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2015
Bar Questions and Suggested Answers
Political Law
I. The Philippines and the Republic of Kroi Sha
established diplomatic relations and immediately
their respective Presidents signed the following: (1)
Executive Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi
Sha to establish its embassy and consular offices
within Metro Manila; and (2) Executive Agreement
allowing the Republic of Kroi Sha to bring to the
Philippines its military complement, warships, and
armaments from time to time for a period not
exceeding one month for the purpose of training
exercises with the Philippine military forces and
exempting from Philippine criminal jurisdiction acts
committed in the line of duty by foreign military
personnel, and from paying custom duties on all the
goods brought by said foreign forces into Philippine
territory in connection with the holding of the
activities authorized under the said Executive
Agreement.
Senator Maagap questioned the constitutionality of
the said Executive Agreements and demanded that
the Executive Agreements be submitted to the Senate
for ratification pursuant to the Philippine
Constitution. Is Senator Maagap correct? Explain.
(4%)
II. (1) A bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives in order to implement faithfully the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which the Philippines
is a signatory. Congressman Pat Rio Tek questioned
the constitutionality of the bill on the ground that the
provisions of UNCLOS are violative of the
provisions of the Constitution defining the Philippine
internal waters and territorial sea. Do you agree or
not with the said objection? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the objection is not tenable. UNCLOS has nothing to do
with the redefinition of our territory. It merely regulates sea-
use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zones, and continental shelves which it delimits.
Whether the bodies of water lying landward of the baselines of
the Philippines are internal waters or archipelagic waters, the
Philippines retains jurisdiction over them (Magallona v.
Ermita, GR No. 187167, July 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476).
(2) Describe the following maritime regimes under UNCLOS
(4%)

(a) Territorial sea

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) Contiguous zone
Senator Maagap is correct in so far as the second Executive (c) Exclusive economic zone
Agreement is concerned. The first Executive Agreement is in
such a nature that such need not be concurred in by the Senate. (d) Continental shelf
In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, the right of the Executive to enter
into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most favored nation rights, patent
(a) Territorial sea – is the belt of waters adjacent to the
rights trademark and copyright protection, postal and
coasts of the State, excluding internal waters in bays
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
and gulfs, over which the state claims sovereignty
However, for the second Executive Agreement which is in the
and jurisdiction and which is 12 nautical miles from
nature of an International agreements involving political issues
the baseline.
or changes on national policy and those involving international
(b) Contiguous zone – is that belt of waters measured 24
arrangements of a permanent character, is deemed as a treaty
nautical miles from the same baseline used to
(Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading), in which
measure the breadth of the territorial sea. In this zone,
case must be concurred in by the Senate (Section 21, Article
the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to
VI, 1987 Constitution). Hence Senator Maagap is only correct
i) Prevent infringement of its customs,
as regards the second Executive Agreement which must be
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
submitted for the concurrence of the Senate.

regulations within its territory or
territorial sea.
ii) Punish infringement of the above laws
and regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea (Article 53,
UNCLOS)
(c) Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea, over which a state has
special rights over the exploration and utilization of
marine resources. It shall not extend beyond 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In case of
archipelagic states, its breadth shall be measured
from the archipelagic baseline (Article 57, 58, 48,
UNCLOS)
(d) Continental shelf - The continental shelf of a coastal
State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance (Article
76, UNCLOS).
III. Professor Masipag who holds a plantilla or regular
item in the University of the Philippines (UP) is
appointed as an Executive Assistant in the Court of
Appeals (CA). The professor is considered only on
leave of absence in UP while he reports for work at
the CA which shall pay him the salary of the
Executive Assistant. The appointment to the CA
position was questioned, but Professor Masipag
countered that he will not collect the salary for both
positions; hence, he can not be accused of receiving
double compensation. Is the argument of the
professor valid? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the argument is not valid. The prohibition of dual
employment does not apply to Professor Masipag because
Section 5 [c], Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel allows court personnel to acquire outside
employment provided, among others, that the outside
employment does not require the practice of law; and
provided, however, that court personnel may render services
as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools,
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review or continuing education centers or similar institutions.
Dual employment applies to appointive officials who are not
allowed to hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned corporation or their
subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position (Article IX B Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution; Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292).
IV. When is a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a law on the ground of violation
of the Bill of Rights traditionally allowed? Explain
your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law is
traditionally allowed when it operates in the area of freedom
of expression. The established rule is that a party can question
the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is
unconstitutional. The exception is the so-called “Facial
challenge". But the only time a facial challenge to a statute is
allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of
expression. ln such instance, the "overbreadth doctrine"
permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even
though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it
might be if applied to others not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. lnvalidation of the
statute "on its face", rather than "as applied", is permitted in
the interest of preventing a "chilling effect" on freedom of
expression (Justice Mendoza's concurring opinion in Cruz v.
DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 06, 20001). A facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenge must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November
19,20011).
V. BD Telecommunications, Inc. (BDTI), a Filipino-
owned corporation, sold its 1,000 common shares of
stock in the Philippine Telecommunications
Company (PTC), a public utility, to Australian
Telecommunications (AT), another stockholder of the
PTC which also owns 1,000 common shares. A
Filipino stockholder of PTC questions the sale on the

ground that it will increase the common shares of AT,
a foreign company, to more than 40% of the capital
(stock) of PTC in violation of the 40% limitation of
foreign ownership of a public utility. A T argues that
the sale does not violate the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens decreed in
Section II, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because Filipinos still own 70% of the capital of the
PTC. AT points to the fact that it owns only 2,000
common voting shares and 1,000 non-voting
preferred shares while Filipino stockholders own
1,000 common shares and 6,000 preferred shares,
therefore, Filipino stockholders still own a majority
of the outstanding capital stock of the corporation,
and both classes of shares have a par value of Php
20.00 per share. Decide. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
AT’s contention does not hold water. The determination of the
percentage of Filipino ownership in a corporation is no longer
primarily based on the number of apparent shares of a
stockholder, nor to the class of stock a shareholder holds. In
the latest ruling of the Supreme Court in Narra Nickel Mining
v. Redmont Consolidated Mines (G.R. No. 195580 January
28, 2015), the computation of the total percentage of the
Filipino ownership in a corporation is applied to BOTH (a) the
total outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election
of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares
of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of
directors.
In Narra v. Redmont, foreign corporations have resorted to
elaborate corporate layering as to make it appear that there is
compliance with the minimum Filipino ownership in the
Constitution. The corporate layering employed by certain
foreign corporation was evidently designed to circumvent the
constitutional caveat allowing only Filipino citizens and
corporations 60%-owned by Filipino citizens to explore,
develop, and use the country’s natural resources. The
application of the Control Test and the Grandfather Rule must
be applied where doubts or various indicia that the "beneficial
ownership" and "control" of the corporation do not in fact
reside in Filipino shareholders but in foreign stakeholders.
Hence, AT cannot claim that PTC is Filipino-owned based
only on the apparent number of stocks belonging to Filipinos.
VI. (1) Distinguish the President's authority to
declare a state of rebellion from the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. (2%)
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) The authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from
the President’s powers as Chief Executive (Sec. 4, Chapter 2,
Book II, Administrative Code of 1997). Its declaration is
deemed harmless and without legal significance (Canlakas v.
Executive Secretary). In declaring a state of national
emergency in PP1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17,
Article Xll of the Constitution, calling for the exercise of
awesome powers which cannot be deemed as harmless or
without legal significance [David v. Macapagal -Arroyo,
supra].
(2) What are the limitations, if any, to the pardoning power of
the President? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The limitations to the pardoning power of the President are
that, it:
i. Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec. 19,
Art. VII)
ii. Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election
laws without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission on Elections [Sec. 5, Art. IX-C].
iii. Can be granted only after conviction by final
judgment
iv. Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as
it would violate separation of powers), or civil
contempt (as the State is without interest in the same)
v. Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability.
vi. Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v.
Factoran, supra].
VII. Senator Fleur De Lis is charged with plunder
before the Sandiganbayan. After finding the existence
of probable cause, the court issues a warrant for the
Senator's arrest. The prosecution files a motion to
suspend the Senator relying on Section 5 of the
Plunder Law. According to the prosecution, the
suspension should last until the termination of the
case. Senator Lis vigorously opposes the motion
contending that only the Senate can discipline its
members; and that to allow his suspension by the

Court would violate the principle of separation of
powers. Is Senator Lis' contention tenable? Explain.
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Senator Lis’, contention is not tenable. The suspension
contemplated in the Constitution to discipline Member of the
Senate is not the suspension contemplated under the Sec. 5 of
the Plunder Law. The latter is not a penalty but a preliminary
preventive measure and is not imposed upon the petitioner for
misbehavior as a member of Congress. In a synonymous case
(Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
128055, April 18,2001) it appears to be a ministerial duty of
the court to issue the order of suspension upon a determination
of the validity of the criminal information filed before it. The
order of suspension provided in RA 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks. Neither does
the order of suspension encroach upon the power of Congress.
The doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed
to have effectively excluded the members of Congress from
RA 3019.
VIII. A law provides that the Secretaries of the
Departments of Finance and Trade and Industry, the
Governor of the Central Bank, the Director General
of the National Economic Development Authority,
and the Chairperson of the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board shall sit as ex-officio members of
the Board of Directors (BOD) of a government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). The other
four (4) members shall come from the private sector.
The BOD issues a resolution to implement a new
organizational structure, staffing pattern, a position
classification system, and a new set of qualification
standards. After the implementation of the
Resolution, Atty. Dipasupil questioned the legality of
the Resolution alleging that the BOD has no authority
to do so. The BOD claims otherwise arguing that the
doctrine of qualified political agency applies to the
case. It contends that since its agency is attached to
the Department of Finance, whose head, the
Secretary of Finance, is an alter ego of the President,
the BOD's acts were also the acts of the President. Is
the invocation of the doctrine by the BOD proper?
Explain. (4 %)
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention of the BOD is proper. Under the doctrine of
qualified political agency or alter ego principle, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution 0r law t0 act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business
or unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v.
Secretary of the lnterior, No. 46574, April 21, 1939).
Under our governmental set-up, corporations owned or
controlled by the government… partake of the nature of
government bureaus or offices, which are administratively
supervised by (one) “whose compensation and rank shall be
that of a head of an Executive Department” and who “shall be
responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose
control his functions ... shall be exercised.” (Executive Order
No. 386 of December 22, 1950, section 1, issued under the
Reorganization Act of 1950). (in Namarco v. Arca, 29 SCRA
648). Through the Secretary of Finance, any act of the BOD
shall be subject to the constitutional power of control by the
President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
IX. Several senior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines received invitations from the
Chairperson of the Senate Committees on National
Defense and Security for them to appear as resource
persons in scheduled public hearings regarding a
wide range of subjects. The invitations state that
these public hearings were triggered by the privilege
speeches of the Senators that there was massive
electoral fraud during the last national elections. The
invitees Brigadier General Matapang and Lieutenant
Coronel Makatuwiran, who were among those tasked
to maintain peace and order during the last election,
refused to attend because of an Executive Order
banning all public officials enumerated in paragraph
3 thereof from appearing before either house of
Congress without prior approval of the President to
ensure adherence to the rule of executive privilege.
Among those included in the enumeration are "senior
officials of executive departments who, in the
judgment of the department heads, are covered by
executive privilege." Several individuals and groups

challenge the constitutionality of the subject
executive order because it frustrates the power of the
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Decide the case. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The subject executive order is unconstitutional. The Court in
Senate v. Ermita (GR No. 169777) declared that the executive
privilege is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. But
this is recognized only for certain types of information of a
sensitive character. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the
President.
Under the Constitution, there are two different functions of the
Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question
hour. The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When
Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads’ appearance is merely requested. The power
of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to
legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. The executive privilege is the exception under
this type of inquiry.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter
which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of
the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to
avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
(Senate v. Ermita)
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X. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) issued Memorandum
Circular No. 123-15 prescribing the administrative
requirements for the conversion of a timber license
agreement (TLA) into an Integrated Forestry
Management Agreement (IFMA). ABC Corporation,
a holder of a TLA which is about to expire, claims
that the conditions for conversion imposed by the
said circular are unreasonable and arbitrary and a
patent nullity because it violates the non-impairment
clause under the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution.
ABC Corporation goes to court seeking the
nullification of the subject circular. The DENR
moves to dismiss the case on the ground that ABC
Corporation has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies which is fatal to its cause of action. If you
were the judge, will you grant the motion? Explain.
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion by the DENR to dismiss the case for ABC’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be set aside.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only
to decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of
their quasi-judicial powers [Association of Philippine Coconut
Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No.
110526, February 10, 1 9981. Thus, where what is assailed is
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same (Smart communications v. National
telecommunications commission, G.R. No. 151908, August
12, 2003).
XI. (1) What is the concept of expanded judicial review
under the 1987 Constitution? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's"
of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566 November 19, 2013)
(2) Differentiate the rule-making power or the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules under Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution and judicial legislation. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Rule-making power of the Supreme Court was vested by
the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules that would protect
the constitutional rights of our people, pleadings, practice and
proceedings in all courts. This is recognized power exclusive
to the Supreme Court. But while the power of the judiciary is
to interpret laws, judicial legislation takes place when a court
steps in to craft missing parts or to fill in the gaps in laws or
when it oversteps its discretional boundaries and goes beyond
the law to coin doctrines or principles where none was before
(Judicial Legislation: Dissected. M. Vidal). This is frowned
upon because the courts should merely interpret laws, and not
make new laws.
XII. Discuss the evolution of the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis of Filipino citizenship under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the 1935 Constitution, Filipino citizens under the
principle of jus sanguinis are only those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, Filipino citizens are those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens.
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XIII. On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina
Tatalo filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5432,
entitled "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of
the Lone District of the City of Pangarap." The bill
eventually became a law, R.A. No. 1234. It mandated
that the lone legislative district of the City of
Pangarap would now consist of two (2) districts. For
the 2016 elections, the voters of the City of Pangarap
would be classified as belonging to either the first or
second district, depending on their place of residence.
The constituents of each district would elect their
own representative to Congress as well as eight (8)
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No.
1234 apportioned the City's barangays. The
COMELEC thereafter promulgated Resolution No.
2170 implementing R.A. No. 1234.
Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution as
unconstitutional. According to him, R.A. No. 1234
cannot be implemented without conducting a
plebiscite because the apportionment under the law
falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
cities under Section 10, Article X o f the 1987
Constitution. Is the claim correct? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Piolo Cruz’s claim in incorrect. While the Constitution
and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite
to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of the boundary of a local government unit, no
plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC). In the
case at bar, RA 1234 merely increased its representation in the
House of Representatives. There was no creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of a local government unit that
took place. RA 1234 did not bring about any change in the
City of Pangarap’s territory, population and income
classification. Hence no plebiscite is required.
XIV. Congress enacted R.A. No. 14344 creating
the City of Masuwerte which took effect on
September 25, 2014. Section 23 of the law
specifically exempts the City of Masuwerte from the
payment of legal fees in the cases that it would file
and/or prosecute in the courts of law. In two (2) cases
that it filed, the City of Masuwerte was assessed legal

fees by the clerk of court pursuant to Rule 141 (Legal
Fees) of the Rules of Court. The City of Masuwerte
questions the assessment claiming that it is exempt
from paying legal fees under Section 23 of its charter.
Is the claim of exemption tenable? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The claim of exemption is not tenable. Section 23 of the RA
14344 runs contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
Under the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court has the
power to promulgate its rules on pleadings, practice and
procedures in court (Section 5, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution).
Payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less with the Executive (AM No. 12-2-03-0).
Such act by Congress also transgresses the fiscal autonomy of
the Courts.
Hence the City of Masuwerte cannot question the assessment
of legal fees for the cases it filed before the court.
XV. The President appointed Dexter I. Ty as
Chairperson of the COMELEC on June 14, 2011 for
a term of seven (7) years pursuant to the 1987
Constitution. His term of office started on June 2,
2011 to end on June 2, 2018. Subsequently, the
President appointed Ms. Marikit as the third member
of the COMELEC for a term of seven (7) years
starting June 2, 2014 until June 2, 2021. On June 2,
2015, Chairperson Ty retired optionally after having
served the government for thirty (30) years. The
President then appointed Commissioner Marikit as
COMELEC Chairperson. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed her appointment. The
appointment papers expressly indicate that Marikit
will serve as COMELEC Chairperson "until the
expiration of the original term of her office as
COMELEC Commissioner or on June 2, 2021."
Matalino, a tax payer, files a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court asserting that the
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appointment of Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson is
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The
appointment of Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson
constituted a re- appointment which is proscribed by
Section 1(2), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) the term of office expressly stated in the
appointment papers of Marikit likewise contravenes
the aforementioned constitutional provision. Will the
constitutional challenge succeed?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the constitutional challenge will not succeed. It is well
settled in the case of Matibag v. Benipayo, the Supreme Court
said that when an ad interim appointment (of the Chairman of
the Commission on Elections) is not confirmed (as it was by-
passed, or that there was not ample time for the Commission
on Appointments to pass upon the same), another ad interim
appointment may be extended to the appointee without
violating the Constitution.
XVI.
(1) Gandang Bai filed her certificate of candidacy (COC)
for municipal mayor stating that she is eligible to run
for the said position. Pasyo Maagap, who also filed
his COC for the same position, filed a petition to
deny due course or cancel Bai's COC under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code for material
misrepresentation as before Bai filed her COC, she
had already been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Hence, she is disqualified
perpetually from holding any public office or from
being elected to any public office. Before the
election, the COMELEC cancelled Bai's COC but her
motion for reconsideration (MR) remained pending
even after the election. Bai garnered the highest
number of votes followed by Pasyo Maagap, who
took his oath as Acting Mayor. Thereafter, the
COMELEC denied Bai's MR and declared her
disqualified for running for Mayor. P. Maagap asked
the Department of Interior and Local Government
Secretary to be allowed to take his oath as permanent
municipal mayor. This request was opposed by Vice
Mayor Umaasa, invoking the rule on succession to
the permanent vacancy in the Mayor's office. Who
between Pasyo Maagap and Vice Mayor Umaasa has
the right to occupy the position of Mayor? Explain
your answer.

Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to occupy the position of
Mayor. This was settled in Talaga v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
196804 October 9, 2012). where the court upheld that the
disqualification of Bai created a situation of a permanent
vacancy in the office of the Mayor. A permanent vacancy is
filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44
of the LGC which states the “If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-
mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. “
Pasyo Maagap who garnered only the second highest number
of votes lost to Gandang Bai. Applying the Labo case cited in
Talaga, Maagap could not assume office for he was only
second placer despite the disqualification of the Gandang Bai
because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign
will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated
candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.61 There
was to be no question that the second placer lost in the
election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not
assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and
compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be
their political leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place
of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites
concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was
fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes
in favor of the ineligible candidate.64 Under this sole
exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the
eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes
may be deemed elected.65 The facts of the case at bar did not
state the existence of such exception, thus it cannot apply in
favor of Maagap simply because the second element was
absent.
(2) How do you differentiate the petition filed under
Section 68 from the petition filed under Section 78,
both of the Omnibus Election Code? (3%)
8
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two remedies available to prevent a candidate from
running in an electoral race are under Section 68 and under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The candidate who
is disqualified based on the grounds under Section 68 (i.e.,
prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s
permanent residency in another country when that fact affects
the residency requirement of a candidate) is merely prohibited
to continue as a candidate. On the other hand, a candidate
whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course based on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate
that is false under Section 78, is not treated as a candidate at
all, as if he/she never filed a Certificate of Candidacy. (Talaga
v. COMELEC)
XVI. The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth
Association (GBTYA), an organization of gay,
bisexual, and transgender persons, filed for
accreditation with the COMELEC to join the
forthcoming party-list elections. The COMELEC
denied the application for accreditation on the ground
that GBTYA espouses immorality which offends
religious dogmas. GBTY A challenges the denial of
its application based on moral grounds because it
violates its right to equal protection ofthe law.
(I) What are the three (3) levels of test that are
applied in equal protection cases? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The three kinds of tests applied in equal protection cases are:
a. Strict Scrutiny Test – requires the government to
show that the challenged classifications serve a
compelling state interest and that the classification is
necessary to serve that interest. This is used in cases
involving classifications based on race, national
origin, religion, alienage, denial of right to vote,
interstate migration, access to courts and other rights
recognized as fundamental
b. Immediate or middle-tier scrutiny test – requires
government to show that the challenged
classification serves as an important state interest
and that the classification is at least substantially
related to serving that interest. This applies to
suspect classification like gender or illegitimacy.
c. Minimum or rational basis scrutiny – according to
which the government need only to show that the

challenged classification is rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest. This is the
traditional rationality test and it applies to all
subjects other than those listed above. (see Bernas
Commentary, in Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, GR No.
190582, April 8, 2010 for the explanation)
(II) Which of the three (3) levels of test should be
applied to the present case? Explain. (3%)
Rational Basis Test
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The Rational Basis Test should be applied to the present case.
In our jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared that the
standard of analysis of equal protection challenges is the
rational basis test. Jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
the classification shall be upheld as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate end. In the case at bar, in so far
as the party-list system is concerned, GBTYA is similarly
situated as all other groups which are running for a party-list
seat in Congress (Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC).
XVII. Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police
officers was on routine patrol in Barangay
Makatarungan when it noticed an open delivery van
neatly covered with banana leaves. Believing that the
van was loaded with contraband, the team leader
flagged down the vehicle which was driven by
Hades. He inquired from Hades what was loaded on
the van. Hades just gave the police officer a blank
stare and started to perspire profusely. The police
officers then told Hades that they will look inside the
vehicle. Hades did not make any reply. The police
officers then lifted the banana leaves and saw several
boxes. They opened the boxes and discovered several
kilos of shabu inside. Hades was charged with illegal
possession of illegal drugs. After due proceedings, he
was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
In his final bid for exoneration, Hades went to the
Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated when the police officers searched his vehicle
without a warrant; that the shabu confiscated from
him is thus inadmissible in evidence; and that there
9
being no evidence against him, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
For its part, the People ofthe Philippines maintains
that the case ofHades involved a consented
warrantless search which is legally recognized. The
People adverts to the fact that Hades did not offer any
protest when the police officers asked him if they
could look inside the vehicle. Thus, any evidence
obtained in the course thereof is admissible in
evidence.
Whose claim is correct? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Hades’ claim is correct. The evidence obtained was illegally
seized and is thus inadmissible in evidence.
A consented warrantless search, if it exists or whether it was in
fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Hades’ mere silence does not
amount to consent. In the absence of such consent, evidence
obtained thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence, in which
case precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused (Ong v. People, GR No. 197788, Feb. 29, 2012).
XVIII. Pursuant to its mandate to manage the
orderly sale, disposition and privatization of the
National Power Corporation's (NPC) generation
assets, real estate and other disposable assets, the
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
(PSALM) started the bidding process for the
privatization of Angat Hydro Electric Power Plant
(AHEPP). After evaluation of the bids, K-Pop Energy
Corporation, a South Korean Company, was the
highest bidder. Consequently, a notice of award was
issued to K-Pop. The Citizens' Party questioned the
sale arguing that it violates the constitutional
provisions on the appropriation and utilization of a
natural resource which should be limited to Filipino
citizens and corporations which are at least 60%
Filipino-owned. The PSALM countered that only the
hydroelectric facility is being sold and not the Angat
Dam; and that the utilization of water by a
hydroelectric power plant does not constitute
appropriation of water from its natural source of
water that enters the intake gate of the power plant

which is an artificial structure. Whose claim is
correct? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
PSALM’s claim is correct. Under the Water Code, a foreign
company may not be said to be “appropriating” our natural
resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and
converts the same into electricity through artificial devices
such as the hydroelectric facility as in the case case at bar.
Since the NPC remains in control of the operation of the dam
by virtue of water rights granted to it, there is no legal
impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the
generation of electric power using waters already appropriated
by the NPC, the holder of the water permit. With the advent of
privatization of the electric power industry which resulted in
its segregation into four sectors, NPC’s generation and
transmission functions were unbundled. Hence the acquisition
by a foreign company of the hydroelectric facility did not
violate any constitutional provision (IDEALS v. PSALM, GR
No. 192088).
XIX. Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of
Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were destroyed which
impeded the entry of vehicles into the area. This
caused food shortage resulting in massive looting of
grocery stores and malls. There is power outage also
in the area. For these reasons, the governor of the
province declares a state of emergency in their
province through Proclamation No. 1. He also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the
provincial governor the power to carryout emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national
law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence. In the same proclamation, the
governor called upon the members of the Philippine
National Police, with the assistance of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general searches and seizures
including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety. Was the action of the provincial
governor proper? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
10
No, the action of the governor is not proper. Under the
Constitution, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, as well as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof. In the case at bar, the provincial
governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the state
forces at his own bidding. It is an act which is ultra vires and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code (Kulayan v. Gov. Tan, GR No.
187298, July 3, 2012).
XX. The Partido ng Mapagkakatiwalaang
Pilipino (PMP) is a major political party which has
participated in every election since the enactment of
the 1987 Constitution. It has fielded candidates
mostly for legislative district elections. In fact, a
number of its members were elected, and are actually
serving, in the House of Representatives. In the
coming 2016 elections, the PMP leadership intends to
join the party-list system.
Can PMP join the party-list system without violating
the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941?
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Yes, the PMP can join the party-list system in accordance with
the rules enunciated in Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC.
Accordingly, political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, GR
Nos. 203766, 203818-19, et al.)
XXI. The President appoints Emilio Melchor as
Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission. Upon
confirmation of Melchor's appointment, the President
issues an executive order including him as Ex-Officio
member of the Board of Trustees of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC), and the Board of
 11

Directors of the Philippine Health Insurance

Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Allegedly, this is
based on the Administrative Code of 1997 (E.O. No.
292), particularly Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V. This provision reads: "The chairman ofthe
CSC shall be a member of the Board of Directors of
other governing bodies of government entities whose
functions affect the career development, employment,
status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees..." A taxpayer questions the
designation of Melchor as ex-officio member of the
said corporations before the Supreme Court based on
two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) it violates the
constitutional prohibition on members of the
Constitutional Commissions to hold any other office
or employment during his tenure; and (2) it impairs
the independence of the CSC. Will the petition
prosper? Explain. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the petition will prosper. The appointment of Melchor as

ex-officio member of the GSIS, ECC and PHILHEALTH
during his tenure as the chairperson of the CSC is
unconstitutional for violating Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, prohibiting members of Constitutional
Commissions from holding any other office or employment
and impairing the independence of the CSC (Section 1, Article
IX-A). This has been a settled case where the Court ruled that
the CSC Chairperson’s holding other offices resulted in double
compensation and impairment to CSC’s independence because
other offices held by the CSC chairperson are under the Office
of the President (Funa v. Duque, GR No. 191672, November
25, 2014).