Administrative Law
CENTRAL BANK VS CA AND ABLAZA Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
Vim Malicay
FACTS: This is a petition made by the Central Bank which was sentenced
to pay respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation for
damages for breach of contract. In this case, it appears that after going thru
the process of usual bidding, CB awarded to Ablaza a construction contract
and allowed the latter to commence work. However, on a certain date the
Bank then refused to proceed with the project unless the plans were revised
and a lower price were agreed to by Ablaza.
Now CB raises the issue that there was no perfected contract
between the parties as there was no compliance with the requirement under
Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that:
Section 607. Certificate showing appropriation to meet
contract. — Except in the case of a contract for personal service or for
supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving an expenditure by the
National Government of three thousand pesos or more shall be entered
into or authorized until the Auditor General shall have certified to the officer
entering into such obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for
such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed
contract is available for expenditure on account thereof. xxx
CB contends that in view of such omission and considering the
provisions of Section 608 of the same code to the effect that "a purported
contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding
section hereof shall be wholly void", "no contract between the petitioner and
respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation was ever
perfected because only the first stage, that is the award of the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder, was completed."
ISSUE # 1: WON the aforementioned provisions apply to the
Central Bank so as to render void the contract entered into by CB and Ablaza.
RULING: NO. It is of the court’s view that contracts entered into by petitioner
Central Bank are not within the contemplation of Sections 607 and 608.
Immediately to be noted, Section 607 specifically refers to "expenditure(s) of
the National Government" and that the term "National Government" may not
be deemed to include the Central Bank. Under the Administrative Code itself,
the term "National Government" refers only to the central government,
consisting of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
government, as distinguished from local governments and other
governmental entities and is not synonymous, therefore, with the terms "The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine Government",
which are the expressions broad enough to include not only the central
government but also the provincial and municipal governments, chartered
cities and other government-controlled corporations or agencies, like the
Central Bank.
ISSUE # 2: Is Central Bank part of National government?
RULING: NO. Central Bank is a government instrumentality created as an
autonomous body corporate to be governed by the provisions of its charter,
Republic Act 265, "to administer the monetary and banking system of the
Republic."As such, it may acquire and hold such assets and incur such
liabilities as result directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this
Act, or as are essential to the proper conduct of such operations." It has
capital of its own and operates under a budget prepared by its own Monetary
Board and otherwise appropriates money for its operations and other
expenditures independently of the national budget. It does not depend on the
National Government for the financing of its operations; it is the National
Government that occasionally resorts to it for needed budgetary
accommodations. Its prerogative to incur such liabilities and expenditures is
not subject to any prerequisite found in any statute or regulation not expressly
applicable to it. For these reasons, the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code invoked by the Bank do not apply to it.
BACANI VS NACOCO
Vim Malicay
FACTS: Bacani and Matoto are court stenographersassigned in Branch VI
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of the case
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani
and Matoto complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their
bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the
amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate
of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of NACOCO, the Auditor General
disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts
paid. the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts
on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion
was expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government
entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
NACOCO set up set up as a defense that it is a government entity
within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court but Bacani and Matoto argued that NACOCO is not a
gov’t entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the National Coconut Corporation may be considered as
included in the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for the
purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
RULING: NO. GOCCs do not come under the classification of municipal or
public corporation like NACOCO.
National Coconut Corporation was organized with the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences
in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra
products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which
our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry,
however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law
in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned. It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
As this Court has aptly said, “The mere fact that the Government happens to
be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation”
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA) VS CA
Pauline Rojo
FACTS: MIAA operates NAIA Complex under E.O. No. 903 (MIAA
Charter). As operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued
an Opinion, it opined that the LGC of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real
estate tax granted to MIAA. Thus, MIAA negotiated with City Paranaque to
pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. The City of Paranaque issued
notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport lands and buildings and
threatened to sell at public auction.
MIAA argued that the Airport lands and buildings are devoted to
public use and public service and the ownership remains with the State.
Thus, the properties involved are inalienable and not subject to real estate
tax by governments.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 193 of the LGC,
which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “GOCCs” upon the
effectivity of the LGC.
ISSUE: WON MIAA is a GOCC which makes it to be EXCLUDED from tax
exemption
1
 Administrative Law
RULING: NO. MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation.
There is no dispute that a GOCC is not exempt from real estate
tax. Under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987 it provides that,
a GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is
not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no
stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any
other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate
powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the
government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but
also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of
eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the
same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the MIAA Charter.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to
inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature
clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations,
which is absent in this case.
Also, MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and
Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the
Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real
properties owned by the Republic. The properties are still of public domain
and outside the commerce of men, hence cannot be taxed.
REPUBLIC VS RAMBUYONG
Pauline Rojo
FACTS: Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/or
damages against the National Power Corporation (NPC) Appearing as
counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong who was then the incumbent
Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that
under Section 90 (b), (1) of R.A. No. 7160,otherwise knownas the LGC,
sanggunianmembers are prohibited "to appear as counsel before any court
wherein x xx any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party."
NPC contended that being a GOCC, it is embraced within the term
"instrumentality."
ISSUE: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty.
Rambuyong, as Sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against
it.
RULING: Yes, NPC is government instrumentality thus, Atty. Rambuyong
should not appear as counsel against it.
Based on jurisprudence, Maceda vs Macaraig, Jr., 1997 197
SCRA 771 (1991), the Court stated that NPC is a government instrumentality
with the enormous task of undertaking development of hydroelectric
generation of power and production of electricity from other sources, as well
as transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the
quality of life pursuant to the State policy embodied in Section 9, Article 2 of
1987Constitution. With this, the LGC prohibits a sanggunianmember (Atty.
Rambuyong) to appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
MACEDA VS MACARAIG
Ogie Adlawan
FACTS: The National Power Corporation was created by CA 120. In 1949,
it was given tax exemption by RA 358. NPC was further strengthened by RA
6395 in 1971. In 1984, PD 1931 was passed removing the tax exemption of
NPC and other GOCCs. There was a reservation, however, that the president
or the Minister of Finance upon recommendation by the Fiscal Incentives
Review Board may restore or modify the exemption. In 1985, the tax
exemption was revived. It was again removed in 1987 by virtue of EO 93 w/c
again provided that upon FIRB recommendation it can again be restored. In
the same year, FIRB resolved to restore the exemption. The same was
approved by Cory through exec sec Macaraig acting as her alter ego.
Maceda opined the FIRB resolution averring that the power granted to the
FIRB is an undue delegation of legislative power. His claim was strengthened
by Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Secretary Ordoñez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Opinion 77 can be given credence.
RULING: The SC ruled that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power. First of all, since the NPC is a GOCC and is non-profit it can be
exempt from taxation. Also, Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Sec Ordoñez was
overruled by Macaraig. This action by Macaraig is valid because the
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify,
alter or reverse the construction of a statute given by a department secretary
– pursuant to the president’s control power.
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY VS CA
Ogie Adlawan
FACTS: Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and
promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.
The ISA had the power “to initiate expropriation of land required
for basic iron and steel facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease to the
companies involved if it is shown that such use of the State's power is
necessary to implement the construction of capacity which is needed for the
attainment of the objectives of the Authority.” (Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5)
years counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on 10
October 1978, its term was extended for another ten (10) years by Executive
Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979.
The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") embarked on an
expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. xxxx Pursuant to said expansion program,
the President of the Philippines on 16 November 1982 withdrew from sale or
settlement a large tract of public land (about 30.25 hectares in area) located
in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy
of NSC.
Since certain portions of the subject public land were occupied by
a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by
private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), the NSC
was directed to "negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the
Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on
the subject land." Upon the failure of NSC and private respondent MCFC to
reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from 16 November
1982, petitioner ISA was directed to exercise its power of eminent domain
under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect
ofoccupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public
land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to
the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.
Accordingly, on 18 August 1983, petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain
proceedings against private respondent MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City.
2
 Administrative Law
On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the
trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control
of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however,
the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC
then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be
rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner
ISA filed its opposition to this motion.
In an Order dated 9 November 1988, the trial court granted
MCFC's motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was
anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only natural or
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case."
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court.
ISSUE: WON the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted
for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.
RULING: Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that
ISA is anentity authorized by law to institute actions.
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powersor attributes
normallyassociated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision
in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive
juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The
ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or
delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body
corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described as "legal personality." xxxx
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires,
the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that
agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers,
duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency
is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for,
in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the
instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special
statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto
by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
The procedural implications of the relationship between an agent
or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic itself are, at
least in part, spelled out in the Rules of Court. The general rule is, of course,
that an action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party
in interest. (Rule 3, Section 2) Petitioner ISA was, at the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, a real party in interest, having been explicitly
authorized by its enabling statute to institute expropriation proceedings.
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in
its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. The present
expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the Republic
as the principal of ISA.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of
the Philippines and not the National Steel Corporation, even though the latter
may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the condemnation
suit be eventually successful.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the
Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the
statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings. Xxxx
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs SPOUSES DAVID AND ELISEA
RAMOS
“The States immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner
because it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from
being the States exclusive prerogative.”
FACTS: Sps Ramos discovered that a portion of their land with an area of
985 sqm more or less was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of Loakan Airport operated by Petitioner ATO. Both parties
negotiated and Sps agreed to sell the used portion for 778, 150.00, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale, however, petitioner failed to pay.
Sps. filed an action for the collection of sum of money against ATO
and some of its officials in the RTC.
ATO invoked Proclamation No. 1358 of President Marcos
reserving parcels of land including that of respondents for the use of such
airport. ATO further asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been
entered into in the performance of governmental functions. Basically, ATO is
invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the
State may be extended to the ATO
RULING: NO
DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of
sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the
State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.
The Court cited Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:
“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.”
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity
from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the
instance of every other individual, government service may be severely
obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that
the State has to defend against.
WILL IT BE EXTENDED TO ATO? NO
The Civil Aeronautics Administration (predecessor of ATO) comes
under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was
created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary
function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the
construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects
for which the entity was organized.
3
 Administrative Law
The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as
an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no
claim to the States immunity from suit.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first
resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. The Supreme Court ruled that
thedoctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument forperpetrating any
injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court
explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its
proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private
property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being
paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners.
DOH VS PHIL PHARMAWEALTH
Mariel Banosan
FACTS: Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to
government hospitals in the Philippines.
On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G.
Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998,
outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government
suppliers for pharmaceutical products.
A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10, Series of 2000,
providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed
at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner
Department of Health (DOH). Part V of A.O. No. 10 reads, in part: Only
products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be procured by the
DOH and all other entities under its jurisdiction.
On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, PPI submitted to petitioner
DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited
drug products, including the antibiotic Penicillin G Benzathine. Based on the
schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and
release of the result of PPI’s request were due on September 2000, the last
month of the quarter following the date of its filing.
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner
Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards
committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million
units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding PPI’s
request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, PPI
submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were
opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with PPI
submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of PPI’S Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to YSS.
PPI thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
praying, inter alia, that the trial court nullify the award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract (IFB No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and
direct defendant DOH, defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon and
defendant Lopez to declare PPI as the lowest complying responsible bidder
for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to PPI
and adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and
severally to plaintiff, for the therein specified damages.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Romualdez, Galon, et al prayed for the outright
dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state
immunity.
PPI contended that the doctrine of state immunity is not applicable
considering that individual petitioners are being sued both in their official and
personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for damages.
ISSUE: WON Doctrine of State Immunity from suit may be availed of by
Romualdez, et al.
RULING: NO. The suability of a government official depends on whether the
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and
whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a
charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the
Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official
concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where
satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to
perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to
pay the damages awarded against them.
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officersare not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that
an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director
of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and propertyrights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or underan assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not asuit against the State within
the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged
in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious
to the rights of others.Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly
being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although
acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public
position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal
capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of illegally abusing
their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be
awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with
full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is
permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who
exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of
sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
ISSUE: WON the defense of immunity from suit is available in favor of
DOH
RULING: As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will
not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for
the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and
mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary
injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a
person.Defense of ‘state immunity from suit’ does not apply in causes of
action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the
State.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs PHIL PHARMA WEALTH
Mariel Banosan
4
 Administrative Law
“The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public
officials may not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official
functions or within the scope of their authority.”
FACTS: AO 27 was issued by the then Secretary of HealthRomualdez.
Said AO set the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public,
such accreditation to be valid for three years but subject to annual review.
AO 10 was issued amending AO 27, “the accreditation period for
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to two years.
Moreover, such accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked after
due deliberation and proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee,
through its Chairman.”
AO 10 was later amended by AO 66, which provided that the “two-
year accreditation period may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after
due deliberation, hearingand notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee,
through its Chairman.”
Phil Pharma (PPI) was invited to a meeting which then it was
issued a document entitled “Report on Violative Products” after the finding of
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) that PPI’s products which were being sold
to the public were unfit for human consumption. The 10-day period given to
PPI within which to give its answer regarding the issue expired without it
submitting the same. Instead, PPI sent a mere letter informing the DOH that
the matter was already forwarded to their lawyers for appropriate reply.
The Undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s letter and
informed the latter that, effective immediately, its accreditation has been
suspended for 2 years pursuant to AO 10 and Memo No. 171-C (for the
sanctions for violations)
PPI filed before the RTC of Pasig a Complaint seeking to declare
null and void certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for
damages (awardof moral damages of ₱5 million, exemplary damages of ₱1
million, attorney’sfees of ₱1 million, and costs of suit) and injunction against
the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon.
DOH submits that:
1. PPI prayed for the award for damages against it, the case should be
considered a suit against the State, for it qould require appropriation to
satisfy PPI’s claim;
2. The State did not give its consent to be sued; and
3. In issuing and implementing the questioned issuances, individual
petitioners acted officially and within their authority, for which reason they
should not be held to account individually.
ISSUE: WON the mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in performance of their official functions.
RULING: YES. The suability of a government official depends on whether
the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity,
and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result
in a charge or financial liability against the government.
Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of
bad faith."
Moreover, "the rule is that if the judgment against such officials
will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state. In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it
has been filed without its consent."
It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries
Romualdez and Dayrit, as well as Undersecretary Galon, were done while in
the performance and discharge of their official functions or in their official
capacities, and not in their personal or individual capacities. Secretaries
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Romualdez and Dayritwere being charged with the issuance
of the assailed orders.
On the other hand, Undersecretary Galon was being charged with
implementing the assailed issuances. By no stretch of imagination could
same be categorized as ultra vires simply because the said acts are well
within scope of their authority. Section 4 of RA 3720 specifically provides that
the BFAD is an office under Office of Health Secretary. Also, the Health
Secretary is authorized to issue rules and regulations as may be necessary
to effectively enforce provisions of RA 3720.
As regards Undersecretary Galon, she is authorized by law to
supervise the offices under the DOH’s authority, such as the BFAD.
Moreover, there was also no showing of bad faith on their part. The assailed
issuances were not directed only against PPI. The suspension of PPI’s
accreditation only came about after it failed to submit its comment as directed
by Undersecretary Galon. It is also beyond dispute that if found wanting, a
financial charge will be imposed upon them which will require an
appropriation from the state of the needed amount.
LT. GEN. ALFONSO DAGUDAG vs JUDGE MAXIMO PADERANGA
Mariel Banosan
FACTS: A team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR,
and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the subject container vans at a port
in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest
products and the names of the shippers and consignees.
The crew of M/V General Ricarte (of NMC Container Lines) failed
to produce certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents
covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No.
07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products
within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as
abandoned.
The DENR Forest Protection Officer Canete posted notices
(CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Lines building)
informing the unknown owner about the adjudication, subsequently, the
forest products were confiscated in favor of the Government.
A certain Roger Edma prayed that a writ of replevin be issued
ordering DENR, CENRO and Dagudag to deliver the products to him, to
which respondent Judge granted hence a writ was issued ordering the sheriff
to take possession of the products.
The defendants (petitioners in this case) prayed that the writ be
set aside alleging among others that:
1. Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
2. the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; and
3. the State cannot be sued without its consent.
Also, they alleged that the DENR was the agency responsible for
theenforcement of forestry laws.
Later, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), found
respondent Judge to have violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WONrespondent judge violated doctrine of primary jurisdiction
RULING: YES
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under this doctrine, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s
TaskForce Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them
to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This
should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the
5
 Administrative Law
forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced,
and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
In the case of Paat, the Court said:
The enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources “By the very nature of its function, the DENR should
be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.”
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits
unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and
the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
The party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can
resort to courts. Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy.
He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that
(1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are
subject to review by the DENR Secretary;
(2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and
(3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through
a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
The Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products
in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency — not the courts.
GO VS RAMOS
Marion Lara
FACTS: These three cases are petitions for review on certiorari. Two of the
cases are regarding the preparation and filing of deportation charges against
Jimmy T. Go. On the other hand,the third case seeks to set aside the decision
and resolution of the Appellate Court . Considering that all cases arose from
the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570
and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution dated February 26, 2007.
It all started when Luis Ramos initiated a petition against petitioner
Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien and not a Filipino
citizen. Ramos alleged that Go represents himself as a Filipino citizen when
in fact Go’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is
Chinese.
Go denies the allegation and insisted that he is a natural-born
Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese
father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance
withArticle IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 625.
The complaint for deportation against Jimmy was dismissed
however the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal,
holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time.
Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of
his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation
and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
Petitioners father and son filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC seeking to
annul and setaside the Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had therein. They
challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the
deportation proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence adduced by the petitioners to prove
their claim of Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the
Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in
order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage;
RULING: No. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own. Unlike other
cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. Every time the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered
as res judicata. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the
following concur:
a) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party;
b) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part
in the resolution thereof; and
c) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Court.
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his
deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the
decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect
upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos,
he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear
and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process
determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. However, this Court,
following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary
jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v.
Deportation Board wherein we stressed that judicial determination is
permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is
substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.
Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the
courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the
same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in
proper proceedings. After all, the Board's jurisdiction is not divested by the
mere claim of citizenship. Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen
and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship
reviewed by courts, after deportation proceedings. The decision of the Board
on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was
not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction
to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were
presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his
siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens.
Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine
citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it
was not made on time.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was properly observed in the
proceedings before the Board;
RULING: No. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character,
summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given
theopportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met.
Petitions Denied.
6
 Administrative Law
MACHADO VS GATDULA
Marion Lara
FACTS: The dispute involves two adjoining parcels of land
locatedinBarangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, one belonging to the
Machados, and the other belonging to respondent Ricardo L. Gatdula
(Gatdula).
On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter to the COSLAP
requesting assistance because the Machados allegedly blocked the right of
way to his private property by constructing a two-door apartment on their
property.
Acting on Gatdula’s letter, the COSLAPconducteda
mediationconference on February 25, 1999; the parties then agreed to
have a verification survey conducted on their properties and to share the
attendant expenses. Thereafter, the COSLAP issued an Order dated March
16, 1999 directing the Chief of the Survey Division of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office – Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), to conduct a verification survey on
May 9, 1999. The order likewise stated that in the event that no surveyor is
available, the parties may use the services of a private surveyor, whom the
CENRO-DENR Survey Division would deputize.
As scheduled, a private surveyor, Junior Geodetic Engineer Abet
F. Arellano (Engr. Arellano), conducted a verification survey of the properties
in the presence of both parties. Engr. Arellano submitted a report to the
COSLAP finding that the structure built by the Machados encroached upon
an alley found within the Gatdula property. Engr. Arellano’s findings
corroborated the separate report of Engineer Noel V. Soqueco of the
CENRO, Los Baños, Laguna that had also been submitted to the COSLAP.
The Machados contested these reports in their position paper
dated August 26, 1999. They alleged that Gatdula had no right of action since
they did not violate Gatdula’s rights.They further assailed the jurisdiction of
the COSLAP, stating that the proper forum for the present case was the RTC
of San Pedro, Laguna.
ISSUE: Whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over Gatdula’s complaint
for right of way against the Machados; and
RULING: NO. The COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the present
case.
In resolving the issue of whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over
the present case, a review of the history of the COSLAP and an account of
the laws creating the COSLAP and its predecessor, the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP), is in order.
The COSLAP’s forerunner, the PACLAP, was created on July 31,
1970 pursuant to Executive Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the
committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate the investigation and
resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems,
and/or recommend other solutions.
The PACLAP was abolished by EO 561 effective on September
21, 1979 and was replaced by the COSLAP. Unlike the former laws, EO 561
specifically enumerated the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its
adjudicatory functions
The Commission shall have the following power to refer and follow
up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any
land problem or dispute referred to the Commission:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or
timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the
public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
ISSUE: Whether the COSLAP can validly issue the writs
of execution and demolition against the Machados.
RULING: NO. In this case, the COSLAP did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint filed by Gatdula, yet it proceeded to assume
jurisdiction over the case and even issued writs of execution and demolition
against the Machados. The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’
participation in the proceedings before the COSLAP. Under the
circumstances, the Machados can rightfully question its jurisdiction at
anytime, even during appeal or after final judgment. A judgment issued by a
quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS vs. DANES B. SANCHEZ
Marion Lara
FACTS: Respondent Danes B. Sanchez filed a Complaint for Damages
against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the
Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the
University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the
respondent’s Transcript of Records (ToR)
Respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002
with a Bachelor’s Degree of Science in Nursing; that he was included in the
list of candidates for graduation and attended graduation ceremonies; that he
sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrar’s Office, paid the
required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar;
that despite repeated attempts by the respondent to secure a copy of his
ToR, and submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment, UST
refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take the
nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a
living; and that petitioners’ actions violated Arts. 19-21 of the Civil Code. The
respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST
liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and the
costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they
refused to release respondent’s ToR because he was not a registered
student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three
semesters prior to graduation. They also sought the dismissal of the case on
the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action as respondent
allegedly admitted in paragraph 10 of his complaint that he was not enrolled
in UST in said semesters.
Petitioners then filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before Commission
on Higher Education (CHED). Thus, CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve
matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of instant case was
premature.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
issues involved required an examination of the evidence, which should be
threshed out during trial. Petitioners’ MR was also denied. The CA affirmed
the denial.
ISSUE: WON Respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies as
the CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school
matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondent’s demand for the
release of his ToR.
RULING: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply in this case because petitioners failed to demonstrate that
recourse to the CHED is mandatory—or even possible—in an action such as
that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and
damages. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of
numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and
well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners’
liability—if any—for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any
judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil
7
 Administrative Law
Code. As we held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology, “the CHED does not have the power to award damages.”
In addition, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the
actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not
shown that the CHED possesses any such power to “investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions.”
ISSUE: Respondent violated the rule against forum-shoppingsince
respondent sought recourse with both the CHED and the RTC;
RULING: Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Here, there can
be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial
power, and cannot make any disposition thereof—whether favorable or
otherwise.
The petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of are AFFIRMED. The RTC is DIRECTED to continue the
proceedings.
CT TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. VS HIBIONADA
Marion Lara
FACTS: CT Torres Enterprises, Inc, as agent of private respondent
Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment
to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been
completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the
subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed
a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in the RTC
of Negros Occidental.
It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide
the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
On September 17, 1987, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss in an order reading as follows:
A perusal of both pleadings and the complaint filed by plaintiff, the
issue to be determined are basically governed by the provisions of the New
Civil Code, particularly on contracts. The complaint is one for specific
performance with damages which is a justiciable issue under the Civil Code
and jurisdiction to hear the said issue is conferred on the regular Courts
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
It is, therefore, finding of this Court that jurisdiction as conferred
by law is vested in regular courts & not inHousing & Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB).
ISSUE: WON HLURB should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over case and
not RTC.
RULING: YES. HLURB should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
In holding that the complaint for specific performance with damages
wasjusticiable under the Civil Code and so came under jurisdiction of regular
courts under B.P. 129, the trial court failed to consider the express provisions
of P.D. No. 1344 and related decrees. It also erred in supposing that only the
regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code, to the
exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies.
P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides
that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate
the real estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and
empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the
enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial
jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. unsound real estate business practices;
B. claims involving refunds and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman;
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman. (Emphasis supplied)
Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory
functions conferred on the National Housing Authority under P.D. Nos.
957,1344 and other related laws were transferred to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, which was renamed Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board by E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986.
It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344 that
the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Diongon with
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a
subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to
deliver to him the corresponding certificate of title.
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims
resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-
changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing
this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-
judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the
principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under
their particular expertise.
We hold, in sum, that the complaint for specific performance and
damages was improperly filed with the respondent court, jurisdiction over the
case being exclusively vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board.
HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP VS EMILY HOMES
SUBD. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA)
Marion Lara
FACTS: Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association (EHSHA) and
the 150 individual members thereof filed on October 21, 1998 a civil action
for breach of contract, damages and attorneys fees with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao del Sur, Branch 19, against petitioners HLC Construction and
Development Corporation and Henry Lopez Chua, the developers of low-cost
housing units like Emily Homes Subdivision.
EHSHA alleged that HLC Construction used substandard
materials in the construction of their houses, like coco lumber and termite-
infested door jambs.HLC Construction furthermore allegedly did not adhere
to the house plan specificationsbecause the ceiling lines were sagging and
there weredeviations from the plumb line of the mullions, door jams (sic) and
concrete columns. EHSHA asked HLC Construction to repair their defective
housing units but latter failed to do so. EHSHA had to repair their defective
housing units using their own funds. Hence, they prayed for actual and moral
damages arising from HLC Construction’s breach of the contract plus
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On December 11, 1998, HLC Construction filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, claiming that it was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the trial court which had jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE: WON HLURB, not RTC, should exercise exclusive jurisdiction
RULING: YES. HLURB should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
SC finds that the trial court should have nonetheless dismissed
the complaint for a more important reason it had no jurisdiction over it. It is
the HLURB, not the trial court, which had jurisdiction over EHSHA’s
8
 Administrative Law
complaint. The HLURB is the government agency empowered to regulate the
real estate trade and business, having exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refunds and any other claims filed by subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; (emphasis supplied); and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
In this case, EHSHA’s complaint was for the reimbursement of
expenses incurred in repairing their defective housing units constructed by
petitioners. Clearly, the HLURB had jurisdiction to hear it.
The fact that the subject matter of the complaint involved defective
housing units did not remove the complaint from the HLURBs jurisdiction.
The delivery of habitable houses was HLC Construction’s responsibility
under their contract with EHSHA. The trial court should have granted the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioners so that the issues therein could be
expeditiously heard and resolved by the HLURB.
SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA vs. HON. JACINTO G. ANG
Mariel Banosan
“HLURB has authority to impose administrative fines under Sec.
38 of PD 1344 but not the criminal penalties provided under Section 39 of PD
957.”
FACTS: (Background) Petitioners and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI)
executed a Contract to Sell a condominium unit. FEPI failed to construct and
deliver the contracted condo despite the lapse of 3 years. Petitioners then
filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Pasig City accusing FEPI’s
directors and officers (private respondents) of violating Section 17 and 20 of
PD 957 in relation to Section 39 thereof. Section 39 provides for the criminal
penalty. PR Bondoc filed a counter-affidavit contending that the City
Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls under the jurisdiction
of Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The prosecutor
dismissed the complaint ruling that HLURB has jurisdiction.
Petitioner then filed this present petition alleging that it is the
Prosecutor’s office which has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
and file corresponding information in court for criminal violation of PD 957,
and not the HLURB because the latter’s jurisdiction is limited only to the
enforcement of contractual rights, and not the investigation of criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON HLURB may investigate or impose criminal penalties.
RULING: NO.
The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was to
provide for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all
parties buyers and sellers of subdivision and condominium units - may seek
remedial recourse. The law recognized, too, that subdivision and
condominium development involves public interest and welfare and should
be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical expertise. In the
exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to
interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties
under these contracts. This ancillary power, generally judicial, is now no
longer with the regular courts to the extent that the pertinent HLURB laws
provide.
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURBs jurisdiction over
contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and
condominium contracts comes out very clearly. But hand in hand with this
definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for
violations of the Decree, provided under the Decrees Section 39.
Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction
to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides
is the authority of the HLURB to impose administrative fines under
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing
the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree.
Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority may prescribe and
impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the
provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall
be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of execution in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
The Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that The
implementation and payment of administrative fines shall not preclude
criminal prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree. Thus,
the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two separate
remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree,
specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution.
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS & TRUST CO vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, AREVALO,UY, SPOUSES SORIANO, JR.,
ALFREDO LIM andFELISA CHI LIM/ALFREDO LIM
Mariel Banosan
“HLURB has jurisdiction to declare void a mortgage of lot done in
violation of PD 957 and annul a foreclosure sale.”
FACTS: Each of private respondents entered into separate contracts to sell
with TransAmerican Sales and Exposition (TransAmerican) through the
latters Owner/General Manager, Engr. Jesus Garcia, involving certain
portions of land. Despite demands, TransAmerican/Garcia failed to comply
with their undertakings. Engr. Garcia and his wife obtained a loan from Home
Bankers and without the prior approval of the HLURB the spouses mortgaged
the subject lands as collateral (five out of these eight titles turned out to be
private respondents townhouses subject of the contracts to sell).
Petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure since Garcia failed
to pay his obligation. Private respondents filed a complaint with the Office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA), HLURB, against
Garcia/TransAmerican for non-delivery of titles and non-completion of the
subdivision project. They prayed among others for the annulment of the
mortgage in favor of petitioner. The OAALA declared the mortgage executed
by and between respondents Engr. Jesus Garcia and TransAmerican and
Home Bankers to be unenforceable as against all the complainants.
Petitioner claims that HLURB has no power to declare
themortgage contract over real property executed between a real estate
developer and petitioner, a banking institution, void or unenforceable, as it is
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC and that since there is no seller-
buyer relationship existing between it and private respondents, HLURB has
no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the mortgage and to annul foreclosure
proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the HLURB has jurisdiction to declare invalid the mortgage
contract between TransAmerican and Home bankers.
RULING: YES
In Union Bank of the Philippines vs. HLURB, the SC ruled on the
question of HLURBs jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium buyer’s
complaint for:
(a) annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted by the project owner
without the consent of the buyer and without the prior written approval
of the NHA;
(b) annulment of the foreclosure sale; and
(c) annulment of the condominium certificate of title that was issued to the
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.
P.D. No. 1344 expanded the jurisdiction of the National Housing
Authority to include the following:
9
 Administrative Law
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, broker or salesman.
On February 7, 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the
regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (now HLURB).
Sec. 8. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS. The regulatory functions of
the National Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957,
1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission,
together with such applicable personnel, appropriation, records, equipment
and property necessary for the enforcement and implementation of such
functions. Among these regulatory functions are:
1. Regulation of the real estate trade and business:
7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made
by the owner or developer;
11. Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices;
claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers,
dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific performance.
Clearly, TransAmerican’s act of mortgaging the condominium
project to Home Bankers, without the knowledge and consent of private
respondents as buyers of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA
(now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957, was not only an unsound real
estate business practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer. Private
respondents, who has a cause of action for annulment of the mortgage, the
mortgage foreclosure sale, and the certificate of title that was issued to the
Home Bankers. The case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NHA
(now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of
1978.
We hold that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real
estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for
specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage, of a
condominium unit, with damages.
CADIMAS VS CARRION & HUGO
Pauline Rojo
“Mere allegation of relationship between the parties, that of being
subd. Owner or developer and subd. Lot buyer does not automatically vests
jurisdiction in the HLURB.”
FACTS: Petitioner Cadimas averred that she and respondent Carrion
entered into a Contract to Sell, wherein Cadimas sold to Carrion a town
house in West Fairview Oark Subdivision, Quezon City for P300,000 to be
paid in installments. According to Cadimas, Carrion violated par. 8 of their
contract when Carrion transferred ownership of the property to Hugo under
the guise of special power of attorney, which authorized Hugo to manage and
administer the property and in behalf of Carrion.
Cadimas filed a complaint for accionreividicatoriaand damages
before the RTC against the respondents. Hugo on behalf of Carrion, filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on
the part of the RTC. Hugo argued that HLURB has jurisdiction over the
complaint because, the sole issue to be resolved was whether Cadimas, as
the owner and developer of the subdivision, on which the subject property
stood, was guilty of committing unsound real estate business practices.
ISSUE: WON HLURB has the jurisdiction over the instant case
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
RULING: NO. HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case,
hence, RTC validly heard the case. An examination of Sec.
1 of P.D. 1344, which enumerates the regulatory functions
of the HLURB, shows that its quasi-judicial function is limited to hearing only
the following cases:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker, or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman.
Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that
petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. Note
particularly paragraphs B and C of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344, the HLURB’s
jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyers. As to paragraph A, concerning "unsound real estate practices,"
the logical complainants would be buyers and customers against sellers
(subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors),
and not vice versa.
The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot
buyer. The contract to sell does not contain clauses which would indicate that
petitioner has obligations in the capacity of a subdivision lot developer, owner
or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real estate business. From the
face of the complaint and the contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller
of an interest in the subject property who is seeking redress for the alleged
violation of the terms of the contract to sell.
Not every controversy involving a subdivision or condominium unit
falls under the competence of the HLURB in the same way that the mere
allegation of relationship between the parties, that of being subdivision
owner/developerand subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically
vestjurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as
enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344.
ARRANZA VS B.F. HOMES, INC.
Pauline Rojo
“Receivership does not divest HLURB of its exclusive jurisdiction.”
FACTS: One of the subdivisions that respondent BFHI developed was the
BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision. When the Central Bank ordered the
closure of Banco Filipino, which had substantial investments in BFHI,
respondent BFHI filed with SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration
that it was in a state of suspension of payments.
Orendain was Receiver, but later on was relieved by SEC of his
duties and a new Board of Receivers of 11 members of BFHI’s Board of
Directors was appointed. The new Board revoked the authority given by
Orendain to use the open spaces; to collect community assessment funds;
deferred purchase of new pumps; recognized BFPHAI as the representative
of all homeowners; took over the management of the Clubhouse; and
deployed its own security guards in the subdivision.
Petitioners files with the HLURB a class suit, “to enforce the rights
of the purchasers of lots” in BF Homes Parañaque. Petitioners raised issues
on the following basic needs of the homeowners: rights-of-way; water; open
spaces; road and perimeter wall repairs; security; and the interlocking
corporations that allegedly made it convenient for respondent "to
compartmentalize its obligations as general developer, even if all of these are
hooked into the water, roads, drainage and sewer systems of the subdivision.
HLURB Arbiter Bunagan issued a 20-day TRO and subsequently,
an Order granting petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was issued.
10
 Administrative Law
Respondent thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It
contended that HLURB acted completely without jurisdiction in issuing Order
considering that respondent is under receivership, subject matter of the case
is exclusively within SEC jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the SEC has jurisdiction over the instant case
RULING: NO, SEC has no jurisdiction over the instant case. In the case at
bar, petitioners' complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights
as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open
spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then,
HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.
The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest
HLURB of that jurisdiction. The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve
a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights. In
this case where there appears to be no restraints imposed upon respondent
as it undergoes rehabilitation receivership, respondent continues to exist as
a corporation and hence, continues to perform its contractual and statutory
responsibilities to petitioners as homeowners. Receivership is aimed at the
preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights; it cannot be used
as an instrument for the destruction of those rights.
No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to creditors
would result as far as petitioners' complaint before the HLURB is concerned.
Again, what petitioners seek to enforce are respondent's obligations as a
subdivision developer. Such claims are basically not pecuniary in nature
although it could incidentally involve monetary considerations. All that
petitioners' claims entail is the exercise of proper subdivision management
on the part of the SEC appointed Board of Receivers towards the end that
homeowners shall enjoy the ideal community living that respondent portrayed
they would have whenthey bought real estate from it. Moreover, under
petitioner’s complaint for specific performance before the HLURB, petitioners
do not aim to enforce a pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbursement
should be viewed in the light of respondent's alleged failure to observe its
statutory and contractual obligations to provide petitioners a "decent human
settlement" and "ample opportunities for improving their quality of life." Hence
HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal with that matter.
MARINA PROPERTIES CORP. VS. CA
Vim Malicay
“There is no forum shopping where HL Carlos (contractor) sues
before HLURB to enforce Contract to Purchase & files another suit in court
to collect money re: unpaid billings from Construction Contract.”
FACTS: Petitioner Marina Properties Corporation (MARINA for short) is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate development.
Among its projects is a condominium complex project, known as the MARINA
BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT. The construction of the project
commenced sometime in 1988, with respondent H.L. Carlos Construction,
Inc. (H.L. CARLOS for brevity) as the principal contractor, particularly of
Phase III.
As an incentive to complete construction of Phase III, MARINA
allowed H.L. CARLOS to purchase a condominium unit therein known as Unit
B-121.
After paying P1,810,330.70, which was more than half of the
contract price, H.L. CARLOS demanded for the delivery of the unit, but
MARINA refused. This prompted H.L. CARLOS to file with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 61 a complaint for damages against MARINA,
docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5870.
Meanwhile, on April 20, 1990, MARINA wrote H.L. CARLOS that
it was exercising its option under their Contract to Purchase and to Sell to
take over the completion of the project due to its (H.L. CARLOS)
abandonment of the construction of the Phase III project.
In a letter dated March 15, 1991, H.L. CARLOS inquired from
MARINA about the turn-over status of the condominium unit. MARINA replied
that it was cancelling the Contract to Purchase and Sell due to H.L. CARLOS
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
abandonment of the construction of the Phase III Project
and its filing of baseless and harassment suits against
MARINA and its officers.
Forthwith, H.L. CARLOS filed the instant complaint for specific
performance with damages against MARINA with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), alleging among others, that it has substantially
complied with the terms and conditions of the Contract to Purchase and Sell,
having paid more than 50% of the contract price of the condominium unit;
and that MARINAs act of cancelling the contract was done with malice and
bad faith.
Respondents contended that this case should be suspended
because of the pending civil case between the parties, said pending case,
Civil Case No. 89- 5870 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila, was filed by the same complainant herein against the same
respondent for collection of unpaid billings.
HLRUB ruled in favor of H.L. Carlos, Marina filed a petition for
review ascribing the following errors to the office of the President:
(3) In not dismissing case on grounds of litis pendentia, forum- shopping
and
ISSUE: Whether or not H.L. Carlos is guilty of forum shopping?
RULING: NO. The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves
scant consideration.
H.L. CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued
MARINA before the HLURB to enforce their Contract To Purchase and To
Sell. Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable)
opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
might look with favor upon the party. Contrary to MARINAs assertion, H.L.
CARLOS complaint was hardly a duplication of Civil Case No. 89-5870 which
was filed to collect the sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from
their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil case was,
therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before the
HLURB. For this reason, neither could there have been splitting of a cause
of action.
SEC VS. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORP.
Vim Malicay
“A criminal charge for violation of the code is a specialized dispute
that should first be looked into by the SEC under doctrine of primary
jurisdiction and if it finds probable cause, it should refer to the DOJ for PI.
SEC investigation interrupts prescriptive period.”
FACTS: On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a
Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The SEC
averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public
disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors,
respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider
information.
Consequently, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that
IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, when it failed to make
timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC
pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into
transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to
Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondents in turn filed a petition before Court of Appeals which
promulgated a Decision in favor of IRC. It determined that there was no
implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or
any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which IRC allegedly
violated. CA likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to
initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative
11
 Administrative Law
proceedings may possibly be held against respondents without violating their
rights to due process and equal protection.
ISSUE: WON the SEC has no statutory authority to initiate and file any
suit against IRC and its directors with respect to Section 30 (INSIDER'S
DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN TRADING) and Section 36
(DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) of the
Revised Securities Act.
RULING: The SEC has authority. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act do not require the enactment of implementing rules to make
them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or
administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents without
violating their right to due process and equal protection. This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which
may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court
upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that every law
has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid
and binding for all intents and purposes. The mere absence of implementing
rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given.
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid
in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt
is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts
of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to
make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers'
providing general regulations for various and varying details of management.
To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act
of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the
implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made
to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to
act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state
of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know.
It is well established that administrative authorities have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to
effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into
effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and
regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or
deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no
impediment to its implementation.
PADUA VS. RANADA
Ogie Adlawan
FACTS: On February 27, 2001, the Citra Metro Manila Tollways
Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim
adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project – Stage 1.
Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had
devaluated from P26.1671 in 1995 to P48.00 in 2000, CITRA alleged that
there was a compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan
obligations of the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
On November 9, 2001, TRB issued Resolution
No. 2001-89, authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at
the Metro Manila Skyway, effective January 1, 2002.
Petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assailed before
the Supreme Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89.
ISSUE: WON it was correct for them to immediately assail
validity of the Resolution before the SC
RULING: We rule for the respondents. It was incorrect for them
to immediately go before the SC.
P.D. No. 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the TRB on
petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the
President within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof."
Obviously, the laws and TRB Rules of Procedure have provided
the remedies of an interested Expressways user. The initial proper recourse
is to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The need
for a prior resort to this body is with reason. The TRB, as the agency assigned
to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities, has
the necessary expertise, training & skills to judiciously decide matters of this
kind.
As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner’s
argument is that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant,
oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This is obviously a question of fact
requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in
determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within province of TRB.
FRANCISCO, JR. VS. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
Ogie Adlawan
FACTS: On March 31, 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. ("P.D.") 1112, authorizing the
establishment of toll facilities on public improvements.
In order to attract private sector involvement, P.D. 1112 allowed
"the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that
would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments." The same decree
created the Toll Regulatory Board ("TRB") and invested it under Section 3 (a)
(d) and (e) with the power to enter, for the Republic, into contracts for the
construction, maintenance and operation of tollways, grant authority to
operate a toll facility, issue therefor the necessary Toll Operation Certificate
("TOC") and fix initial toll rates, and, from time to time, adjust the same after
due notice and hearing.
The petitions consolidated by Resolution of March 20, 2007 assail
and seek to nullify certain statutory provisions, presidential actions and
implementing orders, toll operation-related contracts and issuances on the
construction, maintenance and operation of the major tollway systems in
Luzon. The petitions likewise seek to restrain and permanently prohibit the
implementation of the allegedly illegal toll fee rate hikes for the use of the
North Luzon Expressway ("NLEX"), South Luzon Expressway ("SLEX") and
the South Metro Manila Skyway ("SMMS").
The petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have the
Court declare as invalid (a) Section 3 (a) and (d) of P.D. 1112 (which accord
the TRB, on one hand, the power to enter into contracts for the construction,
and operation of toll facilities, while, on the other hand, granting it the power
to issue and promulgate toll rates) and (b) Section 8 (b) of P.D. 1894
(granting TRB adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate
movements).
As submitted, granting the TRB the power to award toll contracts
is inconsistent with its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for initial
toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so petitioners would
postulate, be impartiality in such a situation.
ISSUE: WON TRB’s Power to Enter into Contracts; Issue,
Modify and Promulgate Toll Rates; and to Rule on Petitions Relative to Toll
Rates Level and Increases are Valid.
12
 Administrative Law
RULING: The TRB’s Powers are valid. The petitioners are
indulging in gratuitous, if not unfair, conclusion as to the capacity of the TRB
to act as a fair and objective tribunal on matters of toll fee fixing.
Administrative bodies have expertise in specific matters within the
purview of their respective jurisdictions. Accordingly, the law concedes to
them the power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations ("IRR") to
carry out declared statutory policies – provided that the IRR conforms to the
terms and standards prescribed by that statute.
The Court does not perceive an irreconcilable clash in the
enumerated TRB’s statutory powers, such that the exercise of one negates
another. The ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under
the premises, be accorded cogency. Petitioners have not shown that the TRB
lacks the expertise, competence and capacity to implement its mandate of
balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative
of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their investment with reasonable
profits.
The grant to and the exercise by an administrative agency of
regulating and allowing the operation of public utilities and, at the same time,
fixing the fees that they may charge their customers is now commonplace. It
must be presumed that the Congress, in creating said agencies and clothing
them with both adjudicative powers and contract-making prerogatives, must
have carefully studied such dual authority and found the same not breaching
any constitutional principle or concept. So must it be for P.D. Nos. 1112 and
1894.
For example, the LTFRB and NTC – both spin-off agencies of the
now defunct Public Service Commission – exercise similar concurrent
powers.
The LTFRB is empowered, among others, to regulate the
operation of public utilities or "for hire" vehicles and to grant franchises or
certificates of public convenience ("CPC"); and to fix rates or fares, to
approve petitions for fare rate increases and to resolve oppositions to such
petitions.
The NTC, on the other hand, has been granted similar powers of
granting franchises, allocating areas of operations, rate-fixing and to rule on
petitions for rate increases.
The Energy Regulatory Commission ("ERC") likewise enjoys on
the one hand, the power (a) to grant, modify or revoke an authority to operate
facilities used in the generation of electricity, and on the other, (b) to
determine, fix and approve rates and tariffs of transmission, and distribution
retail wheeling charges and tariffs of franchise electric utilities and all electric
power rates including that which is charged to end-users.
To summarize, the fact that an administrative agency is exercising
its administrative or executive functions (such as the granting of franchises
or awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising its quasi-legislative
(e.g. rule-making) and/or quasi-judicial functions (e.g. rate-fixing), does not
support a finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution. m
PCGG vs. HON. PEÑA et. al.
G.R. No. 77663 April 12, 1988
Ogie Adlawan
In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission
(PCGG) is a co- equal body with regional trial courts (RTC’s) and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other.
FACTS: On March 25, 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents
and records of two export garment manufacturing firms. The PCGG
appointed an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) for the said corporations with full
authority to manage and operate the same.
On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the amount of
P400,000.00, more or less, from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of
the staff, employees and laborers of the same.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
On February 13, 1987, an action for damages
was instituted against the said bank and the OIC, among
others, before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro
Manila, presided by respondent judge.
On February 16, 1987, respondent judge issued the questioned
temporary restraining order enjoining the bank, its attorneys, agents or
persons acting in their behalf "from releasing any funds of American Inter-
fashion Corporation,” among others.
On February 20, 1987, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or
over the subject of the case, among others.
On March 5, 1987, respondent judge issued the other assailed
order denying the Commission's motion to dismiss, among others.
On March 20, 1987, the Commission filed the petition at bar
seeking to set aside the orders, dated February 16 and March 5, 1987,
rendered by respondent trial judge on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON RTC’s have jurisdiction over PCGG and properties
sequestered and placed in its custodia legisin the exercise of its
powers; and
WON said RTC’s may interfere with and restrain or set aside the
orders and actions of PCGG.
HELD: RTC’s do not have such jurisdiction over PCGG.
To eliminate all doubts, the Court upholds the primacy of
administrative jurisdiction as vested in the Commission and holds that
jurisdiction over all sequestration cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and
properties under the past discredited regime fall within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review exclusively by
this Court.
Executive Order No. 1 created the PCGG, tasked with regard to
the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, among others. In
the discharge of its vital task "to recover the tremendous wealth plundered
from the people by the past regime in the most execrable thievery perpetrated
in all history," the Commission was vested with the ample power and
authority.
"So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it
[PCGG] was granted power to conduct investigations; require submission of
evidence by subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum; administer oaths;
punish for contempt. It was given power also to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of (its creation)."
As seen from the foregoing, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial
functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the PCGG is a co-equal
body with RTC’s and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the other."
Executive Order No. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The
PCGG shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayanwhich shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."
Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts
or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the
Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by this Court.
SAÑADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108338 April 17, 2001
Ogie Adlawan
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or
in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public
convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial.
13
 Administrative Law
FACTS: On October 28, 1969, the defunct Philippine Fisheries
Commission issued in favor of petitioner Sañado an Ordinary Fishpond
Permit covering an area of fifty hectares. Petitioner on January 6, 1972
transferred his rights over twenty hectares of the original area of fifty
hectaresin favor of his uncle and brother.
On July 16, 1973, petitioner subleased his rights over the fishpond
area to private respondent Nepomuceno in a contract without approval of the
appropriate ministry head.
On September 28, 1979, the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the
conversion of the Ordinary Fishpond Permit into a 25-year fishpond loan
agreement. Pursuant thereto, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued to
petitioner.
On July 17, 1981, petitioner filed a complaint against private
respondent with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 2085.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the aforesaid case with the
RTC, an order was issued by then Minister of Agriculture and Food Salvador
H. Escudero III, on January 28, 1985 cancelling the Fishpond
Lease Agreement. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the
President but his appeal was dismissed in a decision rendered on July 31,
1989.
On June 19, 1989, the RTC ordered defendants jointly to restore
possession and control of the fishpond area in question to the plaintiff, among
others.
Private respondent appealed the RTC's decision. The CA
reversed the decision appealed from insofar as it ordered “defendants jointly
to restore possession and control of the fishpond area in question to the
plaintiff” for being already moot and academic due to the cancellation of the
Fishpond Lease Agreement as sustained by the Office of the President.
Since the subject July 31, 1989 decision was rendered a few days
after the RTC handed down its decision ordering herein petitioner to be
restored to the possession of the subject fishpond area, the petitioner posits
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining evidence
and/or other matters not duly covered or taken up in the trial and in applying
said matters in its disposition of the case.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision and
what is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case No. 2085?
HELD: The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or
in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public
convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not
purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent
upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a
decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined.
As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President
is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the
Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus
squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts
are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the
Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the
President, his powers and duties.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision is
premised on the essential function of the executive department — which is
to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is P.D. No. 704
which consolidated and revised all laws and decrees affecting fishing and
fisheries.
Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to
possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment
of facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which has
jurisdiction over the matter — the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to
interfere with actions of the executive branch on
administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of
licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of
applications therefor. Such respect is based on the time- honored doctrine of
separation of powers and on the fact that these bodiesare considered co-
equal and coordinate rank as courts. Theonly exception is when there is a
clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.
The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing
petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring or subletting the fishpond
granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the administrative
body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the
fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of
one's license. If petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the
President, he should have elevated the matter by petition for review before
the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in
the record do we find such action on petitioner's part.
Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the
fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office
of the President. The CA could not award possession to the very same party
whose license has been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer
tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of fishpond
areas, and which cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the
President. Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It
is not a vested right given by the government but a privilege with
corresponding obligations and is subject to governmental regulation.
The July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a
substantial supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances
of the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award
possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the fishpond license.
The July 31, 1989 decision is not confined to the validity of the
cancellation by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of petitioner's Fishpond
Lease Agreement for violation of the terms thereof and/or the fisheries rules.
The right to possess the subject fishpond area is necessarily included in the
decision. The cancellation or revocation of petitioner's license necessarily
eliminated his right to possess the same since the new licensee would then
be the one to enjoy this right.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS vs.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 135992 July 23, 2004
Ogie Adlawan
The power of the NTC in granting or denying a provisional
authority to operate a local exchange carrier service is a quasi-judicial
function, a sphere in which the DOTC cannot intrude upon.
FACTS: Respondent International Communication Corporation (ICC), now
known as Bayan Telecommunications Corporation or Bayantel, applied for
and was given by the NTC a Provisional Authority (PA) on March 3, 1995, to
install, operate and provide local exchange service in Quezon City, Malabon
and Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the entire Bicol region. Meanwhile,
petitioner Telecommunications Technologies Philippines, Inc. (TTPI), as an
affiliate of petitioner Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),
was granted by the NTC a PA on September 25, 1996, to install, operate and
maintain a local exchange service in the Provinces of Batanes, Cagayan
Valley, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Vizcaya, Ifugao, Quirino, the cities
of Manila and Caloocan, and the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila.
It appears, however, that before TTPI was able to fully accomplish
its rollout obligation, ICC applied for and was given a PA by the NTC on
November 10, 1997, to install, operate and maintain a local exchange
servicein Manila and Navotas, two areas which were already covered by
TTPI under its PA dated September 25, 1996.
14
 Administrative Law
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA
arguing that the NTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting a
provisional authority to respondent ICC to operate in areas already assigned
to TTPI.
On April 30, 1998, the CA dismissed the petition for review on the
ground that the NTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting
the PA to TTPI. It sustained the NTC's finding that ICC is "legally and
financially competent and its network plan technically feasible." The CA also
ruled that there was no violation of the equal protection clause because the
PA granted to ICC and TTPI were given under different situations and there
is no point of comparison between the two.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in
upholding the Order of the NTC granting a PA to Respondent to operate LEC
services in Manila and Navotas which are areas already assigned to
petitioner TTPI under a prior and subsisting PA.
HELD: No, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
Court of Appeals in sustaining the NTC's grant of provisional authority to ICC.
The power of the NTC to grant a provisional authority has long
been settled. As the regulatory agency of the national government with
jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities, it is clothed with authority
and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. In this
regard, the NTC is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on matters solely
within its competence.
In granting ICC the PA to operate a local exchange carrier service
in the Manila and Navotas areas, the NTC took into consideration ICC's
financial and technical resources and found them to be adequate. The NTC
also noted ICC's performance in complying with its rollout obligations under
the previous PA granted to it.
The Court will not interfere with these findings of the NTC, as
these are matters that are addressed to its sound discretion, being the
government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
its special and technical forte. Moreover, the exercise of administrative
discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by
the government agency concerned, and not by the courts.
The power of the NTC in granting or denying a provisional
authority to operate a local exchange carrier service is a quasi-judicial
function, a sphere in which the DOTC cannot intrude upon. If at all, the
service area scheme provided in the DOTC Department Circular is only one
of the factors, but should not in any way, tie down the NTC in its determination
of the propriety of a grant of a provisional authority to a qualified applicant for
local exchange service.
More than anything else, public service should be the primordial
objective of local exchange operators. The entry of another provider in areas
covered by TTPI should pose as a challenge for it to improve its quality of
service. Ultimately, it will be the public that will benefit.
BALANGAUAN V. CA
Mokee Codilla
FACTS: KathereneBalangauan was a Customer Service Representative of
HSBC. As a PCSR, she managed the accounts of HSBC depositors with
Premier Status. One such client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger
Dwayne York. Sometime in April 2002, he went to HSBC's Cebu Branch
totransact with Katherene respecting his Dollar and PesoAccounts.
Katherene being on vacation at the time, York was attended to by another
PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about the status of his time deposit
in the amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR representative who attended to
him, however, could not find any record of said placement in the bank's data
base.
HSBC's bank personnel discovered unauthorized/suspicious
transactions, which York denied ever making. (taas ang facts pero immaterial
man so, to shorten) - Based on the foregoing factual circumstances HSBC
filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa before the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Victor C.
Laborte, Prosecutor II of the OCP, Cebu City recommended
the dismissal of HSBC's complaint.
HSBC appealed which, the Chief State Prosecutor, Jovencito R.
Zuño, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed.
HSBC then went to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision granting
respondent HSBC's petition, thereby annulling and setting aside twin
resolutions of DOJ.
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ's failure to identify
and discuss the issues raised by the HSBC in its Petition for Review filed
therewith. And, in support thereof, HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue
that "it was not necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution
recite the facts and the law on which it was based," because courts and
quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them should state
clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision
is based.
Katherene defends the DOJ and assert that the questioned
resolution was complete in that it stated the legal basis for denying
respondent HSBC's petition for review - "that (after) an examination (of) the
petition and its attachment [it] found no reversible error that would justify a
reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and
evidence on the matter."
ISSUE: WON THE SOJ SHOULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by
them should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on
which the decision is based.
RULING: NO. It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not
a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasi- judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, thus:
“[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor
rule- making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While
the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-
court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not
the fiscal.”
Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to
conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only
to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the
similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is an organ of
governmentother than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-
judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards,
determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as
judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts
a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an Information
against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions. In this case, since the
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
finds no application.
15
 Administrative Law
Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first
resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved HSBC's motion for
reconsideration. (i take note ninga sentence kay gigamitni as argument sa
next case)
BONDOC V. TAN TIONG BIO
MokeeCodilla
FACTS: Tan Tiong Bio had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-
square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of
Fil- Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-
Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot, despite repeated
demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the
purchase price. Respondent, later learning that the lot "sold" to him was
inexistent, filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its
Corporate Secretary Atty. Bondoc.
On the basis Bondoc’s allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, Tan
Tiong filed a complaint for Perjury against Bondoc before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 2004 for
insufficiency of evidence& denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by
Resolution of July 20, 2005 signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the
Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed petition on finding that there
was no showing of any reversible error, following Sec. 12(c) of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule
on Appeal).
Tan Tiong's motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution of January 23, 2006, he filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008, set aside the
DOJ Secretary's Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent's petition for review
without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the
dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Tan Tiong Bio posits that Balangauan finds no application in the
present case (refer to ruling in case number 4) for, as the Supreme Court
stated, the DOJ "rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a
lengthier one when it resolved HSBC’s . . . motion for reconsideration."
ISSUE: WON THE SOJ SHOULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by
them should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on
which the decision is based.
RULING: Balangauan v. Court of Appeals in fact iterates that even the
action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor's order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-
judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body." Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by
the DOJ Secretary.
Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution in
resolving the therein respondent's motion for reconsideration is immaterial.
The extended resolution did not detract from settling that the DOJ is not a
quasi- judicial body.
A PI is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since the prosecutordoes
not determine guilt or innocence of accused. PI is merely inquisitorial.
Prosecutor cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the court that
ultimately passes judgment on the accused. A PI partakes of an investigative
or inquisitorial power for sole aim of obtaining information on what future
action of judicial nature may be taken.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. CA
MokeeCodilla
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
FACTS: Private Respondent Arokiaswamy William
Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a
Philippine visitor's visa. Sometime in April 1988, she
enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the
Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman,
Quezon City.
After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral
program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as
Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as
General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome.
She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation
entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines."
There were allegations of massive unauthorized plagiarism made
by Celine regarding her dissertation.
The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the
recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree and
forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University
Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the
Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.
On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent
private respondent the following letter:
xxx by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as
recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with
by the External Review Panel xx
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
ordered to restore to respondent her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology.
ISSUE: WON THE UP Board of Regents have the power to withdraw
Private respondent’s degree (I just based the issue on the PPT)
RULING: YES. UP Board is empowered to withdraw conferment of degree
founded on fraud.
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing
new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution[36] likewise provided
for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy
of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court
in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a
freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide
sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it,
it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction
of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction
was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw
the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university
does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of
Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in
question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case
began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation
ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations
conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have
been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of
higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote
again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest
governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer
degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if
the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents
is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw
what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher
16
 Administrative Law
learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has
conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than
bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who
has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic
excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of
self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its
integrity.
Private respondent argues that under §25 (a) of the said Rules
and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to one's studies (i.e., plagiarism) may
be punished only with suspension for at least one (1) year.
The cited portion, §5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates that
the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal extends only to disciplinary
actions.
In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent.
Private respondent is no longer within "the ambit of disciplinary powers of the
U.P." Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the
penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is
suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the
Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by
withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained
through fraud.
CARIÑO vs. CHR
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
Pauline Rojo
“Constitution grants CHR the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil & political rights, but it does not include
power to adjudicate. Fact-finding is not adjudication.”
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA)
and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described
as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest
rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting
classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands
had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary
of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
Respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating
in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely
unknown to them.
The Commission thereafter issued an Order enjoiningSecretary
Cariño, Superintendent and principal Lolarga to appear before the CHR to
resolve the complaint of the teachers. Through the OSG, Secretary Cariño
filed motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON CHR has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide
HELD: NO. The CHR has no such power; and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence, the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot
and should not try and resolve on the merits (which requires adjudicating
powers) the matters involved in striking teachers’ case. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a)
whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or
not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of
the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite
the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c)
what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
BIRAOGO vs THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
Pauline Rojo
“PTC has no quasi-judicial powers, which involves the power to
hear and determine questions of facts to w/c the legislative policy is to apply
and to decide in accordance with the standards set by law in administering
the same law.”
FACTS: This case involves 2 consolidated cases both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 1. The first case is, a
special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Biraogo in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer.The second case, is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Lagman, Albano Jr.,
Datumanong, and Fua, Sr. as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced, when then
Senator Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption
with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walangmahirap. To transform his
campaign slogan into reality, the President on July 30, 2010, signed E.O. No.
1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Among others, the petitioners in this case primarily assails the
constitutionality and validity of E.O. No. 1, as it illegally amended the
Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of
Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
ISSUE: WON PTC was vested with quasi-judicial powers
HELD: (please take note that the PTC has been declared as
unconstitutional as it was violative of equal protection clause)
NO. The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-
execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily
investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate
action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in
the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It
has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is
involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is
17
 Administrative Law
exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the
legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. Even respondents themselves admit that the
commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power
The PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. The recommendation to prosecute
is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-
finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much
less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a
function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its
investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a
contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before
the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PICHAY vs. OCHOA
G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012
Pauline Rojo
“IAD-ODESLA is fact-finding & recommendatory body to the
President, not having power to settle controversies & adjudicate cases”
FACTS: The then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. 12 creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to
investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its
report and recommendations to the President. E.O. 12 provides:
xxx (b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the
authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against
allpresidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or
instrumentalities xxx
President Aquino III issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for
grave misconduct against Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Velasco, Vargas,. Pena,
Sr. and Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave
misconduct is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power
which is reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception
through an express grant by the legislature, to administrative agencies. He
points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself
that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
ISSUE: WON IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body
vested with quasi-judicial powers
HELD: NO. While the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation,
the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to
the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall
"perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC. Under E.O. 12, the
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential
appointees in the governmentand to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President."The IAD- ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission:
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.
JALOSJOS JR. VS COMELEC
GR NO. 193237, OCT. 9, 2012
Marion Lara
“Comelec did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions, nor violated
petitioner’s right to due process, when it motu proprio issued Res. 9613
cancelling his COC as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition
or resolve any election case before it. It merely performed its legal duty to
cancel COC of one suffering from accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to run xxx by virtue of final judgment, even w/o a petition
under OEC or under Sec. 40 of LGC. This is an exercise of its administrative
power. Comelec is duty bound to enforce/administer laws regarding conduct
of election.”
FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan
City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running
for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under
Section78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made
a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of
candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery
and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC)
of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted
that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his
conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino
countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19
March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an
Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with
the order of probation.
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s
petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under
oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact
he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of
which he has not yet served." The COMELEC First Division found that
Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation wasfraudulently issued; thus,
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence.
Having been convicted by final judgment, Jalosjos is disqualified
to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as the
elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission
of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to oust him
from the office he now wrongfully holds.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate
misrepresentation as to his qualifications.
18
 Administrative Law
RULING: NO. COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ COC. The perpetual
special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars
the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the
final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not
only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked
to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the
judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of
the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public
office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws"
relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petitionto
cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special
disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely
exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was
elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in
its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public
office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final
judgment.
OPLE VS TORRES
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
Marion Lara
“Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies/enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.”
FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
December 12, 1996. Petitioner Ople prays for the invalidation of
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
ISSUE: WON A.O. 308 involves a subject which is appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order.
RULING: NO. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has
control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that
he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.
To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate
to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements
the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance" and
"embodies changes inadministrative structures and procedures designed to
serve the people." The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals
with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of
Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the
President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the Constitutional
Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on
Administrative Procedure.
These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus
and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the
national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by
administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal
organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the
effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private
individuals or parties outside government.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time
a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of
Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a
subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is
not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection,
and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business
with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
19
 Administrative Law
NOTE: Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject
of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because it facially violates the right to privacy.
CIPRIANO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004
Marion Lara
“Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies/enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.”
FACTS: On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate
of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK
elections held on July 15, 2002.
On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the Commissions Law
Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of
several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was
based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other
candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the
barangay where they intended to run.
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No.
5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution.
She argued that a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due course or
cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered candidate for the
same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
toSections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. Accordingto petitioner,
the report of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the COMELEC cannot,
by itself, deny due course to or cancel ones certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her certificate
of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing.
Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction
to act on the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance
because it is the Division of the Commission that has authority to decide
election-related cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad
administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC is authorized to motu proprio deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy of Cipriano
RULING: NO. The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to
govern the conduct of elections and to ensure that the electoral process is
clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall.
As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with
the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and
quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for
example, include the power to determine the number and location of polling
places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; register
political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens arms of the
Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President
the removal or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or
employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or
decision. It also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved
in the conduct of election.
Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules
and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer.
The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was
granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the
Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus
Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority, however, must be
in accordance with the conditions set by law.
The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper
proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in
due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC
has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give
or not to give due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy. The duty of
the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due
form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent
defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their
face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond
the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due
course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the
administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmentalorgans. We have earlier enumerated the scope of the
Commissions administrative functions. On the other hand, where a power
rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but
does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an
officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.
The determination whether a material representation in the
certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether a
candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of
fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right
to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be
notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity
to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not
sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of
candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove
that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that COMELEC’s
Resolutions canceling petitioner’s certificate of candidacy without proper
proceedings, are tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.
ROMEO JALOSJOS VS COMELEC
Vim Malicay
“Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies/enforcing orders as determined by proper gov’tal organs (Ople vs.
Torres, 293 SCRA 150; Cipriano vs. Comelec, 08/10/2004). It doesn’t entail
an opportunity to be heard, weighing of evidence, & decision thereon.
Quasi-judicial function applies to the action, discretion etc. of
admin officers/ bodies who are required to investigate facts xxx”
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos was convicted by final judgement of
two counts of rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. He served his
sentence and was later on issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison.
Years after, Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City but
was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration
Board due to his previous conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for
inclusion in the permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court.
Pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a CoC in the upcoming local
20
 Administrative Law
elections. MTC later on ruled for the denial of the petition on account of
petitioner’s absolute disqualification which in effect deprived him of the right
to vote in any election.
Five petitions were filed before the COMELEC first and second
divisions, intended for the purpose of cancelling Jalosjos COC. Pending
resolution, the COMELEC en BANC resolved for the denial of petitioner
Jalosjos COC due to the latter’s perpetual absolute disqualification as well
as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. Thus this
petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when
it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated
petitioner’s right to due process.
RULING: Section 3 Article IX-c of the Philippine Constitution requiring a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is
confinedonly to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the
COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions.
The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial
functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction
over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its
divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer
election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his
perpetual absolutedisqualification, the fact of which had already been
established by his finalconviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc
wasexercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a
motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
OMBUDSMAN VS VALERA
Vim Malicay
“Appellate court finds merit or compelling reason for non-
compliance with the rule”
FACTS: Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.
The office of Ombudsman received a Sworn complaint filed by the Director
of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) and Atty.
Adolfo Casareño against respondent Valera for entering into a compromise
agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504
to the prejudice of the government.
Petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio the Issued a
Preventive suspension order against Atty. Valera, Villa-Ignacio likewise
denied Valera’s motion for reconsideration.
Even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon,
however, respondent Valera already filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify the Order of
preventive suspension issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio.
The appellate court then rendered the assailed Decision setting
aside the Order of preventive suspension and directing petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to desist from taking any further action. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: WON there was Forum Shopping in this case. YES
RULING: Respondent Valera’s alleged non-compliance with the rule on
non- forum shopping when he filed the petition for certiorari with the appellate
court, the appellate court correctly overlooked this procedural lapse. In this
case, it was ruled that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no
authority to issue a preventive suspension order. Hence, the appellate court’s
decision in relaxing the rule requiring the certification on non-forum shopping
is justified.
BUNDALIAN VS MONTEMAYOR
Vim Malicay
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
“OMB decision dismissing criminal case vs.
DPWH RD Montemayor does not operate as res judicata in
PAGC admin case vs. him for ill-gotten wealth”
FACTS: On July 15, 1995, private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN
addressed to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco an
unverified letter- complaint, accusing petitioner Edillo Montemayor, then OIC-
Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained
wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were
indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San Francisco, California,
to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) for
investigation. Petitioner pointed out that the charge against him was the
subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman which was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence.
The PCAGC after conducting its own investigation found that the
complaint has basis and the Office of the President in turn concurred with the
PCAGC finding and ordered petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture
of all government benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and
academic. NO.
RULING: The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata
in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his
possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal
Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential
appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative
power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation
of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.
Hence, the petitioner’s dismissal was just proper after it was
established that he acquired properties whose value is disproportionate to
his income in the government service.
HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND
HENRY LOPEZ CHUA VS EMILY HOMES SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION ET AL
GR No. 139360; 23 Sep 2003
Ogie Adlawan
FACTS: Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association
(EHSHA) and the 150 individual members thereof filed a civil action for
breach of contract, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Davao del
Sur against petitionersHLC Construction and Development Corporation and
Henry Lopez Chua, the developers of low-cost housing units like Emily
Homes Subdivision.
Respondents alleged that petitioners used substandard materials
in the construction of their houses and that petitioners allegedly did not
adhere to the house plan specifications. Respondents asked petitioners to
repair their defective housing units but petitioners failed to do
so. Respondents had to repair their defective housing units using their own
funds. Hence, they prayed for actual and moral damages arising from
petitioners breach of the contract plus exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
citing, among others, the defective certification on non-forum shopping which
was signed only by the president of EHSHA and not by all its members; such
defect allegedly warranted the dismissal of the complaint.
The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground
that respondents’ certificate of non-forum shopping substantially complied
with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, among others. It
also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
21
 Administrative Law
ISSUE: WON the RTCwas correct in holding that respondents
had substantially complied with the rules on forum shopping despite the fact
that only one of the 150 respondents had signed the certificate therefor.
HELD: We cannot sustain petitioners’ contention that
respondents’ certificate of non-forum shopping was defective, thus allegedly
warranting the outright dismissal thereof by the trial court.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them
is insufficient.However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum
shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as
to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The strict compliance
with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does
not thereby prohibit substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances.
Respondents (who were plaintiffs in the trial court) filed the
complaint against petitioners as a group, represented by their homeowners
association president who was likewise one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Samaon M.
Buat. Respondents raised one cause of action which was the breach of
contractual obligations and payment of damages. They shared a common
interest in the subject matter of the case, being the aggrieved residents of
the poorly constructed and developed Emily Homes Subdivision. Due to the
collective nature of the case, there was no doubt that Mr. Samaon M. Buat
could validly sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of all his co-
plaintiffs.
In cases therefore where it is highly impractical to require all the
plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping, it is sufficient, in order
not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of plaintiffs, acting as representative,
to sign the certificate provided that, the plaintiffs share a common interest in
the subject matter of the case or filed the case as a collective, raising only
one common cause of action or defense.
CABARRUS, JR. VS. BERNAS
279 SCRA 388; A.C. No. 4634; September 24, 1997
FACTS: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas
for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas is the counsel of respondent Ramon B.
Pascual, Jr. in a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages filed
before the RTC in NCR. Appended thereto was a verification and certification
of non-forum shopping duly subscribed under oath before a notary public in
Makati City.
Complainant alleged in his complaint-affidavit, among others,
thatthe act of respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas in instigating
a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery, violates the circulars of the
Supreme Court onforum shopping.
ISSUE: The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty.
Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and
Administrative Circular No. 04 - 94 on forum shopping.
HELD: After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative
complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed.
Actions; Forum Shopping; Attorneys; National Bureau of
Investigation; There is no forum shopping where a counsel merely requests
the assistance of the NBI to investigate the alleged fraud and forgery
committed against his client; The filing of a civil case for reconveyance and
damages before the courts does not preclude the institution of a criminal
action.—There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resorts
to forum shopping because “by filing another petition
involving the same essential facts and circumstances, x xx,
respondents approached two different fora in order to increase their chances
of obtaining a favorable decision or action. In this case, there is no forum
shopping to speak of. Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely
requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the alleged fraud and
forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus. The filing of a civil case for
reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allows
the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating
the circulars on forum shopping.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; National Bureau of
Investigation; The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and
informational in nature—the NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and
is incapable of granting any relief to a party, an investigative agency whose
findings are merely recommendatory.—Explicitly, the functions of the
National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational
in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of
granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is
an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It
undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public
welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the
investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought
in order to prosecute those persons responsible for defrauding his client.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The courts, tribunals and agencies
referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or
quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear anddetermine
controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or
judgments—the NBI is not among those forums contemplated by the Circular
that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief,
declaratory or otherwise.—The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to
under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial
powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between
adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put
it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the
Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief,
declaratory or otherwise.
VELASQUEZ vs HERNANDEZ[G.R. No. 150732. August 31, 2004]
CSC vs HERNANDEZ[G.R. No. 151095. August 31, 2004]
“Rule on forum shopping does not apply to agency not exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”
FACTS: the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS-CAR,
(Cordillera Administrative Region) sent a letter to Velasquez informing him
of the alleged infractions committed by Hernandez such as soliciting,
acceptingetcin exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers.
Velasquez then convened a fact-finding committee. The committee issued
an Investigation Report recommending the filing of administrative and
criminal complaints against Hernandez and a formal charge for Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
Abuse of Authority, and Violation of Section 22 (k) Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and other related laws was filed against
Hernandez. (admin case)
Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra issued
a Resolution in I.S. No. 97-003 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Helen
Hernandez, et.al. This Resolution, which arose from the sworn complaints
filed by the complaining teachers, indicted Hernandez for violation of Section
3(b), Republic Act No. 3019. (criminal case)However, upon motion filed by
Hernandez, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, reconsidered and set
aside its Review Action, and ordered the withdrawal of Informations for direct
bribery filed against Hernandez.
22
 Administrative Law
After due proceedings, the CSC issued a Resolution, finding
respondent guilty of the charges against her and ordering her dismissal from
the service.
The Court of Appeals reversed the resolutions of the CSC. It
opined that when petitioners filed a formal charge against respondent, it was
incumbent upon them to inform the Civil Service Commission that another
case was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
considering that the facts and circumstances from which both complaints
stem are the same. Citing Section 13 (1) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
and Section 19 and 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, the appellate court added
that the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman have concurrent original
jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against any government
employee. Thus, it ruled that the effects of res judicata or litis pendentia may
not be avoided by varying the designation of the parties, changing the form
of the action, or adopting a different mode of presenting ones case.
ISSUE: WON the rule on forum shopping applies in this case.
RULING: NO. Forum shopping consists of filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It may also
consist in a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum
other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari.
In not a few cases, the SC has laid down the yardstick to
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping as where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. There must be between the two
cases (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) that the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration.
It is significant to note that the action filed before the CSC-CAR is
administrative in nature, dealing as it does with the proper administrative
liability, if any, which may have been incurred by respondent for the
commission of the acts complained of. In stark contrast, the case filed before
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which incidentally was not
initiated by herein petitioners but by the complainant teachers, deals with the
criminal accountability of the respondent for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Unmistakably, the rule on forum shopping would find
no proper application since the two cases although based on the same
essential facts and circumstances do not raise identical causes of action and
issues. It would, therefore, be absurd to require the certification of forum
shopping to be attached to the formal charge filed before the CSC, for the
evil sought to be curbed by the proscription against forum shopping is simply
not extant in the instant case.
UST vs SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010
“No forum shopping since CHED is without quasi-judicial power
and cannot make any disposition of the case.”
FACTS: A complaint for damages (raffled at Branch 5 of the RTC of
Dinalupihan, Bataan) was filed by Sanchez against UST for their alleged
unjustified refusal to release his Transcript of Records. He alleged that he is
a student enrolled in UST and a graduate therefrom with a Bachelors Degree
of Science in Nursing. Instead of filing an answer, UST filed a Motion to
Dismiss alleging that Sanchez is not a registered student for he failed to enroll
for the second semester of SY 2000-2001. Also UST filed a Supplement to
their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Sanchez sought administrative recourse
before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-
complaint. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction
to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the
instant case was premature. UST raises that Sanchez violated the rule on
forum shopping since the latter sought recourse with both the CHED and the
RTC.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
ISSUE: WON Sanchez violated the rule on forum
shopping.
RULING: NO
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in
oneforum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Here, there can be no forum
shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial power, and
cannot make any disposition of the case whether favorable or otherwise. As
held in Cabarrus, Jr. v. Bernas. (NBI is given as an example) “The courts,
tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular
No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial
powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or
judgments. As succinctly put by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums
contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or
even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.”
OMBUDSMAN V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010
FACTS: On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman received a complaintfor
abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect
of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.
On 1 September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan,
Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar
complaint against Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
In its 8 September 2003 notice, the municipal vice-mayor required
Rodriguez to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2003, the Ombudsman required
Rodriguez to file his answer.Rodriguez alleged that the sangguniang bayan
had already acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September
2003.
On 29 October 2003, complainants filed a motion to withdraw the
complaint lodged in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted
to prioritize the complaint filed in the Ombudsman.
On 4 November 2003 the municipal vice-mayor dismissed the
case filed in the sangguniang bayan.
In its 29 January 2004 order, the Ombudsman directed both
parties to file their respective verified position papers.
Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to
exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had
not received any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint filed in the
sangguniang bayan.
In reply, complainants maintained there was no more complaint
pending in the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion
to withdraw the complaint.
The Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and
oppression
The Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision
of the Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the
hearing on the administrative case. The appellate court reasoned that the
sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the person of
Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman.
23
 Administrative Law
The appellate court noted that the sangguniang bayan served on
Rodriguez a notice, requiring the latter to file an answer, on 8 September
2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or on 10 September 2003.
The Ombudsman contends that upon the filing of a complaint
before a body vested with jurisdiction, that body has taken cognizance of the
complaint. Ombudsman points out it had taken cognizance of the complaint
against Rodriguez before a similar complaint was filed in the sangguniang
bayan against the same respondent. Ombudsman maintains summons or
notices do not operate to vest in the disciplining body jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent in an administrative case. Ombudsman concludes
that consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the Ombudsman's
exercise of jurisdiction should be to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
Rodriguez counters that when a competent body has acquired
jurisdiction over a complaint and the person of the respondent, other bodies
are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over the same complaint. He cites
Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic ActNo.
7160, which provides that an elective official may be removed from office by
order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Rodriguez insists the sangguniang
bayan first acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and his person. He argues
jurisdiction over the person of a respondent in an administrative complaint is
acquired by the service of summons or other compulsory processes.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when
they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical
complaints against Rodriguez. NO.
(2) Whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first
acquired jurisdiction.OMBUDSMAN.
RULING:
(1) The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v.
Ombudsman. The Court held therein that the rule against forum
shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the
Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against
private respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping
because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.
(2) In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or
more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman,
and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang
bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the
Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could
no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent
complaint filed by the same complainants.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999
FACTS: Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial
banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly
income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits,
and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00.
The taxes due were settled by applying PBCom’s tax credit
memos and accordingly, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Tax
Debit Memo Nos. 0746-85 and 0747-85 for P3,401,701.00 and P1,
615,253.00, respectively.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses
so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for the
year-ended December 31, 1985, it declared a net loss of
P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability. For the succeeding
year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss
of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.
But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from
leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding
creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986.
On August 7, 1987, PBCom requested the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00
representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of
1985.
Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, PBCom filed a claim for refund of
creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for
P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.
Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, PBCom instituted a Petition for Review on November 18,
1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled:
“Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”
On May 20, 1993, the CTA rendered a decision which denied the
request of PBCom for a tax refund or credit in the sum amount of
P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided for by law.
PBCom argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not
yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states
that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive
period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits
for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
On June 22, 1993, PBCom filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the CTA’s decision but the same was denied due course for lack of merit.
Thereafter, PBCom filed a petition for review of said decision and
resolution of the CTA with the Court of Appeals. However on September 22,
1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the CTA’s resolution dated July
20, 1993. Hence this petition now before us.
ISSUE: WON RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two
years to ten years, is valid.
RULING: NO. Rev. Memo Circular 7-85 (change of prescriptive period on
claims of excess quarterly income tax payments) inconsistent with the NIRC;
no vested rights arising from wrong construction of law.
After a careful study of the records and applicable jurisprudence
on the matter, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the
relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not warranted as it
disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by law.
Basic is the principle that “taxes are the lifeblood of the nation.”
The primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to finance the needs
of the citizenry and to advance the common weal. Due process of law under
the Constitution does not require judicial proceedings in tax cases. This must
necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly
relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost
importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of taxes levied
should be summary and interfered with as little as possible.
From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should
be exercised within the time fixed by law because the BIR being an
administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its functions should not be
unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters.
24
 Administrative Law
Section 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of
1977 (now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997) provides for the prescriptive period for
filing a court proceeding for the recovery of tax erroneously or illegally
collected.
The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or
credit with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after
payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. The two-year
prescriptive period provided, should be computed from the time of filing the
Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year.
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC
7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of
excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear
inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the
BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to
the statute passed by Congress.
It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are
considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less
general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is
to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such
interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be
erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that
override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they
seek to apply and implement.
In the case of People vs. Lim, it was held that rules and regulations
issued by administrative officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the latter.
Article 8 of the Civil Coderecognizes judicial decisions, applying
or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of the country. But
administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of recognition. A
memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer
with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak
of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials
and such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to
correct or overrule the same.
OPLE VS TORRES
G.R. NO. 127685 JULY 23, 1998
AO 308 providing for adoption of a national computerized
identification reference system is unconstitutional. Its establishment requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the primacy of
national security etc. It deals w/a subject that should be covered by law.
FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
December 12, 1996. Petitioner Ople prays for the invalidation of
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
ISSUE: WON A.O. 308 is involves a subject which is appropriate to be
covered by a law.
RULING: YES. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time
a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of
Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of
thought.Assaidadministrativeorderredefinestheparametersofsomebasic
rightsofourcitizenry vis-à-vis
theStateaswellasthelinethatseparatestheadministrativepowerofthePresidentt
omakerulesandthelegislativepower of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with a subject that should be covered bylaw.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that
A.O. No. 308 is
notalawbecauseitconfersnoright,imposesnoduty,affordsnoprotection,and
createsnooffice.UnderA.O.No.308,acitizencannottransactbusinesswith
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplatedidentificationcard.Nocitizenwillrefusetogetthisidentification
cardfornoonecanavoiddealingwithgovernment.Itisthusclearasdaylight that
without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying
his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no
right and imposes no duty cannotstand.
NOTE: refer to page 21 Ople vs Torres ruling on the scope of
Administrative Order vis-à-vis Legislative Acts
DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350 December 3, 2002
“LBC of DBM setting a maximum limit to additional allowances to
be given by LGU to national government officials is invalid bec. it goes
beyond the law. Sec. 458 of LGC allows the grant “when the finances of the
LGU allow.” It doesn’t authorize setting a definite maximum limit to additional
allowances.”
FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started
receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly
appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said
city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
provided that: xxx xxx xxx
2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government
units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances
and other benefits to national government officials and employees assigned
in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates
not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in
municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions:
a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;
b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the
implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the
budget;
c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325
of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and
d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160. (italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity
without need of publication:
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges
Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC
Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan,
in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the
additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced
to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they
received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a
protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the
protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA
Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion
to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied.
ISSUE: WON the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate
of allowances to the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed by the DBM
under Local Budget Circular No. 55.
RULING: YES. The City Ordinance of Mandaue shall prevail. The SC
declared LBC 55 to be null and void.Although our Constitution guarantees
25
 Administrative Law
autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by
the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between
control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down
the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are
not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by
their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand,
supervision does not cover such authority.Supervising officials merely see to
it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to
such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over
local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter
egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter
egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local
affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be
given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the
law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government
allow. The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit
to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor
the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city
government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city
government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and
expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional allowances of more
than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can
afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is
an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par.
(a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160.
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniangpanlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city
as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective city government, and in this connection,
shall:xxx xxx xxx
(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for
additional allowances and other benefits to judges,
prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and
other national government officials stationed in or assigned to
the city; (italics supplied)
The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local
government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory
nature of the circular had no legal basis.
IN RE EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF COURT & SHERIFF’S FEES
OF DULY REGISTERED COOPERATIVES
668 SCRA 1
“The rules promulgated by the SC for payment of legal fees cannot
be modified by a law granting exemption from legal fees.”
FACTS: In a Petition, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI),
through counsel, requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and
implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and
sheriffs fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption
provided for under Sec. 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520, which
states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriffs
fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with
all actions brought under this Code, or where such actions is brought
by the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of the cooperative.
It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of
Republic Act No. 6938, An Act to Ordain a Cooperative Code of the
Philippines, and was made basis for the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 03-4-
01-0, as well as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 44-
2007.
It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws
and issuances, PHCCI had been continuously assessed and required to pay
legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.
Issue: Whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and
sheriffs fees.
Ruling: No.The fees referred to are those provided for under Rule 141
(Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court.
The exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2,
paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938; Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act
No. 9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do not cover the amount
required to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or
other court-authorized person in the service of summons, subpoena and
other court processes issued relative to the trial of the case, which are neither
considered as court and sheriffs fees nor are amounts payable to the
Philippine Government.
In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the
cooperatives from court fees but not from sheriffs fees/expenses.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
LUPANGCO VS. CA
160 SCRA 848
“PRC resolution prohibiting attendance in accountancy review
classes is not valid. It violates examinees’ right to liberty & the academic
freedom of schools.”
26
 Administrative Law
FACTS: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its
"Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to
take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the
following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference
or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like
or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately
preceding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the
sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission.
ISSUE: Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from
attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three
(3) days before the date of the examination?
RULING: No. We rule in favor of the petitioner.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of
their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make
use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be
allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote
their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme
Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from
physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where
one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the
equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his
happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable
to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates
the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot
interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required
before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or
methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or
riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our
pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology,regarding academic freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or college itself is
possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly
manner or in a grudging fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving
them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three
precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they
have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting
the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there.
If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so
be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be
observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then
licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of
the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to
avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations
should not be curtailed.
ANNIE SAND, LYDIA VALDES, LUZ SABAS, JOSEFINA A. MENDOZA
and ROSARIO A. ORDIZ, vs.ABAD SANTOS EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTION, SCHOOL OF NURSING and HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS
ANGELES
G.R. No. L-30918 July 18, 1974
“Board of Examiners for Nursing regulation for period inspection is valid”
FACTS: An action for declaratory relief was filed by respondent Abad
Santos School of Nursing against petitioners chairman and members of the
Board of Examiners for Nurses seeking a declaration that "Article VIII, Rule
69, section 5 of the rules and regulations of petitioner board adopted on July
27, 1967 is void, illegal and ineffective and without force of law and that
respondent school is not required to comply with the terms and provisions
thereof. The respondent, alleged that, while petitioner board has the full
authority under section 9, Republic Act No. 877, as amended to promulgate
said rules and regulations, particularly the cited regulation providing for
periodic inspection of nursing schools and bars graduates of such schools
that do not comply "with the minimum requirements and standards" from
admission to the nurses' examination or registration as a registered nurse,
the board "may apply only the same to new schools or colleges established
or opened after the promulgation of said rules and regulations" and
"conversely" may not be given "retroactive effect" and "cannot be enforced
on schools and colleges already duly accredited by the Bureau of Private
Schools" prior to the promulgation by the board of the 1967 rules and
regulations.
ISSUE: WON the regulation for period inspection is valid
RULING: YES.
Respondent school's challenge against the authority of petitioner
board to promulgate the disputed regulation for periodic inspection by the
board and for non-admission to the nurses' examination conducted by the
board of graduates of sub-standard nursing Schools is manifestly
untenable.The Philippine Nursing Act, Republic Act No. 877 as amended by
Republic Act No. 4704 expressly empowers in section 9 thereof the petitioner
board "subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines [to]
promulgate such rules and regularly as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act."Also, Section 3 of the cited Act specifically empowers
petitioner board to inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it with
authority "to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue certificates of registration for
practice of nursing. The Board shall study the conditions affecting nursing
education and the practice of the nursing profession in the Philippines, and
shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Act with a view to
the maintenance of an efficient ethical, technical, moral and professional
standard in the practice of nursing. Xx xxxx
Furthermore, there exists no justification in law and in fact,
therefore, for respondent court's judgment declaring the cited regulation for
periodic inspection "void, illegal and of no effect" against respondent school
and its graduates. Respondent court's view that petitioner board's power of
periodic inspection would apply only to new nursing schools opened after the
promulgation of the rule and not to existing schools already accredited by the
Bureau of Private Schools would lead to the absurd result whereby petitioner
board would be utterly helpless with reference to existing schools and
powerless to require them to maintain the minimum standards under pain of
disqualifying their deficient graduates from the nurses' examination. The
above mentioned or cited rule is the same provision found in Rule 70, section
5, Article VIII of the original rules and regulations promulgated on June 1,
1954 (13 years earlier) by the same board and which was never challenged
by respondent school nor has it been the object of any complaint from any of
the other nursing schools.
It is reasonable, that those students who have commenced
schooling or their studies of nursing under the old curriculum which has been
approved by the Bureau of Private Schools, and which petitioner has been
following up to the present time be allowed to graduate and to take the
27
 Administrative Law
examinations. If the law were otherwise upon this point, it would be
impossible for the Board of Medical Examiners to give effect to the knowledge
which they from time to time acquire as to the standing of medical schools;
and an intending physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes
upon himself the risk of changes that may be made in the standing of the
institution by the board," nothing exists in the record to remotely indicate that
petitioner board was poised in the discharge of its periodic inspection in 1967
to impose new requirements and changes in the curriculum that would be
enforced upon the current graduates and prevent them from taking the
examination that year. In this regard, the presumption is that petitioner board
would discharge its task justly and reasonably in accordance with established
norms. Where it would impose new substantive requirements in the curricula
or the facilities to upgrade the standards beyond the minimum requirements,
such requirements would be prospectively. But where the board finds in the
course of its periodic inspection that a nursing school does not meet
the standing minimum requirements and standards then it is the board's duty,
as provided in the rule, to require the deficient school to make the required
improvements as would enable it to meet the minimum standards which must
be carried out within one year and meanwhile to bar the would-be graduates
of such deficient school from the nurses' examination until its deficiency and
that of its would-be graduates shall have been removed.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
CHREA vs. CHR
444 SCRA 300
Vim Malicay
While members of the CFAG are authorized to formulate & implement
organizational structure of their respective offices & determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute & must be
exercised w/in the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification&Compensation System under RA 6758 administered by the
DBM. Thus, CHR cannot lawfully implement an upgrading & reclassification
of positions w/o DBM imprimatur. The upgrading/creation of FMO and PAO
in CHR was not authorized by any law. The 1998 GA Act did not give
authority
Facts: Congress passed RA No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It proved for Special Provisions Applicable to all
constitutional officer enjoying fiscal autonomy. As such, Constitutional
Commissions were authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries,
allowances, and other benefits of their personnel and make adjustments in
their personal services itemization. CHR is a member of the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy (CFAG). The CHR adopted a reclassification scheme
among selected positions wherein the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions
in the body to provide additional source of funding for staffing.
Then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request as it effectively
involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.
CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with
appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of
reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-
Central Office denied CHREA’s request. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. NO.
2. Whether or not it can validly implement an upgrading
reclassification creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
Commission without the prior approval of the Department of
Budget and Management.
Ruling: No.
The present petition is imbued with merit.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is, flawed considering that the coverage thereof
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
While members of the CFAG are authorized to formulate and implement
organizational structure of their respective offices & determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System under RA 6758 administered by the DBM. Thus, CHR
cannot lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of positions
without DBM imprimatur. The upgrading or creation of FMO and PAO in CHR
was not authorized by any law.
DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. It is within the turf of the DBM
Secretary to disallow the upgrading , reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such schema
lack legal justification.
CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to
the species of constitutional commission. But, Article IX of the Constitution
states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions
with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy CHR is not among the class of
Constitutional Commission.
28
 Administrative Law
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to
allocate and utilize funds, granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch it needs may require from time to time.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal
autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
All told, the CHR although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless
not included in the genus of officers accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.
CHREA vs. CHR
496 SCRA 227
Vim Malicay
CHR has a certain degree of fiscal autonomy thru the privilege of having its
approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly, but
not fiscal autonomy in its extensive sense like using their appropriations to
effect changes in their organizational structure & their savings for certain
official purposes
Facts: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to
All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting
an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant
positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing
modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the
request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA)
in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution
and reversedthe recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement
of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling,
and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action
is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
Issue: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the
prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
Ruling: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is
REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
5. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and For Other
Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is
the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously
held by the CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf
of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of;
and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of
the state.
5. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is
encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the
recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation,
allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and
employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM
are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system
of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants
it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and
exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is,
nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution
affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be
interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of
Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the
DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of
Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s
compensation system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for
under R.A. No. 6758.” )
5. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks,
the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under
the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and
Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national
resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems
essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and
efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the
upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the
CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or
approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three
letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped
from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the
DBM is a superfluity
5. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-
Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as
such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
29
 Administrative Law
Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the
CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But the
Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the
COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of
similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically
and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution,
an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and
independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an
independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly
clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As
expressed in the oft-repeated maxim
30xclusion30uniusest30xclusionalterius, the express mention of one person,
thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
expressiumfacitcessaretacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to
allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to
time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it
is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522,
while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR
as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to
include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy
by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share
the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all
government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with
the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of
the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute
and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
4. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however,
is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances
and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.”
CSC vs DBM
Vim Malicay
Funds for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy should be automatically &
regularly released, and not conditioned on the “no report, no release” DBM
policy. The withholding of P5.8M (of P285.6M) for FY 2002 by the DBM,
allegedly due to revenue shortfall, is unconstitutional. Even granting there is
revenue shortfall, these agencies should be given priority. The exception is
where “total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to
cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy.”
Facts: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002
(GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC
complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an
unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the
ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition
for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its
budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this
Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
Issue: Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is
constitutional
Ruling: DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue
shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be
enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article
IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner;
without thought or conscious intention. Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes
something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are
not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them
from the national coffers.
By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual
appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with
fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the
Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a
―no report, no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also been
granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
30
 Administrative Law
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only
to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one,
and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding
or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent,
place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing
to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
RE: CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP OF THE PHILIPPINE
JUDICIAL ACADEMY
A.M. NO. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA: January 31, 2006
Pauline Rojo
The authority of the DBM to review the plantilla and compensation of court
personnel extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may
perceive as erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules on position
classification.
FACTS:
The Court promulgated a resolution on February 24, 2004, clarifying and
strengthening the organizational structure and administrative set-up of the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). Pursuant to said resolution, the
positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff
Officer with SG 25 and 23, respectively, were created. However, in its Notice
of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA), the DBM
downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades, as follows:
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer – SG 25 to SG 24; and Supervising Judicial
Staff Officer – SG 23 to SG 22.
PHILJA Chancellor, Justice Melencio-Herrera alleged that, to allow the DBM
to disregard such resolution would undermine the independence of the
Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme Court's exercise of its fiscal autonomy
expressly granted by the Constitution. Then, Atty. Di, Office of the Chief
Attorney, recommended that the DBM be directed to implement the Court's
Resolutions of February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005 (refers to the downgrading
of the SGs).
ISSUE:
WON the DBM may be allowed to downgrade the SGs of the officers under
the Judiciary
RULING:
NO. DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a proposed
reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with applicable laws and
regulations. The task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and
benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if
it complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard.
Thus, the role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to
ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to
be given to government officials and employees adhere to the policies and
guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws." As such, the authority
of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel
on matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by
the provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal
autonomy and Article VIII, Section 6 on administrative supervision over court
personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
fabric of our constitutional system is based. Clearly then, in
downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer and SC Supervising Judicial Staff
Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached
upon the Court's fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as
enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the Constitution itself.
Moreover, the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act
reiterates the constitutional provision on fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary. In
matters affecting court personnel and compensation, the Court is guided by
the Special Provision for the Judiciary under the General Appropriations Act
for FY 2003 (Republic Act No. 9206), which was deemed reenacted for FY
2004, and hence governed during the issuance of the Resolution of 24
February 2004. When the Court exercises its administrative authority over
matters affecting its personnel, it does so within parameters prescribed by
pertinent laws. It cannot be presumed that the Court will violate budgetary
laws or go beyond the ambit of its authority or issue administrative resolutions
in derogation of the law.
Thus, the authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of
court personnel extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it
may perceive as erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules on
position classification. The DBM may not overstep its authority in such a way
as to cause the amendment or modification of Court resolutions even if these
pertain to administration of compensation and position classification system.
Only after its attention to an allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent
law or rule has been called by the DBM may the Court amend or modify its
resolution, as its judgment and discretion may dictate under the law.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF
CABALLERO
G.R. No. 158090 October 4, 2010
Pauline Rojo
“Sec. 39 of R.A. No. 8291, which exempts GSIS from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt
it from the payment of legal fees. The Supreme Court has the sole authority
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts.”
FACTS:
Fernando Caballero and his wife, secured a loan from GSIS in the amount
of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note. They executed a real
estate mortgage, mortgaging their lot with a commercial building therein,
located at Mlang, Cotabato. Fernando defaulted, hence, the mortgage was
foreclosed and was sold at a public auction where the petitioner was the only
bidder. For failure of Fernando to redeem, petitioner executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership. Negotiation as to the repurchase by Fernando
of the subject property went on for several years, but no agreement was
reached between the parties.
Petitioner scheduled the subject property for public bidding. Fernando's
daughter, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00, while Carmelita
Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid in the amount
of P450,000.00. Since CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awarded the
subject property. The Board of Trustees of the GSIS issued Resolution No.
199 confirming the award, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and TCT
was issued in the name of CMTC.
Fernando filed a Complaint, alleging that the GSIS Board of Trustees
Resolution; Deed of Absolute Sale; and the said TCT be declared as null and
void ab initio. He also alleged that there were irregularities, and prayed that
he should be allowed to repurchase the property
The GSIS in its counterclaim, alleged that Fernando owed petitioner the sum
of P130, 365.81, representing back rentals, including additional interests,
31
 Administrative Law
and the additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita Ang Hao.
RTC granted petitioner's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249,800.00. The
foregoing amount was collected by Fernando from the CMTC and represents
payment which was not turned over to petitioner, which was entitled to
receive the rent from the date of the consolidation of its ownership over the
subject property. Respondent seeks modification that the portion of the
judgment ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, be
deleted.
GSIS submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from
the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action
of Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute
sale and TCT. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's
counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees
results into the dismissal of its claim. Petitioner further argues that assuming
that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and
decide the same, considering petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees
(GSIS in this case failed to pay the docket fees).
ISSUE:
WON the GSIS is exempted from the payment of legal fees
RULING
NO. In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that
the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties
of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This
was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed
this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province
of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the
claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under
Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy,
assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule
141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and
the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of
these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by
the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute
a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment
of legal fees granted by Congress to GOCCs and LGUs will necessarily
reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally
infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence.
Since the GSIS cannot be exempted from the payment of legal fees, its
petition regarding the rental fees is denied. This is because the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction to try the said case in view of petitioner’s failure to pay for
the docket fees.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE
APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES
PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
678 SCRA 1, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012
Ogie Adlawan
FACTS:
The present administrative matter stems from the two
Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August I 0, 20 I 0, submitted by Atty.
Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice.
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinionissued by the
Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the
appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the
Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by
applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No.
35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution
of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,when it
should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-
Adated August 5, 1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her
Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that
the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the
authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these
were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving
two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,the COA upheld the in-
house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG
guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal
autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among
others,contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and
utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of
what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of
the discharge of its functions.To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy
in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into
this judicial prerogative.
ISSUE:
These Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the
proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired
Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to
pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure.
HELD:
Judiciary; Judges; By way of a long standing tradition, partly
based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the
retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during
their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit.—
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward
long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically
designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established
practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized.
The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of
additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and
employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under
this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the
32
 Administrative Law
Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and
manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as
provided by law and by its own grants.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Independence; Fiscal Autonomy; The
Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices,
judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the
Court’s granted power.—Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc
determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges
and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court
personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they
determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula
provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of
its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how
these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice
and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
EVANGELISTA VS. JARENCIO
68 SCRA 99, No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
FACTS: Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO)
under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
For a realistic performance of its functions, the
President vested in the Agency all the powers of an
investigating committee under the Revised Administrative
Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, among others.
Whereupon, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of
the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City
Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandumcommandinghim "to be and appear as witness at the Office of
the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando
Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the CFI of Manila an Amended
Petition for prohibition,certiorariand/orinjunction with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining orderand assailed its legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J.
Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Manila, issued the preliminary
injunction prayed for.
Because of this, petitioners elevated the matter direct to Us
without a motion for reconsideration on the submission that the Order is a
patent nullity.
ISSUE: WON the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
HELD: The disputed subpoena issued by Quirico Evangelista to
Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to
issue.
An administrative agency may be authorized to make
investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but
also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which
future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require
the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.
It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued
in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and
whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a
complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific
charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made
pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose.The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove
a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so
justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought;
it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that
might shed some helpful light.
Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon
evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not
follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are
enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry.The
administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent
upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not.When investigative and accusatory duties are
delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to
inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.In sum, it may
be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the
inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too
indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being
conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public
officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall
within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be
33
 Administrative Law
elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be
in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
LASTIMOSA VS. VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
This case requires us to determine the extent to which the
Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and
the conditions under which he may do so.
FACTS: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor
Oliveros E. Kintanar refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as
ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining
from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor
and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the
Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime, the two were placed under
preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two
proceedings.
MAIN RULING: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
The records show that despite repeated orders of the
Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in
the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE 1: Petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable
for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than
judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman
RULING 1: There is no merit in the argument.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to “punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.”
As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary
investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi-
judicial in character.
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders
constitutes a defiance, disobedienceor resistance of a lawful process, order
or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt
under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after
appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of
the contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful
orders.
ISSUE 2: Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the
order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the
opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the
evidence against them is not strong as required by §24.
RULING 2: The contention is without merit.
Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not
being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence
of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into
account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in
cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is
given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly
left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial
Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their
preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of
that case may not be hampered. In addition, because the charges against
the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect
of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public
office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension.
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Requisites for valid administrative rules and regulations
FACTS:This is a petition for several Presidential Decrees, Letters of
Instructions, General Orders and Proclamation, Executive Orders, Letters of
Implementation and Administrative Orders to be published first in the Official
Gazette for it to be given effect pursuant to the right guaranteed under
Section 6 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide
for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to
take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.Art. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, ...
ISSUE: WON publication is necessary
RULING: YES
in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity.Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
importantlegisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a
34
 Administrative Law
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
(From PPT) Requisites:
1. Must be issued unde authority of laws;
2. Must be within the scope and purview of the law;
3. Must be reasonable; and
4. Must be published.
SEC v. PICOP
G.R. No. 164314 September 26, 2008
“The SEC violated due process when it denied the public prior to knowledge
of SEC 1990 Circular removing the filing fee ceilings provided for in SEC
1986 Circular. The 1990 SEC Circular was not yet effective during the time
PICOP filed its request in 2002 to extend its corporate existence as the
SEC filed said Circular with UP Law Center only in 2004. The OP and the
CA were correct in declaring that the applicable filing fee payable by PICOP
is P100T as computed under the 1986 Circular, instead of P12M SEC
assessment under the 1990 Circular”
FACTS:(1990 Circular [that was supposed to govern the subject matter] was
published only in 2004. Before its publication, there was an application by
PICOP in 2002.)
In 2002,respondent PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) filed with petitioner SEC
an application for amendment of its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) extending
its corporate existence for another fifty (50) years. PICOP paid the filing fee
of P210.00 based on SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 (1994
Circular).
The SEC, however, informed PICOP of the appropriate filing fee of P12
Million, or 1/5 of 1% of its authorized capital stock of P6 Billion.What followed
were several exchanges of correspondence on the applicable filing fee for
amended AOI extending the corporate term of PICOP.
The SEC held that the P12 Million assessment is based on Republic Act No.
3531. This Act provides that in case an amendment of the AOI consists of
extending the term of corporate existence, the SEC shall be entitled to collect
and receive the same fees collectible under existing law for the filing of AOI.
PICOP asked for the reduction of the filing fee from P12 Million to P210.00.
The present SEC Revised Schedule of Fees (2001 Circular) does not provide
varying filing fees for amended AOI depending on the purpose of the
amendment to be introduced. Neither did the previous Schedule of Fees
(1994 Circular) allow SEC to collect and receive the same fees for
amendment of AOI as an original filing. Under the latter Circular, the
examining and filing fee for amended AOI of both stock and non-stock
corporations is only P200.
The amount was reduced to 6 Million, which is 1% of the authorized capital
stock. PICOP sought reconsideration of the En Banc ruling. It argued that RA
3531 has been repealed by the Corporation Code of 1980 and PD 902-A.
Section 139 of the Corporation Code authorizes of the SEC to collect and
receive fees as authorized by law or by rules and regulation promulgated by
the SEC.
The SEC En Banc denied once more PICOPs request to reconsider the
earlier ruling and reverted to the 12M assessment. The SEC, among other
things, explained that contentions that its 2001 Circular was not published
are erroneous. There was in fact, due publication in the Manila Standard on
July 31, 2001. Accordingly, the 2001 Circular became effective on August 15,
2001. Thus, the public was properly apprised of the changes in fees.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid publication
RULING: NO
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
The court in one case laid the guidelines in resolving
disputes concerning the interpretation by an agency of its
own rules and regulations, to wit:
(1) Whether the delegation of power was valid;
(2) Whether the regulation was within that delegation; and
(3) Whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due
test.
It is admitted that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for promulgation
when it filed the required copies of the said regulation at the UP Law Center
only 14 years after it was supposed to have taken effect. The SEC violated
the due process clause insofar as it denied the public prior notice of the
regulations that were supposed to govern them. The SEC cannot wield the
provisions of the 1990 Circular against PICOP and expect its outright
compliance. The circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its
request to extend its corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was only
discovered in 2004, 15 days before the SEC filed its second motion for
reconsideration.
GSIS v. COA
G.R. No. 125982 January 22, 1999
“EO 79 providing for compulsory membership in GSIS of qualified reserve
AFP officers like Gen. Asuncion is effective 15 days after its publication in
OG on December 22, 1986.”
FACTS: In November 1936, CA 186 creating GSIS was enacted. Sec 4
thereof provides that membership in the system shall be compulsory upon,
among others, all officers and enlisted men of the Regular Force, Philippine
Army.
The original act has undergone various amendments that increased its
coverage.
On December 2, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquinoenacted Executive
Order No. 79, Section 1 (c) of which provides:
"Sec. 1 (c). A reserve officer who has satisfactorily rendered a total of ten
(10) years continuous active commissioned military service shall not be
reverted to inactive status, except upon his own request or for cause, up to
the time he reaches the compulsory retirement of thirty (30) years of service
or fifty six (56) years of age, whichever comes later but not later than sixty
(60) years of age."
Then General Asuncion died on November 16, 1987. His heirs filed a claim
with the GSIS for payment of death benefits due to him as a member of the
System.
On December 11, 1987, the board of trustees of the GSIS in resolution No.
566, approved the compulsory insurance coverage of reserve officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (hereafter AFP) falling under the provisions
of Executive Order No. 79.
On September 4, 1990, Melanio D. Fabia, vice-president, Legal Services
Group, GSIS, gave an opinion that compulsory coverage of reserve officers
AFP took effect on December 23, 1986, the day following E. O. 79's
publication in the Official Gazette. GSIS then paid the claim.
The auditor disallowed in audit the payment of the claim, pointing out that at
the time of his death, General Asuncion was not a member of the GSIS
despite E. O. 79.
ISSUE: WON EO 79 at the time of Gen. Asuncion’s death already took effect
RULING: YES
The President issued the executive order on December 2, 1986. It was
published in the Official Gazette on December 22, 1986.
Thus, E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette, or on January 07, 1987. At that time, the late General
Asuncion was a reserve officer who had rendered a total of ten (10) years of
continuous active duty service commission in the AFP. Hence, he was
35
 Administrative Law
compulsorily covered as a member of the GSIS on the date he died on
November 15, 1987, in line of duty in a helicopter crash. Consequently, his
heirs are entitled to payment of death benefits.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL V. COA
GR NO. 132593
DBM Circular disallowing payment to gov’t employees of allowances is of
no force & effect due to absence of publication in OG or newspaper xxx.
That it was reissued & submitted for publication in OG does not cure the
defect and retroact to the time of disallowance in audit. Publication is a
condition precedent to effectivity of a law (Phil. International Trading vs.
COA, 309 SCRA 177).
FACTS:
The PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation. On October 19,
1988, the PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program for qualified
PITC officers.Under such car plan program, an eligible officer is entitled to
purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be
shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be
shouldered by the officer. The plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility
during official trips especially within Metro Manila or the employee's principal
place of assignment, without having to rely on PITC vehicles, taxis or cars for
hire.
On July 1, 1989, RA 6758, entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and
For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized
salary rates save for certain additional compensation such as representation
and transportation allowances which were exempted from consolidation into
the standardized rate. Said section likewise provides that other additional
compensation being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated
into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
To implement RA 6758, DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular No.
10. Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 discontinued effective November 1,
1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not
otherwise enumerated under paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.
Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:
"5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of
compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not
mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5[6] above shall be discontinued
effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe
benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public
funds."
On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the above-mentioned
expenses (50% of the yearly car registration and insurance premiums and
50% of the costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car) made
after November 1, 1989 was disallowed by the resident COA auditor. The
disallowance was made on the ground that the subject car plan benefits were
not one of the fringe benefits or form of compensation allowed to be
continued after said date under the aforequoted paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC
No. 10, in relation to paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.
ISSUES:
1. WON the DBM Circular is valid. NO.
2. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and
retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were
disallowed in audit? NO.
RULING:
1. PHILSA correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the
part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by
incumbents of government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is no dispute
that the PITC officials who availed of the subject car plan
benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1,
1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them to continue enjoying said
benefits within the five year period from date of purchase of the vehicle
allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.
COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10 as basis for the disallowance of the subject
car plan benefits. DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant
to Section 23 of RA 6758 mandating the said agency to issue the necessary
guidelines to implement RA 6758 has been declared by this Court in De
Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, et al. as of no force and effect due to
the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation.
"On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the
affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tana ̃ da, publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is
required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular
the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated
differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go
through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.” (De Jesus, et al. v. COA)
It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in
its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter to
the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent
publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-
mentioned items were disallowed in audit?
2. It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-
issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per
letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the
subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that
the above- mentioned items were disallowed in audit?
The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the reason that publication is
required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public
of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and
interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the
expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular
remained in legal limbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Tañada
vs. Tuvera, "prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be
dispensed with, for the reason that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it."
PHILSA V. LABOR SECRETARY AND VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO
MIKIN AND CEDRIC LEYSON
GR No. 103444
POEA Circular not filed with the National Administrative Register cannot be
used as basis for imposition of administrative sanctions and is ineffective
and may not be enforced; a requisite under Secs. 3 & 4, Bk Vll, EO 292
(Philsa International Placement Corp. vs. Labor Secretary, 356 SCRA 174).
That it is addressed to specific group, i.e. private employment agencies,
does not exclude it from publication requirement.
FACTS:
Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers.
Private respondents are OFWs which left for Saudi Arabia on January 29,
1985.
36
 Administrative Law
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from
petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner
refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its
foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:
1.Illegal dismissal;
2. Payment of salary differentials;
3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
5. Contract substitution.
POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and
unlawful deduction.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as
POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.
ISSUES:
1. WON POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983 may be
used as grounds for finding Philsa guilty of illegal exaction. NO, it
is not valid for lack of publication.
2. WON thePOEA circular is not among those requiring publication
contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a
specific group of persons and not to the general public. NO.
RULING:
1. There is merit in the argument.
In Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties."
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared
ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment
agencies or authority holders.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative
Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
2. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the
questioned administrative circular is not among those requiring publication
contemplated by Tana ̃ da vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific
group of persons and not to the general public.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a
specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders,
does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In
the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the
administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even
smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that,
for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions areinterpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
HONASAN V. DOJ PANEL
GR No. 159747
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular 95-01 is merely internal bet. the DOJ & the OMB,
outlining the authority & responsibilities among prosecutors in conduct of PI.
Said circular does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public in
general, nor does it contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory
act. Hence, it need not be published (Honasan vs. DOJ Panel, 4/13/04).
Note: superseded by OMB-DOJ MOA dated 3/29/12
FACTS:
An affidavit-complaint for coup d’etat was filed against Honasan.The Panel
of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice sent a subpoena to
petitioner for preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, Honasan, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ’s jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since
the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office
of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take
cognizance of the case.
The arguments of Honasan are:
1. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary
investigation involving Honasan.
2. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without
authority since OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires
for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the powers granted
to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of
publication, hence null and void.
ISSUES:
1. WON DOJ Panel has Jurisdiction. YES, OMB authority is not
exclusive
2. WON DOJ Circular is Valid without publication. YES, internal
agreements need not be published
RULING:
1. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by
public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
37
 Administrative Law
offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at
any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation
of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws
but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
take over at any stage.
2. A close examination of the circular supports the view of the
respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper
reading and application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001, an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman, has to be published.
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the
case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that
before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to
date, has not yet been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or
prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the
Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between
the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and
responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the
public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner’s submission that OMB- DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.
REPUBLIC VS EXPRESS TELECOM
GR NO 147096
JANUARY 15, 2002
The 1978 NTC Rules ought to apply in the grant of provisional authority to
BayanTel despite filing of 1993 Revised Rules with UP Law Center. The 1993
NTC RR should have been published in OG or newspaper of general
circulation before it can take effect. Publication in OG or newspaper xxx is a
condition sine qua non before rule takes effect. Filing of the 1993 NTC RR w/
U.P. Law Center is not the operative act that gives the RR force & effect. The
National Admin Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules.
FACTS
On December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation
(now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of
Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a
digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA).
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
On May 6, 1993, and prior to the issuance of any
notice of hearing by the NTC with respect
to Bayantels original application, Bayantel filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. The notice of
hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was
published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the
notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings
were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could
complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order to
archive the case without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the
requisite frequency becomes available.
On June 18, 1998, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 5-6-
98 re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency spectrum for
the expansion of CMTS networks. Likewise, on March 23, 1999,
Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99 was issued by the NTC re-allocating an
additional five (5) MHz frequencies for CMTS service. On May 17,
1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators.
On February 1, 2000, the NTC granted BayanTels motion to revive the
latters application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17
and 22, 2000. Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom)
filed in NTC Case No. 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying
for the dismissal of Bayantels application.
On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor
of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service.
On Appeal, the Orders of NTC are annulled and set aside and the
Amended Application of respondent Bayantel is dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Applying 1993 Revised
Rules of Practice and Procedure, NTC cannot grant the provisional
authority motu proprio or on its own initiative.
ISSUE
WON the 1993 Revised Rules of Practice and Procedure is applicable in this
case.
RULING
NO. In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a
CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice
and Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an
application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the
Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative,
the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the
affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without
prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which
shall be called within thirty (30) days from grant of authority asked
for. (underscoring ours)
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have
applied the 1993 Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules
deleted the phrase “on its own initiative”; accordingly, a provisional authority
may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the Secretary of the
Commission, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993
Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978
Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at
the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3,
1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987
which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
38
 Administrative Law
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2,
Section 3 thereof merely states:
Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary,
shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain or
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified
rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the
Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs. In a similar case, we held:
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is
a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative
Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order,
legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil
Code, which reads:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. x x x
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National
Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of
the Administrative Order.
This Court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, December 29,
1986, 146 SCRA 446) stated, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative power
or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since
its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO
133.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Thus, publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is
a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or
regulations can take effect. This is explicit from Executive Order
No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which
states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements
Section 29 of the Public Service Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall squarely
within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the
case Tanada v. Tuvera.
Our pronouncement in Tanada vs. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely
internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take
effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall
take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that
governs.
In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or the 1993
Revised Rules should apply, the records show that the amended application
filed by Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance of a provisional
authority. Hence, it cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional
authority motu proprio. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it found
that the NTC issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its own initiative.
SEC VS GMA NETWORK
G.R. No. 164026
December 23, 2008
RA 3531 authorizes SEC to collect filing fees for amendments extending
corporate existence. SEC MC # 1 imposing a filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of AC
plus 20% thereof [or P1.2M on GMA] for amendments extending corporate
existence is not a mere interpretation or an internal rule. The MC is invalid
as it was not published in OG or newspaper, nor filed w/Office of National
Administrative Register of UPLC. It needs to be published as it implements
mandate of RA 3531 and it affects public.
FACTS
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC.,
(GMA, for brevity), a domestic corporation, filed an application for
collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and
Exchange Commission, (SEC, for brevity). The amendments
applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate
name of petitioner from Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. to
GMA Network, Inc. as well as the extension of the corporate term
for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000.
Upon such filing, GMA had been assessed by the SECs
Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the
application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of
1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount
of P1,212,200.00.
On October 20, 1995, GMA formally protested the
assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for
extension of corporate term.
39
 Administrative Law
On March 19, 1996, GMA requested for an official
opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the
assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate
Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its
ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment,
the dispositive portion of which states:
In light of the foregoing, we believe that the questioned
assessment is in accordance with law. Accordingly,
you are hereby required to comply with the required
filing fee.
An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent
SEC was subsequently taken by GMA on the ground that the
assessment of filing fees for the its application for extension of
corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital
stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.
For its part, GMA points out in its Memorandum, dated September 23,
2005, that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing
fees for amended articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of
extending the term of corporate existence. The questioned circular, on the
other hand, refers only to filing fees for articles of incorporation. Thus, GMA
argues that the former circular, being the one that specifically treats of
applications for the extension of corporate term, should apply to its case.
Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is
applicable, GMA avers that the latter did not take effect and cannot be the
basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for the reasons that it was
neither filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center nor published
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as
required under existing laws.
ISSUE
Which of the following should be the basis for computing the filing fees of
Articles of Incorporation and/or its amendment:SEC Memorandum Circular
No. 1, Series of 1986 or SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994
RULING
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 must be applied in
computing the filing fees. Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that
where the amendment consists in extending the term of corporate existence,
the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the amended
articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under existing law as the
filing of articles of incorporation. As is clearly the import of this law, the SEC
shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it assesses and collects
both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an amended
articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate
existence.
The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law and
other pertinent laws, issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of
1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock
but not less than P300.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock
corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock but not less
than P200.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations without
par value, for the filing of amended articles of incorporation where the
amendment consists of extending the term of corporate existence.
Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting the
maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, such
that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation became 1/10 of 1%
of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof but not less
than P500.00.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they
indeed pertain to different matters, as GMA points out. SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the
filing fee for the amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate
life, while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the filing
fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the former circular,
being squarely applicable and, more importantly, being more favorable to it,
should be followed.
What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear directive of
R.A. No. 3531 to impose the same fees for the filing of articles of incorporation
and the filing of amended articles of incorporation to reflect an extension of
corporate term. R.A. No. 3531 provides an unmistakable standard which
should guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its rates and fees. If such
mandate were the only consideration, the Court would have been inclined to
rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as outlined in the
questioned memorandum circular, GMAs argument notwithstanding.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned
memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it
has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code,
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, the Court, expounding on the publication
requirement, held (pls refer to Republic vs Extelcom case for excerpt)
The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed
with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the
Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987.
In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, which provided for the
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment
agencies or authority holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed
with the National Administrative Register.
The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized,
cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This
administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A.No. 3531
and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore,
be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the
law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published
nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.
A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned
issuance as interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SECs assessment
amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an
imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official
to accept a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and
proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this case,
the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to
warrant an extension of its corporate term.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been
delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due
process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the
regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-
fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a person’s
right to property.
FABELLA VS CA
G.R. No. 110379
November 28, 1997
The inclusion of teachers’ organization representative is indispensable to
ensure impartial tribunal.
FACTS
40
 Administrative Law
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-
to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in talk-outs
and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to
October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of
13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill
in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cario filed administrative cases
against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong
High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in
writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass
action in violation of civil service laws and regulations
At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitioner-appellee to be
placed under preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR Regional
Director Nilo Rosas on November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates when
petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike.
Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-
appellees counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and
demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the
committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received
no response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later, however,
counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it
stated:
The committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against
petitioners was illegally constituted, their composition and
appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act. No. 4670 hence
all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever.
The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being
arbitrary and violative of the teachers right to due process. Due
process must be observed in dismissing the teachers because it
affects not only their position but also their means of livelihood
CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.
Fabella et al. argued that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA
4670, because all the teachers who were members of the various committees
are members of either the Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or
the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation and are deemed to be the
representatives of a teacher’s organization as required by Section 9 of RA
4670.
ISSUE
WON the constitutional right to due process of the teachers was violated.
RULING
YES.Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the
other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be
heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the
absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public schoolteacher’s administrative
cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national
teacher’s organization and a supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear
the administrative charges against private respondents did not include a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization as required by Section 9 of RA
4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction.Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and
meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and
a real opportunity to be heard.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teacher’s
organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of
such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teacher’s organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating
committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of
education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS
as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized
by a teacher’s organization as its representative in said committee.
Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS Secretary nor the DECS-
NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it
to a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondary and elementary
school teachers, and consultants. But there was no representative of a
teacher’s organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the
committee because the provision for the representation of a teacher’s
organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers
facing administrative charges.
Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void,
no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is
baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be reinstatedand
awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the
period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal
MARTIN S. EMIN, PETITIONER, VS. CHAIRMAN CORAZON ALMA G.
DE LEON, COMMISSIONERS THELMA P. GAMINDE AND RAMON P.
ERENETA, JR., OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENTS.
CSC has no original jurisdiction over an admin case vs. a public school
teacher as jurisdiction is lodged with the Investigating Committee under
Sec. 9 of RA 4670. Still, the SC affirmed dismissal from service of petitioner
for dishonesty (for faking CS eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee) as he
was sufficiently afforded due process by CSC. He answered the charges &
participated in hearings. He is barred under principle of estoppel by laches
to impugn CSC jurisdiction
Facts: Appointment papers for a change of status from provisional to
permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the
Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato with
attached photocopies of certificates of eligibility of the teachers. Although the
certificates seemed authentic, the signatures were forgeries. Upon
41
 Administrative Law
verification, it was found out that said applications were disapproved and the
certificates although authentic but were never issued to anyone. Two
separate investigations were conducted (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates
were issued/released from the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said
certificates. The teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and
bring the original copies of their certificates of eligibility. The teachers gave
their own sworn statements pointing the petitioner as the person who gave
them the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their
appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was
formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
The petitioner denied the accusations and filed for motion to dismiss but was
subsequently denied. Six teachers cited in the charge sheet were presented
as witnesses for prosecution including two other holders of fake certificates
of eligibility. On June 29, 1994, Director Buenaflor submitted a report[5] to the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission where CSC found sufficient
evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner. The CSC resolution decreed
petitioner guilty of Grave Miscounduct with penalty of dismissal from service
and its accessory penalties. Petitioner filed again for Motion of
Reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals, but it was subsequently dismissed. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner was accorded due process.
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioner is the Non-Formal Education Supervisor of the DECS, in
Kidapawan, Cotabato, in-charge of the out-of-school programs, and this
position is covered by the definition of teacher as provided by R.A. 4670. The
petitioner’s contention that since he is under R.A. 4670, the Investigating
Committee should have investigated his case in conformity with the DECS
Rules of Procedure, is correct. However, at this late hour, the proceedings
conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on
procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is
now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case. The Civil
Service Commission has afforded the petitioner ample time to defend and
opportunity to be heard in view of the case filed against him and during this
time no objections were raised. Petitioner voluntarily and willfully participated
in the proceedings. As held previously, participation by parties in the
administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars them
from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered
against them. In the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time in his amended petition for review before the CA.
Petitioner’s contention that he was denied due process for he was not
allowed for cross examination was equally unmeritorious. It is well to
remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Neither is there
merit in petitioner’s assertion that he was denied the right to due process
when the CSC Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator,
prosecutor, judge and executioner. This kind of procedure is not unusual in
an administrative proceeding. It is has to be noted however, that ultimately
the Civil Service Chairman was the one who promulgated the decision.
Lastly, the petitioner contention of admitting the affidavit of Teodorico Cruz
as newly discovered evidence cannot be accepted by court. Newly
discovered evidence can only be accepted if the petitioner exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial
but had nonetheless failed to secure it. It appears that the affidavit was
merely an afterthought, a last ditch effort to clear petitioner’s name.
Hence instant petition is hereby denied and decision of CA is affirmed.
MELECIO ALCALA, PERLA ALCALA, ROQUE BORINAGA, DIOSDADA
BORINAGA, HELEN LENDIO, and MARY BABETH MAGNO, petitioners,
vs. JOVENCIO VILLAR, respondent.
School Principal Villar is barred under principle of estoppel by laches from
assailing the jurisdiction of OMB since his right to procedural due process
was properly observed. Not only did he file his CA and MR from decision
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
dismissing him for dishonesty, he also participated in
hearings conducted by OMB-VIS & was given the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses vs. him
Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High
School, Pilar, Cebu City. In February 1998, Rolando Torceno and petitioners,
Melecio Alcala, Perla Alcala, Roque Borinaga, Helen Lendio, Emma
Labaniego and Mary Babeth Mano, all teachers of Lanao National High
School, as well as AsterioVillarante and petitioner DiosdadaBorinaga,
teachers of Dapdap National High School, Pilar, Dapdap, Cebu City (herein
collectively referred to as complainants), filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty.
Complainants alleged that on August 18-22, 1997, they attended a mass
training/seminar at the Consolacion National High School, Consolacion,
Cebu. Respondent asked them to submit their respective Certificates of
Appearance for the preparation of the vouchers for the refund of their
expenses during the said training/seminar. Thereafter, they received from
respondent the amounts as refund.
Upon verification with the Department of Education Culture and Sports
(DECS) Division Office, complainants discovered that each of them were
issued checks in the amount of P312.00 as reimbursement, and that
respondent received the same by forging their signature.
Complainants further alleged that sometime in November 1997, Melecio
Alcala, DiosdadaBorinaga, Helen Lendio, and Rolando Torceno received
from respondent P1,500.00 each representing Loyalty Benefits. They
learned, however, from the DECS Division Office that they were entitled to
receive P2,000.00 each.
Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that he was in fact authorized by the
complainants to claim and encash their checks at the E and E Lending
Investors where most of them have existing loans. He contended that their
school is located in the rural area where no banks are operating, such that it
has been the practice of teachers to authorize the principal to claim, receive
and encash the checks in their behalf. He explained that complainants did
not receive the entire amount of P312.00 because they authorized the E and
E Lending Investors to deduct certain amounts from their checks as payment
for their respective loans. As for the Loyalty Benefits, respondent alleged that
complainants received the entire amount due them and that he deducted
nothing therefrom.He asserted that the real reason behind the filing of the
complaint was to force him to resign so that one of the complainants could
apply for his post.
On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from service.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent; however, the same
was denied on October 13, 1999.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without
jurisdiction over administrative complaints against public school teachers. It
ruled that the governing law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and not Republic Act No. 6770,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were accorded opportunity to be heard.
Ruling: Yes.
Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had
afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself
against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of certain
teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC
Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against him
to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its
proceedings was willful and voluntary.
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings
without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional
42
 Administrative Law
infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them. In the case at
bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his
amended petition for review before the CA. He did not raise this matter in his
Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his
Counter-Affidavit, he himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by
stating that he was open to further investigation by the CSC to bring light to
the matter and by further praying for any remedy or judgment which under
the premises are just and equitable. It is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.
In the case at bar, respondent was amply afforded due process in an
administrative proceeding, the essence of which is an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Not only did respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion
for reconsideration, he also participated in the hearings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman and was given the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. Verily, participation in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of
jurisdictional infirmities.
OMB vs ESTANDARTE
“By virtue of RA 4670, original jurisdiction belongs to the school
superintendent. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. And a subsequent openness
by the OMB to transfer the case to its office, despite the acquiescence of
the DECS RO6, will not divest the DECS of jurisdiction already acquired. It
is not lost upon instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated”
FACTS:
Peoples Graftwatch, through its Chairman, Dr. Patricio Y. Tan, referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), for immediate investigation, a
complaint of the Faculty Club and Department Heads of the Ramon Torres
National High School (hereinafter the Faculty Club) against Heidi Estandarte,
the school principal. The complaint consisted of 33 allegations of
improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial
transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. However, the complaint was not
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant, and not supported by the sworn
statements of witness. The Ombudsman (Visayas) treated the matter as a
request for assistance.
On August 31, 1998, the Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports Regional Office VI (DECS-
Region VI) and the Commission on Audit (COA) for appropriate action. The
DECS-Region VI found that the complaint did not comply with the formalities
under Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative
Code of 1987. Thus, it dismissed the complaint, without prejudice to the filing
of an appropriate one.
Undaunted, the Faculty Club filed a formal complaint sworn and subscribed
to by the complainants with DECS-Region VI. However, in a letterdated, the
said office dismissed the complaint outright for lack of verification and
certification against forum shopping.
The Ombudsman (Visayas) decided to refer the administrative aspect of the
case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941, entitled COA Region 6, Office of the
Provincial Auditor v. Heidi Estandarte) to the DECS-Region VI for
administrative adjudication pursuant to Section 23(2) of Rep. Act No. 6770.
The complete records of the case were forwarded to the DECS-Region VI in
a letter dated November 29, 1999.[15]
It appeared, however, that the DECS-Region VI did not receive this referral
because on December 7, 1999, it inquired on the status of RAS-VIS-98-1030
from the Ombudsman (Visayas).[16] On March 9, 2000, the Ombudsman
(Visayas) inquired about the progress of the case from the DECS-Region
VI,[17] and when it did not receive an answer, it sent another letter-inquiry
on September 21, 2000.[18] Finally, on November 22, 2000, the Ombudsman
(Visayas) received a letter from the DECS-Region VI informing it that the
latter did not receive any referral concerning the case.[19] Hence, the
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Ombudsman (Visayas) again forwarded the records of the
case to the DECS-Region VI, which received them
on December 26, 2000.[20]
The DECS-Region VI directed the consolidation of this case (COA Region 6,
Office of the Provincial Auditor v. Heidi Estandarte) with the case pending
before it (Faculty and Department Heads of the Ramon Torres National High
School, Bago City v. Heidi Estandarte). Thereafter, the hearing of the case
by the Special Investigating Committee resumed.
In view of the referral to DECS-Region VI, the Ombudsman (Visayas)
considered OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941 closed and terminated in its
Memorandum of November 27, 2001.
In a letter dated April 29, 2002, the Faculty Club requested the
Ombudsman (Visayas) to take over the case for speedier disposition. Ms.
Lucia Jane Grecia, a member of the Faculty Club, also wrote a letter to the
Ombudsman (Visayas) complaining that she was being oppressed by
Estandarte. She likewise requested the Ombudsman (Visayas) to take over
the case. Consequently, on July 5, 2002, the Ombudsman (Visayas)
informed the DECS-Region VI that it would not object if the case is returned
to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases against
government employees, which includes public school teachers, is vested by
no less than Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution which states
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.[54]
In a case of recent vintage, the Court held that the Ombudsman has full
administrative disciplinary authority over public officials and employees of the
government, thus:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the
manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover
the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority
to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers
and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and necessarily, impose the said penalty.[55]
However, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers,provides that:
Section 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher
shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would
at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The
committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of
Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings:
Provided, however, That, where the school superintendent is the complainant
or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Education.
43
 Administrative Law
Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first assumed jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against the respondent. It should be recalled that
when Peoples Graftwatch forwarded the complaint to the Ombudsman
(Visayas), the latter treated it as a request for assistance and referred it to
the DECS-Region VI and COA for appropriate action. After it had resolved to
upgrade the matter to an administrative case, the Ombudsman decided not
to take cognizance of the same and refer it, instead, to the DECS-Region VI
pursuant to Section 23(2) of R.A. 6770.
We do not agree with petitioners contention that it could assume jurisdiction
over the administrative case after the DECS-Region VI had voluntarily
relinquished its jurisdiction over the same in favor of the petitioner.
Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the
complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI,
jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner
upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the
DECS and petitioner.
Nonetheless, even if we hold that the Ombudsman (Visayas) had concurrent
jurisdiction over the administrative case, we would still sustain the DECS
authority to decide the administrative case.
Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by
the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to decide the
matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced proceedings over the
administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating Committee
pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
Note: The rulings of the Court in Alcala and de Leon are not applicable in this
case. From the very start, respondent consistently protested the referral of
the case back to the Ombudsman, and demanded that the same be
remanded to the DECS. She refused to participate in the proceedings before
the Ombudsman precisely because she believed that jurisdiction was already
vested on the DECS-Region VI. Hence, she filedinstead a motion to remand
the case to the DECS-Region VI and motions to postpone or suspend the
proceedings. On the other hand, what was striking in
the Emin and Alcala cases was that the respondent therein actively
participated in the proceedings before the other tribunal.
OMB vs OIC PRINCIPAL MEDRANO
G.R. No. 177580 October 17, 2008
“RA 6770 recognizes the existence of some proper disciplinary authorities. Thus,
administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB over a public school teacher is
not exclusive but concurrent with DepEd.”
FACTS:
In May 2003, Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher at Jacobo Z. Gonzales Memorial
National High School in Bian, Laguna (the school), filed a sworn letter-
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging her superior, OIC of the
school and concurrently the principal of San Pedro Relocation Center National
High School, with violation of Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (criminal case),
and grave misconduct, (administrative case).
The administrative complaint alleged that in the afternoon of March 28, 2003,
respondent made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and abused her
sexually. Respondent denied the charge, claiming that it was maliciously designed
to harass and threaten him to succumb to Ma. Ruby’s demand that she be given
a regular teaching post. While the administrative case was pending investigation,
respondent was preventively suspended for 6 months without pay.
OMB adjudged respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, he argued that under the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, an administrative complaint against a public school
teacher should be heard by an investigating committee of the DECS, DepEd,
composed of the school superintendent of the division where the teacher belongs,
a representative from a teachers organization, and a supervisor of the division. He
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
thus prayed for the dismissal of the administrative case as
petitioner has no jurisdiction over it.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint
against respondent YES
2. WON OMB should refer the case to a proper committee for appropriate
administrative proceedings YES
RULING:
In resolving the 2 issues, it is necessary to examine the source, nature and extent
of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis--vis the provisions of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers.
1. OMB’s far-reaching powers is not exclusive as the framers of the Constitution
gave Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional
powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman, as mandated in Section 13(8) of
R.A. 6770.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) providing for the
functional, structural organization, and the extent of the administrative disciplinary
authority of the petitioner. The provisions of this law apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by any officer or
employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure
in office. The acts or omissions which the petitioner may investigate are
quite extensive. OMB’s far-reaching powers is not exclusive as the framers of the
Constitution gave Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation,
additional powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman, as mandated in Section
13(8) of R.A. 6770.
2. However, when an administrative charge is initiated against a public school
teacher, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically
provides that the same shall be heard initially by
an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division,
as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers organization, and a supervisor of the division. Section 9 of RA
4670, therefore reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate
set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers.
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some
proper disciplinary authorities, such as the investigating committee of the DepEd
mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus,
Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the
petitioner may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative pr
oceedings against erring public officers or employees.
In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but
is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd. Thus, the administrative
complaint against respondent should have been referred by petitioner to the proper
committee of the DepEd for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
While petitioner should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint
against respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it
had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon,
respondent is now barred from assailing petitioners acts under the principle
of estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before
petitioner.
OMB vs DELIJERO
G.R. No. 172635 October 20, 2010
“OMB may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. It is more
prudent that the OMB referred the case to DECS (DepEd) as it is in better
position to serve the interest of justice, since respondent is a public teacher.”
FACTS:
44
 Administrative Law
A complaint against respondent was filed before petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman as a Request for Assistance (RAS) from the President of the Burauen
Watchdog Committee for Good Government. Delijero, Jr., was a public school
teacher at the Burauen Comprehensive National High School,
Burauen, Leyte and was administratively charged for Grave Misconduct. The
complainant, Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was the mother of the alleged victim Myra. At
the time of the incident, Myra was only 12 years old and a first year high school
student. Respondent, on the other hand, was Myra's 52-year-old Mathematics
teacher.
In May 2003, complainant learned from her cousin that respondent was courting
her daughter Myra. Complainant then immediately confronted Myra, who admitted
having received from respondent several handwritten love letters, a Valentine's
card and Two Hundred Pesos as allowance. Also in her affidavit, she alleged that
last April 7, 2003, at about 10:00 a.m., more or less, Delijero, who was inside his
room, called her attention, and as she got inside the said room, he abruptly closed
the open door, thereby, immediately kissed her cheek, out of fear, she pushed him
away, and rushed to the door of said room and went outside.
Respondent denied kissing Myra in the morning of April 7, 2003. Moreover,
respondent claimed that Myra fell in love with him and wrote him love
letters. Respondent claimed that he was merely forced to answer her letters as
she threatened him that she would kill herself if he would not answer her and
reciprocate her love. Lastly, respondent claimed that their relationship was merely
platonic.
OMB rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct and
meted him the penalty of dismissal. Respondent then appealed to the CA. The CA
ruled that petitioner had no jurisdiction to investigate the complaint filed before it
as, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. The CA held that
petitioner should have immediately dismissed the case after respondent had
informed it, through a manifestation, of the pendency of an administrative
complaint before the DECS.
ISSUE:
1. WON OMB has jurisdiction over the case and/or WON OMB should have
referred the case to a proper committee for an appropriate administrative
proceeding YES
2. WON there was a violation of due process NO
RULING:
1. (In resolving the 1st issue, the SC made references to the Medrano case. Please
check the ruling of the Medrano case above, as the SC held in toto with it.)
2. In Office of the Ombudsman vs. Galicia, SC ruled that the right to due process
was not violated, notwithstanding that the DECS had original jurisdiction to hear
the complaint, thus:
The records show that Galicia was given the right to due process in the
investigation of the charges against him. He participated in the
proceedings by making known his defenses in the pleadings that he
submitted. It was only when a decision adverse to him was rendered
did he question the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Under the
principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is now too late
for Galicia to assail the administrative investigation conducted and the
decision rendered against him.
In the case at bar, respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and
attached annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for
affirmative relief from the Ombudsman. The case at bar is, however, somewhat
peculiar because when petitioner asked the parties to submit their position papers,
respondent did not submit one and instead filed a Manifestation informing
petitioner of another proceeding before the DECS.
However, the case was remanded to to the CA for it to decide the case on the
merits, as the CA granted respondent's petition on the sole ground of petitioner's
alleged lack of jurisdiction which it tackled motu proprio.
OMB vs. MASING
542 SCRA 253
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
“The 1987 Constitution cannot be restricted by RA 6740.”
FACTS:
Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special
School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an
office clerk in the same school. In 1997, respondents were administratively
charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanaofor allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds.
Florita A. Masing faced another administrative case before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan. The charges were oppression,
serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or
mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.
Masing filed a motion to dismiss on both complaints on the ground that the Office
of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. Respondents alleged that
the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a
committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670,
otherwise known as the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
In both complaints, OMB found Masing guilt as charge. However, The CA reversed
and set aside the orders of the OMB in both cases, hence, this review. The SC
then consolidated the cases. One of the contentions of Masing is that, OMB has
no jurisdiction over the cases.
ISSUE:
WON the power and function of the OMB granted by the Constitution may be
restricted by the Magna Carta for Public Teachers
RULING:
NO. In the cases at bar, the rulings of the CA adversely affected the all-important
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. The rulings aggrieved the Office of
the Ombudsman for they have serious consequences on its effectiveness as the
body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees
of the government suspected of violating our laws on graft and corruption.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers
and employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions
and duties of the Ombudsman as follows:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee
of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well
as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official
or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts and transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate and report any irregularity action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary
in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant
and with due prudence.
45
 Administrative Law
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and complaints against all public officials and employees, with the
the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment
or over members of Congress and the Judiciary. If an issue
(8) Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other powers or should ever arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitution and
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670. However, repeals by implication are
not favored, and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable,
The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive. Congress enacted R.A. No. apparently conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement
6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, on November 17, in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose
1989 giving the Office such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform the a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with
task given by the Constitution administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers should be construed
as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative
The manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the investigations conducted by the DECS.
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the
constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the
powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and
recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanod bayan under the 1973
Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases
against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a
more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and
other offenses committed by public officers and employees.

The Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute

an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be
coursed through the proper officer. While Section 15 of RA 6770 states that the
Ombudsman has the power to recommend removal, suspension, demotion of
government officials and employees, the same Section also states that the
Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of RA 6770.

The Fabella Case as invoked by MAsing, however, does not apply to the cases at
bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations of civil
service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the
DECS Secretary. In contrast, herein respondents Masing and Tayactac were
administratively charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges were for violation of RA 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, collecting unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees, failure to
account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the
conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to
respondents conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and
corruption.

The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative

investigations is beyond cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and action
center against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than
Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of
R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative
complaints, viz:

Sec.19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints

relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations

conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules
of procedure and consistent with due process.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers
an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and
prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.
It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a
law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite

DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO 46

 Administrative Law
GILDA CRUZ and ZENAIDA PAITIM v CSC
G.R. No. 144464 | November 27, 2001
“Petitioners were not denied due process by the fact that the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge. CSC is mandated to hear
and decide admin cases instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on
appeal. CSC is still impartial judge so long as its decisions was based on
substantial findings.”
FACTS: The CSC received a letter from a private individual, Carmelita
Esteban, claiming that during the examinations for non-prof in the career
service, Zenaida Paitim (an employee of the Municipality of Bulacan), on
1989, falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz (Paitim’s co-worker),
took the exams. Esteban requested the CSC to investigate the matter.
The Director of the Commission was then furnished with the picture seat plan
of the room where Gilda Cruz was during said examinations not only during
1989 exams but also on 1987 and 1988 and it was declared that there was a
prima facie case against Paitim and Cruz. A fact finding investigation was
conducted and a “Formal Charge” for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service was filed against the
two.
Petitioners declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the
matter and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the
investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process
because the CSC was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at
the same time.
ISSUE: WON Paitim and Cruz were denied of due process
RULING: NO
On the basis of a tip-off that the two public employees were involved in an
anomalous act, the CSC conducted an investigation and verified that the two
employees were indeed guilty of dishonesty. Thus, in accordance with the
CSC law, the petitioners merited the penalty of dismissal.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case
instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal
including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to
it. Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with
such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of
the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and
executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it
could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was
based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies,
being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.The
records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the
CSC and found that:
After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds
respondents guilty as charged.
The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan
(PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of
Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the
said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz.
It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding
that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly
informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that
there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
CSC-NLRC v RANULFO ALBAO
G.R. No. 155784 | October 13, 2005
“ Sec. 12 refers to the authority to institute directly and motupropio admin
cases of dishonesty and falsification, intended to administer CS system and
protect its integrity by removing from list of eligible those who falsified their
qualifications.
Sec. 47 refers to the ordinary disciplinary proceedings intended to discipline
a bona fide member of the system.”
FACTS: The Office of the Vice President of the Philippines issued an original
and permanent appointment for the position of Executive Assistant IV to
Albao, who was then a contractual employee of said office. Instead of
heeding to the request of the retrieval od the said appointment, he CSC-NCR
disapproved the appointment.
Petitioner, after a fact-finding investigation, found a prima facie case against
Albao for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents committed as
follows.:
 In his Personal Data Sheet, he stated that he took and passed the
Electrical Engineer Examination with a rating of 71.64%
 The PRC has informed the Commission that the name
RanulfoAlbao does not appear I the Table of Results and
Masterlists of examinees
 That the examinee number appearing in the Report of Rating is
assigned to BienvinedoAnio
Respondent contended that the Commission has no jurisdiction for the
following grounds, among others:
47
 Administrative Law
1. The permanent appointment issued to him never became effective
because he did not assume such position. Moreover, he was out
of the government by virtue of his resignation
2. No longer in the civil service then the Commission has no
disciplinary jurisdiction over him
3. While it is true that the Commission has original disciplinary
jurisdiction over all its officials and employees involving civil
service examination anomalies or irregularities as well as sworn
complaints directly filed before it against any other official or
employee, the admin case commenced against him did not fall
under any of those instances
CA held that based on Sections 12, 47 and 48 of EO 292, the CSC-NCR
does not have jurisdiction to investigate and decide the case against Albao.
Petitioner invokes Sec 12 (11), (16) in relation to Section 16 (15 [c]) of EO
292, as such when the Commission comes to know of any transgression
committed by a government employee, it can initiate the necessary
proceedings. In this case, it is due to discovery of Albao’s spurious eligibility.
ISSUE: WON CSC has original jurisdiction over the admin case
RULING: YES
Pursuant to Sections 47 and 48 of EO 292, it is the VP of the Philippines, as
head of office, who is vested with jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action
against Albao.
Nevertheless, this Court does not agree that petitioner is helpless to act
directly and motu proprio, on the alleged acts of dishonesty and falsification
of official document committed by respondent in connection with his
appointment to a permanent position in the Office of the Vice President.It is
true that Section 47 (2), Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads of
government offices original disciplinary jurisdiction over their own
subordinates.
The present case,partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of
the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary
actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on
administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its
integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing
from its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be
distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the
law or the rules of the service.
MIGUEL SINGSON v. NLRC and PAL
G.R. No. 122389 | June 19, 1997
“Labor Arbiter Aquino whose decision is subject of appeal is the reviewing
officer as Commissioner of NLRC, not allowed”
FACTS: Singson was employed by PAL as Traffic Representative
Passenger, Handling Division whose duty consisted of checking in
passengers and baggafe for a particular flight. He was assigned to serve the
check-in counter of Japan Airlines. Among the passengers checked in by him
was Ms. Lolita Kondo who was bound for Narita, Japan. After checking in,
Ms. Kondo lodged a complaint against Singson alleging that the latter
required her to pay 200 US Dollars for alleged excess baggage without
issuing any receipt. Petitioner was administratively charged and investigated
by a committee formed by PAL. Per recommendation of the committee, PAL
dismissed petitioner from the service.
Petitioner lodged a complaint against PAL before the NLRC-NCR for illegal
dismissal and was raffled to then LA Raul Aquino. Aquino found the evidence
adduced by PAL to be insufficient and declared that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
On appeal by PAL, the NLRC was composed of Calaycay
and Rayal with Aquino as the presiding commissioner and
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter Aquino. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with only Calaycay
and Rayal taking part.
Respondents contend that Aquino’s failure to inhibit himself is a harmless
error that will not infirm the subject resolution..
ISSUE: WON Aquino may participate in reviewing and reversing on appeal
his own decision as labor arbiter
RULING: NO
The SC, in one case, laid down the requisites of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings, to wit:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have something to support itself;
(4) the evidence must be substantial;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered. In addition, administrative due process includes
(a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the
institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right;
(b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his
favor;
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable
assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least
ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
It is self-evident from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case
on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of
review. Thus, it was ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce be other
than the officer whose decision is under review."
Petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated,
as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing
private respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a
former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from the
public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member
each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively.The composition
of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners
who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any
participation in this case
TEJANO V. DESIERTO
159190
48
 Administrative Law
OMB committed grave abuse of discretion when he participated in
reinvestigation of graft case vs. PNB VP Tejano despite his earlier
participation in PI as SP (Tejano vs. Desierto, 462 SCRA 568)
FACTS:
The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated Vice President
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising
Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including
Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the
irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.
Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the
properinformation for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III
Orlando I. Ines of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
In a Memorandum dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton.
On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer
recommended the approval of the memorandum of Special Prosecution
Officer Ines.
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor,
concurred in the approval of Ferrer. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
concurred thereto on 11 November 1994.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan,
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 22 December 1994, Tejano filed his motion for reinvestigation in the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned
to Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus Micael.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict Tejano, Special
Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum dated 03 November 1999,
recommended the dismissal of the case. Therecommendation was approved
by Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier
participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor,
disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the
marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case
aggressively.
Tejano filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired,
approved Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion
in disapproving the memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case against Tejano, where he had
earlier participated in the preliminary investigation of the said criminal case
recommending the filing of the information. YES
RULING:
Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion.
Tejano attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having
participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the
recommendation for the filing of the information before the
Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the Tejano. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who
reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is
under review. In Zambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals,
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set
aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an
appeal of the Secretary’s own previous decision, which he handed down
while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. We have equally declared
void a decision rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission, because one of its members, Commissioner Raul
Aquino, participated in the review of the case which he had earlier decided
on as a former labor arbiter. Likewise, this Court struck down a decision of
Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil
Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier
concurred.
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case
and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the
review of the same during the reinvestigation.
REP V. EXPRESS TELECOM
147096
NTC order reviving archived application of BayanTel w/o notice to oppositor
is not denial of procedural due process (Rep. vs. Express Telecom, 373
SCRA 319)
FACTS:
On December 29, 1992, Bayantel filed an application with the National
Telecommunications Commission for a Certificate of Public Convenienceto
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) .
NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective
applications before the Commission on or before February 15, 1993, and
deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date until further
orders.
On May 6, 1993, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an
amended application. (lagpas sa feb 15 deadline).
Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But
before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC
issued an Order dated December 19, 1993 stating:
In view of the recent grant of two (2) separate Provisional Authorities in favor
of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available
frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and in order
that this case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, AS
PRAYED FOR, let this case be, as it is, hereby ordered ARCHIVED without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes
available.
On May 17, 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing
the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators.
On February 1, 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel’s motion to revive the
latter’s application.
Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application. Extelcom argued that
Bayantel’s motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost
eight (8) years ago. Thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of
respondent Bayantel in this application are all outdated and should no longer
be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. Moreover,
49
 Administrative Law
Extelcom alleged that there was no public need for the service applied for by
Bayantel as the present five CMTS operators --- Extelcom, Globe Telecom,
Inc., Smart Communication, Inc., Pilipino Telephone Corporation, and Isla
Communication Corporation, Inc. --- more than adequately addressed the
market demand, and all are in the process of enhancing and expanding their
respective networks based on recent technological developments.
NTC granted BayanTel’s application.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NTC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it revived Bayantel’s application based on an ex-parte motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a violation of the fundamental right
of Extelcom to due process when it was not afforded the opportunity to
question the motion for the revival of the application.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of Extelcom’s the right to due process. NO
RULING:
It must be noted that said Order referred to a simple revival of the archived
application of Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-426. At this stage, it cannot be
said that Extelcom’s right to procedural due process was prejudiced. It will
still have the opportunity to be heard during the full-blown adversarial
hearings that will follow. In fact, the records show that the NTC has scheduled
several hearing dates for this purpose, at which all interested parties shall be
allowed to register their opposition. We have ruled that there is no denial of
due process where full-blown adversarial proceedings are conducted before
an administrative body.
With Extelcom having fully participated in the proceedings, and indeed, given
the opportunity to file its opposition to the application, there was clearly no
denial of its right to due process.
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right
to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in
court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings. where opportunity to
be heard is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no
denial of procedural due process. As reiterated in National Semiconductor
(HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence,
in Navarro III vs. Damaso (246 SCRA 260 [1995]), we held that a formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all instances essential. Plainly,
Extelcom was not denied due process.
Extelcom had already entered its appearance as a party and filed its
opposition to the application. It was neither precluded nor barred from
participating in the hearings thereon. Indeed, nothing, not even the Order
reviving the application, bars or prevents Extelcom and the other oppositors
from participating in the hearings and adducing evidence in support of their
respective oppositions. The motion to revive could not have possibly caused
prejudice to Extelcom since the motion only sought the revival of the
application. It was merely a preliminary step towards the resumption of the
hearings on the application of Bayantel. The latter will still have to prove its
capability to undertake the proposed CMTS. Indeed, in its Order dated
February 1, 2000, the NTC set several hearing dates precisely intended for
the presentation of evidence on Bayantel’s capability and qualification. Notice
of these hearings were sent to all parties concerned, including Extelcom.
CSC V. LUCAS
127838
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from fundamental procedural
principles, such as right to due process. Respondent must be duly informed
of charge vs. him & he cannot be convicted of a crime with w/c he was not
charged (CSC vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA 560)
FACTS:
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant at the
Department of Agriculture (DA), filed with the office of the
Secretary, an affidavit-complaint against Jose J. Lucas, a
photographer of the same agency, for misconduct.
Raquel described the incident in the following manner:
“While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J. Lucas, Raquel
noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that very instant
used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his shoe. At that
moment she felt Mr. Lucas’ hand touching her thigh and running down his
palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and
admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. But Lucas touched her
again and so she hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying
‘lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan’ A
verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the
arm and shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door. Mr. Lucas, bent on literally
throwing the affiant out of the office, grabbed her the second time while she
attempted to regain her posture after being pushed the first time.”
On June 17, 1992, Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant
head, BOPI, denying the charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the
thigh of complainant Linatok, that what transpired was that he accidentally
brushed Linatok’s leg when he reached for his shoes and that the same was
merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand
got in contact with Linatok’s leg.
On May 31, 1993, after a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the board
issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and
recommending a penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day.
The Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation.
In due time, Lucas appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). On July 7, 1994, the CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty
of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Lucas moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of
the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI. The Court of Appeals
ruled that “a basic requirement of due process on the other hand is that a
person must be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182).
CSC anchors its position on the view that “the formal charge against a
respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision
of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised
of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense.”
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found
him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct. YES
RULING:
As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the
CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs.
Civil Service Commission, we held that “in grave misconduct as distinguished
from simple misconduct, theelementsofcorruption,clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest,” which is
obviously lacking in Lucas’s case.
Lucas maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC
deprived him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave
misconduct.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appealsthat: (a) a basic requirement of
due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against
himand that (b) a person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was
not charged.
50
 Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and
hearings.
The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in
administrative proceedings.
Of course, we do not in any way condone Lucas’s act. Even in jest, he had
no right to touch complainant’s leg. However, under the circumstances, such
act is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that Lucas
was maliciously motivated. We note that Lucas has been in the service for
twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.
LACSON VS PAGC
May 30, 2011
G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475
The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both
procedural & substantive due process. Procedural due process requires
that the dismissal when warranted be effected only after due notice &
hearing. While substantive due process requires that dismissal be for legal
cause. Petitioners actively participated in PAGC proceedings where they
explained their actions thru their memoranda. For failure to appeal to proper
forum (to CSC & not to CA), PEA decision has become final & executory.
FACTS
Theron V. Lacson (Lacson), Jaime R. Millan (Millan) and Bernardo T.
Viray (Viray) were non-presidential appointees and career service officials of
respondent Philippine Estates Authority (PEA), holding the positions of
Deputy General Manager for Finance, Legal and Administration; Assistant
General Manager; and Department General Manager, respectively.
On October 3, 2002, Sulficio O. Tagud (Tagud) filed a complaint-affidavit with
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) accusing Lacson, Millan and
Viray for overpricing, by P600,000,000.00, the contract for the construction
of the Central Boulevard Project (the Project), otherwise known as the
President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard.
Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation
of both the criminal and the administrative aspects of the case. The criminal
casecharged Lacson et al. for committing an act in violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7080.The administrative case, on the other hand, charged
them with Dishonesty, Serious Misconduct and Acts Inimical to the Interest
of the Public Service in violation of Section 52A (1), (3) and (20) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.
Meanwhile, on October 14, 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) requested the Ombudsman for authority to conduct
administrative disciplinary proceedings against Lacson et al. and other
individuals involved in the Project.
Subsequently, on November 12, 2002, a formal complaint was filed by the
Investigation Office of PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including
Lacson et al., with acts and/or omissions contrary to: (1) IRR of PD No. 1594,
as amended; (2) R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (3) Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (4) the Construction
Agreement signed on April 10, 2000 between PEA and J.D. Legaspi
Construction; and (5) EO No. 292, as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 3019,
as amended.
On November 28, 2002, PAGC issued a resolution recommending the
dismissal of Lacson, et al. from PEA with the imposition of thecorresponding
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification
from employment in the government. On July 25, 2003, PEA dismissed the
Lacson, et al.
Lacson et al. argue that they were denied due process because their order
of dismissal was not accompanied by any justification from the PEA Board of
Directors who merely relied on the findings of PAGC.
ISSUE
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
WON there was a violation of Lacson et al’s right to due
process.
RULING
NO. There was no violation. As conversely pointed out by PAGC, Lacson et
al cannot claim that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite due
process because they were given the opportunity to be heard in the course
of PAGCs investigation.
Indeed, as career service officers, they enjoy security of tenure as
guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. This is further reiterated in Section
36(a) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, which clearly provides that no officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by
law and after due process.
The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both
procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires
that the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after notice and
hearing. On the other hand, substantive due process requires, among others,
that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and effect the
administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member of
and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting
the rights and interests of the public.
Well-established is the rule that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may
have in support of his defense.The demands of due process are sufficiently
met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered.
In this regard, Lacson et al. actively participated in the proceedings before
PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions
through their memoranda.The essence of due process is the right to be heard
and this evidently was afforded to them. Thus, petitioners assertion that their
dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process cannot be sustained.
In sum, the removal from office of Lacson et al. was valid. PEA dismissed
them for cause and in accordance with the requisites of due process.
RUIVIVAR VS OMBUDSMAN
September 16, 2008
G.R. No. 165012
There is no denial of due process when on her filing a MR from the decision
reprimanding her was given opportunity to be heard but she refused to file
pleading.
FACTS
On May 24, 2002, the Dr. Bernardo filed an Affidavit-Complaint
charging Ruivivarbefore the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority, and violations of the
Revised Penal Code and of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Dr. Bernardo
stated in her complaint that she is the President of the Association of Drug
Testing Centers (Association) that conducts drug testing and medical
examination of applicants for driver’s license. In this capacity, she went to the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) on May 17, 2002 to meet with
representatives from the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) and to file a copy of the Associations request to lift the moratorium
imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of drug testing clinics. Before
proceeding to the office of the LTO Commissioner for these purposes, she
passed by the office of Ruivivarto conduct a follow up on the status of her
company’s application for accreditation. While there, Ruivivar-- without
provocation or any justifiable reason and in the presence of other LTO
employees and visitors -- shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting
manner, hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from entering
the office of the LTO Commissioner. Ruivivaralso accused the Dr. Bernardo
51
 Administrative Law
of causing intrigues against her at the DOTC. To prove her allegations, Dr.
Bernardo presented the affidavits of three witnesses.
The Ombudsman rendered the November 4, 2002 Decision
based on the pleadings and the submitted affidavits. It found
Ruivivaradministratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official
functions and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand. She filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that she was deprived of due process because
she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of Dr. Bernardo’s witnesses.
The Ombudsman responded to Ruivivar’smotion for reconsideration by
ordering that the latter be furnished with copies of the affidavits of Dr.
Bernardo’switnesses. The Ombudsmans order also contained the directive
to file, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which
she may deem fit under the circumstances.
Records show that Ruivivar received copies of Dr. Bernardo’s
witnesses affidavits but she did not choose to controvert these affidavits or
to file a supplement to her motion for reconsideration. She simply maintained
in her Manifestation that her receipt of the affidavits did not alter the fact the
she was deprived of due process nor cure the irregularity in the November 4,
2002 Decision.
ISSUE
WON Ruivivar was denied of her right to due process when she was deprived
of her right to confront the evidence submitted against her before the
Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was rendered.
RULING
NO. She was not denied of her right to due process.Ruivivar has
been granted the opportunity to be heard and has refused to avail of this
opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due process. She was given
the opportunity by Dr. Bernardo to rebut the affidavits submitted by her. . .
and had a speedy and adequate administrative remedy but she failed to avail
thereof for reasons only known to her.
The records show that Ruivivarduly filed a motion for
reconsideration on due process grounds (i.e., for Dr. Bernardo’s failure to
furnish her copies of the affidavits of witnesses) and on questions relating to
the appreciation of the evidence on record.The Ombudsman acted on this
motion by issuing its Order of January 17, 2003belatedly furnishing her with
copies of Dr. Bernardo’s witnesses, together with the directive to file, within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may deem
fit under the circumstances.
Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits,
Ruivivarsimply chose to file a Manifestation where she took the position that
the order of the Ombudsman dated 17 January 2003 supplying her with the
affidavits of the complainant does not cure the 04 November 2002 order, and
on this basis prayed that the Ombudsman’s decision be reconsidered and
the complaint dismissed for lack of merit.
NOTE: Although they are separate and distinct concepts, exhaustion of
administrative remedies and due process embody linked and related
principles. The exhaustion principle applies when the ruling court or
tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine its findings and
conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking
recourse against the court or the tribunals ruling omitted to take.Under the
concept of due process, on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court
or tribunal rules against a party without giving him or her the opportunity to
be heard. Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the
ruling court or tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view
of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made. The commonality they
share is in the same opportunity that underlies both.
GAOIRAN VS ALCALA
November 26, 2004
G.R. No. 150178
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
Unverified complaint filed w/ CHED is not the complaint
w/in purview of EO 292. It merely commences fact-finding
investigation. The formal charge of CHED Legal Office
against Gaoiran constituted the complaint with regard tomauling.
“Complaint” in EO 292 & CSC both refer to actual charge to respondent
Gaoiran
FACTS
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED
against Gaoiran, Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the
AngadananAgro-Industrial College (AAIC), a state-supervised school in
Angadanan, Isabela. In his letter-complaint, Castillejo, Administrative Officer
II, also of the same school, charged the Gaoiranwith mauling him while he
was performing his duties therein. Appended to the letter-complaint were the
verified criminal complaint filed by Castillejo against Gaoiranand the sworn
statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person
in authority was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San
Guillermo. After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon
finding of a prima facie case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the
Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension.
Gaoiransought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive
suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath
and that he was not informed nor apprised of the complaint against him
before, during and after the preliminary fact-finding investigation.
Since Castillejos letter-complaint failed to comply with the formal
requirements of the law, Gaoiranmaintains that Director Mayo rightfully
dismissed the same and that Alcala abused his discretion when he dismissed
them from the service.
ISSUE
WON the letter-complaint filed by Castillejo constitutes as a complaint which
must be verified.
RULING
NO. The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in Book
V of E.O. No. 292. Sections 46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A
thereof read:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint
against a civil service official or employee shall be given due course
unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant.
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of Castillejo was
not concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal
complaint that he filed against the Gaoiran, as well as the sworn statements
of his witnesses. These documents could very well be considered as
constituting the complaint against Gaoiran. In fact, this Court, through the
Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only
unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct.Indeed, it
is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in
the scope and exercise of its investigative powers.After all, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.
In any case, contrary to the Gaoiran’s assertion, the letter-complaint
of Castillejo is not a complaint within the purview of the provisions mentioned
above. In the fairly recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Court of
52
 Administrative Law
Appeals, this Court held that the complaint under E.O. No. 292 and CSC
rules on administrative cases both refer to the actual charge to which the
person complained of is required to answer and indicate whether or not he
elects a formal investigation should his answer be deemed not satisfactory.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the CHED referred the matter to its
Office of Legal Affairs Service and Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof,
conducted a fact-finding investigation on the incident. The said letter-
complaint did not, by itself, commence the administrative proceedings
against Gaoiran, requiring an answer from him, but, as already mentioned,
merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
The Court cannot, therefore, uphold Gaoiran’scontention that
Castillejo’s letter-complaint was inexistent and could not be acted upon by
the CHED for to do so, would result in an absurd and restrictive interpretation
of E.O. No. 292 and effectively deprive the Government of its disciplining
power over people who hold a public trust.
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension filed by Atty. Dasig against Gaoirancharging him with grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
directing him to submit his answer in writing and under oath that constituted
the complaint.
CONCERNED MWSS OFFICIALS VS. VASQUEZ
240 SCRA 502
One may be heard not solely by verbal presentation but also thru pleadings
in admin proceedings. Technical rules of procedure & evidence are not
strictly applied
FACTS:
Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturer’s Association (PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office
of the Ombudsman on the public bidding conducted by MWSS for projects
APM-01 and APM-02 of its Angat Water Supply Optimization Project
(AWSOP), which aims to provide 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8
million residents in the metropolitan area. The letter of complaint accused
the MWSS of an apparent plan even before the bidding to favour suppliers of
fiberglass pipes and urged the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation to
hold in abeyance the award of contracts.
The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
issued an injunction directed to the Board of Trustees of the MWSS (1) to
set aside the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids, and Awards
Committee for Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-
CSTE) that contract no. APM-01 be given to a contractor offering fiberglass
pipes and (2) to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive
bidder.
Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman over PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the
challenged order contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the issuance of restraining
orders/injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process. NO
RULING:
Relative to the first issue, we are more than convinced, after a scrutiny of the
records of this case, that petitioners have been amply accorded the
opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners were asked to comment on the letter-complaint of PLDPPMA. On
25 June 1992, petitioners moved for an extension of time within which to
comment. On July 16, 1992, petitioners filed their letter-comment.
Responding to the reply of PLDPPMA, petitioners later filed a rejoinder.
DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO
When an adverse order was rendered against them,
petitioners moved for its reconsideration, albeit to no avail.
The absence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many
times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA
313 SCRA 404
Due process in administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts
FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the
doctoral program in Anthropology of theUniversity of the Philippines College
of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP).
After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program,
she worked on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines."
However, after going over her dissertation, the assistant Dean informed the
CSSP Dean Paz that there were portions in Celine’s dissertation that was
lifted from various published works without proper acknowledgment.
Nonetheless, Celine was allowed to defend her dissertation and was able to
have a passing mark.
Dean Paz in a letter, then requested the Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, to exclude Celine from the list of candidates for graduation, pending
clarification of the problems regarding the latter’s dissertation. Apparently,
the letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time and Celine was able to
graduate.
Subsequently, the assistant dean formally charged Celine with plagiarism
and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Various
ad hoc committees were then formed to investigate the plagiarism charge
against Celine. In a letter, Dean Paz informed Celine of the charges against
her and in a subsequent letter; Celine was summoned to a meeting and was
asked to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. During
the meeting, Celine was informed of the charges against her and was
provided a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Celine on the
other hand submitted her written explanation in a letter.
Subsequently, the investigating committees submitted their report with the
same conclusion, - that there was indeed an overwhelming proof of massive
lifting and even admission on the part of Ms. Celine that she plagiarized, and
so the Committee recommended the withdrawal of the doctoral degree of Ms.
Celine.
On the basis of such report, a letter was sent to Celine informing her of the
withdrawal of her Ph.D degree. Celine then raised the matter to the Trial
Court which dismissed the same. Upon appeal however, the CA reversed the
decision of the Trial Court on the basis that Celine was denied due process.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
 WON Celine was denied of Due Process. No.
 WON the UP Board of Regents has the authority to withdraw the
Ph.D already conferred. Yes.
RULING:
53
 Administrative Law
With regard to the first issue, the court held that it cannot be said that Celine
was denied of Due Process.

First, from the facts of the case it is clear that various committees had been
formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed NPC vs. NLRC
plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense 272 SCRA 707
and consequently all investigations resulted in a finding that Celine
committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of Service of summons or order on OSG is indispensable ingredient of due
which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. process

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the FACTS:

opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek
NAPOCOR entered into an agreement with Westinghouse as principal
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27 A party who has
contractor and Power Contractors Inc. (PCI) as sub-contractor for the
availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have
construction of the power plant in Morong, Bataan.
been denied due process.28
Pursuant to PCI's sub-contract with Westinghouse, over six thousand
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges
workers were hired to undertake the civil works for the Bataan Nuclear Power
against her29 and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to
Plant (BNPP). After the completion of certain phases of work at the power
submit her written explanation, which she was able to do30 Private
plant, the services of the workers were terminated. The dismissed employees
respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the
did not receive any separation pay.
Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, shesent several letters
to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.31
As a consequence, cases for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits
were filed before the Labor Arbiter against PCI.
Second., it is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled
to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an
On 1986, the Labor Arbiter ordered NAPOCOR and Westinghouse
administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those
impleaded as additional parties-respondents. Copies of said Order were
in the courts of justice.
served on counsel for respondent workers and counsel for respondent PCI
but not on respondent Westinghouse.
And Third, Celine cannot contend that she was entitled to be furnished a copy
of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In
A copy of the Order requiring the parties to submit their memoranda was
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,34 we held:
served on the ACCRA Law Firm, purportedly the counsel for Westinghouse.
The law firm, however, promptly filed a Manifestation stating that it did not
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not
enter its appearance as counsel for Westinghouse in the consolidated
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which
cases.7
became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity,
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the cases
the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for
as counsel for NAPOCOR. During the proceedings, however, Atty. Restituto
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
O. Mallo represented NAPOCOR as the deputized Special-Attorney of OSG.
cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate
students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the On December 29, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision, which held
attributes of a judicial proceeding. . . that NAPOCOR, PCI and Westinghose jointly and severally liable for the
adjudged separation pay and money claims.
In sum:
A copy of the decision was served on NAPOCOR through the deputized
1. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
special attorney who received the same on January 18, 1989. The OSG
simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a
however, was not served with a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision. The
chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of;
ACCRA Law Office, having likewise received a copy of the decision, again
2. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-
filed a Manifestation that it never entered its appearance as counsel for
type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice; and
Westinghouse.
3. Due Process in disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination. NAPOCOR then filed its appeal memorandum only on February 22, 1989.
The Labor Arbiter on the otherhand denied due course of such for being filed
Anent the second issue, the UP Board of Regents has the authority to
out of time. Undaunted, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal and Appeal
withdraw the conferment of a degree founded on fraud.
memorandum questioning thedenial on the ground that the OSG was not
served a copy of the 12.29.1989 decision. The OSG further alleged that the
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body
Appeal filed on 02.22.1989 was filed on time.
of the University of the Philippines.38 It has the power confer degrees upon
the recommendation of the University Council.39 If follows that if the
The first issue raised by petitioner revolves around the service of the Labor
conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is
Arbiter's decision on the special attorney and not on the OSG.
also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what
it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher Petitioner alleges that it was denied due process because its counsel, the
learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has OSG, was not served a copy of the said decision. It thus claims that the period
conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than to appeal did not commence to run because the decision was never served
bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who on the OSG. Hence, petitioner's appeal memoranda filed by the special
has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic attorney on February 22, 1989 and by the OSG on July 17, 1989 were filed
excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of seasonably. The petition has merit.
self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its
integrity. ISSUE:

DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO 54

 Administrative Law
Whether the Service of Summons is an indispensable ingredient of due
process.

RULING:

The lawyer deputized and designated as "special attorney-OSG" is a mere

representative of the OSG and the latter retains supervision and control over
the deputized lawyer. The OSG continues to be the principal counsel for the
National Power Corporation, and as such, the Solicitor General is the party
entitled to be furnished copies of orders, notices and decisions. The
deputized special attorney has no legal authority to decide whether or not an
appeal should be made. 25

As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized

counsel, acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not
binding until they are actually received by the latter. It has been likewise
consistently held that the proper basis for computing the reglementary period
to file an appeal and for determining whether a decision had attained finality
is service on the OSG. 27 In the present controversy, only the special
attorney was served with a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since
service of said decision was never made on the OSG, the period to appeal
the decision to the NLRC did not commence to run. Hence, the appeal
memorandum filed by the OSG on July 17, 1989 was not filed belatedly.

DIGESTED BY: ADLAWAN, BANOSAN, CODILLA, LARA, MALICAY & ROJO 55