White Light Corporation VS City of Manila property is affected.

property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness
of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774
Facts: is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate
Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading
Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro
as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that
Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and
the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to
the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending &
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance
Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC.
directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in
The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The
the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle
City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993,
the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009,
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on
whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of
certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts,
constitutionality of the Ordinance.
trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA
proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages
Ruling:
and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
the MRT3.
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising
upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer
State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated
Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila
analysis of its guarantees to the people. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash
Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this
rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary
billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also
dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system,
police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in
and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
legislative power.

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards,
signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of
the areas as to which the prohibition applied.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.
vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit.
After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following
conditions:
(1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store;
(2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because
these are functions of optical clinics;
(3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made
by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to
the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses;
(4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar
glasses and frames;
(5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas
(SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the
conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of
such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and
Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months
to wind up its affairs.
Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid
exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits
Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within
the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business
permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must
always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the
Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such
special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public
respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special
conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.
The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory
in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such
licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business
of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business
permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is
within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to
supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board
of Examiners in Optometry.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS: These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform
Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a
call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963.
P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor
of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by
the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar
as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to
their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land.
In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong
to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and
that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land
in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been
in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of
cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not
only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these
two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need
to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing
for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary,
it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body,
then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This
is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money
hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
PPI vs. COMELEC
Facts: On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 stating that the
Commission shall have free print space of not less than one-half page in at least one newspaper
in every province or city as “Comelec Space”. This ad space will be used by candidates for their
campaign and platforms of government, and for the Commission’s dissemination of vital
information. Moreover, COMELEC released a letter-directive ordering the different newspapers
to comply with the said resolution. The petitioner Philippine Press Institute (PPI) filed a petition
contending that COMELEC violated the prohibition imposed by the Constitution against the
taking of properties without just compensation due to Sec 2. Moreover, the directive of
COMELEC amounts to involuntary servitude and violation of the freedom of expression and of
the press due to Sec 8. On the other hand, COMELEC asserts their directive is not mandatory
and compelling. They only ask for a donation. They aver that even if the order is mandatory, it
would still be valid through the use of police power.
Issue: Is COMELEC’s action constitutional through the exercise of police power?
Held: No. Looking at Sec 2, it seems that respondent is correct that the order to give a free
space to COMELEC is not mandatory as there is no compelling language or any criminal or
administrative charges for violation. The respondent’s reason for creating the resolution was
due to the voluntary offers given by the newspaper company in the 1992 elections to help them
advertise important election matters. However, the court will have to disagree that even if the
order is mandatory, it would still be valid as an exercise of police power. First, only the
legislature can exercise police power except if it is delegated to some other body. The COMELEC
did not give any effort to specify evidences that they were given police power. According to the
Constitution, when a property is taken, it must be given a just compensation. In the case at bar,
there is no just compensation as the newspapers will give the space for free as a donation.
Moreover, there was no showing of reasonable necessity or emergency for the taking of print
space confronted the Commission. However, Sec 8 still stands as it is within the power of
COMELEC to control the media influences of candidates to prevent unequal campaigns.
Petition is partially granted. Sec 2 is not mandatory and Sec 8 is valid
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES CANCIO
G.R. No. 170147 January 30, 2009
FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18115 which
reserved certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner
(then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export
Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of
respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land. Petitioner offered to
purchase respondents’ lot P52,294,000 which respondents rejected.
Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. It
sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the
offered amount with LBP in accordance with A.O. No. 50.7. Respondents, however, filed a
motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974, specifically Sec 4(a) thereof, which
requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal
valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the
writ of possession.
RULING:
RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA 8974 applies to
instances when the national government expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects. The economic zone is a national government project. Also, the
complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the law
was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just
compensation will be determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties
may present evidence relative to the property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5
of RA 8974.
Landbank of the Philippines
vs Raymunda Martinez
Ponente: Nachura
Facts:
The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of
which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was
just and confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.
PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation,
so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.
LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation
has become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP
instituted a petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its
discretion when it issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition
in the RTC. CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department; (2)
whether or not petitioner committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of
execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Ruling:
The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the
principal legal counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal
Department’s filing of the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped
when it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their
annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was
not entitled to the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of
the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4,
2002 decision on land valuation. The said adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse
of the 15-day period stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure.
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its
ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains
finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing
of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed
with the SAC within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the
PARAD’s decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for
the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
656 SCRA 60
G.R. No. 165828
August 24, 2011
TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation
FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant
Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.
On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just
compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe
place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation
RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled
to the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay
not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the
taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically
deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value.
Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic
G.R. NO. 168770, 9 FEBRUARY 2011
FACTS:
1. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency
pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
2. As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or
repurchase of said property so long as Lahug ceases its operation or transfer its
operation to Mactan – Cebu Airport.
3. Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a
complaint for the expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug
Airport.
4. The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said
projects and order for just compensation to the land owners, at the same time
directed the latter to transfer certificate or ownership or title in the name of the
plaintiff.
5. At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-
Cebu airport opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
6. This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said
properties being expropriated by the trial court under the power of eminent
domain. Hence these two consolidated cases arise.
7. In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to
the land owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners Oaunos and against the MCIAA for the
reconveynace of their properties but was appealed by the latter and the earlier
decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the reversed
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
 Should MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners? YES
HELD:
The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership
over or a fee simple title to the covered land is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be
differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of
an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept
really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the “fee simple concept” if the
transfer is conditional.
The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its
continued devotion to its public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion subject of course
to the return at the very least of the just compensation received.
In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory
requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed such that the state must show, at the
minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to
be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include
any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of
the public].” If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—allowing,
at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no
more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal
situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private
person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to
renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.
The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases
and in the process dishonor the judgment of expropriation. A condemnor should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it vs.
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to JU DGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TUBOD,
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.

Hence, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in
question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that
the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default,
which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation.
Facts:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian Hefti reassigned Mustapha Gandarosa from Cagayan
de Oro City to Quezon City. Gandarosa, not amiable to the reassignment, filed a Rule 65 petition
with prayer for a TRO before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, under Judge Flores. The judge
granted Ganadarosa’s request.

According to the Administrative Code of 1987 in Book V, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Section 26(3),
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
vs.
 an employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS Commission.

FACTS: Issue:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a private property owned by Did Judge Flores commit gross ignorance of the law by taking jurisdiction of the case?
respondents Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for its Power
Transmission Project. NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of way Ruling:
over a portion of the said property. However, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR Yes. When a law rule is basic, judges should simply apply the law. Anything less is considered
filed a motion to discontinue the expropriation proceedings, that the property sought to be gross ignorance of the law. In this case, the law was clear that Gandarosa should have filed the
expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose, that because the public purpose case with the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial Court.
ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was
now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance
of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance of the Rules of Court. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
ISSUE:
Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
HELD: Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for
the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the
just and equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the request. Charges include:
ground that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been 1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
retired. The retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation 2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
proceedings of the element of public use. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to 3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
discontinue the proceedings and requires the return of the property to the respondents. 4. False statement or entries
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to 5. Election contribution in name of another
the respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
possession by paying actual or other compensatory damages. The compensation must be evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed
based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the
and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation denied request on the following grounds:
proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court treats the dismissal of the 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the
expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures
damages. and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-
US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by
EFREN T. UY, NELIA B. LEE, RODOLFO L. MENES and QUINCIANO H. LUI, Complainants,
the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information
in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection
with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion
favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well
as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize
them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s
application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to
post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction
of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in
accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds: It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing
among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack
of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate
Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of
RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply
cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The
essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that]
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides,
thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from
the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary
violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.
SUYAN VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 189644 | July 2, 2014
Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render
the probation order ineffective. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound
to observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run
the risk of revocation of this privilege.
SERENO, J.
FACTS: SUYAN was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. He
pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of
prision correctional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a
Probation Order covering a period of six years.
While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violations of
Section 16 of RA 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him. Because of this, the
Chief of the Parole and Probation Office (ATTY. NAVARRO) recommended the revocation of his
probation, citing recidivism. NAVARRO also pointed out that SUYAN was no longer in a position
to comply with the conditions of his probation, in view of his incarceration.
The RTC ordered the revocation of SUYAN’s probation and directed him to serve his sentence.
SUYAN then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not
accorded due process. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to
the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.
The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer SUYAN
showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drug
activities despite counseling and warning from the Office. The prosecution likewise filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that SUYAN has
already served his sentence on the other drug charges against him. SUYAN filed his Comment
but did not dispute the certification.
After hearing, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. SUYAN appealed with the CA,
but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.
HELD:
Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another
offense is a direct violation of the condition in his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly
outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the
commission of another offense shall render the probation order ineffective.
The Court’s discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to
grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a
proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGAY"
S. SAN LUIS
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification
was filed by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito,
who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Laguna.
Petition alleged Ejercito distributed orange card to influence voters in his
favor; and Ejercito exceeds the amount of expenditures necessary.
Ejercito proclaimed Governor.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito
prayed for the dismissal of the petition which was improperly filed because it is in reality a
complaint for election offenses, thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law
Department, and if with probable cause, file with proper court.
The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. The
COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action
to disqualify Ejercito.
Ejercito filed before the Court GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION against COMELEC and
contends It violated the right of petitioner due process when it ruled for disqualification of
petitioner even it was not prayed for disqualification. Worse, there is yet no finding of guilt by
competent court that he committed election offense.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
NO. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an
independent action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple errors of judgment.45 More
importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to
exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law. x x x.47
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with
grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition
filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for
disqualification as well. Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San
Luis’ petition. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the specific rule governing the disqualification of
candidates. Moreover, the averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the
OEC as grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds
for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the
candidate shall be disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from
holding the office. A similar tenor was expressed in the prayer in the petition filed by San Luis.
An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect
may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect of a
disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an
election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which
determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through
its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before
the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to
convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even
include disqualification from holding a future public office. The conduct of preliminary
investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a disqualification case.
The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
casesinvolving criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate
may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation
TELEBAP vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes
property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess
of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for
their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government
would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides
that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,”
while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own,
establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to
see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For
while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights,
they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access
to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the
autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social
function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media
can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may
render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to
be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member
of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such
an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and
question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Held:
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to
know the status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country.
The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that
clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated
by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to
be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in
nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide
whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of
their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an
"adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that
of former President Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent
initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is
the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of
violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for
it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out
the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ
G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
FACTS:
When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections” was passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised
against Section 2 which states that “No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.
Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then
incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled
out that there consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING:
The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides:
“Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is however considering
equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. The law can treat
barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself
provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term
and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the
Constitution provides for a 3-year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the
length of term and the application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-
uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
Jose Miguel Arroyo vs Department of Justice
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Due to allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation during the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec.
In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao
were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage. After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed
against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the petitioners assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel
and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
Arroyo raised the issue in his petition that the creation of the Joint Committee is violative of
the equal protection clause since it was created with the sole purpose of investigating and
prosecuting certain persons and incidents only, specifically those involving the 2004 and 2007
elections to the exclusion of others contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court in Biraogo vs
Philippine Truth Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Joint Committee is violative of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
No, the creation of the Joint Committee does not violate the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court held that Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that
it singles out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, infringes the equal
protection clause.
The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of investigating
alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive Order No. 177
specifically referred to the “previous administration”; while the Joint Committee was created
for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004
and 2007 elections.
While Mike Arroyo and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who
were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
Equal protection merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall
be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Given that the creation
of the Joint Committee was not purposefully created to investigate only the involved parties
specifically, there is no violation of the equal protection clause in this case.
Republic vs Daisy Yahon
G.R. No. 201043
Facts:
 Sgt. Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to
protect the respondent from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide
reasonable financial spousal support to the respondent. In his failure to appear before the court
with a counsel and with an answer to the charges against him, the court has granted PPO for
the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the
financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement benefits. However, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon
cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution. The petitioner contended
that money due to government employees is not liable to the creditors of the said employees
in the process of garnishment.
Issue: Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court
to provide for the financial spousal support of respondent.
Held: Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of
respondent. As a rule in statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court
should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No. 9262 used the general term 'employer', it
includes in its coverage the military institution, which is the employer of Sgt Yahon.
Manalili vs Court of Appeals (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997
Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in
front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves
and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked
him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and
allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to
headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in
any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be
made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground
of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in
the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
respondent court.
PEOPLE VS SUCRO
FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the
INP) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by
Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out
later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return
to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant
went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned
out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought
the same from Sucro. The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered
19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and
consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The
rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious
activity and the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the
marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-
appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and
therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal
knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier
conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among
the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering
its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from
such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE versus VALDEZ
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was
allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and
cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous
drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel
V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all
member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector
Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent
to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result.
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants
were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as
the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked
to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants.
He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied
any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of
the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The
police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters,
appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law
enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful
and the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.
HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to
obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle
of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any
form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their
intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during
an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the
marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an
unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to
have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused
may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed
against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it,
that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s
part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to
convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of
the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police
Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline
with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio
call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk
of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with
Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later
identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying
a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the
man changed direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then
introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what they’re
saying. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open
his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent
plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station,
where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police
Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
RULING: The Court held in the negative.
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal
effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in
accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following
cases, to wit:
(1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar,
there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's
participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance
to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to
justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a
waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to
him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot
logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he
deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive
search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be
inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San
Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben,
carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and
there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for
further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant
arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana
and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that
this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an
informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana.
The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
Facts:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her
possession more than 500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by a security personnel
at a gate in the airport. The security personnel felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal
area and when asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation.
Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough
search on respondent, packets of shabu were seized from her.
Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was
not valid and that her constitutional rights were infringed when such search was conducted.
Issue: WON a valid search was made.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and…
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or
(b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is far from being accurate.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons
or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit
in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through
a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant
herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante
delicto.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and
other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring
out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and
when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag.
It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained
also hashish.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another”

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.

When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio
City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
Valmonte v de Villa; G.R. No. 83988; 29 Sep 1989; 178 SCRA 211
FACTS:
The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated on January 20,
1987 pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with
the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintain peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. The NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not checkpoints are illegal as they violate the people’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but it is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and
an individual’s right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail. Petition is DISMISSED.
People v de Gracia; G.R. Nos. 102009-10; 06 Jul 1994; 233 SCRA 716
FACTS:
A team from the NCR Defense Command conducted a surveillance on a Eurocar
building pursuant to an intelligence report that elements of the RAM-SFP was occupying the
said establishment as their communication command post. After they were fired at by a group
of five men, a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office, finding and confiscating
ammunition, dynamites, M-shells and “Molotov” bombs inside one of the rooms and arresting
appellant who was holding a C-4.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.
RULING:
YES. The military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts.
Impugned judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, but the recommended executive clemency
is DELETED.
Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was
being committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts, the same constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches.
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
FACTS:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations
on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate
for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates
for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that
there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It
is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience
to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the
qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot
require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure,
is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
POLLO VS CONSTANTINO DAVID
FACTS:
CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source,
making her aware that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed personnel
and directed them to back up all the files of the computers found therein.
David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are related to
administrative cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. David
inferred that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice that he pursued
regularly.
Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC
conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the
complaint was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713. After some motions
filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the CA wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his
governmental duties. The CA ruled that the search was legal because in their capacity as
employers, the government agencies could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for
search and seizure.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO
FACTS: On the evening of August 6, 2002, member of Drug Enforcement Group together with a
female informant went to the parking area of McDonalds to conduct an entrapment operation.
Edaño arrived at around 7:00 p.m. on board a space wagon. The informant approached Edaño
and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waived at PO3 Corbe who then
approached Edaño. The latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. PO3 Corbe was able to
grab Edaño, causing the latter to fell on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a “knot-tied”
transparent plastic bag from Edaño’s right hand.
ISSUES: Whether the search and seizure that followed warrantless arrest is valid.
HELD: NO, the warrantless arrest of Edaño was not valid. Consequently, the search and seizure
that followed the warrantless arrest was likewise not valid. In this case, there was no overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to Edaño to rouse
suspicion in the mind of the police that he had just committed, was actually committing or was
attempting to commit a crime in their presence. Informant and Edaño were just talking to each
other, there was no exchange of money and drugs as the police approached the car. Edaño is
entitled to acquittal since the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

ISSUE: Whether there was illegal search.

RULING:
The SC ruled in favor of the CSC. Basing their decision on other cases, the SC asked
whether Pollo has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files and was
the search reasonable in its inception and scope.
On regards the first inquiry, the SC found that he had no actual expectation of
privacy on his work computer. He did not have a separate office space nor did he use a
password for his computer. He would have visitors which he let them use his computer. The
CSC also implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything on their office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business purposes.
On the second inquiry, the SC said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-
complaint. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
SC's first Amparo case
FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the
CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months
of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody.
The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking
to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
HELD:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of
the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and
security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. (GR
No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)
Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a search
warrant.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that
the production order should be likened to the production of documents or things under sec. 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,
of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control.” (GR No. 180906, The
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)
REV. REYES VS GONZALES (2009)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Rev. Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 2007 and together with fifty (50) others, they were brought to Camp Crame to await
inquest proceedings. On December 2007, a Hold Departure Order List was
issued ordering the Immigration to include the name of petitioner and 49 others for the alleged
crime of Rebellion, in the interest of national security and public safety.
Petitioner’s counsel wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO, in view of the
dismissal of his client’s criminal case on rebellion. That, the DOJ Secretary has not acted on their
request, petitioner then next recourse was for the availment of the writ of amparo because of
his alleged continued restraint of right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
No. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Here, the
restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his
right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy.
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. Where, as in this case, there is no
clear showing that the right to life, liberty or security of the petitioner is immediately in danger
or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best
merely speculative.
Petition is dismissed.
RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO
FACTS:
Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state,
making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos
in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where
more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a
member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a
military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army.
Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other
NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and
tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a
surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take
Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went inside
their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking
men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for
the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production
of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza,
Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on
her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court
of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino,
Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac,
the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on
account of her immunity from suits.
ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her
presidential immunity from suit
WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and
habeas data cases.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only
applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the
latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure
may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits
during their tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to
shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in
order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the
respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other
hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and
allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property.
He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of
respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect
to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and
P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent
Callagan for lack of merit.
LEE VS ILAGAN
FACTS:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her
former common law partner.
According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while.
When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy
confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing
him and another woman.
He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They had an
altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic
Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other
woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital
camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days
from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and
reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s
petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in
the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of
data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over
of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense
that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of
reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to
privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not on
its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme
Court.
HELD:
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals[2], which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself[3].”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data
Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other[4]. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will
not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful[6].
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a
privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way
to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he to failed to explain the
connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.
RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs
the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore,
the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City.
At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the
heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wiretapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of
the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in
favor of the accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient
and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to
excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be
considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who
provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.
RAMIREZ VS. CA G.R. NO. 93833 SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize
wiretapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From
the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and
void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the
party is a violation of R.A. 4200.
Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall
be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be
a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even
a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of
the provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Zulueta v. CA
FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta, petitioner, entered the clinic of her husband, Alfredo Martin, private
respondent, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinets and took a total of 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between the private respondent and and hi alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, respondent’s passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were to be used in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from practice of medicine filed by the petitioner against the private respondent.
Respondent then filed an action for the recovery of the documents and damages against the
petitioner which was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The decision of the RTC was
then affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) hence this petition for certiorary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents obtained be admissible as evidence against the
respondent.
HELD: NO. Such documents are inadmissible in any proceeding. Even though the petitioner and
respondent are husband and wife, their contracting of marriage does not shed the right of
privacy of one of the contracting parties. And that, such documents were obtained without the
consent of the respondent.
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy of the spouse as against the other is preserved
even after marriage. As elaborated by the Court, “the intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.”
38. Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. YSP Inc., a
supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per
unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00.
Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost
per bottle was indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms.
Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.
Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes. Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as
counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the
dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
39. MARQUEZ vs DESIERTO
FACTS: Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank Julia Vargas, received an Order from
Ombudsman to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera. The
Ombudsman wanted to conduct such in camera inspection on the accounts based on a trail of
manager’s checks by a certain Trivinio who purchased 51 managers checks for a total amount
of P272M. Marquez agreed to the inspection.
Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman saying that the accounts in question cannot readily be
identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The Ombudsman replied that the Bank
should have preserved records despite the accounts being dormant.
Ombudsman issued order to direct Marquez to produce the bank documents due to the
unjustified delay by the Bank since the in camera inspection had already been extended twice.
Marquez filed for declaratory relief to clear the rights of petitioners under the bank secrecy law
ISSUE/S: Whether the in camera inspection orders are allowed as an exception to the bank
secrecy law? NO
RULING: The in camera inspection is not allowed. There being no pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction. An exception to the bank secrecy law is when the money deposited
is the subject matter of a litigation. Therefore, it may be allowed on the ground of a pending
case when:
1. The case is pending in court of competent jurisdiction
2. The account must be clearly identified
3. Inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending case
4. The Bank personnel and account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection
5. Such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case
The order for in camera inspection is based on a pending investigation of the Ombudsman for
violations of RA 3019, Sec 3(e)(g). Clearly, there is no pending litigation yet before a court of
competent authority. It is only an investigation by the Ombudsman.
40. O P L E V S T O R R E S ( 1 9 9 8 )
FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four
newspapers of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
HELD: The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection. The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations
by persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said
order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will
put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
41. TELEBAP v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes
property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess
of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates
themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which
candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely
depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time
unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III,
§7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the
duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so
demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to
see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For
while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights,
they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access
to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the
autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold
the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a
social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast
media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they
may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good
42. ABS-CBN v. COMELECBS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other groups from conducting
; exit survey during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice
President. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL).
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes the Freedom of
Speech and of the Press.
HELD: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media
constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the COMELEC
cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.
Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools in
eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the COMELEC so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our
people.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to
be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right
of suffrage. The Court cannot support any ruling or order “the effect of which would be to nullify
so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” When faced with borderline situations in which
the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is
invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean
in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s
power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in
the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
43. SWS vs Comelec
of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather
than speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils To
summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought
to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social
A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001 RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF
research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
E. ESTRADA SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features news-
petitioners,
worthy items of information including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for
vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair
Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
Nature: Motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election
Keywords: Live telecast of President Estrada’s Plunder Case, right to information,
survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release
to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
MENDOZA, J
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey
results up to the last day of the elections on May 14,2001
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter
requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
Issue : WON Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
of speech, expression, and the press.
The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the
people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be recognized, served and
HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4?
satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the
The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O
live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of
'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional
ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press]
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most
coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent
influential test for distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
have "become canonical in the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has
been applied by this Court in at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O
Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information
'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest
of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might
Ratio: The petition is denied.
undermine the integrity of the election, Sec. 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression,
while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers Even if
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates,
and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved
in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention
and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only
by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not
at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under
the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before
the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President
shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of
the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original
thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
45. Newsounds Broadcasting vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270, April 2, 2009 Nature: Petition for
Review emanated from a petition for mandamus
Nature: Petition for Review emanated from a petition for mandamus
Keywords: Prior restraint, Permit to operate, Agricultural land to Commercial
Summary: RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for mandamus. The RTC upheld all the
arguments of the respondents, including their right to deny the sought after mayors permit
unless they were duly satisfied that the subject property has been classified as commercial in
nature. The Decision made no reference to the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in impliedly denying the application for preliminary mandatory injunction.
TINGA, J.:
Facts: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast
station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela.
Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management
office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the
location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate
smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning
Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds
that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land
was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of
mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the
property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the
DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the
same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia,
City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus
Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election
period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004,
but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had
no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after
elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but
both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits,
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority
to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993.
However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit
“either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted
from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to
commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial.
Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a
commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of
property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying
the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is
not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer
to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.
Issue: WON there is prior restraint against DZNC
Ratio: YES.
Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the
right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They admit
that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in
Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political
dynasty. Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001
until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station
manager at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City,
DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a
20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending
to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM.
The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards one
opinion or the other, but not us. The comfort offered by the constitutional shelter of free
expression is neutral as to personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The judges tasked to
enforce constitutional order are expected to rule accordingly from the comfort of that neutral
shelter.
The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are
authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some
years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities
have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners
to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits
to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority. While once
petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of government has since bore down upon
them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic
understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases.
Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents,
we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as
an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court
bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid.
That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a
long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental
action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental
action directed at most other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of
the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification
for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of
validity that inheres in every legislation.
At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place
or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws
are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern
with discrimination in the regulation of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech
or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it
operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station,
as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station
or business enterprise within the LGU.
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as
a content-based restraint.
35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very telling. The
closure comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage.
Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.
In their Answer with Comment to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted that
petitioners had made such exposes during the 2001 elections, though they denied the nature
and truthfulness of such reports. They conceded that the Philippine Daily Inquirer story
reported that Dy said he planned to file disenfranchisement proceedings against [DZNC]-AM.
While respondents assert that there are other AM radio stations in Isabela, they do not
specifically refute that station DWDY was owned by the Dy family, or that DZNC and DWDY are
the two only stations that operate out of Cauayan.
Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government
requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the
election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to
impose these new requirements substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for
commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive
in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored
Respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.[52] Respondents efforts to close
petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004 elections, where
a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a credible and
ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be
the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements required of petitioners
by the Cauayan City government are frankly beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted
by local governments throughout the Philippines.
All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately
shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based. The United States Supreme
Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm
violation of the First Amendment. The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn
up by a constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may
be violated.
The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict
scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-
based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.[54] The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that
the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do
not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in
the absence of any compelling reason,[55] the burden lies with the government to establish
such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to
immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners
Notes: Whenever the force of government or any of its political subdivisions bears upon to
close down a private broadcasting station, the issue of free speech infringement cannot be
minimized, no matter the legal justifications offered for the closure. In many respects, the
present petitions offer a textbook example of how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech, expression and of the press may be unlawfully compromised. Tragically, the lower
courts involved in this case failed to recognize or assert the fundamental dimensions, and it is
our duty to reverse, and to affirm the Constitution and the most sacred rights it guarantees.
46. Hector Villanueva v. PDI
DOCTRINE: Consistent with good faith, reasonable care and the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for
honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and
tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events
and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being
hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for malice or
damages, i.e. libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of
morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press freedom, there
is this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’— that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." There
can be no presumption of actual malice on privileged communication, thus it must be
sufficiently proved. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
communication and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander for as such, no
malice can be aptly be presumed on them. The instant articles of the case dealt with matters
of public interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking
into account the very public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted
media mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates.
Thus, no malice may be imputed on these articles for the action of libel to stand, it must be
sufficiently proved.
FACTS:
Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during
the May 11, 1992 elections.
On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied
by the COMELEC.
Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin
Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-
NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in
three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment
in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office of Bais City.
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G.
Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having
been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of
authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge
of the mayor’s office in the city.
On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When
results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.
 Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories,
petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for
damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were “maliciously timed” to
defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly
believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for
actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages
of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P300,000 and
costs of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Bulletin and Philippine Daily Inquirer are liable for damages or
libel for the published article.
RULING: NO
For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press freedom, there is this test
to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’— that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Fair commentaries
on matters of public interest are privileged communication and constitute a valid defense in an
action for libel or slander for as such, no malice can be aptly be presumed on them. The rule
on privileged communication had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918,
in United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of
public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with
matters of public interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, taking into account the very public character of the election itself. For this reason,
they attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to
the candidates.
In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in
question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what
was false or not.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false,
mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or
misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent
with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be
some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much
leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our
democracy.
A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report
on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear
of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for malice or
damages, i.e. libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of
morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
As aptly observed in Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al.:
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name
and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under
the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation
of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression,
for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
We find respondents entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights. We cannot punish
journalists including publishers for an honest endeavor to serve the public when moved by a
sense of civic duty and prodded by their sense of responsibility as news media to report what
they perceived to be a genuine report.
47. G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS,
Petitioners, vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL
RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA,
Respondents.
Facts: PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal
charges against respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1)
year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges contained that
respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the
latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red
shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action
proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate
therefrom.
Issue: Whether or not the unruly mass gathering of twenty employees during office hours,
inside office premises to protest falls within the purview of the constitutional guarantee to
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
Ruling: Yes.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political
rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must
be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing
at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even
badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect
work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.
The limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to
temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass
undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving
our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to
voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and
interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair
to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived
this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
Respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 02-
1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or
regulated these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents actuations did not
amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.
48. Soriano v. MTRCB
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the
MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon
and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioner‘s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the
TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue: Whether or not Soriano‘s statements during the televised ―Ang Dating Daan‖ part of
the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioner‘s utterances on the viewers‘ fundamental rights as well as
petitioner‘s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him
from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly
asserted that petitioner‘s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech
either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above
(re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster‘s role
and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language
be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language.
The SC ruled that ―Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,‖ and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing
decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be ―context
based‖ and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television
broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the ―G‖ rating of the show, which are all
factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on
how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context
that they were used.‖
The SC also said ―that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a ―form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.‖ In affirming the power of the MTRCB to
issue an order of suspension, the majority said that ―it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly
impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.‖ visit
fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension ―is not a prior restraint on the right
of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued
to him by MTRCB,‖ rather, it was a sanction for ―the indecent contents of his utterances in a
―G‖ rated TV program.‖ (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
Dissenting Opinion:
PUNO, J.:
In a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government action could be both a penalty
and a prior restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month suspension takes
such form because it also acts as a restraint to petitioner‘s future speech and thus deserves a
higher scrutiny than the ―context based‖ approach that the majority applied. In voting to grant
Soriano‘s petition, the Chief Justice said that ―in the absence of proof and reason, he [Soriano]
should not be penalized with a three-month suspension that works as a prior restraint on his
speech.
49. a SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., vs.ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
et. al G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010 chilling effect, facial challenge, Human Security Act of
2007, in terrorem effect
FACTS: Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUE: Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines?
RULING: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra
vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates
as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of
Speech.
HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not
convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church
appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself,
bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly
refers to candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their
respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is
a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several theories and
schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
1. First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the
right to criticize government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or
airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
2. Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
3. Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
4. Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
5. Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and
minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of
democratic governance]. ”
6. Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this
situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful
methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful
means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent
dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions.
BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006
Facts:
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was
violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass
action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated
Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October
4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police
blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing
injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-
sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in
front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along
Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy
announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because
it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies
without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions
are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for
being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880,
aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore
B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that
the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing
the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincingevidence of a clear and present danger is
too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as
certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly
wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order
supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880
and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the
right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to
prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow
of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a
permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and
not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because
it covers all rallies.
Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly
and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P.
No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and
benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is,
likewise, no priorrestraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps
for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permitshall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has
not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
IBP VS HON. MANILA MAYOR ATIENZA (2010)
FACTS:
In 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed an
application with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-
sectoral organizations. Respondent Mayor Atienza issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a
rally on given date but indicated Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of the Mendiola Bridge.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari but having been unresolved
within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners again, filed before the SC assailing the appellate
court’s inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public
Assembly Act of 1985.
The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, and as alleged by the Petitioners, the
participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. A few days later,
the MPD instituted a criminal action,against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in
staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
ISSUE: Whether the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and
violates the constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
HELD: The Court finds for petitioners. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard
first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the
permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO
ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
 (d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and
stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful
cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or
influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the
government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike
areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code,
its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people
are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of
the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound
system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for
any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-
owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations
of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign
period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers;
the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets
to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8
hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous
place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept
the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises
of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-
four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from
date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use,
for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate
the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to
another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of
commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the
public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the
permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly
interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall
not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public
safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may
be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of
activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement
agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their
duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising
their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this
end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in
complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently
on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum
tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but
may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots
or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used
unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or
deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall
be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such
public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent
shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any
possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants
are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such
property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the
participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should
not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a
warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of
time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of
this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall
not constitute a group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully
dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without
having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned,
or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit:
Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in
or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of
this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for
a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any
person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of
activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and
the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of
a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts
defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day
to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and
one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment
of one day to thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within
the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need
of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish
the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-
1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son
with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the
State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary
to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized
for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Soriano v Laguardia
587 SCRA 79 (2009)
Velasco, Jr. J.:
FACTS:
In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as hose of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed towards private
respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo and a host of the program Ang
Tamang Daan:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang
babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa
sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private respondents,
all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB. On 16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued an
order preventively suspending Ang Dating Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD
1986.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson Consoliza
Laguardia recuse themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew his motion followed by
the filing for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension order.
On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension from the
program Ang Dating Daan.
ISSUES:
 W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.
 W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack of due
hearing in the case.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious freedom.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and expression.
HELD:
1.) Yes. The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and functions which
may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of
the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the law. The authority given should be liberally
construed. A perusal of the PD 1986 reveal the possession of authority to issue preventive
suspension as found in Sec 3(d), “To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition,
and/or television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…” Any
other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted,
carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.
Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by MTRCB in pursuant
to PD 1986 merely formalizes the power bestowed by said statute. The IRR provision on
preventive suspension is applicable not only to motion pictures and publicity materials but only
beyond motion pictures. The MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be
subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
2.) No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in response to a written
notice after petitioner appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents
complaint, no violation of the guarantee was made. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD
1986, preventive suspension shall issue any time during the pendency of the case. In this
particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated
PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. At
any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing
Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied. Petitioner argues that he was unable
to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. The equal protection clause demands
that all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The Court ruled that
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers,
who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he
offers no proof to such allegations.
3.) No. The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical
mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program
does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple
insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the
need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.
4.) No. The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against
publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in
libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the
freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or
other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of
speech may be regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when
the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. The freedom to express
ones sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and
integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with
proper regard for the rights of others. A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the
utterances involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.
The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child,
and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the
US Supreme Court, the Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the
utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the
time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be
easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely
secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of
the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies to all
establishments, whether religious or not.
Facts: The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications
form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and
responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his
district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor
Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very
ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of
dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of 
employer's duly authorized representative
as grounds for the termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA
for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed
by petitioner against the SDA.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which
is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria
was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive
Secretary, et al (2003)

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO
46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on
Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation
of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion
RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a
religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State,
the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate
the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III,
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without
doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has
in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product
as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected
by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and
ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in
the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws
do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given
detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the
perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided.
The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the
official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is
GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
CASE: Velarde v Social Justice Society (SJS)
DATE: April 28, 2004
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing June
12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 49.
Topic in Syllabus: The Decision
FACTS:
 January 28, 2003, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – Manila against Mariano “Mike” Velarde, His
Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Bro. Eliseo Soriano. SJS sought the interpretation of certain
constitutional provisions, specifically concerning the separation of Church and State,
as well as a petition for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of religious
leaders endorsing certain candidates and asking members of their flock to vote for
a specific candidate.
 All respondents of the initial case sought for the dismissal of the petition on the
common ground that aforesaid petition by the SJS did not state a cause of action
and had no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way
of advisement which was followed closely by another Order that denied all Motions
to Dismiss.
 Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo
moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, asked for
extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order
by submitting his Memorandum. The Motions for Reconsideration were denied as
well.
 Main contents of assailed Decision:
 Aforementioned actions of respondents in the initial case
 That the trial court had jurisdiction over the Petition because "in praying
for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law,
[the Petition] has raised only a question of law." A lengthy discussion of
the issue raised in the Petition – separation of Church and State –
followed.
 A quo, it also mentioned that "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in
an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation
clause."
 After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive in its Decision.
 Petition for Review thus filed by respondent Velarde.
ISSUES:
 Procedural Issue:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the SJS with the RTC of Manila
have the necessary requisites?
- Justiciable controversy?
- Ccause of action?
- Legal standing?
 Substantive Issues:
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? (MAIN ISSUE in connection with
the syllabus topic)
2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited
from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned
from campaigning against said candidates?
RULING:
The Petition of Bro. Mike Velarde is meritorious.
“WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED.
The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and
thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure
to state a cause of action.”
REASONING:
 Petition for Declaratory Relief, Sec. 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
"Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder."
 Procedural Issue:
Requisites for Petition for Declaratory Relief
 Justiciable Controversy
- Refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory
- SJS failed to show an existing controversy in their Petition, as well as the
legal right of petitioners being violated by the respondents therein
- Elections had not even started yet  SJS was questioning a mere
possibility
- Premise was highly speculative and theoretical, thus insufficient
- No factual allegation that SJS’ rights were being subjected to any
threatening, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented
by the declaratory relief sought
- Judicial power and duty of court cannot be exercised when there is actual
or threatened violation of right
- All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised
in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved," seeking an opinion of court more
than anything else
- Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering advisory opinions
 Cause of Action
- An act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights
of another, causing injury to the latter
- Essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
former to the latter
- HOWEVER, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a
cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply, only
that a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least
threatened
- Petition of SJS, however, discloses no specific allegation. Interest can
only be inferred in so far as the SJS “has thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a
judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation
of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure
adherence to the Constitution by everyone.”
- General averment  not enough to constitute a legal right or interest
- In the whole Petition, there is no single allegation of fact upon which SJS
could base a right of relief and even granting that it sufficiently asserted
a legal right it wanted to protect, there was no certainty that such right
would be invaded by said respondents
 Legal Standing
- Defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act
- Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. In SJS’s Petition, there is no indication, whether implied or
explicit, of taxpayer’s money being wrongfully disbursed
- There was also no showing that as a political party or with members as
voters, they would be adversely affected by the alleged acts if issue were
not resolved. No allegation that they had suffered or would be losing
votes through the actions of the therein respondents.
- The allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by Philippine jurisprudence
 Sans legal standing, SJS insisted that the Court take cognizance of the Petition
as it raised “issues of paramount public interest.” This had already been done
in a prior case, that of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, where
the Court entertained IBP’s petition despite a lack in locus standi. In this case,
however, despite being given the opportunity to substantiate otherwise
 barren allegations concerning the supposed constitutional issue, counsels for
both sides – particularly respondent SJS – made no satisfactory allegations or
clarifications.
 Regarding proper proceedings before the trial court, the following must be
noted in order to not waste precious judicial time and effort:
(Copy-pasted from case because it’s too long and impossible to
shorten.)
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of
the defendant -- dismiss a complaint (or petition, in a special civil action)
that does not allege the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s) cause or causes of
action. A complaint or petition should contain "a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
claim or defense." It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the
requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a
directive that the defendant answer within 15 days, unless a different
period is fixed by the court. The summons shall also contain a notice that
if such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment
by default and may be granted the relief applied for. The court, however,
may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after
the time fixed by the Rules.
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be
answered within ten (10) days from service. A reply may be filed within
ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation). Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a
counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at
any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary
judgment in its favor. Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a
counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought --
may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor. After the
motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
there is a showing that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the
complaint or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based
on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their
arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions
of fact. After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny
the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It shall not defer
the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor.
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the
balance of the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less
than five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice
of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant
shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of
the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.
After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be
set for pretrial, which is a mandatory proceeding. A plaintiff’s/
petitioner’s (or its duly authorized representative’s) non-appearance at
the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the
action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure
on the part of the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the
plaintiff/petitioner to present evidenceex parte, and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial. Upon the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the
matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or
admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters
considered. The parties may further avail themselves of any of the
modes of discovery, if they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial, in which the parties shall
adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or
defenses. By their written consent or upon the application of either
party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the
issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or
to be agreed upon by the parties. The trial or hearing before the
commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the
court.
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall
file with the court a written report on the matters referred by the
parties. The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall
issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or
recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present
further evidence before the commissioner or the court.
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the
clerk of court
 Based on aforementioned procedure of court proceedings, following
conclusions may be made concerning proceedings conducted in the RTC of
Manila:
 - Initial pleading of the SJS was grossly inadequate  did not even specify
relief
Relief - a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a
violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner
- Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, the Motions (of therein respondents) were not heard.
Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not
state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of
the said Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the grounds relied
upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal findings and conclusions of
the trial court
- The RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to file their
answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues
- The questioned Decison was utterly lacking in requirements prescribed
by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
- Trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of
the law, with grave abuse of discretion
 Substantive Issues:
1. Fundamental Requirements of a Decision (MAIN ISSUE in connection with
the syllabus topic)
 Constitution, Sec.14 Article VIII:
"No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis
therefor."
 Rules of Court, Sec. 1 Rule 36 (Civil Procedure)
"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk
of court."
 Rules of Court, Sec.2 Rule 120 (Criminal Procedure)
"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.”
 Administrative Circular No. 1, January 28, 1988: Prompted all judges to “to
make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the
legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should
avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the
facts from which such conclusions are deduced.”
 Court cannot simply give a judgment without justifying its action – such could
leave parties in the dark and be prejudicial to the losing party desiring to take
the case to a higher tribunal
 People v Bugarin
- Requirements: intended to inform parties of the reasons behind the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate
court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees
- Also, to assure parties that judge reached judgment through legal
reasoning
 Madrid v Court of Appeals
- Instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions
would present a comprehensive analysis of the factual and legal findings
 Decision assailed:
- Begins with the nature of the action and the question or issue presented
- Brief discussion of the constitutional provisions involved and what the
petitioners sought to achieve
- Proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of Church and State
- Did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion
 Manalang v Tuason de Rickards
- Dispositive of a decision  investive or controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions settled
therein
 Significance of factual findings  value of the decision as a precedent
 Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate
are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void
Parts of a Decision
 Statement of a Case
- Legal definition of the nature of the action, whether civil or criminal, etc.
- Criminal cases: verbatim reproduction of criminal information serves as
a guide; importance emphasized when there is a question of efficiency
of the charges
- Mentions also: court of origin & case number
- Reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the
reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo
 Statement of Facts
- Three ways:
i. Objective/reportorial method – summarizes without comment the
testimony of the witnesses
ii. Synthesis method - factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution
and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according
to the judge’s best light
iii. Subjective method - version of the facts accepted by the judge is
simply narrated without explaining what the parties’ versions are
iv. Combination of objective/subjective - testimony of each witness is
reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of
the facts
 Issues or Assignments of Error
- Both factual and legal issues should be stated
 - Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may
also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered
 The Court’s Ruling
- Includes a full discussion of the errors and issues involved in the case
 The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
- Criminal case: Innocence or guilt, specific crime, penalty imposed,
participation of the accused, modifying circumstance, if any then civil
liability and cost.
- Civil case: Whether complaint is granted or dismissed, specific relief
granted, costs.
- Test of completeness:
i. Parties should know rights and obligations
ii. Know how to execute decision under contingencies
iii. No need for further proceedings to dispose of issue
iv. Case should be terminated according to proper relief
2. Religious Leaders’ Endorsement of Candidates
 Issue deserved serious consideration. There was, however, a lack in ultimate
facts in the SJS Petition
 Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are enough
factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no
facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision
 Assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because
it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed
legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review,
affirm, reverse or even just modify.
Taruc v. De la Cruz
Facts:
 The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in
Socorro, Surigao City.
 Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano
for the reason that Fr. Florano’s wife’s family belonged to a political party opposed
to petitioner Taruc’s. Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so he did not
give in to the request.
 Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta
celebrated by Fr. Ambong who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of
Surigao.
 Petitioners were then expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1)
disobedience to duly constituted authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in
division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help and (3) threatening to forcible
occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the General Membership.
 Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop
De la Cruz and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with
the Bishop. They said that their rights to due process were violated because they
were not heard before the order of expulsion was made.
Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution – NO
Ratio: Section 5 of Article III
 A form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical
authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude
unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical in nature.
 In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area, which
the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
 To the power of excluding form the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters, which are outside the
province of civil courts.
Comments: records show that Bishop De la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to
commit acts inimical to the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the consequences
of their actions yet these pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears.
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo
July 22,2014 | Brion J. | implementation of infrastructure project not subject to judicial review
PETITIONER: Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. represented by its VP, Carlito Badion, et al
RESPONDENTS: Jessie Robredo in his capacity as Secretary of DILG, et al
SUMMARY: Petitioners reside in the cites of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon. LGU has a infrasture
project that requires the eviction and demolition of illegally occupied areas by the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a case which argues that respondents must first secure an eviction and/or demolition
order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 and argued
that the said RA was unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: To justify judicial review to be conducted by the Judicial department, the petitioners must
establish facts that are necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem they presented in this case.
FACTS:
 The members of petitioners were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and
located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon
 These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and
construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by the
petitioners
 Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any
court order when:
 o persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places suchas sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and
o persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure
projects with available funding are about to be implemented.
 On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the respondents to first secure an
eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
 Petitioners argue that they have:
o No plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional for
warranting demolition without any court order. (Section 6, Article 3 of
the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of
abode unless there is a court order.)
o Violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in
Article 25 of Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a) of
RA 7279.
o Insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondents’threats of
evictions and demolitions had previously conducted evictions and
demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the
1987 Constitution.
o Also contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues
raised in this case clothes them with legal standing.
 Respondent’s case:
o Respondents prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its
serious procedural defects:
 Petitioners Ignored the hierarchy of courts
 Petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
o For a writ of prohibition is merely to
prevent the public respondent’s
usurpation of power or improper
assumption of jurisdiction, on the
other hand, a writ of mandamus only
commands the public respondent to
perform his ministerial functions.
 the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of
discretion that the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed.
 the petition does not present any justiciable controversy
since the City of Navotas had already successfully evicted the
petitioners in San Roque, Navotas
 petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were
personally notified of the intended eviction and demolition
on September 23, 2011
 He further asserts that his faithful implementation of Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, which are presumed to be
constitutional, cannotbe equated to grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects – YES
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of
the 1987 Constitution - NO
(3) Whether or not the petion may be subject to Judicial Review –NO
RULING: Petition is Dismissed
RATIO:
(1).
 The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly
filed the petition before the Court.
 The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of
last resort, not a court offirst instance.
 The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus.
For a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public
respondent’s usurpation of power or improper assumption of
jurisdiction, on the other hand, a writ of mandamus only
commands the public respondent to perform his ministerial
functions.
 The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents
have discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall
be performed. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
(2).
 The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is
not the lis mota (the cuase of the suit or action) of the case.
(3).
 The petition fails show the essential requisites that would warrant the Court’s
exercise of judicial review which are:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination;
 (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part ofthe
party raising the constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
decision of the case.
 the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the
constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable.
 Petitioners fail to show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of
the 1987 Constitution. In the case of Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already
ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions without any court order.
 the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public
respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, theymerely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the
public respondents through general averments in their pleading, but without
any basis to support their claim.
Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG
(Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern)
FACTS:
Petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former gov’t official, impelled to bring
this action regarding several news reports on: (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs,
on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that
respondents make public any negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a
“debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino People. Hence, they have the right to know the transactions effected by
the Government.
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner’s action is premature,
because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since
the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Further, Pres. Ramos, in his Memorandum, commanded the PCGG Chairman NOT to
approve the Compromise Agreements. Embodied in the covenant that (a) the Marcoses shall
provide the gov’t assistance by way of testimony or disposition on any information that may
shed light on the cases; (b) the assets determined to belong to the Marcoses shall be net of and
exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines; (c) that all disclosures of
assets shall not used as evidence by the Gov’t in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative case
against the former.
ISSUES:
(A) Procedural:
1) W/N the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the
instant petition; and
2) W/N this Court is the proper court before which this action may be
filed.
(B) Substantive:
1) W/N this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
2) W/N there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-
gotten wealth.
HELD:
First Procedural Issue
YES. The Petitioner has the legal standing to file the instant petition.
In Legaspi vs. CSC, the Court declared that “when a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.”
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access
to official records and documents which guaranteed under Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution. Due to the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to
sustain petitioner’s legal standing, i.e. 1) the enforcement of a public right; 2) espoused by a
Filipino citizen, the Court ruled that the petition at bar should be allowed.
Second Procedural Issue
YES. Section 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the SC original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus.
The Court ruled that this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have
already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any
settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise
interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public transaction.”
This broad and prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil
Case.

First Substantive Issue
YES. The Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, whether perfected or not.
Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to
gov’t research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Such recognized restrictions are as follows: a) national security matters and
intelligence information; b) trade secrets and banking transactions; c) criminal matters and; d)
other confidential information.
The Court emphasized that ill-gotten wealth assumes a public character which
refers to assets and properties acquired, directly or indirectly, by former Pres. Marcos, his
family and relatives through or as a result of improper of illegal use of government funds or
properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers
or influences resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to
the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines.
Thus, the Court can require the PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on
any agreement that may arrived at and any proposed settlement concerning the Marcoses’
purported ill-gotten wealth.
Second Substantive Issue
YES. There are Legal Restraints existed against the compromise agreement between
the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.
Generally, law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the
following matters: 1) the civil status of persons, 2) the validity of a marriage of a legal
separation, 3) any ground for legal separation, 4) future support, 5) the jurisdiction of courts,
and 6) future legitimate. A Compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy or public order.
In Republic & Campos Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the power to grant criminal immunity
was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides:
Section 5. The PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to
any person who provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted by
the Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired the properties in question in any case where
such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter’s guilt or
his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the
witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to
do so by the latter or by the Commission.
In the case at bar, the compromise agreements revealed serious flaws. First, the
agreements did not conform to the requirements of EO 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity under
section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the ill-gotten
wealth cases. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information against
a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
Second, under the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms
of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Constitution. Sec. 28(4), Art. VI of the Constitution specifically provides: “No law granting any
tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the
Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant such exemptions.
Third, under the Agreement, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of
all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other court. This is
a direct encroachment on judicial powers of the court which has the jurisdiction on dismissal.
Hence, PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses.
Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether past,
present, or future against the Marcoses. This stipulation is contrary to the Civil Code which
states that “an action for future fraud may not be waived.” Further, the Agreements do not
provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their
respective prestations.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that the Agreements which
PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs violated the Constitution.
Petition GRANTED.
Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998
AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during
the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in
relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court:
Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be
revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or
public policy.
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or the
prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse
for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or
penalties.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties,
limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except
those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the
public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly
or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In
no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice,
judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a
plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial.
Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may
modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried again
following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days
from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case
may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from
the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors
resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.
Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for
the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to
the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred
eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred
twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the
period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.
Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental
competency, or physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed
thirty (30) days,
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases
or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any
proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an
essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered
absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence.
An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her
whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or
he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or
physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is
filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that
offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time
limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over
whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and
no motion for severance has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio
or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the
justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant
in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in
accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets
forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends
of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public
and the accused in a speedy trial.
Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a justice or
judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of
Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make
a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the
number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to
expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of general
congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public attorney
knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is
charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime,
or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on
the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of
his/her right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise
the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the
prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause
notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence
of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a
properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall
be made available to that public attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an
accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended
by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall
have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden
of going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10
of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider,
among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case
which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act
and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial
or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or
public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary
witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and
without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false
and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or
administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and
when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by
imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is
entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding
Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court
considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority
or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules
of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section.
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal
cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide
sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification
consistent with the provisions of this Act.
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative
orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court
under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be
necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision of this
Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III,
Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional,
the other provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of
this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-
month period provided in Section 9 of this Act.
Estrada v Desierto
GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Ponente : Puno, J.
Facts :
1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President. The president was accused with corruption, culminating in
Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingson’s accusations that the president received millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.
2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began early investigations regarding the
accusation, while key socio-political figures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and
Ramos, the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet members called on the president to
resign, and resigned from their cabinet posts themselves.
3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by
Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second
envelope of evidence showing the president’s P3.3 billion bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde”, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began.
4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Roco’s motion to postpone the impeachment trial until the
House of Representatives resolved the lack of public prosecutors.
5. With the defection of more officials and of the army and police from the Estrada
administration, the president attempted to appease public sentiment by announcing a snap
election and by allowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures failed, and the calls
for resignation strengthened.
6. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-president.
News broke out that Chief Justice HilarioDavide would administer the oath of presidency to the
vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the
constitutionality of Arroyo’s presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing
his responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.
7. The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of
government, by majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment
trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor- Santiago that the
impeachment court had failed to resolve the case, leaving open questions regarding Estrada’s
qualifications to run for other elected posts.
8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of
Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings
until his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and
incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting
president only.
9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the
President vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in
public the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving
pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days.
Issues:
I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is
a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still president, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity
Ruling:
I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because the cases at bar pose legal, and not
political, questions. Hence, the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
· Definition of ‘political questions’: “...those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government.” --Former CJ Roberto Concepcion
· Arroyo’s government is NOT revolutionary in character, since her oath was taken
under the 1987 Constitution.
· EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and the right to
assembly. It is intra constitutional in this regard (within the scope of the
Constitution). The resignation of Estrada that it caused and the subsequent
succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review. 
II. Estrada is NOT a President
on leave while Arroyo is Acting President.
· Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada says that only Congress has the ultimate 

authority to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his 

functions in the manner provided by said provision.
· Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge Estrada’s inability to do his job as President.
· However, both houses of Congress expressed their recognition and support of
Arroyo 
as the new President, and it is implicitly clear in this recognition that
Estrada’s inability is no longer temporary. Thus, Congress has rejected Estrada’s
claim of inability.
· Furthermore, Court cannot exercise its judicial power to revise decision of
Congress in recognizing Arroyo. To do so would be to transgress principle of
separation of powers, since this is a political issue. 
III. Estrada contends that he has
not been convicted in the impeachment case and that he enjoys immunity from all
kinds of suit.
· Executive immunity provision of 1973 Constitution was no longer included in the
1986 Constitution. This is in accordance with SC ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez
that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.
· When the president has resigned, then proper criminal and civil cases may already
be filed against him 
·
IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him because of
prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has also developed bias.
· In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga v Court of Appeals it was laid down that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible
press.
· Our judges are smart enough to know the law and to disregard camera drama and
off-court evidence. Their exposure to media does not affect their impartiality.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER
CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
June 14, 2011 A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners
were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came
to be known as Maguindanao massacre´ spawned charges for 57 counts of murder
and additional charges of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766,
commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer
of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge
Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives
of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities and members of the
academe filed a petition before this court praying that live television and radio
coverage of the trial in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be
permitted inside the court room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 addressed to Chief
Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned this Court
to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The Court docketed the matter
as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.
By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-
11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted
intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the
accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are
being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry,
and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the
number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to
one reporter for each media institution.
Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of right to a fair and public
trial and the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV
and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case and
the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan
of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings,
they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights
are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation
is a viable alternative.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the
Maguindanao Massacre should be allowed
HELD:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of
the trial court proceedings, subject to guidelines.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test,
applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must
be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long
ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their
proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings.
Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same
time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or in any
court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated
as a means of entertainment, and to so treat it deprives the court of the dignity
which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for
which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that massive
intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and
destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the
question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case.
It held that the propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involves the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right
to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused,
on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial In so allowing pro hac vice the live
broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court
lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in
Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made
both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television
broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting
that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that
they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the
same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and
regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of
judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall
be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by
the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No
panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying
incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the
Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting
sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should
not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring,
if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the
trial court. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator
shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and
equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the
media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance
shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and
the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment
monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which
should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside
the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and
(iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities
facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via
wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one
common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or
derived to feed the images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access by the media
entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and
in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective
witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses
and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative
testimonies is material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the
consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or
mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial
break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned,
except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of
the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going
proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except
brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them
at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice
rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the
finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes,
which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt
power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives,
as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of
application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design
and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and
administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of
the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The
Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability
and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein
requirements.It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the
field of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court
(i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and
allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in
addition to these guidelines.
RESOLUTION October 23, 2011
Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta take issue on provisos (t), (g), and (h) of
the enumerated guidelines in the June 14, 2011 Resolution and allege that these
must be struck down for being unconstitutional, as they constitute prior restraint on
free expression because they dictate what media can and cannot report about the
"Maguindanao massacre" trial.
Accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan) also filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 27, 2011, alleging that the June 14, 2011 Resolution "deprives him of his
rights to due process, equal protection, presumption of innocence, and to be
shielded from degrading psychological punishment."
This Court partially grants reconsideration of the June 14, 2011 Resolution and deny
the Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2011 of petitioners Editha
Mirandilla Tiamzon and Glenna Legarta. The Court is now disallowing the live media
broadcast of the trial of the "Maguindanao massacre" cases but is still allowing the
filming of the proceedings for (1) the real-time transmission to specified viewing
areas, and (2) documentation.
In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. The
right to a public trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is
satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public and the press to attend
the trial and to report what they have observed. The accused's right to a public trial
should not be confused with the freedom of the press and the public's right to know
as a justification for allowing the live broadcast of the trial. The tendency of a high
profile case like the subject case to generate undue publicity with its concomitant
undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact
that the accused has legal remedies after the fact is of no moment, since the damage
has been done and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the fundamental
right to due process of the accused cannot be afforded after the fact but must be
protected at the first instance
To address the physical impossibility of accommodating the large number of
interested parties inside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, it is not necessary to
allow the press to broadcast the proceedings here and abroad, but the Court may
allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing areas outside the courtroom where
those who may be so minded can come and watch the proceedings. Aside from
providing a viewing area outside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, closed-circuit
viewing areas can also be opened in selected trial courts in Maguindanao,
Koronadal, South Cotabato, and General Santos City where most of the relatives of
the accused and the victims reside, enabling them to watch the trial without having
to come to Camp Bagong Diwa. These viewing areas will, at all times, be under the
control of the trial court judges involved, subject to this Court's supervision.
The disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial in Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-
162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-1 0-162652-66, and Q-10-163766 is subject to the
following guidelines on audio visual recording and streaming of the video coverage:
a. An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both
for documentary purposes and for transmittal to specified closed-circuit viewing
areas: (i) outside the courtroom, within the Camp Bagong Diwa 's premises; and (ii)
selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and General
Santos City where the relatives of the accused and the victims reside. Said trial
courts shall be identified by the Office of the Court Administrator. These viewing
areas shall be under the control of trial court judges involved, subject to this Court's
supervision.
b. The viewing area will be installed to accommodate the public who want to
observe the proceedings within the Camp Bagong Diwa premises. The streaming of
this video coverage within the different court premises in Mindanao will be installed
so that the relatives of the parties and the interested public can watch the
proceedings in real time.
c. A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No
panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying
incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the
Supreme Court.
d. The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the
closed-circuit viewing areas shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical
 disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings.
e. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall
coordinate and assist the trial courts involved on the physical set-up of the camera
and equipment.
f. The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
g. The audio-visual recording of the proceedings and its transmittal shall be made
under the control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the
exigency requires, subject to this Court
h. In all cases, the witnesses should be excluded from watching the proceedings,
whether inside the courtroom or in the designated viewing areas. The Presiding
Judge shall issue the appropriate orders to insure compliance with this directive and
for the imposition of appropriate sanctions for its violation.
Jonathan Cariaga v. CA
June 6, 2001
Gonzaga-Reyes
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting
Jonathan Cariaga of qualified theft
Facts:
Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC). He
received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He
initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators.
In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber
Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under
the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”.
‘Duran’ became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said
that his ‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area.
Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him.
‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named
Jonathan Cariaga (accused). Jonathan was the driver of a DLPC service truck. On November
1988, ‘Duran’ and Jonathan were introduced to each other. After which, more transactions
were made between the two.
‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him on
February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved
to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and
confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga.
The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the
subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to
give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC
for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal.
Issues:
(1) WON Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence
(2) WON Siton is a credible witness
(3) WON guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven
Held / Ratio:
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
(1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as
evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule
115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a
witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v. CA, the Court has held that “unable to testify”
does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only
subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan
Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its
coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case.
(2) Credible. Contradictions in the affidavit and his testimony in the court do not always
militate against a witness’s credibility. Affidavits, which are usuall ex parte, are often
incomplete and inaccurate and, generally, inferior to a testimony in an open court which
is subject to cross examination.
Siton’s statement on direct examination that he “corrected” his affidavit does not
necessarily discredit him. The payment was made in exchange for his services as agent
and not for concocting a story. The other alleged inaccuracies are negligible (e.g.,
description of Jonathan’s house)
(3) Yes. Jonathan cited testimonies of witnesses which seem to confirm that there were no
stolen goods. A more careful examination of the testimony reveals otherwise.
The determination of sufficiency of evidence is based on the credibility and quality, not
on the number. Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of one, if
credible, is sufficient to convict. The defense’s bare denial cannot prevail over the
unimpeached testimony of Ricardo.
Mere circumstance that Jonathan is an employee of DLPC is insufficient to create relation of
confidence which is required for the crime of qualified theft. However, access to the place
where the taking took place OR access to the stolen goods changes the crime to a qualified
theft.
Appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle is proper even if
not alleged in the information. A generic aggravating circumstance may be proven even if not
alleged. The truck was used to store & transport the materials to the place where they are sold.
People vs Ong
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004
Criminal Case Digest
Facts:
Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of
July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP
Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit
drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief
Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed
the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages
rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong
and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter
arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.
The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets
and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was
referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese
citizen from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in
1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but later hunted
for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician
in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William
Ong was later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming
for the first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the
RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his girlfriend
and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz, testified in De Ming’s favor and corroborated
with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was misidentified as
one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car, took his clutch
bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing
Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them
the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos.
However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim
that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Held:
The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial.
The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused
with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known
to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the
trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants are
Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the
accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the information was read in
the language or dialect known to them.
Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both entered
a plea of not guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese
language, however the appellants were arraigned on an information written in the English
language. The requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect known
to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation
against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules
necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the trial, the
lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.
Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise
the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the
meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court
held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but merely the deliveryman. His
testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone
cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.
The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether
there was valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police
officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that
the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and
competent evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu
started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given
instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-
bust operation.

(a) Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential
Rules of Criminal Procedure? informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the
privilege is no longer applicable.
In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The
problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in
protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The
balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the
crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informer’s
testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.
In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can
result in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material
elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the
testimony of the informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a
person enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value
of higher significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged
confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution.
There is no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the
substance confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.
The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @
Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
People of the Philippines vs. Federico M. Chua Hiong
G.R. No. 10413-R October 20, 1954
Facts:
Federico Chua Hiong is the uncle of Cesareo Gacheco. Gacheco and his family were defeated in
a civil case in the CFI of Manila, which, if not overturned by the SC, would lead to Gacheco and
co. losing 2/3s of the inheritance left by a Paulino Gacheco. Hiong sided with the party that
defeated Gacheco. This created tension and Gacheco wrote the Chief Finance Agent of the
Department of Finance charging Hiong with tax evasion and using a fake citizenship. He then
wrote a letter to Vice President Fernando Lopez accusing Hiong of illegal transactions with the
government.
A letter was written by a certain Benito Solipco to Hiong. (The SC says Solipco was undoubtedly
if not
Gacheco himself, acting under Gacheco’s inducement.) It said that the members of the Go
Family Association, of which Gocheco belonged, told Solipco that they will make every
vengeance against Hiong, such as paying some persons to kill him, or reporting him to every
Philippine Government Authority that he is a communist and other kinds of vengeance. The
letter warned Hiong to be careful as the Go Family wee all his enemies now and that they will
make every vengeance against him at all cost. The letter was contained in an envelope along
with a rope which contained a note saying “this serves for your personal use.” Hiong received
threats on the phone and was denounced as a communist through anonymous letters. Gocheco
then caused to be published articles entitled “Doubtful Citizenship” in the Feb 11, 1952 issue
of the Manila Chronicle. It said that while the Commissioner of Immigration had certain
evidences supporting the Filipino citizenship of Hiong, the Commisisoner’s decision was based
on questionable proofs. It then proceeded to enumerate the evidences such as:
1. Mr. Frederico M. Chua Hiong and his family, as shown, by the Master List of alien
registered in 1941 with the Bureau of Immigration, were registered under reg no.s.
199-461 to 199466.
2. The proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry at the Port of Manila, under Chinese
Board Report No. 1451, show that Mr. Chua Hiong was admitted into the country as
legitimate minor son of Chua Pe on September 23, 1913.
3. A certified Chinese Marriage Certificate secured from the local Civil Registrar shows
that his marriage was performed by the Chinese Consul at the Chinese YMCA in
1926.
4. Affidavits sworn to by residents of Aparri, Cagayan, the place where the alleged
mother (of Hiong) lives, and submitted by the Chief of Police at the instance of the
investigator in this case, show that the alleged mother has never left Aparri, much
less the Philippines, and therefore could not give birth to Hiong who was born in
China.
In response, Hiong caused Seriously Speaking to be published in the Manila Chronicle. It said:
“This investigation was only one of a series of other investigations conducted by different
agencies of our government at the instigation of Mr. Gocheco, who appears to be obsessed
with a persecution mania in order to besmirch my name and reputation and harass me and my
family. To my eternal shame and misfortune, Mr. Cesario T. Gocheco is my nephew. As such,
he is cognizant of all of the facts of my life for he has known me for the past 25 years….Why
then this sudden concern over my citizenship? Why this mad desire to bring harm to me and
my family? The reason is not hard to find – personal revenge is the moving passion in this drama
of intrigues and persecution to which I and my family have been subjected.… It is easy to
imagine the gloom, despondency and despair, that must have seized the Gocheco family when
the above decision was handed down as that would divest them of everything that they now
have and thus face stark poverty… It is obvious that the name “Benito Sulipco” is fictitious, as
it is the most natural thing that my enemies should cowardly hide behind the cloak of
anonymity, but, one need not stretch the imagination too far to be able to guess the
“mastermind behind these threats... For what could be better or more convenient to my
enemies than my untimely death, or for that matter, my deportation from this country had they
been able to prove their charges filed with the different government agencies. What better or
more convenient weapon can my enemies avail of then a this systematic and malicious
persecution in order to coerce or cajole me into submitting to their demands that I should desist
from proceeding with the civil case I have instituted against the Gocheco family which shall
ultimately reduce them to the poverty of the
proverbial church-mouse?” Because of the article above, Hiong was found guilty of libel by the
RTC. He now appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Chua Hiong’s libelous publication was a proper act of self-defense
Ruling: Yes
Self-defense applies to the crime of libel. Self-defense is a man’s inborn right. In a physical
assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no
further harm to repel. But that is not the case when it is aimed at a person’s good name. Once
the aspersion is cast its sting clings and the one thus defamed may avail himself of all necessary
means to shake it off. He may hit back with another libel which, if adequate, will be justified.
Granting that the “Seriously Speaking” column of the Manila Chronicle caused by Hiong was
libelous, is it unnecessarily libelous? It was intended to counteract the impression left in the
mind of the public by the article “Doubtful Citizenship” which Gocheco caused to be published
in the Manila Chronicle on Feb. 11, 1952. Hiong was living as a Filipino, his livelihood depended
mainly upon enterprises only Filipinos can engage in. It is perfectly conceivable that any
attempt to assail his Filipino citizenship should meet the keenest defense from him. To flout in
public the genuineness of one’s citizenship is slanderous, nobody would dare deny, the more
so Hiong’s case for obvious reasons. The Doubtful Citizenship column makes it appear that his
citizenship was acquired through questionable means and that an investigation is currently
being conducted with respect to the legality of his citizenship. Gocheco’s purpose was to malign
Hiong. Because he lost in the civil case, Gocheco decided to air his grievances through the press.
Hiong’s Seriously Speaking Column is not necessarily libelous because Hiong is entitled to show
Gocheco’s motive behind Doubtful Citizenship and to dispel the bad impression about him of
those who had read it.
People v Malimit
DOCTRINE: The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact
the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate
neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.
FACTS:
 At 8 pm, Onofre Malaki(victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto
Batin, was busy cooking supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store
 Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. to purchase chemical for his
rice farm
 Batin had just finished cooking, he proceeded directly to the store to ask Malaki if supper
is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he saw accused Ercarnacion “Manolo”
Malimit coming out of the store with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was
sprawled on the floor struggling for his life
 Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw
accused Malimit rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained
bolo
o Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the store,
Rondon clearly recognized Malimit
 Both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio
Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki.
 Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki
in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer
was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket
TC: Convicted accused for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
One of the contentions of accused Malimit in this appeal is that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of Rondon and Batin. He questions the credibility of the 2 witnesses
because they only revealed that they have knowledge of the crime and identified the accused
as the perpetrator, 5 months after the incident.
Date of the crime: April 15, 1991
Witnesses pointed at accused: September 17, 1991
ISSUE:
WON the testimonies of the witnesses may be appreciated by the court? YES
HELD:
Accused haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this
gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was merely
the date when Rondon and Batin executed their respective affidavits, narrating that they saw
the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out
of Malaki's store.
As to his claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample testimonial
evidence negating his assertion, to wit:
1. After having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin
immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him
that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the crime scene;
2. Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their barangay
where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night;
and
3. Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15,
1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not
render their testimony less credible.
The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after
the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural
reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors,
as in this case, is of judicial notice.
At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court
with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by
the appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values
to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can weigh
said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And
although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at
are clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.
Additional info:
The non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if accused was
indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime was not necessary for the prosecution to
present as evidence. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable.
Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have secured
a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence
to impeach Batin's credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the
blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.
People vs. Rondero
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied
hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations
in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several
circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison
with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as
blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers
the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence
of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be
admitted as evidence against him?
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted
from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as
evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples
may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under
duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband
in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government
corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners
and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what
they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."
3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly
prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to
find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA
3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein,
the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe
and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated
has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would
not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.
4. Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations
placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill
of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right
to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it
partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence,
the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.
Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999
Facts:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage
of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold
Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and
Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought
the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail
pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village
following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents
in a private car.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the
Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a
mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were
later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the
contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon
seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo
St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At
that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed
the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the
letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and
Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very
same letters confiscated from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were
declared guilty.
Issue(s): Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known that during
custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any
admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case,
even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters, the letters are still admissible as
evidence because the accused was convicted not only by means of these letters but also by
testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the letters were
validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest and therefore can stand on their own. The
decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
People v. Gallarde
G.R. No. 133025
Facts: An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging
accused-appellant of having sexual intercourse with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of age,
against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of
the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field. Through circumstantial
evidence, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim actual
damages. It convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime
of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge.
Issue: Whether or not right against self-incrimination is violated if pictures of accused were
taken, without assistance of counsel, as part of the evidence.
Held: No.The SC did not agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I",
"J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same
were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures
of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. 28 Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled
to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine
its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
COMELEC V. TAGLE
397 SCRA 618
FACTS:
 Florentino Bautista ran for the position of Mayor in Kawit Cavite
 He filed a complaint against the incumbent Mayor Poblete and others supported by
affidavits of 44 witnesses attesting to vote- buying activities.
 The case was handled by a prosecutor of the COMELEC’s law department.
 A separate complaint was filed by Rodelas and Macapagal with the provincial
prosecutor against the witnesses (vote-selling)
 COMELEC en banc declared the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to institute
criminal actions against the witnesses as null and void. COMELEC cited RA 6646
otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms law of 1987” which grants immunity
from criminal prosecution persons who voluntarily give information and willingly
testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling.
 Law department of COMELEC filed a motion to dismiss the case against the
witnesses. This was denied by respondent judge TAGLE.
 According to Tagle, for the witnesses to be exempt to should have committed the
overt act of divulging information regarding the vote buying
HELD:
Witnesses are exempt from criminal prosecution.
 A free, orderly, honest , peaceful, and credible election is indispensable in a
democratic society, as without it democracy would not flourish and would be a
sham.
 One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in
favor of the party whose vote was bought.
 The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, as
may be otherwise provided by law
 When the COMELEC nullifies a resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor which is the
basis of the information for vote selling, it in effect, withdraws the deputation
granted to the prosecutor.
 Where certain voters have already executed sworn statements attesting to the
corrupt practice of vote-buying in a pending case, it cannot be denied that they had
already given information in the vote- buying case.
Dela Cruz vs. People GR No. 200748 July 23, 2014
Ponente: Sereno, CJ
FACTS:
The petitioner here was Jaime De La Cruz, a police officer, who was charged of violation of Sec
15, Art 2 of RA 9165 or “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. According to the
prosecution, the NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito that Ariel, who was the
live-in partner of Corazon and the son of Charito was picked up by unknown persons whom
were believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. After that, an errand boy came
and gave a phone number to the complainants. During the call, complainants were instructed
to go to Gorordo Police Office wherein they met James who demanded them money worth
P100,000 which was lowered to P40,000 in exchange of the release of Ariel. After the meeting,
they went to the NBI to file a complaint. Thus, the NBI conducted an entrapment operation.
During the course of entrapment, the officers were able to nab Jaime Dela Cruz by using a pre-
marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder which was made part of the amount
demanded by James and handed by Corazon. After that, petitioner Jaime was required to
submit his urine for drug testing which produces a positive result for having presence of
dangerous drug. However, petitioner denied the charge against him.
RTC and CA found the accused guilty.
Issue:
WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal
Held:
No. Drug test can be made upon persons who were apprehended or arrested under
the situations listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. It must be noted that the accused was here was
arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Extortion is not listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. Thus, drug
test in Sec 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any crime, but only for
unlawful acts listed under Art 2 of RA 9165.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9745]
AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Anti-Torture Act of 2009”.
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights;
(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners
are respected at all times; and that no person placed under investigation or held in custody of
any person in authority or, agent of a person in authority shall be subjected to physical,
psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs
his/her free will or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity;
(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and
(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and
prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international
instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international human rights instruments
to which the Philippines is a signatory.
SEC. 3. Definitions. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) “Torture” refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person
information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third
person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority
or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(b) “Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment” refers to a deliberate and
aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by
a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under his/her custody,
which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the
latter.
(c) “Victim” refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment as defined above and any individual who has suffered harm as a result
of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
(d) “Order of Battle” refers to any document or determination made by the military, police or
any law enforcement agency of the government, listing the names of persons and organizations
that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as legitimate targets as
combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic and
international law.
SEC. 4. Acts of Torture. — For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to,
the following:
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain,
exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or
other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other
stuff or substances not normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper
or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the
wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or
blood until the brink of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or
rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear,
tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of
asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory, alertness or will of a
person, such as:
(i) The administration of drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) “Mental/Psychological Torture” refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent
of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine
a person’s dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/her relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful
acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;
(5) Preparing a prisoner for a “show trial”, public display or public humiliation of a detainee or
prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another,
creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person’s family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person’s family, relatives or any third
party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places,
shaving the victim’s head or putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family;
and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
SEC. 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. — Other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of
severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The
assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including
the duration of the treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases,
the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim.
SEC. 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, an Absolute Right. — Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination
comprising an “order of battle” shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
SEC. 7. Prohibited Detention. — Secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado
or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are hereby
prohibited.
In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and other law enforcement agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention
centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the
prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of
arrest and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available
to the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the respective national
headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by
the PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five (5) days
of every month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law
enforcement agencies shall also maintain a similar list for all detainees and detention facilities
within their respective areas, and shall make the same available to the public at all times at
their respective regional headquarters, and submit a copy, updated in the same manner
provided above, to the respective regional offices of the CHR.
SEC. 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. — Any confession, admission or
statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings,
except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing
torture.
SEC. 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. — A victim of
torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government
concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the PNP,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a
maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is filed within
which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An
appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed herein;
(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment, threat and/or
intimidation as a consequence of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence
therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford security in order
to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution
such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and
(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents
evidence in any fora in order to avoid further trauma.
SEC. 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and
Compliance with a Judicial Order. — A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas
data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and
inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release
by virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or
complied with immediately.
SEC. 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. — The CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance
in the investigation and monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for any interested
party thereto.
The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights
Action Center (BHRAC) nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment
organizations (NGOs).
SEC. 12. Right to Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. — Before and after
interrogation, every person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the
right to be informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an independent and
competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her
own doctor, he/she shall be provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor
to conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with
psychological evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female,
she shall be attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the
right to immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment.
The physical examination and/or psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a
medical report, duly signed by the attending physician, which shall include in detail his/her
medical history and findings, and which shall be attached to the custodial investigation report.
Such report shall be considered a public document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical,
psychological and mental examinations, the medical reports shall, among others, include:
(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;
(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical,
psychological and mental examination, and/or medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim’s injury, pain and disease and/or
trauma;
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were
sustained;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this provision may knowingly and
voluntarily waive such rights in writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her
counsel.
SEC. 13. Who are Criminally Liable. — Any person who actually participated or induced another
in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment
or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal.
Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who
issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall
be held equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior
public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal
to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for
any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted
or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If
he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that
acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others
within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has
the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act,
whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed
and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act
of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its
discovery; or
(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principals in the act of torture or
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the accessory
acts are done with the abuse of the official’s public functions.
SEC. 14. Penalties. — (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall
have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of
mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of
becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture
resulting in psychological, mental and emotional harm other than those described in paragraph
(b) of this section.
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or
to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of
any such member; or shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part of
his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been
ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or
incapacitated for labor for more than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety (90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed if,
in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30)
days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and
maintain secret detention places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement,
incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this
Act where torture may be carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officer/s or personnel
of the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to
maintain, submit or make available to the public an updated list of detention centers and
facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained
therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.
SEC. 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. — Torture as a crime shall not absorb
or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a
means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a
separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice
to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.
SEC. 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. — In order not to depreciate the
crime of torture, persons who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any
special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of exempting them from any
criminal proceedings and sanctions.
SEC. 17. Applicability of Refouler. — No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to
another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in
danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such grounds
exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in
coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting
State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
SEC. 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. — Any person who has suffered torture shall have
the right to claim for compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided,
That in no case shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims
of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such other financial relief
programs that may be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations.
SEC. 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of
this Act, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the
Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned government agencies, and human
rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of
torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and the DOH shall also call on human rights
nongovernment organizations duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the
formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological
healing and development of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of
restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same
agencies.
SEC. 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. — An Oversight Committee is hereby created
to periodically oversee the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a
Commissioner of the CHR, with the following as members: the Chairperson of the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of
Representatives’ Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both
houses or their respective representatives in the minority.
SEC. 21. Education and Information Campaign. — The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of
National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such
other concerned parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that education and
information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel,
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in
all primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.
SEC. 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. — The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
insofar as they are applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of
any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against
Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts
constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
SEC. 23. Appropriations. — The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby
appropriated to the CHR for the initial implementation of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as
may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
SEC. 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The DOJ and the CHR, with the active
participation of human rights nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of this Act. They shall also ensure the full
dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law
enforcement agencies.
SEC. 25. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional,
the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
SEC. 26. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
SEC. 27. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
FACTS: Right against cruel and unusual punishment
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year
old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as being
severe and excessive, cruel and unusual in violation of the constitution. He invokes the ruling
in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US Supreme Court categorically ruled that death penalty is
cruel and degrading. He also argues that death is an excessive and cruel punishment for a crime
of rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the ruling in Coker vs. Georgia
which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should not involve the taking of
human life. In rape, life is not over for the victim. Death penalty should only be imposed where
the crime was murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment.
HELD: NO. The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the US case of Kemmler,
it was held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It implies
there something inhuman, barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of life. It is
degrading if it involves public humiliation. The severity is not sufficient, but must be
disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessiveness is measured by 1) seriousness of the
crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death penalty itself, but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed by the jury. It was nullified
because the discretion in which the statute vested in trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards.
With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held that this case has no bearing on
Philippine experience and culture. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion
of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our
legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and because
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and
a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so.

RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes – crimes punished with death are
those that are grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and
perversity, those that are repugnant and outrageous to common standards of norms and
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. They also include crimes which are
despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is treated as an animal or dehumanized.
People v Mercado
No. L-65152
Ponente: J. Relova
Date: August 30, 1984
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Federico Mercado or Alberto Mercado
Relief: Appeal from the decision of CFI of Rizal
FACTS:
 Mercado was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon, the younger sister of complainant
Yvonne Baylon. Susan left the family residence on Sept 1, 1979 and Mercado
suspected that its was Yvonne who instigated her to leave.
 At about 8:30am the next day, Mercado came from behind Yvonne while she was w
alking on a road at San Carlos Subd, Binagonan, Rizal. Mercado grabbed Yvonne by
the neck and pointed a knife on her throat, then dragged her to the house of his fri
end
Norma Guerrero. Mercado demanded that Yvonne produce her sister Susan. He th
en dragged her to the road side.
 The brothers of Yvonne and some neighbors arrived asking Mercado to release
Yvonne, but instead of doing so, Mercado raised the blouse of Yvonne and inserted
his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her breast. Thereafter, Mercado d
ragged Yvonne to a store where the Chief of Police and some policemen talked to h
im.
Mercado demanded from the police that he wanted to see Susan and that he be gi
ven transportation and money. This situation lasted up to about 12nn.
 The barrio captain arrives and he was able to take hold of Mercado and subdue him
. with the full time of his preventive imprisonment upon a showing that he agreed to abide by
Yvonne, because of the traumatic experience she was subjected to, lost
consciousness and was brought to the hospital. Her fingers suffered injuries, abrasi
on on her neck, and a small wound on her stomach.
 On the other hand, Mercado averred that Susan was his wife; that although they w
ere not legally marries, they had been living together for some time in their family
house in Tayuman. He also alleged that it was Yvonne who first attempted to stab h
im, only he was able to stop her and grab the knife from her, and that was when th
e barrio captain and the policemen arrived who thought that he was going to stab Y
vonne.
ISSUE1: WON the lower court erred in not ruling that Mercado’s guilt has not been proven –
NO
HELD/RATIO1:
The issue revolves around the credibility of the witnesses. Well settled is the rule that “unless
there is a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court. For having had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses while testifying, the trial
court, more than the reviewing tribunal, is in a better position to gauge their credibility, and
properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties”.
ISSUE2: WON Mercado should be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention – YES
HELD/RATIO2:
While the defense argued that Mercado should be convicted of grave coercion only sicne his
purpose was to force Yvonne to produce Susan, the Court believes this was without merit.
Following the Ablaza case, “the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her freedom, and
that makes proper the prosecution of the accused under Art 267 of the RPC (illegal detention)”.
ISSUE3: WON Mercado should be credited with mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation – NO
HELD/RATIO3:
Said mitigating circumstance cannot be invoked in favor of the accused whose relationship with
her was illegitimate. The obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments.
ISSUE4: WON Mercado should be credited with the period of his preventive detention – YES
HELD/RATIO4:
He has been detained since Sept 2, 1979 and therefore, in accordance with Art 29 of the RPC,
the period of his preventive detention should be deducted from the term of his sentence
(reclusion perpetua).
DISPOSITIVE:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs. Appellant should be credited
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited
with 4/5 of the time of such preventive imprisonment.
NOTES:
Elements of the crime of illegal detention (Art 267, RPC):
1) that the offender is a private individual
2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty
3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal
4) in the commission of the offense, any of the ff circumstances is present
a) that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days
 b) that it is committed simulating public authority
c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made
d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer
Illegal detention is committed by a private person while arbitrary detention (Art 124, RPC) is
committed by a public officer, usually a law-enforcing authority. There is illegal detention in
forcible abduction. When the violent taking of a woman is motivated by lewd designs, forcible
abduction under Art 342 is the offense (against chastity); when it is not so motivated, the
offense is kidnapping under Art 267 (against personal liberty).
CUISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On February 7, 1989 respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan rendered a Joint decision finding the accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of
double homicide beyond reasonable doubt in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the
modification that the civil indemnity was increased from P30, 000 to P50, 000. The accused
elevated the decision on a petition for review but the Supreme Court denied the petition.
The case was remanded to the RTC Pangasinan for promulgation of the decision.
However, respondent Judge promulgated the decision of the Court of Appeals only with respect
to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence
service of his sentence.
Ass. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor
General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the
decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995 the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify
Decision, wherein the resolution modified the appealed decision of the court a quo in one
respect only- the increased of the indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the
victims.
After a careful review the court found no doubt as to the participation of the
accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Castro and that conspiracy was present in the
instant case. Acting on the motion to clarify decision, the Court affirmed the decision of the
court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment in the said Trial Court’s decision.
The accused, however, fled a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the grounds that
it will violate the accused’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial courts’s promulgation of the CA decision would violate the
constitutional right against double jeopardy?
HELD:
The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of
Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to
imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the
payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated,
the promulgation of only one part of the decision such as civil indemnity is not a bar to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.
To substantiate the claim of double jeopardy, it must be proven that:
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
2. First jeopardy validly terminated
3. Second jeopardy must be for the same offense
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity.
Hence, a decision in such case disposes both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities
of an accused. Here, the trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but
not the criminal. The promulgation of the CA decision was not only incomplete but
void. It was emphasized that grave abuse of discretion rendered the
aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal case has not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot
prosper as a defense.
ALMARIO VS CA
FACTS:
Almario is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru
falsification of public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent
RCBC as the offended party in both cases. The hearing was reset several times due to the
elevation of the Presiding Judge to a higher court, lack of trial judge immediately appointed to
the hearing, and lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon
motion of Almario’s counsel, the respondent court issued an order dismissing the case for
failure to prosecute and considering Almario’s right to a speedy trial.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of Almario, respondent court
ordered that there has been no vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified
postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case
tried which would constitute a violation of the right of Almario to speedy trial.
After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was ordered terminated
on October 25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of
the proof of service of the notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995,
counsel for the accused did not interpose objection to private prosecutors motion to postpone
due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial
of three criminal cases, the three other accused were not present. There were only three settings
from the date of termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence and the
same were postponed with valid reasons. Furthermore, the dismissal in the Order dated
September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the right of the accused
to speedy trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the motion of
the accused there is no double jeopardy.
The order dismissing the charge/case against Almario is reconsidered and set aside. Almario
then moved for a reconsideration which was denied and so Almario filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari which the appellate court denied and dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. Almario asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double
jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ISSUE: Whether double jeopardy had set in so that Almario’s constitutional right against such
jeopardy had been violated?
RULING: NO. Clearly, under Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, double jeopardy
attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was
made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance
of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of
a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Delay in
the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. There
were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of
time. It follows that Almario cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy
when that order was reconsidered seasonably. For as Almario’s right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy that the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused was not met. The trial courts initial order of dismissal was upon motion
of petitioners counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case,
despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach.
MANANTAN vs CA
FACTS:
The petitioner Manantan was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela with
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The alleged crime occurred on or about the 25th day
of September 1982 in the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The provincial fiscal filed this
information on June 1, 1983 within the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The accused was the
driver and person-in-charge of an automobile with the Plate No. NGA-816. Manantan willfully
and recklessly drove the vehicle in a negligent manner which ended up sideswiping a passenger
jeepney. Which caused the Jeepney to turn turtle twice that ultimately ended with the death
of Ruben Nicolas, a passenger of the jeepney. On a decision dated June 30, 1938 which was
later promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court reached a decision in favor of Manantan.
With the subsequent turn of events the private respondent spouses Nicolas filed their notice
of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s judgment. The spouses Nicolas prayed that the
decision appealed from be modified and that the appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and
damages. The court reached a decision wherein the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the
private respondents. With regards to the civil liability the court a quo stated that during the
time that the accident occurred. Manantan was in a state of heavily inebriated after consuming
at least twelve bottles of beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The petitioner opted for
reconsideration but the appellate court denied it vehemently.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused also extinguished his civil liability.
RULING:
No, it is quite evident that the law recognizes two different kinds of acquittal, with
entirely different effects regarding the civil liability of the accused. First and foremost, the
grounds pertaining to the acquittal of the accused is not the main reason for the act or omission
complained of as a felony. In this particular instance this relinquish the civil liability for a person
who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act or omission shall not be and should
never be held liable for such an act or omission. This surmise that there is no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is entirely out of the question and therefore the civil action if there is any. Which will
be instituted should be based on the grounds other the delict that was complained of.
The secondary instance is an acquittal that was based on reasonable doubt
regarding the guilt of the accused has not been duly established. In this case at hand the
acquittal was primarily based on reasonable doubt. It was clearly stated that the accused was
recklessly imprudent or negligent. Which evidently prompted the court to acquit him on the
main contention of a reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in a criminal case
if the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt. The decision of the Court of Appeals states
that the defendant is civilly liable for negligent and reckless of driving his automobile which was
the proximate cause of the vehicular accident and to indemnify the plaintiff for a sum of money
due to the death of Ruben Nicolas.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L.
ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
TOPIC: right to be informed of their offenses, disguise, res gestae, treachery
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and
separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members.
RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered
archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES:
6. Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the
information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite
the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
7. Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that
accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the
information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them holds no water. The Court found no merit on the
appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should not have included the phrase “wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they were presenting
testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in
the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will
not be appreciated as such
It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
“wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence,
introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as
an aggravating circumstance.
What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they
were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks
is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act
of one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal
their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have
done so.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution. It was held that the trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies in their
statements were immaterial considering the swiftness of the incident.
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this
case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since
they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus
is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made
immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res
gestae.
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at
different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack,
testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and
some were unmasked.
When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed
the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore,
must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the
commission of the crime
The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they
would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only
way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed
and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The
attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the
bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate
or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
Merciales v CA
FACTS:
 Criminal cases for rape with homicide in connection of the death of Maritess
Merciales were filed against private respondents/accused
 During the trial, the public prosecuter filed a motion for the discharge of accused
Nuada so that he could be a state witness but the prosecution contended that it was
not required to present evidence to warrant the discharge of Nuada because he was
already under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ
 But this was motion was denied for failure of prosecutor to present evidence
provided in Sec 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
 Prosecution then filed petition for certiorari [GR. No. 113273-78, another case]
before the SC question such denial.
 The private respondents then filed a motion to set the case for hearing based on
their constitutional right to speedy trial which was granted and the hearing was set
on July 29, 1994
 On that date, the prosecution filed an MR, instead of presenting of further evidence.
The hearing was postponed and set for another hearing (Aug 9)
 On that said date, prosecutor again filed for MR and invoked its pending petition for
certiorari with the SC but the respondents objected to reset the hearing again.
 The judge called for recess to allow the prosecution to present the NBI agent would
be presented to prove the extrajudicial confession of the accused Nuada
 But after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the NBI agent and
manifested that it would not anymore present further evidence
 The defense then moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision and
asked leave of court to file a DEMURRER to evidence
  The SG filed in the case before the SC a motion for issuance of a TRO to enjoin the
judge but was denied by the SC
RTC: dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents/accused; hence, the accused were ACQUITTED and the criminal cases against
them were DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guild of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt
Petitioner argued:
 reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused’s right to double
jeopardy.
 There was judicial misconduct due to the prosecutions’ premature resting and trial
court’s grant of the demurrer to evidence even if the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution has not been completed (violation of due process)
Respondent’s argument:
 No extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion and jurisdiction defect to warrant the
annulment or
 Reopening of the case will violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy
ISSUE: Could there be an acquittal by demurrer in this case? NO. There was grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court.
HELD: PETITION GRANTED, case remanded, RTC judge order to complete presentation of all
available witness for the prosecution
Nonfeasance on the party of the public prosecutor:
 The trial court required the public prosecutor to present evidence to justify Nuada’s
discharge as state witness but it insisted there was no need to do so because Nuada
was already under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ
 Due to this refusal to present the required evidence it prompted the trial court to
deny the motion to discharge Nuada
 Again, the trial court the directed public prosecutor to present Atty. Caabay, the NBI
agent who took Nuada’s extrajudicial confession but the prosecutor declared that
he was resting the prosecutions case, knowing fully well that the evidence he
previously presented was not sufficient to convict the accused.
 And due to that, a demurrer to evidence was filed by the accused and was granted
by the trial court
 It was then clear that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance. It was
his duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the people in trial. He should have
exhausted all available proof to establish the guilt of the accused.
Grave abuse of discretion on the part of trial court:
 Due to the nature of the testimonies of the 7 prosecution witness and and nature of
the circumstances, the trial court (motu proprio) should have called additional
witnesses to question such them to satisfy his mind to the issues of the case
The petitioner was deprived of her day in court. It is not only the State but also the offended
party that is entitled to due process in criminal cases.
With regard the acquittal of the accused by the trial was done without regard to due process
of law, it is null and void as if there was no acquittal at all. It cannot be double jeopardy
HENCE, it was very apparent that the public prosecutor violated the due process rights of the
private complainant owing to its blatant disregard of procedural rules and the failure to
present available crucial evidence, which would tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the
accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that the trial court was gravely remiss in its duty
to ferret out the truth and, instead, just “passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled
the case.”
Doctrine in this case:
 When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in dismissing the criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to
evidence, the judgment of the TC is considered VOID.
NOTES:
 “The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a
grave abuse of such discretion.”
 As to effect, “the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
 The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
 When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes
null and void.
 The accused cannot be in double jeopardy because the lower court acted without
jurisdiction (the trial judge in this case acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for
a judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent to excess or lack of
jurisdiction
 “The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with
great caution, because not only the rights of the accused – but those of the offended
party and the public interest as well – are involved.”
 “Demurrer to the evidence is “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.
POTOT vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
On December 12, 1999 the appellant Potot was charged with homicide before the
RTC for assaulting and stabbing Rodolfo Dapulag with a deadly weapon in the form of a knife
which ultimately led to the dead of the latter. During the arraignment, Potot pleaded guilty and
invoked the mitigating circumstances of the plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. He was later
on convicted of homicide with the above stated mitigating circumstances. Potot filed a
manifestation with motion informing that he is not appealing from the Decision and praying
that a commitment order be issued so he could immediately serve his sentence. Rosalie
Dapulag (the wife of the victim) with the approval of the public prosecutor, filed a motion for
reconsideration or retrial hoping that the decision be set aside and that the case be heard again
due to several irregularities that were done before the trial. She alleged that there were 2 other
persons involved in committing the crime and that the eyewitness opted not to include this
information in his sworn statement. This was mainly due upon a solicitation by a certain person
and also due to the belief of the witness that it would further complicate the case. The
petitioner vehemently opposed this motion, stating that the case can no longer be modified or
set aside once it has become final when he formally waived his right to appeal. On May 3, 2000
the motion of Rosalie Dapulag was granted by the trial court and set aside the previous decision.
While also ordering that the records of the case be remanded to the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and filing of the corresponding charge. Hence, the
petitioner filed an MFR contending that the trial court jurisdiction to issue the order since the
decision has already become final and that the said order would place him in a Double Jeopardy.
On May 26, 2000 the MFR was denied by the trial court on the contention that the State is not
bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence the jeopardy shall not attach.
The petitioner assailed the decisions with the Solictor General. With the February 1 decision
reinstated and the other court orders be set aside.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court based on a motion by a private complainant can set aside a
previous judgment of conviction and have records remanded of case to the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of evidence and the filing of the corresponding charges.
HELD: No, it is only the accused that can modify or have the judgment of conviction set
aside. Although he must do this before the judgment becomes final or before he perfects his
appeal. This duly based on Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of
the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent
court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:
(a) the commission of the crime, and
(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.”
 Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the
prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CLARENCE ASTUDILLO, CRISANTO
ASTUDILLO, alias ANTENG or ENTENG, HILARIO ASTUDILLO, alias BODA,appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in
Criminal Case No. 1698, convicting appellants Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario
Astudillo of the crime of Murder; sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and
ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre
Aquino, Jr.
The Information filed against the appellants reads:
That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 oclock in the evening at Zone 7,
Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed
with a sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, which caused his death and thereafter, the accused rode on an
unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No. 7077, which they used in
escaping from the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued. The prosecutions account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At around
7:00 p.m., of November 12, 1995, brothers Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to
house of Alberto Damian who was celebrating the eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto
and thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to go with
him.[4] Silvestre acceded and the two walked towards Floras Store, where they were later joined
by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto and Silvestre had an argument.[5]
At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11
years of age, respectively, were selling balut in front of Floras Store. They saw Clarence stab
Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the wrists. Clarence delivered
several stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell to the
ground. Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle.[6]
Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra, where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiac Tamponade, secondary to Stab Wound.[7]
On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows: On November 12, 1995 at around
7:00 p.m., Clarence passed by the house of Alberto Damian where Silvestre and several others
were playing cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which he declined. Silvestre got
embarrassed and cursed him so he decided to leave the house. However, Silvestre followed
him in front of Floras Store and pushed him twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then,
Silvestre struck him on the head and arm with an empty one-liter softdrink bottle.[8]
Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the latter attacked him. As he retreated, he saw
a knife which he then swung at the victim. Silvestre was hit but continued to attack him. Left
with no choice, Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the latter collapsed to the ground,
Hilario rushed to the succor of his elder brother, Clarence.[9] Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from
shock and remained seated on the ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the
roadside and called for help.[10] The appellants left the scene on board a tricycle and proceeded
to the house of Clarences in-laws. On the same night, they surrendered to the Philippine
National Police, stationed at Bangued, Abra.[11]
On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellants of the crime of
Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.[12] Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and,
assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been
alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated against them.[13] Appellants motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 13, 1998.[14] However, an Amended
Decision[15] was rendered where the phrase abuse of superior strength was replaced with
TREACHERY in the body of the Decision and in the decretal portion thereof, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep Act No. 7659,
qualified by TREACHERY AND for having conspired together and helping one another to kill
Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, [which is]
however, offset by the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentences
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amount of P65,288.50 [as] actual damages, P50,000.00 for his death
and suffering plus P500,000.00 [as] moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT CONVICTED THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND DECISION DATED JULY 10, 1998.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF
CONSPIRACY AND SENTENCED THEM TO A UNIFORM PENALTY.[17]
The resolution of the instant case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. The settled rule is
that the matter of assigning value to a declaration on the witness stand is more competently
performed by a trial judge who had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the
witnesses demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying. In the absence of a clear showing
that some fact or circumstance of weight or substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied, the trial judges assessment of the witnesses testimonies shall not be disturbed on
appeal.
A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial court did not miss any
such material circumstance, nor did it commit any palpable error in upholding the facts as
established by the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, that the
appellants ganged up on the defenseless victim. These witnesses were not shown to have been
impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against the appellants, hence, their testimony is entitled
to full faith and credit.[18]
Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and
their affidavit are too inconsequential to merit consideration. Specifically, appellants point to
the failure of Eduardo Bata to state in his sworn statement that appellants Crisanto and Hilario
restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, as well as the alleged unfamiliarity of
prosecution witness Manny Bareng with the Ilocano words bagsol and binagsol (which mean
stab and stabbed, respectively), in his sworn statement. Suffice it to state that inconsistencies
between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can
be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than
those stated in sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of
reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific
inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement,
hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the
prosecution witnesses direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to
their extrajudicial statements. This is especially so because their testimony to the effect that
Crisanto and Hilario held the victims wrists while Clarence stabbed him remained consistent
even under cross-examination.[19]
The trial court correctly rejected the appellants self-defense theory. When an accused invokes
self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden of proof is thus shifted on
him to prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.[20]
In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial act of aggression came from the deceased,
still the appellants plea of self-defense will not prosper. As stated above, the evidence
overwhelmingly shows that appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able to restrain the victim by
the wrists. At that point, any unlawful aggression or danger on the lives of the appellants
ceased, hence, it was no longer necessary for appellant Clarence to repeatedly stab the
victim. Verily, their act could no longer be interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a
perverse desire to kill.[21] Furthermore, the number of wounds sustained by the victim negates
self-defense. It certainly defies reason why the victim sustained a total of 15 wounds on the
different parts of his body if appellants were only defending themselves. Parenthetically, the
number of wounds was eloquently established by the physical evidence, which is a mute
manifestation of truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[22]
From the attendant circumstances, it is evident that appellants collective and individual act of
holding the victims wrists and delivering several stab blows demonstrated the existence of their
common design to kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can
be inferred from the acts of the three appellants which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills
and a common intent or design to commit a crime.[23]
Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in appellants contention that
the trial cannot validly appreciate the same in its amended decision because the attendance of
treachery was not one of the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration. Otherwise
stated, appellants posit that the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction should be
limited only to the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence
and/or the propriety of appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
which was not alleged in the information.
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,[24] a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the
court, with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7,[25] a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused. [26] These provisions
changed the previous rulings[27] of the Court to the effect that such modification may be made
upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or
an appeal has been perfected.[28]The requisite consent of the accused to such motion for
reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself
anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have
overlooked.[29] Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly promulgated, any
reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly
committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be
made only with the consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot
be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of, or
appeals from, the decision.[30]
It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules
may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of
a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the
accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion.[31] His motion gives the
court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions
of law and make them conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment
it has to render.[32]The raison detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes
and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being taken.[33] In effect, a motion for reconsideration
or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for
the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings, such as the
taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the judgment
of conviction should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the
court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants
waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial
open for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying
circumstance in the case at bar was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer
for conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the
information. Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify
its mistake in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of
treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the attendance of a qualifying circumstance
if the complaint or information did not allege such facts.[34] Even before the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure[35] took effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were
required to be so specified in the complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be
appreciated against the accused.
In order that treachery may be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the
malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being
given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.[36] Here, it is clear that
treachery qualified the killing of the deceased to murder, considering that the appellants
deliberately restrained the victim so as to enable one of them to successfully deliver the stab
blows without giving the latter a chance to defend himself or to retaliate.
As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the trial court erred
in appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was
deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime
could not have been committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where
the use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension
difficult.[37]
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly appreciated in favor of
appellants. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[38]
In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same night of
the incident when they learned that the authorities were looking for them.[39] Though they did
not give a statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should nonetheless be considered in their favor. What matters is that they
spontaneously, voluntarily and unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of the
authorities. This act of respect for the law indicates a moral disposition favorable to their
reform.[40]
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on the
appellants, in accordance with Article 63 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum
period, which is reclusion perpetua.[41]
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, the award of moral and exemplary damages
cannot be lumped together as was done by the trial court. These kinds of damages are different
in nature, and require separate determination. Moral damages are awarded where the
claimant experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result of
the felonious act.[42] The award of exemplary damages, on the other hand, is warranted when
the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying. In People v. Catubig,[43] we explained:
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation
of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[44]
As testified to by the widow of the deceased, the death of her husband brought grief and
emotional suffering to their family.[45] Hence, they are entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, pursuant to current jurisprudence.[46] Likewise, the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in the killing of the deceased justifies the award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[47]
The award of actual damages should also be modified. In order that actual damages may be
recovered, the amount actually expended in connection with the death of the victim must be
substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In the instant case, the records show that
the amount of P65,288.50 awarded by the trial court as actual damages is not fully
substantiated by receipts.[48] However, as the heirs of the deceased actually incurred funeral
expenses, they are entitled to temperate damages.[49] In the recent case of People v.
Abrazaldo,[50] we ruled that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined
because of absence or lack of receipts to prove the amount claimed, temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded.
Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil
indemnity which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than
the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds responsibility therefor.[51]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued,
Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698, finding appellants, Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto
Astudillo @ Anteng or Enteng, and Hilario Astudillo @ Boda, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the civil liability. As modified, appellants are
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861 23 March 1984
REYNALDO R. BAYOT, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one
hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government
auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together
with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teacher's
Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-
existent obligations of the Teacher's Camp resulting in damage to the government of several
million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1978. In the meantime,
petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in
January 1980. He was elected. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision
convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32)
cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now
pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76. However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to
the herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an
ex post facto law.
Issue:
Whether or not the retroactive application of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 would
violate the Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post facto law.
Held:
NO. The Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic
Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged
therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which
violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3
of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or
public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as
penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,
if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3
and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a
penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer
charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity
does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law.
 In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was
acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti- element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of having been made.
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom
similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice
be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under established:
oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom
if thought, assembly and association. 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose
is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
Issues: 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK v. SOLICITOR GENERAL

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. 259 Phil. 1024

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
NARVASA, J.:
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
appeal,[1] since the central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct.
Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully
(A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor."[1] As
posed by the referral resolution,2 the question is whether or not said statute --
" ** en cuanto autoriza la confiscacion en favor
del Estado de las propiedades ilegalmente adquiridas por un funcionario o empleadodel Gobi
erno antes de la aprobacion de la Ley ** es nula y anticonstitucional porque:
(a) es una Ley ex-post
facto que autoriza la confiscacion de una propiedad privada adquirida antes de
la aprobacion de
la ley y obligael funcionario o empleado publico a explicar como adquirio sus propiedades priv
adas, compeliendo de esta forma a incriminarse a simismo, y authorities, the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public
en cierto modo autoriza la confiscacion de dicha propiedad sin debido proceso de la ley; y
(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion de inmuebles previamente hipotecados de buena fe a una
persona."
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and
Mercedes Katigbak. In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined
from filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A.
No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture
of properties acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of
the complaint filed against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties
acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the government service be excluded from
forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor
(Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition[3] filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking
the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbakallegedly gotten by
him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired
while Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an
examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly
recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered[4] (1) dismissed the complaint
and the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No.
31080, ordered "that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired
in 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of
P100,000.00."[1] The judgment also declared that the "impatience of the Investigating
Prosecutor" during the preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for violation
of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such arbitrariness as would justify annulment of the
proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of the case in the trial
court;[2] that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a
penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust;3 that with respect to
things acquired through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender;[4] that
Alejandro Katigbak may not be deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since
he took the witness stand voluntarily.[5] The Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new
trial. The Trial Court refused to grant a new trial but modified its decision by reducing the
amount of "P100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ** to P80,000.00."[6]
Appeal was taken from this verdict to the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as
earlier stated, was certified to this Court.
No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo.[7] They
concern mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex post facto law, principally because it
imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly
in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted.[8]
Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial
Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and
categorically pronounced by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.[9] Citing voluminous
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ** and his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ** has been held ** to
partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property (although
technically civil in form) are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants
in criminal cases from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves is applicable
thereto."[10] The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in Republic v. Agoncillo.1 And
germane is the 1977 ruling of the Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc.[2] -- involving among
others the issue of the validity and enforceability of a written agreement alleged to be in
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act -- to the effect that "the provisions of said law cannot be given retroactive effect."
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty;
and it being axiomatic that a law is ex post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act,"
or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that that penalty
of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its
passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws
or bills of attainder.[3] But this is precisely what has been done in the case of
the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to
be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed
a lien thereon "in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is,
quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.
As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made
answerable for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080,
resulted from a preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an
arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any
intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The
trial court further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on
September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and
competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that
the preliminary investigation was terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does
not necessarily signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the
Trial Court's factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public
respondents complained of, and consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under
established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any showing of the existence of some
recognized exception thereto.
The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of
property by the appellants illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien
thereon in favor of the Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
WRIGHT vs CA G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994 Extradition, Ex post facto law
FACTS:
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable
crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed against him which ordered the
deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence,
petitioner came herein by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation,
contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Can extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
RULING: NO. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of
retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase,
citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull
concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes.
As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are
1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when
committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a
crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4)
laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a
defendant.
“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to
criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.” This being so, there is
no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining
the Treaty’s retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s
coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation
nor a criminal procedural statute. “It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.”
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 128096; 20 JAN 1999]
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized
crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners
and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident
as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including
herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as
accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting
the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been
introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
Held: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right
to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made
by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof
of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public
officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.”
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to
the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However,
upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge
of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in
relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE (2008)
Background:
This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project.
During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions
involving his conversations with President Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive
privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed a case
against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the SC ruled in favor of Neri
and upheld the claimof executive privilege.
ISSUES:
8. Are the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions covered by
executive privilege?
9. Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in
contempt and ordering his arrest?
HELD:
4. The SC said that the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive
privilege.
Using the above elements of presidential communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet.
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in
the enactment of a law.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court said that Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion
in citing Neri in contempt. The following reason among others was given by the SC:
There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege. For the claim to be properly invoked, there
must be a formal claim by the President stating the “precise and certain reason”for preserving
confidentiality. The grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita are specific enough,
since what is required is only that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular
ground must only be specified, and the following statement of grounds by Executive Secretary
Ermita satisfies the requirement. “The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is
that the information sought to br disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
CENTER FOR PEOPLE G.R. No. 189546
EMPOWERMENT IN
GOVERNANCE,
This case concerns the duty of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disclose the source
code for the Automated Election System (AES) technologies it used in the 2010 national and
local elections.
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-
government organization,[1] wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code
of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national,
and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.
CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9369, which
provides:
xxxx
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make
the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or
groups which may conduct their own review thereof.
Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the human readable instructions that
define what the computer equipment will do. This has been explained in an article:
Source code is the human readable representation of the instructions that control the
operation of a computer. Computers are composed of hardware (the physical devices
themselves) and software (which controls the operation of the hardware). The software
instructs the computer how to operate; without software, the computer is useless. Source
code is the human readable form in which software is written by computer programmers.
Source code is usually written in a programming language that is arcane and
incomprehensible to non-specialists but, to a computer programmer, the source code is the
master blueprint that reveals and determines how the machine will behave.
Source code could be compared to a recipe: just as a cook follows the instructions in a recipe
step-by-step, so a computer executes the sequence of instructions found in the software
source code. This is a reasonable analogy, but it is also imperfect. While a good cook will use
her discretion and common sense in following a recipe, a computer follows the instructions
in the source code in a mechanical and unfailingly literal way; thus, while errors in a recipe
might be noticed and corrected by the cook, errors in source code can be disastrous, because
the code is executed by the computer exactly as written, whether that was what the
programmer intended or not x x x.
The source code in voting machines is in some ways analogous to the procedures provided to
election workers. Procedures are instructions that are provided to people; for instance, the
procedures provided to poll workers list a sequence of steps that poll workers should follow
to open the polls on election morning. Source code contains instructions, not for people, but
for the computers running the election; for instance, the source code for a voting machine
determines the steps the machine will take when the polls are opened on election
morning.[2] (Underscoring supplied)
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request[3] for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of
Voters which is not part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A.
9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous
individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain
candidates or parties.
Still, the COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it said it was
approving for release. Consequently, on July 13, 2009, CenPEG once more asked COMELEC for
the source code of the PCOS, together with other documents, programs, and diagrams related
to the AES. CenPEG sent follow-up letters on July 17 and 20 and on August 24, 2009.
On August 26, 2009 COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist for
the reasons: 1) that it had not yet received the baseline source code of the provider,
Smartmatic, since payment to it had been withheld as a result of a pending suit; 2) its
customization of the baseline source code was targeted for completion in November 2009 yet;
3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369, the customized source code still had to be reviewed by an
established international certification entity, which review was expected to be completed by
the end of February 2010; and 4) only then would the AES be made available for review under
a controlled environment.
Rejecting COMELECs excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition
for mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to
CenPEG and other interested parties.
COMELEC claimed in its comment that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and well-defined
right that was enforceable by mandamus because COMELECs duty to make the source code
available presupposed that it already had the same. COMELEC restated the explanation it gave
in its August 26, 2009 letter to CenPEG.
In its manifestation and omnibus motion, CenPEG did not believe that the source code was still
unavailable considering that COMELEC had already awarded to an international certification
entity the review of the same and that COMELEC had already been field testing its PCOS and
CCS machines.
On February 10, 2010 COMELEC filed a manifestation, stating that it had already deposited on
February 9, 2010 the source code to be used in the May 10, 2010 elections with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. Required to comment on this, CenPEG said on February 22, 2010 that the
manifestation did not constitute compliance with Section 12 of R.A. 9369 but only with Section
11 of R.A. 8436.
In its earlier comment, COMELEC claimed, reiterating what it said in its August 26, 2009 letter
to CenPEG, that it would make the source code available for review by the end of February
2010 under a controlled environment. Apparently, this review had not taken place and was
overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
On June 21, 2010 CenPEG filed a manifestation and omnibus motion, reiterating its prayer for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case notwithstanding the fact that the elections for
which the subject source code was to be used had already been held. It claimed that the source
code remained important and relevant not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose
thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud.
The Court finds the petition and this last manifestation meritorious.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is
selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct
their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it
was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be
done, apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had
passed and that reason is already stale.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and DIRECTS the COMELEC to
make the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A.
9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for
independent review.
SO ORDERED.
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to
12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely
critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a
result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why they
should not be held liable for holding an assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be
a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities
who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-
academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
United Pepsi Cola v. Laguesma [G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998]
FACTS: Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-
arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route
managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership pursuant
to Art. 245 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing that
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the
Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join
unions, contravenes the constitution.
Citing the Court’s ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
petitioner argues that previous administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have the
effect of res judicata in this case, because “labor relations proceedings” are “non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities.”
ISSUE: W/N res judicata applies to administrative proceedings?
HELD: YES. The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings. As early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, the Court sustained the dismissal of an
action by a trial court on the basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by
the Wage Administration Service, applying the principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v.
NLRC the Court applied the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior
determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. were project employments
was binding in another case involving another group of employees of the same
company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that
“the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers.” Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in
nature and, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for
the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined
by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without substantial
evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that employees who are otherwise
supervisors may wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel and thus denied
the right of self- organization, has decided to review the record of this case.
Acosta vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates
in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated
in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress of their grievances.
Petitioners were administratively
charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil
service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations
conducted by the DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as
charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the
CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six (6) months suspension without pay.
 PALI opposed the motion, arguing that the rehabilitation courts stay order stopped the
Appeal to CA: Denied
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their
constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances
HELD: These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’
sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public
employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the
exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila.
For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions
in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
67. Pacific Wide Realty and Dev’t Corp vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc.
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 180893
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated
in Ternate, Cavite. In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks.
However, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both current and
those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB) – later
substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC) – filed foreclosure
proceedings on PALIs mortgaged properties. PALI filed a petition for suspension of payments
and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation plan and three (3) nominees for
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision approving PALIs petition for suspension
of payments and rehabilitation.
In G.R. No. 178768
On March 3, 2005, EIB filed an urgent motion to order PALI and/or the mortgagor
TUI/rehabilitation receiver to pay all the taxes due on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
133164. EIB claimed that the property covered by TCT No. 133164, registered in the name of
TUI, was one of the properties used to secure PALI’s loan from EIB.
enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise, against a debtor, its guarantors,
and its sureties not solidarily liable to the debtor; thus, TCT No. 133164 was covered by the stay
order.
The court reiterated that TCT No. 133164, under the name of TUI, was excluded from the stay
order. In order to protect the interest of EIB as creditor of PALI, it may foreclose TCT No. 133164
and settle the delinquency taxes of third-party mortgagor TUI with the local government
of Pasay City.
PALI filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the rehabilitation court in allowing the foreclosure of
a mortgage constituted over the property of an accommodation mortgagor, to secure the loan
obligations of a corporation seeking relief in a rehabilitation proceeding.
On July 27, 2009, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
ISSUE
whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-
impairment clause
RULING
No. The terms of the rehabilitation plan are reasonable and does not violate the non-
impairment clause
Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, rehabilitation is defined as the
restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that
its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the
present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues as a going
concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation plan. The restructuring of the
debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC
and as affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the
interest of PWRDC as a secured creditor.
We also find no merit in PWRDCs contention that there is a violation of the impairment clause.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of
contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring
the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation
mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked.
ALVAREZ vs PICOP
December 3, 2009
SUMMARY:
In 1952, TLA 43 was issued to PICOP. It was valid for 25 years and renewable for
another 25 years and with a condition that DENR can amend the boundaries covered by the
license. Upon request of the board of investors if PICOP, President Marcos signed 1969
Document purportedly a Presidential Warrranty assuring PICOP of the boundaries convered by
the TLA. However, PICOP claimed that such warranty is a contract which guarantees perpetual
renewal of its license. In 1999, DAO 99-53 was issued providing for the conversion of TLA to
IFMA. PICOP applied for the conversion of its TLA which was already subsisting since 1952 and
was already renewed once in 1977. Without negotiating further with the DENR, PICOP filed a
mandamus with RTC of Manila to compel DENR Sec Alvarez to issue the IFMA they are applying
for insisting that there should be automatic conversion, the 1969 Document is a contract and
that it has complied with all the legal requirements for the conversion of its TLA to IFMA. RTC
granted the mandamus. CA affirmed. SC reversed. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
It was held that there is no law enjoining the DENR to issue the IFMA applied for because it is
discretionary upon the Secretary after proper evaluation. The 1969 Document is also not a
contract but a mere reassurance of the boundaries of TLA 43. It cannot be construed to grant
perpetual renewal of license because that would contravene Sec 2, Article 12 of the
Constitution. Regarding the adminsitrative requirements, the Court held that PICOP submitted
the forest protection and reforestation plans and paid forest charges. PICOP is required to
submit the NCIP certification mandated by RA 8371. Also, the approval of the Sangunians of
ALL local government units (Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao
Oriental) concerned. The approval of Surigao del Sur cannot be deemed as sufficient
compliance.
DOCTRINE: The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local
government has control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to
protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26
states that it applies to projects that "may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-
renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or
plant species." The local government should thus represent the communities in such area, the
very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even climatic change if the project
is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake in the resources in the area, and
deserve to be adequately compensated when these resources are exploited.
FACTS:
1952 - Timber License Agreement (TLA) 43 was issued to PICOP1. TLA is valid for 25 years or
until 1977 and renewable for another 25 years. It was issued under the condition, among
others, that the DENR may amend or alter the description of the boundaries in the area covered
by the license agreement.
1969 – President Marcos signed the 1969 Document purported to be Presidential Warranty in
response to the request of the Board of Investments of PICOP for a warranty on the boundaries
the concession area under TLA 43.
1977 - TLA 43 (valid from 1952-1977) was renewed for another 25 years or until 2002.
1999 - DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 was issued providing for the conversion of
TLA to Integrated Forest Management Agreement2 (IFMA).This is a late response to the change
in the
1 PICOP is a predecessor-in-interest of Bislig Bay Lumber Company, Inc (BBLCI) 2 A production-
sharing contract entered into by and between the DENR and a qualified applicant wherein the
DENR grants to the latter the exclusive right to develop, manage, protect and utilize a specified
area of forestland and forest resource therein for a period of 25 years and may be renewed for
another 25- year period, consistent with the principle of sustainable development and in
constitutional provisions on natural resources from the 1973 Constitution, which allowed the
granting of licenses to private entities, to the present 1987 Constitution, which provides for co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements as the permissible schemes
wherein private entities may participate in the utilization of forest products.
10. Since the granting of timber licenses ceased to be a permissible scheme for the
participation of private entities under the present Constitution, their operations should have
ceased upon the issuance of DAO No. 99-53, the rule regulating the schemes under the present
Constitution. This would be iniquitous to those with existing TLAs that would not have expired
yet as of the issuance of DAO No. 99-53, especially those with new TLAs that were originally set
to expire after 10 or even 20 or more years. 

11. The DENR thus inserted a provision in DAO No. 99-53 allowing these TLA holders to
finish the period of their TLAs, but this time as IFMAs, without the rigors of going through a new
application, which they have probably just gone through a few years ago. 
PICOP filed with the
DENR an application to have its TLA 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the processing
of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR.
Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a
privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an
IFMA to PICOP. 
PICOP based its action on the 1969 Document which it claimed to be an
enforceable contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, and asserted
that it has complied with all the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of IFMA.

Among the requirements are (1) a consultation with and approval from the Sanggunian
concerned under Sections 26 
accordance with an approved CDMP, and under which both
parties share in its produce. (DAO 99-53) 

and 27 of the Local Government Code; and (2) a Certification from the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) that the concession area does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. PICOP’s TLA No. 43 traverses the length and breadth of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del
Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental. However, it secured only the approval of the
Sangunian of Surigao del Sur. PICOP claimed that it did not need to secure the certification from
NCIP because the subject lands are not ancestral domain
RTC granted the Petition for Mandamus and award damages to PICOP. Upon motion for
reconsideration filed by DENR Secretary Alvarez, the damages awarded was deleted.
CA affirmed RTC decision. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Upon petition for review,
the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
lower courts. Hence, this motion for reconsideration
public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees,
its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees,
including tollway operations; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from
the words used in the statute; and that the imposition of VAT on tollway operations has been
the subject as early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars.

ISSUES and RULINGS: The government also argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of
contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
1. Can the Court compel DENR to issue the IFMA applied for by PICOP? NO agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway operators. At any rate, the non-
This issue hinges on these issues: impairment clause cannot limit the State's sovereign taxing power which is generally read into
5. Is there a law specifically enjoining the issuance of IFMA by the DENR? NO 
 contracts.
6. Is the 1969 Document a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause? NO.

 Issue:
7. Does the 1969 Document specifically enjoin the government to issue the IFMA? NO.
It is a mere assurance that the boundaries under TLA 43 will not be altered 
 May toll fees collected by tollway operators be subjected to VAT (Are tollway operations a
8. franchise and/or a service that is subject to VAT)?
9. 2. Did PICOP comply with all the administrative and statutory requirements for the
issuance of an IFMA? NO 
This issue hinges on these issues: Factual sub-issues 
 Ruling:
10. Did PICOP submit the required Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and Seven-Year
Reforestation Plan? YES 
 When a tollway operator takes a toll fee from a motorist, the fee is in effect for the latter's use
of the tollway facilities over which the operator enjoys private proprietary rights that its
11. Did PICOP pay all forest charges? YES 
Legal sub-issues 

contract and the law recognize. In this sense, the tollway operator is no different from the
12. Is PICOP required to acquire a Certification from the NCIP that the concession area
service providers under Section 108 who allow others to use their properties or facilities for a
does not overlap with any ancestral domain? YES 

fee.
13. Is PICOP required to consult with and acquire an approval from the Sanggunian
concerned under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code? YES, and it has to be from
Tollway operators are franchise grantees and they do not belong to exceptions that Section 119
all province concerned and not just Surigao del Sur. 

spares from the payment of VAT. The word "franchise" broadly covers government grants of a
special right to do an act or series of acts of public concern. Tollway operators are, owing to the
nature and object of their business, "franchise grantees." The construction, operation, and
maintenance of toll facilities on public improvements are activities of public consequence that
necessarily require a special grant of authority from the state.

A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government principally for the purpose of raising
Diaz vs. Secretary of Finance (2011)
revenues to fund public expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand, are collected by private
tollway operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the construction,
Facts:
maintenance and operation of the tollways, as well as to assure them a reasonable margin of
income. Although toll fees are charged for the use of public facilities, therefore, they are not
Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed this petition for
government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax. Taxes may be imposed only by the
declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by
government under its sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of tollway operators. Court treated the
government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership.
case as one of prohibition.
People vs. Galit
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC, intend to include
[GR 51770, 20 March 1985]
toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a
"user's tax," not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a tax on
Facts:
 In August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando was found dead in her bedroom as a
result of 7 wounds inflicted in her body. More than 2 weeks thereafter, the police authorities
of Montalban picked up defendant-appellant, Francisco Galit on suspicion of the murder on the
occasion of a robbery. When the case was referred to the NBI, NBI Agent Flores conducted a
preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. The
following day, Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily executed a “Salaysay” admitting his
participation in the commission of the crime and implicating two other persons as his
companions. In reality, Galit had been obtained and interrogated almost continuously for 5
days, but to no avail as he consistently maintained his innocence. The investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Galit admitted what the investigating officers
wanted him to admit to the crime and he signed the confession they prepared. Galit was
charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, was found guilty with the sentence of death
penalty. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary
admission that may be used against the accused?
Held:
Herein, the only evidence against Galit is his alleged confession. A long question
followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. Galit is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did
not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks
after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement
does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was
not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel of
his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the
taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into
giving one. Where there is any doubt as to the voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
G.R. No. 132154 June 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
PACITO ORDOO and APOLONIO MEDINA
Facts: On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a 15 year old girl named Shirley Victore was
found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union who three (3)
days before was reported missing. According to a post-mortem examination conducted by Dr.
Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime.
However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go
home. On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the
police station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime.
Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their
confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer
to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing
lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. The
investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police
and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving
of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the
crime.
Issue: whether or not their confession is inadmissible due to the lack of counsel to assist them
during custodial investigation
Held: Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the
confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the
confession must be in writing. Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest
respect than an accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and
shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person
being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation
for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial
investigation any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him.
This exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
People vs. Lugod
[GR 136253, 21 February 2001]
Facts: A case of rape with homicide was filed against the accused, Clemente John Lugod, for
allegedly raping the eight-year old girl victim, Nairube J. Ramos and dumping her dead body in
the grassy coconut plantation area.
On September 15, 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was
asleep in her house together with her husband and their children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube.
At around 12:30 a.m., they noticed that Nairube was gone. The backdoor of their house was
left open where a pair of slippers that did not belong to the family was found. In the morning,
the police began their search for Nairube wherein a panty belonging to the victim was found,
as well as a black collared shirt belonging to the accused, Lugod. Witnesses testified that both
slippers and the shirt were worn by Lugod. Lugod was then brought to the police station where
he was temporarily incarcerated. Although he admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and
killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same.
On September 19, 1997, the Vice-Mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the course
of his conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense.
Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. After trial, Lugod was found guilty and was
sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not Lugod’s alleged confession can be used against him?
Held: At the time of his arrest, records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and his rights to counsel. There is also no evidence to
indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Consequently, the accused-appellant’s act of
confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellant’s rights under the Bill of
Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no
matter how brutal the crime committed may be.
Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation
and thus, not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police
station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized
as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his
detention. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellant’s claim that he was
beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession.
In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the
accused-appellant to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of
Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with
respect to the alleged confession made by the accused-appellant is not conclusive.
As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely
responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not
state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor
admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube.
PEOPLE VS TABOGA
FACTS:
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in an Information which reads that
with intent to gain, and with violence against persons, entered the house of one Francisca
Tubon, and once inside, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, assault, attacked and
stabbed Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which necessarily caused the death
of said Tubon and took away several personal properties belonging to Tubon. He was likewise
indicted for Arson for setting the victim’s house on fire.
After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay Captain Pagao confronted
Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Tubon and set her house on fire, causing
the whole house, including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio
announcer of DZNS, went to Police Station to interview the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted
killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes
charged and interposed an alibi. Accused-appellant also claimed that he was maltreated by the
policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Contaoi,
he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station
where policemen were present and that the reporter acted as an agent for the prosecution.
Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.
The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a private person,
can be admitted as evidence against him.
HELD:
Yes.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything
on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police
to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked
permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information
obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going
on. The records also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reporter but
to several others.
Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that he was
maltreated and compelled to confess. Where the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers
who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of
violence, on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating the
voluntariness of the confession.
The RTC did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant's taped confession. Such
confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to
a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-
appellant admitted to the Baranggay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even
before the police started investigating him at the police station. Besides, if he had indeed been
forced into confessing, he could have easily asked help from the newsman.
People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002
Facts:
On August 3, 1996, the body of Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls of Barangay
Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. The body was discovered by Juanito Baloloy.
Barangay Captain Ceniza testified that during Genelyn’s wake Juanito voluntarily told her the
circumstances surrounding the incident and how he raped Genelyn which led to the latter’s
death.
Ceniza then turned over Juanito to a policeman who brought him to the police station, and took
the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day, a complaint was filed against Juanito.
On August 4, 1996, several people came to the courtroom of Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon
to swear to their affidavits before him. Judge Dicon asked Juanito several questions where the
latter spontaneously narrated how he killed Genelyn and dropped her body into the precipice.
During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, Juanito was never assisted
by a lawyer.
Juanito was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. Subsequently, the trial court
convicted Juanito of rape with homicide and imposed on him the penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the alleged confession of the accused Juanito
Baloloy to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon and its admissibility.
Ruling:
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can
it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he
is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza, in a spontaneous answer and freely
and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner, that he raped Genelyn. It was given before he was
arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the
offense.
However, as far as the custodial investigation of Judge Dicon is concerned, the conduct of such
was in violation of the constitutional rights of Juanito. It is settled that at the moment the
accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial
investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his
complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon’s claim that no
complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time, Juanito was already under the
custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who
were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.
At any rate, while it is true that Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made
without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could
however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through
the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
Narciso vs. Cruz
Facts: After a preliminary investigation, Narciso Cruz was charged with the crime of parricide
for allegedly killing his wife. He was thereby detained. He then filed a motion for reinvestigation
and to lift warrant of arrest.
Also, Cruz filed an ex-parte motion for bail. The prosecutor made no objection. The
motion was granted on the same day, allowing the accused to post bail at P150,000.
Flor Cruz, sister of the deceased wife, filed a Motion to lift order allowing accused to post
bail.
Issue: Is the grant of bail valid?
Ruling:
No. Cruz was charged with parricide which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When
the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial
judge before the bail can be granted. Without such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
In the case, there was no basis for the granting of the bail. No hearing was conducted on
the application for bail – summary or otherwise. The CA even found that only 10 minutes had
elapsed between the filing of the Motion and the granting of bail. Such lapse of time could not
be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence.
Even if the prosecutor did not object to the motion, the judge still had no basis to grant
the bail. The judge had no reason to presume that that prosecutor knew what he was doing. It
is
the judge’s duty first to determine if evidence of guilt is strong before bail is granted.
Defensor-Santiago v Vasquez; G.R. Nos. 99289-90; 27 Jan 1993; 217 SCRA 633
FACTS:
Petitioner posted a cash bond for her provisionary liberty in connection with an
information filed against her for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Sandiganbayan issued a hold-departure order after it was revealed in the media that she
intended to leave the country to study.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the hold-departure order violates petitioner’s right to travel.
RULING:
NO. The hold-departure order is but an exercise of the court’s inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the accused. Under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Elvira Agullo, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, respondents, G.R.
No. 132926. July 20, 2001
Facts:
On July 14, 1986, an audit conducted by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III,
discovered a cash shortage of P26,404.26 on Elvira Agullo’s accountability. Subsequently, she
was charged with malversation of public funds.
Upon arraignment, accused Agullo, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not
guilty to the charge, after which the Sandiganbayan conducted a pre-trial on 11 February 1990.
Agullo admitted in effect the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the
Information. Notwithstanding, Agullo persistently professed her innocence of the charge and
categorically denied having malversed or converted the public funds in question.
At the witness stand, Agullo narrated that on October 22, 1985, burdened with the
thought that she failed to give the salary of the permanent employees, she went to report for
work despite not feeling well. However, while walking on the street, she collapsed and lost
consciousness. She awakened in a hospital bed of St. Pauls Hospital where she was confined for
over a week. Hence, she lost the subject amount in a fortuitous event.
The Sandiganbayan struck down the defense as incredible and without basis and
rendered its decision, convicting Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds,
ratiocinating principally that no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government
funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which bear considerable weight in the adjudication of Agullo’s guilt or
the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Ruling:
In the case before us, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked
certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the
adjudication of petitioner’s guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise.
Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense,
we hold that Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima
facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this
end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the
missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain.
True enough, the evidence adduced by the defense reveals sufficient circumstances
to establish the strongest degree of probability that the public funds subject of the criminal
indictment for malversation was lost during that fateful day of October 22, 1985, where Agullo
suffered a stroke on the streets as she was then on her way to the MPWH Regional Office.
Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the
flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit
of the prosecution’s evidence. This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the
prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
“The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only
to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be
an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and
all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of doubt.”
The decision of the Sandiganbayan and its Resolution are hereby reversed and set
aside. Petitioner Elvira Agullo is hereby acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs Sergio Bato and Abraham Bato,
G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998
Facts:
The two accused were charged with murder.
On January 15, 1990, the accused were arraigned in the Waray dialect which they
understood and spoke. Assisted by Counsel Benjamin Pore, both pleaded not guilty.
Aside from the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination, the only other
witness for the prosecution was Ernesto Jr. who was only able to establish the following
circumstances: (1) that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) after two
hours of drinking, said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away;
(3) the following day, the body of the victim, which sustained several hack and stab wounds,
was recovered about five kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.
On the other hand, the accused raised the defense of denial. They maintained that
their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernesto’s murder is merely an afterthought,
necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution. They presented as
witness Pfc. Benjamin Montanejos, who affirmed that the entry he made in the police
blotter did not mention the accused as suspects to the crime. He further testified that it was
the barangay captain who reported the incident to the police, contradicting the claim of Ernesto
Jr. that he did so.
After due trial, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding there was positive identification of the
accused, a violation of their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Ruling:
The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence
gleaned from the sole testimony of the son of the deceased. While it is true that in the absence
of direct proof, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The
circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of
guilt. As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and
every hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of what transpired during the interval
of the acussed tying the hands of the victim up to the time his body was discovered. The
prosecution, in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to surmise that the accused must
have killed the victim during such interregnum.
In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of
proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. By constitutional fiat,
the burden of proof is accordingly vested on the prosecution.
The state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence, hence, the assailed Decision is reversed and set aside and Abraham
Bato is acquitted on reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs Ronaldo de Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010
Facts:
Ronaldo de Guzman was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, punishable
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Through a buy-bust operation, accused was arrested and brought to the police
station.
At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation
were turned over to the police investigator who entered the incident in the police blotter. He
then placed his initials on the packets of suspected shabu, which were later submitted to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. Confirmatory tests revealed that the
substance in the packets that appellant handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed shabu.
At the trial, appellant denied the charges against him. The trial court found De
Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and such conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence necessary for the
accused’s conviction was duly established.
Ruling:
The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with
the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of
evidence required. The courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the
crucible of a severe testing.
When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one
of which is consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption
of innocence must prevail, and the court must acquit.
The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is reposed in the State. Law enforcers and
public officers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart
of his fundamental rights. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug
is the very corpus delicti of the crime.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart
from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict. The corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.
In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who
marked the seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station.
Moreover, there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken
under the circumstances. There was also no mention that representatives from the media and
from the DOJ, and any elected official, were present during this inventory. The prosecution
never explained the reasons for these lapses. Thus, we find no justifiable ground for such non-
compliance.
Readily apparent in the prosecution’s evidence, likewise, is a gaping hole in the chain
of custody of the seized illegal drugs. The length of time that lapsed from the seizure of the
items from De Guzman until they were given to the investigating officer for marking is too long
to be inconsequential. And it took yet more time before the same were submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, and without any clear explanation on who had custody in the meantime. This
vacuum in the chain of custody of the seized items cannot simply be brushed aside.
These circumstances cast a strong shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of
the evidence presented before the court.
Indeed, the prosecution’s failure to prove that the specimen submitted for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from appellant is fatal to the
prosecution’s case. Hence, Ronaldo de Guzman is acquitted of the crime charged.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Eloy Magsi et al., defendants, Teodoro del
Rosario, defendant- appellant, G.R. No. L-32888, August 12, 1983
Facts:
Eloy Magsi, Juan Ponce, Perfecto Arce, Gerardo Flores, Opring Olazo, Teodoro del
Rosario and Peter Doe where accused of attacking, assaulting and shooting Jesus Gallardo
causing the latter’s death.
 On August 20, 1970, defendat-appellant was apprehended and was scheduled for
arraignment.
Altogether, this case was set and rescheduled for six (6) times. Of the six hearing
dates, accused at two instances entered a qualified plea of guilty.
Recorded proceedings showed that de officio counsel Atty. Rivera and accused were
hardly afforded by the Court any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified
plea of guilty resulted from the Court’s prodding rather than from accused's spontaneous
volition. At the second instance the Court knew accused's prior plea of guilty by alleged duress
employed on him by the other accused. Accused's allegation of duress prompted his lawyer to
move for the resetting of the case for the study and presentation of possible mitigating
circumstances. Subsequently, several resetting of the hearing of the case happened until
October 19, 1970 when Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused was ready
to enter an unqualified plea of guilty and hearing was conducted that day.
Based on accused's plea of guilty without any evidence for the prosecution on any
of the alleged aggravating circumstances nor accused's evidence on duress, the Court rendered
its decision the next day finding the accused guilty of the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in not making an inquiry as to the extent of the
force applied by Eloy Magsi and his companions upon the accused Teodoro del Rosario, when
they ordered him to kill Jesus Gallardo, thus, not affording the accused the right to be heard.
Ruling:
In a long line of cases, the Court has long been commenting on the necessity for
strict and substantial compliance with every court’s obligation to an accused. Thus, “while there
is no law requiring it, yet in every case under the plea of guilty where the penalty may be death,
it is advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the
degree of culpability of the defendant” and “the Court should be sure that the defendant fully
understands the nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the
punishment to be imposed before sentencing him...”.
In the case at bar, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the first time,
with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the
meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be
imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the
alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense charged. But
these considerations notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor
from the defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the
accused whether he confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the case.
The conduct of the court a quo taken in the light of the foregoing decisions clearly
established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the herein accused, who was
convicted on an improvident plea of guilty. The case is remanded to the Court a quo for
rearrangement and further proceedings.
People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
Facts:
Rolando Rivera was charged of willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously
having carnal knowledge of his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latters will
and without her consent.
During arraignment on September 30, 1997, the accused, duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera, her aunt,
Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical examination of
complainant.
The defense also presented its evidence and accused, his sister, Concepcion Sayo,
and Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital were
presented as witnesses. Accused denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that the rape
charge was filed against him because his wife had a paramour and resented him because he
hurt her. The defense presented a letter to accused written by his wife, asking him to sign a
document so that she could attend to it before he got out of prison. The defense also offered
as evidence a document, designated as Waiver of Rights, signed by accused, in which he
acknowledged that he was a tenant of a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily
surrendered his right over the said landholding to a certain Ponciano Miguel, a cousin of his
wife. He said that he signed the document because his wife’s relatives promised him that he
would get out of prison after signing the document. Another witness for the defense was
Concepcion Sayo, accused’s sister, who testified that accused stayed in their house during the
entire month of March, except in March 19, 1997. The last defense witness was Natividad
Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital, who identified a
certification, dated April 29, 1999, in which it was stated that Zaira Rivera was confined at that
hospital from March 1 to March 2, 1997.
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the court failed to consider the evidence of the Accused and
ruled with partiality in violation of the accused’s right to be heard.
Ruling:
Accused pointed out that trial judge’s questions propounded to him during his cross-
examination was an indication of the latter’s partiality for the prosecution.
Where the trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes
necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine
a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear understanding
of the facts. The trial judge merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of
accused-appellant and not to establish his guilt. It is a judge’s prerogative to ask questions to
ferret out the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals
certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party. “Trial judges in this
jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the
performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to
propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will
enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to
tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw
out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the
position taken by one or the other party…”.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of rape is affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Alcanzado, G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2004
Facts:
Oscar Alcanzado was accused of Murder.
On the early morning of June 17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on
duty, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of the victim
with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF American Bar being guarded by the
accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service firearm
to policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two (2) spent shells. The ballistic report
states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from the gun surrendered by the accused to
policeman Bagon.
During arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
There was no eye-witness to the shooting incident. The RTC relied principally on the admission
of accused to the police officer that he shot the unknown victim when he surrendered his
service firearm. The prosecution rested its case on October 13, 1998. Upon motion of appellant,
the RTC issued an Order dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer to
evidence. On November 19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence which was opposed
by the prosecution. The accused opted to file demurrer to evidence which was denied by the
Court, instead of testifying and could have explained what really happened and why he
surrendered his service firearm. On April 22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein assailed
decision convicting appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused without any admission on
his part or despite a broken chain of incriminating circumstances which constitutes a violation
of the accused’s constitutional right to be heard.
Ruling:
The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the
demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant
the opportunity to present his evidence.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was
denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying appellant’s
demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court
violated the provisions of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Appellant
had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and
therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have given
appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the fact that
appellant’s counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this Court. In effect,
appellant has not been accorded due process.
Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling
of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is
warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated.
People vs. Bayya
FACTS:
Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at
the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He repeated the bestial act in their
house about twice a week afterwards, and then later used her four (4) times a month, the last
she remembered being on July 5, 1995.
During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter
twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In
view of the facts established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing
appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that the
Information filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial
of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him
HELD:

A careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a crucial omission in its
averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be informed
are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against
further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
it may decide whether the are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same was proven
during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint
or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included.

The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by
degrees.

"WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that appelant LODRIGO BAYYA is adjudged guilty of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua...."