PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION AS AN

EXPERIMENTAL TOOL TOWARDS THE CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO

IDENTITY THROUGH FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A CORE FILIPINO VALUE

__________

A Dissertation

Presented to the

Graduate Faculty of the

College of Arts and Sciences

University of San Carlos

Cebu City, Philippines

__________

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY

__________

by

RUBY S. SUAZO

October 2006
 This is to acknowledge the support provided by the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED)

Republic of the Philippines

Commission on Higher Education
Pasig City, Metro Manila

The researcher is a recipient of the Dissertation Writing Grant Program of CHED.

 ii

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation entitled PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION

AS AN EXPERIMENTAL TOOL TOWARDS THE CLARIFICATION OF THE
FILIPINO IDENTITY THROUGH FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A CORE FILIPINO
VALUE prepared and submitted by RUBY S. SUAZO in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY has been
examined and is recommended for acceptance and approval for ORAL EXAMINATION

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

FR. HEINZ KULÜKE, SVD, Ph.D.

Adviser

BRO. ROMUALDO E. ABULAD, SVD, Ph.D. CLARITA C. FILIPINAS, Ph.D.

Member Member

FR. RAMON D. ECHICA, S.T.D. AGUSTIN L. SOLLANO, JR., Ph.D.

Member Member
________________________________________________________________________
PANEL OF EXAMINAERS

Approved by the committee on Oral Examination with a grade of PASSED.

BRO. ROMUALDO E. ABULAD, SVD, Ph.D.

Chair

FR. RAMON D. ECHICA, S.T.D. CLARITA C. FILIPINAS, Ph.D.

Member Member

FR. HEINZ KULÜKE, SVD, Ph.D. AGUSTIN L. SOLLANO, JR, Ph.D.

Adviser Member

Accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY.

Comprehensive Examination Passed: July 5 & 6, 2002.

ELIZABETH M. REMEDIO, Ph.D.

Dean

Date of Oral Examination: October 18, 2006

 iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the following persons who have
“motivated”, “inspired”, “encouraged”, “pushed”, “stirred” and “provoked” me to finish
this dissertation:

1. Fr. Heinz Kulüke, S.V.D., Ph.D., my adviser, for guiding me through this
work and for his affable support and motivation to have this dissertation
finished;

2. Bro. Romualdo E. Abulad, S.V.D., Ph.D., Fr. Ramon D. Echica, S.T.D.,

Agustin L. Sollano, Jr., Ph.D., and Clarita C. Filipinas, Ph.D., the dissertation
committee members and at the same breath, the panel of examiners, for their
invaluable comments and suggestions, guidance and encouragement from the
proposal hearing down to the oral defense;

3. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) for the Dissertation Grant

Assistance Program that is very helpful in easing out the financial constraint
of the researcher in finishing this dissertation;

4. Ester B. Velasquez, Ph.D., Cebu Normal University president, for believing in

my capacity to finish this dissertation, thereby, recommending me to CHED to
avail of its Dissertation Assistance Program;

5. Ali, Alvin, Ma’am Amosa, Bernard, Sir Boy, Ma’am Cherry, Franco, Gerry,
Glenn, Greg, James, Lot, Maje, Ma’am Myrna, Rani, and Ryan for their
undying encouragement, inspiration and support;

6. Bryan, Glenn, John M., John Z., Levi, Sir Nacs, and Rene for their incessant
support and for constantly pushing me to finish this project;

7. Razel, Zcheri Ayn Margaret, Friedrich Bill Ignatius and to our forthcoming
angel, far more than the encouragements, the inspiration has brought me to the
culmination of this project;

8. Isabelo, Romana, James Roy, and Annabelle for their moral support.

9. Finally, I would like to bear witness to the infinite goodness of God. My heart
sings of gratitude, praise and worship as I also laud for the powerful
intercession of the Virgin Mother.

Daghan Kaayong Salamat Kaninyong Tanan!!!

 iv

ABSTRACT

This study deals with Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation. Consequently, it attempts

to utilize his hermeneutic phenomenological approach in general and his hermeneutics of
appropriation in particular in clarifying the identity of the Filipino. The attempt to clarify
the Filipino identity is done through family orientation as a core Filipino value. The
attempt is carried on through an evaluation of three specific areas.
First, the author traces the development of the approach that Ricoeur develops in
his attempt to think anew the age-old and central question of philosophy as to what it
means to be a thinking, reflective subject. Ricoeur develops an approach that is a dialectic
between the auto-foundational claims of idealistic philosophies of the self and the
skeptical philosophies of the masters of suspicion. As he develops the hermeneutic
phenomenological approach to study the subject, he realizes the need of symbolisms as a
detour leading to the understanding of his notion of the subject. In fact, he finds out that
the different levels of interpreting symbolisms mirror the gradation of the subject’s going
into itself. The hierophanic marks the identity of the symbol on the shared experiences of
the people thus making it very objective in nature. The oneirotic as the elaboration of
dream symbol peers into the experiences of the dreamer to ascertain the dream account
through its relationship with the reality of one’s experience. Lastly, the poetic
imagination is the articulation of the subject’s own reflection that is being excited by his
oneirotic experiences. Because of the latter, a need to shift from the generic hermeneutic
phenomenological approach to the hermeneutics of appropriation is set in place.
Second, the nature of poetic imagination being forward looking excites the
development of the hermeneutics of appropriation. Hermeneutics of appropriation
presents the reader’s subjectivity as an extension of the fundamental aspect of discourse.
But contrary to the case of dialogue, no vis-à-vis is given in the written situation. The
relation is, so to speak created by the work itself. A work opens up its readers and thus
creates its own subjective vis-à-vis. As the work involves the interpreter and opens itself
up to him, a dialogue is initiated in an existential sense. Moreover, appropriation is
dialectically linked to distancing in written discourse. Thanks to the distancing of the
text, appropriation no longer bears the mark of affective connection to the author’s
intention, and lacks all contemporaneousness with the creative process of agreement with
an original intention. Appropriation represents understanding over distance. In other
words, appropriating the meaning of the text to one’s self-understanding must not be
understood as the culminating point of reading. Reading should end with acting inasmuch
as reading effects thought. Ricoeur is convinced about the flexible connection between
thought and action.
And finally, the researcher sets the clarification of the Filipino identity by way of
Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation. Tracing the historical development of the Filipino
value system constitutes the phenomenological part of the study. On the same breath, the
hermeneutics of suspicion reveals the falsehoods and illusions that the Filipino attaches to
the value of the family. A genuine effort to make family orientation become helpful to
nation-building is only generated after a critical awareness of the discontinuities and
estrangements of the said value. Ultimately, the hermeneutics of appropriation imagines
the enormous possibilities of making family orientation as a value that suits into the
project of nation-building and national development.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

APPROVAL SHEET ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iii
ABSTRACT iv

CHAPTER
ONE INTRODUCTION 1

Rationale of the Study 1

Theoretical Background of the Study 11
The Problem 22
Statement of the Problem 22
Significance of the Study 23
Scope and Limitations of the Study 23
Methodology 24
Definition of Terms 25

TWO THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 28

Dislocation of the Subject 30

The Cartesian Tradition 30
Husserlian Egology 33
Heidegger and the Subject 38
The Masters of Suspicion 42
Symbol and Interpretation 45
Symbol and Its Related Structures 47
1. The Signs 47
2. The Allegories 50
3. The Symbolic Logic 51
4. The Myths 52
The Zones of Emergence of Symbol 53
1. Symbol and the Phenomenology of Religion 53
2. Symbol and Psychoanalysis 57
3. Symbol and Poetic Imagination 58
The Symbolic Categories and Interpretation 60
1. The Hierophanies 62
2. The Oneirotic 66
3. The Poetic Image 70

THREE THE HERMENEUTIC OF APPROPRIATION 76

Reflection as Interpretation 82
 vii

The Nature of Discourse 87

Discourse as Saying 89
Discourse as Writing 91
Discourse as Real 92
The Nature of Text 94
Explanation and Understanding 98
Guess as a Holistic But Naïve Grasping of the Text 100
Falsification as Validation: The Explanatory Phase 102
Meaningful Action Considered as a Text 108
Distanciation and Appropriation 112
Appropriation: A New Concept of Interpretation 116

FOUR FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A DETOUR FOR THE

CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO IDENTITY:
APPLYING PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF
APPROPRIATION 126

The Quest for the Filipino Identity 128

The Filipino Values in General 134
The Philippine Cultural Systems 142
Historical Development of the Dual Value System 144
Family Orientation as the Core Value 148
The Antagonism Between Family Orientation as a Core
Value and Nation Building 152
Family Orientation as a Core Value and Its Implications
to Social Institutions 157
Re-understanding Filipino Orientation as a Core
Filipino Value 163

FIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION 181

Summary and Conclusion 181

Recommendation 192

BIBLIOGRAPHY 195
APPENDIX A The Role of Education in Integrative Development 215
APPENDIX B General Framework for the Study of Philippine
Society and Culture 216
APPENDIX C Filipino Culture of Insecurity 217
APPENDIX D Integration of Tradition & Modernity 218
APPENDIX E Contrast Between Exogenous and Indigenous Models 219
APPENDIX F DECS Values Education Framework 220
APPENDIX G Culture Clash In Filipino Formal And
Non-Formal Organizations 221
CURRICULUM VITAE 222
 INTRODUCTION

Rationale of the Study

Don Ihde notes that the history of hermeneutics may be seen to have had three

phases: (1) hermeneutics as linked with biblical exegesis and interpretation; (2) modern

hermeneutics as both expanding hermeneutics from its previous more narrow religious

focus and transforming hermeneutics into a method which determines the shape of the

social (or ‘human’) sciences and the humanities; and, (3) the contemporary hermeneutics,

identified with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Ricoeur, extending modern hermeneutics

through the adaptation of Husserlian phenomenology on the one hand, and interpreting

the task of hermeneutics as that of providing an ontology of human existence, on the

other.1

Of the three contemporary hermeneutic philosophers, Ricoeur is found by the

researcher to be the most interesting because of his re-thinking of the central problem of

philosophy which is the human being, particularly the meaning of a thinking, reflective

subject (italics mine).2 At first, Ricoeur’s approach to the problem of subjectivity is

phenomenological and hermeneutical. It is phenomenological, “in that it seeks to clarify

through reflective analysis that which is immediately and indubitably given to

consciousness: the fact of the subject’s own existence, the ‘mineness’ characteristic of

existence.”3 Likewise, it is hermeneutical, “in that this reflective analysis is not

1
Don Ihde, “Paul Ricoeur’s Place in the Hermeneutic Tradition” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 60 – 62.
2
G.B. Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 75.
3
Ibid.
 2

descriptive in an intuitive or introspective sort of way but is indirect and interpretive and

is, moreover, motivated by the basic goal of all hermeneutics: a heightened self-

understanding.”4

By reflexive analysis, echoing Nabert, Ricoeur means

the recovery of the effort to exist and the desire to be. However, this
effort and this desire cannot be grasped immediately in an act of
intellectual intuition; they can only be glimpsed through the mirror of the
objects and acts, the symbols and signs, wherein they are disclosed.
Hence, ‘reflection must become interpretation because [the person] cannot
grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the world’.5 Reflection
cannot speak from nowhere, for it must always begin by interpreting the
cultural products of a specific tradition. Such interpretation makes
reflection ‘concrete’… [f]or reflection is necessarily self-reflection.6

Aside from reflexive analysis which is phenomenological in nature, Ricoeur resorts also

to hermeneutics because he finds the Husserlian eidetic phenomenology to be less than an

appropriate approach. This is due to Husserl’s notion of ‘a thinking subject called

‘transcendental’, a subject which is not bound up with the accidents of history, a kind of

foundational subject which would be, in the awareness of itself, the source of all

knowledge’.7 Moreover, Ricoeur points out that “there is no self-understanding which is

4
Ibid., 75 – 76.
5
See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis
Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 46.
6
John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction” in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited., translated, and introduced by John B.
Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 17 – 18.
7
Madison, 79. Cf. Ricoeur, “History as Narrative and Practice” (An Interview with Paul Ricoeur
by Peter Kemp), Philosophy Today (Fall 1985), 219.
 3

not mediated by signs, symbols and texts;”8 “in the last resort understanding coincides

with the interpretation given to these mediating terms.”9

Ricoeur explains the task of hermeneutics as the deciphering of multiple

significance. “Interpretation,” he says, “is the work of thought which consists in

deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of

meaning implied in the literal meaning.”10 Consequently, the surface meaning may be

hidden or concealed or at least contain a less obvious depth meaning which is

nevertheless dependent upon the surface literal meaning.

He approaches the study of the subject in three fields: (1) as mediated by symbols;

(2) as mediated by signs; and (3) as mediated by texts.

As mediated by symbols11, Ricoeur tries to understand the meanings of the

symbols that man sees in dreams; creates in religious rituals and ceremonies; and presents

in poesy. The problem of understanding man through symbols lies in the double-

meaning structure of symbols. This double-meaning structure opens the way to

interpretation. As it turns out, “the problem of interpretation in turn designates all

understanding specifically concerned with the meaning of equivocal expressions. To

interpret is to understand a double meaning.”12 Because of double-meaning, interpreting

8
Ibid. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II,
trans. by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 15.
9
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II, 15.
10
Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, edited by Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1974), 13.
11
See Ricoeur, “On Interpretation”, 16-17.
12
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8.
 4

the meaning of symbols is necessary for symbols point to something beneath their

appearances.

Aside from symbols, Ricoeur points out also two instances where interpretation is

applied. The more common instance is the use of natural languages in the conversational

situation. Natural languages are polysemic by nature where meaning is determined by

the context of the dialogue. Hence, interpretation is connected to the selective function of

context. It becomes the process by which “interlocutors collectively determine the

contextual values which structure their conversation.”13 The second instance is portrayed

by the text; here meaning is mediated by texts. When the text is considered in itself, “the

meaning contained therein is rendered autonomous with respect to the intention of the

author, the initial situation of discourse and the original addressee.”14 These three

components constitute what Ricoeur calls the ‘site-in-life’ of the text. In interpreting the

text, the interpreter considers only the matter of the text and not the psychology of the

author. With the ‘matter of the text’, the text which is free from its ‘site-in-life’ opens up

the possibility for a multiple interpretation. At this moment, a hermeneutic circle is

formed between “the understanding initiated by the reader and the proposals of meaning

offered by the text.”15

Ricoeur does not disregard the possibility of the interpreter’s misappropriation of

the meaning of the text. In fact, he points out that “the most radical way in which

hermeneutics questions the primacy of subjectivity is to take as its touchstone the theory

13
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences:
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited., translated, and introduced by John B. Thompson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 107.
14
Ibid., 108.
15
Ibid.
 5

of the text; indeed, to the extent to which the sense of a text has become autonomous in

relation to the subjective intention of its author, the essential question is no longer to

rediscover the lost intention behind the text, but to unfold before the text, as it were, the

‘world’ that it opens and uncovers.”16 Consequently, he considers the distanciation-

appropriation cycle in interpretation.

Distanciation, according to Ricoeur, is a variant of phenomenological epoche

whereby meaning is placed at a distance from the lived-experience of people, purely and

simply.17 The consideration of the ‘matter of the text’ apart from the psychology of the

author is established by the hermeneutical function of distanciation. The distanciation

that is constituted by the objectification of the author in the written work makes

interpretation a fundamental reply to this problem. When the act of discourse passes

from oral to written as exemplified by the written text, the work becomes

autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text
signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant… The autonomy
of the text already contains the possibility that... the ‘matter’ of the text
may escape from the finite intentional horizon of its author; in other
words,… the “world” of the text may explode the world of the author.18

The possibility of understanding is made possible by distanciation because “to invoke

distanciation as a principle is to attempt to show the very experience of belonging to

16
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography” in Lewis Edwin Han, ed., The Philosophy of Paul
Ricoeur, 35.
17
Ibid., 36.
18
Ibid., 139.
 6

[which] requires something like externalization in order to apprehend, articulate and

understand itself.”19

Appropriation, as a theory, is more of an “intersubjective relation of mutual

understanding than a relation of apprehension applied to the world conveyed by the

work.”20 Here follows a new theory of subjectivity. Ricoeur emphasizes that, in general,

appropriation is not understood as a theory of subjectivity of which the subject would

possess the key to knowledge. He remarks, “to understand is not to project oneself into

the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds which

are the genuine object of interpretation.”21 Thompson observes that “the act of

appropriation does not seek to rejoin the original intentions of the author, but rather to

expand the conscious horizons of the reader by actualizing the meaning of the text.”22

Consequently, the subject appropriates the meaning of the text “only insofar as he

disappropriates himself and the naïve, uncritical, illusory and deceptive understanding

which [the subject] claims to have himself before being instituted as subject by the very

texts which he interprets.”23

Ricoeur avers that his subjectivity is not the correlate of objectivity, that is, not a

subjectivity that constitutes objectivity but a subjectivity grounded in participation. Both

objectivity and constituting subjectivity are founded on the ontological participation of

19
John W. Van den Hengel, The Home of Meaning: The Hermeneutics of the Subject of Paul
Ricoeur (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982), 109.
20
Ricoeur, “Appropriation” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 182.
21
Ibid., 182 – 183.
22
Thompson, 18.
23
Ricoeur, “A Response By Paul Ricoeur” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 37.
 7

the being-in-the-world. The subject can provide an epistemological justification and

operate methodologically only because it is grounded primordially in participation.

Consequently, Ricoeur’s idea of understanding as self-understanding is not the same as

the idea of a self-conscious subject. The meaning of the consciousness is not derived

from the ego as pointed out by participation and distanciation. It is derived from

something outside itself. Understanding attests to the fact that the subject belongs to

being. The understanding of a text leads to the problem of appropriation of the text

which is its application to the present situation of the interpreter.24 The point of Ricoeur

concerning the hermeneutics of the text is its being a home for meaning. Taking the text

as a home for the truth effects various troubles in interpretation; while the interpretation

of the text that focuses on the truth propagated by the text is very confusing; hat which

focuses on the meaning of the text makes more sense.

Finally, the three phases: (1) phenomenological reduction; (2) hermeneutics; and

(3) appropriation flow directly from one single approach: the hermeneutic

phenomenological approach. The hermeneutic phenomenological approach can be used

to check critically one’s experience within society. It urges deliberate suspension of

judgments and allows experience to unfold and show its relevance. Further, it

admonishes the person to be on guard against trivial matters that conceal the meaningful

and existential understanding of the subject or the person. Ricoeur rediscovers the right

place of the subject in the context of experience. He desires to have a subject that is

certain of the meaning of its experience which is devoid of naiveté.

In connection with this, the researcher wishes to apply Ricoeur’s approach to the

problem of subjectivity to the clarification of the Filipino identity. There is a parallelism

24
Ibid., 143.
 8

between Ricoeur’s project and the researcher’s project in that the researcher’s quest for

the Filipino identity is basically a quest for the Filipino self, and this is like that of

Ricoeur’s search for the meaning of self in the self-understanding and self-reflection.

Basically, the question is: What does it mean to be a Filipino? Lapeña opines that

by Filipino, one usually means a person who belongs to a race or culture. Nevertheless,

he further says that the Filipino race contains Malay, Polynesian, Indonesian and other

“basic stock” interwoven with Indian, Chinese, Spanish and more recent American and

Japanese strains and influences. Thus, the percentages of blood and thinking that qualify

one to be a Filipino is a problem.25 Consequently, looking for what exactly is the

meaning of being a Filipino is very problematic.

Furthermore, the pursuit of identity of the Filipino is said to be not a national

concern. It is only the concern of the Filipino elite. Foronda, as quoted by Babor,

explains,

To be sure, the study of Filipino identity has been the pre-occupation of

the scholar and the intellectual and not, as expected, of the poor, the
unlettered, or the dispossessed. For his part, the poor had the more
pressing pre-occupation of keeping body and soul together, his dire
poverty, and therefore, his struggle to live is more intense the way, than
that of the effete intellectual given to theorizing.26

25
Jose Florencio Fabella Lapeña, Jr., “Halo-halo Reflections: The Filipino Identity and
Interdependence, Our Children and Our Common Future.” Philippine Journal of Education, 69 (March
1991), 438b.
26
Eddie R. Babor, “Heidegger’s Concept of ‘Authentic Existence’ in Being and Time and Its
Applicability to Filipinos” (Unpublished Dissertation: University of San Carlos, Cebu City, 2004), p. 188.
Cf. Marcelino Foronda, Jr. “The Filipino and His Society in Philippine History: Some Personal
Reflections” in Filipino Thought on Man and Society, ed. by Leonardo Mercado (Tacloban City: Divine
Word University Publications, 1980), 2.
 9

Corpuz, as cited by Lapeña, opines that the common tao knows that he is a Filipino

though he does not know why he is a Filipino.27 In this connection, the pursuit for the

Filipino identity is still relevant inasmuch as the Filipino elite affect literally the

development and progress of the entire country. If they understand truly the Filipino, they

will have a positive impact on the development of its country.

Nevertheless, the problem is not with who or what is a Filipino. The question

rather is: Why should the Filipino identity be known? The true Filipino identity has to be

known because it serves as “a rallying point for unity, self-discipline, and love and pride

in one’s country.”28 Arguably, knowing the Filipino identity helps the Filipino find a

sense of meaning, thereby, understands his reason for being. Consequently, this gives the

Filipino a sense of direction.

The assumption of this contention is that the moment the Filipino understands

who he is, he can extend such knowledge to the societal level and eventually create a

wave of true national Filipino identity. Consequently, this is the beginning of the true

sense of nationalism. With the individual Filipino becoming nationalistic, he becomes

concerned with the true Filipino interest. Moreover, knowing one’s self is tantamount to

the person’s ability to appropriate his decision upon his own. Consequently, not knowing

one’s self may lead to blindly following what other people tell him, supposing that since

it works with other people it will also work with him. However, his situation might be

different from that of others. So, it does not necessarily follow that what works with

others will also work with him.

27
Lapeña, 438b.
28
Emmanuel Mangubat, “Basic Considerations for Attaining a Truly Filipino National Identity”,
Philippine Journal of Education, 60 (December 1981), 297a.
 10

Momentarily, since the Filipino does not yet find his locus of control, he has also

not ascertained yet the direction of his endeavors. Inasmuch as the present Filipino is

formed by his diverse influences, both eastern and western with their opposing

tendencies, he becomes confused. Seeing the best and the worst of both worlds is

supposedly advantageous to the Filipino. But his ignorance about his reason for being

makes him incapable of threshing out the good influences from the bad influences,

something that can drive his nation to the desired stability.

The question, however, about the Filipino identity is ambivalent. Thus, the

researcher proposes a detour. Filipino identity is reckoned to be embedded in the values

that a Filipino holds dear. Among the many values, the Filipino is known for the so-

called close family ties or solidarity.29 The family is discerned “as a defense against a

hostile world and a unit where one can turn to in case [a family member] has a serious

problem.”30 However, this seems to counter the idea of thinking nationally for this tends

to make a Filipino act parochially.

The researcher chooses the family/kinship orientation to be the value where the

Filipino identity can be discerned for the reason that it is considered to be the core

Filipino value. According to Talisayon, the core or central clusters of the Filipino value

system revolve around seven values: (1) family/kinship orientation; (2) makatao/kapwa

tao (personalism); (3) “loob complex” (religious/psychic orientation); (4) social

acceptance; (5) pakikiramdam; (6) pakikisama (group centeredness); and (7) economic

29
Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th edition (Quezon City: GAROTECH
Publishing, 1990), 6 -7.
30
Isabel S. Panopio and Realidad Santico Rolda, Society and Culture: Introduction to Sociology
and Anthropology (Quezon City: JMC Press, Inc., 2000), 79. Cf. Jaime Bulatao, Split-level Christianity
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1966), 26.
 11

security. He, however, observes that the strongest macroclusters are five, in order of

strength: the relationship macrocluster, loob macrocluster, social macrocluster, livelihood

macrocluster, and optimism.31 Since the strongest macrocluster is the relationship

macrocluster, the researcher identifies the family/kinship orientation as the core value for

the reason that personalism, as the other value pertaining to relationship, can be

considered vis-à-vis the family/ kinship orientation. Curiously, the significance of this

value is overwhelming because the state has strongly recognized the primacy of the

family in Philippine society as enshrined in the Philippine Civil Code and the Philippine

Constitution of 1986.32

If Ricoeur, in his quest for the re-understanding of the meaning of the subject,

specifically as the self in self-understanding and self-reflection, makes a detour to signs,

symbols, and text, so the researcher, in his quest for the clarification of the Filipino

identity, uses also the family/kinship orientation as a point of reference.

Theoretical Background of the Study

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur is among the philosophers who see the

importance of the subject. Although it was Rene Descartes among the modern

31
Serafin D. Talisayon, “Values In Our Quest for Freedom (1896 – 1898) and Their Application
for Future Development” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values
Education Through History, 105. This is a result of Talisayon’s compilation and review of almost a
hundred academic, journalist and opinion articles about Filipino values, orientations or attitudes, and
idiosyncrasies. He was able to discern commonalities and consensus among various authors, and reduce
them into a set of identifiable value clusters with some internal consistency or coherence.
32
Alfred McCoy, “`An Anarchy of Families’: The Historiography of State and Family in the
Philippines” in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, edited by Alfred W. McCoy
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 7.
 12

philosophers who initiated the discussion with his doctrine “Cogito Ergo Sum”33, Ricoeur

thinks that the subject has not been afforded due recognition since Descartes’ time. Thus,

Ricoeur embarks on a rediscovery of the subject using the hermeneutic

phenomenological approach.

Through this approach, Ricoeur’s desire to re-understand the meaning of the

subject commences. The practical value of Ricoeur’s approach can be seen in its ability

to check critically the meaning of an experience before appropriating it. It urges

deliberate suspension of judgment and allows experience to unfold and show its own

relevance. Furthermore, it admonishes the person to be on guard against those trivial

matters that tend to conceal the meaningful and existential quality of the subject.

Descartes’ Cogito is the subject considered merely as a thinking being, void of

any objectivity and separated from its essential reality.34 What is noteworthy about it is

that it is immediately conscious of itself. Thus, the subject is certain of its existence. At

the same time, on the basis of Cartesian dualism, the subject is uncertain of the existence

of objects outside itself. Thus, the Cartesian Cogito does not represent the subject in its

full meaning.

Ricoeur, subsequently, discovers Gabriel Marcel and this has influenced him

greatly. Contrary to the dichotomy of the subject and the object, Marcel conceives the

ultimate ontological unity of man’s being-in-the-world. He does not reduce the subject or

the object to the other. Rather, he pursues a description of the polar structure of the

33
Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldine and
G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), 101 ff. & 149 ff.
34
Ibid., 153-57.
 13

ultimate unity of the subject and the object.35 Basically, Ricoeur accepts the position of

Marcel, but he looks for a more rigorous and systematic method that will adequately

expand the ontological unity into a systematic philosophy of man’s being-in-the-world.36

He is dissatisfied with the inexactness of Marcel’s journal method.

Ricoeur learns of Husserl’s phenomenological writings that require the

description of the ontological unity of the subject and the object. Intentionality then

becomes central to Ricoeur’s method, providing a disciplined expression for the vague

recognition of the unity of experience through its recognition of consciousness as always

a consciousness of something.37 This implies that the basic datum of experience at its

most immediate level in the intentional unity of subject and object is the reflexive

consciousness. However, by reflection, the intentional unity of experience is polarized

and the object is viewed opposite to the reflecting subject. To deliberately suspend the

objectifying standpoint, phenomenological reduction or bracketing is used as an approach

which separates the essential structure of man’s being-in-the-world from its special

existential characteristics.38 The separation of the essential structure from the special

existential characteristics is necessary in order to understand objectively the meaning of

an experience without any subjective prejudices. Biases and prejudices impede one’s

objective perception or understanding of the object. Nevertheless, this approach of

35
Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1: Reflection and Mystery (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1950), 114 – 23.
36
Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. with intro. by Erazim
Kohak (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), xxx.
37
Ibid., xiii.
38
Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. by William P. Alston and George
Nakhnikian, intro. by George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 4.
 14

bracketing prejudices is dubious because freeing oneself from biases is impossible since

the language used in describing is in itself bias.

On this ground, Ricoeur considers the phenomenological reduction as insufficient.

While it describes the essential structures of the subject, it does not say anything about

the latent meaning hidden behind the manifest structure of the subject. Ricoeur surmises

that the ontological unity of the subject and object implies the need to uncover the latent

symbolic and mythical expressions of the subject’s experience. To uncover this latent

meaning Ricoeur goes beyond Husserl’s bracketing and follows Heidegger’s ontological

hermeneutics. Following Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics, Ricoeur refuses to take

subject as identical to its immediate experiences. Instead of attempting a direct

description of the subject’s experiences, he recognizes the need for a hermeneutic theory

that uncovers the underlying meanings of experience.

Husserl claims that the consciousness of the subject entails its being conscious of

“something”39, but Ricoeur rebuffs this claim on the immediacy of the subject’s

consciousness. In full recognition of the positions of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, he

argues that Husserl’s is a false consciousness.40 To question the reliability of immediate

consciousness is tantamount to saying that not all modes of discourse tell the exact

meaning of experience. The unreliability or falsity of the subject’s immediate

consciousness leads Ricoeur to think that the subject is indeed not certain of itself.

Apparently, the subject is lost when Marx, Nietzsche and Freud contend that

immediate consciousness is an illusion. Ricoeur, for his part, upholds that the subject is

39
Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), 120.
40
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33 – 34.
 15

not actually lost, only dislocated. To liberate the subject, Ricoeur does not search for the

first truth; instead he searches for that truth that is not naïve. One liberates the subject not

through a presuppositionless philosophy but through a philosophy that regards all its

presuppositions.

Freud, though one of the philosophers who believes that the subject is lost, gives

Ricoeur the idea on how to liberate the subject through interpretation of dreams. To

interpret dreams is not to interpret them literally. Dreams are enigmatic; they convey

meanings behind their literal meanings.41 With this disguise of dreams Ricoeur realizes

that the subject can reestablish the truth of dreams through reflection and distanciation.

In reflection, the dreamer recollects himself and lets the dream unfold in front of him.

After which the dreamer looks for its significance to himself. He thus interprets the

dream. He appropriates to himself its meaning and thereby distances himself from its

content and peeks deeply into its great abyss.

Ricoeur employs Nabert’s philosophy of reflection that is neither direct nor

immediate. Reflection is indirect because Nabert believes that existence is revealed only

in the documents of life and because false consciousness needs a corrective critique

which will lead it from misunderstanding to understanding.42 Reflective philosophy aims

to appreciate in praxis an originary dynamism that grounds human existence. Reflection

recaptures the subject through the expressions of life that objectify it. However, the

textual exegesis of consciousness collides with the initial ‘misinterpretation’ of false

41
Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, trans. by and intro. by Dr. A.A. Brill,
Book 2: The Interpretation of Dreams (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), 218.
42
Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 18.
 16

consciousness. Thus, hermeneutics is there to rectify what was first a misinterpretation

and makes possible the re-appropriation or recovery of the subject.

Now, the researcher applies Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation as an

approach in clarifying the meaning of the subject to the clarification of Filipino identity.

There is always the question of who are the Filipinos. It is believed that the Filipinos’

confusion regarding their identity contributes to the stagnation of the Philippines as a

country. Thus, there is a constant clamor for the thoughtful consideration of the Filipino

identity.

De Quiros of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, in his article entitled “A Question of

Identity”, points out the significance of identity saying:

[W]hat's the big deal about identity? Well, look at countries like Thailand,
Singapore and Malaysia, and look at us. With nations as with individuals,
you have no sense of self, you will never know, and do, what you want.
You will only know, and follow, what others tell you to.43

The importance of knowing one’s self depends on the ability of the person to appropriate

his decision upon his own.

Another discussion on the importance of looking into the Filipino’s identity is

found in the article of Michael Tan, “Looking for the Filipino Soul.” Tan observes that

there are people calling for a return to values as the solution to all of the problems that

beset the Filipinos. However, he points out that what the Filipinos need to do first is to

be more introspective and ask themselves: what values? And whose values?44 He adds

by saying that

43
Conrado de Quiros, “A Question of Identity” [article online]; available from http://www.inq7.
net/opi/2002/mar/20/opi_csdequiros-1.htm; accessed September 3, 2003.
44
Michael L. Tan, “Looking for the Filipinos Soul” [article online]; available from http://www.
pinoykasi.homestead.com/files/first_article.htm; accessed September 3, 2003.
 17

I am not about to romanticize Filipino culture, praising all that is local as

good and pure. Our faults are many and we should be mature enough to
talk about them and laugh at ourselves, even as we recognize that we
would be so much duller if we didn't have those faults.45

He accentuates the importance of soul-searching and the unraveling of the Filipino

psyche all the more that it is fairly a young nation. Looking into the Filipino soul is

needed in the Filipinos’ search for their identity.46

Roco intimates the same sentiments. In one of his news releases entitled “Making

People Strong: The DepEd under Sec. Raul S. Roco,” he envisions Filipino leaders who

are open to the global environment yet rooted in their national identity. He believes that

“education will arm the Filipino people in a world fueled by knowledge; an education

that develops functional literacy and numeracy, critical and higher thinking, a

commitment to excellence and a love for learning.”47 However, the researcher focuses on

the vision of Roco of Filipino leaders who are deeply in contact with their national

identity.

Tomas Andres, in his book entitled “Understanding Values”, says that the core of

human reality is the self. The superficiality of the Filipino’s action and the

meaninglessness of every moment are eliminated when the Filipino self is discovered.

This makes self-discovery as the basic premise of every meaningful human activity.48 He

persuades the reader, through his book, “to evaluate alternatives and select the one that is

45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Raul Roco ,“Making People Strong: The DepEd under Sec. Raul S. Roco” [article online];
available from http://www.raulroco.com/news_releases/ newsreleases.htm accessed September 6, 2003.
48
Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Values (Quezon city: New Day Publishers, 1980), viii.
 18

right for him so that he can clarify his values, realize his goals, gain self-confidence and

form meaningful relationships with others”; the reader is “encouraged to set up his own

benchmarks against which to measure his own personal search for meaning.”49

The researcher finds this exhortation relevant to the Filipinos in general. He likes

to extend this idea to the search for the true Filipino identity, for through it the Filipinos

are encouraged to set up their own benchmarks against which to measure their communal

search for meaning.

A detour, however, in the clarification of the Filipino identity has to be put in

place. A way to know a nation’s identity is by its values.50 According to Talisayon, the

core or central clusters of the Filipino value system revolve around seven values, with

family/kinship orientation as the core value.51 McCoy shares this observation. In fact,

according to him,

the state recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society. In

curiously loving language, Article 216 of the Philippine Civil Code states
that “The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects.” In Article 219 the state admonishes its officials to respect
the family’s primary responsibility for social welfare: “Mutual aid, both
moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family.
Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.”
Similarly, in Article 2, section 12, the Philippine Constitution of 1986
makes the defense of the family a basic national principle: “The state
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.”52

49
Ibid.
50
Alejandro R. Roces, “A Nation Is Known By Its Values” in Peace and Tolerance: Values
Education Through History, 122-124.
51
Talisayon, 105.
52
McCoy, 7.
 19

McCoy also observes that the Filipino family “provides employment and capital,

educates and socializes the young, assures medical care, shelters its handicapped and

aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its name, honor, lands, capital, and values to

the next generation.”53

Family orientation is indeed very crucial to the Filipino. Historically, Covar

points out that during the formative period of the Philippine history, the Filipino was

concerned with the ginhawa (inner comfort) of the tao and the well-being of the sakop

(ward).54 As the Filipino progressed in the period of Struggle and National

Consolidation, the concern now turned into the civilization of the ‘natives’ as Spanish

mesticillos and little brown Americans who eventually became the ilustrados. Also,

during this time, the Filipino began to think about the national interest. However, the

promise of working for the national interest and general welfare had remained a promise

for the colonizers effectively exploited the Filipino’s family-centeredness by fitting one

family against another family, one region against another region.55

As we now enter the 21st century, social scientists and communicators usually ask,

“What happened to the society and culture during the Formative Period? Were they

wiped out during the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation? Is there anything

left in the indigenous culture and society which we could rally around the Period of

53
Ibid.
54
Prospero R. Covar, “Unburdening Philippine Society of Colonialism” in Peace and Tolerance:
Values Education Through History, 171.
55
Ibid., 171.
 20

Cultural Solidarity?”56 Then Covar explains, “Our answers to these questions shall help

guide us in our quest for values beyond 1998.”57

The answer of Ramirez to the questions is affirmative. Indeed, there are still

things left in the indigenous culture and society that pervade in the Period of cultural

solidarity. The traces of the Formative period pervades in what Ramirez calls as the

suppressed culture that operates vis-à-vis the dominant culture imposed by the colonizers.

It might be thought of that the operating values during the Formative period are

insignificant for they are now relegated to the collective unconscious of the people.

However, Ramirez elucidates that they are not insignificant for they have “become the

soil in which any external item from other cultures may be grafted to assume its own

unique growth and evolution.”58 This hidden dimension, she explains further, “is

sometimes more powerful than the external elements of a culture [for it] lives in the

minds and hearts of people.”59

During the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation, the people’s operating

values of the Formative Period were forcefully put on the back burner for the reason that

colonizers imposed religious, social and political systems on the Filipinos.

For the Spaniards, colonization was part of their desire to ‘Christianize’
us; for the Americans, it was their plan to establish a politico-economic
foothold in Asia, disguised as ‘benevolent assimilation.’ Punitive
measures accompanied these impositions. Filipinos who refused to accept
the new systems were punished as heretics and insurrectos…. They
likewise introduced their values as standards for what is desirable, good,

56
Ibid., 174.
57
Ibid.
58
Mina M. Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System” Reflections on Culture, an occasional monograph (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991), 4.
59
Ibid.
 21

true, and beautiful in society. On the other hand, native customary ways
were set aside as “primitive.” Conventional practices were labeled as
“barbaric.” Indigenous values were described as “backward” and
“corrupt.” Native character was seen as “uncouth” and local beliefs were
called “superstitions.” Thus viewed, local knowledge, beliefs, and
practices became undesirable. They were said to be “barriers to
modernization.” Therefore they had to be changed.60

Meaning, with the use of the whip, the people were forced to adopt the value system of

the colonizers without positively understanding the impact of the modern practices to

modernization. They adopted the practices of the colonizers out of fear, practices which

were not completely assimilated and grafted to the indigenous soul of the people. In the

words of Alfred McCoy, citing O.D. Corpuz, although Spain and the United States tried

to forge a strong bureaucratic apparatus based upon their own laws and social practice,

they could not induce compliance through shared myth or other forms of social sanction

because the modern Philippine state did not evolve organically from Filipino society.

They derived their authority from the implied coercion of colonial rule.61 Consequently,

Filipinos became very religious and devout Christians, but the sharing of material goods

to others, most especially to the needy, are quite difficult for them. Also, nowadays, with

free enterprise, people earn more money but it is not necessarily equated with hard work.

People realize that if one is clever enough, one can get money through gambling,

scheming (like in graft and corruption) or some illegal way.62

60
F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition (Manila: PUNLAD Research
House, Inc., 1997), 3 – 4.
61
McCoy, 11. Cf. O.D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public
Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957), 128 – 213.
62
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”,
5. See also, Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” Reflections on
Culture, 19.
 22

While conventional practices are labeled as “barbaric,” indigenous values

described as “backward” and “corrupt,” native character seen as “uncouth” and local

beliefs called “superstitions,” the people are able to develop the idea that the indigenous

models are inferior compared to the exogenous models brought by the colonizers.63 As

mentioned above, the simultaneous demands of the two incongruous systems on the

Filipinos create conflict situations which satisfy neither value system fully. Thus, in the

supposed Period of cultural solidarity, there is really no solidarity that happens for the

reason that the operating values in the formative period (the traditional value system) and

those of the period of struggle and national consolidation (the dominant value system) are

continually in conflict in this period of supposed solidarity.

Nevertheless, the Filipino bats for national solidarity. However, the interests of

the family interfere with the interests of the nation, which might be the reason why the

Filipino has the difficulty of achieving a true sense of nationalism. For this reason, to re-

understand family orientation as a core Filipino value is an imperative.

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem

This dissertation attempts to clarify the meaning of the Filipino identity through

family orientation as a core Filipino value using Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation

as an experimental tool. The researcher then resolves to answer the following problems:

1. What is Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology as a philosophy?

2. How does the hermeneutics of appropriation work?

63
Jocano, 5. See also Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines”,
23 – 24.
 23

3. How can the hermeneutics of appropriation as a methodology be applied in the

clarification of the Filipino identity?

Significance of the Study

The researcher finds a parallelism between Ricoeur’s clarification of the meaning

of the subject and the researcher’s own quest for the clarification of the Filipino’s

identity.

The dissertation brings forward a lesson directed to anybody. As a person and an

inhabitant of the Filipino society, the researcher aims at applying Ricoeur’s hermeneutic

of appropriation to the clarification of the Filipino identity. Phenomenological bracketing

suspends deliberately judgments about the Filipino values and lets it unfold itself and

show its relevance to the Filipino experience. Hermeneutics cautions the Filipinos to

realize the appropriateness of the Filipino values to the present time.

In other words, hermeneutic phenomenological approach can be used to check

critically the Filipinos’ experience within the society. It urges deliberate suspension of

judgments and allows experience to unfold and show its relevance. Further, to rephrase

what has been said above, it admonishes the Filipino to be on guard against trivial matters

that conceal the meaningful and existential understanding of the being of a Filipino.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

The aim of this dissertation is not to have a full blown study of the philosophy of

Paul Ricoeur. It zeroes in only on Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation.

Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology is studied just to locate the place of the

hermeneutic of appropriation.
 24

Furthermore, the clarification of the Filipino identity is done through a detour on

family/kinship orientation as a core Filipino value.

Consciously, Ricoeur’s recovery of the subject using hermeneutics of

appropriation is the same route that this dissertation is following.

Another limitation of the study is that Ricoeur’s writings are in French and the

researcher will have to depend on translation. The name of the translators are listed in

the citations of Ricoeur’s works.

METHODOLOGY

The present study makes an exploratory review of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic

phenomenology, in general, and the hermeneutics of appropriation, in particular.

Subsequently, the researcher explores also the initial understanding regarding Filipino

identity and the common understanding of the Filipino values, in general, and the

family/kinship orientation as a core Filipino value, in particular.

The researcher, at first, utilizes phenomenology to clarify through reflective

analysis the Filipino’s own existence whereby his identity can be deduced. Subsequently,

he makes use of hermeneutics, inasmuch as this reflective analysis is indirect and

interpretive, for it deduces the Filipino identity from the family/kinship orientation as a

core Filipino value. Ultimately, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation is utilized in

order to have a proper appreciation of the family/kinship orientation as a core value,

which will then be utilized as a springboard in the making of the new Filipino in the new

millennium.
 25

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Appropriation. This theory of interpretation does not imply the secret return of the

sovereign subject. It is the making-one’s-own of the ground of one’s existence. It is the

becoming of the self grounded in participation. Thus, appropriation is more of an

intersubjective relation of mutual understanding.

Close Family Ties. The family has been the unit of society and everything revolves

around it. The Filipino family consists of the grandparents, the parents, and the children.

The father is the head of the family, but while he rules, the mother governs. Over and

above the “ruler” and the “governor” are the grandparents, whose opinions and decisions

on all important matters are sought.64

Filipinos. They are Malay-Indonesian negritos distilled with European and American

cultures and races; individuals well-gifted in friendship, understanding, letters, arts and

sciences, sports and pursuit of excellence; Christian people; an avid lover of democracy;

and a personality gradually discovering his identity.65 Although Agoncillo explains that

the Filipino is difficult, if not impossible to define, he picks out some traits common to

the average Filipino that separates him from the Spaniards and the Americans. These

traits are the following: hospitality, close family ties, respect for the elders, regionalistic,

fatalistic, loyalty, sensitive, tendency to be indolent, lack of initiative, curious,

individualistic, jealous, etc.66

64
Agoncillo, 6 -7.
65
Andres, Understanding Filipinos Values: A Management Approach (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers, 1981).
66
Agoncillo, 5 – 15.
 26

Filipino Culture. It is an integrated system of learned behavior patterns that are

characteristic of the members of the Philippine society. It refers to the total way of life of

the Filipinos. It includes everything that the Filipinos think, say, do, or make. It includes

Philippines customs, traditions, language, values, beliefs, and attitudes, concepts of self,

morals, rituals, and manners.67

Hermeneutic phenomenology. Ricoeur rediscovers the right place of the subject in the

context of experience. He desires to have a subject that is certain of the meaning of its

experience which is devoid of naiveté. To do so, Ricoeur grafts Husserl’s bracketing into

Heidegger’s question of being. The result is the hermeneutic phenomenological

approach, an approach to know objectively the nature of experience. Ricoeur finds the

understanding of the subject possible only through things that mediate the subject.

Re-understanding Filipino Values. It means suggesting new ways of looking at the

traditional Filipino values, or re-understanding them so that the Filipinos can harness

them to work for them. This also refers to the need for the Filipinos to shift their value

paradigms – to recast their mindsets and to redefine their perspectives from one which

sees their traditional values as sources of ills to another which sees them as sources of

inner strength and moral will to survive and excel.68

Revolution of Mindsets. It means a change in the school system, Church system, and

communications system. These systems will have to play their role in clarifying values,

67
Andres and Pilar Corazon B. Ilada-Andres, Understanding the Filipino (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers, 1987).
68
Jocano, Filipino Value System.
 27

particularly those related to the “economy” in which a great many of the Filipino people

feel much deprived.69

Socio-cultural System is the complex of institutional dynamics, which is but a

manifestation of the collective unconscious (the hidden dimension of a culture) that has

developed through the historical evolution of a people.70

Values. They are the deepest layer of the institutional dynamics of a society that spells

out the structures or the enduring patterns of relationships operating as extensions of

culture.71

69
Mina M. Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System” Reflections on Culture, an occasional monograph (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991).
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
 CHAPTER TWO

THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

The conclusion of Paul Ricoeur’s book The Symbolism of Evil that says “the

symbol gives rise to thought”72 is highly instructive as to his attempt to elucidate the

dimensions of human subjectivity hermeneutically.73 Ricoeur explains that the said

statement enchants him for it says two things: “the symbol gives; but what it gives is

occasion for thought, something to think about.”74 Subsequently, in understanding the

symbol, Ricoeur adds that there is a need for “an interpretation that respects the original

enigma of the symbols, that lets itself be taught by them, beginning from there, promotes

the meaning, forms the meaning in the full responsibility of autonomous thought.”75 For

this reason, “the task of the philosopher guided by symbols would be to break out of the

enchanted enclosure of consciousness of oneself, to end the prerogative of self-

reflection.”76

In connection with this, Madison comments that “one of Ricoeur’s chief

contributions to philosophy in our time is the way in which he enabled us to think afresh

the age-old and central question of philosophy which is ourselves, the question as to what

72
Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. by Emerson Buchanan (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967), 347-357.
73
G. B. Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 75.
74
Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348.
75
Ibid., 350.
76
Ibid., 356.
 29

it means to be a thinking, reflective subject.”77 This becomes the focal point of Ricoeur’s

philosophical inquiries as it comes out from the Cartesian understanding of the subject up

to the influenced he got from Jean Nabert, his teacher. Nevertheless, the first philosopher

who has a great influence on Paul Ricoeur is Gabriel Marcel who was his professor from

1935 through the graduate years. Ricoeur holds, with Marcel, a profound respect for the

mystery of being and a deep distrust for any simple reductive explanation of the human

subject. Ricoeur’s modification of this Marcelian theme is one which complements his

respect for mystery.78

Avoiding the dichotomy of subject and object, Marcel formulates an ontological

unity of man’s incarnate existence. Marcel intends to describe the polar structure of the

ultimate unity of the subject and the object rather than reduce the subject or the object to

the other. The germ of Ricoeur’s idea on the unity of the subject and the object is already

found in Marcel. Later in his philosophical career, Ricoeur’s reading of Marx, Nietzsche,

and Freud validates Marcel’s concept of the mystery of being through the mystery of the

consciousness which is inscripted by symbolisms.

The essence of the symbolic enigma hints at a complication between the

consciousness and the object of consciousness. In the writings of Freud, there is no

immediate relationship between the dream and the apparent meaning of the dream. But,

if immediacy between the consciousness and its meaning is untenable, then there occurs a

dissociation of the subject from its consciousness.

77
Madison, 75.
78
Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1986), 8.
 30

A. Dislocation of the Subject

To trace the impetus of the dislocation of the subject from the influence of

Descartes is quite appropriate. Through Descartes, philosophers start to investigate the

subject that is the questor itself. The influence of Descartes in modern philosophy is

undeniable. His thought triggers other philosophers to either support or debunk his ideas.

The heritage of Cartesianism is so exemplary that even phenomenology takes its

beginning from it.

The Cartesian Tradition

In the history of Western Philosophy, the subject starts to be given full attention

only by Rene Descartes, who proposes that “we reject all such merely probable

knowledge and make it a rule to trust only what is completely known and incapable of

being doubted.”79 In view of this thrust, he employs doubt as a method in order to

ultimately find that entity which is certain and indubitable. He accepts nothing as true

unless he is certain of it. As he tries to doubt everything, he notices that

whilst I thus wish to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that
the “I” who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth
I think, therefore I am was so certain and so assured that all the most
extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable
of shaking it, came to the conclusion that I would receive it without
scruple as the first principle of the philosophy for which I was seeking.80

His proclamation of “Cogito, Ergo Sum” leads, however, to the isolation of the subject

from its environment81 and, in the clarity of itself, the assertion of itself.

79
Descartes, “Rules for the Direction of the Mind”, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes,
trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), 3.
80
Descartes, “Discourse on the Method”, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 101. Cf.
Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 149ff.
81
Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, 153-57.
 31

The Cartesian Cogito is the unsurpassed starting point of Modern Philosophy, the

historical moment which is also the moment of the subject. The subject has thereby been

instituted through Descartes’ declaration of “Cogito, Ergo Sum.”

The Cartesian methodic doubt is, by its very nature, epistemological. Moreover, it

is necessary to explain it as a jumping board for our quest of the subject. It will be

remembered that the very characteristic of Descartes’ methodic doubt is “his decision to

treat the probable as false, and to distrust the senses as sources of knowledge. He even

went as far as to suppose the existence of some powerful malignant spirit who constantly

deceived him in all that he thought.”82

Nevertheless, the methodic doubt leads Descartes to one indubitable truth: his

own existence. The founding of his own existence as the indubitable truth becomes the

basis of his entire philosophy. He focuses on the importance of analyzing and evaluating

human knowledge and thus stresses the role of the subject in any such study.83

The Cartesian subject, however, remains separated or divorced from its existential

reality for the reason that it is centered on the Cogito and not on the Ego of the Cogito.

In this regard Ricoeur criticizes Descartes, saying:

the celebrated Cartesian cogito... is a truth as vain as it is invincible. I do

not deny that it is a truth; it is a truth which posits itself, and as such it
can be neither verified nor deduced. It posits at once a being and an act,
an existence and an operation of thought: I am, I think; to exist for me,
is to think: I exist insofar as I think.84 But this truth is in vain... so long
as the ego of the ego cogito has not been recaptured....85

82
Reginald F. O’neill, S.J., Theories of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1959), 135. Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, 148.
83
Ibid., 136.
84
Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, 150-51.
85
Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 17.
 32

The assertion of the Cogito is the assertion that the Cogito is the sole truth of the

consciousness. Since the Cogito is an indubitable truth, the “sum” possesses the certainty

of the consciousness. Henceforth, the Cogito understands intuitively its own existence.

If Descartes considers the Cogito as the most unshakable truth, then it is void of any

doubt. The existence of the Cogito is intuitive, that is, it is an unclouded conception

which the mind gives us so readily and distinctly that it is free from doubt. And so he

concludes that each individual can mentally have an intuition of the fact that he exists,

and that he thinks.86 Thus, Ricoeur is correct when he remarks that

The Cogito is not only a truth as vain as it is invincible...as well, that it is

like an empty place which has from all time, been occupied by false
Cogito... that so-called immediate consciousness is first of all “false
consciousness”. Henceforth it becomes necessary to join a critique of
false consciousness to any rediscovery of the subject of the Cogito in the
documents of its life....87

The understanding of Descartes of the Cogito as the subject is not yet the subject

which he refers to as “I am”. On the contrary, the subject that is talked about here refers

to the subject as substratum. The subject as the ground or substratum is “that which

gathers everything to itself to become a basis. This subjectum is not yet man and not at all

the ‘I’.”88

Ricoeur emphasizes the difference between subjectum as ground and subjectum as

“I”. The subjectum as ground accentuates the central importance of the Cogito in its

relation to the existent. The certainty of the things outside the Cogito depends on the

86
Cf. Descartes, “Rules for the Direction of the Mind”, 7.
87
Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 18.
88
Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 228.
 33

Cogito itself. This happens because the Cogito is the model of certitude and consequently

mirrors certitude. The world, in this sense, becomes a picture that stands before the

Cogito. Thus, “the existent as a whole is posited as that with respect to which a man

orients himself, which, therefore, he wishes to bring and have before himself, and thus, in

a decisive sense, re-presents to himself.”89 The representation of the existent emerges as

parallel to the emergence of man as subject.

On the other hand, the understanding of the subjectum as “I”, based on the

previous analysis, becomes a temporal entity. The “I” is an entity that “belongs to an

age, and not only to an age, but to the first age for which the world is made into a

view.”90 This means to say that the Cartesian idea of the Cogito as absolute is now

defunct. The Cogito is actually an entity that belongs to an age, formed by its culture and

environment. When Ricoeur seemingly destroys the Cogito, he does this to justify the

return of the question of the subject. The ego is a temporal entity and not an immediate

consciousness.

The Husserlian Egology

The starting point of Husserl’s philosophy, following the Cartesian tradition, is

the self-evidence of one’s own consciousness.91 If Descartes prides himself on the

immediacy of the Cogito, Husserl, for his part, gives exceptional consideration to

perception. For him, “seeing” is very important. The vagueness of the configuration of

an object in the dark can be made clear through “seeing”. Husserl says that what he

89
Ibid.
90
Ibid., 229.
91
Robert C. Solomon, A History of Western Philosophy. Volume 7: Continental Philosophy Since
1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 130.
 34

wants to achieve is clarity. He writes, “I want to understand the possibility of that

reaching. But this... signifies: I want to come face to face with the essence of the

possibility of that reaching. I want to make it given to me in an act of ‘seeing’.”92 What

Husserl wants to see is the necessary and universal truth of experience.

According to him, the entities that are really clear to his cognition are the

immanent entities since they are within him. The knowledge of the things belonging to

the objective sciences, the natural sciences, and the sciences of culture, as well as those of

the mathematical sciences, is transcendent. Because it is transcendent, it is outside him.

Now he raises the question of the possibility of cognition reaching what is beyond itself.

It seems to be not possible to reach those entities that are not found within the confine of

consciousness.93

Husserl says there is only one indubitable entity, i.e., the genuinely immanent

being. Primarily, the subject may use the genuinely immanent being because it is beyond

questioning. However, he may not yet use the transcendent or the non-genuinely

immanent being. Nevertheless, he can still use it after accomplishing a

phenomenological reduction. The method of phenomenological reduction involves the

exclusion of all that is transcendentally posited.94 Transcendental reduction brings

knowledge to self-evidence and self-givenness. “The idea of phenomenological

reduction acquires a more immediate and more profound determination and a clearer

meaning .... The root of the matter, however, is to grasp the meaning of the absolutely

92
Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by William P. Alston and George
Nakhnikian, intro. by George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 4.
93
Ibid., 3.
94
Ibid., 3-4.
 35

given, the absolute clarity of the given, which excludes every meaningful doubt, in a

word, to grasp the absolutely “seeing” evidence which gets hold of itself.”95

Consequently, the world is not just a reflection of the Cogito. The world becomes a kind

of a being-for-me. If the first thing that is discovered by the Cartesian methodic doubt is

the ego-cogito, in Husserl’s phenomenology the first discovery is the opening up of the

ego-cogito-cogitatum.96 This is what Husserl meant by the world as a kind of a being-

for-me.

The idea of the being-for-me is the offshoot of the idea of intentionality.

Intentionality is characterized by mental acts such as judgments, beliefs, meanings,

valuations, desires, loves, hatreds, and so on. It is always an act that is “about” or “of”

something.97 All experiences which have these essential properties in common are also

called “intentional experiences”; in so far as they are a consciousness of something, they

are said to be “intentionally related” to.98 Husserl adds,

That an experience is the consciousness of something;..., this does not

relate to the experimental fact as lived within the world... but to the pure
essence grasped ideationally as pure idea. In the very essence of an
experience lies determined not only that, but also whereof it is a
consciousness, and in what determinate or indeterminate sense it is this.99

95
Ibid., 4.
96
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion
Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 50.
97
Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology , translated by W. R. Boyce
Gibson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), xiii-xiv.
98
Ibid., 119.
99
Ibid., 120.
 36

In other words, as Kearney describes it, “to say that consciousness is ‘intentional’ is to

recognise that when I perceive or imagine an object my consciousness is already out there

reaching toward the object itself.”100

Husserl’s phenomenological reduction promotes a subject that is the final

justification of all objectivity. It promotes a consciousness that points to the correlative

poles of the conscious act, the object of consciousness which he designates by the term

“noema” and the conscious act that intends the object which he calls “noesis”. These two

poles of the conscious are acts inseparable and they constitute together the two

correlative sides of the pure ego.101 As a consequent, Husserl replaces the traditional

category of “substance” with the category of “relation”.102 This is being the case; the

subject and the object do not exist as if they are two distinct substances existing

independently of each other. On the contrary, they exist, first and foremost, in relation to

each other. They become separated only as they are divided at the reflective level of

logic.103

The moment of bracketing the transcendents to uncover the immanents of the

object involves a new problem in the nature of the subject. The project of Husserl is to

uncover the immanent and this involves “seeing”. Nevertheless, as Jervolino quotes

Ricoeur, “all seeing is already and always understanding-interpreting... The articulation

of the understood, as it takes place in the form of the approach that understands being in

100
Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 2nd edition (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1994),, 15.
101
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 29.
102
Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 13.
103
Ibid.
 37

the form of the ‘as something’, precedes any thematic statement about the being.”104

Inasmuch as all seeing is already and always understanding-interpreting, then the

presuppositionless philosophy of Husserl is not sufficient. The act of understanding-

interpreting is not void of presuppositions. Instead, it presupposes the historicity of the

subject which already conditions its consciousness.

The main objection of Ricoeur to the transcendental nature of Husserl’s subject is

its position that the subject has an immediate and intuitive consciousness. For Ricoeur,

an immediate and intuitive consciousness of the subject is not convenient. That

transcendental constitution of the subject is what he means by reflection. But, according

to him, reflection is not an intuition.105 The consciousness is not the abode of meaning;

there is something other than the consciousness that is the abode of meaning.106 The very

idea of the Cogito and the transcendental ego implies that subject constitutes meaning.

Ricoeur reasons that the subject should not be identified with the consciousness.

Meaning, the “I am” must not be identified with the “I think”. To understand the subject

does not need intuition. If it is intuited, “the first truth - I am, I think - remains as abstract

and empty as it is invincible; it has to be ‘mediated’ by the ideas, actions, works,

institutions, monuments that objectify it. It is in these objects... that the Ego must lose

and find itself.”107

104
Domenico Jervolino, The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur,
trans. by Gordon Poole (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Klumer Academic Publishers, 1990), 90.
105
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 43.
106
Ibid., 55.
107
Ibid., 43.
 38

Heidegger and the Subject

Kearney remarks that Heidegger revised Husserl’s phenomenological method so

that it might properly respond to the question of Being. He re-opened the brackets and let

existence back in. But existence was now to be understood neither as mere subjectivity

nor mere objectivity, but as a fundamental openness to the Being of beings.”108

Heidegger denies the possibility of bracketing. To understand Dasein is always mediated

by a foreknowledge which comprises the life-world of the interpreter. Therefore,

suspending that life-world would preclude the possibility of understanding, altogether. As

Bleicher explained, “since Dasein is characterized by its understanding of Being, the

meaning can only be interpreted from within this pre-current understanding.”109

Heidegger reaches this conclusion by contending that as a necessary part of

Dasein, things are perceived according to how they are encountered and used in one’s

everyday routines and tasks. Perception and apprehension are moved from fore-

knowledge to an existential understanding which is largely an unreflective and automatic

grasp of a situation that triggers a response. The meaningfulness of this understanding is

due to Dasein’s being both historical and finite. “It is historical in that understanding

builds from the fore-knowledge accumulated from experience. It is finite due to

“thrownness”, the necessity of acting in situations without the time or ability to grasp the

full consequences of actions or plans in advance.”110 Ricoeur comments that indeed

108
Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 30.
109
Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method,
Philosophy and Critique, reprint edition (London: Routledge, 1993), 100.
110
John C. Mallery, Roger Hurwitz and Gavan Duffy “Heidegger’s Ontological Hermeneutics”
[article on-line]; available from http://www.ai.mit. edu/people/jcma/papers/1986-ai-memo-871/
subsection3_4_1.html; accessed July 22, 1998.
 39

“language is so made that it is able to designate the ground of existence from which it

proceeds and to recognize itself as a mode of the being of which it speaks.”111

Although it might appear that hermeneutics opposes phenomenology,

phenomenology is actually not invalidated. As a matter of fact, phenomenology is the

unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics.112 Only that, Ricoeur comments, “[F]or

hermeneutics, the problem of ultimate foundation still belongs to the sphere of

objectifying thought, so long as the ideal of scientificity is not questioned as such. The

radicality of such questioning leads from idea of scientificity back to the ontological

condition of belonging, whereby he who questions shares in the very thing about which

he questions.”113

Heidegger develops an ontology of the subject that refutes Descartes’ Cogito. The

Cartesian Cogito, according to Ricoeur, is conceived as a simple epistemological

principle that prioritizes the self-positing or the self-asserting of the Cogito. The

Heideggerian ontology refutes the Cartesian Cogito as a starting point which serves as the

model for certitude. Heidegger’s ontology, which Ricoeur calls the hermeneutics of the

“I am”, speaks of the Cogito as the foundation of Being which is necessarily spoken as

grounding the Cogito.114

111
Ricoeur, “The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 266.
112
Jervolino, 87.
113
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences:
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited, translated, and introduced by John B. Thompson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 106.
114
Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 223-
225. Grounding here does not refer to the idea of subjectum as ground. Subjectum as ground refers to the
Cogito as the epistemological foundation. On the other hand, grounding here refers to the Being of the
Cogito which is grounded on its historicity.
 40

What is important in the ontology of Heidegger is that “the problem of Being

occurs as a question precisely in the treatment of the concept of ‘question’ in which we

shall discover this reference to a self...”115 The idea of the subject as the questor of Being

does not mean that it is doubting nor is it posited as certain of itself. However, this

Being, which is a being of understanding which Heidegger calls Dasein, is “the subject

that is totally open to the question and the manifestation of Being.”116 The questioning of

the meaning of Being is the mode of being of a possible ego.

The position of the question of Being leads to the positing of the subject. Ricoeur

quotes Heidegger:

Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access

to it - all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and
therefore are modes of Being of such a particular being..., viz., that which
we the inquirers are ourselves....117

Here Paul Ricoeur understands the inquirer as the “I am” and no longer as the “I think” of

Descartes.

The inquirer is not the “I think” of Descartes because the inquirer which he calls

Dasein is a being that has a grounding relation to every subject in the world. Now, every

utterance of Dasein in its quest of Being leads to language. However, prior to the

subservience of Dasein to language, it must first feel the world wherein it is rooted.

115
Ibid., 225.
116
Van den Hengel, 101.
117
Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 226.
Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), 26-27.
 41

Hence, understanding, which is a very definitive characteristic of Dasein’s

being118, occurs after its encounter with the world. From the “world” he moves to

“being-in”, then to “being-there”. Understanding is located within the trilogy of

situation, understanding, and interpretation.119

Prior to understanding, which is exteriorized by language, there is first the

situation wherein Dasein finds itself. Before Dasein can talk, it first finds itself rooted in

a situation, in a certain milieu. Within the situatedness of Dasein, understanding arises.

The task of understanding is the orientation of Dasein to its situation. Since

understanding characterizes Dasein, its task is to disclose the possibilities of Dasein.

These possibilities, which have something to do with the projection of Dasein, are

referred to the choices that are open to Dasein in every situation it encounters. It is the

understanding which sees these possibilities as the future of Dasein.120

Using language as an aid to understanding is interpretation. Every act of

understanding involves an act of interpretation. Actually, interpretation is an explication

of understanding. If understanding connotes the incorporation of the things understood

into Dasein’s world, which happens only after interpretation.

Understanding as interpreting means that there are structures to be considered,

structures that are necessary for interpretation. These structures are the fore-structure and

the as-structure.121 The fore structure involves the presuppositions of Dasein. These

118
Ibid. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.
119
Ricoeur, “The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 266.
120
John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1969), 22.
121
Ibid., 23.
 42

presuppositions color every apprehension of something. It follows then that they color the

understanding of something.

The as-structure, on the other hand, is an "interpretation of something as something,

and indeed only can we be said to have apprehended an understanding of it. For instance,

we interpret a moving light in the sky as an aircraft or as a meteorite or in some other

way".122 And this appropriation is based on the person's apprehension of the phenomenon.

Every interpretation is based on some prior understanding of the apprehended

thing and at the same time involves language. Language is typically expressed in a

discourse. This does not mean that language is principally communication; instead, it is a

disclosure of Dasein. Language evolves from the need to manifest the understanding of

Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Ricoeur says that Heidegger’s destruction of the Cogito as

a self-positing being and an absolute subject is the reverse side of a hermeneutics of the

“I am” as constituted by its relation to Being.123

The Masters of Suspicion

Ricoeur gets the idea of the subject as having no immediate and intuitive

consciousness from the three masters of suspicion: Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. Each of

the three contests the primacy of consciousness that made them decide to look upon the

whole of consciousness as false which contradicts the indubitability of the Cartesian

cogito of Descartes. With the three masters of suspicion, self-consciousness becomes

illusory. As Ricoeur elaborates, he says that

they all attack the same illusion, that illusion which bears the hallowed
name of self-consciousness. This illusion is the fruit of a preceding

122
Ibid.
123
Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 234.
 43

victory, which conquered the previous illusion of the thing. The

philosopher trained in the school of Descartes knows that things are
doubtful, that they are not what they appear to be. But he never doubts that
consciousness is at it appears to itself. In consciousness, meaning and the
consciousness of meaning coincide. Since Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,
however, we doubt even this. After doubting the thing, we have begun to
doubt consciousness. 124

The goal of their destructiveness is set upon clearing “the horizon for a more authentic

word, for a new reign of Truth, not only by means of a ‘destructive’ critique but by the

invention of an art of interpreting.”125 Ricoeur elaborates that

all three... begin with suspicions about the illusions of consciousness and
operate by the guile of decipherment. All three... far from being detractors
of “consciousness,” aim at extending it. What Marx wants is to liberate
praxis by the awareness of necessity... What Nietzsche wants is to
augment man’s power and restore his force... What Freud wants is for the
patient to make the meaning which was foreign to him his own and thus
enlarge his field of consciousness, live better , and finally, be a bit freer
and, if possible, a bit happier. Thus the same doubter who depicts the ego
as a “poor wretch”... is also the exegete who rediscovers the logic of the
illogical kingdom.126

With the advent of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, to understand becomes

hermeneutics. Hence, “to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of

meaning, but to decipher its expressions.”127 They then define the fundamental category

of consciousness to be the relation hidden-shown.128 Consequently, they point to the

124
Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 148.
125
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33. Cf. Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of
Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 149.
126
Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 150.
127
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33. Cf. Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of
Contemporary Culture”, 149.
128
Ibid., 33-34.
 44

“process of false consciousness and the method of deciphering.”129 Moreover, the

suspicion concerning the illusions of consciousness becomes the stepping stone in

employing the stratagem of deciphering.130

The hermeneutic task is the deciphering of multiple significance.

“Interpretation... is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden

meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the

literal meaning.”131 This hermeneutic task is consistent with Ricoeur’s meditation on the

sentence mentioned above: “The symbol gives rise to thought.” The project of the three

critiques of “false” consciousness132 is consistent with what Ricoeur claims:

All criticism “demythologizes” insofar as it is criticism; that is to say, it

always adds to the separation of the historical… and the pseudo-
historical…. [C]riticism cannot help being a “demythologization”; that is
an irreversible gain of truthfulness, of intellectual honesty, and therefore
of objectivity.133

The acceleration of the movement of demythologization brings to light the dimension of

the symbol.

Kearney comments that although the hermeneutics of suspicion is a negative

hermeneutics of demystification, “it deals with falsehood and illusion not just in the

subjective context of epistemological error, but as a dimension of our social discourse as

a whole. Thus, Marx conceived of false-consciousness as a reflection of the class

129
Ibid., 34.
130
Ibid.
131
Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 13.
132
Ricoeur, Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations 148
133
Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 352.
 45

struggle; Nietzsche as the resentful vengeance of the weak against the strong; and Freud

as a history of human desire repressed by cultural prohibition.”134 The project of the three

masters is consistent with what Ricoeur perceives to be the task of hermeneutics, i.e., “to

read a text and to distinguish the true sense from the apparent sense, to search for the

sense under the sense.”135

Its further significance, Robinson explains, lies on its “task of 'doing away with

idols,' namely, becoming critically aware of when we project our own wishes and

constructs into texts, so that they no longer address us from beyond ourselves as

‘other’.”136 And as Kearney clarifies also, although the hermeneutics of suspicion is a

negative hermeneutics of demystification, “we cannot affirm the positive ontological

content of our significations – that is, the projection of authentic possibilities of being –

without demythologising their false content.137

B. Symbol and Interpretation

Paul Ricoeur's first notion of interpretation is rooted in his quest to understand

symbol. He observes that there is something in the symbolic that tells more about it. He

defines "symbol and interpretation in their relation to one another."138 This implies that

134
Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 105.
135
Charles Reagan and David Stewart, eds., The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His
Work (Beacon Press, 1978) as cited by Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy,105.
136
G. D. Robinson, “Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion: A Brief Overview and
Critique”, Premise, volume II, number 8 (September 27, 1995), 12ff. [article online]; available from
http://capo.org/premise/95/sep/p950812.html; accessed February 20, 2004.
137
Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 105. Kearney comments further that
“the atheistic critique championed by the ‘masters of suspicion’ is an essential ingredient of the mature
faith of modern man.” (Ibid.)

138
Patrick L. Bourgeois, Extension of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), 71.
 46

his study on symbol leads to the understanding of his notion of the subject. The

interpretation of symbolisms mirrors the gradation of the subject’s going into itself.

He considers three zones which deal with symbols: Phenomenology of Religion,

Psychoanalysis, and Metaphor. These he refers to as the hierophanic, oneiric, and poetic,

respectively. He elaborates them separately in different works. He discusses the

Phenomenology of Religion in the Symbolism of Evil, his investigation on Psychoanalysis

in Freud and Philosophy, and his study on Metaphor in the book entitled The Rule of

Metaphor.

Primarily these areas of study are selected due to their symbolic nature. In other

words, these fields separately interpret symbols. It has to be emphasized, however, that

symbols are expressions with double meaning. The problem with the symbolic lies in

its double meaning structure. The double meaning structure of the symbolic opens the

way to the problem of interpretation. As it turns out, “the problem of interpretation in

turn designates all understanding specifically concerned with the meaning of equivocal

expressions. To interpret is to understand a double meaning.”139 With the advent of the

double meaning, a need for interpretation becomes of utmost necessity. A need for

interpreting the meaning of the symbolic is necessary in order to understand its meaning.

Furthermore, Ricoeur is fascinated with symbol and finds it to be very significant.

Every symbol is not to be taken as it is. It always points to something beneath its

appearance. He considers a symbol to be more than a mere sign or an icon which so

concentrates on the periphery that it becomes ordinary the moment its meaning is

discovered. On the contrary, the symbol provides a food for thought. The first discovery

139
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8.
 47

of its meaning leads to further discovery. There is an apparent movement or even a cycle

in the unfolding of the meaning of the symbol.

The sense of the symbol betrays its reference. Unlike the use of a univocal sign,

the ideal sense of the text in a symbolic sign can have a reference that transcends the

sense of the text. If the sense of a univocal sign can be reflected by its reference, the

symbolic sign cannot. The apparent disparity of the sense to the reference of the text

leads to interpretation. This will be further illustrated later by the three symbolic

categories: hierophanic, oneiric, and poetic. At the moment, however, it will be good to

contrast a symbol with other entities having a related structure with it to further

understand its nature.

Symbol and its Related Structures

Ricoeur has in mind an intentional analysis which marks the difference of a

symbol from a series of related structures. The process also shows that, though they are

different, they have an identical nucleus of meaning. Consequently, Ricoeur

differentiates the symbol from the sign, the allegory, the symbolic logic, and the myth.

1. The Signs

Basically, a symbol is a sign. However, not all signs are symbols. A sign

becomes a symbol only if it has a

double meaning or the double intentionality which the symbol conceals in

its aim. This is the intentional structure of the symbol, which is so
important for Ricoeur, and especially relevant to his theory of
interpretation, since it gives rise to the need for interpretation.140

A sign signifies something directly. For instance, sun, as an audible word, is a

signifier. The thing signified by this audible word is the physical object that can be
140
Bourgeois, 71.
 48

observed in the sky that shines so brightly. Now, if this thing being signified by this

signifier is revealed, then this sign loses its meaning. In contrast,

symbol conceals in its intention a double intentionality. There is, first, the
primary or literal intentionality, which like any meaningful intentionality,
implies the triumph of the conventional sign over the natural sign: this is
the stain, the deviation, the weight - words which do not resemble the
thing signified.141

On the other hand, signs are transparent because they say only "what they mean by

positing the signified."142 On the other hand, symbols are opaque. "The first, literal,

patent meaning analogically intends a second meaning which is not given otherwise than

in the first."143 For instance, the sky, literally, signifies the expanse of space that

surrounds the earth. This literal meaning of the sky signifies the thing. However, the sky,

as a symbol, signifies another thing which is not the literal meaning of the audible word,

“sky”. Inasmuch as “sky” means another thing which is its non-literal meaning, it

becomes opaque. Its opaqueness makes it enigmatic. Its meaning is inexhaustible.

"Signs are expressions that carry a meaning, which is revealed through the intention of

signifying that is conveyed by words.... Every sign is directed to something beyond itself

and stands for this something."144 The transparency of the sign enables man to say what

the sign is by indicating the thing signified by the sign.

This is not the case with symbol. The double intentionality of the symbol leads

the first literal intention to the second intention. Meaning, the first obvious literal

141
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I, trans. by Denis Savage in
The Conflict of Interpretations, 289.
142
Ibid., 290.
143
Ibid.
144
Ricoeur, “The Symbol...Food for Thought”, Philosophy Today, 3 (April 1960), 199.
 49

meaning itself looks analogically toward a second meaning which is found only in the

first meaning.145 Ricoeur emphasizes that

the symbol in fact is the very movement of the primary meaning which
makes us share the hidden meaning and thus assimilates us to the thing
symbolized, without our being able to get hold of the similarity
intellectually. It is in this sense that the symbol "provides;" it provides,
because it is a primary intentionality which yields a second meaning.146

The correspondence that happens in symbols is the same with signs. In signs, the

correspondence is between signifying word and signified thing. But in symbols, the

correspondence is between the first meaning and the second meaning.

In a sign, the signified thing is always the intention of the signifier. If you know

already what is being signified by the signifier, interpretation is no longer needed.

However, in the case of a symbol, the second meaning which is the hidden intention of

the signifier needs interpretation. It must be remembered that the second intention can be

attained only via the first intention of the signifier. This is because what transpires in a

symbol is the very movement from the first intention to the second intention which is

hidden in the first intention. In the example of the “sky” given above, the first intention of

the signifier is its literal meaning. However, as a symbol, it means something more than

the literal meaning of the signifier “sky”. This non-literal meaning is the hidden meaning

of the literal meaning of the signifier “sky”. And this non-literal meaning is the second

intention that is meant by the first intention.

145
Ibid.
146
Ibid., 200.
 50

2. The Allegories

As the signifier of a symbol signifies something beyond its literal meaning, so

must be with an allegory. However, an allegory and a symbol are not actually the same.

The distinction between symbols and allegories is based on analogy. The analogy

is again applied to the literal meaning. Ricoeur singles out the clarification done by M.

Pepin as regards the problem of analogy. Quoting Pepin, Ricoeur says that

in allegory, the first thing signified (the literal meaning) is contingent, and
the second thing signified, the symbolic meaning itself, is sufficiently
exterior to be directly accessible. Between the two meanings then there is
a relation of translation. Once the translation is made you can let the
symbol fall away by the way, since it has become useless.147

The moment an allegory is interpreted, a process of tearing down the disguise takes place.

When the meaning is revealed, the allegory becomes ineffectual. Its usefulness ceases.

As Ricoeur has it, an allegory is more of a modality of hermeneutics than a spontaneous

creation of signs. Allegory in itself is already a hermeneutic. It is always an

interpretation of an idea or event. Such an idea or event is narrated by using

symbolism. An allegory is capable of translation. Meaning, an allegory has a direct

equivalence or a univocal interpretation.

On the other hand, symbol precedes hermeneutics. It must be noted that the

interpretation of the symbolism starts from the symbol itself. The second intention,

which is the hermeneutic meaning, is actually based on the first intention of the given

symbol. The meaning of a symbol is generated in enigma and not in translation. The

multiplicity of meanings of a symbol is already the result of the interpretation of the

147
Ibid.
 51

symbol that is rooted in its first and literal meaning. Thus, the symbolic meaning, that is,

its multiple meaning, is incapable of translation because it is not univocal.

3. The Symbolic Logic

Ricoeur treats symbolic logic in order to distinguish symbol itself from that of a

symbol in the sense of symbolic logic. He wants to point out that symbol in this sense

has nothing to do with symbol as an enigma. Instead, he wants symbol in the sense of

symbolic logic to be understood as the apex of formalism. In the symbolic logic, the case

is reversed. It replaces the terms of the syllogisms by signs that can stand for anything.

In symbolic logic, the syllogistic expressions are “replaced by letters, by written signs,

which need not be spoken and about which it is possible to calculate, without asking how

they are incorporated into a deontology of reasoning. They are not even abbreviations of

known verbal expressions, but ‘characters’. . . .”148

The symbol, in Ricoeur’s sense, is obviously not a character. Ricoeur emphasizes

that the symbol belongs to thought that is bound up with content and therefore not formal.

Moreover, the symbolic language is an expression of the fullness of language. The

symbol is essentially bound to its primary content and through its primary content to its

second content. In this regard, Ricoeur’s symbol is absolutely the reverse of formalism.

Ricoeur, nevertheless, provides a reason why symbol is used in two ways that

differ so sharply. He writes, “the reason perhaps should be sought in the structure of

signification. On the one hand, signification is related to absence, because it points out

things that are absent. But on the other hand, it is related to presence, because it

148
Ricoeur, The Symbol. . . Food for Thought, 200-201.
 52

represents, it renders present, that which is absent.”149 These are the reasons why symbol

is used in two differing forms. He discusses the symbol in the sense of the symbolic

logic to accentuate the sense of the symbol as something beyond the subject of

discussion. So, the symbol, in the sense of the symbolic logic, will not be used as such.

When the symbol is spoken of here, it refers to the meaning of the symbol as bound up

with content. The second meaning is tied up with the primary meaning.

4. The Myths

Of the related structures of symbol, Ricoeur takes myth as the only species of

symbol. Myth is already a symbol in a narrative form. It is in time and in space.

However, it is not bounded by any specific history. In his studies of western myths,

Ricoeur classifies them into four basic types: (1) the drama of creation; (2) the tragic

myths; (3) the “philosophical myths” of the exiled soul; and (4) the eschatological or

anthropological myth of biblical history.150 The first three myths, in relation to the evil

story, put the genesis of evil prior to man. However, the last myth locates evil in man’s

conscious volition. Ricoeur’s analysis of the different myths presents various schema of

evil. The symbolism of evil is invariant. It does not change. What now varies is how

the symbolism of evil is being interpreted. It means that myths are already an

interpretation of the symbolism of evil. Myths vary because the interpretation of the

invariant symbolism varies. This makes myths an interpretation of the symbolism of evil.

If myths are the variant aspect in the analysis of evil, “the symbol is the

invariant.” Don Ihde explains that the “invariance of the symbol... serves more than one

149
Ibid., 201.
150
Ihde, 115-16.
 53

purpose in this hermeneutics. In its first aspect the invariance is that of the ‘fullness of

language’ which functions clearly at the end as the whole from which all parts are

derived.”151 The implication is that myths are various interpretations of the symbols.

They are already the interpretation of the symbolism. “The myth takes the schema and

provides... its ‘explanation’.... [But] it is symbol which reveals originary experience.”152

The Zones of Emergence153 of Symbol

Ricoeur considers three zones which deal with symbol: Phenomenology of

Religion, Psychoanalysis, and Metaphor. These fields separately interpret symbol. It has

to be emphasized that symbols are expression with “double meaning”. In fact, his

interpretation results in the discovery of the apparent conflict in the interpretations of

symbols. However, before considering that conflict of interpretation, the relationship of

symbol to the three fields will be first examined.

1. Symbol and the Phenomenology of Religion

Ricoeur studies intently and thoroughly the symbolism of avowal. Moreover, this

study is intently related to the symbolisms used in myths and rituals. Reagan comments

that “realizing that symbols are more basic than myth, and focusing on religious symbols

151
Ibid., 128.
152
The symbol is finally the third term which, on Ricoeur’s methodological grounds, is that which
unites the double circles (experience-expression and the expression-interpretation cycle) of hermeneutic
phenomenology. The symbol reveals experience through expression; the myth interprets the expression which
the symbol gives. The hermeneutic problem at this level then becomes one of finding an interpretation which is
adequate to the invariance of the symbol. Ihde, 129.

153
Bourgeois, 72.
 54

expressing the experience of evil, he began to investigate the structure and nature of

symbolic expressions.”154

The phenomenology of religion frequently encounters those “great cosmic

symbols of earth, heaven, water, life, tress, and stones, and with those strange narratives

about the origin and end of things which are the myths.”155 The phenomenology of

religion deals with symbols as the manifestation of the reality. Symbols are always

related to the fundamental reality of human experience, but they always express a reality

that both shows and hides.156 The encounter with the symbolic is an expression of the

revelation of the sacred.

Ricoeur’s voluminous study of the symbolisms of evil points to the human

experience of the avowal of evil. The symbolism of evil has a wide scope and range.

The meaning of evil as a symbol ranges from evil as dealing with the stain image with

magical conception of evil as pollution to the deviation images of the crooked path, of

transgression, of wandering or error in the more ethical conception of sin, to the weight

images of a burden in the more interiorized experience of guilt.157

The study of symbolisms in relation to the sacred involves the relationship of the

primary symbols and the mythical symbols. The former is exemplified by the example

given above with the symbolism of evil. Primary symbols “point out the intentional

154
Charles E. Reagan, ed. Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Ohio: Ohio University Press,
1979), 85.
155
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
156
Ibid.
157
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 289.
 55

structure of symbols.”158 They pertain to the intended meaning of the symbol of evil for

example. In other words, there is a primary or literal intentionality in every symbol

which implies the triumph of the conventional sign over the natural sign. This is due to

the fact that “upon the first intentionality is built a second intentionality, which, through

the material stain, the deviation in space, the experience of burden, points to a certain

situation of man in the Sacred.159 “This situation, aimed at through the first meaning,”

Ricoeur elaborates, “is precisely stained, sinful, guilty being. The literal and obvious

meaning, therefore, points beyond itself to something which is like a stain, like a

deviation, like a burden.”160

Through this, Ricoeur distinguishes technical signs, which are perfectly

transparent and say only what they mean by positing the signified from symbolic signs

which are opaque because the first, literal meaning analogically intends a second

meaning which is not given otherwise than in the first. This opaqueness is the symbol’s

very profundity, an inexhaustible depth.161 Ricoeur conceives the interpretation of

symbols in the light of the symbolisms of evil as “an amplifying interpretation, by which

[he] means[s] an interpretation attentive to the surplus of meaning included in the

symbol….”162

158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
160
Ibid., 290.
161
Ibid.
162
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography” translated by Kathleen Blamey in Lewis Edwin Hahn,
ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 20.
 56

On the other hand, “mythical symbols are more articulated: they leave room for

the dimension of narrative, with its fabled characters, places, and times, and tell the

Beginning and End of the experience of which the primary symbols are the avowal.”163

“Myth can exercise its symbolic function only through the specific means of narrative;

what it wants to say is already drama.”164 Adam, Anthropos, Eve, and the snake are

examples of mythical symbols.

The problem of symbols leads to the problem of language. Symbols are present.

However, they are just empty without language. It is language that makes symbols

relevant. The survival of the archaic symbol depends on the revolutions of experience

and language that engulf it.165 Symbols themselves are not passive. They are dynamic.

For them to survive, they have to destroy prior symbols. Thus, there is a movement

happening from symbols themselves. There is a movement of “breaking with and taking

up.”166 Such that, evil symbolizes no longer just as a sin symbol but also a guilt symbol.

Nevertheless, even if the definition of symbols is continuously anchored on the semantic

structure of double meaning, a new dimension of understanding symbols comes into the

offing. Guilt as a symbolism of evil leads him to tackle Freudian psychoanalysis.

In this schema, there is now the internalization of the evil experience. That

experience is seen in the act of will. There the subject feels that the origin of evil is not from

the outside but from the inside. The schema of guilt is a sort of self-conscious knowledge of

163
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 289.
164
Ibid., 293.
165
Ibid., 291.
166
Ibid., 292.
 57

the evil experience. The subject is fully aware of the repercussion of the act he wills. This

consciousness of the meaning of the guilt symbolism attempts to make it “coincide[s] with

the ‘unconscious’ work of establishing a code which they attributed to the will to power, to

the social being, or to the unconscious psyche.”167 Ricoeur claims that this leads to the

discovery of Freud of On Dreams.

2. Symbol and Psychoanalysis

Dreams themselves are symbolic. They want to say something other than what

the person dreaming likes to say. Ricoeur notes that “the analyst deliberately takes in the

opposite direction the path that the dreamer took, without willing it or knowing it, in his

‘dream work’”.168 Freud believes that dreams are not just dreams, but they portray

something beyond the dream. The dreamer’s claim of knowing the meaning of one’s

dream is suspect. Ricoeur claims:

It is in this mood of suspicion as to consciousness’ claim to original self-

knowledge that a philosopher may enter into the company of psychiatrists
and psychoanalysts. Anyone who arrives at the correlation between
consciousness and the unconscious must first have crossed the arid zones
of a double confession: ‘I cannot understand the consciousness from what
I know about consciousness or even preconsciousness,’ and ‘I no longer
even understand what consciousness is.”169

The implication of this claim is that the person’s dream account can only be ascertained

through its relationship with the reality of one’s experience. The validity and the limits of

167
Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 149.
168
Ibid.
169
Ricoeur, “Consciousness and the Unconscious” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 99 -100.
 58

all assertions about the reality of the dream can only be defined by referring to its

essential and non-accidental grounds170

For Freud, dreams serve as a model for the interpretation of culture. They also

expresses of human desires.171 In the interpretation of dream, it is not the dream itself

that is being interpreted; it is the dream as a text – the dream text that manifests the so-

called primitive speech of desire.172 Thus, there is a movement of the analysis from one

meaning to another meaning. This is so because “for Freud the meaning of the dream… is

inseparable from ‘analysis’ as a tactic of decoding.”173

Paul Ricoeur always calls the region of double meaning as symbol.174 Hence, as

the dream text wants to tell something beyond what is said, it enters into its symbolic

function.175

3. Symbol and the Poetic Imagination

According to Ricoeur, it is the poetic imagination that is the least understood

among the three zones of emergence. Frequently, poetic imagination is related with

imagination per se and is referred to as the “power of forming images.”176 Poetic

imagination never reduces itself to forming mental pictures of the unreal. However,

following Bachelard, Ricoeur explains, “the poetic image ‘places us at the origin of

170
Ibid., 107.
171
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 5.
172
Ibid., 6.
173
Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 149.
174
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
175
Ibid., 12.
176
Ibid., 15.
 59

articulate being’; the poetic image ‘becomes a new being in our language, it expresses us

by making us what it expresses.’ This word-image, which runs through the

representation-image, is symbolism.”177

The poetic language is very different from the literal language. Poetic language

itself is very rich in meaning. Its literal meaning, that is, the first intention is different

from the second intention. Thus poet shows the birth of the word, the metaphorical word.

The metaphorical makes the poetic symbolic. It is the double-meaning of the

metaphorical word that makes it symbolic.

As symbol emerges from the three aforementioned zones of emergence, it

emerges in three different categories. These symbolic categories are ordered according to

their expressivity: the hierophanies, the oneirotic, and the poetic.178 The three categories

are inherently connected in themselves, but each has its separate interpretation of

symbols. Thus, Ricoeur's interpretation results in an apparent conflict even though a

relationship exists among the three categories in that they explain the growing

internalization of the subject. The three symbolic categories illustrate the gradation of an

interpretation or the giving of a meaning to the various experiences of the subject. In

other words, the three symbolic categories correspond to the different types of

interpretation. The hierophanic corresponds to interpretation as recollection of meaning

while the oneirotic corresponds to interpretation as suspicion. Lastly, the poetic

corresponds to interpretation as appropriation. The internalization is based on how

proximate is the subject to its participation in the realm of being.

177
Ibid., 15 - 16.
178
Cf. Ricoeur, The Symbol…Food for Thought, 197-8.
 60

His theory of interpretation begins when he is confronted with the problem of

symbol or the problem of double meaning. However, interpreting a symbol or a double

meaning entails various manners of interpretation. In fact, his investigation results in the

discovery of the apparent conflict in the interpretations of symbols. However, before

considering that conflict of interpretations, the relationship of symbol on the three fields

has to be examined first.

The Symbolic Categories and Interpretation

In interpreting a symbol or a double meaning, Ricoeur assigns a field wherein to

limit his field of interpretation. In the hermeneutic field, the area of symbol and the

interpretation confront each other. By hermeneutics, he means a way of understanding

“the theory of the rules that provide over exegesis – that is, over the interpretation of a

particular text, or a group of signs that can be viewed as a text.”179 In the hermeneutic

field wherein symbol and interpretation apparently confront each other, they also

complement each other at the same time. The symbol having a double meaning demands

interpretation. On the other hand, interpretation works at deciphering symbols. Hence,

the double meaning structure of symbol180 makes it legitimate object of interpretation.

Ricoeur enumerates the symbol’s various spheres. First, he uses Mircea Eliade’s

term, hierophanies181, to mark the identity of the symbol being tied in with rites and

179
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8.
180
Bourgeois says, “Ricoeur uses a brief eidetic description in imaginative variation to derive a
characterization of symbols and hermeneutics in which he defines symbol and interpretation in their relation to
one another, thus limiting one by the other.” Bourgeois, “From Hermeneutics of Symbols to the
Interpretation of Texts” in Reagan, 85. Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8 – 9; Symbolism of Evil, 14 – 18;
“Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 12 – 13.
181
This is a term that Paul Ricoeur borrowed from Mircea Eliade. Eliade uses the term hierophany to
designate the act of manifestation of the sacred. As he said, "it is a fitting term, because it does not imply
anything further; it expresses no more than is implicit in its etymological content, i.e., that something sacred
 61

myths. Hierophanies connote the symbol as the language of the Sacred.182 The second

category is that of the nocturnal and oneirotic. For Sigmund Freud, symbols are not just

representations that stand for something else but oneirotic representations that go beyond

individual history. The last category is the poetics. The poetic imagination is imported

by Ricoeur from M. Bachelard who has shown that “the problem of imagination is not the

problem of the image, not even of the image in relation to the absence or the annihilation

of the real. . . . [Instead], ‘the poetic image. . . brings us to the origin of the being who

speaks.’ And later on: ‘It becomes a new being in our language; it expresses ourselves by

making us into what it expresses.’”183

The three symbolic categories are in themselves representing various modes of

interpretation. They are apparently conflicting with each other. Still, they also signify

the various modes of subjectivity. With hierophany, the experience of the subject is still

very objective; in the oneirotic, the subject suspects the veracity of the manifested

meaning of the symbol. After doing, this becomes very subjective in the sphere of the

poetics inasmuch as the subject appropriates well the meaning of such symbol to his life

project. In other words, the three symbolic categories demonstrate the internalization of

the subject.

The three symbolic categories illustrate how the subject feels about the nature of

its experience. Their meaning will be discussed in relation to the flow of the subject’s

shows itself to us. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. from the French
by Williard K. Trask. (New York: Harper, 1959), 11. Cf. Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (New York:
Sheed and Ward Inc., 1958), 7 ff.
182
Ricoeur, The Symbol. . . Food for Thought, 197.
183
Ibid., 198.
 62

affectivity as regards its experience. It will illustrate, through the symbolic categories,

the philosophy of the symbol as expressed in the three stages that “stake out the

movement that leaps from the life in symbols toward thought - thought that truly starts

out from symbols.”184

1. The Hierophanies

The hierophanies, which designate the acts of manifesting the sacred, are very

much related to the phenomenology of religion185 and "tied in with rites and myths."186

The sources of the hierophanies are the religious rites as well as the ancient myths

regarding the Holy.

The religious rites are one of the sources of the hierophanies because they deal

with the sacred or the holy and the rites apply to the worship of the gods and the

goddesses. For instance, the rite of Aiyanar performed by the Dravidian villagers in

South India is done in honor of Aiyanar, a Brahman deity. In this rite, the Dravidian

villagers offer a large terra-cota horses to Aiyanar so that he can ride around the village

and look after its safety.187

Ancient myths, in addition to rituals, are also sources of hierophanies. These are

mostly stories of gods and goddesses. They are always related to the sacred beings, e.g.

184
Ibid., 202.
185
The phenomenology of religion here refers simply to the religious phenomena as perpetuated by
the history of religion. As Eliade noted, "Now, in my researches, what have primarily interested me are these
facts, this labyrinthine complexity of elements which will yield to no formula or definition whatever. Taboo,
ritual, symbol, myth, demon, god - these are some of them; but it would be an outrageous simplification to
make such a list tell the whole story. What we have really got to deal with is a diverse and indeed chaotic mass
of actions, beliefs and systems which go together to make up what one may call the religious phenomenon
[bold mine]." Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, xii.
186
Ricoeur, The Symbol…Food for Thought, 197
187
Joseph M. Kitagawa and Charles H. Long, eds., Myth and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea
Eliade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 32.
 63

the Homeric myths, the creation myths, the Adamic myth, and many more. The Homeric

myths tell us about the relation of the gods and goddesses to human beings in the same

way that the creation and Adamic myths tell us the story of God and man. Ancient myths

mirror the relationship between the Holy Other and man.

These religious rites and myths utilize symbols which constitute the language of

the sacred. Religious rites always portray the life story of the gods or goddesses, but

since they can no longer reenact exactly the whole event they use symbolism. For

example, the sky symbolizes the abode of the gods and goddesses. It is usually portrayed

as "the symbol of the most high, of the elevated and immense, of the powerful and well-

ordered, of the shrewd and the wise, of the sovereign and immovable."188 But we can

still add some more symbolisms of the sky, proving that a symbol is boundless and

inexhaustible.

The phenomenology of religion deals with symbols as the manifestation of reality.

Symbols are always related to the fundamental reality of human experience, but they

always express a reality that both shows and hides.189 The symbolic shows the literal

manifestation or the apparent signification of the symbol. However, behind this literal

signification, the symbol hides a second meaning which is the symbolic meaning, such as

the phallic images divinized by the Dravidians. If these images are considered as a

univocal sign, then they represent the phallus as it is. But symbolically, the images that

serve as signifiers do not signify the phallus literally. They instead refer to something

else and that is the god of fertility. The Dravidians cannot conceptualize this in a very

188
Ricoeur, The Symbol… Food for Thought, 198.
189
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
 64

realistic way. Instead, they conceptualize god symbolically, that is, through the phallus

as a symbol of fertility.

This reality of the symbol that both shows and hides its meaning is like an

analogical statement: A is to B as C is to D. The meaning of the symbol is made up of

the literal meaning of the symbol itself. The sky as a symbol of power is conceived

analogically through this expression. As sky is above and as power is over man, so sky

can be a symbolism for the abode of power. Such symbolism constitutes the reality of

the sky. Thus, analogically, sky and power are related in the sense that just as the sky is

above man, so can power be viewed as over man. In this sense, the symbol manifests a

literal meaning although its analogue is vast and boundless. The sky symbolism can still

have other analogues besides power, but, these analogues are commonly appropriated by

most individuals with a shared belief.

The problem of symbols in the phenomenology of religion leads to the problem of

language. Symbols are present; however, they are empty without language. It is

language that makes symbols relevant. It has to be remembered that the hierophanies

which are manifested by the cosmic symbols are actually experienced symbols. Still,

those experiences are just blind experiences which need to be expressed in language, and

when so expressed their meaning remains to be inexhaustible. Then they can branch out

to other categories.

As hierophanies are tied in to the phenomenology of religion, so are the meanings

of their symbolic images exposed to recollection. Hierophanies in nature are objective.

They are expressed through the common experience of the people. The appropriation of

their meaning depends on the shared experience of the religious people.

 65

Interpreting the symbols of the sacred is very objective in nature. To ascertain the

meaning of the perceived sky symbolism, for instance, as symbolizing the abode of the

gods, the interpreter tries to compare it to other symbols. The comparison gives the

interpreter the distinct confidence of its veracity. Analogically, the symbol may have the

same interpretation as the other symbol if their range of experienciability is the same.

There is a commonality of understanding inasmuch as shared attributes are given to these

symbols experienced in the phenomenon of religion. The field of participation is external

to the interpreter. Since the expanse of the experience is external, then it must be

objective. The subject does not experience the event itself except as a shared experience.

The process of understanding better the truth of the experience and its extensivity

involves the horizontal understanding of the symbol through phenomenology and

comparative studies. With the horizontal understanding, the subject disregards the

immediacy of its belief. Ricoeur understands that after the horizontal understanding of

the symbol, what transpires is the dynamicity of the symbol. The symbol might be serene

and amicable, but it could mean war and violence. In interpreting, the subject is able to

understand the symbolic meaning anew. This new understanding takes place on the

critical level. Thus, to understand critically, the subject which is now the interpreter

abandons the position of the distant and detached observer. He now participates in the

dynamicity of the symbol.

The experience of the symbol in its dynamicity may excite the subject and thus

have an impact on it. This excitement will lead the subject to pursue the effect of the

experience. Hence, various desires and wishes are formed in the consciousness of the

subject, some of which are attainable and others not, some might be real and others may
 66

not be. The sentiments that arise from the previous experience of the subject are formed

in the consciousness of the subject.

2. The Oneirotic

The second symbolic category that Ricoeur examines is the dream language,

particularly in the work of Freud. He mentions also the contribution of Jung, but he

makes a more thorough investigation of Freud than Jung.

Ricoeur remarks that Freud sees dream language as symbolic, as an oneirotic

representation. As such, dream language must not be interpreted literally, but

symbolically. It is symbolic because what appears in the dream reveals a deeper meaning

than its literal presentation. Since dreams are the disguised fulfillment of repressed

wishes or desires, this leads to the hermeneutics of deciphering. Since desires hide

themselves in dreams, interpretation must substitute the light of meaning for the darkness

of desire. The elaboration of the dream symbol through countless cross-checks leads to

what is called the language of desire or the oneirotic.190 “[D]reams attest that we

constantly mean something other than what we say; in dreams the manifest meaning

endlessly refers to a hidden meaning..,” says Ricoeur.191 But these dream symbols are not

unique to an individual. What is spectacular is that they even coincide with that of an

entire people. Since these symbols go beyond individual history, the arche is not of a

particular individual. It is rooted in the common culture. The content of the proverb,

“What does the goose dream of? Of Maize”, implies that dreams are often culturally

190
Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 159-60.
191
Ibid., 15.
 67

based. Thus, the interpretation of dreams is also related to the culture of the people to

which the patient belongs because we have the same, if not similar, wishes or desires.192

In his analysis of dreams Freud points out that a dream is somewhat

incomprehensible and absurd. But even though its meaning is hidden, a dream is actually

meaningful. He says that “the dream is not meaningless, not absurd, does not presuppose

that one part of our store of ideas is dormant while another part begins to awake. It is a

perfectly valid psychic phenomenon, actually a wish-fulfillment. . . We have found that

the dream represents a wish as fulfilled.”193

Categorically, Freud declares that a dream represents a wish that is fulfilled.

Nevertheless, some of Freud’s patients bring to his attention that not all dreams are a

matter of wish-fulfillment. On the contrary, these dreams express the opposite of wish-

fulfillment. These apparent objections lead Freud to say that the basis of his view of the

dream as wish-fulfillment is not the obvious dream content, but the thought-content

which lies behind the dream. This leads him to compare and contrast the manifest and

the latent dream-contents. Obviously, the manifest content of a dream of a most painful

nature distorts the idea of the dream as a wish-fulfillment since nobody of sane mind

wishes to be in pain. However, Freud asserts that if this manifest content of the dream

will be properly interpreted, the analyst will discover that the dream has a latent thought-

content which makes for the possibility that even painful and terrifying dreams are cases

of wish-fulfillment.194

192
Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, translated and introduced by Dr. A. A.
Brill. Book 2: The Interpretation of Dreams (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), 215.
193
Ibid., 208.
194
Ibid., 218.
 68

If there is a need to interpret dreams, then dreams do not say directly what they

mean. This presupposes that the phenomenon of distortion is present at the manifest

dream-content, which does not disprove that dreams are wish-fulfillment.

The interpretation of dreams leads to the discovery of the latent dream-content as

an expression of wish-fulfillment. The phenomenon of dream distortion is only an

attempt to disguise or censor the wish. Even a dream with a disagreeable content can still

be analyzed as a wish-fulfillment through the phenomenon of dream distortion. The

disagreeable content serves only to distinguish the thing wished for.195 The truth that the

dream has a hidden meaning, which is a wish-fulfillment, can be proven through analysis.

This analysis is done by peering into the experiences of the dreamer.

For this part, Carl Jung (1875 - 1961) sees symbolism in dreams as a way of

exploring our potentialities. He analyzes dreams as "prospective as well as retrospective

in content, and compensable for aspects of the dreamer's personality that have been

neglected in the waking life".196 Dreams do not only foretell the possibilities for objective

evaluation but also provide themes for meditation and thus pave the way to "becoming

oneself". The forward-looking aspect of symbols is necessary to Ricoeur. He then

connects it with the “cosmo-theological functions of symbols by which man is

reintegrated into his whole sacred past.”197

195
Ibid., 225.
196
Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, third edition (Manila: National Book
Store, Inc. 1978), 143.
197
Ricoeur, The Symbol… Food for Thought, 198.
 69

Freud sees dreams as a model not only for the interpretation of culture but also for

the expression of human desires. The dream text that manifests the so-called primitive

speech of desire is the text being interpreted by analyzing the symbols.

The interpretation of the dream language is not as objective as that of the

hierophanies. Various subjects have the same dreams, and dreams are the disguised

fulfillment of repressed wishes or desires of these subjects. Actually, the emphasis of the

oneirotic is not on the dream language itself but on the expression of the desires or wishes

or sentiments of the subject. The impact of the religious experience to the subject leads

the subject to long or desire for the fulfillment of what it perceives as the expression of

the meaning it perceives out of that experience. For instance, in the Roman Catholic

religion, a certain subject might have been inspired religiously by the sermon of the

priest. Symbolically, the priest is seen as the other-Christ. With that inspiration, the

subject then wishes or desires to do something that will fulfill what it understands in that

experience.

The desire of fulfilling what the subject perceives as the fulfillment of the inspired

thought coming from the priest is not unique to that subject. The dreams are ways of

exploring the possibilities of fulfilling the inspiration given by the priest. Consequently,

these dreams provide themes that pave the way for the subject to become what it wants to

be. The subject has its own personal interpretation on how to make that dream come true.

To be sure whether the subject’s desire at the moment is indeed the true desire it wishes

to fulfill, an intelligent interpretation must be done.

It is intelligent because interpretation comes under scrutiny. To begin to yield the

knot of the symbolic meaning involves an intelligent deciphering. The understanding of

 70

the meaning of the symbol in this stage involves a circle wherein the symbol gives up its

meaning as the interpreter interprets. To be able to understand, the interpreter must have

lived in the atmosphere of the meaning that is being looked for. Thus, the subject who

listens to the sermon of the priest and is inspired and decides to become a priest must

have lived to the aura of what he feels to be.

In this regard, Ricoeur agrees with Rudolf Bultmann when the latter said in his

article “The Problem of Hermeneutics”:

Every comprehension, like every interpretation... is forever receiving

direction from the way the question is put and what is aimed at. It is never
without presuppositions; it is always directed by a precomprehension of
the matter about which the text is being consulted. Only from the starting
point of this precomprehension can it generally investigate and
understand. . . . the presupposition of all comprehension is the vital bond
between the interpreter and the matter which the text is talking about,
either directly or indirectly.198

The other half of the circle, nevertheless, which is “we can believe only in

interpreting”, has been posited. In this circle, the union between belief and criticism has

been developed. In a criticism which rebuilds rather than destroys, an irrevocable gain for

the truth has been achieved. The union between belief and criticism confers the second

level of interpretation. Hereafter, the symbol begins to provide food for thought, which is

the level of the poetic imagination.

3. The Poetic Image

According to Ricoeur, it is the poetic imagination that is the least understood

among the three symbolic categories. Frequently, poetic imagination is related to

imagination per se and is referred to as the "power of forming images."199 Poetic

198
Ibid.
199
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 15.
 71

imagination is not the forming of mental images of the unreal. Instead, it is the

articulation of the subject’s own reflection that is being excited by his oneirotic

experiences. This oneirotic experience is transformed into a new being which is reflective

in nature. As the subject expresses experience through language, a word-image is formed.

The word-image which is no longer a representation-image200 is what Ricoeur

calls symbol. If the word-image is still consonant to the representation-image, then it is

not yet the symbolic. However, if it already transcends its univocal signification, then the

word-image becomes a symbol. The word-image refers to the thing that is being

signified by the signifier. In the schema of a univocal sign, the signifier has a signified

thing, and that is the only thing it signifies. This thing is now called the representation-

image. For example, in the symbol earth, the signifier is the audible word, the signified

the mental notion of the earth: Thing 1 would be the physical object, the earth itself, and

Thing 2 a “nonliteral” reference. The relation of Thing 2 to the signified is the word-

image and the relation of Thing 1 to the signified is the representation-image. The

relation of Thing 2 to the signified calls for interpretation.201

Ricoeur says that the only difference of poetic images from the other two

categories is

that the poetic image ... shows up at that moment when it is an emergence
from language, when it puts language in a state of emergence. Unlike the
case of the history of religion, it is not restored in its hieratic stability in
the custody of rite and myth. The basic point is that what is born and
reborn in the poetic image is the same symbolic structure that runs through

200
Representation-image of the word refers to the literal signification of the word.
In the double-meaning structure, the representation-image refers to the thing 1.
201
Matthew Parfitt, “Reading Poetry with Ricoeur’s Dialectical Hermeneutics,” Budhi, No.1
(1997), 96.
 72

the most prophetic dreams of our inner development and that sustains
sacred language in its most archaic and stable forms.202

The poetic imagery only appears when it already emerges from language. Without

language, poetic image has no way of existing. It exists because of language itself. In

contrast, the hierophanies are there prior to language. The sacred is already in the

cosmos, but it becomes symbolic only when it is stated in language. The poetic language

is very different from the literal language. Poetic language is so rich in meaning that its

literal meaning, that is, its first intention, is different from the second intention. Thus, the

poet shows the birth of the metaphorical word that makes it very symbolic.203

Seemingly, the three symbolic categories are not related. Still, they have a

common denominator - language. In all the three categories of the symbol, the problem of

the symbol’s resolution is itself the problem of language. It is language that expresses the

symbol. Even though at each time symbol originates from the expressivity of the

cosmos, the interpretation of the cosmic experience is based on what the interpreter

desires. The imaginative variety of the subjects attests to their unique way of fulfilling or

realizing what they desire. Although the hierophanies originate from the expressiveness

of the cosmos, there must always be a word to take up the cosmos and turn it into a

hierophany. Likewise, the dreamer has to recount his dream for us to know about it; it is

his narration of the dream that introduces to us the problem. Finally, it is the poet who

shows us the birth of the word; it is the power of the poet that shows forth symbols.204

202
Ricoeur, The Symbol… Food for Thought, 198.
203
Ricoeur considers the metaphor as one of those that have a double-meaning. The double-meaning
structure of metaphor makes him consider it to be symbolical.
204
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 16.
 73

Thus, although symbols might have existed before language, it is language that shows

forth the symbol.

The three symbolic categories present a scattered interpretation of symbol.

However, Ricoeur thinks that amidst scattered manifestations of symbol, the semantic

structure of the symbols shows consistency and unity. In all the three scattered

manifestations of symbol, the semantic structure that is of multiple meaning is what they

have in common. Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in

which meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another

meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality.

The common semantic structure of symbol which is that of multiple meaning

leads Ricoeur to distinguish symbol from the other related structures. He distinguishes

symbol from the sign, the allegory, and the symbol in the sense of the symbolic logic.

Sign, allegory, and the symbol in the sense of the symbolic logic are structurally similar

to symbol. Their literal meaning or signification does not necessarily coincide with what

the sign, allegory, and the symbolic logic want to convey. In the case of the myth,

Ricoeur emphasizes that it is already a symbol. Nonetheless, as a symbol, the myth

interprets already the symbol. Thus, there can be various myths on human evil but

symbolisms of evil are invariable.

Similarly, symbols have a double-meaning structure. But amidst the similarity of

the three symbolic categories, they differ as discussed above. Moreover, as explained

above, the three symbolic categories express the degree of internalization of the meaning

as far as the experience of subject calls for it. The three symbolic categories might be
 74

common in terms of their semantic structure but this has to do also with how the

experience affects the subject.

The case of the poetics is the apex of Ricoeur’s subjectivity. Ideally, the event of

the discourse happens between the literary text and the reader alone. In reading a literary

piece, the world of the text and that of the reader interact. The experience of the reader

might be similar with other people sharing the same spatio-temporal conditions.

However, the impact of the experience varies from one reader to another. Inasmuch as

no two individuals feel the same impact in a similar situation, the interpretation of the

text varies as well from one interpreter to the other. The meaning of the text depends

solely on the interpreter. The meaning is not a shared experience.

The subject has the last say on how to realize its dream. The subject might

consult others for opinions, but ultimately it decides for itself. At the outset, there is the

first structure or the superstructure. Participating in the same superstructure, various

subjects arrive at a similar understanding of it. To continue its participation in this

superstructure, the subject visualizes a way to participate in the system. The vision might

be the same with others, although they will certainly vary in the actualization of their

visions. This is how the symbolic categories work in the experience of the subject.

The subject, after finding himself in the realm of symbols through the

intermediary of the phenomenology of religion and myths and that of the careful

hermeneutics of individual text, can promote and shape the meaning of the symbol in a

creative interpretation.205 The interpretation of symbols illustrates its growing subjective

understanding and interpretation. At first, the treatment of symbol is very objective.

205
Ricoeur, The Symbol. . . Food for Thought, 205.
 75

Then it becomes little by little grounded on the understanding of the subject until it

becomes solely the concern of the subject.

 CHAPTER THREE

THE HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION

Ricoeur asks himself regarding the philosophical traditions that characterize his

philosophy. He points out three features that characterize it. They are the reflexive

philosophy206, Husserlian phenomenology and the hermeneutical variation of the

Husserlian phenomenology.207

He traces the origin of reflexive philosophy from the Cartesian cogito as handed

down by way of Kant and the French post-Kantian philosophy. However, this was

strikingly represented, Ricoeur claims, by Jean Nabert.208 Ricoeur explains that

reflexive philosophy considers the most radical philosophical problems to

those that concern the possibility of self-understanding as the subject of
the operation of knowing, willing, evaluating, and so on. Reflexion is that
act of turning back upon itself by which a subject grasps, in a moment of
intellectual clarity and moral responsibility, the unifying principle of the
operations among which it is dispersed and forgets itself as subject.209

Consequently, it is very appropriate to acknowledge Descartes as the origin of reflexive

philosophy by way of its recognition of the significance of the subject.

The emergence of the subject as an entity that is isolated from its environment but

having clarity through its self-assertion starts from Descartes. Ricoeur believes in the

contribution of Descartes to the Modern Philosophy and he writes that the Cartesian
206
Kathleen Blamey narrates: “In French, the adjective reflexive incorporates two meanings that
are distinguished in English by reflective and reflexive. On the advice of the author (Paul Ricoeur) I have
chosen to retain the latter in order to emphasize that this philosophy is subject-oriented; it is reflexive in the
subject’s act of turning back upon itself. The other possible meaning should, however, also be kept in
mind.” Kathleen Blamey in the endnote of Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in Paul Ricoeur, From Text to
Action: In Hermeneutics, II, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Illinois: Northwestern
University Press, 1991), 339
.
207
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” From Text to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics, II, 12.
208
Ibid.
209
Ibid.
 77

Cogito is an indelible moment in the history of the emergence of being. Nevertheless, he

also recognizes that a new relationship to the subject must be established in our time.

His reading and attendance in the Friday meetings of Marcel triggers the idea of

remodeling the relationship of the subject with the object. His introduction to Marcel’s

method known as the secondary reflection which “consisted in a second-order grasp of

experiences that ‘primary reflection,’ reputed to be reductive and objectifying, was held

to obliterate and rob of their original, affirmative power”210 sustains and strengthens his

interest on the project of remodeling the relationship of the subject with the object.

Marcel’s intuition is “precisely one of an ultimate ontological unity of man’s being-in-

the-world and so stands in clear contrast to the dichotomy of subject and object which

materialism and idealism… take as their datum.”211 However, Ricoeur finds Marcel’s

methodology as insufficient. Although Marcel has a major influence on Ricoeur, he is

dissatisfied with the inexactness of Marcel’s method.

In his search for a methodology, Ricoeur encounters the concept of

intentionality212, which is central to his methodological apparatus. Intentionality, as a

methodological apparatus elaborated by Husserl provides “a disciplined expression for

the vague recognition of unity of experience by recognizing that consciousness is always

a consciousness of . . . .”213 In its least technical sense, intentionality is the “priority of the

210
Paul Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 7.
211
Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, xii.
212
Ricoeur claims that “it was through the theme of intentionality that Husserlian phenomenology
became recognized in France. It was neither the foundational requirement, nor the claim to apodictic
evidence belonging to self-consciousness that was first remarked, but instead, that which in the theme of
intentionality made a break with the Cartesian identification between consciousness and self-
consciousness.” Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 7.
213
Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, xiii.
 78

consciousness of something over self-consciousness.”214 Kearney explains that Husserl

endeavors

to recover philosophy’s true vocation as phenomenology by showing how

the two poles of objectivity and subjectivity – which positive science
tended to segregate in terms of a polar opposition – are in fact inseparable,
each being co-determined by the other in a primordial relation. The world
is disclosed accordingly as a world that is always for consciousness….
And likewise consciousness is disclosed as a consciousness of something
other than itself….215

However, there is a tendency for the intentional unity of experience to be immediately

polarized in thought. The tendency to objectify the intentional correlate of consciousness

and oppose it to the reflecting subject is inevitable. With this circumstance, there is a

difficulty in reaching the level of intentional unity of experience in understanding. To

resolve this problem, the bracketing or phenomenological reduction technique comes into

being. “Bracketing is the deliberate suspension. . . of the objectifying standpoint and of

causal explanation derived from it.”216 This activity, however, catches up

phenomenology “in an infinite movement of ‘backward questioning’ in which its project

of radical self-grounding fades away.”217 As a consequence, “the Lebenswelt (the life-

world) is never actually given but always presupposed.”218

Ricoeur notes that the fading away of phenomenology’s project of radical self-

grounding happens, as according to hermeneutics, “the problem of ultimate foundation

214
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 13.
215
Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy: Phenomenology, Critical
Theory, Structuralism, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 15.
216
Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, xiii.
217
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 13 – 14.
218
Ibid., 14.
 79

still belongs to the sphere of objectifying thought…. The radicality of such questioning

leads from the idea of scientificity back to the ontological condition of belonging,

whereby he who questions shares in the very thing about which he questions.”219

Accordingly, “the theme of the Lebenswelt…,” Ricoeur further explains, “is adopted by

post-Heideggerian hermeneutics no longer as something left over but as a prior condition.

It is because we find ourselves … in a world to which we belong and in which we cannot

but participate that we are then able … to set up objects in opposition to ourselves,

objects that we claim to constitute and to master intellectually.”220

In agreement to Heidegger, Ricoeur intimates that the situation of Dasein is

actually the first condition that shapes understanding. Understanding is understood as

interpretation inasmuch as “interpretation… is the development… [of] an understanding

[that is] always inseparable from a being that has initially been thrown into the world.”221

In doing so, the precedence of being-in-the-world in relation to any foundational project

is discovered.

Although Ricoeur agrees with the Heideggerian desire of immediately

“establish[ing] a fundamental ontology, i.e. through a direct description of Dasein who

exists by the mode of understanding.”222 Nevertheless, Ricoeur reproaches Heidegger’s

“‘short route’ to being… out of commitment to the ‘long route’ of multiple hermeneutic

detours through the exteriorities of sense, instantiated in culture, society, politics, religion

219
Ibid., 30.
220
Ibid., 14.
221
Ibid., 14 – 15.
222
Peter Kemp, “Ricoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas: Original Affirmation Between
Ontological Attestation and Ethical Injunction” in Richard Kearney, ed., Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics
of Action (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 47.
 80

and the human sciences.”223 This commitment leads to a new epistemological

consequence that says “there is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs,

symbols, and texts; in the last resort understanding coincides with the interpretation given

to these mediating terms.”224 As Ricoeur explains further, the detour he makes through

symbols is his way of questioning the “presupposition common to Husserl and to

Descartes, namely the immediateness, the transparence, the apodicticity of the Cogito.

The subject… does not know itself directly but only through the signs deposited in

memory and in imagination by the great literary traditions.”225

For this reason, interpretation becomes an act of understanding in the sense that

understanding is interpreting that presupposes the consideration of some structures

inherent to signs, symbols, and texts. Consequently, the assertion of the subject having an

immediate and intuitive consciousness is naïve for unfolding the plurivocity of the

aforementioned mediators are possible only in appropriate contexts.

The notion of the non-immediacy of consciousness has been supported by

Ricoeur’s understanding of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, for whom the immediate

consciousness of the subject cannot be relied on. These philosophers of suspicion

unmask the illusion of the subject. Blamey notes specifically that

Ricoeur’s reading of Freud… produces a systematic philosophical

interpretation of psychoanalytic analytic concepts and at the same time
results in a reworking of Ricoeur’s own theory of interpretation, opening it

223
Richard Kearney, “Introduction” in Richard Kearney, ed., Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of
Action (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 1.
224
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 15.
225
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 16.
 81

up to the deciphering of the concealed, distorted, censored representations

of the unconscious by means of a hermeneutics of suspicion.226

Since there is no immediacy of the consciousness, the subject is at odds with the

consciousness. The subject is dispoliated, a circumstance that pushes Ricoeur to liberate

the subject from being lost. He wants to emphasize that although there is no immediate

consciousness, still there is a conscious subject.

The unmasking of the illusion of the subject entails the uncovering of the

suspicions that lurks within the subject. This unmasking is reflected on how man

understands and eventually interprets the varying symbols that intersperse in his

experiences. Madison, for his part, notes that “the net effect of what [Ricoeur] aptly

termed the hermeneutics of suspicion would be to render illusory the goal of his own

restorative hermeneutics which aims not ‘at demystifying a symbolism by unmasking the

unavowed forces that are concealed within it’ but rather at a ‘re-collection of meaning in

its richest, its most elevated, most spiritual diversity.”227

The subject is lost when Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud contend that immediate

consciousness is an illusion. Ricoeur, on the contrary, upholds that the subject is not

actually lost. Immediate consciousness might be an illusion, but knowing something

objectively is still possible. Wanting to liberate the subject, Ricoeur is not in search of

the first truth. Rather, he is searching for that truth that is not naive. Liberating the

subject is not through a presuppositionless philosophy but only through a philosophy that

regards all its presuppositions.

226
Kathleen Blamey, “From the Ego to the Self: A Philosophical Itinerary” in Lewis Edwin Hahn,
ed., The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court:1995), 573.
227
Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 79.
 82

This liberation is made possible through the self’s recognition of itself. And this

recognition of the self of itself is reflection. “The idea of reflexion,” Ricoeur explains,

“carries with it the desire for absolute transparence, a perfect coincidence of the self with

itself, which would make consciousness of self indubitable knowledge….”228

Furthermore, reflection is conceived of as “the recovery of the effort to exist and the

desire to be. However, this effort and this desire cannot be grasped immediately in an act

of intellectual intuition; they can only be glimpsed through the mirror of the objects and

acts, the symbols and signs, wherein they are disclosed. Hence, ‘reflection must become

interpretation because I cannot grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the

world.’”229 Furthermore, Madison affirms that “the reflecting subject has meaningful

access to his own existence only through the signs in which gets expressed his effort to

exist and his desire to be.”230

Reflection as Interpretation

The position of the three masters of suspicion dislodges the immediacy of the

consciousness in such a way that subjectivity is not immediately available. Ricoeur

himself makes an extensive study of one of these masters - Freud, who intimates that the

liberation of the subject is possible through interpretation. Through the influences of the

masters of suspicion, Ricoeur, Madison observes, takes reflection also as a critique in

another sense. Madison concurs that “not only is consciousness not accessible to itself in

immediate transparency such that it must seek to know itself through ‘a decipherment of

228
Ibid., 12 – 13.
229
John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction” in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited, translated, and introduced by John B.
Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 17. Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 46.
230
Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, 79.
 83

the document of its life, in addition, immediate self-consciousness is more often than not

a false consciousness.”231

Ricoeur writes that all interpretation aims at overcoming the distance between the

past cultural epoch to which the text belongs and the interpreter himself. To overcome

this distance, the interpreter appropriates “its meaning to himself: foreign, he makes it

familiar, that is, he makes it his own. It is thus the growth of his own understanding of

himself that he pursues through his understanding of the other. Every hermeneutics is

thus, explicitly or implicitly, self-understanding by means of understanding others.”232

Self-understanding by means of understanding others signifies reflection which must not

be qualified as a blind intuition. For reflection not to be a blind intuition, it must be

mediated by the expressions in which life objectifies itself. Ricoeur quotes Nabert saying

that

reflection is nothing other than the appropriation of our act of existing by

means of a critique applied to the works and the acts which are the signs
of this act of existing. Thus, reflection is a critique. . . in the sense that the
cogito can be recovered only by the detour of a decipherment of the
documents of its life. Reflection is the appropriation of our effort to exist
and of our desire to be by means of the works which testify to this effort
and this desire..233

Ricoeur employs Nabert’s reflexive philosophy because he believes that “the increase in

subjectivity... goes hand in hand with an increase in reflection and meaning. Subjectivity

is granted us in and through the great variety of experiences that have shaped a cultural

heritage.”234 The aim of reflexive philosophy, Van den Hengel explains, is “to

231
Ibid., 80.
232
Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 16-17.
233
Ibid., 17-18.
234
As cited by John Van den Hengel, 15.
 84

appropriate in praxis an originary dynamism which grounds human existence and with

which the conscious, practical self does not coincide... According to Ricoeur’s

estimation, Nabert succeeded in linking this original desire to be and the signs in which

that desire is expressed.”235 Through reflection, the subject recaptures itself through the

expressions of life that objectify it. However, Ricoeur writes, “the textual exegesis of

consciousness collides with the initial ‘misinterpretation’ of false consciousness.

Moreover . . . we know that hermeneutics is found wherever there was first

misinterpretation.”236

Nabert’s reflexive philosophy is neither direct nor immediate. In fact, “reflection

must be doubly indirect: first, because existence is evinced only in documents of life, but

also because consciousness is first of all false consciousness, and it is always necessary to

rise by means of a corrective critique from misunderstanding to understanding.”237

Nabert’s ethical philosophy seeks to recapture the primordial source of human existence,

a quest made indirectly possible through the interpretation of the signs in which the

“desire-to-be” is inscripted. This view implies that there is at least a direct relationship

between the understanding of the signs of the “desire-to-be” and self-understanding.

Henceforth, self-understanding passes through the signs in which the self inscribes itself.

Nabert’s indirect approach of understanding the “desire-to-be” counters

Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. The implication of Heidegger’s ontology is that

Dasein’s situation shapes its consciousness. Henceforth, language which is a tool for

235
Ibid., 15-16.
236
Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 18.
237
Ibid.
 85

Dasein is also shaped by the situation. Thus, we can backtrack to the experience of

Dasein to understand its text. However, for Nabert, human existence can only be

understood through the understanding of the signs representing human existence. This

indirect approach of understanding human existence is Nabert’s contribution to the

philosophy of Ricoeur. Ricoeur believes that there exists a relationship that is frequently

disregarded, the relationship between the act of existence and the signs in which this act

is represented. For Ricoeur, the sign that mediates the subject and its experience is

inscripted in language. Language in turn is also inscripted in the text. Hereafter,

Ricoeur’s indirect ontology takes shape.

Ricoeur’s indirect ontological thrust is linked with reflexive philosophy. The

hermeneutics’ task, in this sense, is to explicate the subject’s desire and effort to be.

“Hermeneutics mediates the re-appropriation or the recovery of the subject. Only

through a hermeneutics of the text is reflection liberated from being abstract. Through

hermeneutics reflection becomes concrete reflection.”238

To be refreshed, Ricoeur’s study of the subject was never direct. Accordingly,

understanding of the self is indirect inasmuch as it is mediated by signs, symbols and

texts. The first two mediations were already discussed extensively in the previous

chapter.

His understanding of the self evolves from understanding it through the mediation

of the sign then to symbol and finally to text. The question arises as to why he shifts

from symbol to text. Ricoeur explains that he

realize[s] that no symbolism, whether traditional or private, can display its

resources of multiple meaning (plurivocité) outside appropriate contexts,

238
Van den Hengel, 106.
 86

that is to say, within the framework of an entire text, of a poem, for

example. [Secondly], the same symbolism can give rise to competitive…
interpretations, depending on whether the interpretation aims at reducing
the symbolism to its literal basis, to unconscious sources or its social
motivations, or at amplifying it in accordance with its highest power of
multiple meaning. In the one case, hermeneutics aims at demystifying a
symbolism by unmasking the unavowed forces that are concealed within
it; in the other case, it aims at a re-collection of meaning in its richest, its
most elevated, most spiritual diversity. But this conflict of interpretations
is also to be found at the level of texts.239

Ricoeur explains further that his shift from symbol to text is also due to the undefinability

of hermeneutics through symbolic interpretation. Nevertheless, he is aware of the two

diverging stages in interpretation – “the linguistic character of experience and the

240
technical definition of hermeneutics in terms of textual definition.” These stages

imply that self-understanding is not really intuitive in nature. On the contrary, to

understand one’s self is “to take the round-about path of the whole treasury of symbols

transmitted by the cultures within which we have come, at one and the same time, into

both existence and speech.”241

Mediation by text plays a significant role in the hermeneutic game. Although

mediation by text appears to be limited than that of signs and symbols, it nevertheless

obtains intensity in character. The intensity is derived from the characteristic of writing

which opens up new and original resources for discourse. Ricoeur rationalizes that

[t]hanks to writing, discourse acquires a threefold semantic autonomy: in

relation to the speaker’s intention, to its reception by its original audience,
and to the economic, social, and cultural circumstances of its production.
It is in this sense that writing tears itself free of the limits of face-to-face
dialogue and becomes the condition for discourse itself becoming-text. It

239
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 16 - 17.
240
Ibid., 17.
241
Ibid.
 87

is to hermeneutics that falls the task of exploring the implications of this

becoming-text for the work of interpretation.242

The questions on the primacy of subjectivity become the reason he makes the “theory of

the text as the hermeneutical axis.”243 By text, it is generally understood as “a unit of

discourse longer than the sentence.”244 Thus, the explanation of the nature of discourse

will illumine the entire textual enterprise.

The Nature of Discourse

Basically, discourse refers to the interaction of two subjects: the speaker and the

listener. This interaction is generally governed by a question and answer relationship.

Ricoeur declares about the subject that

In addressing himself to another speaker, the subject of discourse says

something about something; that about which he speaks is the referent of
his discourse. As is well known, this referential function is supported by
the sentence, which is the first and the simplest unit of discourse. It is the
sentence which intends to say something true or something, at least in
declarative discourse. The referential function is so important that it
compensates, as it were, for another characteristic of language, namely the
separation of signs from things. By means of the referential function,
language ‘pours back into the universe’… those signs which the symbolic
function, at its birth, divorced from things. All discourse is, to some
extent, thereby reconnected to the world.245

In this way, the circumstantial milieu of discourse becomes very meaningful inasmuch as

in speech, the interlocutors are present to one another and at the same time to the

242
Ibid.
243
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics,
II, 35.
244
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 3.
245
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 147-148.
 88

situation. This entails the ultimate going back to reality as indicated by discourse. This

going back is characteristic of discourse being an event.

Discourse as an event demonstrates that something happens when someone

speaks. There is a “transition from a linguistics of the code to a linguistics of the

message.”246 Ricoeur understands discourse as an ‘event’, as a temporal realization,

which happens in the present. He contrasts discourse with language in the sense that

language is virtual and outside of time.247

In the instance of a discourse, “the eventful character is now linked to the person

who speaks; the event consists in the fact that someone speaks. Someone expresses

himself in taking up speech.”248 Discourse in itself refers to the world which it claims to

describe, express, or represent. The event, in this sense, is the advent of a world in

language by means of discourse. Messages are exchanged in discourse. Aside from

having a world, discourse has also an interlocutor. The event in this sense is in the

phenomenon of exchange or in the dialogue that transpires between the speaker and the

listener.249

Discourse as an event is in tension with the meaning of discourse. If event is the

realization of discourse, discourse is also understood as meaning. “To mean is both, what

246
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and Surplus of Meaning (Texas: The Texas
University Press, 1976) , 11.
247
Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 133. Cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 11 & 198. See also, Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text:
Meaningful Action Considered as a Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 133.
248
Ibid.
249
Ibid.
 89

the speaker means, i.e., what he intends to say, and what the sentence means.”250

According to Ricoeur, “what we understood is not the fleeting event, but rather the

meaning which endures.”251

The understanding of discourse surpasses itself as event and meaning. Discourse

as an event refers to the act of saying, while the meaning of a discourse refers to the said.

Ricoeur recognizes the difference between saying and said. According to him, the very

first distanciation is the distanciation of the saying in the said.252

1. Discourse as Saying

In the act of a discourse, the event is surpassed by meaning. Event is fleeting

while meaning is enduring. The event of a discourse refers to the saying. The meaning

that is produced in a discourse refers to the said. Why does the said surpass the saying?

What is said? In clarifying this problem, Ricoeur borrows the theory of speech-act.

According to him, the act of discourse is constituted by a hierarchy of subordinate acts

distributed on three levels.253

The first level is the level of the locutionary or the act of saying. It is also called

the propositional act. The second level is the level of the illocutionary act (or force).

What has been done by the speaker at the moment of saying is the concern of this level.

Lastly, the third level is the level of the perlocutionary act. This refers to what has been

done by the speaker by the fact that he speaks.

250
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 12.
251
Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text”, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 134.
252
Ibid.
253
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 14. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” Hermeneutics and
Human Sciences, 134 - 35.
 90

In the first level, the focus is on the relation of the action predicate to the subject

of the proposition and to the rest of the predicate. However, aside from the act of saying,

there is also the manner of stating the proposition. Is it said with the force of an order, or

is it said merely as a statement, a wish or promise? Finally, the act of discourse can also

provoke a reaction from the side of the addressee. For example, this reaction could be

fear if a certain proposition is given as an order. Hence, discourse is a sort of stimulus

which produces certain results.254

An act of discourse will not forever be in the form of an oral discourse. The

distanciation of the saying from the said can be surmised through the subordinate acts in

the very act of saying. The meaning of the said will then be further exteriorized in

writing, most especially in the work.

Ricoeur thinks of work as a sequence longer than a sentence. It is submitted to a

form of codification which is applied to the composition itself. Work transforms

discourse into a sort of a literary genre. It has also a unique configuration that reflects the

individuality of the author..255

The notion of meaning in discourse as a work differs from the notion of meaning

in discourse as an act of saying. In oral discourse, the listener can ask the speaker for

clarification or further explanation if he fails to understand the speaker. The meaning of

the said can be clarified from the speaker himself. In work, “the notion of meaning

254
Ibid.
255
Ibid., 136.
 91

receives a new specification.... There is thus a problem of the interpretation of works, a

problem irreducible to the step by step understanding of sentences.”256

Work is no longer an event between the speaker and the listener. It now happens

between the author or the writer and the reader. Here, the second form of distanciation

takes place.

2. Discourse as Writing

In discourse as work, the dialectic of event and meaning can be found in the

realization of the work as an event. The work itself which is already a written text is the

event which is structurally characterized by openings, possibilities, and indeterminacies.

To grasp a work as an event is “to grasp the relation between the situation and the project

in the process of restructuration.”257 The fact that the work is already finished and that

the author, in a sense, is contemporaneous with the meaning of the work as a whole,

objectifies the understanding of the work. It has been objectified by writing.

The distanciation that is constituted by the objectification of the author in the

written work makes interpretation a fundamental reply to this problem. When the act of

discourse passes from oral to written, the work becomes “autonomous with respect to the

intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author

meant.... The autonomy of the text already contains the possibility that ... the ‘matter’ of

the text may escape from the finite intentional horizon of its author; in other words,... the

‘world’ of the text may explode the world of the author.”258

256
Ibid.
257
Ibid., 137.
258
Ibid., 139.
 92

The author writes the work according to his own psycho-sociological conditions.

However, the moment the work is finished; it transcends the author’s own psycho-

sociological conditions. Accordingly, the work “opens itself to an unlimited series of

readings, themselves situated in different socio-cultural condition. In short, the text must

be able... to ‘decontextualize’ itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualized’ in a

new situation - as accomplished precisely, by the act of reading.”259

Where writing frees the text from the whims of the author, writing and reading

become different from speaking and hearing. The autonomy of the text subjects itself to

the conditions of interpretation.

3. Discourse as Real

In an event of discourse, Ricoeur focuses on what happens to the denotation or the

reference of discourse. The notion of the reference is linked by Ricoeur to the notion of

“the world of the text”.

Frege discusses in On Sense and Reference260 the distinction between the sense

and the reference of any proposition. Ricoeur follows this up. To him, the sense of a

proposition refers to the ideal object or meaning just as the proposition refers to the ideal

object or meaning which the proposition intends. Hence, the sense of the proposition is

immanent in a discourse. On the other hand, the reference of the proposition, which

refers to the truth-value of the proposition, refers also to its claim to reach reality. Thus,

reference distinguishes discourse from language. As Ricoeur says, language “has no

259
Ibid.
260
Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, trans. by Max Black in Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 56-78 as cited by Paul Ricoeur
in Interpretation Theory, 19.
 93

relation with reality, its words returning to other words in the endless circle of dictionary.

Only discourse... intends things, applies itself to reality, expresses the world.”261 Ricoeur

adds that “this notion of bringing experience to language is the ontological condition of

reference.”262 Meaning, the sense of the proposition presupposes reference. The reason

for this is the fact that “there is first something to say, because we have an experience to

bring to language, that conversely, language is not only directed towards ideal meanings

but also refers to what is.”263

Sense and reference are not so problematic in the event of an oral discourse. The

problem of reference can be resolved by pointing out the spatio-temporal situations that

are common to the interlocutors. Reference can be determined by the ability to point out

the reality that they shared. Their situation in the moment of an oral discourse can

determine the situatedness of the reference in reality. Clarifications can be done through

the explanation of the speaker.

On the contrary, when a certain discourse is put to writing, the situation changes.

The commonality of situation between the reader and the writer is no longer there. The

condition of the act of pointing out does not exist since the situations of the reader and

the writer are not the same. The psychological intentions of the writer which are

concealed behind the text can, in this case, no longer be completely defined. Ricoeur

asks, “if we do not reduce interpretation to the dismantling of structures, then what

261
Ricoeur, “What is a Text?”, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 140.
262
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 21.
263
Ibid.
 94

remains to be interpreted?”264 He answers: “to interpret is to explicate the type of being-

in-the-world unfolded in front of the text.”265

The Nature of Text

In Ricoeur’s theory of the text, there are two elements to be remembered. Ricoeur,

first and foremost, wants to overcome the romantic notion of interpretation as

understanding the intentions of the author behind the text. For Ricoeur, to interpret is to

grasp the world opened up in front of the text. Secondly, Ricoeur develops a concept of

the text as autonomous work, which makes it possible to include a critical moment of

explanation in the process of interpretation.

If discourse is both oral and written, a text is already understood as “any discourse

fixed by writing.”266 This definition exemplifies the fixation by writing of discourse

which is constitutive of the text itself. This implies further that writing is first and

foremost speaking inasmuch as it is first said verbally or mentally. Ricoeur explains

further that this “[f]ixation by writing takes the very place of speech, occurring at the site

where speech could have emerged. This suggests that a text is really a text only when it

is not restricted to transcribing an anterior speech, when instead it inscribes directly in

written letters what the discourse means.”267

Inasmuch as writing transcribes the speech, speech and text are therefore in the

same position with respect to language. This is so because speech is understood as the

264
Ibid., 141.
265
Ibid.
266
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 145. See also, Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics” in Paul Ricoeur,
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences,166.
267
Ibid., 146.
 95

realization of language in an event of discourse. It is the production of an individual

utterance by an individual speaker.268

Although writing is prior to speech, “writing adds nothing to the phenomenon of

speech other than the fixation which enables it to be conserved. Whence the conviction

that writing is fixed speech, that inscription, whether it be graphics or recording, is

inscription of speech – and inscription which … guarantees the persistence of speech.”269

But what happens to discourse when it passes from speaking to writing? The

moment the text replaces speech, a very important incident happens. The circumstantial

milieu of discourse becomes very meaningful inasmuch as in speech, the interlocutors are

present to one another and at the same time to the situation. This entails the ultimate

going back to reality as indicated by discourse. “Thus in living speech, the ideal sense of

what is said turns toward the real reference, towards that ‘about which’ we speak. At the

limit, this real reference tends to merge with an ostensive designation where speech

rejoins the gesture of pointing. Sense fades into reference and the latter into the act of

showing.”270 Furthermore, Ricoeur explains

At first sight, writing seems only to introduce a purely external and

material factor: fixation, which shelters the event of discourse from
destruction. In fact, fixation is only the external appearance of a problem
which is much more important, and which affects all the properties of
discourse…. To begin with, writing renders the text autonomous with
respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer
coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, textual meaning and
psychological meaning have different destinies.271

268
Ibid.
269
Ibid.
270
Ibid., 148.
271
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences,139.
 96

In this sense, interpretation is put side by side with the moment of ‘understanding’ the

situation of the reader apart from the writer. Interpretation thus becomes the projection

of the ownmost possibilities that the reader can find in the situation. Ricoeur, applying

this to the theory of the text as autonomous, says that “what must be interpreted in a text

is a proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my

ownmost possibilities.”272

Because the meaning of the text is autonomous it escapes from the psychological

intention of the writer. The truth value of the text is now independent from the writer’s

original intention. The sense of the text as envisioned by the author may now have a

reference different from the situation of the reader. The open-endedness of the text may

vary from one interpreter to another inasmuch as they vary in the projection of their

ownmost possibilities. The re-appropriation of the text becomes variable.

The elusiveness of the reference from the sense is illustrated by the notion of

symbol as an enigmatic entity. That is to say, the signification of a symbol may elude its

apparent sense for it may refer to something else.

He explains further that “insofar as the meaning of a text is rendered autonomous

with respect to the subjective intention of its author, the essential question is not to

recover, behind the text, the lost intention but to unfold, in front of the text, the ‘world’ it

opens up and discloses.”273

272
Ibid., 142.
273
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays In
Hermeneutics, II, 35.
 97

In front of the text, the subject, i.e., both that of the author and the reader,
274
becomes secondary. What is given primary importance is the matter of the text. By

freeing the text from the subjectivities of the author and the reader, the first task now of

hermeneutics, Ricoeur asserts, is “to seek in the text itself, on the one hand, the internal

dynamic that governs the structuring of the work and, on the other hand, the power that

the work possesses to project itself outside itself and to give birth to a world that would

truly be the ‘thing’ referred to by the text.”275 In short, the task of hermeneutics is

twofold: “to reconstruct the internal dynamic of the text and to restore to the work its

ability to project itself outside itself in the representation of a world that [the reader]

could inhabit.”276 This internal dynamic and external projection constitutes what Ricoeur

calls the work of the text.

As a result, Ricoeur resists the dialectic of understanding and explanation which

is the consequent of the two one-sided attitudes of reducing understanding to empathy

and of reducing explanation to an abstract combinatory system.277 To do so, he elucidates

again the meaning of understanding and explanation as follows: “by understanding I

mean the ability to take up again within oneself the work of structuring that is performed

by the text, and by explanation, the second-order operation grafted onto this

understanding which consists in bringing to light the codes underlying this work of

274
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics, II, 17.
275
Ibid.
276
Ibid., 18. See also Paul Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding”, From Text
to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics, II, 113.
277
Ibid., 19.
 98

structuring that is carried through in company with the reader.”278 He explains further that

such a resistance leads him to use the very dialectic of understanding and explanation at

the level of the “sense” immanent in the text to define interpretation. He then claims that

this would be his first contribution to the hermeneutical philosophy out of which he is

working.279

Explanation and Understanding

Ricoeur aims to establish the interrelation of explanation and understanding.

Seemingly, explanation and understanding, in the act of reading, are two distinct

processes that cannot be united. This exclusivism, Ricoeur asserts, is a consequent of

Dilthey’s position that in the act of reading, persons either “`explain’ in the manner of the

natural scientist, or … ‘interpret’ in the manner of the historian.”280 Nevertheless, amidst

this apparent contradiction, Ricoeur is going to deliberately “show that the concept of the

text… demands a renewal of the two notions of explanation and interpretation and, in

virtue of this renewal, a less contradictory conception of their interrelation.”281 Hence, he

is going to search for a “strict complementarity and reciprocity between explanation and

interpretation.”282 He is going to prove that understanding is not sole domain of the

human sciences and that explanation is not limited to the natural sciences.

278
Ibid., 18 – 19.
279
Ibid., 19.
280
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences,150.
281
Ibid. Eventually, the explanation-interpretation becomes explanation-understanding inasmuch
as interpretation is a particular province of understanding.
282
Ibid.
 99

Initially, the apparent contradiction between explanation and understanding, as

mentioned above, is due also to the differences of their objects. The purpose of

explanation is to “explicate or unfold the range of propositions and meanings, whereas in

understanding we comprehend or grasp as a whole the chain of practical meanings in one

act of synthesis.”283 Vis-à-vis discourse, Ricoeur elaborates by way of an analogy saying

that “understanding is to reading what the event of discourse is to the utterance of

discourse and that explanation is to reading what the verbal and textual autonomy is to

the objective meaning of discourse.”284

Ricoeur also observes that “the dichotomy between understanding and

explanation in Romanticist hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It

opposes two methodologies and two spheres of reality, nature and mind. Interpretation is

not a third term, nor… the name of the dialectic between explanation and understanding.

Interpretation is a particular case of understanding. It is understanding applied to the

written expressions of life.”285

Ricoeur exposes the process of the dialectic of explanation and understanding as a

unique process following the route of understanding to explanation and then explanation

to comprehension. The first phase is simply governed by a guessing expedition inasmuch

as its sole purpose is to first grasp the whole meaning of the text. The second phase, on

the other hand, becomes a more sophisticated mode of understanding inasmuch as it is

283
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 72.
284
Ibid., 71 – 72.
285
Ibid., 73.
 100

now employing explanatory procedures. Thus, from being a mere guess, it will now

satisfy the conditions of appropriation as the new concept of interpretation.

1. Guess as a Holistic but Naïve Grasping of the Text

Guessing the meaning of a text is necessary in relation to the autonomy of textual

meaning. This necessity is very specific to writing because the “verbal meaning of the

text no longer coincides with the mental meaning or intention of the text. This intention is

both fulfilled and abolished by the text, which is no longer the voice of someone

present.”286 However, Clark observes that “although ‘the human fact disappears’ in

writing, the ‘detachment of meaning from the event’ overcomes the transience of the

instance of discourse. The propositional content of the locutionary act is preserved in its

entirety, whereas the immediate force of the illocutionary act only remains in the form of

additional punctuation marks, and the emotional, even physical, impact of the

perlocutionary disappears.287 Consequently, in this situation, understanding is not

“merely to repeat the speech event in a similar event, it is to generate a new event

beginning from the text in which the initial event has been objectified.”288

Ricoeur’s guessing of the meaning of the text is an honest assessment that since

the author is no longer present in front of the reader, the intention of the author is already

beyond its reach. In other words, hermeneutics can no longer be defined as “an inquiry

into the psychological intentions that are hidden beneath the text, but rather as the

286
Ibid., 75.
287
S.H. Clark, Paul Ricoeur (London: Routledge, 1990), 100.
288
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 75.
 101

explication of the being-in-the-world displayed by the text.”289 In reality, guessing is his

way of showing his opposition to the Romanticist way of interpretation which is “to

understand an author as well as and even better than he understands himself.”290

Inasmuch as writing separates the meaning of the text from the intention of the author, to

put it simply, “the author can no longer ‘rescue’ his work….”291 This is not much of a

problem for Ricoeur. He is in the opinion that the problem of interpretation is on the very

nature of the verbal intention of the text and not on the incommunicability of the mental

intention of the author.292 His position is that

the surpassing of the intention by the meaning signifies precisely that

understanding takes place in a nonpsychological and properly semantical
space, which the text has carved out by severing itself from the mental
intention of its author… [and that] the problem of the correct
understanding can no longer be solved by a simple return to the alleged
situation of the author…. [To make a guess, therefore, is] to construe the
meaning as the verbal meaning of the text.293

Furthermore, Ricoeur enumerates the things realized in guessing. They are as

follows: (1) to construe the verbal meaning of a text is to construe it as a whole; (2) to

construe a text is to construe it as an individual; and, (3) the literary texts involve

potential horizons of meaning, which may be actualized in different ways.294 However,

even then, the caveat is that the guess work is a very subjective interpretation. The

possibility of misunderstanding is very difficult to avoid. Nevertheless, Ricoeur is aware

289
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action: Essays In
Hermeneutics, II, 36.
290
Ricoeur, “The Task of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 46.
291
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 75.
292
Ibid., 76.
293
Ibid.
294
Ibid.,76 – 79.
 102

that rules for making good guesses are impossible to establish. However, the methods for

validating those guesses abound.295 Thus, he emphasizes “the balance between the

genius of guessing and the scientific character of validation of an interpretation…. Guess

and validation are in a sense circularly related as subjective and objective approaches to

the text.”296 He asserts however that this circle is never vicious since it will break away

from the kind of “‘self-confirmability’ which… threatens the relation between guess and

validation.”297 Whenever there are conflicts among competing interpretations, only the

most probable one will be pursued for interpretations are never equal. With this idea,

Ricoeur is confident that there exists “criteria of relative superiority for resolving

[whatever] conflict, which can easily be derived from the logic of subjective

probability.”298

2. Falsification as Validation: The Explanatory Phase

Here, the logic of validation plays a very important role. Ricoeur explains that

“the logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and

skepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront

interpretation, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement

remains beyond our immediate reach.”299 With the said abounding possibilities, the more

it becomes important to validate whatever guesses the reader makes regarding a text.

Amdal and Reagan, however, cite that by validation, Ricoeur does not mean verification.

295
Ibid., 76.
296
Ibid., 79.
297
Ibid.
298
Ibid.
299
Ibid.
 103

It rather means “a process of falsification and probable reasoning which aims at

establishing an interpretation as more probable than another. That a text admits of more

than one interpretation does not mean that all interpretations are equal.”300

Ricoeur imports the methodology that the various structural schools of literary

criticism used. He thinks about the legitimacy of their approach inasmuch as they “all

shared the feature of confining themselves to the structures of the text alone, without any

reference to the presumed intention of the author.”301 Consequently, he sees their

approach to be proceeding from the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference.

From there, “the text intercepts the ‘worldly’ dimension of the discourse – the relation to

a world which could be shown – in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the

discourse to the intention of the author.”302

This approach of reading extends the suspension of the ostensive reference. It also

transfers the reader into the place where the text stands. In doing so, the text is converted

into a closed system of signs. In this way, the text can be subjected to the “explanatory

rules that linguistics successfully applied to the elementary system of signs which

underlie the use of language.”303 However, this structural analysis as applied to text is

only applicable to sequences of signs not longer than a sentence.

300
Reagan, “Words and Deeds” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur
(Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 335 – 336. See also, Geir Amdal, “Explanation and Understanding: The
Hermeneutic Arc -- Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of Interpretation” Candidate Philol. Thesis. (Department of
Philosophy, University of Oslo: May 2001), 51. [on-line text is accessed on April 5, 2006 at]
http://folk.uio.no/geira/thesis/thesis.pdf. Cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 79.
301
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 22.
302
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 81.
303
Ibid., 81.
 104

As a consequence, a question on the propriety of using structural model to text

arises. However, Amdal explains that

[t]he suppression of the direct relation of the text to an author, a world, a

time of creation, makes it possible to analyse it as a closed universe of
words and functions, in the same way in which the langue is analysed as a
‘closed universe of signs’. Indeed, the text is discourse and with regard to
the langue it has a position which is analogous to that of speech. That is to
say, it cannot be conceived as only a structural composition like the
language system. On the other hand, it is something essentially different
from spoken discourse. The text is the type of discourse which can be
analysed in a similar way as the langue. It can be taken as a self-sufficient
system of oppositions, combinations, codes. “The unities of higher order
than the sentence, are organized in a way similar to that of the small
unities of language, that is, the unities of an order lower than the sentence,
those precisely which belong to the domain of linguistics.”304

Ricoeur is moved to use structural analysis to texts when he observes that Claude

Levi-Strauss made structural analysis possible to myth, a category of text. Ricoeur notes

that Levi-Strauss hypothesizes that “myth, like the rest of language, is made up of

constituent units. These constituent units presuppose the constituent units present in

language when analyzed on other levels – namely, phonemes, morphemes, and sememes

– but they, nevertheless, differ from the latter in the same way as the latter differ among

themselves; they belong to a higher and more complex order. For this reason, [they shall

be called] gross constituent units.”305 To insist, however, on this semblance, Levi-Strauss

has to call them mythemes306.

304
Geir Amdal, “Explanation and Understanding: The Hermeneutic Arc -- Paul Ricoeur’s Theory
of Interpretation”, 20 – 21. Cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 82 – 83; Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical
Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 140 & 142.
305
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 82. Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans.
Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967): 208 – 28.
306
“A mytheme is not one of the sentences of a myth. It is, however, an appositive value attached
to several individual sentences, which form “a bundle of relations.” It “is only as bundles that these
relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning.” What is here called a meaning is not
at all what the myth means, in the sense of its philosophical or existential content or intuition, but rather the
 105

From this hypothesis, Ricoeur set in motion the structural model to text. The

contention of Ricoeur is that the same rules applicable to the smallest units known to

linguistics can also be applied to larger units, which are at least the same as the sentence,

when they are put together to form a narrative.307 Using structural analysis to myth,

Ricoeur observes that in this process the myth is explained by not necessarily interpreting

it. Through this process, “the structural law of the myth”308 is brought out and here the

text is only taken as a text. For the time being, the meaning is suspended.

Apart from Levi-Strauss, Ricoeur notes also the influences of the Russian

formalist Vladimir Propp, and the French structural analysts Roland Barthes and A.J.

Greimas in the aspect of folklore narrative. From them, Ricoeur realizes that the units of

action in a narrative if segmented and then the parts are integrated in to the whole, “have

nothing to do with psychological traits susceptible of being lived….”309 There is however

a recognition of the “transposition of the commutative method from the phonological

level to the level of the narrative units. The logic of action then consists in linking

together action kernels, which together constitute the narrative’s structural continuity.

The application of this technique results in a ‘dechronologizing’ of the narrative, so as to

make apparent the narrative logic underlying the narrative time.”310 Ultimately, the

arrangement or disposition of the mythemes themselves; in short, the structure of the myth.” Ibid., 83. Cf.
Levi-Strauss, 207.
307
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 82.
308
Ibid., 84.
309
Ibid.
310
Ibid., 85.
 106

purpose of explaining a narrative is “to get hold of this symphonic structure of segmental

actions.”311

From the aforementioned instances of structural analysis of certain categories of a

text, i.e., from a myth and a folklore narrative, Ricoeur is convinced that explanation, in

the rigorous sense of the term, is not only peculiar to the natural sciences but also

applicable to texts for the reason that “it proceeds from the common sphere of language

thanks to the analogical transference from the small units of language (phonemes and

lexemes) to the large units beyond the sentence, including narrative, folklore, and

myth.”312 From the foregoing discussion, structural analysis of the text is seen as an

appropriate methodology in correcting the historicizing and psychologizing tendencies of

the reader as well as adjusting its existential prejudices.

Furthermore, Ricoeur is going to show that explanation still requires

understanding. In fact he contends that in relation to understanding, explanation is

secondary. Secondary in the sense that “explanation, conceived as a combinatory system

of signs, hence as a semiotics, is built up on the basis of a first order understanding

bearing on discourse as an act that is both indivisible and capable of innovation.”313

Understanding is significant in presenting what is beyond structural analysis. Structural

analysis shall not be limited to explaining the logical operation of the text only. Most

importantly, it is expected to lead the reader from a surface semantics to a depth

311
Ibid.
312
Ibid., 86.
313
Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 10.
 107

semantics. Limiting reading to mere structural analysis deprives the text of its life for it

reduces the text merely to a series of meaningless discourses.

If explanation is concerned with the logical operation of the text, understanding is

concerned with the grasping of the “kind of world opened up by the depth semantics of

the text, a discovery, which has immense consequences regarding what is usually called

the sense of the text.”314 Ricoeur explains further, saying

[t]he sense of a text is not behind the text, but in front of it. It is not
something hidden, but something disclosed. What has to be understood is
not the initial situation of discourse, but what points towards a possible
world, thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text. Understanding has
less than ever to do with the author and his situation. It seeks to grasp the
world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text. To understand a
text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from what it says,
to what it talks about.315

At this junction, to understand is not to understand the intention of the author. It is to

intuitively grasp the intention of the text itself. This is borne by the depth semantics that

structural analysis yields. It yields an invitation “to think of the sense of the text as an

injunction coming from the text, as a new way of looking at things, as an injunction to

think in a certain manner.”316 Consequently, “the text speaks of a possible world and of a

possible way of orienting oneself within it. The dimensions of this world are properly

opened up by and disclosed by the text.”317 Whatever is shown here by the text is at the

same time a creation of a new mode of being. This is what Ricoeur envisions: a model of

314
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 87.
315
Ibid., 87 – 88.
316
Ibid., 88.
317
Ibid.
 108

the text freed with respects to its author, yet still able to reach beyond pure textuality and

retain its relation to a world.

Meaningful Action Considered as a Text

After Ricoeur develops the phases of explanation and understanding dialectically,

he integrates them in “the field of practice, and in general action human action, the

privileged place of the dialectic between explanation and understanding.”318 In the

general scheme of the theoretical development of action, he places the theory of action at

the middle of the theory of the text and that of history. This positioning signals the very

important place of action in Ricoeur’s understanding of the self. This implies that from

reading a text, the person is compelled to appropriate or disappropriate the meaning of

the text read to action. As Madison reckons,

The task of interpretation or hermeneutics is to reconstruct the internal

dynamic of a text so as to make manifest the world which it projects. This
world is a possible world, one which I, as reader, could inhabit. In opening
up worlds which express possibilities of being, literary texts generate
meaning, allow for self-understanding. In revealing possibilities of being,
texts further our self-understanding, for what we essentially are is what we
can become, the being otherwise and being more that are the objects of
effort and desire, the two basic characteristics of the act of existing.319

Now, whether this, mode of appropriation or disappropriation is correct, history is the one

to judge it. It is history that inseparably links text and action together. As Ricoeur

reiterates all over time, he maintains that “the primacy granted to the concept of action is

justified… by an increasingly active attachment to moral and political philosophy.”320 He

318
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 31.
319
Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, 81.
320
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 33. Ricoeur explains that the attention he brought to the
moral problem, from which he never separated the political problem, is contemporaneous with his choice of
the problematic of the will and its development in a meditation on the origin of bad will. He intimates
 109

backs up this position as he affirms that “moral obligation resides on a level less

fundamental than the personal desire for fulfillment; the call of the other is also forcefully

affirmed….”321

Ricoeur considers the text as a good paradigm for the social sciences. In so doing,

he establishes four characteristics of texts that are also borne by action. First, writing

fixes not the event but the meaning of what is said. In this way, a text inscribes directly

the meaning of discourse. In the same way, Ricoeur points out that “meaningful action is

an object for science only under the condition of a kind of objectification which is

equivalent to the fixation of discourse by writing.”322 The possibility of objectification is

due to the inner trait of action which is similar to the locutionary act of a discourse, i.e.,

“it has a propositional content that can be identified and reidentified as the same.”323

Thus, Reagan comments that “when we speak of an action ‘leaving its mark’, we are

metaphorically referring to one of the ways actions are inscribed.”324

Secondly, if in a written text, its meaning is already detached from the intention of

the author, “an action is [also] detached from its agent and develops consequences of its

own.”325 The social dimension of action, which is due to its being “done by several

agents in such a way that the role of each of them cannot be distinguished from the role

further that it was only after the course at Louvain on the semantics of action (1972) that the analysis of the
moral problem is explicitly related to a consideration of the field of practice in its full scope.
321
Ibid., 33- 34.
322
Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 333. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, 203.
323
Ricoeur, “Model of the Text”, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 204.
324
Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334.
325
Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 206.
 110

of the others”326, makes it have “consequences and effects which were neither intended

nor foreseen by the agent.”327 Furthermore, this social dimension makes an action

blameworthy only if it leaves an imprint. And, it is here where history plays a very

important role since it is where human action leaves its imprint. Nevertheless, even if the

continuous process of recording human action takes place in history, its fate escapes the

control of individual actors.328

Thirdly, inasmuch as a text “breaks the ties of discourse to all the ostensive

references”329, “a meaningful action is an action the importance of which goes ‘beyond’

its relevance to its initial situation.”330 This goes on to show that non-ostensive references

which are called a ‘world’ develop as a result of this emancipation from the situational

context of the interlocutors and that of the actors. However, this world does not refer to

the concrete world of the interlocutors and actors but the possible world for the reader.

Reagan quotes Ricoeur saying that “for me, this is the referent of all literature; no longer

the Umwelt of the ostensive references of dialogue, but the Welt projected by the non-

ostensive references of every text that we have read, understood, and loved.”331 Thus,

Reagan further comments that “meaningful actions and their consequences, like the

references of texts, have an importance which goes beyond that of the situation in which

they were produced. Historically significant actions like great works of culture can break
326
Ibid.
327
Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334.
328
Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 207.
329
Ibid.
330
Ibid.
331
Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, 202.
 111

the bonds with the actual conditions of their production and can be reenacted and

reinterpreted in novel situations.”332 As Ricoeur said it, “an important action… develops

meanings which can be actualised or fulfilled in situations other than the one in which

this action occurred.”333

Lastly, the moment written text escapes the bounds lived by the author, and the

narrowness of ostensive reference, it suddenly addresses anybody who is capable of

reading. “An unknown, invisible reader has become the unprivileged addressee of the

discourse.”334 In the same manner, “the meaning of human action is also something

which is addressed to an indefinite range of possible ‘readers’. The judges are not the

contemporaries, but, as Hegel said, history itself.”335 This makes human action like an

open work that becomes open to new readings. As Ricoeur elaborates his position,

It is because it ‘opens up’ new references and receives fresh relevance

from them, that human deeds are also waiting for fresh interpretations
which decide their meaning. All significant events and deeds are, in this
way, opened to this kind of practical interpretation through present praxis.
Human action, too, is opened to anybody who can read. In the same way
that the meaning of an event is the sense of its forthcoming interpretations,
the interpretation by the contemporaries has no particular privilege in this
process.336

After setting up the close analogy between the characteristics of texts and action, Ricoeur

allows the social sciences to adopt the methodology of text-interpretation in order to

understand human action. Madison explains that “it is only by considering action as a text

332
Ibid.
333
Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 208.
334
Ibid., 203. Cf. Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334.
335
Ibid., 208. Cf. Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334 – 335.
336
Ibid., 208 – 209.
 112

that we can hope to come to some understanding of it, and thus of that being which is

essentially we are.”337

Furthermore, Madison claims that for Ricoeur, the theory of action is inseparable

from the theory of texts. Madison quotes Ricoeur saying:

The intersection between the theory of texts and the theory of action
becomes more obvious when the point of view of the onlooker is added to
that of the agent, because the onlooker will not only consider action in
terms of its motive, but also in terms of its consequences, perhaps of its
unintended consequences. A different way of making sense with actions
occurs then, and also a different way of reading it as a quasi-text.
Detached from its agent, a course of action acquires an autonomy similar
to the semantic autonomy of a text. It leaves its mark on the course of
events and eventually it becomes sedimented into social institutions.
Human action has become archive and document. Thus it acquires
potential meaning beyond its relevance to its initial situation.338

This being the case, understanding the self as an acting being paves the way for utilizing

the same paradigm as understanding the self in front of a text inasmuch as a meaningful

action is considered as a text.

Distanciation and Appropriation

“The driving force behind the desire to know is the need to make the world over

in terms that are meaningful.”339 This is the polar force of the reader’s appropriation.

When the reader chooses to engage the otherness as constituted by a text, he nonetheless

enters into a struggle between appropriation and distanciation. This struggle occurs by

virtue of the productive engagement that happens between the text and the reader. This

productive engagement is seen as the process of redescribing the world, first, of the

337
Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, 83.
338
Ibid.
339
Geir Amdal. “Explanation and Understanding: The Hermeneutic Arc -- Paul Ricoeur’s Theory
of Interpretation”, 61.
 113

reader himself and second that of others as inscribed in the text. Amdal considers this as

an interpretive process that “begins with the analytic power of explanation and is then

challenged by the unitary force of understanding.”340 The said engagement of

explanation and understanding is expected to produce the interpretation which in return

responds to the initial need to engage distanciation and appropriation.

Ricoeur employs the theory of the text341 because he finds it as a good guide for

showing that “the act of subjectivity is not so much what initiates understanding as what

terminates it. [Moreover, he takes] this terminal act [as] characteris[ing]

appropriation.”342 To reiterate what has been said above, the rejoining of subjectivity is

not the one that supports the meaning of the text. It only responds to the matter of the text

as proposed meanings unfold in front of the text.

It is from here that distanciation becomes very important. Van den Hengel cites

Ricoeur as saying that “to invoke distanciation as a principle is to attempt to show the

very experience of belonging to. . . requires something like externalization in order to

apprehend, articulate and understand itself.”343 Consequently, the introduction of

distanciation, first, establishes the autonomy of the text with respect to its author, its

situation and its original reader.

340
Ibid.
341
Morrison comments that “a theory of texts is important in Ricoeur's hermeneutic as it offers the
interpreter space for the application of critical tools. True appropriation of a text's meaning is a reflexive
action realized at the intersection of ontological naiveté and critical distanciation.” Bradley T. Morrison. “A
Phenomenology of Marital Dynamics and Pastoral Care” [article on-line]; available from
http://www.xcelco.on.ca/~btmorrison/ricoeur/Ricoeur&Systems.html; accessed 7 July 2006.
342
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 113.
343
Van den Hengel, 109.
 114

Ricoeur also confirms the existence of a second distanciation “by which a new

being-in-the-world, projected, is freed from the false evidences of every reality.”344 He

asserts that “distanciation implements all the strategies of suspicion, among which the

critique of ideology is a principal modality. Distanciation, in all its forms and figures,

constitutes par excellence the critical moment in understanding.”345 In other words,

distanciation is understood as more than a mere distance as it implies a creation of

distance, in order to permit a re-description of reality.

Distanciation as a methodology corresponds to what Ricoeur calls as the first way

of reading a text. Ricoeur elaborates that there are

[t]wo ways of reading…. [First,]by reading we can prolong and reinforce

the suspense which affects the text’s reference to a surrounding world and
to the audience of speaking subjects.346

The first way of reading is referred to as an explanatory attitude. This first reading

confirms the first and second distanciation explained above. Ricoeur, however, explains

that the real aim of reading is borne by the second reading. The second reading becomes

the real aim because the second way of reading “lift[s] the suspense and fulfill[s] the text

in present speech…. [It] reveals the true nature of the suspense which intercepts the

movement of the text towards meaning.”347

The movement of text towards meaning may closely affirm possible imaginative

variation of the ego. With this possibility, a critique of the illusions of the subject is very

344
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 113.
345
Ibid.
346
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 158.
347
Ibid.
 115

much needed. This happens only if and only if the second way reading a text operates

likes a premature appropriation that is directed against an alienating distanciation.

However, if distanciation is taken as a condition of possible understanding one’s self in

front of the text, then it can aptly be taken as an avenue of the critique of ideology which

organically implies a critique of the illusions of the subject. From this, Ricoeur describes

distanciation as “[d]istanciation from oneself [that] demands that the appropriation of the
348
proposed worlds offered by the text passes through the disappropriation of the self.

Consequently, the critique on the illusions of the subject is critique of false consciousness

that can become an integral part of hermeneutics.349

With distanciation, appropriation is deemed as its counterpart. It is taken as a

response to this double distanciation. This becomes the case for the reason that

distanciation is not abolished by appropriation, but is rather the

counterpart of it. Thanks to distanciation… appropriation no longer has
any trace of affective affinity with the intention of an author.
Appropriation is quite the contrary of contemporaneousness and
congeniality: it is understanding at and through distance.350

348
Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 94. “[T]he concept of ‘appropriation’… demands an internal critique. For the metamorphosis of
the ego… implies a moment of distanciation in the relation of self to itself; hence understanding is as much
disappropriation as appropriation. A critique of the illusions of the subject… therefore can and must be
incorporated into self-understanding. The consequence for hermeneutics is important: we can no longer
oppose hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. The critique of ideology is the necessary detour which
self-understanding must take, if the latter is to be formed by the matter of the text and not by the prejudices
of the reader.” Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 144.
349
Ibid., 95.
350
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation”, in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 143.
 116

This makes the possibility of integrating appropriation into the theory of interpretation

without introducing again the primacy of subjectivity.351 Ricoeur ascertain this as he

says:

That appropriation does not imply the secret return of the sovereign
subject can be attested to in the following way: if it remains true that
hermeneutics terminates in self-understanding, then the subjectivism of
this proposition must be rectified by saying that to understand oneself is to
understand oneself in front of the text. Consequently, what is appropriation
from one point of view is disappropriation from another. To appropriate is
to make what was alien become one’s own. What is appropriated is indeed
the matter of the text. But the matter of the text becomes my own only if I
disappropriate myself, in order to let the matter of the text be. So I
exchange the me, master of itself, for the self, disciple of the text.352

Thus we must place at the very heart of self-understanding that dialectic of objectification

and understanding which we first perceived at the level of the text, its structures, its sense

and its reference. At all these levels of analysis, distanciation is the condition of

understanding.

Appropriation: A New Concept of Interpretation

In reading a text, the ultimate aim remains the understanding of what the text

means to the reader. To understand the meaning of the text means to interpret the text.

And, by interpretation, Ricoeur means “the concrete outcome of conjunction and

renewal.”353 Conjunction and renewal are necessary characteristics of reading for the

reason that to read is “to conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of the text.

[Furthermore,] this conjunction of discourses reveals… an original capacity for renewal

351
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 113.
352
Ibid. See also, Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 35.
353
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 158.
 117

which is its open character.”354 Thus Ricoeur asserts that “an interpretation is not

authentic unless it culminates in some form of appropriation (Aneignung), if by that term

we understand the process by which one makes one’s own (eigen) what was initially

other or alien (fremd).”355 As what he further expounds:

By ‘appropriation’, I understand this: that the interpretation of a text

culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth
understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply
begins to understand himself. This culmination of the understanding of a
text in self-understanding is characteristic of the kind of reflective
philosophy which… I have called ‘concrete reflection’.356

This disputation, Ricoeur notes, leads to the three misconception regarding

appropriation. Initially, appropriation is usually understood as a circle between two

subjectivities - that of the reader and the author - and as the projection of the subjectivity

of the reader into the reading itself. It first appears as if appropriation is a return to the

Romanticist claim to a “congenial” coincidence with the “genius” of the author. Ricoeur

declares that this is not true. He stresses that what is to be understood and subsequently

appropriated is not the intention of the author or the historical situation common to the

reader and his original readers; not even their understanding of themselves as historical

and cultural phenomena. Instead, what has to be appropriated is “the meaning of the text

354
Ibid.
355
Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the
Human Sciences, 178. See also, Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics”, Hermeneutics and the
Human Sciences, 113; Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding”, Hermeneutics and the
Human Sciences, 159; “Appropriation”, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 185.
356
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 158.
 118

itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of thought opened up by the text.”357

In other words,

[w]hat we make our own, what we appropriate for ourselves, is not an

alien experience or a distant intention, but the horizon of a world towards
which a work directs itself. The appropriation of the reference is no longer
modeled on the fusion of consciousness, on empathy or sympathy. The
emergence of the sense and the reference of a text in language is the
coming to language of a world and not the recognition of another
person…. [Furthermore,] if appropriation is the counterpart of disclosure,
then the role of subjectivity must not be described in terms of projection. I
should prefer to say that the reader understands himself in front of the text,
in front of the world of the work. To understand oneself in front of a text
is quite the contrary of projecting oneself and one’s own beliefs and
prejudices; it is to let the work and its world enlarge the horizon of the
understanding which I have myself.358

The second misconception about appropriation is the belief that the hermeneutical

task would be ruled by the understanding of the original addressee of the text. Ricoeur

says that this is a complete misconception. He explains that

[o]nly the dialogue has a “thou” whose identification precedes discourse.

The meaning of a text is open to anyone who can read. The
omnitemporality of the meaning is what opens it to unknown readers.
Hence the historicity of reading is the counterpart of this specific
omnitemporality; since the text has escaped its author and his situation, it
has also escaped its original addressee. Henceforth it may provide itself
with new readers.359

Lastly, Critics surmise that the appropriation of the meaning of a text by an actual reader

would place the interpretation under the empire of the finite capacities of understanding

of this reader. Ricoeur answers that this objection had often been raised against all brands

of “existential” hermeneutics. He notes that the cause of this mistrust is the English (and

357
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 92.
358
Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, 178.
359
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 93.
 119

French) translation of Aneignung by appropriation which supposes that the meaning of

the text is put under the power of the subject who interprets it. Ricoeur, however, is

optimistic that

this objection may be removed if we keep in mind that what is “made

one’s own” is not something mental, not the intention of another subject,
presumably hidden behind the text, but the project of a world, the pro-
position of a mode of being in the world that the text opens up in front of
itself by means of its non-ostensive references. [In this way,] interpretation
[becomes] the process by which disclosure of new modes of being …
gives to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself. If the reference of
the text is the project of a world, then it is not the reader who primarily
projects himself. The reader rather is enlarged in his capacity of self-
projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself.360

Appropriation, Ricoeur argues, “implies a moment of dispossession of the egoistic and

narcissistic ego. This process of dispossessing is the work of the kind of universality and

atemporality emphasized in explanatory procedures. … Only the interpretation that

complies with the injunction of the text… initiates a new self-understanding.”361

Furthermore, by appropriation, Ricoeur understands this to be the “interpretation of a text

[that] culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands

himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand

himself.”362

Quoting Ricoeur, Van den Hengel shares that appropriation is “the… making-

one’s-own, of the ground of one’s existence, the home of the subject. Appropriation is the

becoming of the self. Since appropriation is by way of the text and in no sense a direct,

unmediated work, the task of appropriation pertains to the hermeneutical exercise or the

360
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 93 – 94.
361
Ibid., 94.
362
Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 158.
 120

work of interpretation. There is no appropriation without interpretation. In fact,

appropriation is interpretation.”363 The moment of appropriation marks the appearance of

the subjectivity of the reader. Thompson agrees with Van den Hengel’s observation that

appropriation marks the appearance of the subjectivity of the reader as he clarifies that

[t]he act of appropriation does not seek to rejoin the original intentions of
the author, but rather to expand the conscious horizons of the reader by
actualizing the meaning of the text. Although interpretation thus
culminates in self-understanding, it cannot be equated with naïve
subjectivism. Ricoeur emphasizes that appropriation is not so much an act
of possession as an act of dispossession, in which the awareness of
immediate ego is replaced by a self-understanding mediated through the
text. Thus interpretation gives rise to reflection because appropriation is
bound to the revelatory power of the text, to its power to disclose a
possible world.364

Even then, following the Husserlian phenomenology, Ricoeur does not consider

subjectivity as correlate of objectivity, that is, a subjectivity that constitutes objectivity.

He, however, takes subjectivity as grounded on the ontological participation of being-in-

the-world. The subject can provide an epistemological justification and operate

methodologically, only because of its primordial grounding in participation.

363
Van den Hengel, 194.
364
John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction” in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences,
18 – 19. Thompson further explains that “the culmination of interpretation in an act of appropriation
indicates that ontology forms the ultimate horizon of hermeneutics. In endorsing the quest for ontology,
Ricoeur reveals his distance from most Anglo-Saxon philosophies of language, as well as his proximity to
the work of Heidegger and Gadamer. Like the latter authors, Ricoeur considers hermeneutics to be
concerned with the understanding of being and the relations between beings. Nevertheless, Ricoeur wishes
to “resist the temptation to separate truth, characteristic of understanding, from the method put into
operation by disciplines which have sprung from exegesis”. (See, Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”,
in The Conflict of Interpretations, 11.) To dissociate method and truth, in the manner proposed by
Gadamer, is to disregard the conflict of interpretations within which we perceive the being we seek to
understand. It may well follow that the ontology attainable in Ricoeur’s account will remain a fragmented
and incomplete formulation of being; but this intrinsic fragmentation of the hermeneutical horizon is no
basis for renunciation or despair. For it merely attests to the condition of a philosophy which has
acknowledged its fundamental attitude.”
 121

Ricoeur anchors the subject’s primordial grounding in participation to the

ontological dimension of language. “The concept of participation breaks with any vision

of a self-constituting subjectivity. Participation implies that it is not the subject who is

the source of the unity of meaning, but something that precedes the subject.”365

Subjectivity is derived from participation. Van den Hengel explains that

before we speak, before we structure through language, before language is

the product of a subjectivity, I am the being through whom existence,
Being, comes to language. To say it in Ricoeur’s words, “The sense of
human experience is made through us but not by us. We do not dominate
the meaning, but meaning makes us at the same time that we make it...”
We apperceive it in situations in which I find myself without consciously
having chosen them. There are very deep experiences of human finitude.
They are experiences of being affected by things at whose source I do not
stand.366

This assures that appropriation is never equivalent to the idea of an imperial subject. This

assurance, furthermore, is anchored on his insistence that appropriation is dialectically

linked to the objective characteristic of the text. He avers that appropriation is

mediated by all the structural objectifications of the text; insofar as

appropriation does not respond to the author, it responds to the sense.
Perhaps it is at this level that the mediation effected by the text can be best
understood. In contrast to the tradition of the cogito and to the pretension
of the subject to know itself by immediate intuition, it must be said that we
understand ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of humanity
deposited in cultural works…. Thus what seems most contrary to
subjectivity, and what structural analysis discloses as the texture of the
text, is the very medium within which we can understand ourselves.367

365
Van den Hengel, 107.

366
Ibid.

367
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 143.
 122

Ricoeur’s idea of understanding as self-understanding is not the same as the idea

of a self-conscious subject. The meaning of the consciousness is not derived from the

ego. It is derived from something outside itself. As Ricoeur explains,

what I appropriate is a proposed world. The latter is not behind the text, as
a hidden intention would be, but in front of it, as that which the work
unfolds, discovers, reveals. Henceforth, to understand is to understand
oneself in front of the text. It is not a question of imposing upon the text
our finite capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text
and receiving from it enlarged self, which would be the proposed
existence corresponding in the most suitable way to the world proposed.368

Thus, understanding attests to the fact that the subject belongs to being. The

understanding of a text leads to the problem of appropriation of the text which is its

application to the present situation of the reader.

For Ricoeur, the appropriation of the subject, which is the completion of

interpretation, is accomplished through the act of reading. Van den Hengel comments,

reiterating what Ricoeur explains, that “interpretation is complete when the objectivity

and the autonomy of the text are transformed once again into an event of discourse for a

reader. The accomplishment of reading is its power to transform the otherness of the text

into an event of discourse for [the subject]. The event of discourse of the reader is a new

event; that is, not a repetition of the original event, but a creation produced at the behest

of the text.”369 The result of appropriation is the drifting away of the text from its original

addressees. In other words, the constitution of the self of the reader is not

368
Ibid., “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” 143.
369
Van den Hengel, 201.
 123

contemporaneous with that of the original addressees but with the constitution of

meaning that the text projects.370

Even though the ultimate aim of all hermeneutics is to render one’s own what was

previously considered as alien, appropriation must not lose its existential force. This is to

be so because the aim of interpretation is to actualize the meaning of the text for the

present reader.371 Ricoeur confers that

[a]ppropriation remains the concept for the actualization of the meaning as

addressed to somebody. Potentially a text is addressed to anyone who can
read. Actually it is addressed to me, hic et nunc. Interpretation is
completed as appropriation when reading yields something like an event,
an event of discourse, which is an event in the present moment. As
appropriation, interpretation becomes an event.372

Even then, it has to be remembered however, that there are two additional features

underlining appropriation as interpretation. They are: (1) to struggle against

cultural distance, and (2) to underline the ‘present’ character of interpretation

which is the fusing of textual interpretation with self-interpretation. Ricoeur

understands the former as a struggle against the estrangement from meaning as

established by “the system of values upon which the text is based.”373 This

feature of appropriation aptly describes the characteristic of interpretation as

owning what was formerly foreign.

370
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 159.
371
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 91 – 92.
372
Ibid., 92.
373
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 159.
 124

Ricoeur, on the other hand, liken the latter as “the execution of a musical score; it

marks the realization, the enactment, of the semantic possibilities of the text.”374 Ricoeur

considers this as the most important feature of appropriation. He considers it important

because it “fulfills the discourse of the text [as it] finds a surrounding and an audience.

[Consequently,] it resumes the referential movement – intercepted and suspended –

towards a world and towards subjects.”375 The world and the subject that Ricoeur is

referring to here are that of the reader and the reader himself, respectively.

Ultimately, appropriation as an interpretation though commences from reading, it

culminates in a concrete act like that of speech in relation to discourse as its event and

instance. Appropriation starts from looking at the text as having a sense only. It only

looks at its structure. At the moment, it has already a meaning realized in the discourse of

the reading of the subject. The act of appropriating the meaning of the text implies that an

insurmountable responsibility is placed upon the subject as it might “constitute the

primary category of a theory of understanding.”376 Ricoeur assures all over time that

appropriation does not imply the surreptitious return of the sovereign subject. As he

asserts, “[appropriation] does not purport, as in Romantic hermeneutics, to rejoin the

original subjectivity that would support the meaning of the text. Rather it responds to the

matter of the text, and hence to the proposals of meaning the text unfolds.”377

Furthermore, appropriation loses its arbitrariness insofar as it is the recovery of that

374
Ibid.
375
Ibid.
376
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 35.
377
Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action, 37.
 125

which is at work, in labor, within the text. What the interpreter says is a re-saying which

activates what is said by the text.378

Appropriating the meaning of the text to one’s self-understanding must not be

understood as the culminating point of reading. Reading should end with acting inasmuch

as reading effects thought. As Ricoeur remarkably points out in his intellectual

autobiography, Mounier convinces him that “a flexible connection between… thought

and action, without separating them or mixing them together”379 must be always be

effected. This conviction leads him later in life to elaborate the answers for the two

remaining points of his later three problematics. The three problematics, Ricoeur says,

are grouped together as “that of the text…, that of action…, and that of history.”380

378
Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences,164.
379
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 9.
380
Ibid., 32.
 CHAPTER FOUR

FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A DETOUR FOR THE

CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO IDENTITY: APPLYING
PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION

The entire project revolves around the project of clarifying through reflective

analysis the fact of the subject’s own existence: a heightened self-understanding. This

reflective analysis, however, is not direct. It follows a long detour. The detour that

Ricoeur follows to understand the self passes through several agencies: “the unconscious

(the semantics of desire); intuition through critical interpretation (hermeneutics of

suspicion); reason through language (linguistics); and reflection through imagination

(poetics).”381

In doing so, Ricoeur employs Nabert’s philosophy of reflection that is neither

direct nor immediate. Reflection is indirect for the reason that only through the

documents of life is existence revealed. Moreover, the observation that the consciousness

of the self is prone to being false that it needs a corrective critique that will lead from

misunderstanding to understanding. Reflective philosophy aims to appreciate in praxis

an originary dynamism that grounds human existence. To recapture the subject through

the expressions of life that objectify it is the goal of reflection. However, the textual

exegesis of consciousness collides with the initial ‘misinterpretation’ of false

consciousness. Thus, hermeneutics is there to rectify what was first a misinterpretation

and makes possible the re-appropriation or recovery of the subject.

In connection with this, the researcher applies Ricoeur’s approach to the problem

of subjectivity to the clarification of the Filipino identity. A parallelism between

381
Richard Kearney, “Introduction” in Richard Kearney, ed., Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of
Action (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 1.
 127

Ricoeur’s project and that of the researcher’s is being considered. The parallelism lies in

the idea that the researcher’s quest for the Filipino identity is basically a quest for the

Filipino self. And such quest is like that of Ricoeur’s search for the meaning of self in the

self-understanding and self-reflection.

Consequently, the entire chapter is divided in accordance to its affinity to the

project of Ricoeur. Initially, the importance of the quest for the Filipino identity is

explained in the same way that Ricoeur explains his quest to understand the subject.

Furthermore, Ricoeur endeavors to explain the fact of the subject’s existence not

intuitively but by way of its several mediations: symbolic and textual. The researcher, on

the other hand, sets the clarification of the Filipino identity by way of a detour, i.e.,

through a Filipino value.

Making all of the Filipino values as the detour, however, will be too much a

scope of the study. Thus, a narrowing down to a singular value has been done. The choice

of family orientation as a focal value to be studied is not arbitrary. It is based on what

authorities on Filipino values deem to be the most important value. And, they are

unanimous in selecting family orientation as the most important value.

To explain the intricacy of the chosen value, the researcher embarks to situate it in

the context of the cultural systems of the Philippines. By situating it, an understanding as

to how the Filipino generally feels about his value system in general and that of family

orientation in particular will be realized. Moreover, tracing the historical development of

his value system explains his feelings towards it. This constitutes the phenomenological

part of the study.

 128

The hermeneutic part commences with the investigation of the apparent conflict

between family orientation and nation building. The nature of the family is explained as

to why is it seen as antagonistic to nation-building. To highlight the antagonism, the

effect of family orientation to some of the social institutions is described. As a result,

situations were family orientation indeed interfere into the functions of the sample

institutions are pointed out.

The hermeneutics of suspicion reveals the falsehoods and illusions that the

Filipino attaches to the value of the family. Thus, family orientation as a core value is

stripped of all its pretenses. A genuine effort to make family orientation become helpful

to nation-building is only generated after a critical awareness of the discontinuities and

estrangements of the said value. The hermeneutics of appropriation works well in the re-

understanding of family orientation as a core value to make it consistent with the genuine

effort to build the nation.

The Quest for the Filipino Identity

Basically, the question is: What does it mean to be a Filipino? Lapeña opines that

by Filipino, one usually means a person who belongs to a race or culture. Nevertheless,

he further says that the Filipino race contains Malay, Polynesian, Indonesian and other

“basic stock” interwoven with Indian, Chinese, Spanish and more recent American and

Japanese strains and influences. Thus, the percentages of blood and thinking that qualify

one to be a Filipino is a problem.382 As Andres also comments, he narrates: “Ask any

382
Jose Florencio Fabella Lapeña, Jr., “Halo-halo Reflections: The Filipino Identity and
Interdependence, Our Children and Our Common Future.” Philippine Journal of Education, 69 (March
1991), p. 438b. Cf. Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach (Quezon
City: New Day Publishers, 1981), 4 – 8. See also, Camilo Osias, “The Philippines, A Cultural Laboratory”
in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940), 41 – 45.
 129

Filipino to define a Filipino, and he will be perplexed, confused, stupefied, and

puzzled.”383 These reactions result from the varied answers that a Filipino can generate in

answering the said question. Consequently, looking for what exactly is the meaning of

being a Filipino is likewise very problematic.

Foronda, however, lodges a criticism on the Filipino’s incessant pursuit in

identifying his identity. The criticism is based on the belief that this quest is said to be not

a national concern, i.e., it is only the concern of the Filipino elite. Babor quotes Foronda

saying:

To be sure, the study of Filipino identity has been the pre-occupation of

the scholar and the intellectual and not, as expected, of the poor, the
unlettered, or the dispossessed. For his part, the poor had the more
pressing pre-occupation of keeping body and soul together, his dire
poverty, and therefore, his struggle to live is more intense the way, than
that of the effete intellectual given to theorizing.384

Corpuz affirms Foronda as the former opines that the common tao knows that he is a

Filipino. The trouble though is that he does not know why he is a Filipino.385

Nevertheless, even if the pursuit for the Filipino identity is indeed only the

concern of the elite, it is still relevant inasmuch as the Filipino elite affect literally the

development and progress of the entire country for they “have or may have the power to

influence the thinking of the citizenry, drive electric charges into the body politic or civil

society to wake us up, alter the power configuration of the nation, in some instances,

383
Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 3.
384
Eddie R. Babor, “Heidegger’s Concept of ‘Authentic Existence’ in Being and Time and Its
Applicability to Filipinos” (Unpublished Dissertation: University of San Carlos, Cebu City, 2004), 188. Cf.
Marcelino Foronda, Jr. “The Filipino and His Society in Philippine History: Some Personal Reflections” in
Filipino Thought on Man and Society, ed. by Leonardo Mercado (Tacloban City: Divine Word University
Publications, 1980), 2.
385
Lapeña, p. 438b.
 130

singly or in combination, be able to seize power at the top,”386 quips Benigno. Thus, if

they just understand truly the Filipino identity, they will have a positive impact on the

development of their country if the elite embark on a truly decisive and positive

transformation and realignment of the requisite values for integrative national

development.

Most Filipinos perhaps believe that the Filipinos are already reckoned to fail

because of the misplaced practice of their values. But Osias is very empathic in saying

that “we must not fail; we cannot afford to fail. We must succeed; we must will to

succeed. It is therefore incumbent upon us to formulate a philosophy and adopt a way of

life that serves as a guide to the citizen and the nation – a philosophy that gives cohesion

to individual and collective endeavor and makes life purposive and meaningful.”387

In any way, the problem might not be much with who or what a Filipino is. The

question might rather be: Why should the Filipino identity be known? The conviction

that the Filipino’s confusion regarding his identity contributes to the stagnation of the

Philippines as a country, thus, his actions being unsynchronized and the desired national

development seems to be very farfetched, makes for the thoughtful consideration of the

Filipino identity a constant clamor.

The assumption of this contention is that the moment the Filipino understands

who he is; he can extend such knowledge to the societal level and eventually create a

magical wave of true national Filipino identity. Consequently, the development of a true

386
Teodoro C. Benigno, “The Philippines’ Elites,” in Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star (July
20, 2001). Based on his opinion as to the meaning of elite, Benigno enumerates six types of them in the
Philippines: the Filipino Politicians, the Filipino businessmen, the clergy, the military, the media, and the
left.
387
Osias, “The Philippines, A Cultural Laboratory” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized
Philosophy, x.
 131

sense of nationalism begins. With the individual Filipino becoming nationalistic, he

becomes concerned with the true Filipino interest and not just the vested interest of his

immediate kin. De Quiros affirms this belief as he points out the significance of identity

saying:

[W]hat's the big deal about identity? Well, look at countries like Thailand,
Singapore and Malaysia, and look at us. With nations as with individuals,
you have no sense of self, you will never know, and do, what you want.
You will only know, and follow, what others tell you to.388

The importance of knowing one’s self depends on the ability of the person to appropriate

his decision upon his own. Consequently, not knowing one’s self may lead to blindly

following what other people tell him, supposing that since it works with other people it

will also work with him even if his situation is different from that of others. So, it does

not necessarily follow that what works with others will also work with him.

Another, yet, compelling reason on why should the true Filipino identity be

known is that it serves as “a rallying point for unity, self-discipline, and love and pride in

one’s country.”389 Arguably, knowing the Filipino identity helps the Filipino find a sense

of meaning, thereby, understands his reason for being. Bulatao asserts that the moment

the Filipino found himself, he “discover[s] new springs of energy and interest within

himself and begins to move wholeheartedly as one coordinated whole along a path of his

own choice. He has discovered that he can do things. He acquires a personal sense of

worth. He walks with self-confidence so that instead of pushing away responsibility or

fleeting others out of a sense of inferiority is open to others, can trust, can cooperate, can

388
Conrado de Quiros, “A Question of Identity” [article online]; available from
http://www.inq7.net/ opi/2002/mar/20/opi_csdequiros-1.htm; accessed September 3, 2003.
389
Emmanuel Mangubat, “Basic Considerations for Attaining a Truly Filipino National Identity”,
Philippine Journal of Education, 60 (December 1981), p. 297a.
 132

be a full-fledged member of a community.”390 Consequently, this gives the Filipino a

unified sense of direction.

Roco shares the same sentiment for he envisions Filipino leaders who are open to

the global environment yet rooted in their national identity.391 Rootedness to one’s nation

ascertains that the shapers of the nation’s destiny will truly uphold the interests of the

Filipino people and not make them easily succumb to the wish and caprice of any outside

interests nor that of their immediate family only.

Momentarily, since the Filipino does not yet find his locus of control, he has also

not ascertained yet the direction of his endeavors. Inasmuch as the present Filipino is

formed by his diverse influences, both eastern and western with their opposing

tendencies, he becomes confused. Seeing the best and the worst of both worlds is

supposedly advantageous to the Filipino. But his ignorance about his reason for being

makes him incapable of threshing out the good influences from the bad influences, thus,

unable to generate a synthesis that can promote a life for all, something that can drive his

nation to the desired stability. Mendoza cites the case of Japan’s capacity to reconcile

east and west as worth emulating. Although Japan adapts to western values, inasmuch as

western values are purported to be the current key to social progress, it has not

diminished its value system. Western values are adopted only by virtue of their basic

importance and on their instrumental role and at the same time only through their

390
Jaime C. Bulatao, S.J., “Self-Discovery in the Filipino” in Phenomena and Their
Interpretation: Landmark Essays 1957 – 1989 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992),
252a.
391
Raul Roco, “Making People Strong: The DepEd under Sec. Raul S. Roco” [article online];
available from http://www.raulroco.com/news_releases/ newsreleases.htm; accessed September 6, 2003.
 133

capacity to be grafted to the local context.392 This success is anchored on Japan’s

understanding of its reason for being.

The question, however, about the Filipino identity is ambivalent. The

ambivalence lies on the belief that an intuitive grasping of the real Filipino identity is

indiscernible. This moves the researcher to propose a detour in the same way that

Ricoeur does. Since the Filipino identity is reckoned to be embedded in the values that

the Filipino holds dear, the researcher embarks to follow this route.

Michael Tan concurs that though there are people calling for a return to values as

the solution to all of the problems that beset the Filipinos, they need to first do a thorough

introspection and ask themselves: what values? And whose values?393 He adds by saying

that

I am not about to romanticize Filipino culture, praising all that is local as

good and pure. Our faults are many and we should be mature enough to
talk about them and laugh at ourselves, even as we recognize that we
would be so much duller if we didn't have those faults.394

He accentuates the importance of soul-searching and the unraveling of the Filipino

psyche all the more that it is fairly a young nation. Looking into the Filipino soul is

needed in the Filipinos’ search for their identity.395

392
Magdalena L. Mendoza, “The Crisis of Management Culture in the Philippines: Neither East
Asian nor Western” (A paper presented at the 3rd EUROSEAS Conference in London, United Kingdom and
the 4th European Philippine Studies Conference in Alcoba, Spain on September 2001), 2 & 4. [on-line text
is accessed on May 30, 2006 at] http://www.dap.edu.ph/downloads/crisis.pdf.
393
Michael L. Tan, “Looking for the Filipinos Soul” [article online]; available from http://www.
pinoykasi.homestead.com/files/first_article.htm; accessed September 3, 2003.
394
Ibid.
395
Ibid.
 134

Tomas Andres avers that since the core of human reality is the self, the

superficiality of the Filipino’s action and the meaninglessness of every moment are

eliminated when the Filipino self is discovered. This makes self-discovery as the basic

premise of every meaningful human activity.396 He persuades the reader “to evaluate

alternatives and select the one that is right for him so that he can clarify his values, realize

his goals, gain self-confidence and form meaningful relationships with others”; the reader

is “encouraged to set up his own benchmarks against which to measure his own personal

search for meaning.”397

The researcher finds this exhortation relevant to the Filipinos in general. He likes

to extend this idea to the search for the true Filipino identity, for through it the Filipinos

are encouraged to set up their own benchmarks against which to measure their communal

search for meaning.

The Filipino Values in General

A detour in the clarification of the Filipino identity has to be set in place. A way

to know a nation’s identity is by its values.398 This hopes to give rise to economic

development that the Filipino longs for his country and a better life for all of them. This

hope reflects Bago’s stylized framework for development in the Philippines which is

founded on cultural values.399 Based on her framework, the present situation of the

country is a result of the Filipino’s cultural values that serve as the foundation of the

396
Andres, Understanding Values (Quezon city: New Day Publishers, 1980), p. viii.
397
Ibid.
398
Alejandro R. Roces, “A Nation Is Known By Its Values” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice
P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values Education Through History, pp. 122-124.
399
Adelaida L. Bago, Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience (Manila: De La Salle
University Press, Inc., 2001), 9.
 135

nation because “they have far greater influence and impact on the way of life of the

people.”400 Her idea corroborates the insight of Ramirez that the values of the people are

reflected on the workings of institutions. This follows from the fact that the workings of

institutions are externalizations of the culture of which the deepest layer are values. 401

This idea has to be embedded as one of the goals of Philippine education, which is

one of the social institutions. Bago argues that one of the goals of Philippine education

should be

to develop desirable values, beliefs, behaviors, and competencies needed

by human beings to live in peace and harmony with the rest of creation.
The knowledge, attitudes, skills, and other desirable outcomes of learning
enable individuals to deal competently with the demands of the changing
democratic multi-ethnic environment even as they are to grow in wisdom
and faith.402

She believes that the integrative development of the nation can be made possible through

education. This makes the revival of values education in the curriculum very timely for it

can be the most potent vehicle for personal and national development. This means that

the set of desirable values injected to the people will serve as a catalyst for the desired

development that is sustainable, equitable, spiritually uplifting, and socially integrating.

Thus, the time has now come to re-think the different values of the Filipino that

he becomes equipped with “the skills and knowledge, as well as the right values and

attitudes to assure the livelihood of the individual and the country’s survival and

400
Ibid., 8.
401
Mina M. Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System” in Reflections on Culture, Occasional Monograph 2 (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991): 3.
402
Bago, p. 9.
 136

success.”403 Through equipping the people with the aforementioned skills, knowledge,

values and attitudes, they are hoped to learn self-reliance yet are able to work closely

with others. They are expected to become highly competitive individuals yet with a

strong social conscience. They are estimated to become flexible in mind and outlook to

adapt constantly to a rapidly changing world. Ultimately, they must have firm moral

bearings to give them strength in a world of shifting values.

In line with this, Bago notes that this has been the main thrust of the values

education curriculum which is “a response to a general feeling on the need for social

transformation after the February 1986 People Power Revolution.”404 This thrust is

spelled out even more in the goal of the Values Education Program: “to provide and

promote values education at all three levels of the educational system for the

development of the human person committed to the building of a just and humane society

and an independent and democratic nation.”405

Educators likewise hope that this goal produces Filipinos who are: “1. self-

actualized, integrally developed and imbued with a sense of dignity; 2. have a sense of

responsibility for their community and environment; 3. productive and can contribute to

the economic security and development of the family and the nation; 4. have a deep sense

of nationalism and are committed to the progress of the nation; 5. committed to the

403
“The Basis for Survival and Success” [article on-line]; available from http://www.moe.gov.sg/
corporate/mission_statement.htm; accessed May 12, 2004.
404
Bago, 132.
405
Ibid.
 137

progress of the world community and to global solidarity; and, 6. manifest in actual life

an abiding faith in God as reflection of his spiritual being.”406

Furthermore, DECS, which is now DepEd, envisions values education to pursue

at all levels, i.e., national, regional, local, and institutional, the following principles and

guidelines: “1. Orientation toward the total person; 2. Consideration of the unique role of

the family in the personal development and integration of individuals in society and

nation; 3. Importance of teachers who a re aware of their inner worth and have the proper

sense of values as well as respect for others.”407

To understand the Filipino values in general, there are several frameworks to

look upon the different values of the Filipino. To name a few, there is the widely

disseminated The DECS Values Education Framework of Minda C. Sutaria, et al.408, the

Filipino Value System framework of Serafin Talisayon409 and the Philippine-Value

System framework of Tomas Andres410. Quisumbing and Sta. Maria likewise study the

Filipino value system whether it is compatible with the UNESCO project for peace and

tolerance.

406
Ibid., 134.
407
Ibid.
408
Minda C. Sutaria, Juanita S. Guerrero and Paulina M. Castaño, eds., “The DECS Values
Education Framework” in Philippine Education: Visions and Perspectives (Manila: National Book Store,
Inc., 1989), 117 as cited in Bago, 133.
409
Serafin D. Talisayon, “Values In Our Quest for Freedom (1896 – 1898) and Their Application
for Future Development” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values
Education Through History (Manila: UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, 1996), 105 & 119.
This is a result of Talisayon’s compilation and review of almost a hundred academic, journalist and opinion
articles about Filipino values, orientations or attitudes, and idiosyncrasies. He was able to discern
commonalities and consensus among various authors, and reduce them into a set of identifiable value
clusters with some internal consistency or coherence.
410
Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 27. This
framework is Andres’ synthesis of the studies conducted by Lynch, Bulatao, Gorospe, Hollnsteiner, Landa
Jocano, Mercado, and Quisumbing
 138

The framework of Sutaria looks into the human person in relation to its self and

community. As self, the human person is divided into four dimensions: physical,

intellectual, moral, and spiritual. The four dimensions in turn aim to develop respectively

the values of health, truth, love, and spirituality. In community, the human person is seen

socially, economically, and politically. Socially, he is taken in terms of its family and

society. Socially, the person is expected to develop the value of social responsibility.

Economically, he is to develop economic efficiency. Politically, he has to develop the

values of nationalism and global solidarity. The values developed are expected to

improve the human dignity of the human person.

Talisayon, on his part, intimates that the core or central clusters of the Filipino

value system revolve around seven values: (1) family/kinship orientation; (2)

makatao/kapwa tao (personalism); (3) “loob complex” (religious/psychic orientation); (4)

social acceptance; (5) pakikiramdam; (6) pakikisama (group centeredness); and (7)

economic security. 411

Lastly, the framework of Andres analyzes the Philippine value system into three

aspects: first, in terms of its aims, goals, and aspirations; second, in terms of belief,

convictions and attitudes; lastly, in terms of principles and norms. He deduces that the

aims, goals and aspirations of the Filipino are social acceptance, economic security and

social mobility. In terms of belief, convictions and attitudes, the Filipino has a

personalistic and a supernaturalistic world-view. He is non-scientific and non-relational.

In terms of his perception of reality, he is non-dualistic, harmonizing, interpersonal,

concrete, poetic, artistic, and intuitive. On matters of principles and norms, structurally,

411
Talisayon, 105.
 139

he is segmented. There is too much affinity to the family and kin. Age-grading is over-

emphasized. People are divided according to social class, power, region, language, and

even religion. Operationally, emphasis on equivalence, solidarity, reciprocity,

compassion, and non-interference is overdone.

Ultimately, Quisumbing and Sta. Maria, on their part, study intensively the values

of the Filipino and come up with this position:

education for peace, human rights, and democracy, for international

understanding and tolerance is essentially a matter of changing values,
attitudes, and behavior. Hence the need and importance of values
education for our citizenry, especially the youth – at home, in the school,
and in the total learning environment of the society – should be our
absolute priority if we want our children to live and develop in a genuine
of peace and tolerance where people learn to live together in harmony, and
where citizens of a nation and of the global community can work together
in solidarity and in peace.412

Licuanan affirms the position of Quisumbing and Sta. Maria as she sees a need to pay

attention to the dream of peace because “we face the twenty-first century and the new

millennium with raised hopes of economic development for our country and a better life

for our people.”413 In fact, she adds, “we need to foster a culture of peace, peace that

upholds … economic and social justice, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and

sustainable development.414

In connection with this, the UNESCO has identified tolerance as a tool for

peacekeeping.415 The following are the synonyms of tolerance in Filipino: pagpaparaya,

412
Ibid., xi.
413
Patricia B. Licuanan, “Preface” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and
Tolerance: Values Education Through History, vii.
414
Ibid.
415
Sta. Maria, “Filipino Attitudes Towards Tolerance” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P.
Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values Education Through History, 3.
 140

pagpapahintulot, pagpapaubaya, pagpapaumanhin, pagpayag, pagtanggap.416

Noticeably, these expressions can be deduced as extensions if not manifestations of one

of the Filipino’s dearest values: SIR (smooth interpersonal relationships) which is closely

related to what Andres says as the aims, goals, and aspirations of every Filipino.

Harmonious social relations are values that are very important to the Filipinos.417 Thus

Mercado says that inasmuch as interpersonalism requires much diplomacy, frankness is

not a cultural value for them418 because, Andres explains, the Filipino wants to avoid

outside signs of conflict.419

Nevertheless, critics see the aforementioned values of the Filipinos as anti-

development. Jocano explains,

Many critics… see Filipino traditional values as something we should not

have valued in the first place…. They say that these values have
“damaged” our culture, brought about “the ills in our society,” given rise
to our “undesirable traits,” brought about “weaknesses in our character” as
a people, and have caused the “moral breakdown” of our institutions.

Some critics, particularly the foreigners, even see our conformity to

traditional norms as “passivity, subservience, and lack of initiative.” The
high premium we place on reciprocal obligations is described by them as
“scheming,” our concern for consensus as “lack of leadership,” our silence
borne out of deference or sensitivity to feelings of others as “concealed
dishonesty,” our firmness and discipline as “authoritarianism,” our kinship
loyalties as “nepotism,” our gift-giving, as “bribery” and our utang na
loob (debt of gratitude) as “cumbersome system of patronage and major
source of corruption.420

416
Ibid. This list of synonyms is provided by the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA) as assisted by the Commission for the Filipino Language.
417
Ibid., 10.
418
Ibid. Cf. Leonardo Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy (Tacloban City: Divine Word
University Publications, 1967), 98.
419
Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 17.
420
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 2.
 141

Andres shares the same sentiment as the most observers and critics alike who believe that

the values of the Filipinos are anti-development but he believes that this attitude is due to

the emphasis of the negative features of the Filipino values. Soler, as cited by Andres,

says that “the principal cause of the present economic conditions may be attributed to the

negativism in the Filipino national personality. This negativism in turn creates a crisis of

national identity and a crisis of national self-confidence.”421

Nevertheless, is there really something wrong with the Filipino values? No, there

is nothing wrong with the Filipino values! “They have to be challenged.”422 It is just a

matter of looking at them in the right perspective. The appropriate application of the said

values to the Filipino’s desired goal will make them good, desirable and positive.

Ramirez charges that “at present, our social institutions are not responding to

people’s life-needs”423 because the people do not fully understand the dynamism of their

value system. Seemingly, the present value system fails them. This observation,

however, has long been answered by Jocano when he told the many critics that they are

wrong. He says that their judgments are not correct and that they have to be challenged

since their judgments of the Filipino values are based upon the values of the colonizers

who earlier wrote about them. There is nothing wrong with the Filipino values, they are

just different. 424 Thus, he emphasizes the “need to free our minds from the biases of the

421
Andres, Positive Filipino Values (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1999), 7. Cf. Ricardo S.
Soler, “A Crisis of National Self-Confidence” in Industrial Philippines (January 1972), 16.
422
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 4.
423
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”
in Reflections on Culture, 5.
424
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 4.
 142

old colonial value-models and to build new ones that reflect the best in us. We need to

shift our value paradigms – to recast our mindsets and to redefine our perspectives from

one which sees our traditional values as source of social ills to another which sees them

as sources of inner strength and moral will to survive and excel.”425 Nevertheless, there

is still a pervading confusion that arises among the Filipino people on how to perceive

those values due to the present value system of the Filipinos.

The Philippine Cultural Systems

Ramirez observes that the problem that besieged the Philippines today is cultural

by nature. Primarily, by culture she means “the totality of a people’s enduring shared

patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting in response to their life-needs, as made visible

through symbols…. Culture is all pervasive in life. It is imbibed especially through our

primary groups – family, peer, neighborhood and work group. It is projected in

secondary institutions, with the folkways and languages serving as its main vehicles. In

the deepest layer of our culture are our operating values.”426 Accordingly, there are two

cultural systems that operate in the country today that the Filipinos cannot do away with

for they are part of its socio-cultural heritage. They are the popular (traditional) and the

dominant (modern) cultural systems. The former originates in the indigenous roots of the

Filipinos and is relegated to the collective unconscious and lives in their minds and

hearts. The latter, on the other hand, has been imposed by the colonial powers and is

425
Ibid., 5.
426
Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” in Reflections on
Culture, 14.
 143

explicitly advocated by the modernizing elites of the Philippine society.427

Correspondingly, they also have different sets of operating values.

The traditional value system has pananalig sa diyos, buhay, pakikipagkapwa tao,

hinga, loob, and ginhawa as operating values. On the other hand, the western-imbibed or

modern value-system has Christianity, formal education, free enterprise, and democracy

as the operating values. Nevertheless, although they are different from the standpoint of

the perceiver, they have the same goal or intention, that is, the promotion of life. Thus,

for Ramirez, inasmuch as the two cultural systems that operate in the country today

cannot be done away with for they are part of its socio-cultural heritage, elements of both

value systems operate in every dimension of the Filipino life. Thus, she proposes that “to

have access to life, Filipinos know when to use one or the other value system.”428 This is

for the fact that the failure to realize the dynamics of the dual value system leads to

economic stagnation for its dynamism confused them.

Jocano, as cited by Sta. Maria, has the same observation with Ramirez when he

compares the conflicting foreign-derived and traditional values that simultaneously affect

Filipino behavior. The exogenous model has characteristics of being legal, formal, rigid

(through channels), confrontational, and individual merit. On the other hand, the

indigenous model has characteristics of being customary, non-formal, flexible, non-

confrontational, consensus.429 For that reason, Sta. Maria says, “the two incongruous

systems make simultaneous demands on Filipinos, often forcing the loob into conflict

427
Ibid., 4, 15.
428
Ibid., 22.
429
Sta. Maria, 13.
 144

situations which satisfy neither value system fully, and jeopardize the local sense of

upright conduct.”430 This is still due to the failure of the people to realize the dynamism

of both models.

Historical Development of the Dual Value System

To understand the dynamism of the Filipino value system is to go back to its

historical beginning. Knowing its history makes understanding its vulnerabilities and

constraints instructing. The diachronic and synchronic parameters of Philippine history,

as viewed by Prospero Covar, explain the issue. Diachronically, Philippine history is

divided into three periods, namely: (1) Formative period (0.5 M to 1565; (2) Period of

struggle and national consolidation (1565 – 1898); and (3) Period of cultural solidarity

(1898 -1998 and beyond). Synchronically, the evolution of Philippine society and

culture is viewed using these parameters: (1) allocation of goods and services; (2)

allocation of power and authority; and (3) ideological enculturation.431

The concern, however, on the understanding of the dynamism of dual value

system focuses on the third parameter: the ideological enculturation. According to Covar,

“Ideologically, the Formative Period was concerned with the ginhawa (inner comfort) of

the tao and the well-being of the sakop (ward). The period of Struggle and national

Consolidation was to ‘civilize’ some ‘natives’ as Spanish mesticillos and little brown

Americans who eventually became the illustrados. The promise of working for the

430
Ibid., 14.
431
Prospero R. Covar, “Unburdening Philippine Society of Colonialism” in Lourdes R.
Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values Education Through History, 169 – 170.
 145

national interest and general welfare has been the political discourse since the time of the

Propaganda Movement and the first Philippine Republic.”432

Entering the 21st century, “social scientists and communicators,” Covar explains,

“usually ask, ‘What happened to the society and culture during the Formative Period?

Were they wiped out during the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation? Is there

anything left in the indigenous culture and society which we could rally around the

Period of Cultural Solidarity?’”433 Then he adds, “Our answers to these questions shall

help guide us in our quest for values beyond 1998.”434

The answer of Ramirez to the questions is affirmative. Indeed, there are still

things left in the indigenous culture and society that pervade in the Period of cultural

solidarity. The traces of the Formative period pervades in what Ramirez calls as the

suppressed culture that operates vis-à-vis the dominant culture imposed by the colonizers.

It might be thought of that the operating values during the Formative period are

insignificant for they are now relegated to the collective unconscious of the people.

However, Ramirez elucidates that they are not insignificant for they “become[s] the soil

in which any external item from other cultures may be grafted to assume its own unique

growth and evolution. This hidden dimension”, she explains further, “is sometimes more

432
Ibid., 171.
433
Ibid., 174. Jocano shares the same perspective with Covar and Ramirez as to the Filipino’s
retaining his old values. Jocano reveals that in the midst of the rapidly changing environment, “the old rural
patterns are retrieved and used to handle the pressure of adaptation to the changing environment. This
keeps the traditional institutions, values, and sentiments alive. Thus, if one removes the outer trappings of
modernity… one discovers that underneath the veneer, the Filipinos are still traditional in their institutional
values and community outlook, even if they are in grey flannel suits.” Jocano, Filipino Social
Organization: Traditional Kinship and Family Organization (Manila: Punlad Research House,1998), 3.
434
Ibid.
 146

powerful than the external elements of a culture [for it] lives in the minds and hearts of

people.”435

During the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation, the operating values of

the people during the Formative Period are forcefully put on the back burner for the

reason that

colonizers imposed religious, social and political systems on the Filipinos.

For the Spaniards, colonization was part of their desire to ‘Christianize’
us; for the Americans, it was their plan to establish a politico-economic
foothold in Asia, disguised as ‘benevolent assimilation.’ Punitive
measures accompanied these impositions. Filipinos who refused to accept
the new systems were punished as heretics and insurrectos…. They
likewise introduced their values as standards for what is desirable, good,
true, and beautiful in society. On the other hand, native customary ways
were set aside as “primitive.” Conventional practices were labeled as
“barbaric.” Indigenous values were described as “backward” and
“corrupt.” Native character was seen as “uncouth” and local beliefs were
called “superstitions.” Thus viewed, local knowledge, beliefs, and
practices became undesirable. They were said to be “barriers to
modernization.” Therefore they had to be changed.436

Meaning, with the use of the whip, the people are forced to adopt the value system of the

colonizers without positively understanding the impact of the modern practices to

modernization. They adopt the practices of the colonizers out of fear. They are not

completely assimilated and grafted to the indigenous practices of the people unlike that of

the Malay, Chinese, Indian, and Arab.

In the words of Alfred McCoy, citing O.D. Corpuz, he clarifies that although

Spain and the United States try to forge a strong bureaucratic apparatus based upon their

own laws and social practice, they can not induce compliance through shared myth or

435
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”
in Reflections on Culture, 4.
436
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 3 – 4.
 147

other forms of social sanction because the modern Philippine state does not evolve

organically from the Filipino society. Henceforth, they derive their authority from the

implied coercion of colonial rule.437 Consequently, Filipinos become very religious and

devout Christians but sharing of material goods to others, most especially to the needy,

are quite difficult for them. Also, with free enterprise, people earn more money but it is

not necessarily equated with hard work. People realize that if one is clever enough, one

could get money through gambling, scheming (like in graft and corruption) or by some

illegal way.438

When the conventional practices were labeled as “barbaric,” indigenous values

are described as “backward” and “corrupt,” native character is seen as “uncouth” and

local beliefs are called “superstitions,” the people are able to develop the idea that the

indigenous models are inferior compared to the exogenous models brought about by the

colonizers.439 As mentioned above, the simultaneous demands of the two incongruous

systems on Filipinos create conflict situations which satisfy neither value system fully.

Thus, in the supposed Period of cultural solidarity, there is really no solidarity that

happens for the reason that the operating values in the formative period – the concern for

the ginhawa of the sakop – and that of the period of struggle and national consolidation

are continually in conflict in the supposed period of cultural solidarity.

437
Alfred McCoy, “‘An Anarchy of Families’: The Historiography of State and Family in the
Philippines” in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, edited by Alfred W. McCoy
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 11. Cf. O.D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the
Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957), 128 – 213.
438
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System”, 5 and “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines”, 19 in Reflections on
Culture.
439
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 4. See also Ramirez, “The Dominant and
Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” in Reflections on Culture, 23 – 24.
 148

Family Orientation As A Core Value

Among the Filipino values, family orientation is very crucial to the Filipino.

Historically, as pointed out above, Covar stresses the rootedness of the Filipinos on the

family even way back during the formative period of the Philippine history. Foremost of

all is the instinct of the family to provide security to its members. The colonizers have

even realized the extreme significance that Filipinos place on the family as they

effectively exploit the Filipino’s family-centeredness by fitting one family against

another family, one region against another region that even if the Filipinos already began

to think about the national interest during the period of national consolidation, the

promise of working for the national interest and general welfare had remained a

promise.440

Furthermore, Jocano also recognizes the importance that the Filipinos give to the

family441 as it gives higher premium to its interest than to the interest of the

community.442 He believes that “the family is basic to the life of Filipinos. It is the center

of their universe. Much of what they do, what they think, and what they idealize, among

others, are first learned within the narrow confines of the family before these are

enriched, modified, or frustrated by other institutions in the larger community.”443

440
Ibid., p. 171.
441
Stella Go says that the Filipino’s stress on the importance of the family can be attested by the
voluminous existing literature studying the Filipino family. The Research for Development Department of
the Development Academy of the Philippines even compiled in one volume bibliographies together with a
directory of agencies and individuals involved in studying or working with the family. Stella P. Go, The
Filipino Family In the Eighties (Manila: Social Development Research Center, De La Salle University,
1993), 2 – 4.
442
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 9.
443
Jocano, Filipino Social Organization, 11.
 149

Mercado shares the same point of view with Jocano. Mercado even thinks about the

family as reflective of the Philippine society.444

Agoncillo likewise sees that among the many values, the Filipino is known for the

so-called close family ties or solidarity.445 Panopio and Rolda think it so because the

family is discerned “as a defense against a hostile world and a unit where one can turn to

in case [a family member] has a serious problem.”446 As what Bacungan, Vea, and

Ladera point out, aside from giving family members food, clothing, and shelter, it also

“gives security and a sense of belonging and love and affection manifested in the honor

and respect given to parents and elders, in the care given to children, in generosity

towards relatives in need and in the sacrifices endured for the family’s sake.”447 It is also

seen as helping family members “grow healthy minds and bodies and teaches them to

know the right from wrong.”448

Generally, the researcher chooses the family/kinship orientation to be the value

where the Filipino identity can be discerned for the reason that it is considered to be the

core Filipino value. Talisayon underscores that the core of the Filipino value system, as

mentioned above, revolve around the seven values: (1) family/kinship orientation; (2)

makatao/kapwa tao (personalism); (3) “loob complex” (religious/psychic orientation); (4)

social acceptance; (5) pakikiramdam; (6) pakikisama (group centeredness); and (7)

444
Leonardo Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy, reprint edition (Tacloban City: Divine
Word University Publications, 1993), 95.
445
Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th edition (Quezon City: GAROTECH
Publishing, 1990), pp. 6 -7.
446
Panopio and Rolda, Society and Culture, 79. Cf. Bulatao, Split-level Christianity,26.
447
Cleofe M. Bacungan, Agnes B. Vea, and Helen P. Ladera, Values Education (Quezon City:
Katha Publishing Co., Inc., 1996), 80.
448
Ibid.
 150

economic security. He, however, observes that the strongest macroclusters are five, in

order of strength: the relationship macrocluster, loob macrocluster, social macrocluster,

livelihood macrocluster, and optimism.449 Since the strongest macrocluster is the

relationship macrocluster, the researcher identifies the family/kinship orientation as the

core value for the reason that other relevant values such as pakikisama (mutual

cooperation), hiya (shame), utang na loob (lifelong debt to another for some favor

bestowed), and SIR (smooth interpersonal relationship) although seen as the Filipino’s

tendency toward stasis and equilibrium450, they are also maintained for the sake of

maintaining the honor and welfare of the family for it is the most important concern of

the individual.451

Curiously, the significance of this value is overwhelming because the state has

strongly recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society as enshrined in the

Philippine Civil Code and the Philippine Constitution of 1987.452 McCoy shares this

observation. In fact, according to him,

the state recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society. In

curiously loving language, Article 216 of the Philippine Civil Code states
that “The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects.” In Article 219 the state admonishes its officials to respect
the family’s primary responsibility for social welfare: “Mutual aid, both
moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family.
Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.”
Similarly, in Article 2, section 12, the Philippine Constitution of 1986

449
Talisayon, 105.
450
Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840
– 1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), 9.
451
Lourdes R. Quisumbing, “The Filipino Family in the 80’s: Retrospect and Prospect” in
Christian Family Movement, The Filipino Family: Retrospect and Prospect (Quezon City: CFM, 1981), 20.
452
Alfred McCoy, “`An Anarchy of Families’: The Historiography of State and Family in the
Philippines”, 7.
 151

makes the defense of the family a basic national principle: “The state
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.”453

McCoy also observes that the Filipino family “provides employment and capital,

educates and socializes the young, assures medical care, shelters its handicapped and

aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its name, honor, lands, capital, and values to

the next generation.”454

Nolledo, on his part, opines that “to consider the family as a social institution, we

have given importance to the old and tested Filipino tradition of maintaining close family

ties.”455 Furthermore, he quotes that

In the Philippines, the family is the social, economic and residual unit. It is
conceded that the family is the most important element in the personality
development of the child and in his day-to-day behavior as an adult.
Family life revolves around the child…. The child is… trained in the ways
of the family and acquires its norms and values…. They trail him
wherever he goes and in a way become embedded in his total personality
make-up.456

The constitution recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation inasmuch

as “the Filipino family is the nucleus of the barangay and the town and this spirals on to

the nation. Basic in the society is the strength of the family structure.”457 Quiambao even

intimates that “if the little child in the Filipino family is someday to take his rightful place

453
McCoy, p. 7. See also, Belen T. Medina, et al., The Filipino Family: Emerging Structures and
Arrangements (Quezon City: Office of Research Coordination, University of the Philippines, 1996), 2.
454
Ibid.
455
Jose N. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated (Mandaluyong City:
National Book Store, 1997), 193.
456
“Report of the Committee on Youth, 1971 Constitutional Convention” in Nolledo, 193.
457
Vicente C. Sotto III, The Filipino: Values and Visions (Manila: Mary Jo Educational Supply,
1996), 19.
 152

as an effective citizen in the modern democratic world, he must be reared and trained for

it.”458 Thus, the family can also become a very potent tool for nation-building.

The Antagonism Between Family Orientation As A Core Value And Nation Building

The significance of the family as a core value cannot be underestimated. In the

annotation of Nolledo of the 1987 constitution, he cites that

Any program designed to prepare the child for responsible citizenship in a

changing society should not fail to take into account the family as a most
potent influence. Programs designed to facilitate the wholesome
development of the child especially during the early stages should be
family-based and child-focused. In other words, the family should be
protected and strengthened to make it an effective instrument in improving
the situation of children and young people.459

Moreover, the family as the foundation of society, “in it various generations come

together and help one another to grow wiser and to harmonize personal rights with the

other requirements of social life.”460 Nevertheless, although the Filipino bats for national

solidarity, the interests of the family usually interfere with the interests of the nation,

which, Quisumbing intimates “have been contributory to the Filipino’s in-group

centeredness and segmentation.”461 The Filipino has the difficulty of achieving a true

sense of nationalism because of its too much loyalty to the family that becomes an

obstacle to national unity and integration.

458
Ermelinda G. Quiambao, “Bringing Up Children for Democracy” in Family Life Workshop of
the Philippines, Inc., The Filipino Family: Selected Readings (Quezon City: Alemar-Phoenix Publishing
House, 1966), 50.
459
“Report of the Committee on Youth, 1971 Constitutional Convention” in Nolledo, 194.
460
Ibid., 195.
461
Quisumbing, “The Filipino Family in the 80’s: Retrospect and Prospect”, 20.
 153

All the rhetoric about nation-building and nationalism become unproductive

because the focus on the family makes a Filipino act parochially rather than nationally.

Abueva even points out that

Leaders in government, the private sector and civil society often justify
their objectives and actions in terms of selfless, nationalistic ends. In
reality, however, protagonists in politics and advocates of nationalism are
motivated more or less by their individual as well as collective self-
interests. Given this reality, national interest and welfare and the common
good which are the professed goals of nationalism and competing
ideologies, are served to a greater or lesser degree by the continuing
interplay of the selfish and altruistic interests of political actors as they
seek state power and influence the content and implementation of public
policy.462

Furthermore, he supports the claim that the family is one of the sources of the weakness

of Filipino nationalism most specially when the government is ineffective and could not

be depended “to provide equal protection, adequate social services, and the policies that

would spur economic development and create employment.”463 This condition all the

more makes the Filipino cling to his family since it can assure him of his well-being and

security. Consequently, “one’s self-interest or one’s family-interest comes first and above

the interest and good of the people or nation.”464

These characteristics are generally similar with that of the formative period – the

economic well-being of the sakop or ward – that Covar mentions. During the period of

struggle and national consolidation, revolutionaries look at the entire nation as one big

family. Thus, Jose Rizal sets up the Liga Filipina in Manila on July 3, 1892 with the aim

462
Jose V. Abueva, ed., Filipino Nationalism: Various Meanings, Constant and Changing Goals,
Continuing Relevance (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999), 794.
463
Jose Abueva, “Some Indicators and Explanations of the Weakness of Filipino Nationalism” in
Abueva, Filipino Nationalism, 814.
464
Ibid.
 154

of inculcating moral and political principles among the population in order to attain a

greater unity.465

Moreover, on July 7, 1892, Bonifacio establishes the Katipunan with the aim of

uniting all Filipinos in terms of a single ideology.466 He enables the masses to rally

behind his Katipunan because of his vision to bring back the kasaganaan and the

kaginhawaan that the Pre-Spanish Philippines enjoyed.467 This was the central mantra of

his article published in the one and only issue of Kalayaan, the official publication of the

Katipunan, which they attributed the rapid growth of its membership.468 The cry for

kalayaan, also becomes the driving force for Filipinos to persist in fighting against the

Spanish regime.

Furthermore, Ileto explains that

In “kalayaan,” revolutionists found an ideal term for independence that

combined separation from a colonial ruler… and the “coming together” of
people in the Katipunan. Katipunan is kalayaan in that it is a recovery of
the country’s pre-Spanish condition of wholeness, bliss and contentment, a
condition that is experienced as layaw by the individual, who is thus able
to leap from the “familial to the “national.”469

465
Cesar Adib Majul, The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution, reprint
edition (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1996), 3.
466
Ibid., 4.
467
Ileto cites the annotation of Rizal to Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas that pointed out the
flourishing indigenous civilization in the archipelago even before the arrival of the Spanairds. Ileto, 83.
468
Ileto, 82. Ileto cited Pio Valenzuela, one of the organizers of the katipunan, saying that
“hundreds of people nightly joined the Katipunan” after the distribution of the Kalayaan. Ileto intimated
that “Bonifacio himself was surprised at the rapid growth of the society. From the time he had founded it in
1892 to the appearance of Kalayaan in January 1896, it had only some three hundred members. But from
the middle of March to the outbreak of hostilities against Spain in August 1896, its membership rose
sharply to 30,000.” Valenzuela, Ileto said, “attributes the sharp rise in membership to the ‘effect of the
periodical on the people.’” Ibid. Cf. “The Memoirs of Pio Valenzuela” (original in Tagalog), in Minutes of
the Katipunan (Manila: national Heroes Commission, 1964), 107; Teodoro Agoncillo, The Revolt of the
Masses (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956), 96.
469
Ibid., 87.
 155

However, when the revolution was won, the expected national consolidation of

the Filipino spirit did not materialize because of the illustrado and the principalia’s

jockeying for power and opportunities just to assure the economic security of their own

families. This demoralized the organization from the top down to the rank and file and

eventually resulted to the rift between the illustrado and the masses.470

Majul adjoins that before 1896 all revolts were local and regional for there is no

evidence that these revolts represented a concerted effort to form a Filipino state in which

all the inhabitants were to be united by means of a common government.471 During this

period, although the spirit of nationalism is very pregnant and vibrant, Abueva maintains

that “historically, some heroes and leaders have been inspiring models of a socially

concerned and nationalistic leadership, but many leaders have also used their power and

authority for their own benefit and for perpetuating their power and dominance in society.

The latter reinforce the common tendency of citizens to be selfishly individualistic and

family-oriented.”472

Likewise, Agoncillo, as cited by McCoy, accuses the educated illustrados of

Manila’s nineteenth-century elites for betraying the Revolution of 1898 and collaborating

thereafter with American colonialism saying:

When one studies the Revolution in its first and second epochs one finds
that … the middle class as a group betrayed the Revolution by a negative
attitude: they refused to lift a finger to support the mass-movement

470
Bonifacio irks the leading citizens because they believe that if he is to progress, the existing
boundaries and hierarchies in the province would be threatened. Mabini, as Cabinet President of the
Malolos government, was subjected to harassment because he was born to very poor parents. Ileto, 111 &
117.
471
Ibid., 14 -15.
472
Abueva, “Some Indicators and Explanations of the Weakness of Filipino Nationalism” in
Abueva, Filipino Nationalism, 814.
 156

because they did not believe it would succeed… In the second epoch, the
betrayal was consummated by positive action: they now entered the
government by the front door and tried to sabotage it by the back
door….473

Agoncillo takes the first epoch as forgivable but the second is not. “When they accepted

the high positions in the government they were, both from the legal and moral

standpoints, expected to be loyal to that government…. [T]hey accepted the positions…

but by insidious means undermined its foundations – through financial manipulations or

through secret understandings with the Americans.”474 The betrayal of the “Haves” can

be judged as their way of assuring themselves that they will be able to maintain the

comfort of their lives that they were already enjoying.

Similarly, in recent times, F. Sionil Jose assails also this undoing of some elite

members of the society as a cause of the Filipino’s poverty. He conveys that

“[w]e are poor because our elite from way back had no sense of nation -
they collaborated with whoever ruled - the Spaniards, the Japanese, the
Americans and in recent times, Marcos. Our elite imbibed the values of
the colonizer. And worst of all, these wealthy Filipinos did not modernize
this country, they sent abroad their wealth distilled from the blood and
sweat of our poor. The rich Chinese to China, to Taiwan, to Hong Kong,
the rich mestizos to Europe, and the rich Indios like Marcos to Switzerland
and the United States - money that could have developed this nation.475

In the period of cultural solidarity, the Filipinos are already granted their

independence and there is no more inherent fear for the colonizers. At this time,

however, they go back all the more to the ideological enculturation of the formative

473
McCoy, 2. Cf. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City:
University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 644-45. See also Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past
Revisited (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975), 232.
474
Ibid.
475
F. Sionil Jose, “Hindsight” (a speech delivered by the author at the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, on Nov. 23, 2004) [article on-line]; available from http://femba.blogspot.
com/2004_12_01_femba_archive.html; accessed June 16, 2006.
 157

period: the economic well-being of the sakop or ward instead of continuing the started

efforts for national interest and general welfare. The one that has been relegated to the

unconscious has now resurfaced.

It can be deemed that most of the political leaders and economic elite are

concerned only in maintaining the social status and economic security of their immediate

family. Thus, the maintenance of political dynasties, nepotism, cronyism, and family

corporations are prevalent.

Family Orientation as a Core Value and Its Implication to Social Institutions

The Filipino’s overemphasis on the well-being of his family creeps also into the

different institutions of the society. This foreboding malady is even recognized by the

primers of the 1987 Philippine constitution. The 1987 Philippine Constitution even

includes a provision prohibiting political dynasties found in Article II “Declaration of

Principles and State Policies”, sec. 26: “The State shall guarantee equal access to

opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by

law.” Nolledo says that he explains

in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, political dynasties constituted

social maladies that have limited the opportunities of young, talented but
poor candidates to climb the political ladder. Political dynasties… have
made political positions subject to inheritance, have spawned graft and
corruption, and have resulted in proliferation of little monarchies in
various parts of our country.476

Moreover, he reveals that “the rule of equal opportunities for public service can well

cover appointments to public offices. In such a case, such appointments should be based

on merits rather than on patronage or nepotism.

476
Nolledo, 238.
 158

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, abhors appointing members of one family to

the same or different positions in the government. There is no monopoly of expertise and

knowledge.”477 Consequently, the Guingona and the Palacol Bill are introduced in the

Senate and in the House of Representatives respectively on January 1995. Both bills seek

the ban on political dynasties. However, these enabling legislations that would have lent

meaning to constitutional directives are shelved.478 Alejo Jose Sison recounts that when

Esplanada asked Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr. about the passing of the Palacol Bill, the

latter explains that it will not be easy for there are the Asistios, Gordons, Osmeñas,

Shahanis, Duranos, Marcoses, and many others who will be affected by the said bill.479

In the analysis of Sison, one of the explanations for the prevalence of political

dynasties is the very strong family ties. He cites David Timberman as saying that in

enumerat[ing] the following hallmarks of contemporary Philippine

political culture: the primacy of kinship ties, the importance of reciprocity
and patron-client relationships, the emphasis on smooth interpersonal
relationships and pervasive poverty insofar as it affects values and
behavior. With the exception of the last characteristic, all the others may
be subsumed under the heading of “very strong family ties”.480

Going back to the stylized framework of Bago, the only hope that can transform

the country is through education along with communication. However, the working of

the educational system as an institution is also affected by the value of family orientation.

477
Ibid., 238 – 239.
478
Alejo Jose G. Sison, “The Public and the Private in Contemporary Philippine Society. A Study
on Political Dynasties” [article on-line]; available from http://www.unav.es/empresayhumanismo/2activ/
seminario/miembros/ sison/ii18/default.html; accessed May 12, 2004. Cf. Randolf S. David, “Political
Dynasties: Major Poll Issue”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 24, 1995).
479
Ibid. Cf. Jerry Esplanada, “Challenge to Ramos: Ban Political Dynasties – RAM”, Philippine
Daily Inquirer (December 26, 1994).
480
Ibid. Cf. David Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
 159

Pertierra observes that amidst the disheartening result of the latest survey of Asian

universities where Philippine universities fared badly, “Filipinos and particularly

politicians do not seem to appreciate the seriousness of this neglect of education.”481

Pertierra even asks himself the question: Why is education so poorly valued in the

Philippines? His answer is that

[l]argely because its economic and political elite have little use for it.
They can send their children abroad for a good education or keep them
home and yet ensure their futures through personal networks. The notion
of a highly competent and competitive workforce only applies to members
of a small middle class. Poor people rarely enter the race, while the rich
or powerful do not have to worry about competence to succeed.482

Meinardus confirms this observation as he also construes that there is an educational

crisis in the Philippines which is a crisis of the public education since 95 per cent of all

elementary students483, who basically belong to the lower strata of the society, attend

public schools while “the wealthy can easily send their offspring to private schools, many

of which offer first-class education to the privileged class of pupils.”484

There is a crisis in public education because there is an under-investment in the

education sector. Although there is an increase in the budgetary allocation of the DepEd

481
Raul Pertierra, “The Miseducation of the Filipino”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 14, 2000).
In the said survey, the best place that our universities landed on is 48th place by U.P. followed by
DLSU(71), ADMU (72), and UST (74). The seriousness of the problem in education is also reflected in the
result of the Third International Mathematics and Science Study whereby the Philippines placed second and
third from the bottom, respectively in Science and Mathematics out of 42 participating countries. Cf. Bago,
41 – 42.
482
Ibid.
483
Meinardus, “The Crisis of Public Education in the Philippines” [article on-line]; available from
http://www.fnf.org.ph/liberalopinion/2003-06-30.htm; accessed June 16, 2006. Based on the data published
by DepEd, from SY 2000 – 2001 to SY 2004 – 2005, an average of 12,924,287 students enrolled in all the
elementary schools in the Philippines for both public and private, out of which, 11,998,791 or 93% enrolled
in the public elementary schools. Cf. Department of Education, “Fact sheet: Basic Education Statistics”
[data on-line]; available from http://www.deped.gov.ph/cpanel/uploads/issuanceImg/factsheet2006(Mar28).
pdf; accessed June 26, 2006.
484
Meinardus, “The Crisis of Public Education in the Philippines” [article on-line].
 160

from 1986 – 1989, this has not been sustained in the succeeding years. SEAMEO-

INNOTECH observes that starting in 1990 the real per capita expenditures on education

declined. It has to be noted however that the 70% growth of the education budget has
485
been allocated for the salary increase of the teachers. Meaning, only the remaining

30% has been appropriated for the building of classrooms, training of teachers,

purchasing of textbooks and other instructional materials.

Aside from under-investment, the poor quality of education is also attributed “to

deficiencies in pre-service training and in-service training of teachers, and unqualified

teachers teaching subjects outside their areas of specialization.”486 It is observed that only

half of the teachers teaching mathematics in high school really majored on this subject

and only 4% of the physics teachers really majored on this subject.

Meinardus quotes Undersecretary Luz saying that “[t]he quality of Philippine

education has been declining continuously for roughly 25 years [and that] [o]ur schools

are failing to teach the competence the average citizen needs to become responsible,

productive and self-fulfilling. We are graduating people who are learning less and

less.”487 The former adds that this is supposed to be “a devastating report card for the

politicians who governed this nation in the said period. From a liberal and democratic

angle, it is particularly depressing as this has been the period that coincides with

485
SEAMEO-INNOTECH, “The Financing of Education” in Philippines [article on-line]; available
from http://www.seameoinnotech.org/resources/seameo_country/educ_data/philippines/philippines_ibe.
htm; accessed May 16, 2006. The last time this website has been updated was on May 2003.
486
Ibid.
487
Meinardus, “The Crisis of Public Education in the Philippines” [article on-line].
 161

democratic rule that was so triumphantly and impressively reinstalled after the dark years

of dictatorship in 1986!”488 Even then, they never lift a finger to truly solve this problem.

As regards with communication as a tool for education, having a national

language is very important. According to Ramirez, “there is nothing that can give our

people identity other than our languages. The way ordinary Filipinos think, feel and act

must be expressed in the languages they speak.”489 She furthermore argues that “our

dependence on a foreign language has enhanced our dependency in all ways because we

have been conditioned to think in the categories of other cultural contexts. This is a

significant factor in our impoverishment”490 Rubrico concurs that having a national

language “will bring about unity and identity among Filipinos, as they can now express

themselves and communicate with each other in a common language.”491

The sentiment of having a common language as a means of inter-communication

of ideas in the entire archipelago so that ideas, sentiments, and aspirations of the

inhabitants of the Philippines can be transmitted was felt already during the Philippine

Assembly of 1908. However, it was unfortunate that the Philippine Assembly through

Leon Ma. Guerrero, its Chairman on Public Instruction opted to adopt a foreign language

instead of the native ones.492

488
Ibid.
489
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”
in Reflections on Culture, 9.
490
Ibid., 10.
491
Jessie Grace U. Rubrico, “The Metamorphosis of Filipino as National Language”, [article on-
line]; available from http://www. seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/essays_on_philippine_languages. htm; accessed
May 19, 2004.
492
Ibid.
 162

Lope K. Santos revived the issue of having a national language when he

addressed the First Independence Congress on February 30, 1930 by expounding on “The

Vernacular as a Factor in National Solidarity and Independence.” However, the initiative

encountered a problem in 1965 when “some congressmen took the cudgels against the

propagation of Pilipino, which to them is ‘puristang Tagalog,’ as the national language….

[Thus], in 1969, some non-Tagalog speakers, like the Madyaas Pro-Hiligaynon Society

and some Cebuano groups complained against the movement of Manila toward

‘purismo.’ This gave rise to the problems that needed to be resolved before the non-

Tagalog speakers could accept Tagalog as their own ‘wikang pambansa’.”493 The issue

until now has not been resolved. There are still those who refused to accept Filipino as

the national language though it is not anymore “puristang Tagalog”.

The bottom line of the issue can again be traced to the people’s taking pride of the

language of their region. This is a manifestation of outright regionalism which is defined

as “a tendency to emphasize and value, oftentimes to extremes, the qualities and

characteristics of life in a particular region.”494 This regionalistic tendency of the Filipino

makes him think only in terms of regional oneness rather than of national unity.495 In

addition, Andres said, citing Agoncillo and Alfonso, “regionalism is [once again] an

extension of the closeness of family ties.”496

493
Ibid.
494
Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 23.
495
Ibid.
496
Ibid. Cf. Teodoro Agoncillo and Oscar Alfonso, A Short History of the Filipino People
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1961), 9.
 163

Re-understanding Family Orientation As A Core Filipino Value

The Filipino family considered as the most important and highly valued segment

in the Philippine society is really a hindrance to the country’s sustainable development if

the Filipino family is continuously viewed as baranganic and clannish in nature. This

attitude towards the family impinges on institutions with supposedly universalistic value

assumptions.497 This has also been recognized by the Moral Recovery Program of 1992

spearheaded by Ramos-Shahani as one of the weaknesses of the Filipino.498

Since the elite has the power to influence the thinking of the citizenry and can

alter the power configuration of the nation, the Filipino is forced to have faith on the few

modernizing elite. The significance of the elite as a catalyst for change has been tested

already during EDSA I, when the strongman rule of Pres. Marcos was toppled down from

power after being a president for over twenty years, and EDSA II, when Pres. Estrada

was forced to resign due to alleged massive corruption. The success of the two EDSA’s

can be attributed largely to the alliance of elite forces, noticeably, the military and the

church. However, the so-called Poor People Power of May 1, 2001 did not succeed.

The reason is quite obvious, the elite were not there. Likewise, the recent turn of

events during the Pres. Arroyo’s incumbency with the allegations of electoral fraud and

also massive corruption, the possibility of another People Power uprising is very

pregnant. Nevertheless, it never happens yet for the military and the church, were wishy-

washy about their stand on the foregoing issues.

497
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”
in Reflections on Culture, 10.
498
Handbook on Moral Recovery Program, (n.d., n.p.), 51.
 164

Indeed, the influence of the elite is insurmountable. Anyway, the success of an

EDSA type uprising is a collective effort of the elite and the masses as exemplified by the

failure of the Poor People power and the failed Oakwood mutiny. Nevertheless, after the

two EDSA’s, seemingly, the Philippines is still going nowhere. The reason for this is that

the united elite of EDSA 1 and EDSA 2 are now disunited due to shifting alliances

among themselves for again; their narrow and selfish interests are placed over and above

the collective interests of the people. In other words, the old protracted struggle for power

in the Philippines pervades.499

Henceforth, inasmuch as the elite are still governed by familistic behavior, the

former must really be re-educated or forced to take Nationalism 101. This being the

situation, the interest of the nation will always be jeopardized since they are first

motivated to secure their own family over and above the other families, much more that

of the nation.500 As what Murphy suggested, it is now high time that the rich are the one

to be studied instead of the poor being studied all the time.501 This comment is very

relevant because, as McCoy cited, “despite the oft-cited significance of elite families in

499
Herbert Docena, “People Power and the Perils of Democracy Elite” [article on-line]; available
from http://www.pcij.org/i-report/6/democracy.html, accessed July 21, 2006.
500
Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”
in Reflections on Culture, 10.
501
Dennis Murphy, “Time to Study the Rich” in Commentary, The Philippine Daily Inquirer
(May 18, 2004). This reaction of Murphy is based on the result of the study of the Ateneo de Manila
University – Institute of Philippine Culture as regards the voting culture of the poor. The study found that
“poor people have the same criteria in voting as middle class people do. Like the rest of society, they are
also influenced in their voted mainly by the media, the family and the Church or mosque.” (Ibid.)
Furthermore, Murphy claims that “almost all recent research on the urban poor contradicts the old
stereotypes that the poor are ignorant, opportunistic and lacking in any sense of the common good.” (Ibid.)
Studies regarding the poor are already very many but not much can be found about the rich.
 165

Philippine politics, historical and contemporary analysis of their role remains

superficial.”502

The pervasiveness of family orientation underscores the constitution of political

dynasties, family corporations and “profit-making educational family corporations [that]

even religious organizations are not saved from the encroachment of family interests.”503

The elite Filipino family’s broad control of the economic, political, and social functions

tilts the balance only unto their favor. Consequently, Paul Hutchcroft, as cited by

McCoy, said

The Philippine bureaucracy… has long been penetrated by particularistic

oligarchic interests, which have firm independent economic base… yet
rely heavily upon their access to the political machinery in order to
promote private accumulation…. Because the state apparatus is unable to
provide the calculability necessary for advanced capitalism, one finds
instead a kind of rent capitalism based, ultimately, on the plunder of the
state apparatus by powerful oligarchic interests.504

With this kind of set-up, the workings of the institutions are compromised inasmuch as

national political leaders rely on provincial warlords and political families to deliver the

vote and the economic elites to hand over the dough during the campaign period.

Nevertheless, even if the Moral Recovery Program of 1992 found the family as one of the

weaknesses of the Filipino, it has also found family orientation as one of its strengths.505

As a resolution therefore, it is now the right time to expand the Filipino’s idea of

family, with special emphasis to that of the political leaders. As Ramirez imparts,

502
McCoy, 1 – 2.
503
Mina Ramirez, Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino Family: A
Phenomenological Approach (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1984), 43.
504
McCoy., 13. Cf. Paul D. Hutchcroft, “The Political Foundations of Booty Capitalism in the
Philippines” (paper delivered at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association,
Chicago, Illinois, September 1992), 4.
505
Handbook on Moral Recovery Program, (n.d., n.p.), 48.
 166

the main challenge to this observation… lies in the answer to a crucial

question. In what way may we adapt this small group or family
orientation, seen as a cultural reality in our social organizational network,
in a way that its workings will not hamper the operations of the larger
system? As long as leaders themselves still consider their position as
instruments for their own ends, no amount of change of systems and
structures will redound to the good of the larger majority.506

Instead of understanding family as that of the immediate kin only, it now has to be

extended into that of the whole nation. In that way, looking into the diagram of

Talisayon, instead of setting nationalism into the side-line, it must now be placed in the

core. With this new way of looking into the family as a national family, social

institutions of the country are hoped to work accordingly.

The Filipino’s extreme family centeredness has been known a long time ago. In

recognition of this great tendency of the Filipino, Osias sets in motion the need to erect a

guiding philosophy. After many years of colonialism, the Filipinos are required to

shoulder the obligations of leadership and followership. “They must exercise proper

initiative and intelligent self-direction. All citizens must be trained for active participation

in group activities.”507 As a consequence thereof, he embarks to develop a pluralized

philosophy.

The pluralized philosophy intends to capitalize on the idea of interdependence.

This philosophy is anchored on the “recognition of this interdependence and upon a

consciousness of the organic unity and continuity of common interests.”508 Osias

illustrates this concept by studying the intricacies of the language that he knows best: the

506
Ramirez, Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino Family, 44.
507
Camilo Osias, “Introduction” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy, xi.
508
Ibid, xiii.
 167

Ilocano language. He works out on four personal pronouns, first person under the

nominative case. They are as follows: Siac, which means “I,” singular number; Data,

which means “we two,” dual number; Dacami, which means “we three or more,” the

intermediate plural or the plural exclusive number; and, Datayo, which means “we all,”

the superlative plural or the plural all-inclusive number.509

Correspondingly, Osias uses the four pronouns as indicators of the development,

attitude, and outlook of the Filipino. Thus, the Filipino has to undergo four major stages

in the process of broadening his concept. He calls them as the Siac stage, the Data stage,

the Dacami stage, and the Datayo stage. He envisions for a Filipino moving out of the

Siac stage and growing up to the Datayo stage. He trusts that the development of the

mind of the individual will also effect a development of its social mind. As he explains,

“until the social mind becomes thoroughly pluralized there will be clashes between

classes and classes, groups and groups, communities and communities, nations and

nations, regions and regions, races and races, or combinations of some and combinations

of others, even as there are conflicts between individuals and individuals, groups of

individuals and groups of individuals.”510

Osias further concludes that feuds, divisions and prejudices among families

indicate the pervading selfishness and singularness in a social group. Inasmuch as the

idea of a nation is an extension and expansion of the smallest social unit which is the

509
Ibid., “The Tayo Concept” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy, 3 – 4.
510
Ibid., 9.
 168

family, unity eludes them as long as they have not reach yet the last stage, “the stage of

disinterestedness.”511

This paradigm of extending the family to a larger, that of a country, has been

recommended by the academic think tank that Jose Ma. Crisol convened during the

Marcos presidency. The report entitled Towards the Restructuring of Filipino Values

recommends to Marcos the exploitation of the Filipino family paradigm in purging the

country of negative values. It reports,

What is recommended therefore is an expansion of the family to a larger

group – the country. We should treat the country as our very own family,
where the President of the Republic is the father and all the citizens as our
brothers. From this new value we develop a strong sense of oneness,
loyalty to the country, and a feeling of nationalism. Because all Filipinos
are brothers, we become just and sincere. There will develop in us a
feeling of trust such that values, such a lamangan. pakitang-tao, bahala na,
etc. will be eliminated from our system….512

Incidentally, Marcos heeds to the report of Ma. Crisol as he immediately organized the

youth organization Kabataang Barangay led by Imee, his eldest daughter. However, his

paying attention to the report was only limited to this.

McCoy claims that instead of sincerely capitalizing the finding of Ma. Crisol to

promote development, Marcos coalesced with rent-seeking families to solidify his

position in the political sphere. Later on, through martial law, he punished the oligarchs

who were his enemies and gifted his kins and cronies that results to unprecedented

511
Ibid., 8.
512
Jose Ma. Crisol in McCoy, 16. Cf. Jose Ma. Crisol, Towards the Restructuring of Filipino
Values (Manila: Office of Civil Relations, Philippine Army, n.d.), 47.
 169

private wealth. This was the complete opposite of his promise to eradicate political

corruption.513

Likewise, Corazon Aquino, in her desire not to commit the same mistake of

Marcos, barred presidential relatives from public office as enshrined in Article 7, section

13 (2) of the 1987 constitution.514 She, nevertheless, succumbed to political pressure,

thereby, unable to prevent relatives from jockeying over juicy positions in the

government, thus the label Kamag-anak, Inc., as much as preventing them from running,

and eventually winning, in the May 1987 elections although she strongly supported the

abolition of political dynasties in the country.515

Lastly, Fidel Ramos also promised the same thing by attacking the pervasiveness

of rent-seeking families in politics, thus, promised to reform. But again broke his resolve

to reform by granting Ramon del Rosario, his confidante and at the same time a leading

cement producer, a great leverage on manufacturing cement when the former signed

Executive Order No. 1, i.e., granting cement manufacturers a three-year duty-free on

imported cements. Purportedly, this order has been drafted by Del Rosario himself as an

incoming finance secretary.516

Indeed, having the above mentioned conditions as the case, there really is an

immediate need to transform the Filipino’s value of the family inasmuch as the behavior

513
McCoy, “An Anarchy of Families”, 17.
514
“The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed Members of the Constitutional Commission, or the
Office of Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.” Ibid., 18. Cf. Nolledo,
1359.
515
Ibid., 18 – 19.]
516
Ibid., 19.
 170

of the family reflects Philippine society.517 Mabini is right when he proposed to have an

internal revolution as self-interest, jealousy, and favoritism among self-proclaimed

revolutionaries518 crept unto their blood, thus, “a veritable blood-letting is necessary in

order to shed so much vitiated and corrupt blood, inoculated in your veins by your

stepmother in order to bind you to eternal thankfulness.”519 This simply reiterates the

desire of Bonifacio for inner transformation, most specifically from among the leaders of

Katipunan, as a condition to win the revolution. He also attributes the defeat of the

Katipunan to the “infighting and lack of unity among the leaders who continue to have

hardness of loób (matitigas ang kaloóban) while ordinary people suffer.”520

Kanoy opines that the key to success is selfness. He means by selfness as “that

self which springs from one’s best and true nature; it is the result of the simultaneous,

parallel, economical, coordinating, integrating, evoking self-development of the

individual’s physical, intellectual, and emotional well-being.”521 The development of a

healthy self-concept diffuses into that of the extended self to advance the development of

a healthy society whereby only the truest of all the interests is the concern of every

individual.

517
Leonardo N. Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy, 95.
518
Mabini is referring to the “many illustrados, wealthy principales, and mestizos who had
generally been unsympathetic or hostile to the 1896 struggle” but were force to join the Katipunan when
they felt the imminent defeat of the colonizers in the hands of the Katipunan. Ileto, 117. See also, Ileto,
217.
519
Ibid.
520
Ileto, 112. Cf. Teodoro Agoncillo, The Writings and Trial of Andres Bonifacio (Manila:
Bonifacio Centennial Commission, 1963), 82-86,88,91.
521
Julito M. Kanoy, “Selfness: The Key to Success”, Philippine Values Digest, volume 5, no. 1
(1990): 17.
 171

The problem, however, of Kanoy is on the process of identifying and pursuing the

person’s self-interest. This is problematic because Kanoy finds the situation of the

Filipino confusing. He construes that the Filipino’s “purportedly ascetic religion and

culture have indoctrinated him with the idea that self-sacrifice and blind obedience are

the highest virtues, and that morality is synonymous with religiosity, blind faith, and

selflessness. Hence, any suggestion of self-interest offends his sanctimonious sensibilities

and gives him guilt twinges.”522

By this means, the injunction of Ramirez on the need to revolutionize the mindset

of the Filipino is very timely. Most potently, a change on the Filipino’s idea of the family

is very helpful. This is helpful in the sense that in an atmosphere of insecurity, family

security becomes the highest value. This attitude contributes to the development of a

mentality that will make the family as an obstacle to development and nation-building. Its

being an obstacle is a result of its encroachment unto the spheres of politics, economics,

education, and religion by making them as an extension of the family affairs.523

This inner transformation must be done in the context of the family. The family as

a microcosm of the society can serve as the jump off point for the re-understanding of the

family as a core Filipino value. Reflecting on the thoughts of Confucius on the

parallelism between running a state and running a family is very instructive.

The proper relation between a ruler and his minister or between a parent
and child, while not being reciprocal as between equals, still benefited by
the proper attitude and conduct in each case. The political and family

522
Ibid.
523
Mina Ramirez, “The Paradox of the Filipino Family: A Phenomenological Approach” in
Felicidad M. Dacayanan and Josefina Dy R. Isaac, Towards Building The Filipino Family Today (Quezon
City: Bustamante Press, Inc., 1974), 32.
 172

situations were treated as being analogous. The ruler or parent should love
his people or children, while the minister or son should be loyal to the
ruler or parent. Confucius explains the proper behavior of each. "How can
he be said truly to love, who exacts no effort from the objects of his love?
How can he be said to be truly loyal, who refrains from admonishing the
object of his loyalty?" Confucius summarizes the art of the ruler as
follows: “A country of a thousand war-chariots cannot be administered
unless the ruler attends strictly to business, punctually observes his
promises, is economical in expenditure, loves the people, and uses the
labor of the peasantry only at the proper times of year.”524

This is one way of saying that a head of the family or that of the state is only

believable if there is consistency between his words and deeds. Understandably, for the

Chinese, to philosophize is “to measure one’s words for his deeds. In the words of

Confucius, the superior man is he who ‘acts before he speaks and then speaks according

to his action.’”525

Applying the Confucian edict to Bacungan’s attribution to the thinking of the

family as a microcosm of society: “a decision-making body; an economic group, a social

unit; and an anthropological unit”,526 is likewise very helpful.

Firstly, the family as a decision-making body should train the children to make

simple decisions to prepare them to make the big ones. Training them to make decisions

is training them for independence. Independence exists in different forms all throughout

the life of a person. It can mean standing up on one’s own two feet, making one’s own

524
“Confucius” [article online]; available from http://www.san.beck.org/CONFUCIUS4-
What.html ; accessed June 2, 2005. Cf. Analects, 14:8 and 1:5.
525
Manuel B. Dy, Jr. “Philosophy and the Just Man” in Manuel B. Dy, Jr., Philosophy of Man:
Selected Readings, 2nd edition (Makati: Goodwill Trading Co., Inc, 2001), 26. Cf. Confucius, Analects II:
13.
526
Cleofe M. Bacungan, et al., 81. Cf. Lawrence Senesh, “Orchestration of Social Sciences in the
Curriculum” in Irving Morrisett and William W. Stevens, Jr. (eds.), Social Science in the Schools: A Search
for Rationale (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971).
 173

decisions, and may also mean taking responsibility for those decisions.527 Ultimately,

“independence rests on a foundation of skills that parents must help their children

practice every day.”528

Making a decision is not an effect only of how the subject perceives himself. It

has to manifest also the person’s perception of his “ability to perform in relation to

others….”529 Decision-making usually emphasizes the decision-maker’s taking

responsibility of the consequent of his action. Thus, accountability with one’s action is

given primary importance. Negatively, however, an act might have been done to the

detriment of the other. Holding accountability is praise-worthy. But, having the ability to

respond to the objective demand of the situation is more note-worthy. This idea of

responsibility is due to the person’s sincere care for the other. In like manner, when the

child becomes a grown-up and given a chance to become a leader, he can be expected to

treat his subordinates fairly and humanely.

In the Philippines, as a patriarchal society, decision-making as well as imposing

discipline is centered on the father. Psychologically, Mangubat explains that “the Filipino

is that, like a nail he needs a hammer to pound his head. We can never discipline him if

we are not firm and resolute. Freedom to him means freedom to do anything he wants.

Some amount of coercive power is needed to make him feel that over his head is a

hammer ready to pound his head if he does not conform.”530

527
Ibid., 82.
528
Ibid. Cf. Katherine C. Kersey, “Fostering Your Child’s Independence,” Better Homes and
Gardens (March 1986).
529
Paul Lewis, 40 Ways to Teach Your Child Values (Manila: Christian Literature Crusade, 2000),
21.
530
Mangubat, 298a.
 174

Seemingly, this contradicts the principles of democracy for it has a semblance of

authoritarianism. Nevertheless, Mendez and Jocano insist that authoritarianism as a

principle of socialization and communication is not wrong per se if it is understood in the

proper context of the Filipino. They clarify that “if we take authority to mean the right to

command, enforce obedience, then the Filipino family is no less authoritarian than any

other family in all known cultures. Thus to single it out and make it as a unique principle

as though it were dominantly and typically Filipino, is to show less familiarity.”531

Nevertheless, if by family, it is understood as the primary source of social and

economic support, then the patriarch has all the right to enforce loyalty among its

member inasmuch as to think of one’s good apart from that of the entire family is

inconceivable. Bearing in mind, however, the Confucian behavior of a ruler, the subject

will not mind being “coerced” by a just and humane ruler who always sees the good of

all. As what Lee Kwan Yew highlighted, the efficacy of instilling discipline to all is only

made possible by those who are in themselves disciplined.532

Secondly, the family, as an economic group, aside from being a producer,

distributor and consumer of goods and services, is also expected to inculcate appropriate

values and goals in dealing with money matters. The behavior of the family on matters of

spending and saving money affects the member’s valuation of it. In other words, “the

economic behavior of families can contribute to the strength and well-being of the nation

because the economy looks to the family as a market for its goods and services and as a

531
Paz Policarpio Mendez and F. Landa Jocano, The Filipino Family In Its Rural and Urban
Orientation: Two Case Studies in Culture and Education (Manila: Centro Escolar University Research and
Development Center, 1974), v.
532
Benigno, “Nation Still In Denial” in Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star (March 10, 2004).
 175

source of capital for not only business enterprises but also government programs and

services.”533

Moreover, in the establishment of a family business enterprise, its success, Lee-

Chua observes, is determined by three factors: a strong marital alliance, parents’

consistency and fair treatment of the children, and a good sibling relationship.534 She

perceives that a healthy family is directly proportional to a healthy family business. The

strong and loving marital alliance musters a healthy business atmosphere. This

atmosphere is more effected by sibling functions anchored on mutual regulation and

direct services brought forth by equally capable and experienced siblings. Business

usually collapses due to parents’ playing favorites in relegating responsibilities to favored

children instead of basing it on legitimate qualifications.535

In like manner, government economy cannot soar high if the government plays

favoritism as well. For instance, during the almost 14 years of authoritarian rule of Pres.

Marcos, Sison detects that

during his mandate, he did not only have a stranglehold on government,

the military, and politics, but on the economy as well. He oversaw the
distribution of highly lucrative virtual monopolies (trade in sugar, coconut,
banana and tobacco), sensitive, government-protected industries
(electricity, water, telecommunications, air transport) and infrastructure
projects to his relatives and friends (many of whom were in the military as
well), in a system later called "crony capitalism." As a result in 1984 and
1985, the final years of the Marcos administration, the national economy
had contracted by 9% and 7.2% respectively.536

533
Bacungan, 83.
534
Queena N. Lee-Chua, Successful Family Businesses: Dynamics of Five Filipino Business
Families (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997), 217 – 225.
535
Ibid., 218 – 221.
536
Sison, “Business and Culture in the Philippines: A Story of Gradual Progress” (Instituto
Empresa y Humanismo, Universidad de Navarra), [article on-line]; available from http://www.unav.es/
empresayhumanismo/2activ/seminario/miembros/sison/ii26/ ; accessed December 6, 2005. Cf. Donna S.
 176

Familism should not be taken as automatically inconsistent with economic

development as Max Weber537 perceived it. Mendoza identifies Taiwan as exemplifying

the ability to mix together family centeredness, anchored on a Confucian ethic, and

economic prosperity through what Kwang-Kuo calls as the guanxi network538. The

former further reveals that “typical organizations established in Taiwan are family

businesses, including small and medium enterprises that support big companies within

the export-processing industry. The managers and most workers in such plants are

members of the family and relatives, and as such are expected to do their share and take

only what they need from the company.”539

Thirdly, the family, as a social unit, expects its members to play their respective

roles effectively and efficiently. The playing of roles is according to which dyadic

relationship a certain member belongs. The Filipino family has three dyadic relationships,

namely, husband-wife/father-mother, parent-child, and sibling-sibling. Likewise, in the

state, Confucius perceives that the rectification of names generates good governance as to

when Duke Ching of Ch’i asked him on how to govern well, and the former said: “Let the

Cueto, “Ombudsman Violation. Crony Cases Don't Lapse Under Charter”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (Nov.,
19, 1998). See also, Christine Herrera, & Cueto, Donna “De Guzman: I'm A Victim Of Conspiracy”,
Philippine Daily Inquirer (Oct. 29, 1998).
537
Sison takes Weber as saying that an “overly restrictive family bonds constrain the development
of universal values and impersonal social ties necessary for modern business organizations. Family ties
have to weaken before economic progress occurs: from the extended families of agricultural societies to the
nuclear families of industrial societies, and further on to the single-parent families of post-industrial welfare
societies.” Ibid. Cf. Max Weber, The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York, The Free
Press, 1951).
538
The guanxi network refers to the interlocking of Taiwanese business which has been
responsible for its rapid advance. This concept does not have a universal application in the Philippines
except in the Filipino-Chinese business communities. Magdalena, 12 -13. Cf. H. Kwang-Kuo,
Easternization: Socio-Cultural Impact on Productivity (Tokyo, Japan: Asian Productivity Organization,
1995).
539
Ibid., 8.
 177

ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a son.”540

This means that a good government results from “the mutual discharge of

respective duties as dictated by the individual’s moral conscience and social station.”541

In other words, “with the mutual understanding between the ruler and the ruled, the

government can be conducted in complete harmony.”542 Ultimately, the ruler carries the

greatest burden of governance on his shoulders. Co explains that “Kong Zi (Confucius)

exhorted the ruler to be virtuous and to lead his people by example and moral rectitude.

Otherwise he loses his mandate to rule.”543

Ultimately, a good government is discernible whenever the leader is able to

promote the common good. By common good, it means “‘the sum total of social

conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their

fulfillment more fully and more easily.’ The common good concerns the life of all.”544

Most importantly, it necessitates the exercise of prudence from each person. However,

more prudence is being asked from those who exercise the office of authority.545

Lastly, the family, as an anthropological unit, differs from one another. The

distinction is based on the differences of ideas and customs, sizes, economic status,

540
Analects (XII: 11) as cited by Prisciliano T. Bauzon, Essentials of Values Education
(Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 1994), 75. See also, Alfredo P. Co, Philosophy of Ancient China,
reprint edition (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2002), 115.
541
Co, 115.
542
Ibid.
543
Ibid., 116.
544
Rev. Robert A. Sirico and Rev. Maciej Zięba, O.P., eds. The Social Agenda: A Collection of
Magisterial Texts (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Libreria Editrice Vaticana,
2000), 87; [book online]; available from www.thesocialagenda.org/pdfs/english.pdf; accessed April 10,
2006. Cf. Gaudium et Spes, n. 26. See also, Catechism of the Catholic Church, nn. 1906 – 1909.
545
Ibid.
 178

geographical locations, and structures of the family. The aforementioned variables are

deemed “to affect experience and shape behavior”546 of the family. According to

researches, Bacungan claims that on matters of moral maturity development, and hence

proper values formation, “the best family is that which is mildly authoritarian; that is,

democratic within the structure of a stable hierarchy of authority.”547 Meaning, a family

that is excessively permissive and overly autocratic would develop a child with distorted

self-image which would likely forbid the moral maturity development of the child. On the

one hand, excessive permissiveness is expected to bring forth misconduct on the child for

lack of proper guidance. And on the other hand, an overly autocratic upbringing would

curtail the child’s chance for independent thinking, hence, being lost in the absence of

adults.

This condition makes education and civilization a primordial task of the family.

They, being a life-long process, entail “great understanding and sympathy to see children

as creatures who grow and change, who will need much tender loving care, who will

need to be disciplined or repressed at times and a great deal of judicious leaving

alone.”548 Thus, today’s father plays a very important role in the growing up of the

children for the reason that “he must stand firm as head of the family and yet radiate

546
Bacungan, 89.
547
Ibid., 89 - 90.
548
Dr. Estefania Aldaba – Lim, “The Parents in the Family” in The Filipino Family: Selected
Readings (Quezon City: Alemar – Phoenix Publishing House, 1966), 39.
 179

humility, understanding, kindness, sympathy, and love in the home [and] he must set an

exemplary life of honesty, integrity, and high morality.”549

Generally, even if Confucius takes running a family and running a state as

parallel, he does not stop at the family isolating it from the state. In fact, he admonishes

that “people not only loved their own parents and children, but loved the parents and

children of others as well…. All men shared their social responsibilities, and all women

had their social responsibilities and respective roles. Natural resources were fully used to

benefit all, and were not appropriated for selfish ends. People wanted to contribute their

strength and ability to society for public gain.”550 In the same end, Pope John Paul II

preaches that “by means of his work man commits himself, not only for his own sake but

also for others and with others. Each person collaborates in the work of others and for

their good. Man works in order to provide for the needs of his family, his community, his

nation, and ultimately all humanity.”551

Ultimately, even with the many infirmities of family orientation as a core value, it

still has several praiseworthy and noteworthy characteristics such as the promotion of

“sobriety, education, skills, diligence, devotion to the group rather than individual

interests, unconditional respect for hierarchy and emphasis on non-confrontational

approaches towards human relations.”552 Even so, the triumph of making the family as a

549
Dr. Gumersindo Garcia, Sr., “The Father of Today: His Role in Family Life” in Family Life
Workshop of the Philippines, Inc., The Filipino Family: Selected Readings (Quezon City: Alemar –
Phoenix Publishing House, 1966), 60.
550
Co, 116.
551
Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, n. 10 in Rev. Robert A. Sirico and Rev. Maciej Zięba,
O.P., eds., 112.
552
Sison, “Business and Culture in the Philippines: A Story of Gradual Progress”; [article online].
Cf. Government of Singapore, Shared Values, CMD N║ 1 (1991); Anwar Ibrahim, "Complete the Asian
 180

national, if not an international, family depends on the positive contribution and

leadership of the elite.

Revolution", The Asian Wall Street Journal (Aug. 27, 1996);, Mohamad Mahathir, "Address to Heads of
European Governments", The Economist (March 9, 1996); Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Impulse",
Survival, 37-1 (1995) and Can Asians Think? (Singapore, Times Books International, 1998); Tommy Koh,
The Quest for World Order (Singapore: Federal Publications,1998) ; Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A
Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew" Foreign Affairs, 73 (1994).
 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION

Summary and Conclusion

The emergence of the subject as an entity that is isolated from its environment but

having clarity through its self-assertion starts from Descartes. Ricoeur believes in the

contribution of Descartes to the Modern Philosophy and he writes that the Cartesian

Cogito is an indelible moment in the history of the emergence of being. Nevertheless, he

also recognizes that a new relationship to the subject must be established in our time.

This recognition is the impetus that drives Ricoeur in his philosophical career.

His reading of Marcel triggers the idea of remodeling the relationship of the

subject. Marcel’s intuition epitomizes ontological unity of man’s being-in-the-world.

However, Ricoeur finds Marcel’s methodology as insufficient. Although Marcel has a

major influence on Ricoeur, Ricoeur is dissatisfied with the inexactness of Marcel’s

method.

In his search for a methodology, Ricoeur encounters the concept of intentionality,

which is central to his methodological apparatus. Intentionality provides a disciplined

expression for the vague recognition of unity of experience by recognizing that

consciousness is always a consciousness of something other than itself. However, there is

a tendency for the intentional unity of experience to be immediately polarized in thought.

The tendency to objectify the intentional correlate of consciousness and oppose it to the

reflecting subject is inevitable. With this circumstance, there is a difficulty in reaching

the level of intentional unity of experience in understanding. To resolve this problem, the

bracketing or phenomenological reduction technique comes into being. With bracketing,

 182

the subject chooses to view experience as it in fact immediately presents itself. After

bracketing, the subject lists down faithfully its observations.

Listing down one’s observations entails using language as a medium. Here comes

Heidegger, for whom language is biased. According to him language is pre-determined

by experience. The situation of Dasein is actually the first condition that shapes

understanding which is exteriorized by language. Understanding Dasein becomes

interpretation because it always involves an act of understanding. If understanding as

interpreting presupposes the consideration of some structures, then the assertion of the

subject having an immediate and intuitive consciousness is naive.

The notion of the non-immediacy of consciousness has been supported by

Ricoeur’s understanding of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, for whom the immediate

consciousness of the subject vanished. For this reason, the subject is at odds with

consciousness as the latter is culturally tied. The subject is dispoliated, a circumstance

that pushes Ricoeur to liberate the subject from being lost. He wants to emphasize that

although there is no immediate consciousness, still there is a conscious subject. These

philosophers of suspicion help Ricoeur unmasks the illusion of the subject as

immediately conscious as the latter uncovers the varying symbols that intersperse in the

experiences of the subject that is reflective of the degrees of internalization of its

consciousness.

Ricoeur’s intense desire to understand the symbol is anchored on his desire to revive

the subject. Ricoeur observes that there is something in the symbolic that tells him more

about it. He defines symbol and interpretation in their relation to one another. This implies

that his study on symbols significantly leads to a more enlightened understanding of the
 183

subject. The interpretation of symbolisms mirrors the gradation of the subject’s going into

itself.

Ricoeur is fascinated with the symbol and finds it to be very significant. He

considers a symbol to be more than a mere sign or an icon which so concentrates on the

periphery that it becomes ordinary the moment its meaning is discovered. On the contrary,

the symbol provides food for thought. The first discovery of its meaning leads to further

discovery. There is an apparent movement or even a cycle in the unfolding of the meaning

of the symbol.

The sense of the symbol betrays its reference. Unlike the use of a univocal sign,

the ideal sense of the text in a symbolic sign can have a reference that transcends the

sense of the text. If the sense of a univocal sign can be reflected by its reference, the

symbolic sign cannot. The apparent disparity of the sense to the reference of the text

leads to interpretation. Symbolism is a very common human experience and is expressed

by the different myths and stories of the people. The very situation of a human being is

the source of such a symbolism. Experience is so vast and meaningful that oftentimes

language becomes limited and unable to express the fullness of that experience. The

profundity of human experience leads man to use symbolisms. Symbolisms are so

profound in meaning that they form an enigma whose meaning is inexhaustible. Even

then, inasmuch as a symbol hides the meaning, it can only be discovered by

interpretation. Interpretation of this kind can be deemed as backward interpretation for it

focuses more on the archaic as illustrated by the subsequent symbolic categories.

The subsequent symbolic categories are the path followed in the revival of the

subject. The three symbolic categories are the hierophanic, the oneirotic, and the poetic. The
 184

hierophanic exemplifies the grounding moment or interpretation as recollection. The

oneirotic embodies the moment of distanciation or interpretation as suspicion. Lastly, the

poetic demonstrates the moments of appropriation or interpretation as appropriation.

The hierophanic exemplifies the grounding moment of symbol inasmuch as it is

always related to the fundamental reality of human experience. In other words, the

interpretation of the meaning of the hierophanies must be based totally on the context or

culture of the people where the symbol is embedded because, by nature, they are objective.

They are objective because they are expressed through the common experience of the

people. Henceforth, the appropriation of their meaning depends on the shared experience of

the people.

The oneirotic, the language of desire that a dream expresses, exemplifies the

moment of distanciation because its interpretation is not solely based on the culture of the

dreamer but also on its personal human desire. Understanding the meaning of the dream

symbol is firstly anchored on the context of the dreamer for the sign of the symbol is an

expression of the common experience of the locale. However, it has to be exploded for

what appears in the dream reveals a deeper meaning than its literal presentation since

dreams are the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes or desires.

Lastly, the poetic is the least objective and the most subjective of the three

symbolic categories. In a sense, it completely explodes the objective anchorage of the

symbol. As the articulation of the subject’s own reflection that the oneirotic excited, the

poetic expresses the linguistic nature of symbol for it places the subject at the origin of

articulate being. The image that the poetic forms becomes the new being formed in the

language of the subject. It expresses the subject by making the subject what it expresses.
 185

Ultimately, the poetic shows the possibility of bringing interpretation from being

backward looking or archaic to being forward looking or projective.

This being the situation, Ricoeur shifts his interest from symbol to text because of

the latter’s inherent bias to the archaic. Compared to a symbol, a text appears to be

limited. Nevertheless, it acquires intensity in character. The intensity is derived from the

characteristic of writing which opens up new and original resources for discourse.

Ricoeur has done the most to show us that reality lives by text. Technically, it is a written

discourse that is not within the control of the author. It, however, makes its own

testimony and insists upon an interpretation that appropriates in the here and now the

intention of the text or the world of the text. The said intention does not come from the

author of the text but from within the text itself. This enables the text to describe a reality

in a certain way and progressively shape it. Nonetheless, a plurality of texts is to be

expected from different competing texts. This is not a reason to be alarmed but to take

that as a possibility of re-describing the reality. This makes interpretation not anymore

archaic but forward looking.

Ricoeur’s model of the text emphasizes the idea of an interpretation that

commences at the end of a dialogue. The essential difference between the oral

conversation and the process of interpreting texts leads to the three levels of distanciation

that have a profound influence on the process of interpretation. The three levels of

distanciation are: (1) the distanciation of the text from its author; (2) the distanciation of

the text from its original audience; and, (3) the distanciation of the text from its original

situation. Among other things, this closes off the possibility of ostensible reference, that

is, the capacity of the language to refer directly to its subject matter as present. Speakers
 186

are understood when they point to someone and say "you or I", however in the case of the

text it may be possible to decipher who was originally meant, but the reference is no

longer limited to this original referent.

The good thing with the model of the text is on its ability to project a world.

Nevertheless, the world that the text foresees is dependent on the context of the readers.

This notion of a text, likewise, alters the usual conceptions of explanation and

understanding as dichotomous, whereby the former is conceived as the sole methodology

of the natural sciences and the latter, that of the human sciences. They now, however,

become less contradictory but complementary.

At first, in relation to explaining a text, it is simply explained in terms of its

internal relations, i.e., its structure. This orientation does not recognize the fact that the

text is born out of a certain cultural or historical context that generates it. However, as it

is said, the suspense created by explanation can be lifted and fulfill the text in speech, in a

living communication. In other words, the text is interpreted and interpretation has taken

the feature of appropriation inasmuch as in appropriation, the interpretation of a text

culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who, from that time on, understands

himself better. To interpret now becomes following the path of thought opened up by the

text. Meaning, the subject now places itself en route towards the direction of the meaning

of the text.

This reflects what Ricoeur constantly emphasized as the ability of the text to

produce a comprehension of its phenomenon and at the same time casts light onto the

subject’s own life situation. The significance of Ricoeur's theory of interpretation lies on

its ability to combine the critique of naive consciousness with the conceptualization of
 187

human actions as intentional, communicative events. It therefore goes a long way towards

bridging some of the deepest objections raised by the scientistic outlook against the

method of verstehen, while retaining the latter's emphasis on a hermeneutic

understanding of social life. This bridge has been built without resorting to the

objectivism of the natural sciences and by pursuing the logic of a method that is in

concert with the unique object-subject of the human sciences.

Ultimately, the entire project of Ricoeur revolves around the project of clarifying

through reflective analysis the fact of the subject’s own existence: a heightened self-

understanding. As illustrated in the previous part of this chapter, this reflective analysis,

however, is not direct. It follows a long detour. To understand the subject, Ricoeur

follows the detour that passes through the unconscious (the semantics of desire); intuition

through critical interpretation (hermeneutics of suspicion); reason through language

(linguistics); and reflection through imagination (poetics).

Similarly, the researcher endeavors to seek a clarification on the identity of the

Filipino. Understanding the true identity of the Filipino is like understanding the meaning

of the self and is expected to help catapult the Filipino’s desired national development.

The conviction that the Filipino’s confusion regarding his identity leads to the stagnation

of the Philippines as a country , thus, his actions being unsynchronized and the desired

national development seems to be very farfetched, makes for the thoughtful consideration

of the Filipino identity a constant clamor.

Nevertheless, doing an intuitive understanding on the identity of the Filipino is

very superficial and impossible. Looking into the basic stock that makes a Filipino is next

to impossible. Looking into the characteristics that make a Filipino a 100 per cent
 188

Filipino is indiscernible inasmuch as the Filipino contains multi-racial influences from

Malay, Polynesian, and Indonesian to Indian, Chinese, Spanish and more recently

American and Japanese strains altogether. Henceforth, a detour has been proposed.

The Filipino value system is chosen to be the detour based on the thought of

Alejandro Roces that a nation is known by its values. His proposal is duly reflected on

Adelaida Bago’s stylized framework for integrated development in the Philippines which

anchors it on cultural values because they are seen to be greatly influential on the way of

life of the people. Mina Ramirez also corroborates her idea when the latter opines that the

values of the people are reflected on the workings of institutions inasmuch as these

institutions are externalizations of the culture of which the deepest layer are values.

Phenomenologically, the entire spectrum of the value system of the Filipino is explored.

Based on the different perspective of known authorities on Filipino value system, the

researcher comes to the point of having family orientation as the value whereby the

clarification of the Filipino identity is anchored upon.

Specifically, family orientation as a value has been chosen based on the study that

Talisayon conducted placing family orientation as the most important among the seven

clusters of Filipino values. Choosing this value is based on the idea that the importance of

the remaining six clusters of values are perceived in relation to the furtherance of the

most important value cluster – the family or kinship orientation.

Based on the analysis of various authors, family orientation as a value is seen as a

hindrance to the desired national development of the Philippines when it interferes with

the workings of institutions with supposedly universalistic value assumptions. The

pervasiveness of family orientation underscores the constitution of political dynasties,

 189

nepotism, family corporations and profit-making educational family corporations and

even religious organizations are not saved from the encroachment of family interests.

Corruption is likewise a disease traceable to the desire of the Filipino to secure his own

family. The aforementioned instances are known hindrances to national development.

In like manner, the aforementioned instances are under the hands of the Philippine

elite. Inasmuch as an elite is defined as those which have or may have the power to

influence the thinking of the citizenry, drive electric charges into the body politic or civil

society to wake us up, alter the power configuration of the nation, in some instances,

singly or in combination, be able to seize power at the top, then the initiative of

concretely redirecting the nation falls under their hands.

Nevertheless, education, the best avenue whereby change can be effected to the

entire body politic, is taken for granted by the elite. It has been taken for granted because

of the elite’s unconscious desire to keep the great majority of the people stay uneducated.

If they remain uneducated, then they can always be manipulated easily to whatever ends

the elite may have. If ever there is education, they are not really educated in the real sense

of the word; they are only schooled. At school, pupils are seldom taught how to think.

They are almost always asked to memorize data, concepts or information without even

knowing what they really mean. Henceforth, poverty remains pervasive in the Philippines

not because people have no money but because they remain powerless and dependent.

The great majority is used as a qualifier inasmuch as 95% of the pupils who

belong to the lower strata of the society attend the public school system. And it is a

known fact that the public school system of the Philippines is very inadequate. Politicians

do nothing about to arrest the degradation of this very important institution of the nation.
 190

This sector has been neglected because they have no use of it. Anyway, they send their

children to best and expensive schools to assure the latter of good education.

The family, although seen as the focal point of the Philippines’

underdevelopment, is also seen to be the facilitator of genuine national development.

Taking the cue from Camilo Osias, reflecting on one of the Filipino languages, the

Ilocano language, he realizes that an all-inclusive consciousness is imbedded in the

psyche of the Filipino waiting to be roused up. His analysis of the four personal

pronouns, first person under the nominative case of the Ilocano language comes out with

four levels that can be made as indicators of the development, attitude, and outlook of the

Filipino. Going into the four major stages in the process of broadening his concept, the

Filipino may graduate from what he calls as the Siac stage to the Data stage then to the

Dacami stage, and ultimately, to the Datayo stage. His vision is for a Filipino to move

out of the Siac stage and grow up to the Datayo stage.

This inner transformation must be done in the context of the family. The family as

a microcosm of the society can serve as the jump off point for the re-understanding of the

family as a core Filipino value by appropriating the thoughts of Confucius on the

parallelism between running a state and running a family to the Filipino thought

experience.

The success of this endeavor is seen to be decisive when the transformation is

spearheaded by the elite forces of the society. When the elite forces of the Philippine

society will lead the Philippines accordingly, that is, when there is consistency between

their words and deeds will the Philippines achieve its perennial dream of a developed

nation.
 191

The threefold pathway of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology: from Husserl’s

phenomenology to the hermeneutic suspicion and eventually to the hermeneutic

appropriation is helpful in making the Filipino thoroughly understands himself. The

phenomenology of Husserl as a mode of going back to the thing itself is primarily helpful

in describing the value system of the Filipino looking at it from different angles.

Moreover, the overwhelming inferiority complex and colonial mentality of the Filipino

can be traced to the period of struggle and national consolidation whereby the ideology

that has been enculturated was the civilization of the natives. Meaning, the Filipino is

uncivilized or barbaric before the coming of the Spaniards. This has been proven

otherwise by the Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas of Morga as annotated by Rizal. This must

be one of those things to be demythologized.

Secondly, hermeneutics is like a two-pronged fork as it is animated by a double

motivation. Although it has the inherent willingness to suspect, it is nevertheless willing

to listen. In other words, as a hermeneutic of suspicion, it is concerned with the task of

smashing away the idols of false consciousness. After which, a genuine reconstruction of

the desire of the Filipino can be started. An appropriation is only made possible after an

open listening to symbol and to narrative. Consequently, creative events occur in front of

the text and will have their effect on the Filipino.

Utilizing hermeneutics of suspicion, it tries to unmask and demystify the family

being the source of almost everything in life: economic support, social status, religious

guidance, psychological assistance especially during crises and old age. The unmasking

and the demystification processes commence in order to thresh out any extraneous
 192

motives that make family orientation detrimental to the pursuit of nation-building and

national development most especially among the elite sector of the Philippine society.

Finally, the hermeneutics of appropriation imagines the enormous possibilities of

making family orientation as a value that suits into the project of nation-building and

national development. Appropriating the instruction of Confucius on the parallelism

between running a state and running a family makes great sense. Applying the Confucian

precepts on the fourfold function of the family – as a decision-making body, an economic

group, a social unit, and an anthropological unit, the family orientation as a core value is

never repugnant to nation-building and national development. This has been proven by

the guanxi network of Taiwan. Likewise, Japan is able to reconcile east and west value

systems because it understands its reason for being.

Recommendation

As a result of this study, the researcher states the following as its

recommendations.

A unified and clear cut study on Ricoeur’s threefold path – Husserl’s eidetic

phenomenology, hermeneutic of suspicion, and hermeneutic of appropriation – as an

approach in understanding any salient issue must be undertaken. Meaning, a sincere

utilization of this approach is helpful in threshing out the loopholes of any problem. This

is due to the fact that Ricoeur’s approach includes both an archaeological and teleological

arcs of hermeneutic inquiry.

A study utilizing Ricoeur’s approach to truly understand the role of the elite

forces of the Philippines should be made to be able to diagnose the true disease of the

Philippine society. There has been many studies already conducted to the poor sectors of
 193

the society but not much on the rich. Furthermore, the threefold path can also be utilized

to test whether the elite do not really lack nationalism. Looking into the history of the

Philippines, there were several instances that the elite pull back the Philippines whenever

the latter decisively attempts to move toward a nationalistic orientation. Their hand is

patently present in derailing effort towards a genuine national consolidation starting from

the days of the Katipunan to the oligarch’s persistence to maintain their economic

stranglehold and to the inability of past presidents to keep their election promises of

bringing the whole nation to its ultimate aspiration: a kasaganaan and kaginhawaan for

all people.

In the development of a syllabus in the teaching of Philippine History, the

threefold path of Ricoeur is also useful. The syllabus vis-à-vis the teaching of Philippine

History must mirror a descriptive account of Philippine history, i.e., interpreting

Philippine in a recollective manner. Secondly, historical proclamations, ordinances, and

other related edicts must be subjected to suspicion by scrutinizing them to unmask them

of ill intents. Lastly, appropriation is illustrated in allowing students to think ahead to not

make the same events recur. For instance, the ideology perpetuated during the period of

struggle and national consolidation (1565 – 1898), that is, to civilize the natives and as

taught usually by history teachers should be repudiated. Instead, the flourishing

indigenous civilization in the Philippine archipelago that Morga vividly described in the

Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas even before the coming of the Spaniards must be

accentuated. The idea that they owe their civilization from the Spaniards and other

colonizing heathens should be flushed out from their system. Through this, the Filipino
 194

will gain confidence unto what he can do as a person believing that he can be prosperous

as he was prosperous already even before the coming of the colonizers.

In the schools, the value of nationalism should be intensified and amplified. All

the other values should be looked at carefully as to their positive contribution to the

enhancement of nationalism as the core value taught in every school. In other words, all

the facets of nationalism – political, economic, and socio-cultural – must be inculcated

into the psyche of every Filipino, most especially to the elite. Ultimately, a continuous

battle in the framework of an unfinished revolution, i.e., nation-building and national

development must be waged and should be spearheaded and embodied by the elite.
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 209

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Cobb, Kelton Alexander. “Theology of Culture: Reflections on the Ethics of Tillich,

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Elkins, William Wesley. “Learning to Say Jesus. Narrative, Identity, and Community:
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Paul Ricoeur and the Gospel of Mark.” Dissertation Abstract International. 54

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Gross, Nancy Lammers. “A Re-examination of Recent Homiletical Theories in Light

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Kim, Duk Ki. “A Postmodern Ethical-Political Interpretation of Jesus’ Sayings and

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Knutsen, Mary M. “Beyond God the Father: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of the
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Kubias, Craig Owen. “The Emergence of Metaphor Thoery in Religious Thought:

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McLean, Mary Lehman. “Portrait of the Artist as an Old Woman: Tillie Olsen’s
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Payne, Michael W. “The Bible as ‘Poem’. Reconnoitering Ricoeur: From Symbol

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Price, David Walter. “Heresiarchs of History: Carlos Fuentes, Michael Tournier, and
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Pucci, Edi. “The Longing of the Self: Ricoeur on Personal Identity.” Dissertation
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Reed, Donald E. “Naming God in Paul Ricoeur: The Religious Uses of Metaphor and
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Rogers Horn, Patrick Neil. “The Unity of Language and Religious Belief: Gadamer
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 211

Salsman, Scott Alexander. “Paul Ricoeur’s Three-fold Mimesis: A Paradigm for

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200
 215

APPENDIX A

The Role of Education in Integrative Development

Sustainable Spiritually uplifting

Equitable Socially Integrating

INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENT

E
Economic Growth
D
C
U International Cooperation O
M
C M
Environmental Protection
U
A N
Social Justice
I
T C
A
I Peace & Order T
I
O O
Health N
N

CULTURAL
VALUES

Adapted from Adelaida Bago, Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience. Manila: De La Salle
University Press, Inc., 2001.
 216

APPENDIX B

Diachronic
General Framework Formative Period Period of Struggle Period of Cultural

for the Study of 0.5 N – 1565 and National Solidarity

Philippine Society Consolidation 1898 – 1998

and Culture 1565 - 1898 and beyond

Allocation of goods Communalistic Exploitative and Efforts towards

and services Commercial equitable

distributive

system
Allocation of Consensual Authoritarian Pendulum shift:
Synchronic

Power and Centralization to

authority Decentralization

Ideological Well-being of the “Civilizing of the National interest

Enculturation Sakop or ward Natives” and general

welfare

Adapted from Prospero R. Covar. “Unburdening Philippine Society of Colonialism” in Lourdes R.

Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria. Values Education Through History: Peace and Tolerance. Pasay
City: UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, 1996.
 217

APPENDIX C

FILIPINO CULTURE OF INSECURITY

(System of Patterned Response in Coping with Insecurities)

HISTORICAL BARANGAY FORM LONG COLONIAL UNBALANCED

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL STATUS SOCIAL
OF PHILIPPINE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES
SOCIAL REALITY
(Source of Small Group- (Confused self-identity) (Family Insecurity)
Orientation)
DESIRABLE • Extended • Christianity • Family Self-
VALUES Family sufficiency
(IDEAL CULTURE) • Harmonious • Democracy
Relationships • Family
• Smooth Inter- • School Security
Personal Education
Relationships (formal
(pakikisama) schooling)
• Bayanihan
(Mutual Help)

AS VALUES • Distrust of • Emulation of • Indigenous and

OPERATE other groups/ Western western-
(REAL CULTURE) families (tayo- forms, imbibed
tayo; kanya- approaches, values
kanya) products subordinated
to value of
• “Pakikisama” – • Attitude of economic
a way to uncritical security.
prevent conflict imitation
• Exploitation of
• Participation in • Educated or religious
institutions modernizing sentiments
subordinated to elite alienated
interest of from the great • Democratic
small groups majority forms (like
elections/
committees)
may be used
for interests of
families or
small groups

Adapted from Mina Ramirez, Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino Family: A
Phenomenological Approach (Manila: Asian Social Institue, 1984), 40.
 218

APPENDIX D

INTEGRATION OF TRADITION & MODERNITY

(The Two Value Systems)

TRADITIONAL WESTERN-IMBIBED
(LOWLAND PHILIPPINES)

PANANALIG SA
DIYOS CHRISTIANITY

FORMAL EDUCATION
BUHAY

PAKIKIPAGKAPWATAO FREE ENTERPRISE

HINGA
LOOB

DEMOCRACY
GINHAWA

SYNTHESIZING VALUES

MAKA-TAO
MAKA-DIYOS
MAKA-BAYAN

• PROMOTION OF LIFE FOR ALL

Adapted from Mina M. Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” in
Reflections on Culture (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991), 20.
 219

APPENDIX E

DIAGRAM SHOWING CONTRAST BETWEEN

EXOGENOUS AND INDIGENOUS MODELS

Surface Model
(Conscious)

Legal
Formal
“rigid” (thru channels
Confrontational
Individual merit

Internal incongruence

Customary
Non-formal
Flexible
Non-confrontational
consensus

Deeper Model
(Subconscious)
 220

APPENDIX F

DECS VALUES EDUCATION FRAMEWORK

PHYSICAL HEALTH
Physical Fitness
Cleanliness
Harmony with material universe
Beauty and Art
A
S INTELLECTUAL TRUTH
Knowledge
S Creative and Critical Thinking
E
L MORAL LOVE
F Integrity / Honesty
Self-Worth / Self-esteem
Personal Discipline

SPIRITUAL SPIRITUALITY
Faith in God

SOCIAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Family Mutual Love / Respect H
H U
Fidelity
U M
Responsible Parenthood
M A
A N
N Society Concern for others / Common Good
I Freedom / Equality
N Social Justice / Respect for Human Rights D
P I
E Peace / Active Non-violence
C Popular Participation G
R N
O
S I
M ECONOMY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
O T
M Thrift / Conservation of resources
N Y
U Work Ethic
N Self-reliance
I Productivity
T Scientific and Technological knowledge
Y Vocational Efficiency
Entrepreneurship

POLITICAL NATIONALISM
Common identity
National Unity
Esteem of National Heroes
Commitment
Civic Consciousness / Pride
“Bayanihan” / Solidarity
Loyalty to country

GLOBAL SOLIDARITY
International Understanding and
Cooperation

Source: Minda C. Sutaria, Juanita S. Guerrero and Paulina M. Casiño, eds. Philippine Education: Visions
and Perspectives. The DECS Values Education Framework (Manila: National Bookstore, 1989), 117 as
adapted by Adelaida L. Bago, Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience (Manila: De La Salle
University Press, Inc., 2001), 133.
 221

APPENDIX G

CULTURE CLASH IN FILIPINO FORMAL AND

NON-FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

I. Institutional Demands Cultural Interpretations

A. Community (non-formal) Bureaucracy (formal)

Kinship loyalty Nepotism

Familism Favoritism
Friends Cronies
Prompt service Personalism
Elderly concern Autocratism
Strictness (discipline) Authoritarianism

B. Bureaucracy (formal) Community (non-formal)

According to rules Red tape

Thru channels Bureaucratic
Individualism Unconcerned
Frankness Rudeness
According to merit No sympathy

II. Cultural Demands Institutional Interpretations

A. Community (non-formal) Bureaucracy (formal)

Gift-giving Bribery
Social obligations Unreasonable demands
Facilitating things Influence-peddling
Conformity Lack of initiatives
Bahala (responsibility) Fatalism
Sangguni (consultation) Lack of leadership
Asa (hope) Dependency
Awa (sympathy) Petty sentimentalism
Utang-na-loob (obligation) Corruption
CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: RUBY S. SUAZO

Date of Birth: JANUARY 9, 1975
Place of Birth: DAVAO CITY

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT:

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY

University of San Carlos, Cebu City
2006

M.A. PHILOSOPHY
Christ the King Mission Seminary, Quezon City
1998

A.B. PHILOSOPHY
Christ the King Mission Seminary, Quezon City
1996

SECONDARY EDUCATION
Assumption Academy of Compostela
Compostela, Compostela Valley Province
1991

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION
Compostela Central Elementary School
Compostela, Compostela Valley Province
1987

WORK EXPERIENCE:

2004 – present Assistant Professor II

Philosophy Department
University of San Carlos, Cebu City

1999 – present Instructor I

Department of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Electives
Cebu Normal University, Cebu City

1997 – 1999 Junior Instructor

Philosophy Department
University of San Carlos, Cebu City