zERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.

, petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, defendant

Facts:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored

by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, on the manner of expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice
ruled that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss
the same because it was “insufficient in substance” Four months and three weeks since
the 1st filing of impeachment, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., this second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution
2. Whether or not the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a
political crisis.

Ruling:

1. The second impeachment is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the

Constitution which states that: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The filing
 of a second impeachment violates the Constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer.
2. Political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which
are not truly political in nature.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

Facts:

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union assailed this Executive Order averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of Executive Order 284 is being
challenged by the petitioner on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino is

constitutional

Ruling:

No. It is not constitutional. Section 13, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that it seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself. Persons who are
exempted in the case specified in the Constitution itself is the Vice President for which he
is may be appointed to the cabinet and the Secretary of Justice as an ex officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

Facts:

The petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an employee of Bendix Radio,
Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provides technical assistance to the United
States Air Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The petitioner imported on a
Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83, then came the following: "On July 11, 1960, petitioner
requested the Base Commander, Clark Air Base, for a permit to sell the car, which was
granted provided that the sale was made to a member of the United States Armed Forces
or a citizen of the United States employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On
the same date, July 11, 1960, petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie Johnson,
Jr. as shown by a Bill of Sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date, Pfc. Willie
(William) Johnson, Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000.00 as evidenced by a deed
of sale executed in Manila."

Issue:

Whether or not the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine
income tax?

Ruling:

No. The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of
its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If
it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant

Facts:

The accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval
Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house
and built another one in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of
Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's
office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not necessary
for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and
lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon
Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the
house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police
headquarters for interrogation. After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office." The City
Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series
of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs.

Issue:

Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

Ruling:

Yes. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be
Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the
assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. To state the
proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with unorthodoxy. If on a concern
purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national security, the
Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a
mockery and an illusion.
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et al. Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE
INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,Respondents.

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the
framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their
"territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Thus, domestically,
RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with
the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which
the Philippines ratified on 27th of February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the
water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
"regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Issue:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court hold that:

1. Petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens;

2. the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of RA 9522;
3. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al, petitioners

Vs.

Court of Appeals, respondents

Facts:

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA
Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from
several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the adequate
expertise and experience in the health sector that provides for five general areas of reform:
(1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority
public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure
its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and
(5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).

Issue:

Whether or not the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) is unconstitutional for it
violates Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II

Ruling:

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-

executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not
treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by
the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non self-executing. There were no allegations of discrimination
or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate
how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling
the HSRA.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This

Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner

Vs

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, defendant

Facts:

On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Accordingly, the Board determined
the organizational structure of the BCDA and adopted a compensation and benefit
scheme for its officials and employees. The Board adopted a new compensation and
benefit scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual,
regular, permanent employee and Board of Directors. In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000
year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end
benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. The Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA
officials and employees from P10,000 to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials
and employees received a P30,000 year-end benefit, and, on 1 October 2002. Aside from
the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members, the full-
time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit. Thereafter, the COA
issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004 stating that the grant of
year-end benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002.

Issue:

Whether or not the refusal to grant the year-end benefit to the employees,
consultants and Board Members was contrary and inconsistent with Sections 5 and 18,
Article II of the Constitution

Ruling:

The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles
and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles
and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that Some of
the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution specifically, Sections 5 and 18 the provisions of which the Court categorically
ruled to be non self-executing.
LEOPOLDO BACANI, petitioner

Vs.

NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant

Facts:

The petitioner and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court
in Manila. During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the
parties, National Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to
said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees amounting to P714.00.

However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said
amounts on the strength of a circular issued by Department of Justice. It was expressed
that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in
question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview
of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

Issue:

Whether or not the National Coconut Corporation is considered a government

entity through public corporation

Ruling:

No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the
status of being part of the government because they do not come under the classification
of municipal or public corporation. It was, however, given a corporate power separate and
distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned.
It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government.
THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT and COOPERATIVE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION
(ACCFA), petitioner,
vs.
ACCFA SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, ACCFA WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, and THE COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration under the Land Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association
and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as Union in the ACCFA. The Unions
and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one
year. Few months have passed, however, the Unions, together with the Confederation of
Unions in Government Corporations and Offices, filed a complaint against the ACCFA for
having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation of said
agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further
acts tending to discourage the Union members in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to comply with and implement the provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants.

Issue:

Whether or not Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration is a

governmental entity that exercises its governmental functions

Ruling:

Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and
for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the Agricultural Finance
Administration under the Land Reform Project Administration.

The law itself declares that the same is a government office, with the formulation of
policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of
the Agricultural Finance Administration, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a
government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to
rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to
the governmental character of its functions disappears.
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner

Vs.

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, defendant

Facts:

The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private
respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their
employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day
rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount
actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. Here was an answer filed by
petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising
the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. After the parties
submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for
overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on
March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid.

Issue:

Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions

Ruling:

Yes, just because the petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary
function, it does not follow that the labor controversy is beyond the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. The growing complexities of modern society have rendered the
traditional classification of the functions of the government.

The contention that the Eight-Hour Labor Law did not apply to the petitioner.
Moreover, lacked merit on the grounds of the casualness in the way such argument was
advanced in the petition.

"To find how much each of them [private respondents] is entitled under this
judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized representative, is
hereby directed to make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the
possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to submit
his report of his findings to the Court for further disposition thereof." Accordingly, as
provided by the New Labor Code, this case is referred to the National Labor Relations
Commission for further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.
PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING COPRPORATION, petitioner

Vs.

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, defendant

Facts:

In 1967, the Philippine government and the World Food program WFP entered into an
agreement which provided that the efforts of the various Government Agencies
concerned have been successful in developing and executing the overall plan for the
Sapang Palay resettlement area, substantial employment must be found for the majority
of the squatter families at present living there. The People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation, hereafter referred to as PHHC is proposing a self-help project to be
undertaken by the squatter families for the construction of two earth dams (which will
involve the moving of 44,165 cu. meters of earth roads of 850 meters long and 17
kilometers of associate drainage and irrigation channels; at the same time a number of
existing roads in the area will be improved by the construction of 42 kilometers of dams
and ditches which will involve the removal of 75,600 cu. meters of earth.The undertaking
will provide water for the irrigation of more than 100 hectares of land to be used for
additional food production, the reservoir will provide non-drinking water for domestic
purposes and will be stocked with fish. Complaining about their work and compensation,
the participants went to the Department of Labor.

Issue:

Whether or not the Commission on Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over

People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, a government-owned and controlled
corporation performing a governmental function

Ruling:

The jurisdiction of the then Court of Industrial Relations is set forth in Section I of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. Construing this provision of law, We have ruled
that the CIR has jurisdiction over labor disputes involving government-owned or
controlled corporations performing basically proprietary functions. It has not always been
easy determining which functions are governmental in nature and which are proprietary.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION

ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Facts:

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated
by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency then driven
officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a
bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial
Hospital where he died.

Issue:

Whether or not National Irrigation Administration may be held liable for damages
caused by its driver

Ruling:

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not
a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-
governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident
resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable
for damages.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a
crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a
government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture
of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages
caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the driver.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, petitioner

Vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTION, defendant

Facts:

Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the

proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided by Sec. 5, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA
7941. While on the other side, the public respondent, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list
representatives is filled up at all times.

Issue:

Whether or not the Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a private non-

government corporation

Ruling:

These arguments of petitioner notwithstanding, we are constrained to rule that

petitioner is in fact a public corporation. Before responding to petitioner’s allegations one
by one, here are the more evident reasons why the VFP is a public corporation:

(1) Rep. Act No. 2640 is entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known
as the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Defining its Powers, and for Other
Purposes."

(2) Any action or decision of the Federation or of the Supreme Council shall be
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The VFP is required to submit annual reports of its proceedings for the past year,
including a full, complete and itemized report of receipts and expenditures of
whatever kind, to the President of the Philippines or to the Secretary of National
Defense.
 (4) Under Executive Order No. 37 dated 2 December 1992, the VFP was listed as
among the government-owned and controlled corporations that will not be
privatized.

(5) In Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, this Court held in a
minute resolution that the "VFP [Veterans Federation Party] is an adjunct of the
government, as it is merely an incarnation of the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines.

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the

ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.

Facts:

Ramiscal was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the Board of
Directors of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development
as housing projects. On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and
Flaviano the attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed
of Sale (1st Deed) over the subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m.
After the payment of P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral
Deed of Sale (2nd Deed) over the same property with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per
sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd Deed was presented by Flaviano for registration which became
the basis of the Certificate of Title of the said property.

Ramiscal filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February 12, 1999 with a
supplemental motion dated May 28, 1999 regarding the findings of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman acted positively on the findings of the prosecutor and scheduled the
arraignment of Ramiscal Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on
the ground that there is a pending resolution of his second Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his
arraignment

Ruling:
 No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration
or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject
of the motion.

The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
are: unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.

JULIAN A. ALZAGA, MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, and MANUEL S.

SATUITO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

On October 7, 1999, four separate Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 were filed against petitioners Julian A. Alzaga, Meinrado
Enrique A. Bello and Manuel S. Satuito relative to alleged irregularities by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). Alzaga
was the Head of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS when one of the lots was purchased.
Bello was a Police Superintendent and he succeeded Alzaga as Head of the Legal
Department. It was during his tenure when the other three lots were purchased. Both were
Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS.

Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/or Dismiss the informations
alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them and their alleged offenses
because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity created for the benefit of its members and that
their positions and salary grade levels do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:

Whether or not that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the AFP-RSBS and
their alleged offenses because it is private entity created for the benefit of its members
and that their positions and salary grade levels do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan

Ruling:

The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No. 361 (1973)10 in December 1973
to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system, as
provided for in R.A. No. 340 (1948).11 It is similar to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) since it serves as the system that
manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service.12

The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees
and Management Group,13 and funded from congressional appropriations and
compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; donations, gifts, legacies, bequests
and others to the system; and all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any
tax whatsoever.

Carolina R. Javier, petitioner

Vs

Sandiganbayan, defendant

Facts:

On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, or otherwise known as the Book
Publishing Industry Development Act, was enacted into law. On February 26, 1996,
petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector representative for a
term of one (1) year. During that time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers
Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the following
year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for the
same period of one (1) year. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is
to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing
bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel
authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997.
Based on her itinerary of travel, she was paid P139,199.00, as her travelling expenses.
Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.
On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to
immediately return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. On July 6, 1998, she was issued a Summary of
Disallowances from which the balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. Despite
said notice, no action was forthcoming from the petitioner.

On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the
NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public
funds and properties. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713[13] for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Ruling:
We believe otherwise. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
25867 and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC,
respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the
accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and
substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned
in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to
quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering
that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner
had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the present petition does not fall under the
exceptions wherein the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's
motion to quash the information. And even assuming that petitioner may avail of such
remedy, We still hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE,
and CITY TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE, respondents

Facts:

Petitioner operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). As operator of

the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within
the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless
specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.On 21 March 1997, the Local
Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA
under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of
Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the
real estate tax already due.

On 17 July 2001, the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of
levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should
MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of the
MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.

On 1 October 2001, MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for
prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-
day reglementary period.

Meanwhile, in January 2003, the City of Parañaque posted notices of auction sale. MIAA
filed before this Court an Urgent Ex-Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order. On 7 February 2003, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) effective immediately. The Court ordered respondents to cease
and desist from selling at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings. Respondents
received the TRO on the same day that the Court issued it. However, respondents received
the TRO only at 1:25 p.m. or three hours after the conclusion of the public auction.

On 10 February 2003, this Court issued a Resolution confirming nunc pro tunc the TRO.
Issue:

Whether or not the Manila International Airport Authority is a mere instrumentality of

the government and not a government owned and controlled corporation and as such
exempted from tax

Held:

Yes. MIAA is a mere instrumentality of the government and not a government owned
and controlled corporation. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
"organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided
into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, which states:

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
– Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

xxxx

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and local government units.

Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the
national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power
to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local
governments, local governments may only exercise such power "subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA
G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007

FACTS:
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The
objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws
relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine
Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate
the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. For the purpose of enhancing its
powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of
animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. However, the power
to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for
violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel
treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes,
which the Government is duty bound to enforce. When the COA was to perform an audit
on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a private entity and not under
the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities. On the other
hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said petitioner is a private entity

RULING:
Yes. The general principle of prospectivity of the law likewise applies to Act No.
1459, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, which had been enacted by virtue of the
plenary powers of the Philippine Commission on March 1, 1906, a little over a year
after January 19, 1905, the time the petitioner emerged as a juridical entity. Even the
Corporation Law respects the rights and powers of juridical entities organized
beforehand, viz:

SEC. 75. Any corporation or sociedad anonima formed, organized, and

existing under the
laws of the Philippine Islands and lawfully transacting business in the
Philippine Islands on the date of the passage of this Act, shall be subject to
the provisions hereof so far as such provisions may be applicable and shall
 be entitled at its option either to continue business as such corporation or to
reform and organize under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act ,
transferring all corporate interests to the new corporation which, if a stock
corporation, is authorized to issue its shares of stock at par to the stockholders
or members of the old corporation according to their interests.

Here, the Court, in holding that the subject corporation could not invoke the right
against self-incrimination whenever the State demanded the production of its corporate
books and papers, extensively discussed the purpose of reportorial requirements, viz:

x x x The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be

incorporated for the benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges
and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the
limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract
not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve[d]
right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state,
having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not,
in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been
employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production
of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to
this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal
violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a
refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an
individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless
protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested
with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when
charged with an abuse of such privileges.
Serana vs Sandiganbayan
GR 162059, January 22, 2008

Facts:
Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a
student regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the
performance of her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that
the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the
amount of P15,000,000.00. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a public officer due to the
following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she
merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer,
since she had the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of
UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Moreover, the Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers
in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only
through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information

Held:
Yes. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or
higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up

under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice

to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil 113 (1945)

Facts:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings
in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General
Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings
and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation,
and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same
respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the
government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto governments.

Issues:
Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings
of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.

Rulings:

It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in
these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de
facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments
remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue
of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained
good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American
and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that
well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied
by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty,
"does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader,
which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done
under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done,
to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law,
remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed
by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely
less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should
be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed
upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ."
In Re Letter of Associate Puno
210 SCRA 588

Facts:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals,
wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of
his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals
was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, petitioner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a member of
the Judiciary. The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening
Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice. The Screening Committee
recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals
and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices.
When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s
seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be
attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section
2 of Executive Order No. 33.

Issue:
Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old
Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of
E.O. No. 33.

Held:
The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987
Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as
an entirely new court.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts
existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization
launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the
people power in 1986.
 Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden. radical
and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with
violence or at least some acts of violence."
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003

Facts:

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA

Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1)
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily
tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the
PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-
Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[2]

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July
1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the
reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of
a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379

HELD:

No. The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. The PCGG
tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. The PCGG gave this
task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to
conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard
to the following matters:
 (a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may
assign to the Commission from time to time.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned
in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their
public office or using their powers, influence; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases
of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.