TECSON vs. COMELEC
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe,
his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-
born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and
his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which
the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the
death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan
Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he
died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should
be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death.
not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe
may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of
private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a
Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens
of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of
whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age
of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place
of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed
to be the place of residence prior his death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship
would have extended to his son, Allan---
respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s
son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage
and the allegation that respondent was born only
before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondent’s citizenship in view of the established
paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES
vs. COMELEC,et al.
Perez, J.:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016
elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and that her
residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would
be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24,
2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn
infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage
to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at
the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines
due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005.
She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to
the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a
voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes
Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny
or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot
be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en
banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the
ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified
as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a
natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year
residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born
Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos
may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact
that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently
providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents
are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial
evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of
the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a
class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred
with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and
supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the
10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines,
Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of
her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under
RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.
 Gregorio Nuval v. Norberto Guray | GR No L-
30241 | Dec. 29, 1928
Facts:
- On May 11, 1928, within the period fixed by
Sec. 437 of the Administrative Code, Nuval filed in
Civil Case 1442 in CFI-La Union, in his dual
capacity as a registered voter and a registered
candidate for the office of municipal president, a
petition filed against Guray, asking for the
exclusion of the latter’s name from the election list
since he has not fulfilled the residency requirement.
- The Judge dismissed the petition, opining that
Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality
from Jan. 1, 1927; since the order was not
appealable, Guray’s name remained in the
election list.
- Guray was elected as municipal president, with
Nuval obtaining second place.
- Nuval filed the present quo warranto action,
based on Sec. 408 of the Administrative Code,
asking that Guray be declared ineligible due to
non-fulfillment of the residency requirement which is
required to be eligible in an elective office.
Issues: Whether the judgment rendered by the
CFI in cancelling Guray’s name on the election
list constitutes res judicata;
In Sec. 437 of the Administrative Code, the
procedure prescribed is summary in character, thus
the judgment rendered therein is unappealable,
EXCEPT when the petition is tried before a justice
of peace, in which case it may be appealed to a
CFI judge.
However, it is not enough to constitute res judicata.
There is no substantial identity of parties, which is a
requisite in res judicata. The petition for execution
was presented by Nuval in his capacity as a
qualified voter and as a duly registered
candidate. The quo warranto proceeding, however,
was in Nuval’s capacity as a registered candidate
for the office.
Furthermore, the subject matters are not
substantially identical. In the petition for exclusion,
the object of the litigation was the conclusion of
Guray as a voter from the election list, while in the
present quo warranto proceeding, the object is the
expulsion from office.
There is no identity in the causes of action. In the
petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that
Guray had not fulfilled the 6-month required
residency. In the quo warranto proceeding, the
cause of action was that Guray has not the one
year legal residence required for the eligibility of
the office of the municipal president.
Whether Guray, at the time of his election, was
ineligible for office of the residence in the
municipality;
On June 27, 1922, Guray was appointed
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union. A
requirement of the post is that he live continuously
in the municipality where he performs such official
duties. Due to this, Guray asked for the
cancellation of his name in the election list of Luna
(where he has lived since forever). In 1926, Guray
and his family went back to live in Luna at his in-
law’s house due to high costs of living in Balaoan. In
1927, he began construction of a house which
remained incomplete. On February 1928, he
applied for and obtained vacation leave to be
spent in Luna, and filed his resignation on the same
month. Despite having a cedula declaring him a
resident of Balaoan, he obtained another cedula
from the municipality of Luna on Feb. 20, 1928,
which was dated January 15, 1928. He then
applied for registration as a voter of Luna,
alleging that he had been residing in the
municipality for 30 years.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises
whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal
residence of one year immediately prior to the
general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be
eligible to the office of municipal president of
Luna, Province of La Union.
It is an established rule that "where a voter
abandons his residence in a state and acquires one
in another state, he cannot again vote in the state
of his former residence until he has qualified by a
new period of residence". "The term 'residence' as
so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." Since Norberto
Guray abandoned his first residence in the
municipality of Luna and acquired another in
Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in
the municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire
residence in the latter municipality for the length of
time prescribed by the law, and for such purpose,
he needed not only the intention to do so, but his
personal presence in said municipality.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion
and so hold in fact and in law Norberto Guray
only abandoned his legal residence in the
Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire
another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury
16, 1928, when he filed his resignation from the
office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he
had been holding, and which resignation was
accepted; and on being elected municipal
president of Luna in the general elections of June
5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence
necessary to be validly elected to said office.
[G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.]
A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur
Graydon Moody, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUAN
POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,
Defendant-Appellee.
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI
of Manila in an action to recover from the
defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal
Revenue the sum of P77,018,39 as inheritance
taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed
against the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came
to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and
engaged actively in business in these Islands up to
the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February
18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and at
the time of his death left an estate consisting
principally of bonds and shares of stock of
corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other
intangibles and personal property. All of said
property at the time of his death was located and
had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as
this record shows, he left no property of any kind
located anywhere else.
He executed in the Philippine Islands a will
where he bequeathed all his property to his only
sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a
citizen and resident of the State of New York, USA.
On February 24, 1931, a petition for
appointment of special administrator of the estate
of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed
by W. Maxwell. Subsequently or on April 10,
1931, a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer,
asking for the probate of said will of the deceased
, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated
by the court and it was declared that Ida Palmer is
the sole and only heiress of the deceased Moody.
However the will does not cover the respective
values of said properties for the purpose of the
inheritance tax.the BIR prepared for the estate of
the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax
return.
The estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody
paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22,
1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on
January 19, 1932, making a total of P90,019,75,
of which P77,018.39 covers the assessment for
inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers
the assessment for income tax against said estate.
The protest was overruled by the BIR.
The petitioner contends that that there is no
valid law or regulation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any
inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or
collected upon transfer, by death and succession,
of intangible personal properties of a person not
domiciled in the Philippine Islands
Issue: Whether Arthur G. Moody was legally
domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his
death
Held: The Court ruled that Moody was domiciled in
the Philippines.
According to the Court, the fact that Moody
accumulated a fortune from his business in the
Philippines and that he lived in the Elks’ Club in
Manila for many years and was living there up to
the date he left Manila the latter part of February,
1928 proved that his domicile at the time of his
death was in the Philippines. And that the only
reason why he left the country was that he was
afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and
had been informed that he would be reported to
the Philippine authorities for confinement in the
Culion Leper Colony as required by the law.
Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated
and in violation of his promise to his doctor that he
would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously
left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928,
under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket,
passport or tax clearance certificate.
He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during
the months of March and April of the year 1929
where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at
the Pasteur Institute. There is no statement of
Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had
adopted a new domicile while he was absent from
Manila. Though he was physically present for some
months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death
there, the appellant does not claim that Moody
had a domicile there although it was precisely from
Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished
to sell his business in Manila and that he had no
intention to live there again. Much less plausible is
the claim that he established a legal domicile in
Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no
writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no
evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed
abode that he intended to be his permanent home.
There is no evidence that he acquired any property
in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his
own account there. There is no evidence of any
affirmative factors that prove the establishment of
a legal domicile there. His short stay of three
months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view
that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of
receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute.
The evidence in the record indicates clearly
that Moody’s continued absence from his legal
domicile in the Philippines was due to and
reasonably accounted for by the same motive that
caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to
evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile
of natural persons as "the place of their usual
residence." The record before us leaves no doubt in
our minds that the "usual residence" of this
unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a
"fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he
had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he
visited during his wanderings up to the date of his
death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of
one’s domicile, there must be a deliberate and
provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a
declared or provable intent that it should be one’s
fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home.
There is a complete dearth of evidence in the
record that Moody ever established a new
domicile in a foreign country.
Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 317
Doctrine: To be qualified to run for elective office
in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have
“waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country.
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the
CA and Petition for certiorari to review the decision
of the Commission on Election
Facts:
 Merito Miguel was elected as municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local
elections of 1988.
 Petitions were filed for his disqualification
under Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the ground that he is a green
card holder, hence, a permanent resident
of the US, not of Bolinao
o One of the petitioners is Mateo
Caasi, his rival candidate for the
position of mayor
 Miguel admitted that he holds a green
card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the US
o He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that
he may freely enter the US for his
periodic medical examination and
to visit his children there.
o He alleged that he is a permanent
resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan
that he voted in all previous
elections.
 COMELEC dismissed the petitions, except
for Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr.
o According to COMELEC, the
possession of a green card by
Miguel does not sufficiently
establish that he had abandoned
his residence in the Philippines
o COMELEC said that as the
respondent meets the basic
requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to
elective local officials under Sec
42 of Local Govt. Code, there is
no legal obstacle to his candidacy
for mayor.
 o In the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Badoy, he opined
that a green card holder, being a
permanent resident of or an
immigrant of a foreign country,
under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, has to prove that he
has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant
to be qualified to run for election
office.
Issue: Is green card a proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the US? Yes.
Did Miguel waive his status as permanent
resident or immigrant to US prior to the
local elections? No.
Is he disqualified to become a candidate
of municipal mayor? Yes.
Ruling:
 Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines
o The intention to live there
permanently is evidenced by his
application for an immigrant’s visa.
o Immigration – removing into one
place from another/entering into a
country with the intention of
residing in it.
o Immigrant – person who removes
into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence
 As a resident alien in the US, Miguel owes
temporary and local allegiance to the US,
in return for the protection given to him
during the period of his residence.
 Sec 18, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution is
not applicable to Miguel
o “Any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law”
o not applicable to Miguel for he
acquired the status of an
immigrant of US before he was
elected to public office, not
“during his tenure” as mayor
 Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the
applicable law to him
o “Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws”
o Residence in the municipality
where he intends to run for elective
office for at least 1 year at the
time of filing his certificate of
candidacy is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for
elective public office must possess.
 He resided in Bolinao for
only 3 months after his
return to the Phils and
before he ran for mayor
 Clear policy of excluding
from the right to hold
elective public office those
Philippine citizens who
possess dual loyalties and
allegiance, as such are
incapable of the entire
devotion to the interest
and welfare of their
homeland
 To be qualified to run for elective office in
the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must
have “waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country.
o His act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant
of US
o The waiver of green card should
be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective
office
o Without such prior waiver, he was
“disqualified to run for any
elective office”
 Miguel’s application for immigrant status
and permanent residence in the US and his
possession of a green card attesting to
such status are conclusive proof that he is a
 permanent resident of US despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines
o Miguel filled up his application for
Immigrant Visa in his own
handwriting, answering
“Permanently” on the question of
his length of intended stay.
o On its face, the green card
identifies Miguel in clear bold
letters as a Resident Alien
 SC annulled the election of Miguel
as municipal mayor.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO,respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995,
providing that her residence in the place was seven
(7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position
filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not
comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House
of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of
votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,
Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of
the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which
reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she
has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced
by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be
correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not
her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District
of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are
set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
109 Phil 273
FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint
praying of a decree annulling his marriage with
Remedios Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of
her genitals was too small to allow the penetration
of a male organ or penis for copulation. He also
claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist. The
wife was summoned and served with a copy of the
complaint but she did not file an answer. The court
entered an order requiring defendant to submit to
a physical examination by a competent lady
physician to determine her physical capacity for
copulation. Defendant did not submit herself to the
examination and the court entered a decree
annulling the marriage. The City Attorney filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds
that the defendant’s impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that
she had not been physically examined because she
refused to be examined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be
annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony
of the husband who claimed and testified that his
wife is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the
case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of
the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of
the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising
out of the suppression of evidence could not arise
or be inferred because women of this country are
by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled
to by competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense . She is not being compelled to be a
witness against herself.
“Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency.” The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the
ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
Ruling: The decree appealed from is set aside and
the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision,
without pronouncement as to costs.
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER (1913)
Short summary: Spanish subjects get married in
Spain, but wanted to divorce in RP. Wife further
claims the refund of the 30k Spanish dollars which
is allegedly her paraphernal property. Court held
that even if divorce is not allowed in RP, the court
could still exercise jurisdiction over the parties who
are domiciled in RP and it is not divested
jurisdiction by the subject matter.
Facts:
Gabriel FUSTER and Constanza Yanez were
>married in Spain 1875
>1899: made an agreement in public document
that they resolved to separate and live apart
>1909: Constanza commenced DIVORCE
proceedings vs. Gabriel for Adultery, praying for:
 Decree of divorce
 Conjugal society liquidated
 Share adjudicated to her
 Payment of support
(probably the property of the spouses belonging to
the conjugal property are all located in RP)
TC: for CONSTANZA
 suspension of life in common
between plaintiff and defendant
 Payment of support
 Division of communal property
>>>BOTH Parties appealed: Alleged dowry:
WON it should be returned to CONSTANZA
WON RP courts are competent to decree the
divorce? YES
1. Authority of jurisdictional power of courts
to decree a divorce is NOT COMPRISED W/n the
personal status of the husband and wife
-whole theory of the statutes and the rights which
belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere
of private law
-authority and jurisdiction of courts are matters of
public or political law
-jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
PROCEDURE are considered to be of a public
nature, submitted to the TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
2. All persons have to demand justice in a
court which would have coercive means to enforce
any decision they may render
3. Justice should be administered WITHOUT
TAKING INTO ANY ACCOUNT THE STATE TO
WHICH THE LITIGANTS BELONG
-all civilized nations are interested in doing justice,
not alone to their people, but to those foreigners
who contract w/n the country or outside of it
juridical ties which in some manner affect their
sovereignty
4. HERE
 CFI had jurisdiction over the person of the
litigants: residents of Manila, had domicile in
Manila
 THEREFORE: CFI had power and jurisdiction
to try actions for divorce. Not divested of
jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the
litigation
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
If this case be decided now in RP: no absolute
divorce: Divorce is considered violation of public
policy. Therefore: courts could no longer try actions
for divorce even if brought by nationals whose
laws allow it
 BEGINNING AND END OF PERSONALITY
BEGINNING: depends on personal law
 GERMAN CIVIL CODE: completion
of person's birth
 SPANISH CIVIL CODE: after
person be alive for at least 24 hours
 PHILIPPINE CIVIL CODE: Birth
determines personality
 If born normal (9 months): if
born alive at time completely
delivered from mother's womb (even if
dies later after a few hours)
 If w/ intra-uterine life of 7
months: alive at least 24 hours after
complete delivery from maternal
womb
 If fetus: considered a person
for all purposes favorable to it,
provided it be born later (depends on
the intra-uterine life - see above)
ART 40: Birth determines personality; But the
conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be
born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
ART 41: For civil purposes, the fetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had
an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is
not deemed born if it dies w/n 24 hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb.
TOLENTINO: before birth, the fetus is not a person
but merely a part of the internal organ of the
mother.
-because of the expectancy that it may be born,
the law protects it and reserves its rights, making its
legal existence, if it should be born alive, retroact
to the moment of its conception
Quita vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
FACTS:
Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941 and
were not blessed with children. Their relationship
soured and eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
U.S.A and in July 1954, she obtained a
final judgment of divorce. Three weeks after, she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality
but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still
in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent BlandinaDandan, claiming
to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan,
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of
the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced
by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors submitted certified photocopies of
the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be
the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of
heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate. At a scheduled hearing, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents,
the issue on the declaration of heirs would
be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
ISSUE:
Who between petitioner and private respondent
may validly claim as the spouse of the decedent
RULING:
The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse
must still be determined by the trial court. The trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth
of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary
and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments
of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence.
On the other hand, private respondent’s claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship.
The case was remanded to the trial court.
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente
were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo
was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon
after, he left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his
visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was
living with his brother and a child was born. The
child was registered as legitimate but the name of
the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce
in California, which later on became final. He
married Alicia and they lived together for 25
years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will be
given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of
probate that made or appointed Alicia his special
administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed a letter of administration over
Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and
denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal
was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that
she be declared co-owner of whatever properties,
she and the deceased, may have acquired during
their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen
when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation
when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are
validly required in their National Law. Thus the
divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the
law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his
National Law since the divorce was contracted
after he became an American citizen. Furthermore,
his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose
Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together
for a month before petitioner returned to her
parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal
home. It was alleged that respondent demanded
her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such
acts and demanded her husband other than the
legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and
deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and
different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor
of respondent and stated that Goitia could not
compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her
husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who
is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or
by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not
absolute. The law will not permit the husband to
evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal
home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at
bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal
abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
Wong wong vs. Vivo
Doctrine:
Laws relating to family rights or to the status of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
Facts:
1. The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a
decision finding petitioner to be legally married to
Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as
a non-quota immigrant, which was later on
affirmed by the Board of Commissioners.
2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set
of members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered
petitioner to be excluded from the country.
3. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same
was denied for lack of merit. She then filed the
instant petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction (considered as certiorari) before the
Manila CFI.
4. After the respondents filed their answer and the
parties submitted a written stipulation of facts, the
court a quo declared valid the original decision
and restrained respondents from excluding
petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed
the present appeal.
5. It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner
declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961
for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas
to whom she was married in Chingkang, China
on January 15, 1929; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader;
that the new set of Board of Commissioners found
that petitioner’s claim was without basis, it
appearing that in the entry proceedings of
Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he
declared that he first visited China in 1935 and
married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly
sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in
1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962
Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in
1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry
declaration he admitted that he first went to China
in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in
1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit
likewise claimed that he first went to China when he
was merely four years old so that computed from
his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in
1912.
Issue:
W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to
support fact of her marriage and can thus be
admitted as non-quota immigrant in the country?

Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the
statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband in the investigations conducted by the
immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in
support of petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife is
a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft
of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that
laws relating to family rights or to the status of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad, and it is well-known
that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated
in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior
to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
priest or minister of the gospel of any
denomination duly registered in the Philippine
Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2).
Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of
petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader
is valid in China, the same is not one of those
authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of
General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section
19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our
new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of
the Philippines which is valid under the law of the
country in which it was celebrated is also valid in
the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this
contention because no proof was presented
relative to the law of marriage in China. Such
being the case, we should apply the general rule
that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign
country it should be presumed that it is the same as
our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage
celebrated before any of the officers mentioned
therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it
is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true,
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Decision appealed from reversed.
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
43 Phil 43 [GR No. 18081 March 3, 1922]
Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died
intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly
P100,000. The estate of the deceased was
claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee,
who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a
marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in
China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the
other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that
she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in
1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her
daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay,
and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting
claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The
trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after
hearing the evidence presented by both sides,
reached the conclusion, with reference to the
allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof
did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage,
but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been
admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the
deceased, he should share in the estate as a
natural child. With reference to the allegations of
the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and
Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that
the marriage between the Mora Adong and the
deceased had been adequately proved but that
under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not
be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the
daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as
natural children. The order of the trial judge,
following these conclusions, was that there should
be a partition of the property of the deceased
Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong
Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is
valid and recognizable in the Philippines.
Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is
valid.
Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General
Order No. 68) provides that “All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be
valid by the laws of the country in which the same
were contracted, are valid in these Islands.” To
establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove
before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then
necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony
as to what the laws of China in the Province of
Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the
Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear,
strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior
Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years
for forty years and the two cases are the same.
Yes. The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is “that
a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.”
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a
curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. We can see no
substantial reason for denying to the legislative
power the right to remove impediments to an
effectual marriage. If the legislative power can
declare what shall be valid marriages, it can
render valid, marriages which, when they took
place, were against the law. Public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriages and should
retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
The courts can properly incline the scales of their
decisions in favors of that solution which will mot
effectively promote the public policy. That is the
true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect. And here the consequences,
entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora
Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in
conformity with the Mohammedan religion and
Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in
disastrous result. The last census shows that there
are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who
have been married according to local custom. We
then have it within our power either to nullify or to
validate all of these marriages; either to make all
of the children born of these unions bastards or to
make them legitimate; either to proclaim
immorality or to sanction morality; either to block
or to advance settled governmental policy. Our
duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral
conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan
marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX
of the Marriage law as validating marriages
performed according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion.
People v Dumpo
Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally
married according to the rites and practices of the
Mohammedan religion. Without the marriage
being dissolved, it has been alleged that Dumpo
contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal
after which they lived together as husband and
wife.
Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy in the CFI
Zamboanga. Dumpo appealed.
It has been established by the defense, without the
prosecution having presented objection or evidence
to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage
was null and void according to Mohammedan rites
on the ground that her father (Moro Jalmani) had
not given his consent.
Issue: Whether or not Dumpo was guilty of bigamy.
Held: No. Dumpo was acquitted.
The court formulated that there is no general
statement regarding the requisites necessary for
the validity of a marriage between Moros
according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact
which must be subject to proof in every particular
case.
In the case, the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari
(Iman or Mohammedans priest authorized to
solemnize marriages between Mohammedans) was
that the effect of the consent of the father's bride is
an indispensable requirement for the validity of
such contracts.
It was easy for the prosecution to show that the
marriage was void by refuting Tahari's testimony
because there were 2 other Imans among the State
witnesses in the case, but it failed to do so.
Granting the absolute necessity of the father's
consent, tacit compliance may be presumed
because it does not appear that Dumpo's father
has signified his opposition to the 2nd marriage
after he had been informed of its celebration. But
this presumption should not be established over the
affirmation of Dumpo's father saying that he did
not give his consent to the 2nd marriage.
It is an essential element in bigamy that the 2nd
marriage have all the essential requisites of a valid
marriage. It appearing that the 2nd marriage
cannot be considered as such, there is no
justification to hold her guilty of bigamy.
Dissent:
There is no quotation from the Koran regarding the
essentials of a marriage ceremony. Justice Hull
agrees that the evidence relied upon is not worthy
of serious consideration. If consent were in fact
necessary, it can well be presumed from the
subsequent actions of the girl.
Ching Huat v. Co Heong
facts of the case
Huat prays for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus directing any lawful officer to take
from Heong and produce before the Court his
daughter Maria Ching and require the respondent
to justify his right to the custody of said minor (15
years old). Further, he seeks that he be awarded
said custody of his child.
Huat alleges that taking advantage of his
confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching
as her godfather, Heung persuaded and induced
her by means of stick, promises and cajolery, to
leave the parental home and to elope with him to
Plaridel, Bulacan where they were married.
Further, he alleges that Heung had been previously
married in China to Gue Min, said marriage being
said to be subsisting at the time respondent
married Maria Ching. Heung on the other hand
alleges that they were married in accordance with
Philippine law.
issue
WON Huat retains the custody over her minor
child? (NO)
ratio
The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue
Min in China has not been proven. There is no
allegation in the petition, much less is there
evidence, to show that the said supposed marriage
was performed in accordance with the laws of
China in force at the time of its supposed
performance, nor even what those laws were. Court
cited Sec. 19 of CC1 which is substantially the same
as Sec. IV of the former Philippine Marriage Law2.
As applied: the Philippine marriage between
said respondent and Maria Ching before the
Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, is
undisputed. It is also beyond question that
marriage was contracted by a man much over 16
years old with a girl 15 years old.
Note: If the supposed prior Chinese marriage
had been sufficiently proven, then in order that the
subsequent Philippine marriage could be valid, it
would have been necessary either [a] that the
Chinese marriage should have been previously
annulled or dissolved; or [b] that the first wife of
respondent should have been absent for 7
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the respondent having news of
the absentee being alive; or [c] that the absentee
should have been generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by respondent at the time of
contracting the subsequent marriage, in either of
which last two cases the subsequent marriage will
be valid until declared null and void by a
competent court, while in the first it will be valid
without this limitation. However, the complete
absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese
marriage makes Sections 29 and 30 of the
Marriage inapplicable.
Maria Ching having been validly married on
June 21, 1946, she became emancipated. This
emancipation brought about the loss by the father
of the parental authority that he claims. Further,
1 "Sec. 19. Marriages performed abroad. - All marriages
performed outside of the Philippine Islands in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
these Islands."
2 "Sec. IV. All marriages contracted without these Islands,
which would be valid by the laws of the country in which
the same were contracted, are valid in these Island."
Article 48 of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage
Law of 1870, whose Articles 44 to 8 were, and are
then partly, in force in the Philippines provides that
the wife has the duty of living in her husband's
company and of following him to wherever he
transfers his domicile or residence.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24,
1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived
in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a
petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry
under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.
The article should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtained a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the US. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as
fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred
from remarrying.
Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy
Chun Yen, petitioners, versus Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and
Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.
No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17,
1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here
in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition
alleging among others that:
a) They are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego;
b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao
Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and
d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratriz of the intestate
estate of the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he
married on January 19, 1931 in China;
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children
of the deceased Yao Kee; and
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat
on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
does not have a marriage certificate because the
practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the bethrotal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who contracted
or entered into an agreement with the parents of
her husband; that she and her husband have been
living in Fookien, China before he went to the
Philippines; that in China, the custom is that there is
a go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is
known to both parties who would talk to the
parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
groom-to-be their son-in-law, then they agree on a
date as an engagement day; that on the wedding
day, the document would be signed by the parents
of both parties but there is no solemnizing officer
as is known in the Philippines; that the parties do
not sign the document themselves; and that she and
Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and
the document was left in China and she doubt if
that document can still be found now.
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot
be considered as proof of China’s law or custom on
marriage not only because they are self-serving
evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. The marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
They must be alleged and proved as any other
fact.
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of
Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of
China, they cannot be accorded the status of
legitimate children but only of acknowledged
natural children.

The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother

of Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of his
sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate
is issued by the Chinese government, a document
signed by the parents and elders of the parties
being sufficient. Statements were made by
Asuncion Gillego when she testified that a) Sy Kiat
was married to Yao Kee according to a Chinese
custom.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao

Kee in China is valid.

Held:

The law requires that a custom must be proved as

a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local
custom as a source of right cannot be considered
by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other
fact.

Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All

marriages performed outside the Philippines in