Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Young Auto Supply Co. vs.
ng Auto Supply Co. vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Venue in case of personal actions.—Personal
actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the Court of
First Instance where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Primary objective and nature of an action for
annulment or rescission of contract is to recover real property.—A
prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to
efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to
recover real property.
Same; Same; Same; An action for the annulment or rescission
of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental
and prime objective and nature of the case which is to recover said
realproperty.—While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek
the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his
action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which,
under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of
which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is
that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real
property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real
property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not
err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec.
2, Rule 4) which was timely raised.
Clavecilla Radio System vs. Antillon, et al.
Corporation Law; Domicile of a corporation.—The residence
of a corporation is the place where its principal office is
established. It can be sued in that place, not in the place where its
branch office is located.
Actions; Venue; Venue of a tort action against a, corporation
in inferior court.—Where the action filed against a corpo-ration in the
inferior court is based on tort, it should be filed in
the place where the corporation has its principal office, not in the
place where it has its branch office. To allow an action against a
corporation to be instituted in any place where a corporate entity
has its branch offices would create confusion and work untold
inconvenience to the corporation.
Same; When provision, “may be served with summons”,
applies.—The phrase “may be served with summons” in section 1,
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court does not apply when the
defendant resides in the Philippines, for, in such a case, he may
be sued only in the municipality of his residence, regardless of the
place where he may be found and served with summons.
Same; Plaintiff may not choose venue of action.—The laying of
the venue of an action is not left to plaintiff’s caprice because the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
the Regional Trial Court is either the place where the defendant
Remedial Law; Actions; Venue; A corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office
is located as stated in the articles of incorporation.—A corporation
has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied
to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in
a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal
office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation (Cohen v.
Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 [1916] Clavecilla
Radio System v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379 [1967]). The Corporation
Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles
of incorporation the “place where the principal office of the
corporation is to be located which must be within the Philippines”
(Sec. 14 [3]). The purpose of this requirement is to fix the
residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it
to be ambulatory.
Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Inc. vs. Caluag
The Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, held that Civil Case No. Q-5197
of the latter court is an action in personam, and that, as
such, it does not fall within the purview of said section 3,
and was properly instituted in the court of first instance of
the province in which Cacnio, as plaintiff in said case,
resided, pursuant to section 1 of said rule 5.
We are unable to share such view. Although the
immediate remedy sought by Cacnio is to compel petitioner
to accept the tender of payment allegedly made by the
former, it is obvious that this relief is merely the first step
to establish Cacnio's title to the real property adverted to
above. Moreover, Cacnio's complaint is a means resorted to
by him in order that he could retain the possession of said
property. In short, venue in the main case was improperly
laid and the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, should have granted the motion to dismiss.
Esuerte vs. Court of Appeals
Civil Procedure; Actions; Venue; The option of the plaintiff in
personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is either
the place where the defendant resides or may be found or the place
where the plaintiff resides.—The choice of venue for personal
actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is given to the
plaintiff but not to the plaintiff’s caprice because the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court (see Clavecilla Radio System v.
Antillon, 19 SCRA 379). The rule on venue, like other procedural
rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of
justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every
action and proceeding (Sy v. Tyson Enterprises Inc., 19 SCRA
367). The option of the plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by
resides or may be found or the place where the plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Venue of personal actions should
be at the place of abode or place where plaintiffs actually reside
not in domicile or legal residence.—“Resides” in the rules on venue
on personal actions means the place of abode, whether permanent
or temporary, of the plaintiff or defendants as distinguished from
“domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence
venue of personal actions should be at the place of abode or place
where plaintiffs actually reside, not in domicile or legal residence.
There is no question that private respondent as plaintiff in
the Civil Case is a legal resident of Cebu City. Her
parents live there. However, it cannot also be denied that
at the time of her filing of the complaint against
petitioners, she was a temporary resident of Bacolod City.
She was then employed with the Corazon Locsin
Montelibano Memorial Hospital, Bacolod City, as resident
physician. Moreover, the acts complained of were
committed in Bacolod City. The private respondents were
all residents of Bacolod City at the time of the bringing of
the action. Though Tan’s employment was only temporary
there was no showing when this employment will end.
Justice would be better served if the complaint were heard
and tried in Bacolod City where all the parties resided.
Capati vs. Ocampo
That all actions arising out, or relating to this
contract may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Naga.”
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Venue; Stipulation of the parties
that all actions arising or relating to their contract may be
instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga, not restrictive, but
permissive, Venue of action in Pampanga CFI, where plaintiff
resides, properly laid; Case at bar.—We hold that the stipulation
as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By
the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits
solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga.
They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court,
without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court
specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is
properly laid in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.

But the contract between them provides that "** All suits
arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the
proper Courts of Quezon City” without mention of Tacloban
City. The question is whether this stipulation had the
effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional
venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and
KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general
postulates distilled therefrom, the question should receive
a negative answer. Absent additional words and
expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the
parties’ desire and intention that actions between them
should be ventilated only at the place selected by them,
Quezon City—or other contractual provisions clearly
evincing the same desire and intention—the stipulation
should be construed, not as confining suits between the
parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing
suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option
of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by
respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is
plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are
basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive.
It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person
rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to
venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant and not between the court and the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches
more of the convenience of the parties rather than the
substance of the case.4
Same; Same; Same; Where a defendant fails to challenge
timely the venue in a motion to dismiss, and allows the trial to be
held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot appeal or belatedly
challenge the wrong venue.—Dismissing the complaint on the
ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course
of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in
inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC),
may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to
challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by
Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be
held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a
special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Actions; Dismissal of; The trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
—Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a
motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the
venue, though technically wrong,
may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules
on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case. Indeed, it was grossly
erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut
by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of
improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in
the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we are for
the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and
fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that
respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure
to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right
to be heard on his cause.
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
It cannot be disputed that petitioner’s principal office is in
Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporation15 and
by-laws.16 An action for
damages being a personal action,17 venue is determined
pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Venue of personal actions.—All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may
be found, at the election of the plaintiff.18
Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts
presented before us. He is a complete stranger to the
covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR,
despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the
rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for
whose benefit the electric generating equipment subject of
the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise not
persuaded by his argument that the allegation or
representation made by petitioner in either the complaints
or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is
in Davao City should estop it from filing the damage suit
before the Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that
private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he
relied on such representation by petitioner.
Mangila vs. Court of Appeals
In the instant case, it was established in the lower court
that petitioner resides in San Fernando, Pampanga35 while
private respondent resides in Parañaque City.36 However,
this case was brought in Pasay City, where the business of
private respondent is found. This would have been
permissible had private respondent’s business been a
corporation, just like the case in Sy v. Tyson Enterprises,
Inc. However, as admitted by private respondent in her
Complaint37 in the lower court, her business is a sole
proprietorship, and as such, does not have a separate
juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in
court.38 In fact, there is no law authorizing sole
proprietorships to file a suit in court.39
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the personality of
the owner of the enterprise.40 The law merely recognizes
the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business
organization conducted for profit by a single individual and
requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and
permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the
national government.41 The law does not vest a separate
legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it
to file or defend an action in court.42
Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file this
case, the sole proprietorship is not the plaintiff in this case
but rather Loreta Guina in her personal capacity. In fact,
the complaint in the lower court acknowledges in its
caption that the plaintiff and defendant are Loreta Guina
and Anita Mangila, respectively.
Chua vs. Total Office Products and Services (Topros), Inc.
Actions; Loans; Real Estate Mortgages; An action to annul a
contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage is a
personal action; In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
recovery of damages; A real action is an action affecting title to
real property or for the recovery of possession, of for partition or
condemnation of, orforeclosure of mortgage on, real property.—
Well-settled is the rule
that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real
estate mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement
of a contract or the recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as
indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a real
action is an action affecting title to real property or for the
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property
In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate
mortgage in the present case must fall under Section 2 of
Rule 4, to wit:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions.—All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.14
Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper
venue of the action to nullify the subject loan and real
estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional
Trial Court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of improper venue.
Briones vs. Court of Appeals
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases
where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions,
and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its
validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein
shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the
complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of
improper venue.35 Conversely, therefore, a complaint
directly assailing the validity of the written instrument
itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in
accordance with the general rules on venue. To be sure, it
would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this
nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it,
in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in
which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject
contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it
effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom
to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be
emphasized that Briones’ complaint directly assails the
validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their
execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as
his compliance therewith would mean an implicit
recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general
rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before
a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is
located.
PLEADINGS
Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Court of Appeals
While the third-party defendant would benefit from a
victory by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this
is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party
defendant have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the
defendant and third-party defendant had no common
defense against the plaintiffs’ complaint, and they were
even blaming each other for the fiasco.
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
Same; Same; Criteria or Tests in Determining Whether a
Counter-claim is Compulsory or Permissive; “Compelling Test of
Compulsoriness”; Words and Phrases; Under the “compelling test
of compulsoriness,” “a logical relationship between the claim and
the counterclaim is required, that is, whether conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.”—In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the
criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s counter-claim? 4.
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? Another test, applied in the more recent case of
Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of
compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between
the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.”
Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc.
The alleged malicious filing of estafa against petitioner is
necessarily connected with the non-payment of the value of
steel bars delivered to petitioner. The resolution of the
latter issue does not require the presence of third parties of
whom the court a quo cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Therefore, the counterclaims raised by private respondents
are clearly compulsory in nature. Thus, non-payment of
docket fees does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court
to rule thereon.
SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim.—A compulsory counterclaim is
one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as
to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original
action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount
Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corp.
Same; Same; Same; A counterclaim is permissive “if it does
not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim.”—A counterclaim may either
be permissive or compulsory. It is permissive “if it does not arise
out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim.” A permissive counterclaim is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in
another case. A counterclaim is compulsory when its object “arises
out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.”
Moreover, using the “compelling test of compulsoriness,”
we find that, clearly, the recovery of petitioners’
counterclaims is contingent upon the case filed by
respondents; thus, conducting separate trials thereon will
result in a substantial duplication of the time and effort of
the court and the parties.
Since the counterclaim for damages is compulsory, it
must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would be
barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main
action but in a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground
of
litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the
same fate on the ground of res judicata.
Novelty Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Subsequent submission of requisite documents
constituted substantial compliance with procedural rules.—In
Jaro v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the subsequent
submission of requisite documents constituted substantial
compliance with procedural rules.
Remedial Law; Forum Shopping; Court recognized the
authority not only of a general manager but even of an acting
manager to sign a verification and certificate against non-forum
shopping.—We find equally untenable private respondent’s
argument that the Special Power of Attorney authorizing Ventura
to file the Petition was still defective, since it had been signed by
the general manager and not by the president of petitioner
company. This Court, in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals, recognized the authority not only of
a general manager but even of an acting general manager to sign
a verification and certificate against non-forum shopping.
Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla
Same; Same; Same; Forum-Shopping; Words and Phrases;
“Forum-Shopping,” Explained; The real office of Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to
also as forum-shopping; The language of the circular distinctly
suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory
pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim
for relief.—It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April
1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as
forum-shopping. It is an act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. The language of the circular distinctly
suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory
pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim
for relief.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the so-called
“counterclaim” of a party really consists of two segregative parts—
(1) for unpaid hospital bills and (2) for damages, moral and
exemplary, plus attorney’s fees by reason of the alleged malicious
and unfounded suit filed against it—it is the second, not the first,
claim that is referred to as not being initiatory in character and
thereby not covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular
No. 04-94.—Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial
relief. The so-called “counterclaim” of petitioner really consists of
two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents’
son, Emmanuel Surla, in the total amount of P82,632.10; and (2)
for damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney’s fees by reason
of the alleged malicious and unfounded suit filed against it. It is
the second, not the first, claim that the Court here refers to as not
being initiatory in character and thereby not covered by the
provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
It is
indisputable that Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-fact of the
respondent, was duly authorized and empowered not just to
initiate complaints, whether criminal or civil, to enforce and
protect the respondent’s rights, claims, and interests in this
jurisdiction, but is specifically authorized to sign all “papers,
documents, and pleadings” necessarily connected with the filing of
a complaint. Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
which extended the requirement of a certification on non-forum
shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasijudicial
agencies, as well as Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the aforementioned papers and documents,
which Grace Galvez was authorized and empowered to sign,
must necessarily include the certification on non-forum shopping.
To conclude otherwise would render nugatory the Special Power
of Attorney and also render respondent’s constitution of an
attorney-in-fact inutile.
courts.—Forum shopping “occurs
when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular
court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most
favorable judgment or verdict.” In our jurisdiction, it has taken
the form of filing multiple petitions or complaints involving the
same issues before two or more tribunals or agencies in the hope
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
There is also forum shopping when, because of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The rationale against
forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different fora.
Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes
abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts. Thus, the rule proscribing forum shopping
seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and
their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue
inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of
the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of
two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or
decisions upon the same issue. It is in this light that we must look
at the propriety and correctness of the Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping signed by Grace Galvez on the respondent’s behalf. We
have examined said Certificateand find that under the
circumstances, it does not negate but instead serves the purpose
of the rule against forum shopping, namely to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule requiring a certification
of non-forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all
rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.—Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is
now incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as Rule 7,
Section 5. It is basic that the Rules “shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”
Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, “should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.”
Heirs of Francisco Retuya vs. Court of Appeals
Remedial Law; Actions; Forum Shopping; Court has in a
number of cases applied the substantial compliance rule on the
filing of the certification of non-forum shopping, specially when
majority of the principal parties had signed the same and who
shared a common interest; Such leniency finds no applicability in
this case because of petitioners’ dishonesty committed against the
appellate court.—As correctly observed by the CA, while we have
in a number of cases applied the substantial compliance rule on
the filing of the certification of non-forum shopping, specially
when majority of the principal parties had signed the same and
who shared a common interest, We agree with the CA that such
leniency finds no applicability in this case because of petitioners’
dishonesty committed against the appellate court. A perusal of
the verification and certification against forum shopping attached
to the petition for annulment of judgment filed in the CA would
show that there was a signature above the typewritten name of
Quintin. In fact, written below the signature of Quintin was
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 06570132, issued on
January 8, 2003 in Mandaue City. Thus, it would appear that
Quintin, who was already dead at the time the petition was filed,
had signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping and he was even in possession of a CTC. Petitioners’
actuation showed their lack of forthrightness to the CA which the
latter correctly found to be a dishonest act committed against it.
Jabalde vs. Philippine National Bank
Pleading and practice; Genuineness and due execution of
document; Waiver of defendant’s technical admission thru failure
to deny under oath; Case at bar.—Although, ordinarily, the bank’s
failure in the case at bar to deny under oath the entries in the
passbook as copied in the complaint, constitutes an ad mission of
the genuineness and due execution of the document, this rule
cannot apply because the plaintiff introduced evidence purporting
to support his allegations of deposit on the dates he wanted the
court to believe, and offered no objection during the trial to the
testimonies of defendant’s witnesses and docu mentary evidence
showing different dates of deposit. These acts constitute a waiver
by the plaintiff of the defendant’s tech nical admission through
failure to deny under oath the genuine ness and due execution of
the document
Central Surety & Insurance Company vs. C. N. Hodges
“x x x where a case has been tried in complete disregard of the
rule and the plaintiff having pleaded a document by copy,
presents oral evidence to prove the due execution of the document
as well as the agent’s authority and no objections are made to the
defendant’s evidence in refutation, the rule will be considered
waived.”6
In the case at bar, the parties acted in complete disregard
of or wholly overlooked the rule above-quoted. Hodges had
neither objected to the evidence introduced by petitioner
herein in order to prove that Mrs. Mesa had no authority to
issue a surety bond, much less one in excess of P8,000.00,
and took no exception to the admission of said evidence.
Hence, Hodges must be deemed to have waived the benefits
of said rule and petitioner herein cannot be held liable in
excess of the sum of P8,000.00:
We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from the complaint
and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse
is also true. The complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of
action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the
plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. In this case, we note that records
show that recurring in each of the three contracts is the provision that
payment by petitioner shall be subject to its timely receipt of similar
payments from Fil-Estate. On their face, the said attached contracts
clearly require a specific condition before petitioner may be held liable
for payment.
The complaint, however, failed to state that the said condition had
been fulfilled
Without the said condition having taken place, petitioner cannot be
said to have breached its obligation to pay.

Capitol Motors Corporations v. Yabut

x x x The rule authorizing an answer to

the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of an averment and giving such answer the
effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact
as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so
plainly and necessarily within the defendants
knowledge that his averment of ignorance must
be palpably untrue.[58]

Similarly, in Capitol Motors, the document denied was the promissory

note sued upon and attached to the complaint. In said case, the Court
ruled that although a statement of lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the
complaint was one of the modes of specific denial contemplated under
the Rules, paragraph 2 of the Answer in the said case was insufficient
to constitute a specific denial.[59] Following the ruling in the Warner
Barnes case, the Court held that it would have been easy for
defendant to specifically allege in the Answer whether or not it had
executed the promissory note attached to the Complaint.[60]

Fluor Daniel v. E.B. Villarosa