6.

Interlocutory Order
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and ALFONSO ROXAS CHUA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 110147. April 17, 2001]

Facts:

Petitioner Metrobank and Trust Company (Metrobank for short) brought an action for a
sum of money against private respondents Pacific Multi Commercial Corporation and
Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. Private respondents failed to file their answer and were, for that
reason, declared in default.the trial court rendered judgment for Metrobank

After the decision had become final, Metrobank moved for the execution of the judgment
in its favor. The trial court granted Metrobanks motion and, among other things, the
deputy sheriff garnished the shares of stock of private respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua,
Jr. in the Club Filipino.the sheriff sold at public auction respondent Roxas Chuas
Certificate of Ownership to the Metrobank as the highest bidder. However, respondent
Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. filed with the respondent trial court a motion to hold in abeyance
the delivery to Metrobank of the certificate of ownership and to declare the sale to
Metrobank as null and void on the ground that the certificate of ownership was the
conjugal property of respondent Roxas Chua, Jr. and his wife Kiang Ming Chu. Metrobank
opposed the private respondents motion.

The trial court issued an order denying private respondent Roxas Chuas motion. Private
respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was
denied by the court for failure of the private respondent filed a notice of appeal from the
order of the court.

The CA also disallowed the new grounds raised before it by petitioner. More
important, the appellate court held that those grounds were not proper in a petition for
certiorari, because they did not involve grave abuse of discretion or jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the order of the lower Court cannot be the subject of an appeal as the same is
merely interlocutory in nature and not appealable.

Held:

Yes., Sec. 2. Judgements or orders subject to appeal. -- Only final judgments or orders
shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
rendered for one party or the other.
A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof,
a party may also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not
supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.

A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.

The above provision, particularly its third paragraph, clearly states that one who has
been declared in default may appeal, without need of an order lifting the default. [17] Hence,
the mere fact that the trial court has not lifted its default order does not bar herein
respondent from filing an appeal.
If at all, petitioner ought to have challenged the default status of private respondent
when he filed his Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of
Sale. However, the denial of that Motion being final in character as we shall now show,
he is allowed by the Rules to appeal therefrom.

Doctrine:
An interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case,
but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits.” It “refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which
decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.”
Conversely, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve
the case. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: “Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it
is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final
 7. Remedy Against Judgement
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the
private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on
the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy
of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22,
1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed
that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day
they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order”
appealable under the Rules.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time
Held:
YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this
“fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section
3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined
to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases.
The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement
for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only
when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity
to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.
While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule
41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days
from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence,
the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.

Doctrine:
High Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted.
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy
of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days
from the denial of that motion.
The fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court which states that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order.
The fresh period rule finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of final
order appealed from.
 8. Remedy Against Judgement
WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, CHI TIM CORDOVA AND
ROBERT TIONG KING YOUNG, petitioners, vs. EQUITABLE
BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 153867. February 17, 2005]

Facts:

WTC obtained from respondent a loan in the amount of US$75,000, with

8.75% interest per annum, as evidenced by a Promissory Note signed by
Cordova and Young as representatives of WTC. Cordova and Young executed
a Surety Agreement binding themselves as sureties of WTC for the loan.
Respondent bank made a final demand on April 19, 1996, for WTC to pay its
obligation, but petitioners failed to pay.
In their Answer, they claimed that only one demand letter was made by
respondent. They added that the promissory note did not provide the due date
for payment. Petitioners also claimed that the loan had not yet matured as the
maturity date was purposely left blank, to be agreed upon by the parties at a
later date. Since no maturity date had been fixed, the filing of the Complaint
was premature, and it failed to state a cause of action. They further claimed that
the promissory note and surety agreement were contracts of adhesion with
terms on interest, penalty, charges and attorneys fees that were excessive,
unconscionable and not reflective of the parties real intent. Petitioners prayed
for the reformation of the promissory note and surety agreement to make their
terms and conditions fair, just and reasonable. They also asked payment of
damages by respondent.
The RTC, ordered the defendants Wood Technology Corporation, Robert Tiong
King Young and Chi Tim Cordova to pay solidarily to herein plaintiff the sum of
$75,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency and to pay the stipulated interest of
8.75% per annum to be reckoned from the date that the obligation was contracted until
the filing of this suit. Thereafter, the legal rate shall apply.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment. In addition, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners failed to show any ambiguity in the promissory
note and surety agreement in support of their contention that these were
contracts of adhesion. Finally, it ruled that the interest rate on the loan was not
exorbitant.
The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether or not the answer of petitioners with special and affirmative defenses fails
to tender an issue or admits the material allegations in the complaint

Held:
No. Applying the requisites of a judgment on the pleadings a summary
judgment, the judgment rendered by the RTC was not a judgment on the
pleadings, but a summary judgment. Although the Answer apparently raised
issues, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals after considering the parties
pleadings, petitioners admissions and the documents attached to the
Complaint, found that the issues are not factual ones requiring trial, nor were
they genuine issues.
Summary judgmentis a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard
would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute
genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the
crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to
justify a summary judgment? A genuine issue means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.
In sum, the court find no cause to disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, affirming
those of the RTC as to the reasonableness of the interest rate of 8.75% per annum on the loan.
We also find no persuasive reason to contradict the ruling of both courts that the loan secured by
petitioner WTC, with co-petitioners as sureties, was payable on demand. Certainly, respondents
complaint could not be considered premature. Nor could it be said to be without sufficient cause
of action therein set forth. The judgment rendered by the trial court is valid as a summary
judgment, and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, as herein clarified, is in order.

Doctrine:
Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the
affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a
full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by
petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment? A "genuine issue" means
an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for
trial.