Baker v.
Selden The US Supreme Court found that a copyright did not give an
101 U.S. 99 (1879)
Selden wrote a how-to book that described a new, exciting
method of bookkeeping, including example ledgers for better
ways to keep track of revenues and expenses.
Baker wrote a book on bookkeeping also. It used ledgers that
were pretty much the same as the ones Selden proposed.
Selden sued for copyright infringement.
Selden argued that Baker had stolen his method.
Baker argued that you can't copyright a method, only an
expression of that method. Because his book didn't slavishly
copy Selden's, it was not a violation of Selden's copyright.
Baker didn't copy any of the text from Selden's book, he just
used the same bookkeeping system.
The Trial Court found for Selden. Baker appealed.
The Trial Court found that Baker's books were "in large and
material part identical with and infringements of the books of
Selden system."
The US Supreme Court reversed.
author the right to prevent others from using the same
method.
"The copyright of a book on bookkeeping cannot secure the
exclusive right to make, sell, and use account books prepared
upon the plan set forth in such a book."
The Court found that Selden couldn't copyright the forms
because the forms are necessary to the use of the
bookkeeping system (aka merger).
The concept of merger is that if an idea can only be expressed
in one way or a few ways, granting a copyright on that
expression would effectively lock up anybody from using the
idea. Therefore, since you can't copyright ideas, you can't
copyright those limited ways to express the idea because the
idea behind the work merges with its expression.
The Court found that the forms are functional and not
expressive, so Selden couldn't copyright the forms for that
reason either.
The Court found that what Selden was really trying to protect
was a patent on his method, but he didn't have a patent. He
only had a copyright.
Patents are used to protect ideas and methods (aka "useful
arts"). Copyrights can only be used to protect expressions.
"The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim
to the art itself."
At the time, Selden's method would probably not have been
eligible for patent protection, but he could probably patent it
now under 35 U.S.C. §101.
The decision in this case has now been codified in 17 U.S.C.
§102(b).
See also 37 C.F.R. §201.1, which says that blank forms are not
copyrightable.
JOAQUIN ET. AL VS. FRANKLIN DRILON (1999)
BJ Productions Inc. (BJPI) was the holder of copyright over the
show Rhoda and Me. It holds rights over the show’s format
and style of presentation. In 1991, BJPI’s president Francisco
Joaquin saw on TV – RPN 9’s show It’s a Date, a show which is
basically the same as Rhoda and Me. He eventually sued
Gabriel Zosa, the manager of the show It’s a Date. The
investigating prosecutor found probable cause against
Zosa. Zosa later sought a review of the prosecutor’s resolution
before the Secretary of Justice (Franklin Drilon). Drilon
reversed the findings of the fiscal and directed him to dismiss
the case against Zosa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of Drilon finding no probable
cause is valid.
HELD: Yes. The essence of copyright infringement is the
copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials as
defined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49 (Copyright
Law). Apart from the manner in which it is actually expressed,
however, the idea of a dating game show is a non-
copyrightable material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes
in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of
works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as
provided in PD. No. 49. What is covered by BJPI’s copyright is
the specific episodes of the show Rhoda and Me.
Further, BJPI should have presented the master videotape of
the show in order to show the linkage between the copyright
show (Rhoda and Me) and the infringing show (It’s a Date).
This is based on the ruling in 20th Century Fox vs CA (though
this has been qualified by Columbia Pictures vs CA, this is still
good law). Though BJPI did provide a lot of written evidence
and description to show the linkage between the shows, the
same were not enough. A television show includes more than
mere words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no
similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing
the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.
BJ Productions Inc. (BJPI) was the holder of copyright over the
show Rhoda and Me. It holds rights over the show’s format
and style of presentation. In 1991, BJPI’s president Francisco
Joaquin saw on TV – RPN 9’s show It’s a Date, a show which is
basically the same as Rhoda and Me. He eventually sued
Gabriel Zosa, the manager of the show It’s a Date. The
investigating prosecutor found probable cause against
Zosa. Zosa later sought a review of the prosecutor’s resolution
before the Secretary of Justice (Franklin Drilon). Drilon
reversed the findings of the fiscal and directed him to dismiss
the case against Zosa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of Drilon finding no probable
cause is valid.
HELD: Yes. The essence of copyright infringement is the
copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials as
defined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49 (Copyright
Law). Apart from the manner in which it is actually expressed,
however, the idea of a dating game show is a non-
copyrightable material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes
in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of
works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as
provided in PD. No. 49. What is covered by BJPI’s copyright is
the specific episodes of the show Rhoda and Me.
Further, BJPI should have presented the master videotape of
the show in order to show the linkage between the copyright
show (Rhoda and Me) and the infringing show (It’s a Date).
This is based on the ruling in 20th Century Fox vs CA (though
this has been qualified by Columbia Pictures vs CA, this is still
good law). Though BJPI did provide a lot of written evidence
and description to show the linkage between the shows, the
same were not enough. A television show includes more than
mere words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no
similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing
the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.
CHING V. SALINAS, SR. (G.R. NO. 161295)
Facts:
Petitioner Ching is a maker and manufacturer of a utility
model, Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile, for which he
holds certificates of copyright registration. Petitioner’s request
to the NBI to apprehend and prosecute illegal manufacturers
of his work led to the issuance of search warrants against
respondent Salinas, alleged to be reproducing and distributing
said models in violation of the IP Code. Respondent moved to
quash the warrants on the ground that petitioner’s work is not
artistic in nature and is a proper subject of a patent, not
copyright. Petitioner insists that the IP Code protects a work
from the moment of its creation regardless of its nature or
purpose. The trial court quashed the warrants. Petitioner
argues that the copyright certificates over the model are
prima facie evidence of its validity. CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s model is an artistic work
subject to copyright protection.
(2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to copyright
protection on the basis of the certificates of registration
issued to it.
Ruling:
(1) NO. As gleaned from the specifications appended to the
application for a copyright certificate filed by the petitioner,
the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile and Vehicle
Bearing Cushion are merely utility models. As gleaned from
the description of the models and their objectives, these
articles are useful articles which are defined as one having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information. Plainly,
these are not literary or artistic works. They are not
intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or
works of applied art. They are certainly not ornamental
designs or one having decorative quality or value. Indeed,
while works of applied art, original intellectual, literary and
artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works of
industrial design are not. A useful article may be copyrightable
only if and only to the extent that such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of
the utilitarian aspects of the article. In this case, the bushing
and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the petitioner
himself admitted, utility models which may be the subject of a
patent.
(2) NO. No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in
favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates
of copyright registration and the deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye
Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion. Indeed, in Joaquin, Jr.
v.Drilon and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart,
Incorporated, the Court ruled that:
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory
right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute,
and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by it. Being a
statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers,
and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the
subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions
specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the
works falling within the statutory enumeration or description.
Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of
originality and copyrightability. To discharge his burden, the
applicant may present the certificate of registration covering
the work or, in its absence, other evidence. A copyright
certificate provides prima facie evidence of originality which is
one element of copyright validity. It constitutes prima
facie evidence of both validity and ownership and the validity
of the facts stated in the certificate.
OLANO ET AL VS. LIM ENG CO
In 2004, respondent Lim Eng Co. (LEC) filed a complaint for
copyright infringement against petitioners Sison Olaño, Sergio
Ong, Marilyn Go and Jap Fuk Hai, the directors of Metrotech
Steel Industries, Inc. (Metrotech). BNU represented
Metrotech’s directors before the Department of Justice, the
C.A., and the S.C.
LEC claimed copyright over “hatch doors” based on Certificate
of Copyright Registration and Deposit Nos. I-2004-13 and I-
2004-14 covering illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts
and three-dimensional works relative to geography,
topography, architecture or science and Certificate of
Copyright Registration and Deposit Nos. H-2004-566 and H-
2004-567 covering plans/drawings for “original” ornamental
designs or models for articles of manufacture. LEC alleged that
Metrotech manufactured hatch doors for a construction
project by copying its plans/drawings.
Metrotech’s directors admitted the manufacturing of hatch
doors but denied the commission of copyright infringement.
Metrotech contended that the manufacturing of hatch doors
per se is not copyright infringement because LEC’s copyright
protection did not extend to the objects depicted in the
illustrations and plans. Further, the directors argued that
there is no artistic or ornamental expression in hatch doors
which would make it copyrightable.
The Supreme Court found that Metrotech’s directors are not
guilty of copyright infringement. Ownership of valid
copyrighted material by complainant is one of the essential
elements of copyright infringement under RA 8293.
Valid copyrighted material must be shown by proof of
originality and copyrightability. The SC ruled that LEC’s
Certificate of Registration Nos. I-2004-13 and I-2004-14 cover
only the hatch door sketches/drawings and not the actual
hatch door they depict. The SC further ruled that the hatch
door has no element of design which may be separated from
its utilitarian function. Therefore, the hatch door is an object
of utility, and not an artistic creation. It is not eligible for
copyright.
Citing the case of Ching v Salinas that works of applied art,
original intellectual, literary and artistic works are
copyrightable while useful articles and works of industrial
designs are not. Useful articles may be copyrightable only if
their aesthetic or artistic features can be independently
identified from their utilitarian aspects.