experience before. It must be age.
Things change with age. Think that one of my most raving adversa-
ries at the time when I was working to create School of Business and
Economics turned out to be one of the people behind the proposal to
award me the Nordbank Scientific Prize for 1999. They gave me SEK
~oo,ooo,which is practically all my fortune, considering how poorly
we are paid in this profession.
But, you know, now and then, deep inside, I feel again like that litt-
le boy who dreaded a presentation in front of his class.

Post Scripturn (Rolf A. Lundin)

Since the mock interview was made, I was head-hunted for the dean-
ship of JIBS (Jonkoping International Business School). I accepted the
challenge and have held the job since May 2001, so I am no longer at
Umei. Reading the interview chapter under these new circumstances
was quite an odd experience. When I finished the first reading, I know
exactly how Nils Nilsson felt ("I cannot even show it to my wife!").
The story is simply incoherent and too much of "I" and "me", extre-
mely egocentric. On the other hand, Barbara asked me about my life
story. But some of the material is also very close to the forbidden area
-things you generally only talk about if you know that you can confi-
 T H E LIFE O F A PROJECT RESEARCHER

de what you say to the listener - the ethical aspect. And even at that,
so much is left out. 1 mentioned only a few of "my" 3 0 or so Ph.D.s.
Professor Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson is not part of the story, even
though she wrote "my" first (i. e., her) thesis on projects.
It also appears that too much of feelings and whims rather than
planning took over my past life. In general, my generation does not like
to think of itself in that way. O n the other hand, one of the seven theses
at JIBS during my first year as Dean is all about emotions in manage-
rial work.'' In a sense, that thesis might legitimize this kind of approach
of relative openness.
So all in all, 1 have decided t o go along with the suggestion that the
interview be made public, even though I am not too happy with my
own contribution to the piece. Considering the contents of the chapter,
I cannot help but wonder what the story might have been if Barbara
had interviewed me on another day and in another mood. My guess is
that the story would likely have come out differently. Thus, a serious
question I have for Barbara concerning the narrative genre is: "What
can you learn from life stories of this type?"

BC: I leave the answer t o the readers.

" Rrundin ( 2 0 0 2 )
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 Author presentations

Barbro Anell is professor of management at the Umed School of Business

and Economics. She is currently working at the Center for Regional and
Tourism Research, Denmark. Her main research interests involve
change on different levels of society, from the single firm and the region
to supranational institutions like the EU and the role of competition in
driving change. A central theme is the evolution of island economies.

Maria Bengtsson is Ph.D. and associate professor in Business Admini-

stration at Umed School of Business and Economics. Her main resear-
ch focus is on cooperation and competition in business networks. She
has also investigated new organizational forms, their impact on busi-
ness relations and organizing processes. Among her publications is the
book Climates of competition (Harwood Publishers, 1998).

Tomas Blomquist is assistant professor at Umed School of Business and

Economics. His research interests are project management, relations
between firms and projects, and working life in projects.

Barbara Czarniawska holds the Skandia Chair of Management Studies

at Gothenburg Research Institute, School of Economics and Commer-
cial Law, Goteborg University. She is also a titular professor at the
European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Brussels. Her
research focuses on control processes in complex organizations, most
recently in the field of big city management.

Eskil Ekstedt is professor at the National Institute for Working Life and
the School of Business, Stockholm University. His research has been in
the field of economic and organisational development and its relation-
ship with knowledge formation. At present the focus is on local trans-
formation of business and working life. Co-author of "Neo-Industrial
Organising" (Routledge, 1999).

Mats Engwall is associate professor at Center of Innovation and Ope-

rations Management at Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), Swe-
den. He is also research director at the Fenix Research Program, a joint
 AUTHOR PRESENTATION

venture between Chalmers University of Technology and SSE. He also

holds a visiting position at Umed School of Business and Economics.
His research revolves around issues concerning project organizing, pro-
ject process dynamics, multi-project settings, and the management of
Industrial R&D.

Jessica Eriksson is a doctoral student at the Department of Business

Administration, UmeH School of Business and Economics. Her research
interests include cooperation and competition, industrial change and
the organizing of projects. Her thesis deals with changes in the Swedish
dairy and brewing industries during the 1990s.

Sten Jonsson holds the chair Scandinavian Management at GRI, School

of Economics and Commercial Law at Goteborg University. He held
the Accounting & Finance chair at the same school 1976-96, was the
editor of the Scandinavian Journal of Management between 198s and
2001, and chairman of the Scandinavian Academy of Management
during its first 7 years. He has published internationally on team work
and o n regulation of good accounting practice. He is currently doing
research on communication in multi-cultural teams (product develop-
ment, integration of mergers). He is doctor honoris causa at Turku
School of Economics and Commercial Law.

Henrik Linderoth is assistant professor at Copenhagen Business

School. He also holds an assistant professor position a t Umeg School
of Business and Economics (USBE). He received his Ph.D, from USBE.
His research interest primarily focuses on the management of IT-medi-
ated change processes, and how use of IT can be developed in organ-
izations.

Lars Lindkvist, is professor of business administration at Linkoping

University. He is on of the leaders of the research program "Knowledge
& Organization", focuslng on project organization and knowledge
processes. Articles have been published in Journal of Management
Studies, Organization Studies, and Scandinavian Journal of Manage-
ment. A recent book was edited by Berggren & Lindkvist, 2001. "Pro-
jekt. Organisation for mdlorientering och larande", Studentlitteratur.
AUTHOR PRESENTATION

Christophe Midler is research director at the French National Research

Council in the Polytechnique Management Research Center, Ecole
polytechnique in Paris. He is also professor at Ecole des Mines in Paris
and at Marne la Vallie University. His research topics are project,
research and design management, in relation to organisational learning
theory. Some publications in the area, "Uauto qui n'existait pas",
Dunod, 1994,Project as Arenas for Renewal and Learning (ed. with
R.A. Lundin, Kluwer Academic publication, 1998 and Innovation
Based Competition & Design Systems Dynamics. (in collaboration
with Benghozi, P.J., Charue Duboc, 2000. Paris: L'Harmattan). He is a
Doctor Honoris Causa from Umea University, Sweden.

Tomas Miillern is associate professor at Jonkoping International Busi-

ness School in Sweden. His current line of research includes new and
innovative forms of organizing, strategic and organizational change,
and leaders' use of rhetoric. Among his most recent publications are 2
chapters of the book Organizing (zoor), edited by prof. Andrew Petti-
grew (London: Sage).

Zorica Nedovic-Budic, Ph.D. is associate professor in the Department

of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. She received her doctorate at the University of North
Carolina and her research focuses on the implementation and diffusion
of geographic information systems technology, interorganizational
coordination, and human factors in information technology.

Joham Packendorff is senior lecturer of project management at the

Department of Industrial Econonomics & Management, Royal Institute
of Technology, Stockholm. His current research focuses on project work
from an individual perspective, and on ~roject-basedentrepreneurship.
Author of books and articles on project management, he also works as
lecturer and consultant. Johann holds a BSc and a PhD in Business Admi-
nistration from the Umel School of Business & Economics.

Jeffrey K. Pinto, is the Samuel A. and Elizabeth B. Breene Fellow and

professor of management at the School of Business at Penn State Erie.
His research interests lie in the area of project management, informa-
tion system implementation, innovation, and organization theory. The
former editor of the Project Management Journal, he has published and
consulted widely on project management topics.
 ! AUTHOR PRESENTATION

Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson is professor of management at Uppsala Uni-

versity, Sweden. She has published books and articles on the global
spreading of organizational models and standards, organizational
changes in the public sector, and the organizing of large projects. Her
most recent research has included a research program on trans-natio-
nal regulation and state transformation. She recently edited, together
with Lars Engwall, The Expansion of Management Knowledge: Carri-
ers, Flows and Sources (Stanford University Press, 2002).

Elisabeth Sundin, is professor at the Natiohal Institute of Working Life

and at the Department of Management and Economics at Linkoping
University. Her main research areas were SMEs but are now the rela-
tionships between large and small organisations instead. She sometimes
uses a gender perspective.

Anders Soderholm is associate professor in business administration at

Umei School of Business and Economics and is currently serving as
dean of the school. His main research areas are temporary organiza-
tions, new organizational forms and related issues. Co-author of "Neo-
Industrial Organizing" (Routledge, 1999).

Jonas Soderlund, is assistant professor a t the School of Management,

Linkoping University. His research centers on project management,
project organization and temporary organizations. Soderlund's most
recent publications have appeared in Organization Studies, Internatio-
nal Business Review and Project Management Journal. He is currently
coordinating the national research and education initiative Svenska
Projekt.

Timothy L. Wilson - presently visiting professor of marketing, Umei

School of Business and Economics. Recent research has focused on
industrial marketing topics, service strategies, regional development,
and competition - especially in, among, and as affected by small busi-
nesses. He was in research engineering and management for 15 years
early on in his career.
AUTHOR PRESENTATION

Rolf A. Lundin' is professor and dean at Jonkoping International Busi-

ness School, Sweden.
He was born in Uppsala (north of Stockholm) in 1942. He grew up
in Vasteris and graduated from upper secondary school (high school)
in 1962. He attended Gothenburg for his undergraduate university
education and received his business degree in 1966. Three years later,
in 1969, he received his licentiate degree after defending the thesis
"Upon Some Methodological Problems Arising in Connection with the
Formulation and Application of an Urban Traffic Simulation Model"
written jointly with Uno Larsson. The thesis showed how traffic flows
could be handled more effectively.
He was hired by the University of Gothenburg as an instructor in
business administration after graduating, but left for the U.S.A. when
he received a scholarship to pursue Ph.D. studies at the Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago. He received his Ph.D. there
in 1973 after the successful completion of the thesis "Planning Horizon
Procedures for Production-Inventory Systems with Concave Costs."
Upon returning to Sweden and the University of Gothenburg, Rolf was
appointed assistant professor at that institution.
Rolf's research focus changed after graduation when he started to
investigate organizational problems and public sector development.
One of the major publications from this period was "Myths and Wish-
ful Thinking as Management Tools," (jointly with Sten Jonsson,
published in 1977 in Paul Nystrom & William Starbuch, eds., Pre-
scriptive Models of Organizations, North HollanflIMS). He and col-
leagues also published frequently on public sector problems and ways
of dealing with budgeting issues in public organizations.
In 1974 he was promoted to associate professor and in 1977 to
acting full professor and head of the department. Shortly thereafter, in
1978, he was appointed professor in business administration at the
University of Umei. He continued to publish books and articles
following the tradition in Umei in studies on small businesses and
"organizational economy" (e.g. Lundin, R.A., 1986, "Organizational
Economy - The Politics of Unanimity and Suppressed Competition," in

We have edited this book as a way of showing our appreciation for Rolf A Lundin on his 60'~
birthday. Rolf's research and theorizing has truly inspired all chapters in this volume. For this
reason it seems natural t o include a presentation of professor Rolf A Lundin among the author
presentations.
 AUTHOR PRESENTATION

R. Wolff, ed., Organizing Industrial Devtlopment, Berlin, Walter de

Gruyter & Co.). He was also appointed chairman of the department.
In the early 1980's Rolf initiated the publication of the Scandinavi-
an Journal of Management. He was the journal's first editor 1984-
1987 and took the journal from new and unknown to a recognized
journal in the field. Another major effort of Rolf was the development
of the Umei School of Business and Economics. His initiative to crea-
te a business school at the University of Umei campus by combining
the resources of five existing departments was a major effort. He was
appointed the school's first dean during the period 1989-1993.
In the late 1980's Rolf's research focus turned to renewal issues and
organizational change. He conducted a niajor study of the Dios con-
struction company (Lundin, R.A., Wirdenius, H., 1989, "Foretagsfor-
nyelse och Kulturskifte - Erfarenheter frdn Dioskoncernen [Company
Renewal and Cultural Change - Experiences from the Dios Concern],
Norstedts, Stockholm) and a critical review of the renewal capacity of
the construction industry (Ekstedt, E., Lundin, R.A., Wirdenius, H.,
1992, "Conceptions and Renewal in Swedish Construction Compani-
es," European Management J o u r ~ a lVol.
, 10, N.o z, pp. zoz-zoy).
More recently, he identified projects as a major theme of activity in
current industrial organizations and in particular the use of projects as
a vehicle in organizational change and renewal. In addition to the
extensive empirical and theoretical studies he has been involved, he
took the initiative in the creation of the International Research
Network o n Organizing by Projects (Irnob). Irnop held its first confe-
rence in Lycksele, not far from Umei, in 1994. Papers presented at the
conference were later reviewed and published in the Scandinavian Jour-
nal of Management in 1995 (Vol. 11, No. a). He was the editor of that
special issue on projects and contributed to it with an editorial and an
article (Lundin, R.A. & Soderholm, A., 1995, "A Theory of the Tem-
porary Organization," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 11,
No. 4, PP. 437-455).
Irnop conferences have been held in paris (1996), Calgary (1998),
Sydney (zooo) and Rotterdam (zooz). Both the Paris and Calgary
events resulted in edited books (Lundin, RIA. & Midler, C. eds. , 1998,
Projects as Arenas for Renewal and Learnkng Processes, Norwell, M A :
Kluwer Academic Publishers, and Lundin, R.A. & Hartman, F. eds.,
2000, Projects as Business Constituents nnd Guiding Motives, Nor-
well, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Besides the articles and books
AU'I'HOR PRESENTATION

mentioned above, Rolf's main publication within the field of projects

and temporary organizations has been Neo-industrial Organising -
Action, Knowledge Formation and Renewal in a Project-Intensive Eco-
nomy, published by Routledge in 1999.
He continues to work closely with industrial and university collea-
gues around the globe. He was appointed a member of the Swedish
Project Academy in 1996 and became the Academy chairman in 2000.
Together with Swedish industries and a network of universities in Swe-
den, he founded Project Sweden in 1999, a network to promote re-
search, education and university-industry cooperation in the field of
project management.
Rolf took on a new challenge in 2001 when he was recruited for the
position as dean of the Jonkoping International Business School. He
has since moved to Jonkoping and is approaching his 6othbirthday, still
looking for new projects to initiate and/or implement.