Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private
respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private
respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro
claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to
the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his
answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including
the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in
Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and
wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus,
it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was
pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the
couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The
baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her
daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from
the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the
Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20,
1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not
appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
1
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig
on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither
did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature
only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive
to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent
appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local
civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the
Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the
contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar
of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent
appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by
the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in
their record adequately proved that no such license was ever
issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on
the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the
subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the
certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the
parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded
the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the
marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly
presented to him before the solemnization of the subject
marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not
the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license
was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration
of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24,
1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar.
Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence
of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court
is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by
an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy,
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to
find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage
license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject
marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city
court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily
used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge
of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting
parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and
Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified
during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin
F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and
a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore
the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in
default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's
lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court
that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void
for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no
showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and
FERNANDO SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
2
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah
Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14,
1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong,
Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children
were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo,
Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal
separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for
separation of property on the grounds that her husband
abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29,
1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership.[8] Judgment was rendered dissolving
their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses.[9] The trial court also
granted custody of the children to Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No.
88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the
dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her
husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring
him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her
son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her
son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled
Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different
parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started
choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only
when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma
and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the
blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical
Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it
was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its
decision[12] dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20
days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against
private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for
more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision[13] dated December 4,1991, granted
the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and
sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It
awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner,
and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration
of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions
for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's
infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her
husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part,
choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have
sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of
her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their
marriage and became manifest thereafter.[15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision[16] dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of
Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as
cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity
which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. In the decision [17] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of
petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological
incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to
nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential
requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity
of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their
marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the
couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten
years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior
to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and
the evidence on record.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. [20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises
the following issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON
THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES'
MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE
LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY
NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD
EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR
MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN
TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH
RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant
a declaration of its absolute nullity.
3
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being
void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the
basic rules of fair play and justice,[23] in a number of instances,
we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules
ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing,
the very reason for their existence would be defeated. [24] Hence,
when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular
case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to
cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the
issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of
a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note,
however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what
is required now is a declaration of their effects according to
existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in
her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that
the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion
that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she
points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of
the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached
as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit
"A" in the course of the trial.[26] The date of celebration of their
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on
November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial
court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.[27] This fact
was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22,
1993, during her direct examination,[28] as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were
married on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the
parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which
are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of
the trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there
was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In
addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither
petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record,
we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her
petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents
she presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on
record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in this
case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent
could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-
79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of
the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are
only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son
Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial
below, which shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made
as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection
was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that
having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing
to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient
proof of the facts contained therein.[33]
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private
respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated
December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May
21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The
marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby
declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[31]
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character;
xxx
[32]
ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger,
dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply to the court for relief.
ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.
The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the
resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate
property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors
who acted in good faith.
ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall
be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local customs.
ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
4
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this code shall govern.
ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration
of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
135 and 136.
ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof
shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where
the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper
registries of property.
ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage
may also enter into marriage settlements, but they shall be valid
only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the
provisions of Title IX of this Code.
ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed
by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be
indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to
be made a party thereto.
[33]
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA,
276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416
dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-
1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla
before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel
Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and
Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed
Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita
caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the
said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied
for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita
and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and
claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages
were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the
National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack
of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May
19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a
certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh.
"A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff
alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the
civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792
allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he
never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr.,
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he
and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before
Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage
license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and
expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding,
he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in
Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their
marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him
to be married he being a medical student at that time. They
started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling
before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time
when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant
in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial
separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself
manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage,
he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan
where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9,
1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to
and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply
thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"),
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church
issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff
and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April
11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely
religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969
at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792
issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of
San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March
11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr.,
the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had
a steady romantic relationship after they met and were
introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was
compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to
run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she
turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in
Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and
promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still
fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-
5
28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969,
they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone
prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two
months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors
that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12
(TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded
by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual
behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with
her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex,"
while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months,
hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird
sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has
a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff
took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed"
drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates
or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to
him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly
lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those
times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on
and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff,
who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage
became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused
her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the
United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that
his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife
ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and
guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for
medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed
in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also
stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order
for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage
contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the
marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage
void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent
one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license
no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh.
"F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value
under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage
between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas
solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on
May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized
under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy
Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of
the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the
parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the
Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil
and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the
Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with
the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994),
the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local
civil registry of San Juan testified that they"failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered,"
for the reason that "the employee handling is already
retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume
that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage
contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of
the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for
scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained
an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage
on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a
marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April
2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration
of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and
relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts,
particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from
the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on
their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the
presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted
"fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or
not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in
6
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to
declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force
at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an
essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one
involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in
the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court
of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will
put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his
office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof
of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage
License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements
and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by
this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on
record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies
the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring
to this Court among other things the register of application of/or
(sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19,
1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and
provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were
ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of
marriage applications that your office maintains as required by
the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full COURT
force locating the above problem.
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
San Juan, Metro Manila
xxxx
September 20, 1994
COURT

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license
Local Civil Registrar 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states: Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no
is which now, was this issued or not?
Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect
that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where
This is to further certify that the said application and license do Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear presumption of regularity of performance of official function by
to be fictitious. the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the
interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve. According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is
San Juan, Metro Manila
among the disputable presumptions.
July 25, 2000
In one case, it was held:

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of

Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope
and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the
said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could
not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of
Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work."
Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate
the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said
logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said
evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty
has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the
case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated
by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of
non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also
mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook

7
 10
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that requisites are complied with:
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein. (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact (2) Their consent, freely given;
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the (4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
presumption is of great weight.24 character.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to 11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25 issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife
and lived together for several years producing two 12ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years beginning:
before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he
married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready xxxx
to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from
of exceptional charater.
his own deceit and perfidy.28
13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the 14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no 15 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
16
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before
their preservation is not the concern of the family members the trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance of a
alone.29 certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
17
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which Id. at 228.
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment 18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of 19 Id. at 735-737.
any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
20
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
xxxx
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions
our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a overcome by other evidence;
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30 xxxx

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31
Republic of the Philippines
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling SUPREME COURT
with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said Manila
in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are
FIRST DIVISION
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem. G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 vs.
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
CORONA, J.:
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Sr., J.J., concur. When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Footnotes Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and
she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North
1Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31. cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
2 male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

8
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In
particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by
Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of
a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground
to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
9
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a
decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex
in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground
of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his
petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical
features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name
to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect
of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum,
the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed
in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done.
It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so
far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate
As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical
error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed
in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records:Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change
10
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil
registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments
of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such
as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of
nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation
(that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person
in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration
of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax
and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty
days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to
be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29Thus, the
sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of
the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is
immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used
in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry
(and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from
a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis
for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name
or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-
ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a woman.37 One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
11
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and
the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts
is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol
on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact
a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life
of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams."
No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as
his Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in the
University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies
Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in
Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii,
U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis]
bilateral oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the surgical
excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic
surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and
augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size
and shape of the breasts]." Id.
3 On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7 Special Sixth Division.
8Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok
with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-
Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9 Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an
Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March
2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12
Id.
13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277
Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name
or nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more
names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the
term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and
nickname.
15 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. –
xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar
or the consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the
decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any
person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a
clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first
name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a
verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in
the country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms
of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person
before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be
corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with
the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is
presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars
concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of
the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or
domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in person,
with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general shall be processed in accordance with this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change
of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once.
17 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition
shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to
before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The
affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of
the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is
competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall
state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought
to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page
of the registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be
corrected or changed;
12
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the
correct entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall
be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and
necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall
likewise be supported with the documents mentioned in the
immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall
be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner
shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement
agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992,
209 SCRA 189.
19
Supra note 11.
20 Id.
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22 Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23 Id.
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February
2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25
Id.
26 Id.
27 Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
28Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex
Bookstore, p. 238.
29
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles
407 and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes the recording of
acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of
errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such
cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected
or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition shall
be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the
civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil
Register of Manila, supranote 24)
30
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes
"male" or "female" but the genitals of the child are that of the
opposite sex.
31Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The
body that he inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than
what the physicians have supplied.
32 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
34In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-
7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003
WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).
35 Id.
36Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct.
502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38 Article 2(1), Id.
39These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include
nightwork prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition on
discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.
40These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on
qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts of lasciviousness
with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343
on forcible and consented abduction, among others.
41 Section 3(jj)(4).
Article 4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.
SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C.
Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively
the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were
charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports
of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the
court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed
their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was
thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the
Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First
Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval
inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of
respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
13
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual
antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the
records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the
following couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy,
despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not
reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent
judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had
to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties
which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage
contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of
marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but
the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed
Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile
to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that
he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it
was only lately when she discovered that the court had a
marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage
contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and
that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in
preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo,
however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were
kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting
parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he
failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage
between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article
34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and
to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do
so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with
the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the
administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because
the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not
contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that
the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them
in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to
avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did
not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the
present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he
solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when
in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have
notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and
failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry
where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered
is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible
for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are
merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees
which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers
that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial
Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever
alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is
liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts;
that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and
P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is
paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly
report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that
he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number
of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant
Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the
marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims
that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued
by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held
accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees
because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that
this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for
his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,
respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or
preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the
ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy
reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They
later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City
she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was
appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and,
since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to
sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use
thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the
Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications
for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has
the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no
hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that
the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8)
months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims
that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs.
Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt
therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond
has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money
14
was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been
shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited
with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk
of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt;
that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should
the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow
the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was
archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the
accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do
with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk
of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got
detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex
Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of
respondent judge, the former escaped and was never
recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was
archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated
April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he
never employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate
household help; and that he had to order the case archived
because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and
the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such
entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy
failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead,
she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate
Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick
leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees
from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00;
that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to
encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the
same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited
the same in her account; and that after the check was cleared,
she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other
P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive
Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his
Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with
the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the
same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and
exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry
and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which,
being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by
logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization
of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having
solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly
Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C),
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the
marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his
signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate
as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy
of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family
Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license.
The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with
them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already
started living together as husband and wife believing that the
formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not
have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign
the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both
the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of
the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized
the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon
explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage
and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the
mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be
photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage
as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was
already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of
the parties where the reception would be held was more than
twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The
fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract,
the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate,
do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the
marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the
testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among
others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage
license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony
up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4,
K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot
possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage.
One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he
was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person
whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It
would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself
to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that
Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in
fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B),
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage,
but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so
a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh.
AA).
15
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either
when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only
eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he
and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already before they got married as they
stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than
thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his
wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve)
been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was
his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties
who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have
an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed,
Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time
with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by
Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same
couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first
marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as
(a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not
follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the
marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license
already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not
marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the
marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first
marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license
was not required, why did he already require the parties to have
a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the
second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not
any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64
Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the
Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a)
copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
(Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed
joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario
testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did
not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage
license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they
did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told,
Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a
certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and
sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared
before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and
by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent
Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned
marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a
receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy
(Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage
of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage
license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why
did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered
that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p.
14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and
Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to
give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage
was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult
to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized
also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The
contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage
contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon
allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage
license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William
Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony
(Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his
affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have
been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter
his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and
their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened
to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His
purpose was to save his precious time as he has been
solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times
everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper
and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband and wife before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as
to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a
marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the
testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also
that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages
everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July,
1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending
cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole
month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992
shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the
whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits
of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
(Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits,
however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage
contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge
Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages
illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized
were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having
falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme
Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of
the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the
complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and
September, 1992 are concerned.
16
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H
to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only
six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by
official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the
alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six
(6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases
with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be
based on how many notarized documents were paid of the
notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in
the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying
and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports
because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the
records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because
he is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the
proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso.
Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174
SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo
whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties
she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out
the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-
23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter
as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the
data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because
as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p.
11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the
charge of falsification, however, also shows that respondent
Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees
received for those documents notarized during the month of July
and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also
sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she
did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and
that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond
deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to
have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the
documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September,
1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized
for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there
were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each
document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was
P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was
actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared
that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she
really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for
each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees
were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those
instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack
of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned
anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their
return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any
instance when solemnization fee was returned when the
marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn
over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It
was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of
Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the
functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of
legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did
not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July
and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees
supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any
memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that
she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the
personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs.
4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a
cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she
assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a
temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in
any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her
own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case
where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would
settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28;
12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy
opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March
26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One
Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash
bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself
the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around
one year and five months when she finally deposited it because
of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she
finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash
bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any
authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or
after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she
redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February
28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in
Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent
Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and
X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a
bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that
17
the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would
settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two
months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the
release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office
on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for
cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she
received. She further admitted that some of these temporary
receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts
such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93).
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the
official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February,
1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started
issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly
in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner
was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of
Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it
was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated
May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both
respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It
was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the
vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office
of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The
receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in
this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge
of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion
of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60
SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a
cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from
Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an
affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give
her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh.
N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not
show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the
hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt
for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them
escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide
this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by
Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this
particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled
People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused
Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and
placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0,
0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex
Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail
where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in
custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly
that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of
Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police of
Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in
Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without
basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against
the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service
for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4).
The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a
return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991
showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the
accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be
accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe,
were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order
for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was
supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true
that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the
case archived was because he heard from the police that Alano
escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano,
the former should have been required to explain in writing why
Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest.
It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case
should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this
case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is
another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano
might have really escaped while in his custody only that the
complainants could not present records or other documentary
evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected
filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted
in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees
received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal
account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on
February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil
cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount
of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The
complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended,
which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans
they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment
of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was
respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February
4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the
bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows
that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank
dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not
pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex
6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank
of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of
threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court
in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing
fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer
on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by
the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio
P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license,
and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his
18
duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of
the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992
where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months
were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized,
it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same
or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage
contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized
without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the
contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts
and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the
marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By
solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as
the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity
in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and
under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure
to comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in
the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly
the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs.
Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the
monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already
signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely
supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly
reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false
statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified
the monthly report of cases for the months of July and
September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents
notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she
received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to
account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly
not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for
unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which
were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara
on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and
for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on
March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her
possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing
said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29,
1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only
on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only
an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not
depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it
was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992
for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the
Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully
recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the
clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city
or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit
intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt
and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p.
136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum
Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental
deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of
any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of
the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally
violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and
functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross
neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case
of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC,
Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it
was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds
in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited
immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated
November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982.
Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine
she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty.
"Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and
serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the
service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct
and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must
be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of
its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms
of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised
Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction
to be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be
modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal
solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken
to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the
institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil
status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other
offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate
such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in
the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.
19
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00
on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern
warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and
furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 9 and 23.
3 Ibid., 86.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15,
1991, 202 SCRA 635.
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20,
1994.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended.
8 Article 4, id.
9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act
No. 3613.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with
Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated
23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized
her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief
Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for
appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
Administrator required respondent judge to comment. issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred imposed on respondent judge.
that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February
2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February We agree.
2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge
Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in
could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
acceded.
del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall
ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica
him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not and Burgos. We held that:
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance
the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date.
to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the
long as the requisites of the law are complied with.However,
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only
official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would
be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months
Camarines Sur. on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his
jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting
held that:
parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a
marriage license. He attributes the hardships and The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more
and negligence. than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent
in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
persons.[3]
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
conscience. solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out
2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license
of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
for violating the law on marriage.
nor Orobia claimed it.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that
Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
marriage.
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001,
a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his
of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
previous spouse.
undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one

20
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be
bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of
this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August
5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner
Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is
the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25,
2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as
follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at
the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of
Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to
petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek
(sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds
21
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the
bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688,
herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter
ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment
in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds
accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted
petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial
court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such
be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity
of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of
the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of
good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed
to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate
court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil
Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of
public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such
as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good
faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion
for lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent
observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since
the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage
and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never
married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not
petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in
good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent
is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The
crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the
Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and
lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit
the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage
is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no
account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith
because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
22
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of
criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements
of bigamy are present in this case. InMarbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not
been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that
during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil
Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into
by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990
in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned
from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. [24] The
records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two
were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage
is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least,
the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures
a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we
also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his
defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate
court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge
of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with
moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
[14]
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
[19]
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
[20] Supra.
[21] CA Rollo, p. 38.
[22]
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
[23]
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the

[1]
Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
and Edgardo P. Cruz.
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
[2] Records, pp. 114-119. irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
[24]
[3]
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Rollo, p. 54.
Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, [25] G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
dissenting. [26] Id. at 124.
[4]
Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for
emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their marriage contract.
Records, p. 10. THIRD DIVISION
[5]Theaccusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p.
1, reads:

That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of

Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this RESTITUTO M. G.R. No. 167746
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously ALCANTARA,
united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990
Petitioner,
and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did Present:
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage
and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Chairperson,

[12]
ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or CHICO-NAZARIO,
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared NACHURA, and
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings. REYES, JJ.

[13]Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
Promulgated:
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA
and HON. COURT OF

23
APPEALS, August 28, 2007

Respondents. 1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -x
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two
(2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
DECISION

3. To pay the costs.[11]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in
Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his
petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties
is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.[13]

A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner

against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the issues for resolution:
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8 when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and
December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of
in Tondo,Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise the marriage.
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
alleged marriage license, procured inCarmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133
for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license
Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract [5] and its
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
entry on file.[6]
when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable
Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals.(G.R. No.
127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage,
respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to
of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation,
protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter
named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner
has a mistress with whom he has three children. [8] Petitioner only
filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case We deny the petition.
for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with
marriage be denied for lack of merit. the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license
because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. [15] The
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in
rendered its Decision disposing as follows: CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized
the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go
to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them,
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows: neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The

24
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that
Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage
license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to
Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the
time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.[21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local
Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to
find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No.
3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as
to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar
of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held
that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
25
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage
license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of
the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued
on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took
place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage
license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects
a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating
the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz
of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed
in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor
of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December
8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita
A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.However, the presumption prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support
of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by
counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued
in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of
the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a
resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is
no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,
not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and In other words, you represented to the San Jose
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are Contract?
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of WITNESS
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
Yes your honor.
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.[31] COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same
marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
License is Number 7054033.
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. WITNESS
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage
license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, Yes your honor.[35]
this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a
the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of
willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the
the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil
7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our
wedding.[36]
conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties. Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared
before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
clean hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman
insists took place without the requisite marriage
shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed
license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
in the absence of any showing to the contrary. [37] Moreover, the
because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or
a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot
that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it
benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of
the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34] Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always
in favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
license. There is no claim that he went through the second weight.
wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the
is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
part of the petitioner.
dated 30 September 2004affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage
contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
SO ORDERED.
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as
follows Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
WITNESS
Manila
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary
SECOND DIVISION
document prior to the wedding.
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
COURT
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I
vs.
am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WITNESS
DECISION
I dont remember your honor.
CARPIO, J.:
COURT
The Case
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the
WITNESS Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The
Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of
marriage and they accepted it your honor. Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial
court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
COURT

26
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora)
guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena
Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond
Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the
crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA,
JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved
and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her
[sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly
consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO
O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora
assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of
not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino,
on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on
June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and
both the prosecution and defense entered the following
stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he
admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P.
Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the
Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated
December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s
resolution is whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case
was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective
testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she
was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said
hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife
and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi
Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005,
page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant
learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second
marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she secured a certification as to the civil
status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.
27
Upon learning this information, the private complainant
confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in
CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage
between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this
knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were
neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew
that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was
brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in
Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house
together with a friend and she heard everything that they were
talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return
to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income
opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she
declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had
entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that
because of what happened to her, her mother died and she
almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in
their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that
money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just
asked for the return of her money in the amount of P50,000.00
(TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the
marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding.
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private
complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena
P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the
private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a
confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted
that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still went on to
marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much
(TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein
assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two
(2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and
the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that
he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private
complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to
marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to
the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a
Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one
Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit
‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a
Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad
Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim
convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact
when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why
said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred
having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino
was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant
and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is
a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his
first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not
aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his
Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion
‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret
his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of
marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite
his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN,
January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is
the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of
the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and
authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He
alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad.
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’)
and after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January
10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He
was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his
development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for
a certification because of the filing of the instant case. On
October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it
is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since
January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document,
their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He
declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one
according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his
second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of
the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a
Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN,
October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim
convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the
same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim
also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat
them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first
marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second
marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with
the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry
Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage
celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim
(TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim
in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only
came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she
is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been
married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private
complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said
marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single.
She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their
marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her
husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also
claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim
convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in
accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations
of the private complainant that she was sought by the private
complainant and that they had a confrontation where she
admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to
the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on
to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that
she only came to know the private complainant when she (private
complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted
Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to
prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family Code, or
Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No.
28
1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one
wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he
can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and
polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the
permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a
second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because
having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged,
under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in
the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir,
1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any
Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages,
before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place
where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy
thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council
fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the
Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to
sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-
accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-
mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare
that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his
criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused
entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody
again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear,
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are
requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should
have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that
copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The
argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is
not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said
court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to
interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this
authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused
recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites.
However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence
that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The
evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the
allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private
complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open
to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when
she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in
Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing
near the door and heard their conversation. From this incident,
private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino
was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This
conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be
reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands
what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is
axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s
innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must
survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA
700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino
for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum
of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided
by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of
Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of
his temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal.
The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only
one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second
marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic
religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court
denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices
to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him
pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nollora’s two marriages
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should
apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court
denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The allegations in
the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s
earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate
court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6
April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the
appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, theabsent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.13
29
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14 (2) Nollora and
Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date
of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states
that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF
Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April
1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church
officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and
Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were
married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos
officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil
Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to
have been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M.
NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our
National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to
2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd Distri
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim
religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows
him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable
Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed
by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation,
except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the
property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be
perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied
with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least
two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage
(wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by
two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at
least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of
puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under
the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of
fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage
ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall
be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration
shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked
by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the
contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by
the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe
solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is
competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit
Court or any person designated by the judge, should the
proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the
solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the
Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any
other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower
may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before,
during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl)
shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court
according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states
that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive
Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall
apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither
is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according
to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora
cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his
civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage
contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or
falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage
certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy.
Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you
indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you
were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a
[M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a
[M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your
marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here
that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over
your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I
didn’t know why they did not place any Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with
respect to your marriage contract with your co-accused in
this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr.
Witness, considering that you said that you are already a
[M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage
contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then
keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-
Islam, that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that
the society doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another,
that’s why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you
indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness?
30
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier
married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that
your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already
as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so
we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after
that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you
required under your faith to secure the permission of your first
wife to get married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa
Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she
was very mad at me, at the start, she was always very mad,
ma’am.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the
validity of his marriage to Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not
impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors
to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30
September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the
accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1074 dated 6
September 2011.
**
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1066 dated
23 August 2011.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
7
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts

8Article 180. Law applicable. The provisions of the Revised On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios
Penal Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
person married in accordance with the provisions of this Code or, Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
before its effectivity, under Muslim law. Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

16 Exhibit "B," Records, p. 118. Also Article 2 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209 (1988).
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer.
17
Exhibit "A," Records, p. 117.
18 Exhibit "B," id. at 118.
19 Exhibit "C," id. at 119.
20 Id. at 195-198, 201, 206-207. Nollora presented various proofs
of his Muslim affiliation:
Exhibit "1" and submarkings - Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation
of the Philippines’ Membership Application Form accomplished in
handwritten form, dated 10 January 1992;
Exhibit "2" and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
dated 2 October 2004 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar
Madueño, President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines;
Exhibit "3" and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
dated 17 December 2003 issued by Abdullah M. Al-Hamid,
Director General of the Riyadh branch of the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia;
Exhibits "4," "12" and "13" - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
dated 17 December 2003 issued by the Civil Registry of
Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur; and
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage
as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer.
On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-
trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the
Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the
scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly
notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage
void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee
Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over
it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6

Exhibit "7" and submarkings – Nollora’s Pledge of Conversion The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
dated 10 January 1992 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
Madueño, President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
Philippines. enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
21 Supra note 8. the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
22
returned to the United States and never again communicated
TSN, 30 January 2006, pp. 11-12.
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00
23 TSN, 29 May 2006, pp. 6, 9-10. because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
24 467 Phil. 723, 744 (2004). purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
Republic of the Philippines inception.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration.
THIRD DIVISION The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
vs. bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent. citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

DECISION Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

31
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did
not understand the nature and consequence of getting married
and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and
for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to
acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage,
as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and
knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from
motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within
the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage
by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is
a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio
on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits.
This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as
"limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with
the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases.
It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
"This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires
the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not
"entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of
32
the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention
of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that
this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as
a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is
also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling.
In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order
to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to
marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay
in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all.
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter
what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent,
which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to
this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be
valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has
served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to
be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it
is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non
subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent
has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem
being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal
marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts
have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose"
marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular
purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid. 23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that
when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to
a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into
the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family
Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of
the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of
their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention
to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with
the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a
full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which
was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the
CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A
marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a
pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention
to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete
absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or
for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage
in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to
be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family
Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other
than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,
and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law,
it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go
33
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt
to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration,
it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground
of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife
of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or
deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of
evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail
to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in
their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not
be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as
easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29,
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic
Mario Victor F. Leonen per Special Order No. 1570 dated
October 14. 2013.
**
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad. Per Special Order No. 1554dated September 19, 2013.
1Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez. Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M.
Bato. Jr. and Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth
Division. Manila.
11Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
956. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S.
1953).
12
Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
956; citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying
annulment where parties married only to give a name to a
prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage
was to protect the girl’s name and there was an understanding
that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189
S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties
entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander
v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App.
June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband
to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage
because husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).
13Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage ; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132
CONG.REC. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc
Collum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
of 1986).
15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
16Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17
151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18
United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex.
1969), aff’d , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
20Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.
Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
28
Article 4, Family Code.
29Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200,
1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
30
Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v.
McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
31
Article 4, Family Code.
32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24,
2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as
provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.
269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that
Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met
Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-
in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he
was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of
the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told
of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that
the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for
a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License
filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in
favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR.

SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for

whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy

cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Republic of the Philippines
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification
SUPREME COURT
on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
Manila
counsel.8

34
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for
marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office
had not issued any other license of the same serial number,
namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a
minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He
testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9,
1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez
(Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual
wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of
the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the
bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January
8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding
ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by
the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary
Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed
Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila
City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before
the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their
house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days
later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the
marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She further
testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was
obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case
had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January
10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was
seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that
of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he
35
will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign,
which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and
Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on
June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed,
who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during
the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on
August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no
valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage
License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for
Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither
party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article
9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab
initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7,
2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL
AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER
AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE
OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus
held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed
the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties
had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed
only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against
him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid
and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1,
200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January
9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
36
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony.
Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family
Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not
a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The
RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The
CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license,
or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as
the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned
to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued. In the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including
the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the
civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued
a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite
diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification
used stated that no marriage license appears to have been
issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case,
the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear
in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically
stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is
a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown
that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty
of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located
and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a
copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for
the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity
and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses
she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as
none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of
the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas
Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted
not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying
for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have
testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the
marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of
Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of
Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of
the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
37
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been
issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure
to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote
the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of
Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of
appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well
as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife
and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was
born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years
before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by
him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10
January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and
in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and
perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding
ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence
of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to
Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he
seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does
not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license
cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
33Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.
51
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at
the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is
no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles,
the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before
the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo
mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio
or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before
the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary
steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting
parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding
article, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall
be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil
registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the
period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or
crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by
an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in
flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned
officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in
articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the
ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the
necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
38
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August
2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December
1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office
in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice
and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they
acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in
the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos.
8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to
Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered
in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally
left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court
for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and
Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside
from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction
which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of
her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28
February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September
2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused
to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the
case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor
ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated
21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982
and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of
Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case.
The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because
she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and
did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not
claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally
was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties
that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who
gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as
advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin
and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was
merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As
regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial
court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own
money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of
money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court
found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However,
the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of
Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and
Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his
conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because
she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying
Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s
share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is
further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the
thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila,
TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621,
194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628,
194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210,
206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto
E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan
are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to
delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven
(37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money
without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties
of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
39
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections
of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days
from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722,
respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of
these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681,
these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by
them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation,
partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be
further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of
March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and
counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the
Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds
in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with
Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial
court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly
granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of
Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made
at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and
Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next
hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her
other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin
failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his
prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted
the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s
marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally
rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the
Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to
him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were
acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to
the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of
a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present
clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his
inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be
solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand,
TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be
shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall
accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while
the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of
the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’
decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to
present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence.
Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she
and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there
were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the
scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned
Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case
would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled
hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed
on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding
the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of
the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of
her right to present her evidence because all the postponements
40
were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it
would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present
her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to
present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right
to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s
continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest
to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was
delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of
the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court
of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally
prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial
court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could
not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio.
Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her
evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To
prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to
consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as
his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was
the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated
that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his
family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there
was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and
Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the
informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973
was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was
valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita
Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that
only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did
not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further
testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The
certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if
indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the
marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission
for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III,
Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that
there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed
out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
"was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." 17 In
short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates
of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. 19 Benjamin
and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did
not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the
month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of
Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining
the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision
and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court
of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned
from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest
of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the
concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is
not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall
not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the
crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51
O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting
marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent
that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance,
be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the
marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid
marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
41
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were
given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court
even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the
decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No.
61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married
to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title
"married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to"
preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove
co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or
both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of
the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge
Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the
failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically
labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose,
in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently
explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case
for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her
evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge
Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the
decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally
or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would
justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and
the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October
2012.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 was issued by an Australian family court.
Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe with Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court
Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
12
Article 35 of the Family Code states:
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
21
Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning:
xxxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxxx
Article 21
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the
March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace
J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994
at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
42
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy
-- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he
had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending --
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. [14] The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15]The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the
case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and
Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather,
it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the
Family Code in this case.
4 specify the following:
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts.
11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no
more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law
allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (thelex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to
the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of
the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.These articles
read as follows:
43
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree
of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of
its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence
and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived
and worked in that country for quite a long time.Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts;
thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. [42] Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must
be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was voidab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types.The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree --
a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after
proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to
his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
44
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence
is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. [50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March
1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the
City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha
D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent:
(a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and
Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We
agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with
the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it
may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy,
as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[9]
The couple secured an Australian Statutory Declaration of their
legal separation and division of conjugal assets.
[17] RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
[18]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11,
2000, upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner,
signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for
respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and
Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999.
[19] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.
[20] 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.
[21]
Ruben F. Balane, Family Courts and Significant
Jurisprudence in Family Law, Journal of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.
[22]
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[23]
ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
xxxxxxxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
[24]Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29,
1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March
7, 1933.
[25]
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and
(6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987)
[26]
Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October
8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June
30, 1989.
[27] Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.
[28] Ibid., p. 143.
[29]For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private
International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C.
Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p.
16;
[30]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.
[31]Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil
Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.
[32]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
45
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.
[33]
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
[34]
Sec. 24. Proof of official record.The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-
551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-
134, May 6, 1988.
[35]The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original
copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN,
December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies
of the same documents were attached to the records (Records,
Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).
[36] TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[37]
TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[38]
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28,
1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10,
1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De la
Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14,
1998; Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
[39]
Art. 15, Civil Code.
[49]SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
[50]In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is
merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement
for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family
Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage
celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-
Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997
reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria
Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)
SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577
PHILIPPINES,
Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus-
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 21, 2005
CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case
No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result
of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was
afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in
1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in
46
1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines
and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years
since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent
Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim [4] with the RTC on 05
June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered
than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of
the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to
find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family
hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for
abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job
and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she
left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the
U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed
out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount ofP90,000.00 which
she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-
Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the
Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December
1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands
surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the
Orders[12]and Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus
for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to
have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05
October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to
present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
decision.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her
own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another man in another The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
country. provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or
she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
case in this instance.
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly

reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her
marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to
defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled
in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material
things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare
the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of
the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not
in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained
that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after
a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of

47
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already
become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
I and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions
of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid
down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological
incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed
48
down by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is
no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there
is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register
of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961;
and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest
son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer
to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such
a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.[28]
49
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that
hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the
family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her
American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless,
the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or
grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is
no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue
of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus
must still have complied with the requirement laid down
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause
of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that
its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact
date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984,
after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still
a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she
was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the
law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings
could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over
when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198
(1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State[37]
50
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority
of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General
to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal
to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will
be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of
the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity,
and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to
every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal- Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
SO ORDERED. at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
FIRST DIVISION to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380
it was denied.
Petitioner, In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER

ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
Present:
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies
Davide,to a C.J.,
Jr., valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to
- versus - (Chairman),
the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
Quisumbing,
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
Ynares-Santiago,
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
Carpio, and
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
Azcuna,wife
JJ. obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

Respondent. Promulgated:
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
October 5, 2005
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
x---------------------------------------------- Rules of Court provides:
----x
RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly
V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators
in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

51
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code,
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern
the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
52
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum,
that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be
a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized
as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review oncertiorari[2] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.[3] OnJanuary 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor,Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Republic of the Philippines Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Supreme Court Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree
on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration
Manila of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4,
THIRD DIVISION series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, dissolved (petition) with the RTC.Although summoned, Daisylyn
G.R. No. 186571
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
Petitioner, notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
Present:
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
CARPIO MORALES,
Gerberts.J., Chairperson,

BRION,

- versus - BERSAMIN, In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts
*ABAD, and
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
VILLARAMA, divorce
JR., JJ. decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. [9] Article 26
of the Family Code reads:
Promulgated:

DAISYLYN TIROL STO. August 11, 2010 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
TOMAS and The accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
SOLICITOR GENERAL, solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
Respondents. -- -
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

DECISION is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
BRION, J.:

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative

intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd

53
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to
the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling
unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as
there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in
the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
54
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20]and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the
law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.[24]Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of
no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his
or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage.No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for
its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the
RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of
a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared,
no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
55
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicataeffect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry
of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all
his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, orhis being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in
the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name
and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does
not, by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
56
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time
and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of LaoagCity, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January
2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found
in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was
in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based
its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is
"for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki
and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition
of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
57
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior,
pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore
the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108
is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for
divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final
decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where
the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2
of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that
the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the
petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may
be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of
jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court
to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with
the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays
for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to
sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the
RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together
with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x
x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required
under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the
same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the
Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x
x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case
be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The
Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of
bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if
he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that
the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous
marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry
as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore
be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
40
Bayadog which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara also
denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the
other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
58
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her
and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific,
a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal
of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However,
the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international
law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction
of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section
48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The
rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and
a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as
a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which
are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
59
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also
no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further
to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution
and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior
spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting
and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated,
the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested
in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage
and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in
the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the
civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus,
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil
registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic
v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure
to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino
spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
60
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of
the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available
to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity"
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment,
i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition
of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition
of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94
of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer
sees the need to address the questions on venue and the
contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56
Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3 See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009,
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela
Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated
by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see
rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.
5FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as
amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
7 The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
and WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court. The
RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the
Sheriff’s Trust Fund.
8 and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and
Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall
allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of
the parties and specify the regime governing their property
relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between
the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for
spousal support, custody and support of common children,
visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
61
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against
forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by
counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation,
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
9
(Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).
10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The
following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
xxxx
12 Rollo, p. 56.
13FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
14 Rollo, p. 68.
15 Enacted 26 November 1930.
16CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
17
Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil
officers and priests or ministers authorized to solemnize
marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract
solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit
specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the
duty of the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the
local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and
address of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the place
addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and
relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person
or persons who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full
name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be
recorded the names of the parties divorced or whose marriage
was annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other
details as the regulations to be issued may require.
18
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition. – x x x
xxxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against
forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by
counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation,
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the
"Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor
General stated:
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed
to comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully
prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further
proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise
prayed for.
46
Id.
47 Supra note 33.
48 Supra note 33 at 655.
49 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official
record. — The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. —
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order,
is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and
62
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
50See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also
Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.
51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52
Id., Sec. 6.
53 Id., Sec. 9.
54
Id., Sec. 11-15.
55 Id., Sec. 17-18.
56 Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.
57
Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene
Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 386.
60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
61
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as
the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and –
in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and
quietness.’" (Citations omitted)
62 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity,
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries." (Citations omitted)
63
43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628
SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
65 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
66Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is
established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall
be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments
of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h)
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j)
changes of name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
68 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.
69 FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.
70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71
See supra note 69.
72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x x."
73 FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.
74CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75 Emphasis supplied.
76
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349.
Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
77See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(1997), 518.
78
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
xxxx
79 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. —
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest.
80
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81 Supra note 25.
82 Supra note 25.
83 See supra note 68.
84
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and
in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of
the spouses and the custody and support of their common
children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the
parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It
63
shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44
shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings
for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court
renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public
prosecutor. — (1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties
and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall
state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their
respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days
from receipt of a copy of the report The court shall set the report
for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the
court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the
public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
93 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules
of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x
x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension
shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL &
PEPITO NIAL, JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February
19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that
the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve
the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito
G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. [2] Hence,
this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
64
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct."
It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no
legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as
an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State. [11] This is why the
Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which
is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. [15] To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation
of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. [17] The
Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known
to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in
that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
after his death?
65
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as
to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas
a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first
can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before
its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage
was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. [24] "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like
a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except
in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For

other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void"
in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
[1]
The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998
issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court
(RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendants motion to dismiss is hereby granted and
this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p.
6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2] Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3] Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4] Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
[5] Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be
solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely
given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
[7]
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages
shall be void from the beginning:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character.
xxxxxxxxx
[8]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
[9]
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10]
Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.
R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256
SCRA 158 (1996).
[11]
Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
[12]
Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal or family life. x x x.
[13] Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
66
[14]
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license
shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
[15] Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16]
Rollo, p. 29.
[17]
Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18,
Family Code.
[18]
Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years."
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years"
[19] Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[20]
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party
whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within
five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent
or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any
time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane
spouse, who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any
relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane,
at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the
injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the
injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE
R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge
Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four
children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3]When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment
that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and
Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.What
he knew was that the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage,
as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to
harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating
his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his
earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to
two separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao,
which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon
his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since
their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those
affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to
apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that
he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he
had found no legal impediment to their marriage. [6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
67
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact
of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make
the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
he would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from
their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who
have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This
holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as
in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit
of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge
to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment
of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the
law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The
maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And when
the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator
is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount
of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until
properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted
for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.
They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar,
the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple
got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named
Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent
has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial
court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and
Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that
their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated
by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to
her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred
that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he
has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid
because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However,
it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave
abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and
conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when
the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule
that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared
that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the
parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last
time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage
of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in
actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of
proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but
it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings
before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the
marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
68
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly
annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was
celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a
false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent
never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit
should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues
that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting
attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for
support and not an action for annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that
the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their
marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in
the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to
institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another
case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and
parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and
anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner claims that
in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his
vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate
child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a
mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage
cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner
was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their
sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the
challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and
void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that
courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for
support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented
during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a
marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid. 17 In addition, the OSG
agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial
court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void"
in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it
is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two
marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the
validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas
a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself
in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is
to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant’s name for a marriage license.26 In the instant case,
there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment,
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.28
69
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the
father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax
exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque,
Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of
the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the
petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but
also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner
at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel
to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner
became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though
invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was
merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures
taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3,"
"C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2,"
"F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3").
In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is
seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in
another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in
the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16
October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2Captioned Annabelle Assidao–De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B.
De Castro.
3
The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC,
presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
23 Family Code, Art. 4.
24
Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which
provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
25 TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.
26
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE
REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.
27 Family Code, Art. 175.
28
Family Code, Art. 172.
In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as
examples of "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws:" (a) the baptismal certificate of the child ; (b) a
judicial admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the
child is entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e)
admission by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated
24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife
for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to
his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to
her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three
folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be
released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them
killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at
the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
70
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on
24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the
release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was
[sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to
be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a
ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied
by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when
he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of
assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after
he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be
sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of
emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was
residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he
really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
[sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that
his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s
action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered
the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit.
The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that
the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment
of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in
the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed
beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of
Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the
action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article
87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party
was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced
by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud
and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose
in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within
which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was
only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment
of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion
that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized
under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded
that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by
Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that
the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to
the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity
of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the
dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza,
the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting
parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’
marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular,
Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is
RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void
ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling
of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
71
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled
as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation
of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May
2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before
this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August
2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO
FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal
by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in
order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of
nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose
and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners
Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the
claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is
the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the
essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that
as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that
the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1)
Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988,
indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a
72
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale
for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To
wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission,
is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions
to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that
the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority,
and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with
no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had,
since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum
requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved
in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under
Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with.
It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as
one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. 43 The
Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The
appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only
in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already
well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this
case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in
Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still
needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa
actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage
will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 53 To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow
an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
73
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the
Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law.
The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of
one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that
Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose
and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding
Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August
1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated
sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached
except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a
void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
PRESBITERO J.
DANTE O. TINGA*
VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice
Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness
Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez
as Acting Chairperson.
**
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as
additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate
Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada,
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No.
179474), pp. 156-161.
2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1-8.
5 Court;
The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration
of the parties’ marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was
37.
6The Administrative complaint before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.
7 Id. at 257.
8 Id. at 313-323.
9 Id. at 323.
10 Id. at 321-322.
11ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party
whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within
four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as
the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or person having
legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age
of twenty or eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the
spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of
the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane
spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time
before the death of either party;
74
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party,
within four years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party,
within four years from the time the force or intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party,
within eight years after the marriage.
12 Records, p. 322.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of
a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds
for action for the annulment of marriage.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of
Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination,
church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92;
and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and
consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74
and 75.
18
ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits
of the written authority granted him by his church or religious sect
and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs
to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned
in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case
provided in Article 10.
26
377 Phil. 919 (1999).
27
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
28ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the
Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or
justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character.
30People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G.
4079, 4082.
31The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires
the following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the
contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.
32Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.
33
Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
34
Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated
(1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.
35
In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court
articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which
is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement."
36 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage
license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to
marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons from legalizing
their status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
37Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties
as an "Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who
Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least
Five Years."
38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).
75
39
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363
Phil. 130, 137 (1999).
40
Id.
41
Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25
November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
42
The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other x x x."
43
Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
44Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-
4143), 15 April 1999.
45 Id. at 159.
46First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No.
166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.
47Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30
September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
48 Id.
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).
50 Id.
51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family
in case of unlawful aggression.
52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
53
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
54Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998);
Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil.
96, 108 (2000).
55 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on
the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If
the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting
for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage
license, and they will also be criminally liable." Article 76 of the
Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,
situated in the Bo. of
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO, Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty
One (13,441) square meters.
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.

SANDOVAL CARLOS or

FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.

Parcel No. 3
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:

CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008
x----------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond
for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are
unveiled as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-
325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion
of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4
by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-
B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to
2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ.
METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090,
being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE
METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd.
de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y
Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They

left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case
No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd.
De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con
la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la
Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el
punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la
Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes.Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver
and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.

Parcel No. 2

76
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now reconveyed to him.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCTNo. 139058
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs of suit.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is

now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and
210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in
the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of
said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter
portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They
denied the material averments of petitioners complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage
to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of
the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated
as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary
judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing
the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that
there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise
agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in
August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary
judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las
Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-
respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. [5]

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa

submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity RTC and CA Dispositions
of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as
follows:

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between

his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)
view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
(petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he

entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;

77

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff
the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at
the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully
paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in
the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June
7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling
the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo
II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
78
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment
by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced
in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who
first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify
the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to
recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on
summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage.
The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the
desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and
101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition
for summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees
own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their
marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call
for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule
19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to
be.Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant
Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We
are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the
same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the
merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary
evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take
place, neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject
marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage,
it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be
said of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of
the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of
the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the
same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II
was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what
could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putativefiliation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding
the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when
considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years
of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his
name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial
court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial
on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. [8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and
for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following
issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners
Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof,
with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different
from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court;
79
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1,
Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the
pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on
ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of
the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage
may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity
of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely
within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court.Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases
of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity.The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which
took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct
the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner
shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations
of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity
or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested
the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of
the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the
parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for
the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it
that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if
there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to
make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before
the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits
to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the
Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression
of evidence.[16]
80
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a
right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. Therationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed
by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the
sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who candecide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of
their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends
only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional
rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15,
2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held
inEnrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962.Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an
action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to
be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.[25]Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court
Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as towho can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog,the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount
of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and
child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs,
to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
of
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory
heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does
not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
81
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding
to the estate of the decedent.The presence of legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be
the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
would then have apersonality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II
is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the
widowpursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceasedbrother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner
to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to
ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper
interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found
to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not
inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage
is called for. But the RTCis strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is
proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased
brother of petitioner.
82
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need
to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other
causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling
of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. [36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article
167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a
child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.(Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate
status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for
causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property,
and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage
in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard
to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity ornullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED toDISMISS the action for nullity
of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the
merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting
later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On
18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last
long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the
frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending
a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America
to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in
July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly
been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed
a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
83
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,
Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in
sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not
lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of
judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack
of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and
yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one
but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code,
the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said
that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way
of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage
but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that
it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in
the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of
the consequence of marriage.
84
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity
of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect
in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when
there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that
it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable"
has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is
incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on
if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations,
the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from
the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting,
they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it
and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted
by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
85
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck,
the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be
the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal
terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability
to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to
the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver
the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted
by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who the property relations during the marriage within the limits
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
actively promote its total development.
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
involved. foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook answers to every individual problem.
II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. SO ORDERED.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of

marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug Republic of the Philippines
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should SUPREME COURT
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for Manila
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the SECOND DIVISION
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity. G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article
1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against
her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision

86
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at
the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,
that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March
15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still
very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it
can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
87
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he
is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant
on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the
admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings
and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have
been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not
want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is
no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that
he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth.
We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons
88
for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record
to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is
nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is
no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a
claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed
with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves
to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife
was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go
to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim.
This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations
of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard
to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and
which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost
ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed
any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed,
no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven
self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In
the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner
and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage
is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
89
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based
on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present
case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled —
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985
at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws
on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of
the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
90
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr.
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting
and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends
of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions
during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they
followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
91
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.
MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.
Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initiopursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles
126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and
52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties'
children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children,
their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights
of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1).Out of
their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined
the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit
which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation
when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures
that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure
to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would
even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus,
for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling
"magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she
would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put
up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October
16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already
living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children
left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for
their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad.After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after
them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
92
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan,
the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive
to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records,
pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity
had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also
be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225
of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations
must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial
evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not
alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly,
there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental
- not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set
aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for
a declaration of psychological incapacity.Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage
should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that
under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other
sources of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to
such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code [9] were laid
down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
93
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce
law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this
[12]
"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any
of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner
to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child
by nature or by adoption."
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
94
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court
of Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was
ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on
September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born
on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be
an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-
marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security
Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two
children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country,
Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the
two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9,
1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was
effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper
of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did
not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. [7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that
she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found
him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant
display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between
the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil
and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that
I persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THEMOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted
by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of
the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.More specifically,
does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
95
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude
the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
helpful or even desirable.[13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case,
respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known
the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof.[14] It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception
of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church
rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation under Article 55[17] of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner
and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with
the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even
desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably,
there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect
of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’
penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage
with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The
two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In
a handwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for
the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married
to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office
in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that
he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in
Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
96
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED,
AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL –
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE
FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR
(sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense,
in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to
Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues
that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent,
and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986,
which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila
City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2)
a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12,
1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both
these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have
no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro
and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage
contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as
the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and
that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3,
1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a
positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage
ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of
the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the
self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against
this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,
and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that
the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify
the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting
his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National
Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated
October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of
the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas
was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy
was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
97
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing
between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for
bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
character of this special contract between spouses, and punish
an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of
the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry
before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may
contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity
of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the
presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime
of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a
deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special
contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When
an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s
criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico
Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting,
while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage
with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that
since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been
declared void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior
marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the
subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding
were it not for its being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second
marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute
a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is
required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People
vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised
Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in
Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void
marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal
case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the
Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have
98
been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are
bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In
contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the
second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously
contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent,
can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this
ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed
that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked
"on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime
of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs.
Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one
of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent
marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement
has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs.
Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to
adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is
just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be
considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the
Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised
penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by
itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to
reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with
those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply"
with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely
distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the
essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal
capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of
consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of
a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks
of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid
until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the
Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void
marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate
similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as
I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses’ rights and
obligations, property regime and successional rights would
continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and
until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two
reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground
for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches
neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid
marriages;10and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of
marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license,
mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of
relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however,
being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. 11 It would
have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a
marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for
apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon
Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears
to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter,
it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It
might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further
amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute
nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the
effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the
effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year
period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by
the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant
to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact
that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains,
for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first
been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent
marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning
the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue
much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior
"voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a
prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for
bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other
than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in
a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. 12 The Court
has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it
must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent
marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were
it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established
that the second marriage has been contracted without the
necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely
forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal
liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like
instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required
for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the
perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered
into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can
unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does
not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or
formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of
nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that
ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a
criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of
a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate
the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses
but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the
marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of
the offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
Footnotes
24Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993
Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
25Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full — or half-
blood.
26Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
99
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
27
Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R.
No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
28 Family Code, Art. 54.
8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for purposes of
remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that
the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance,
no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when
either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that
verily results in a "no" marriage situation or when the prior
"marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
10
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a,
55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
(n)
11One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than
psychological incapacity merely renders a marriage voidable, not
void.
 G.R. No. 164435 On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
Present: dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
(Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at
Chairperson, the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
VELASCO, JR.,
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged
NACHURA, and marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).

PERALTA, JJ. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No.
99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
Respondent.

September 29, 2009

xxxx
x----------------------------------------------
----x

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on

October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil
DECISION Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed

PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated
July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional,
as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the
following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this
case, such as the nullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy
and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is
being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 99-93582.

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA

S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows: Costs against the accused.

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo,
and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which
marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during
arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are
as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were
married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico
C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1,
H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same
court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of
the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both
Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage
license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about
her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in
toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that
petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to
Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the
court.This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The
CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a

100
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a
Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and
1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final
and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July
8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied
reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent declaration of
nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences,
among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. [5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER
TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE
OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF
VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT
IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related,
shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of
the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter,
was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC
denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her
101
arguments.In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically
stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and
in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on
the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.
People,[8] where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted
cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of
the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had
not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy
make any difference.[10] As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizesthe
mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.[11]
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is
punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25
of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides
that [c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents x x x .
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as
far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that
time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged
to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing
to establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for
petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent
upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy
already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that
petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support
her allegation. Petitionerstestimony that her own mother told Uy
in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does
not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating
evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person
who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to
Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act
which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive
period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents], as opposed to being
counted from the date of registration of the bigamous
marriage.[15] Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the
period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is,
therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an
erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to
the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to
determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[16]
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on
petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years
imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within
the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period,
102
which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.Again, the trial court
correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that
petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final
judgment[17] to be void ab initio on account of the latters
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to
reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21,
2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are
hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in
all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August
20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated
August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband
Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started
a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from
her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he
was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on
July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to
effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted
the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics
Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the
afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability
of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two
months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with
them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a
social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to
suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and
103
worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family
life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required
under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able
to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to
perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to
comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his
family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated
simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month
after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several
letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but
did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
104
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence
was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need
for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through
an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present
case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale,
dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial
court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner
was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of
the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent
church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog,
Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a
child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months
later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage
to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still
subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was
neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent
affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not
a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted
the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that
Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus,
she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but
told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the
extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.
When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he
separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
105
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant
lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the
basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner
was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed
her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner
because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching
her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and
had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for
two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of
Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She
told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon
show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written
by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic
matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner,
and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she
supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for
a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of
tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence
and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost
anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world
of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to
her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due
discretion on the part of the parties.37During the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s
ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by
the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the
RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the
veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the
appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient
to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of
petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has
yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was
handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse
was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous
on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room
for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did
not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
106
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The
concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting
marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with
such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married,
among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for
divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration
was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity
was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the
Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable
marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage
void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a
vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The
initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,
both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have
given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of
his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of
Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article
45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time,
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological
incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through
Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability
to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same
time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision
ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that
the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this
case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first
in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is
but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee
had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages
already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of
Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is
hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article
36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon
law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent
judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is
merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this
Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower
courts.76
107
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common
legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also
falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of
what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1
and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do
not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the
present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the
Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement
however was dispensed with following the implementation of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
108
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to
the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s
participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed
binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently
establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving
the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any
event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as
credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in
the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to
petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were
further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided
to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes
towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards
the person, and it is also something that endangers human
relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our
thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s]
their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if
you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as
this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of
the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the
marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza,
who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and
ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say
about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is
paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if
carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie
every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme
is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and
if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair
with different women, then that is pathological and we call that
paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be
considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only
the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that
respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie
[and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the
physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology
utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their
medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s
common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity
hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as
the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from
her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health,
her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
109
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a
position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up
letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the
parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before
the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that
any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic
on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable
to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the
essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family
Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46
which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this
case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult
to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take
into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was
made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s
efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without
the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and
Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting
a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient
evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived
at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet,
we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling
the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn
from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed
such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter
would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this
score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not
testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
110
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded
that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s
condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the
experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and
the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997
and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of
canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the
doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer
to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations
that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months
before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained
silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was
incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the
incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an
action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required
a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed
by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot
be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was
no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their
expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this
case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this
case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since
the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC
more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence,
we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing
as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her
persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides
these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization
of a desire of people in love to live together.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals, id. at 39-
41.
THIRD DIVISION
DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 1648

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Petitioner, Present:

RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the
Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. YNARES-SAN
SO ORDERED. - versus - Chairperson,
93 "A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of CHICO-NAZAR
nullity to the effect that the respondent may not enter into another
marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal, in EDUARDO J. NAJERA, VELASCO, JR
deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of
matrimony, as well as for the protection of the intended spouse."; Respondent. NACHURA, an
rollo, p. 97.
PERALTA, JJ.
101 "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase Promulgated:
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses July 3, 2009
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
----x
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook DECISION
II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to PERALTA, J.:
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A.
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article Family Code.
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The facts are as follows:
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
Gains.[1]
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

111

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents
of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the
United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January
31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew
the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan. [2] They are
childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following
facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial
Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He
did not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on
petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder
brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job
as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give
petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her
own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from
nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he came home
from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and
falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took
to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it.When
she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words
against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived
home, he was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage
in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he quarreled
with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home
drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was
quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted
physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a
bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she
sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She
was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the
Bugallon Police Station.
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their
personal belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was
anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be
issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be
rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance
with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative,
decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant
to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the
forfeiture in
112
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties
pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4)
granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion
of petitioner to effect service by publication as provided under
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer [3] wherein he
denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that
petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very
low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject
house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and
money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award
of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys
fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled
hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the
pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally
their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R.
Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting an
investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the
parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case was held on November
23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the
following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R.
Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon,
Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was
working as an accounting clerk in a government agency in
Manila. She and respondentmarried on January 31, 1988 as
evidenced by their marriage contract.[6] At the time of their
marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed
as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial
Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00. It
was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a
seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30,
1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave
petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at
work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after
three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled
with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another
man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana
and every time he went out of the house and returned home, he
was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that
respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot
out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on the
lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party
by the boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent, however, did
not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived
home at around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party,
the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but
he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the
kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the
party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the
one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her,
causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her eyes,
she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill
her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm,
causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her
body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got
nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in
the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out
and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the
motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez
Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus
and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She
alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic
of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours,
she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called
for her parents who were residing about 300 meters away. She
then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in
order to open the door. She found that their personal belongings
were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card
and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of
Bugallon, Pangasinan.[11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his
mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that
he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment
from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while
respondents parents were separated. Respondents brothers
were also separated from their respective wives.[13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the
annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological
incapacity of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed
petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She confirmed
her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE
INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with
psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family
background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and
separated from Respondents father. This turn of events left an
irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic
and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of
a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his
mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior
towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings
and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to
113
resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as
the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV),
Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as
marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras
psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation,
aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult
life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and
marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and
the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior
across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the
light of these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be
annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of
Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties
and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability
of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage
was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of
the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
whichpossibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality
disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received
a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house
under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without
provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The
complaint was entered in the police blotter.[17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed
only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not
the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna
Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the
petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide the
same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.[20]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary
to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set of facts
established by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial
court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by
the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion
of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in Psychology.[21]
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners
evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause
of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is his
dysfunctional family background. With such background,
respondent could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
114
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence --
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." [24] The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. [25] In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What
is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates
conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not
based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent;
thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28] Moreover, the
trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with
certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates
testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a
borderline personality disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time
of the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents
family] background, there was strong basis that respondent
developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondents family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report
which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
115
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is
minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have
not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana
habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline
personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence
presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause
for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30]only
and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her
counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on
February 11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was
promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the
Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, thus:
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation
Petitioners argument is without merit. people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what
apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is x x.
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004when it
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of
same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that Evidence states:
petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal specified.
dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on
February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear
a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence,
ascertaining their truthfulness.
trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs.
First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the
have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a judgment of the Trial Court.[31]
domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he
Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of
depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends,
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third
talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was
paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her
reads:
paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage,
he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he
came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her
with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation. Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the
confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under
Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature,
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the
that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095
Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz
which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second
(member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the
accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were
never presented before said Court. As to the contents and
veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However,
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x
x x.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having

116
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the
confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under
Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is
similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court,
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is
not based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004,
and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and
February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris.
The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount
to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and
the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that
there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
117
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in
toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already present at the inception of the
marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's
testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's
psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she
arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that
there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse
integral element in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of
merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for
failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed
any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. 7 The Court
required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to
comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the
OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. 9 Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of
the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in
the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of
marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence
showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady.
To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not
all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was
happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent.
In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent
could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational.
Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x
x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant
type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such
mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x
x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive
and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of
his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But
this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's
parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse
integral element" in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with,
the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise
failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or
mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these
omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that
upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the
marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on
whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage
void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and
appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however
118
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is
not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to
be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the
petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario,
J.J., concur.
FN:
21
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
22Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
23Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
24
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
25
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below
twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with
the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court’s
ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician
should examine the person to be declared psychologically
119
incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition."2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a)
Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated
April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915,
entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras,
Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo
J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City,
a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613.
She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in
one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a
father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and
testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then
a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City.5He courted her,
frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964,
convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their
wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages
in Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao
for their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at
her parents’ house. It was their residence for three (3) years until
they were able to build a house of their own. 9 For the first five (5)
years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their
children because he shouldered his sister’s
schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all
their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and
store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend
time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning.
Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during
lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their children’s well-
being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while
Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not
heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the
latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop.15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to
the United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their
two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to
the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other
businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a
profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a
conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the
municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free
of charge.
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of
maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last
straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that
after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby
girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s
deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar
examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her
store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they
became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married.
However, it was postponed because her family demanded a
dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mother’s
signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut
land in favor of Rosa.20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the
slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged
profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were
able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store,
establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage
transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal
property and that he and Rosapersonally signed the renewal of
a sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa’s
attitude after her return from the United States. She became
detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s
businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her
"new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely
pretended that their relationship was blissful.24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened
that they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their
children’s tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting
them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3)
months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he
immediately returned to the Philippines.25
He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice
and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to
provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times
he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of
income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of
embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She
did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she
retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern.27 This was further
aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his
vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching
is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did
not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after
Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal
assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there
was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; 30 and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that
the relationship between the parties started well, negating the
existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time
of the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the
declaration of nullity of their marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment
against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same
charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision
finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank
documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He
was suspended from the practice of law, thus:
120
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in
bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges
of immorality andabandonment of his own family, the penalties
to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be
spread in respondent’s record as an attorney, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court
promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards
required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that
Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently
explained by the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record – first,
the income which supported their children came from the
earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from
Rosa’s industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to
his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that
derived from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from
their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as
such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although
unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justo’s alleged
infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x
x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s inability to offer
the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in
violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina. 34 Thus,
she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333
for disbarment are conclusive on the present case.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary
factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Court’s
pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
She states that she could have presented an expert to prove the
root cause of Justo’s psychological incapacity had she been
required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with
Justo be annulled on the bases of the Court’s conclusive factual
findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case
to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest
of due process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present
case is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from
A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein
are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was
conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the
bases of pleadings and documents.
The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the following three
(3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333
are conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception
of expert testimony on the root cause of Justo’s alleged
psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading
of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason
to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that
her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find
that even if we assume Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family
home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is
unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the
marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity.
These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must
assume and discharge as a married person. While they may
manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity,
they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his
acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily
show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking
the basic obligations of marriage in the future.36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying
Rosa’s motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme
Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her husband,
namely, appellee’s falsification of documents to obtain loans and
his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively
establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as
far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities
in appellee’s character in our earlier judgment. However, as
we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such
eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent
incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the
rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article
36.37
Clearly, Rosa’s insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No.
5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present case is
unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to
presume the existence" of Justo’s depravities, however, even
doing so could not bring about her (Rosa’s) desired result. As
Rosa’s prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court
to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No.
5333.38Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges
in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension
of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are also
sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the
disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.39 The Court’s exposition in In re Almacen40 is
instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest
is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
121
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does
not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice
versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is
why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s
charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer,
however, they may not establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the
disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground
of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is
whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-
existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party
from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the
following discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude
that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall
short of what is expected from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological
incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set
forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that
the above Guideline does not require that the respondent should
be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is
important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided,
the Court backtracked a bit when it held inRepublic v.
Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed
complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on
the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003,
geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert
opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of
the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically
explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert
opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root
cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations
indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that
the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine
in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is
no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in
a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established
by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v.
Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife
sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated
November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision, applying
theGuidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this
Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have
retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and
not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper
application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her
case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal.
The Court declined to remandPesca51 on the premise that
the Santos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law
as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim – ‘legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet’ that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of ‘lex prospicit, non replicit.’
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that
the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy,
and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to
the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient
evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.
122
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Court’s consideration is whether the
totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the
dissolution of the marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of
the State’s policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution
mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been
enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union,
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law,
this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the
validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its
validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in
heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature
and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved
spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the
interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main grounds in
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are
his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of
her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to
support the children, andabandonment of the family. Both the
courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue.
However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the
evidence sufficient to support Rosa’s charges of sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S
SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau
of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap
Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the
questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the
questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and
other related instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and the same person.
123
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA
YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person.
(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of
the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the
questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras
were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were
the same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to
negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural
Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the
presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so
authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have
to falsify his wife’s signatures in the bank loan documents? The
purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact
to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-
statements of his children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his
deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing
Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete
City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit
affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against
Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children,
are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing
that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In
other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show
that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a
good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The
early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious.
Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother
to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family
home and acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to
be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care
of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the
passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their
relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been
the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by
the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to
his failure to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law
practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as
well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted
his ego and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at
the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the
latter years when these events took place; their two children died;
he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law
practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case
only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s
"defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why
the marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife
who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this
Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment
do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing
of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the
marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at
its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which
produced four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment
do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s inability to
conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court
ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in
the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this
Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her
husband, married an American and had a family by him, which
she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these
acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not
satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or
mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of
marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from
the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his
wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do
not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 59 As this Court
repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity,
and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of
the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosa’s
plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
124
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
60
Supra, footnote 2, citing:
Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. (109a)
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)
Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of
the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties. (111a)
Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right
and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management
shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
(115a)
61Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of
the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner
to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
FIRST DIVISION
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 16, 2008
x----------------------------------------------
-----x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeks to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision [1] and
September 24, 2004 resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M.
Santos-Halili[3] were only 21 and 19 years of age, respectively,
when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila.
After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective
parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship
nonetheless.
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner
stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with other women.
It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him
to stop dating other women as he was already a married man.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations to
respondent.[4] He claimed that he thought that the wedding
performed at the City Hall of Manila was a joke and that the
marriage certificate he signed was fake. He also pointed out that
he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife and
never consummated the marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
held that, taken in totality, the evidence for petitioner failed to
establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The same was denied. Hence, this petition.
The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner suffered from
psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from
complying with his essential marital obligations.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage
with respondent.[5] He failed to discharge the burden.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a
psychological report written by Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a
clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained
therein.
125
According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a
personality disorder characterized as a mixed personality
disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent personality
disorder brought about by a dysfunctional family background.
Petitioner's father was very abusive and domineering. Although
petitioner and his siblings were adequately supported by their
father, a very wealthy man, they lacked affirmation. Because of
this, petitioner grew up without self-confidence and very
immature. He never really understood what it meant to have a
family, much less to be a husband. According to Dr. Dayan, this
was very much evident in petitioner's impulsive decision to get
married despite having gone steady with respondent for only six
months.
Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential marital
obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife.
They also never consummated their marriage. Furthermore, they
constantly fought. Their separation was inevitable as they were
both immature. Dr. Dayan then abruptly concluded that
petitioner's psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his
immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as
testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted
sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. [6]
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[7] we ruled that the psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
does not equate to psychological incapacity. [8] Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
petitioner's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations, [9] had to be
shown. In this, petitioner failed.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and
respondent had difficulty getting along with each other as they
constantly fought over petty things.[10] However, there was no
showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological
disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere
statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report.
The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his
expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner's
alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about
his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent
never lived together as husband and wife. This, however, fails to
move us considering that there may be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, a married couple might have to
live separately though the marital bond between them
remains.[11] In fact, both parties were college students when they
got married and were obviously without the financial means to
live on their own. Thus, their not having lived together under one
roof did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of
them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner
himself admitted that he and respondent continued the
relationship after the marriage ceremony. It was only when they
started fighting constantly a year later that he decided to file a
petition to have the marriage annulled. It appears that petitioner
just chose to give up on the marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26,
2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424

The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review
Petitioner, under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution
upholding the validity of the marriage.
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his
CORONA,
argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,* null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He
stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the
findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
PERALTA,** JJ.
psychologically incapable of complying with the essential
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI obligations of marriage.

and THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, We grant the motion for reconsideration.

Respondents. Promulgated:

June 9, 2009 In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the
Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the
x---------------------------------------------- provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
----x declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.: Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article

36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. [5]
2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness
review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The
revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality
petition sought to set aside the January 26,
disorder. Thus:
2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the
Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his
marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on
the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it
was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as
husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they
started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner
decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other
women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling
him to stop dating other women as he was already a married
man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that
the marriage was not fake.
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews
which you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings
[and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder.
It is a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality
disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is
brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He
also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a
marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from
psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of
marriage?

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed
personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating
personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners
personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly
affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and
void.[3]
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very
questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he
understood what it meant to really be married and after the
marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual
intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three
months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and
afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he
never thought it was a really serious matter at all.

xx xx xx

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented

126
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili
and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary
judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which]
they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision
that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly
considered themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you
able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are
suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a
residence, they never consummated the marriage. During the
very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and
so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each
other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent
and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-
esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually
bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make
everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such
as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.
In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners
dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended
on them for decisions.[9] Petitioners mother even had to be the
one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what
action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was
for real.[10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons
suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner
typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-
defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other
people to take advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the
way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father
who treated his family like robots [12] and, later, by respondent
who was as domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could
no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred to
hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he
wanted to end their marriage.[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his
dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
127
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological
incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is
dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very domineering.
The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had
affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support
because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never
an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically
robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-
confidence, very immature and somehow not truly
understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant
to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality
disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time
of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. [16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case,
recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may
be long-term.[17]Particularly, personality disorders are long-
standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe
mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living.These disorders
affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
others.[18]
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders
him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court
and the January 26, 2004 decision andSeptember 24,
2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158
dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO
Chairperson,
 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondent,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Oppositor. Promulgated:
February 13, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x warned the latter not to leave Rowena. [7] At one point, Edward
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a
clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats
this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current
jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective
by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form
and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19,
2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of
respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close
friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when
petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood
one another and developed a certain degree of closeness
towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At
first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they
left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their
travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. [4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they
decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was
that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to
get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two
then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was
treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that
they should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested
that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their
own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got
mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that
Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas
uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from
Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for
him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by
his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11,
2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon
City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized
the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male
adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMAComputer College last 1994
and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated
from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my
office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
128
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape
Street, Quezon City. and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to
world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the
still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she
family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and
would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their
simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
would inherit from his parents so they can start a new
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
life.Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
already settled his differences with his own family. When
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to
respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for
isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as
them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the
he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited
and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her
family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives.From
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they
should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is
not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is Revised Beta Examination
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously
brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and
Draw A Person Test
so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the
house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The
parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was Sachs Sentence Completion Test
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help
MMPI
from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of
petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so
respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so
vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now
marriage.
and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case
against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he
pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really
the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself
License. to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated
by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until
after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of
petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
he should persist in going home, they will commission their somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫]ۥ‬ because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams

129
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, [28] that the
is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
relationship. with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And
REMARKS:
the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself
and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented
Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties
by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
is null and void.[31]
parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are
still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the I.
point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative
and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and
she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
mistake for them to take.[15]

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on
solemnization.
the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. [17] The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal. [18]

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003
Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the
trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist
did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower
court for rendering the decision without the required certification
of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition
for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by
the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during
the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the
trial court orders and notices.[27]
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth
P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court
of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Commission of the UP LawCenter, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal
or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare
a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the
effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years
of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person
would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision
Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as

130

a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the
two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later,
to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar
to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese
of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null
and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who,
because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
131
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by
an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and
to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases
refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
special cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close
to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes
only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid
and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state,
the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null
and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living
132
Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court
selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable
to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons
to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent;
Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the
major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due
competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did
not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out
the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s
and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change
was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight,
the way was paved for what came after 1970.Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then
so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. [38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article
68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp
conceptual distinction must be made between the second and
third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the
essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose
wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that
they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract,
there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion
of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to
both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with
the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the
house and its particulars].Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object
of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is
invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological
act, however, is directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third
paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing
the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a
free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota
in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage
arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from
others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however,
so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The
evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person
towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with
respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the
nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is
altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such
that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The
question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the
133
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the
incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent,
is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under
these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is
always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to
think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised
in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object
that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down
by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani
seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between
the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to
fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage,
and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would
have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent
consent.However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting
an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal
judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of
consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According
to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of
Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist
in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of
things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty
not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The
decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable
of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may
have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it
was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or
psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of traits.
fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad
impossibile tenetur.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear
under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality
xxxx invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when
so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin
object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to
a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such
the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent
unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party.The
because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive,
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial
unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is
security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as
the place for detained and individual description.
in the defect of the object of consent.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete

circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person
as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only
at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether
a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage
in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially atmatrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated.Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability
to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A
sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is
interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken
advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume
any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion
that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in
the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by
C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense
only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his
psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness
would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some
freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while
one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem
then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be
one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-
case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage
is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the
lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals,[45]explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

134

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of
the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood
135
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and
apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid,
Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, [49] the
Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court
was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of
Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world.[50] The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes
to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. [51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. [52] The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses
should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and
foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never
again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other
hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated
runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.[56]
of By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered
a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations
of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life;
136
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions
since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among
the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to
fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or
sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem
to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry
out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
137
partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. [61] Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a
court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the
parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field
of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense
with the parties prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,
which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both
parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders
as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships
and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through
adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which
the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with
other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often
a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals
with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work
with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages
of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at
the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages
of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin
studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid
5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph
(EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many
years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A
study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least
marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder
not otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific
personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify
as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have
long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following
manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent
and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-
esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
138
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually
bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects
or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication
that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others
and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they
also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or
politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was
referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-
social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.[66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of
both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that
the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things
on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order
to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
139
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution [2] in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision
and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school.[5]They fell in love, and they were
wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born,
the couple decided to move to Carmens family home
in Cebu City.[7] In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical
board examinations[8] and thereafter proceeded to take a
residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed
the preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he
began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as
member of its active staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the
hospitals Treasurer.[11]
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on
G.R. No. 166562
December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977;
Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on
July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie
Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.[12]
Present:
On October 21, 1993,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., after being married for more than 18 years
to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years
Chairperson,
old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
CARPIO MORALES,*
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
CHICO-NAZARIO,
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
[13]
manifest thereafter.
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she
was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble
Promulgated:
occasionally with his friends.[14] But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at
about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning
drunk
March 31, and
2009violent. He would confront and insult respondent,
physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There
were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the
gate of their house.[15] Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins
job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often
had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass
the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped
calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to
be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the
latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge
the same.[16]
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to
give financial support to their family and would even get angry at
her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking
and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his
hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his
obligation to his children.[19]
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive
gambling.[20] He would gamble two or three times a week and
would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn
his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling. [21] There was also
an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and
even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to
be able to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped
going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for
having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely
committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.[23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological
incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his
excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the
property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown
by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his
family.[24]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically
incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as
his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of
social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for
social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent
person, except when provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his
alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed
that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional
fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as
practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also
insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means
whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for
lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary
things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted
and took care of their children, while Carmen
played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking
and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by
Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children
from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally
witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in
front of their children.[30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however,
Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because
the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
140
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder.[32]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.
Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of
Psychiatry in Don Vicente SottoMemorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological
behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well
as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz,
a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and
his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers. [34] Contrary to
Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong
with petitioners personality, considering the latters good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates
findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of
his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically,
the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to
his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character
traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his
marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant
null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x
x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000,
the CA rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It
faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced
to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates
conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this
case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on
February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could
not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the
principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was
likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated
March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the
CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration. [45] On review,
the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision [46] reversing
its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision.[47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but
the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004
Resolution.[48]
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement
of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts
to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It
is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was
applied by the English courts and was later adopted by
the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato
S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this legal
principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand
by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started
with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents where the same points come again in
litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly
unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision
was the actual principle or principles necessary for the decision;
not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
141
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by
the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict
rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary
discretion in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x
once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well
noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to
abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas reveal a deep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of
law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this
internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal
with for over two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own
life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare
decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions
of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly
observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a
policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare
decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisisinvolves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to
apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis'
view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis
stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable
command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within
the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider
a question once decided. In the same vein, the venerable Justice
Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it. In
contrast, the application of stare decisison judicial interpretation
of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a
statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a
consistent course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This
stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to
preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings;
(2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4)
activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges
that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to
follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192
cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal
doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement
that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is
inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles
of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting,
this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by thestare
decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling
that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our
first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries
will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be
considered before overturning prior rulings. These are
workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and
changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the
following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior
decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add
inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no
more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.[53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is
no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was
struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v.
Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or
construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of
this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned
the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
We said that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing
all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law
but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with
another.[57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
142
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize
in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation
of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root
cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely
affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall
now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to
present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing
the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding
whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence
adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen
(18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the
appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. [61] The psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects
were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She
merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends;
but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither
did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the
decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage
between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts
strengthened respondents allegation of psychological incapacity.
The two experts provided diametrically contradicting
psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, [63] while
Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners
personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr.
Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also
took into consideration the psychological evaluation report
furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally
examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview
with Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts
in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners
drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against
his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity
to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as
the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too
inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to
Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor
of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not been amply
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993.
Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married
143
on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City.
At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while
respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of
marriage. They have no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer
despite service of summons upon him. Because of this, the trial
court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion between the parties. In a report
dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that
there was no collusion between the parties.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered
its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and submitted
a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case
on the State’s behalf under the supervision and control of the
Solicitor General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that
her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to
petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and
continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the
essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a
job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance.
When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them
a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who
paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her
husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper
every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most
jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job
interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and
a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her
husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner
was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was
informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his
parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner
discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the
money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from
his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo
allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have
a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for
a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs.
Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother
and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time
Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards
her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only
had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they
discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was
sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even
want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready.
Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another
place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents,
Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave
their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first
cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the
niece of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She
corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not
gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely
relied on the allowance given by his mother. This witness also
confirmed that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the
rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also testified
that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mother’s house
in business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner
that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that
respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not
living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist.
Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her
psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and
ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for
what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information
gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties
and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering
from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality
Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life was
ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of
this psychological problem was a cross-identification with the
mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering
that respondent’s father was a seaman and always out of the
house. She stated that this problem began during the early
stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration of his
marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also
severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable
because it started in early development and therefore deeply
ingrained into his personality.
Based on petitioner’s evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the
court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of
improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with
the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of
having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between
the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder
and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled
by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show
that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta
Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared null and void
abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the records
of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and
the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision 4 to
correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously
typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that
(a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the
144
information provided by petitioner and was not based on an
examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the
alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of
marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and
incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially
ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the psychological
incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder
existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In
setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned
that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent’s
alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother is
symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellee’s failure to prove that
respondent’s supposed psychological malady existed even
before the marriage. Records however show that the parties
were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and
were living on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent
often times asks his mother for financial support may be brought
about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute
at all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is
working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that
respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that
respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at all
a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent
has shown that he has a full grasp of reality and completely
understands the implication of having a child especially that he is
unemployed. The only problem besetting the union is
respondent’s alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave
her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this case to be
psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his
youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves, do not
constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals,
421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs.
Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme
Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations,
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro,
G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-
appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta
remains VALID.5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or
not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that
the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality of evidence
presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouse’s
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code and settled jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.6 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not
the concern alone of the family members.7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
145
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 11 It should refer to "no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.13
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that
notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court
encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the
interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major
deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that
there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the
annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
psychological incapacity of her husband.
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric
report, highlights the lack of personal examination of Rodolfo by
said doctor and the doctor’s reliance on petitioner’s version of
events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the
psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which
the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony.18 Significantly, petitioner’s narration of facts was
corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close
relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to
elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the
manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 19 Since the trial court
itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there
is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witness.20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in
the trial court’s decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage,
Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from
petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the
couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that
the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to
have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his
relationship to his mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his
marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes by an
expert witness with more than forty years experience from the
field of psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in
particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas
elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and
Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very
limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be the role
model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted
and physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other
hand, she developed growing resentments towards her father
and promised herself that with the first opportunity, she’ll get out
of the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 ½
months after they met, without really knowing anything about
him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at
that time and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision
making in marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she
came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties
and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection,
financial support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father,
who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder brothers were
all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his
mother’s needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her
system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a
prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother,
being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role
model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently,
all the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so
much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting.
Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual
relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of
defying the mother’s love. At this point, he has difficulty in
delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his
continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable
anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him
psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and
outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner, that
Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and
responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform the
duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous
personal problems she has difficulty in handling her considerable
anxiety, at present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr.
Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong
and prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to
a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self
confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed
prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration
due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as
permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his
life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality
structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered
and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.21
146
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr.
Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which we
quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what
was your psychological evaluation?
A: I’ve found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as
matured, independent, very responsible, focused, she has
direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she
wanted, ma’am, and therefore, I concluded that she is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage, ma’am.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your
psychological evaluation with regards to the respondent?
A: Based on my interview, I’ve found out that the husband Mr.
Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a
psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings,
ma’am.
Q: In layman’s language, Madame Witness, can you please
explain to us what do you mean by Dependent Personality
Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in
which their response to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and
inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt
with himself and inability to make his own decision, quite
dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother,
ma’am.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a
psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, ma’am.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and as a father, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root
cause of this psychological problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross
identification with the mother who is the dominant figure in the
family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family
while the father was a seaman and always out of the house, and
if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very
submissive and passive to the authority of the wife, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what
circumstance this kind of psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality development and
therefore, during his early stages in life, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem
existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before
the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the
marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became
manifested with the…that the manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr.
Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no demand on his
life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished
college degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on
himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always
would make the decision for him, ma’am.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem
severe?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe,
Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
responsibility that is expected of a married person, ma’am.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and
therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his personality, and
therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of
the psychological problem as far as the marriage relationship of
Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship
because standard expectation is, the husband has to work, to
feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the
sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in
their marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced
once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact
that because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is
a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying
the mother’s love when they will be having heterosexual
relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to
distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex
relationship will not be satisfactory according to expectation,
ma’am.22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties."23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly
explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce here for
emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the
court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of
improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with
the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of
having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between
the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder
and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled
by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show
that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.
Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of
marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception
of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on
his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident.
To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent
personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage
147
being rooted in his early development and a by product of his
upbringing and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be
sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual
findings of the trial court on this point. The CA’s reasoning that
Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might
have been due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to
the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was
his "responsible" realization that he should not have a child since
he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence
on record to support these views. Again, we must point out that
appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of
the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance
where the findings of the trial court or the experts are
contradicted by evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s
irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact
that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29
years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a
grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature
of a dependent personality disorder and how one afflicted with
such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with
marital obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things
on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order
to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with
dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of
marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact
science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering
from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or
manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the
court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to
carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the
same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own
decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband.
Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68.
Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife;
one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even
the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday;
one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and
emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been
deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar
predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to
interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and
apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With
respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must
take into account not only developments in science and medicine
but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring
of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have
taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material
support of their families. This, however, does not change the
ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social institution,
wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for
the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the
spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a
cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to
the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of
the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is
proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended
Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove
that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring
her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as
null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country
from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been
next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they
were still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at
San Beda College taking a business management course. After a
month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy
ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they
148
named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of
pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24,
1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining
dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow
funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until
he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on
various jobs to meet the family’s needs, first as a part-time
aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time
employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one
with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses
(i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months
after his graduation from college before he started working as a
car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in
1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a
celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all
the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his
irregular income could not be depended upon. In September
1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between
them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms,
thereby affecting their sexual relationship.4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as
a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance
coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were
not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal
needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car
itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the
cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment
after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer.
He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After
petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of
whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister
themselves.5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode
because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place
concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on
his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together
with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial
and presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between
petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity,6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to
by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued together with one
Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature,
strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however,
makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner
also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for
worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent.
Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand,
respondent was found to have a personality that can be
characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His
criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his
misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences
of separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to
this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply
with what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides
from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his
malevolent conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological
incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth
in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant,
establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that
respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing
under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is
totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as
well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the
start of the marriage respondent had left all the household
concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied
and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when
he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary
from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual
infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is
respondent’s propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and
habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic)
more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against
him.
Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of
respondent’s personality disorder and it was only after marriage
that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondent’s
behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His
dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of his
misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to
respondent’s childhood experiences of separation and emotional
deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product
of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the
environment although its over manifestation appear only after the
wedding.
Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed
in him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there
appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary
means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show
that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and
temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate
recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be
delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a
mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner. 9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no
showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or
were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive,
was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for
the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over
financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic.10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision
reversing the judgment of the RTC.11 Specifically, it refused to be
bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert
witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that
respondent’s condition, assuming it is serious enough, was
present before or during the celebration of the marriage.
Although petitioner’s expert witness concluded that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated even before the parties’ marriage,
the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact
that the witness’ findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the
149
basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the
time of the examination, interview, was already head strong in
her resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified,
and harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her
consultation with Dr. Samson.12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient
to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a
grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v.
Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v.
Pesca,15 the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature,
deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of
affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily
constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability
to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his
misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members,
are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a
medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily
equivalent to psychological incapacity, although it may constitute
adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a
criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to
petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation
provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and
sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert
testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the
trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in
Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the
report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson
more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240
SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have
applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490,
October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal
medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for
a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to
the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA
correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr.
Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert
witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic
was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by
petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate in the
proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his
psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-
serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him
rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her
to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from
petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the
ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that
the only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom
petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards
the respondent? At the time you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner
was able to talk regarding her marital problems which is
uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to
condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as
the respondent is concerned, would you say that the petitioner
would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people
the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the
name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself
naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. The CA
rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such
expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the
requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of
Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not
misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband."18 But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s
psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root
cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not
examine Dominic in person before completing her report but
simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that
purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish
the precise cause of private respondent’s psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy
of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the
precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of
Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity
existed at the inception of the marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations
in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity.20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not
the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that was
crucial but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the
burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at
the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the
evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has
reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
150
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.
Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal
medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse
therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his
psychological incapacity22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear,
the statement in Marcos ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the
totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of
his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the
presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to
show the psychological incapacity would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was
the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to
present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented
and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and
decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases
they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the
expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. 23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner
insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help
and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person’s
psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate
an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential
objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations between
husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the
time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological
incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and
incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to
show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a
grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share
his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity,
was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction
that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did
not equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his
supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground
only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M.
No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required,
and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could
be deemed to have become functus officio if not totally
disregarded.25
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The
Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the
proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit
to the court proof of such service within the same period. 26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers
may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the
period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. 28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is
filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to
appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor
vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for,
and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring
that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
151
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would
succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19,
2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND
EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen,
Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between respondent
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-
De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold
once again the validity of a marriage on the ground that the
alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil
rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to
Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. 3
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but
prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot
located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.5 After conducting an
investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no
collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.6
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his
consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she
constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent
most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas
worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal
home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour. 7
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on
the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that
was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder
was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her
Answer/Manifestation,10 whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without
Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted
that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give
up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to
live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and
Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan
to cancel the marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of
Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time
with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant
gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her
duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held
that considering that the matter of determining whether a party
was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr.
Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr.
Reyes was the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological
incapacity.13
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’
MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS
SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved
Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of
the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed
that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that
she could not have known her marital obligations;" and that
Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly
explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:
I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED
PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE
NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS
NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE
ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
V the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY
OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
CAUSE OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT
152
EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE.14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC
and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by the
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); 15 and that
Catalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take
care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not
"defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty,
refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits
and abandonment of the conjugal home were not grounds under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her
infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while
her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the neuro-
psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish
Catalina’s psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not
shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life,
attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her
alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a
finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity;
and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties
inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given
P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in
the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and
Eduardo’s overseas deployment that had required him to be
away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s
relationship and forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support
and company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their
adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children
of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the
declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based
on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and
the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that
a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological
illness.16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological
incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as
those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases
involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later
ruling in Molina,18 viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x
x.19
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have
remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded
on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological
incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. 20 Indeed, the
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial,21 making it incumbent upon the petitioner
to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological
incapacity.22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting
that they thereby explained the gravity and severity of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the
celebration of their marriage.23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a
compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the
gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their
appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to
establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent
gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardo’s
consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of
their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even
established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to
corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his
testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as
evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a
court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the
results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes
despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of
153
Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on
the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is
characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of the
personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships,
where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a
relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in
and out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to
sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has
to be attended to as they might end up doing things which are
often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel
remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from
their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these
mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their
families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these
pattern of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and
successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected
that even with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship
are not also that ideal. If this be the background of the developing
child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as
such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered and a
longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being concluded that
she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her
as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage
is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person,
rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet
the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage.
Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother,
rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in
marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this
attitude and behavior of defendant will still change because her
traits have developed through the years and already ingrained
within her.24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological
incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a
source of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside
from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of
borderline personality disorder, both the report and court
testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root
cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part of
Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or
omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline
personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior
that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties.
Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and
immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no
longer be treated due to her having already reached an age
"beyond maturity."25
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.26We have explained this need in Lim v.
Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of
seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and
prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened
in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert
does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.28
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not
personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from
Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the
conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that
reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a
weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion
that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to perform her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr.
Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence
showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage.
We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo
adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone
did not constitute psychological incapacity. 30 To rule that such
immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which
inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.31
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations, viz:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the
part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both
of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case you filed
against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had
an agreement regarding this case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that
you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell us, what is
that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or
acquired at the time of your marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat,
that is why I agreed, sir.
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this
petition for declaration of marriage which you filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic]
about this case is the division of your conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her
share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not pursue
whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed
against her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr.
witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00
that is the reason why she is no longer around here?

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in A Yes sir, it could be.35
her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a
with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds
collusion between her and Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did
for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of
constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for
conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless
legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the
made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share
other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the
in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset
considering that there should be a showing that such marital
out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to
infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that
such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also
made her completely unable to discharge the essential
to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of
obligations of marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not
not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no
adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity
means be of any consequence in determining the issue of
bereft of factual and legal basis.
collusion between the spouses.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his
psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in
admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to
against its dissolution and nullity.36
convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on
her part,34 to wit: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari;
SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for
wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, lack of merit.
has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed
Costs to be paid by the respondent.
that she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did
you talk to your wife? SO ORDERED.

154

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that
reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision 3(original decision) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside
the June 5, 2002 decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The
Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita 5 and the union bore
two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar
went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12,
1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had
been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in
1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children
and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been
separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage
based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home. 10He testified that
he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report 12
on Lolita
prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as
her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to
go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that
Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were
not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness.
Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which
she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
155
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due
course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original
decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision.
In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted
in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform
her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report
did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for
legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her
marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists
sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity
as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that
"a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. 23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent
abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial
support to her and their children even after he learned of the
affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair
with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No
evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that
Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation
report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity.
The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did
not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. 28 Dr. Flores’
observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-
workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with
Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with
her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.
While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and
relevance to one another should be fully established for them to
be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one
another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared
and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further
belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship 30 is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash
conclusion that this Court cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s
psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible
error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social
institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and
against its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to
the other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent
Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 19, 2011, this Court issued its Decision 1 denying
petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw's petition and affirming the appellate
court's determination that there is insufficient evidence of
psychological incapacity that would render the parties' marriage
null and void. The Court, in making its Decision, relied on the
experts' own proffered guideline for making their conclusions.
They said that actions, such as those allegedly performed by
respondent, "when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
[Narcissistic Personality Disorder]."2 The Court, using the experts'
own guideline, reviewed the evidence to determine if there is
indeed proof, before the Court, that respondent engaged in the
alleged acts, that she performed them constantly, and to the
detriment of the quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties
as mother and wife. Considering the opposing views of the trial
and appellate courts on the matter, the Court thoroughly
reviewed the records of the case, including the psychiatrists'
reports. Despite the Court's considerable effort to respect and
accept the psychologists' findings, we simply found no adequate
evidence of the factual premises of their diagnosis of Narcissistic
156
Personality Disorder. Thus, we agreed with the Court of Appeals
(CA) that the evidence is insufficient for a declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), 3 arguing
that the Court erred in finding the psychological experts'
conclusions (that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
understand the demands of a marriage) unsupported by the
available evidence.
The respondent, in lieu of a Comment,4 reiterated her earlier
Manifestation that she is now conceding that petitioner, not
herself, may actually be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his essential marital obligations.5
The Majority Opinion opines that the Court would be unjust to
keep the parties in a marriage despite their shared opinion that
their marriage is beyond repair.
However, under the law, the parties’ own desire to dissolve their
marriage is not a determining factor in assessing the existence of
a groundfor annulment or declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 48
of the Family Code mandates the court to guard against the
possibility of collusion between the parties:
ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
xxxx
The Court’s Decision should rely solely on the available evidence
and the law.
The Majority Opinion claims that our Decision failed to appreciate
the evidence, as found by the trial court andby the expert
psychologists and that the trial court’s ruling on the psychological
incapacity of the parties should be final and binding on the
appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts and on
opinion of the qualified experts.
I agree that the ruling of a lower court should be given due
respect and finality when it is adequately explained, rests on
established facts, andconsiders the opinion of qualified experts.
Unfortunately, such kind of trial court ruling is not before us;
hence, our September 19, 2011 Decision did not see fit to adopt
the findings of the trial court.
The trial court summarized the parties’ respective evidence,
including the testimonies of their psychologists, inthe first six
pages of its decision.6 It then proceeded to quote Article 36 of the
Family Code and the definitions of psychological incapacity in
Santos v. Court of Appeals7 and in the Republic v. Court of
Appeals.8 Without any indication of which pieces of evidence it
found convincing, reliable, and overwhelming, much less a
discussion of how these evidence tend to prove the existence or
non-existence of psychological incapacity – ergo, without factual
findings whatsoever– the trial court ruled in a terse and
unsatisfying paragraph that:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties
entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their
children to become responsible individuals. Parties’psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be
pervasive, grave and incurable.9 (Emphases supplied)
The inadequacy of the trial court’s ruling and its understanding of
the concept of psychological incapacity is
apparent.1âwphi1 Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
declaration of nullity, is not a lack of understanding of what
marriage entails, nor is it a "failure to commit" one’s selfto the
essential marital and familial obligations.10 It is a downright
inability to understand, perform, or comply with, the said duties
and obligations.11 How can any appellate court rely on the trial
court’s assessment of whether the evidence constituted
psychological incapacity when there is none and its
understanding of the concept of psychological incapacity is
doctrinally flawed?
The trial court then characterized the parties’ psychological
incapacity as grave and serious, without even going over the
evidence upon which it relied in making such conclusion. It
appears to the Court that the last sentence of the trial court’s
decision – that "the incapacity has been clinically established" --
encapsulates the process by which the trial court arrived at its
judgment. It relied merely and solely on the conclusions of the
psychological experts, without doing its duty to make an
independent assessment of the evidence.
To reiterate, while I agree that the trial court’s ruling on the
psychological incapacity of the parties should be final and binding
on the appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts
and on the opinion of the experts, I believe that the trial court’s
decision in this case was not based on facts, but solely on the
opinion of the experts. Such blind reliance by the trial court was
an abdication of its duty to go over the evidence for itself.
While the courts may consider the assistance of the experts, the
courts are duty-bound to assess not only the correctness of the
experts’ conclusions, but also the factual premises upon which
such conclusions are based. The expert’s conclusions, like any
other opinion, are based on certain assumptions or premises. It is
the court’s job to assess whether those assumptions or premises
are in fact true or correct, and supported by evidence on record.
The soundness of experts’ conclusions lie in the quantity and
quality of the input they received in making their conclusions.
This is precisely where the courts take the reins from these
experts. The root cause of psychological incapacity must not only
be clinically identified by experts, it must also be sufficiently
proven and clearly explained in the decision. 12
The expertise of courts lies in determining which facts are
admissible, which are relevant, which carry weight, which have
been proven, which have been debunked. In resolving legal
disputes, the courts have the expertise in evaluating the quantity,
quality, and relevance of the facts to the legal issue involved.
Courts have to conduct its independent assessment of the quality
of the facts that the psychologists relied upon in support of their
conclusion. It is only if, and when, the court is convinced that the
psychologists’ conclusions are strongly anchored on verifiable,
admissible, and relevant evidence that it can adoptthe
psychologists’ findings. Even petitioner’s expert witness, Fr.
Healy, acknowledged in his testimony that it is the court’s job, not
that of the expert, to verify the truthfulness of the factual
allegations regarding respondent’s alleged habits. Fr. Healy
cautioned that his opinion rests only on his assumption that the
factual allegations are true.13
It remains my opinion that the factual premises for the experts’
conclusions in this case werenot established in court. While the
experts testified that the alleged dysfunction in respondent’s
family and her subsequent actions within her marriage are
indicative of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the court records
themselves reveal no credible and preponderant evidence of the
supposed family dysfunction in respondent’s childhood and of her
supposed narcissistic habits later in life. There was no
independent witness presented, who is knowledgeable of
respondent’s upbringing and of her actions before and after the
celebration of marriage. This is detrimental in proving that the
cause ofher psychological incapacity occurred before, or at the
time of the celebration of, the marriage,14 and renders the
experts’ opinion on the root cause of her psychological incapacity
conjectural or speculative. Also there was no evidence of
respondent’s supposed obsessive desire for attention and
selfishness, which obsession, according to the experts, indicates
a narcissistic personality. The most that was provenwas a single
incident wherein she was found in a hotel room with another man
(after they have separated in fact), a penchant for visiting salons
and for meeting friends over a mahjonggame. This can hardly be
157
considered as a pattern, defined as "a reliable sample of traits,
acts or other observable features characterizing an
individual,"15much less an obsession.
Much is said about respondent’s undesirability as a mother for
supposedly exposing her children to the "culture of
gambling;"16 this, from the evidence that she brought her children
with her to their "aunt’s house" where she frequently played
mahjong. I find this judgment unsupported by the evidence and
irrelevant. While it has been proven that respondent played
mahjong, there is no evidence whatsoever that it involved
gambling, which is "the act of playing a game and consciously
risking money or other stakes on its outcome." 17 Without the
element of gambling, a mother’s act of bringing her kids with her
when she meets with friends (which is the most that can be
saidof this matter) can hardly be described as undesirable. Even
Fr. Healy acknowledged that playing mahjong and spending time
with friends are not disorders by themselves. They would only
constitute psychological incapacity if inordinate amounts of time
are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial
duties.18 The Court, in our Decision, applied Fr. Healy’s
standards. We concluded that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated because there was no proof that
she spent inordinate amounts of time in these alleged activities or
that her kids were adversely affected. 19 On the contrary, the
records revealed her efforts to maintain supervision of her kids,
even when she was among her friends. Further, the kids recalled
that, after respondent left the conjugal home, she would
surreptitiously visit them in their schools; and, once granted
visitation rights, spent weekends with them and tookcare of them
at any time they got sick.20 These are hardly the actions of a
woman with an inability to understand her filial duties and
obligations.
It must be emphasized that the Court does not disrespect the
experts’ findings when it disagrees with them; nor does it assert
that it is wiser in analyzing human behavior. It is simply
performing its duty to go over the evidence independently,
consider the experts’ opinions, and apply the law and
jurisprudence to the facts of the case. The Court cannot simply
adhere to the experts’ opinion when there is an obvious dearth of
factual evidence. The Court is not a passive receptacle of expert
opinions; otherwise, there would be no need for psychological
incapacity cases to betried before the courts. Courts would be
reduced to a mere rubber stamp for the expert’s conclusions.
That is not what the framers of Article 36 envisioned.
In the end, this is simply the sad story of two people who married
and started a family, but realized early on that they have made a
mistake. They both contributed to the demise of their marriage,
as hurt people often do. Despite their brokenness, they tried to
make the most of the situation, caring for their children while they
try to move on with their now separate lives. Now, in their
advanced years, they want a magical solution that would erase
any trace of their follies of youth; unfortunately, the provision for
psychological incapacity is not such a miraculous fix for
dissolving the marriage bond. The policy of our 1987 Constitution
continues to be to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. (Art. 11, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) The existence of
any doubt should still be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
I, therefore, submit that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration be
denied with finality.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-
VIÑAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and
Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the
Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-
6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Viñas
(Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Viñas (Mary Grace) as null and
void.cralawred
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years
old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City,
Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant,
however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary
Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a
bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary
Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was
filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition 5 for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary
Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to
regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house.
She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace
refused to perform even the most essential household chores of
cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not
exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind
courtship.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about
the death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she
were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was
self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her
about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left
their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that
she left for an overseas employment in
Dubai.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends.
They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family
and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The
foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of
insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married
life.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional
guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by
Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found
him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of
maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship.”9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality
through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in
college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college
graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an
overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the
time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in
Dubai and romantically involved with another
man.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and
physically harmed Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace
is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and
158
family-oriented.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not
founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to
each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of
declaring the nullity of the couple’s
marriage.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe,
serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is
incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already
been deeply embedded within her system as it was found to
have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it
has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-
]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by
grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with
her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,]
which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in
terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in
[Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn],
she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her
marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x
She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do
things her own way and would not pay close attention to what her
husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled
for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being
too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control. x x x
She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at
night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which
was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s] personality aberration can be
said to have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable
factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,]
which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as this is the time
when the individual’s character and behavior are shaped. [Mary
Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and
tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon]
their children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel
the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who
were supposed to be the first to show concern [for] her. x x x She
has acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to
have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had
from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the
eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always
followed with regards to making decisions and always mandates
people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very
essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of
unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume
mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young
mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to
restrain herself from doing ill-advised things even if she is amply
aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical
antecedence as it was already in her system even prior to the
solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x. 13 (Underlining
ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace
through her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer
and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito
were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary
Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact
opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his
work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA
psychological report dated December 29, 2008.cralawred stated the reasons below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the RTC In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that
“psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision 16 declaring incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
the following as grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the]
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
grant of the petition.
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the mostserious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil.
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
between them be severed.
marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the
(c) incurability.
miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic
Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace]
does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are
was carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made
separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned
her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He
[Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for
likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to
the insistence of [Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts
save the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our
of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are
mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a
obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and
case of psychological incapacity on her part.
fidelity. x x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace]
was in a quandary on what it really means. x x x.
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr.
Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary
examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was
Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of
conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the
mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized
best to have their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her
marital obligations.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive
value in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a
she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the
clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the
psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this
subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and
field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that
was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of [Mary
she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she
Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so
make a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover,
permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this
she admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,]
personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already
hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and
pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It
self-serving.
has become grave, permanent and incurable. 17 (Underlining ours
and italics in the original)
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root cause of the
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also
reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order 18 dated be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
December 1, 2010.cralawred experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to beexisting at the time of the celebration of the
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA marriage and shown to be medically orclinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225
evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from
must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision
and explained in the decision.
failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the
RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did
Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary
not establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and
[Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We
conclusions sans details. Besides, what psychological incapacity
reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the
contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically
obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently
infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown,
proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary
Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the
does not translate into a psychological Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to
illness.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
say:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s “Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
appeal. bepsychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have

159
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.”
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that “Article 36
of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves”. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.” Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-
cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and
emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution 21 dated August
7, 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration 22 filed by
Glenn.cralawred
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of
whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to
its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge should
painstakingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must
refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.23 Further, Glenn argues that inMarcos v. Marcos,24 the
Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the
respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a
nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her
testimony should be considered as decisive evidence. 26 Besides,
the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the
witnesses should be respected.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes
that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere
reiterations of the matters already resolved by the
CA.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily
fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
160
person concerned need not be resorted
to.”29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of
Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence
offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely
shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined
to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai
and is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been
maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the
latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand,
is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary
Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily
indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30is
emphatic that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
– an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not
shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit
with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never
proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise,
the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into
the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that
respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady
and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in
later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to
some psychological illness that is contemplated by said
rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the
original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each
other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The
foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses
under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure
from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere
difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to
live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally
examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present
more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn,
however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in
material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn
and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which
she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof
on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn
even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw
each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw “a loving[,] caring and
well[-]educated person”33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the
Court finds the same as unfounded.Rumbaua34 provides some
guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve
the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account;
she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s
probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be
a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
“believes that the world revolves around him”; and who “used
love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him.” x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-
depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed
to identify the root cause of the respondent’s narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of
the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the
respondent suffered “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces
of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her
own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be
made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence
as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
x x x x
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed
to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married,
respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect
that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and
responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain
how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was
grave and incurable. x x x DECISION
x x x x
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to
the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In
short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the
respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic
personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave
and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of
the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of
the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her
161
diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner
related to her. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent
proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in
this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and
associations, and about events on or about the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and
report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves
around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner
related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a
ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say
this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were
examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed
and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on
having a job, his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the
marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what
character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage,
for example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage
and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for
the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be
sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of
the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x
x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary
Grace’s status as the eldest among her siblings, 36 her father’s
being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother,
a housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and
explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace
warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to
obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the
antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what
the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s
marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010
Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and
set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br. 37), declaring
the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and
private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot
three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro
City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the
petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999,
the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision “due to lack of
participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the
Family Code.”3 The case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from
RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as
Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and
mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital
life and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent
during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint.
She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did
not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor
IsabeloSabanal appeared for the State.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in
California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed
that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and
dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed
that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a
wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances:
(1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did
not know how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared
their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes
because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was
also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed
her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received
anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6)
when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a
certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and
(6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos
Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of
Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial
court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of
Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a
decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground
of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This
decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a
decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that
Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital
discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG
contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage
under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal
separation.
162
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition
and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the
decretal portion, partially reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer
scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor
General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the
evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that
at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital
plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply
the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is
called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated
September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,6stating that the arguments of
Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and
discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new
substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or
reversal of its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT
THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION
OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO
SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE
NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE
LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of
his marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination of the wife by a competent and
qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the
Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave
lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and
obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said
decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with
different men coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a
home maker to her family and as a housewife to him
incapacitated her from accepting and complying with her
essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the
case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly
an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities
of a married woman. Robert avers that a sexmaniac is not just a
mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a deep
psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of
evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a
finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence
fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which
deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the
NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only given
persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of
nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack
of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and
obligations due to outside factors other than psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The
OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the
parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance
of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG
wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued
its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion
between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the
presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she
married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
cralawred
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General
became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a
whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE
FACE executed a “Retraction of Testimony” and a “Waiver of
Custody” waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor,
her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in
the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the
Appellant’s complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who
was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of
the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of
disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even
praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is
strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or
a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the
Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x
The Court’s Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced
proves that Luzwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on
Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
163
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
“Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.7cralawlawlibrary
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.8cralawlawlibrary
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos,
Jr.,9the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10 based on Article 36
of the Family Code.Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x
x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered
view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological
incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-
serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to
corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony
was self-serving and hadno serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of
Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently
proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to
prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing
their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and
receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological
incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as
a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity,cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.11Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable
is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is
another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.12cralawlawlibrary
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert arguesthat the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were
external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was
suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or “excessive sex hunger.” Other than his
allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced
to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in
Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to
prove the existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the
Republic of the Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the
respondent’s act ofliving an adulterous life cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The
petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance
Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would
164
indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to
a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological
incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving
information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that
in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the
Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is
subject to the law on evidence. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence –
what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void x xx. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the
NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered during the
trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence
considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out
that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which
mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of
the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
For clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the deposition of the petitioner – the respondent
understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which
she was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the
woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through
her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-
in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for
marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her
immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional
ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having
invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the
Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby
declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision
rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN –
JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided
by Canon 1095 par. 2 CIC on the part of the woman
Respondent – but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack
of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos v. Santos,16the Court referred to the deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of
Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of
the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095
of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
cralawred
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17the Court was also confronted with a similar
issue of whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also
covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in
our law.In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on
the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it
was not similar to, and only annulments under the third
paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating,
the Court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals
apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when
it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said
Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very
same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on
February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear
before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence,
trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he
saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two
siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up
with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on
whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his
friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this
affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but
later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he
also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with
her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into
marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until
one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and
attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final
separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the
confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under
Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show
that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the
testimonies of the following persons only, to wit:
AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la
Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to
165
the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent
allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike
the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal,
petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the opposing
parties were never presented before said Court. As to the
contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is
without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268
SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However,
the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
cralawred
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence –
what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void xxx.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of
Evidence states:
cralawred
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not
expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on
a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be
based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs.
Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the
judgment of the Trial Court.31cralawlawlibrary
Santos v. Santos18cited the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code.
It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095
which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent
portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x
x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the
confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under
Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial
court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo
is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent.
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of
Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological
incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision
of the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To
repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature
similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos19), which for
ready reference reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
x x x x
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature,
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under
the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered
would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include.
What would prevent members of other religious groups from
invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity?
Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent,
interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for
annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench.
As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts,
but they are not controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21it was written that the Constitution set out
a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic
social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the
family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of
a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it
was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner
166
Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to
prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a
case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is without
prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to
pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot
decree a legal separation because in such proceedings, there
are matters and consequences like custody and separation of
properties that need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated
November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are
herebyAFFIRMED, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's
ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the
YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous
marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued
them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she
has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual
vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to
the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal
earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June
1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he
was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that
he had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
refused to turn over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized
to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of
their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and
of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole
and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their
void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no
property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first
marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing
the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033;
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not
the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is
not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has
no property in his possession is an issue that may be determined
only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the
petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower
court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no
identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional
rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for
separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of
marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent
distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be
had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital
relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of
the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity
of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the
partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles
48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their
marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it
noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in
167
refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for
which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People
v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private
respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article
40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said
petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of the properties acquired during
coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As
such, it is from the beginning. 8Petitioner himself does not dispute
the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied
upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice
Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was
void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That
judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting
the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force
and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the
Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was
"no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other,
for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. 14Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is
borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and
that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed
that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of
a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a
judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared
invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in
the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even
if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to
require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred.
Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
168
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase
"absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if
they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to
in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with
collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a
final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the
other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no
liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in
the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it
is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage
may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too
broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He
proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is
that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go
back to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that
there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage
with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in
the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows
that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would
have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has
previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting
desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one
was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other
words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void?
Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family
life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . .
." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage
for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery
and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the
grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such
a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting
169
norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art.
40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition
that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of
Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
"solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the
Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to
refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only"
refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say
"on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute
nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that
private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for
the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired
during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would
not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate
or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such
as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other
spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad
faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate
prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order
for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a
first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to
decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error
in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-
J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he
saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon
inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake
up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions
to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children
and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his
1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on
January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De
Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not
married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and
claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
170
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who
called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before
a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of
the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites
in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in
all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter
into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application
of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229
[1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He
made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed
deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five
children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary
before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and
Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and
illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a
private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is
also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial
guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts
a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229
SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to
assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic
argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on
marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject,
in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg
in the Cathedral of San Jose.
171
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also
stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the
bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to
him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but
they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with
and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of
knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information even after they
were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of
Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his
witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had
given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked
why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,
respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to
the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said
that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she
had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she
(Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her
expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She
further claimed that she had no information as to the missing
person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12
October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as
amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court
hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that
the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to
show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a
belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this
Court on a Petition for Review where the following allegations are
made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding
that there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco
that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's
declaration that the petition was a proper case of the declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is
"[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil
Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial differences
emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption
to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is
need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the
Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to
be dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present, or
is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes
as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this:
that respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the
third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief"
that the absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a
search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a
"well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of
diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of
bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first
wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first
wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries
concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom
he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of
his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the
purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He
admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead.
He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that
she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
172
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused
London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts
to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of
the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the
geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one —
place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he
found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave
home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or
Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're
going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of
destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on
the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are
around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not
consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London
with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular
person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did —
can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica
declined to give any information as to her personal background
even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of
the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent
said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good
evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence,
said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse
had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's
letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment
contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not
explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when
be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he
married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain
why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed
belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its 5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life
and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue 6 Id.
of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the
other person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to
from its performance, unless:
have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding. xxx xxx xxx
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
marital bonds through existing legal means. present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of
spouse present at the time of the contracting such subsequent
the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
competent court.
emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a

man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly

the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the

preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest; the
public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
THIRD DIVISION
following basic state policy:
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
institution. . . . CALISTERIO, respondent.
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of DECISION
the Philippines in Article 149:
VITUG, J.:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects. On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00.
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
recognized or given effect. 24 Calisterio. Esm

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-
founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already
dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and
both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Petition, p. 2; Record, p. 7.
2 Records, p. 13.
3 Records, p. 14.
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January
1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a
trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married
eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively
dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y
Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition
entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner,"
claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and
thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to
her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that
her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to
the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more
than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage

173
with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate
of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing
jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta
administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate
estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in
favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the
petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner,
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals, formulating that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family
Code in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy
arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at
No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City,
is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a
legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision,
thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed
from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as
of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's
sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the
other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's
estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be
appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among the
deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become the
administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the
present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court
is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of
this Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the
marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a
surviving spouse. Exsm
174
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at
that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took
effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family
Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases
where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy
is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and
void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the
above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three
exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse
present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith. [6] Bad faith imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will. [7] The Court does
not find these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional
cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed
valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party
assailing the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c)
there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article
40,[10] of the Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent
Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent
or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she
entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence
having been adduced to indicate another property regime
between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its
dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should
rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the
deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate[11] of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces,
being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however,
can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and
nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or
are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred
in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its
judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with
their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional
rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it
decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that
the children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to
the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate
pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming
the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
175
Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal
Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on
November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then
previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant,
who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said
EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975,
Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano
Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the
Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She
stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend.
Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student,
while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City
to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a
motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even
brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and
was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week
of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract
that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married
life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home
in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house
only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she
asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in
January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they
exchanged their own vows.[8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995
in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO).
He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his
previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed
to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one
time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He
then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared
he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of
his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first
wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never
saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his
first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from
Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and
ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum,
and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera
the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs
of suit.[9]
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as
it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, insisting that:

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos
belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his
first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him
from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v.
Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously
married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was
not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married
the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for
one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so
only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage.
He posited that the trial court should have taken into account
Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos
defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts ruling in United
States v. Enriquez[13]were misplaced; what is applicable is Article
41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil
Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41
of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present
spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution.
Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainants
knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since
bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the
private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the
affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST
WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER
ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF
PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS ITHAS NO BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the
second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out
that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code,
one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she
is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on
legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent
spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two
requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that
the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he
had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no
knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive;
hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive
death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The
petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime
of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences

provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the
Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first
accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the
be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive
elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant,
death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings
Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could
of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial
lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
second marriage.
in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to
support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

176
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA
erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he
married her, and even knew that he was already married. He
genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial
support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship
with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the
decision of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord
with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To
bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal
Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de
prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and
ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.[20] The
phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in
consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption
of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial
declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally
married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without
the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime
is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a
felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view
that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a
marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the
celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the
first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is a defense.
177
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the
same view as Viada and declared that there are three (3)
elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new
marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of
the act.[28] He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is
undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes,
and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no
willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this
must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be
produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime.
Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had
any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find
her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because
there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential
elements of the crime.[29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is
charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a
felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do not appear in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in
the word voluntary.[31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an
overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another
suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused,
the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a
legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or
probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of
proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless
a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.[34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be
a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner
was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner
married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity
of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general
rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law
is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when
he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-
grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her
for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in
evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on
his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains
and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense
of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of
the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the
State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. Marriage is a social institution of
the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. [37] The laws
regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,
safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community
and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances
the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage;
two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the
parties assume new relations to each other and the State
touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the
declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be
true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage
and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the
other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of
forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition
of individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as
so dissolved as to permit second marriages. [40] Thus, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon
certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as
basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
178
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or
an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war,
and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for
seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of
judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code,
which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven
years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code
was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice
to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
valid, the following conditions must concur,viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c)
there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of
the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of
instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the
spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for
the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings
of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal
Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration
of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know
his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. [48] In In Re
Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the
person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years,
would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial
decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or
she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final
and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition
for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and
of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not
waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous
and meaningless act.[50] The Court also took note that a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared
that the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the
administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
InGue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the
contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the
Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive
death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court
reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the
provision of Article 349 or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in
the proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered
as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if
the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent
first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a
proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous.
He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second
marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the
view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such
decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute
bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it
179
be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy. [55] Former Justice
Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the
case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be
charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a
second marriage.[56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform
to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where
a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse
to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. [57] Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present
spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by
former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for a
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order
not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that
for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second
marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided
in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already
established.[58]
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now
Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now
authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed.
Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of
affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts.
The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is
that the clause before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of
Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there
is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is
bigamy.[59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases
where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be
a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be
made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his
estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage
of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views
because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2)
of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to
rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration
of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the
same Code.[62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court
and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may
be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner
asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People
v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private
complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove
the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not
included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against
the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the
following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de
Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos
de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos
lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No
existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos
de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based
on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the
CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the
confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or
omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on
any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party
only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1,
3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
180
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order
named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be
awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered
mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise,
there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of
specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer
to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to
some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)[68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be
ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable
to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219
in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This
provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and
good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a
legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions
of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not
provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify
the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides
that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury should
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of
law depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71]
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private
complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he
was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the
private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate
of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while
that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the
petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant
had no inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of
acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful
husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman,
lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she
could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her
lawful husband.[72]
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and
deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries
is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, inMorris v.
Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent.
See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031
(1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is
willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the
ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they
consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel
v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super,
579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38.
Here the defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was
willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and
when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only
to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc.,
Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that
because of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed
to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific headaches
and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial
interference with the jurys reasonable allowance of $1,000
punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher,
37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against
public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a
social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral
damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would
not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v.
Groswald:[75]
181
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of
another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral,
but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action
against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by
him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v.
Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370,
17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false
representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his
former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave
her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed
that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or
innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no
bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for
enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be
in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and
assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to
assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false
and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v.
Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself but
upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations
which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the
incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may
be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter
into the marriage relation have been maintained in other
jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17
L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P.
324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of
public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no
moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the
defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself.
Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to
lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or
to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz
v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958. [76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and
reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159614
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA, and
APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 9, 2005
x----------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton.
In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for
hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of
the said order be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of
general circulation in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least
three weeks before the next scheduled hearing. The court also
directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor
General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through
counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan
complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements. [2]
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however, denied by the court
for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. [4]
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were
married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He
testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the
evening and he berated her for being always out of their house.
He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would
be better for her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not reply.
Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day,
Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the
day, Lea was nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought that Lea
merely went to her parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan,
Samar.[8] However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work,
he went to the house of Leas parents to see if she was there, but
he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of
Leas friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was
informed by Janettes brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that
Janeth had left for Manila.[9] When Alan went back to the house
of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea
had been to their house but that she left without notice. [10] Alan
sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised
to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of
Leas whereabouts but to no avail.[11]
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for
Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan
agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for
Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas
where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea
was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. [13] He failed to
find out Leas whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth.
Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time,
he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned
to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.[14]
182
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local
police station.[15] The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on
July 4, 2001.[16]Alan also reported Leas disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.[17]
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of
Alan. He declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan
inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan
that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He
had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.[18] Leas father, who
was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that
he did not know where Lea was.[19]
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in
opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the
petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners
absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioners
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the
decision of the RTC.[21] The CA cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco.[22]
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs
decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove
that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.[23] It
averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and
diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted
that Leas father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been
to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that
the respondent reported his wifes disappearance to the local
police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from
the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and
locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of
the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of ones
spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court
in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to
by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged
missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages x x x
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x
summary nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family.
Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. For respondents failure to prove that he had a well-
founded belief that his wife is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in
searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court
and the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24]
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[25]
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.[26]
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of
an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree,
to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects
of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or
characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions,[27] competence evidence on the ultimate question of
his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of
the inquiries made by present spouse.[28]
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-
founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is
already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,[29] the Court warned
against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible
to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is
also the maxim that men readily believe what they wish to be
true.
183
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other
than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed
to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other
person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to
corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law
on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just
been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7,
1995 after he chided her for coming home late and for being
always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned.
Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving
the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the
chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to
make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas
whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have
enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries
from his parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering that
Leas father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police
authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an
afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to
dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his
petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was
already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749
is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondents petition.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and
Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the Resolution
dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are
challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz
(Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a
petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the
petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country,
Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and
purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively
dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with
Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. 10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner
thereof effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death
benefits13 which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of
Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS
the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the
first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third
with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her
siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all
the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of
her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon
Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13,
199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and
Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and
they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to
contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they
personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz,
claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed
before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s
death,17 he further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was
Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for
death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS. 20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol
Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of
death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an
order for the refund of the amount paid to her from February
1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the
claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon
Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the
balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under
the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has
been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been
misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic]
Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz
Presumptively Dead," did not become final. The presence of Aliz
[sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz
[sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse, his
remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
184
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting
spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque,
for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require
affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not
necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first
wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring
supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August
16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were
the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should
return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised
respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department
that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while
the latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively
dead did not become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof"
against the validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to
return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of
monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February
1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999. 24 In a
subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension,
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before
any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained
valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact
Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,
2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her,
however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition
with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the
SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly
pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was
returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the
funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her
siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any
amount during Bailon’s wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the
parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz
filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga
Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare
her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as
Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her
parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out
that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to
visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage
of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just a
common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that
petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and
primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS
the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she
received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999
as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-
Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of
SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e)
and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its
prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of
its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this
Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that
the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to
the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial
District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased
member represented in bad faith. This Commission
accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its
Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a.
Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation
from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the
deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the
unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving
the deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear
that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the
first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously
annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of
the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation
conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning
spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the
petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased member,
it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary
beneficiary, to the latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the
legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente
Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death
benefit she received from the SSS for the period from February
1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio
indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually
defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she
must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to
her by the SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied
by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review35 before
the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the
April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and
thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits
due her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue
of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC,
declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but,
more importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and
Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and
on its own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis.
On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly
declare the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null
and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person
presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that "the
person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris
tantum," the second marriage contracted by a person with an
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87
185
of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing
spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does
the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS
may validly declare the second marriage null and void on the
basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision
of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without
basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to
review the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of
determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of
the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the
RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x
xx
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually
possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be
without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the
principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit
of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer practical
under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to
restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente
Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is
there a second marriage to terminate because the second
marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente
Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the
filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry
where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already
inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority to review the
decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second
marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on
certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the
findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage
between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the
SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the
death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5 40 of the
Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give
respondent due process or ample opportunity to present
evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to
the CFI proceedings are of no moment to the present
controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter
dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and
subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which
Alice has a better right to the death benefits." 41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to
SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In
so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case
at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order
was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the
same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of
Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of
Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC
virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the
SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in
the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the
SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled
or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional
circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of
these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and
void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in
these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for
15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the declaration of her
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. 46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage,
and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved;
it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be
shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the
defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second
marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of
life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation
with such first spouse.47(Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it
is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted
by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses
in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by therecording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
186
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such
fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided
by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not
preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance
of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death
of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the
death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid
marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can
no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or voidable
marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab
initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil
Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with
the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive
years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the
action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the
three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one
of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any
conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance
with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s
death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other
issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under
this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and
penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be
cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect
thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members,
or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and
decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the
submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and Promulg
settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

xxxx Respondent. Septem

41 Rollo, p. 28.
42Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
43 Article 41 of the Family Code now provides: DECISION
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior NACHURA, J.:
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio
two years shall be sufficient.
Polborosa (Sofio).
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration The facts of the case are as follows:
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
47I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.
Code of the Philippines 282 (1999 ed.). (Citations omitted) On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses only
child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued
48Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring
causes, existing at the time of the marriage: home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal
dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but,
xxxx
finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed
former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up
the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they
agreed to separate. They executed a document to that
x x x x (Underscoring supplied) effect.[1] That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that,
petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even
Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be
if he was alive or not.[2]
commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows:

xxxx
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the
Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3] Subsequently, however, Virgilios
spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
application for naturalization filed with the United States
either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of
Department of Homeland Security was denied because
the other;
petitioners marriage to Sofio was subsisting. [4] Hence, on March
xxxx 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling,
Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

THIRD DIVISION
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007,
dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that
Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her
ANGELITA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 180863
husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead. It said that under
Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to
Petitioner,
prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
Present:
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief,
the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
the absent spouse.
Chairperson,

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not
try to findJR.,
VELASCO, her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement
to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her
mother prevented
NACHURA, and her from looking for her father. The RTC also
said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive,
PERALTA, JJ. that he would have been only 61 years old by then,
considering
and people who have reached their 60s have not become
increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true

187
petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a
drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and
smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] She argued that it
is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family
Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on
January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right
under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions
of the Family Code should not be applied against her because
Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on
declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively,
can be found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code.
To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the
rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution
dated December 10, 2007.[7]
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to
Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code.

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
the RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio its performance, unless:
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of
well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet
in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The
OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code,
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the
under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
Sofios death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
obligations created under the Family Code.[9]
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the competent court.
Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly
repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family
Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively
applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. [11]
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown

The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
affirmed. However, we must state that we are denying the
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC
Decision.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of

opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court,
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on
opened.
one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed;
the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the
law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[12] The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-
quoted provision in this wise:

The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and
holding that petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that
Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the

188
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.[13]
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be
the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of
the absentees estate.
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular
fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in
seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be
taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner.[15]

In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban

In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted
contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10,
marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived together as
1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco
husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the
left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him
husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal
after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and
abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from
friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile.
friends, petitioner found that her husband went
Believing her husband was already dead since he had been
to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came
absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in
from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In
1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is
1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive
presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a
death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been
subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue
absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any
v. Republic[17] are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946,
news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead.
Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they were residing and
In deciding the case, the Court said:
went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been
heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated
with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence,
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a
Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of
property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule the Philippines.
invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the
court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such
person had been unheard from in seven years had been
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and
that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is
made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding,
presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
authorized by law.[18]
competent court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked,
nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code,
there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent the presumption of death is established by law[19] and no court
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
(Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there
pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the
dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
Code.
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation,
because such a presumption is already established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is well-founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have
still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio.
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, with the Civil Code or other laws.
then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the
decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of
a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral
attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law.
It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in
petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed
dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would

189
would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to
achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no
decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be granted under
the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation
of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985
and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T.
SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J.
Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's
judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after
her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on
September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death,
Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten
married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac
City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result,
Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper
in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She allegedly applied
in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995.
She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City,
but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. 10 He
also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no
one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his
Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that
she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
190
appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was
deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of
her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a
resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. 17 As
a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any
notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also
never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. 20 Neither did
she go to an employment agency in February 1995. 21 She also
claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12
years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. 23 Celerina
referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support
her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a
newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies
of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28,
2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of
Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008. 29 The Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution
dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being
a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under
Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the
spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration
of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the
spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file
an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first
place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is
proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance
under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient
remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the
judgment declaring her presumptive death. 34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment
of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be
availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could
always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the
subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the
Family Code is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to
be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the
acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is
extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of
the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that
there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations
in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no
publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a
newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that
because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to
oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for
declaration of presumptive death were false. 43 Celerina further
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office were not given copies of Ricardo's
petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals
sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on
November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July
27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a
month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed
by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred
by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina
at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with
them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a
spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during
the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in
danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses
of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
191
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead
spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage
by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the
part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present
spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2)
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does
not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead
spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage
only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are
present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the
first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a
nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not
recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or
(4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of
law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the
first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is
legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of
the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second marriage,
as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on
the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as
a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social
Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if
the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was
"no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of
determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities
of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse
was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists.
However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered
valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
 spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks
the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is
already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of
a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in
bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition
against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed
his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he
contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family
Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against
bigamous marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy
to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not
preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated
by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of
the subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not
a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage
under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the
same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage
conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death
is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. 63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the
subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." 64 This
means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands
to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify
the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent
marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of
an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice
to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
192
for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171247, July 22, 2015
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. AMELIA C.
MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 268, AND LEONARDO S. UMALE [DECEASED]
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SPOUSE, CLARISSA VICTORIA
UMALE, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the January 31, 2006 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91940.
Factual Antecedents
This case stemmed from the complaint3 filed by Leonardo S.
Umale4 (respondent) against Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. (petitioner)
and others5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The complaint sought to compel the petitioner to account for,
pay, and deliver to the respondent the rental payments allegedly
in the petitioner's possession.6chanrobleslaw
The case was originally raffled to Branch 155 presided over by
Judge Luis R. Tongco, who voluntarily inhibited from hearing the
case upon the respondent's motion.7 The case was later re-
raffled to Branch 268 in the sala of Judge Amelia C. Manalastas
(Judge Manalastas).8chanrobleslaw
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Inhibition,9 Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,10 and Second
Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,11 (collectively, Motions for
Inhibition) to disqualify Judge Manalastas, on the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) That defendant Villamor [petitioner] has obtained information
that the presiding Judge [Judge Manalastas] has stood,
together with plaintiff [respondent], as godparents to a child of
common friend; and
(ii) That the Law Firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas, for
and in behalf of their client Mr. Hernando Balmores, wrote
defendant Villamor [petitioner] on a purported claim which
appears to be the very same claims asserted by plaintiff
[respondent].12
Judge Manalastas issued Omnibus Order13 dated October 17,
2005, which denied, among others, the Motions for Inhibition,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The allegations of defendant-movant [petitioner] in seeking
inhibition of the presiding Judge fall short of the proof required to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake her
noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence
without fear and favor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 7, 2005, the petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
Omnibus Order insofar as it denied his Motions for
Inhibition.14chanrobleslaw
The petitioner claimed that Judge Manalastas's
resolutions,15not pertaining to his Motions for Inhibition, were not
included in the Petition for Certiorari as they were the subject of
a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Order of
Default (MR with Motion to Lift Default Order)16 filed with the
RTC on November 3, 2005.
On November 16, 2005, the CA issued a resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the petition. The respondent filed his
comment on December 14, 2005.17chanrobleslaw
The parties, however, had already filed with the CA the following
manifestations and motions before the issuance of the November
16, 2005 resolution:
1. On November 11, 2005, the respondent filed a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss Petition on the
ground of forum shopping, pointing out the pendency of
the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed by the
petitioner with the RTC assailing Judge Manalastas's
Omnibus Order.
2. The petitioner filed his comment in opposition to the
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss Petition. He
argued that the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order did
not include the subject matter of the Petition
for Certiorari, i.e., the refusal of Judge Manalastas to
inhibit from hearing the civil case.18chanrobleslaw
3. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion
for Inhibition of Presiding Judge on Account of
Institution of Administrative Case (Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case)19 on
November 12, 2005, on the basis of an Administrative
Complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure
and for Bias and Partiality (administrative
complaint)20 filed with this Court through the Office of
the Court Administrator on November 11, 2005. In this
regard, the petitioner filed with the CA a Manifestation of
Filing of Administrative Complaint for Gross Ignorance
of the Law or Procedure and for Bias and Partiality on
November 14, 2005.
Subsequently, on November 18, 2005, the respondent filed a
Supplemental Manifestation/Motion to Dismiss Petition
(reiterating his claim that the petitioner engaged in forum
shopping and praying for the dismissal of the Petition
for Certiorari) since Judge Manalastas's inhibition had also been
raised as an issue in the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case filed with the RTC.
The petitioner later filed with the CA a Manifestation dated
November 22, 2005, to the effect that in view of his filing of an
administrative complaint against Judge Manalastas, he filed with
the RTC a Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
Case.
On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed another Manifestation
with the CA stating that he had filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Manalastas with the Office of the Court
Administrator.
The CA Resolution21
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping.
It noted that contrary to the petitioner's claim, the MR with Motion
to Lift Default Order prayed that the entire Omnibus Order be
reconsidered and set aside without excluding the issue of Judge
Manalastas's inhibition.
Moreover, the petitioner later filed with the RTC the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. The CA observed
that the administrative case referred to by the petitioner in
support of the motion was based on the very same grounds he
raised in his previous motions for inhibition.
The CA also found that the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA
and the pending motions in the RTC prayed for the same relief;
this, to the CA, was a plain and simple case of forum shopping.
The dispositive portion of the CA resolution
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the private respondent's
motion and supplemental motion to dismiss the petition
193
are GRANTED. The instant petition is herebyDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The Petition
The petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA resolution on the
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. "THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ITS RESOLUTION
DATED JANUARY 31, 2006, xxx HAS DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, WHEN IT ACTED UPON
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED, WITHOUT LEAVE OF
COURT, BY RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 5,
RULE 46, AND ITS OWN RESOLUTION DATED
NOVEMBER 16, 2005 REQUIRING PETITIONER [sic]
TO FILE A COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND NOT A
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND THEREAFTER,
DISMISSING THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. S.P. NO.
91940 ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING;
AND
2. "THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS, BY ITS
RESOLUTION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED HEREIN,
SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE TRIAL
COURT, MORE PARTICULARLY ITS PRESIDING
JUDGE AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF INHIBITION, SO
AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT OF ITS POWER OF
SUPERVISION OVER THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE TRIAL COURT."22
Respondent's Comment23
The respondent raises the sole issue of whether the petitioner
engaged in forum shopping.
The respondent argues that the petitioner engaged in forum
shopping when he availed of three separate remedies, namely:
(1) the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed with the RTC;
(2) the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA; and (3) the Motion
for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, also filed with
the RTC; praying for the same relief, i.e., the inhibition of Judge
Manalastas from hearing the case.
The respondent asserts that a party is guilty of forum shopping
when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court.24chanrobleslaw
Petitioner's Reply25
The petitioner reiterates in his reply all the arguments he raised
in the petition.
Additionally, he wants this Court to rule on the propriety of Judge
Manalastas's refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the RTC case.
He points out that considerable time has already elapsed, and to
serve the ends of justice, the controversy must finally and totally
be laid to rest.26chanrobleslaw
Issues
Two issues thus arise for this Court'
resolution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Whether the petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and
II. Whether Judge Manalastas's decision to continue
hearing the civil case was improper.
Our Ruling
The petitioner fails to convince us of the merits of this claim.

The petition is without merit. Although the arguments supporting the MR with Motion to Lift
Default Order pertained solely to the issue of declaration of
We rule that (1) the petitioner engaged in forum shopping, and default, the prayer was direct and plain.
(2) Judge Manalastas's decision to continue hearing the civil
case is not improper. It read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Petitioner Engaged in Forum Shopping
As a rule, forum shopping is committed by a party who, having
received an adverse judgment in one forum, seeks another
opinion in another court other than by appeal or the special civil
action ofcertiorari. Conceptually, forum shopping is the institution
of two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or
related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs.27chanrobleslaw
Forum shopping also exists when, as a result of an adverse
decision in one forum or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a
favorable opinion in another forum through means other than an
appeal orcertiorari.28chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005, be
RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE, and that defendant
Villamor's Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, BE
GRANTED. It is further prayed that the order of default
issued against Villamor be lifted or set aside.35
The petitioner prayed that the Omnibus Order be reconsidered
and set aside, period. He did not pray that it be partially
reconsidered and set aside only insofar as the order of default
was concerned. With respect to the "order of default," the
petitioner further prayed that this order "be lifted or set aside,"
thus implying that the petitioner asked for more than the lifting of
this order.

There is likewise forum shopping when the elements of litis Notably, the motion's preliminary statements were also
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will unambiguous. The petitioner stated in clear terms that he was
amount to res judicata in another.29chanrobleslaw moving for the reconsideration of the Omnibus Order; again,
without qualification. Nowhere in the preliminary statements did
Litis pendentia is a Latin term meaning "a pending suit" and is the petitioner indicate that he was only moving for a partial
variously referred to in some decisions as Lis pendens and auter reconsideration of the Omnibus Order.
action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it
refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the The petitioner's failure to state in unequivocal terms that he was
same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them only moving for the partial reconsideration of the Omnibus Order
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy may or may not have been intentional. But, regardless of the
against multiplicity of suits.30chanrobleslaw petitioner's intention, the result is the same: the motion prayed for
the reversal and setting aside of the Omnibus Order in its
There is litis pendentia when the following requisites are present: entirety. For all intents and purposes, the MR with Motion to Lift
identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the Default Order necessarily included the relief also prayed for in
causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the the Petition for Certiorari.
identity between the two actions should be such that any
judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which Even if we accept the petitioner's explanation that the MR with
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the Motion to Lift Default Order did not raise the issue of Judge
other.31chanrobleslaw Manalastas's inhibition, and that it was meant to be a partial
reconsideration of the Omnibus Order, the petitioner still cannot
Otherwise stated, the test is whether the two (or more) pending deny that he engaged in forum shopping.
cases have identity of parties, of rights or causes of action, and
of the reliefs sought. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule We find it undisputed that during the pendency of the
against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may Petition for Certiorari in the CA and the MR with Motion to
also constitute direct contempt.32chanrobleslaw Lift Default Order in the RTC, the petitioner filed with the
RTC his Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
Appeals and petitions for certiorari are normally outside the Case.
scope of forum shopping because of their nature and purpose;
they grant a litigant the remedy of elevating his case to a superior The petitioner's claim that he did not engage in forum shopping
court for review. completely crumbles when this new Motion is considered. Three
remedies were then pending in two separate tribunals, all
It is assumed, however, that the filing of the appeal or petition praying for the same relief: the inhibition of Judge
for certiorari is properly or regularly invoked in the usual Manalastas.
course of judicial proceedings, and not when the relief sought,
through a petition for certiorari or appeal, is still pending with or First, the Petition for Certiorari, prayed among others, that
has yet to be decided by the respondent court or court of origin,
tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial authority,e.g., xxx after proceedings duly had, render
a still pending motion for reconsideration of the order assailed via judgment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.33chanrobleslaw
(i) ANNULLING the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005
insofar as public respondent judge therein denied petitioner's
Forum Shopping at the Court of Appeals
Motion For Inhibition dated March 1. 2005, Supplemental
Motion For Inhibition dared April 12, 2005 and Second
We agree with the CA that the petitioner engaged in forum
Supplemental Motion For Inhibition dated June 21, 2005;
shopping.
(ii) ORDERING the inhibition of public respondent judge in
At the time the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Civil Case No. 70251 xxx36
CA, the RTC had yet to resolve the MR with Motion to Lift Default
Order earlier filed with the RTC.34chanrobleslaw Second, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
Case prayed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner took pains to explain that the MR with Motion to
Lift Default Order did not include Judge Manalastas's denial of
his Motions for Inhibition.

194
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Honorable Presiding
Judge inhibit herself from further proceeding with the instant
case.37
Third (and as already explained), the MR with Motion to Lift
Default Order prayed that Judge Manalastas set aside the
Omnibus Order in its entirety, which would logically result in her
inhibition from hearing the case.
The petitioner, however, insists that the filing of the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case was the necessary
consequence of the administrative complaint. The petitioner
argues that the pendency of the administrative complaint should
result in Judge Manalastas's inhibition. 38chanrobleslaw
He asserts that the basis of the Motion for Inhibition on Account
of Administrative Case was Judge Manalastas's gross ignorance
of the law, and bias and partiality while the basis of the Motions
for Inhibitions — denied by Judge Manalastas and later the
subject of the Omnibus Order elevated to the CA through the
Petition for Certiorari — was Judge Manalastas's grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to inhibit from hearing the civil case
because of bias and prejudice.
The petitioner argues that the grounds relied upon in the Petition
for Certiorari were different and distinct from those in support of
the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. 39 In
sum, the petitioner claims that the remedies were based on
different grounds and that they should not be treated as praying
for the same relief.
We do not find the petitioner's position persuasive.
A perusal of the administrative complaint40 would show that the
petitioner raised, as one of the grounds for imputing gross
ignorance of the law to Judge Manalastas, her refusal to inhibit.
In fact, the petitioner copied the allegations from the Motions for
Inhibitions and generally pasted them on the administrative
complaint.41chanrobleslaw
Glaringly, the petitioner used the same ground to support the
Petition for Certiorari and the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case. As earlier stated, the petitioner likewise
prayed for the same relief in both of these remedies.
These only lead to one inevitable conclusion: the petitioner
engaged in forum shopping by simultaneously raising the same
issues in different tribunals, relying on the same ground founded
on the same facts, hoping that both or either court would grant
his prayer.
Further, in anticipation of an adverse ruling in the MR with Motion
to Lift Default Order, the petitioner, without waiting for Judge
Manalastas's resolution, filed the Petition for Certiorari with the
CA hoping to obtain a favorable ruling.
To reiterate, the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari while the
MR with Motion to Lift Default Order was pending. This violates
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
availability of a remedy in the ordinary course of law precludes
the filing of a petition for certiorari; under this rule, the petition's
dismissal is the necessary consequence if recourse to Rule 65 is
prematurely taken.42chanrobleslaw
Had the petitioner waited for the resolution of the MR with Motion
to Lift Default Order, the Petition forCertiorari would have been
regularly and properly invoked in the usual course of judicial
proceedings and should not have been dismissed by the CA.
In fact, if the CA had strictly applied Rule 65, it could have
summarily dismissed the Petition forCertiorari on another
ground in addition to forum shopping.
One of the essential requisites of a petition for certiorari is that
there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose annulling or
modifying the questioned proceeding.43chanrobleslaw
195
There was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to annul or
modify the Omnibus Order. The petitioner should have expressly
included in the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order the denial of
his Motions for Inhibition so that Judge Manalastas could have
properly reconsidered her Omnibus Order in its entirety.
In the end, it was the petitioner's precipitate resort to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari that was his own undoing.
Forum Shopping in this Court
The petitioner likewise committed forum shopping when he
submitted for this Court's resolution an issue still pending with the
RTC.
We do not know if the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case was still pending with or had been resolved
by the RTC when the petitioner filed the present petition. The
petitioner kept silent on its status, in violation of his commitment
under the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
he had filed.44chanrobleslaw
What we know is that the administrative complaint, the basis of
the said motion, was still pending when the present petition was
filed.45chanrobleslaw
To recap, the petitioner anchored his administrative complaint on
Judge Manaiastas's gross ignorance of the law. Among the
grounds relied upon was Judge Manaiastas's bias and partiality,
the same ground used in the Motions for Inhibition, which later
became the subject of the Petition for Certiorari(the CA's
resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari is now subject of
the present petition). The petitioner subsequently filed with the
RTC the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.
The series of events shows that the petitioner filed the present
petition when the administrative complaint, and very likely, the
Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case were both
pending.
Again, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
Case and the present petition prayed for the same relief.
We note that the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case prays "that the Honorable Presiding Judge
inhibit herself from further proceeding with the instant
case,"46 while the present petition prays that -
xxx (b) after proceeding duly had, render
judgment:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(i) SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated January 31, 2006 x x x
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 91940...
(ii) <B>ORDERING the inhibition of Presiding Judge Amelia C.
Manalastas</B> of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 268,
Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 70251 xxx47
Plainly, the petitioner, in an attempt to increase the chances of
preventing Judge Manalastas from hearing the case,
successively filed the administrative complaint, the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, and the present
action.
Significantly, this Court's First Division in its Resolution48 dated
July 5, 2006, dismissed the administrative complaint against
Judge Manalastas.
With respect to the petitioner's claim that Judge Manalastas's
refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the civil case constitutes
gross ignorance of the law, we emphasize that judges must be
free to judge, without pressure or influence from external sources
or factors; they should not be subject to intimidation or to the fear
of civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions for acts they do and
dispositions they make in the performance of their duties and
functions.
Try as the petitioner might to characterize and label these
remedies as separate, independent, and distinct from each other,
the unavoidable reality is that their ultimate aim is the same,
they involve the same parties, and they rely on the same
grounds. In short, all the badges of forum shopping are present.
In Montes v. Court of Appeals,49 we found that the petitioner
therein engaged in forum shopping when he filed with this Court
a petition for prohibition while his motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending in the
CA. Although the purpose of a petition for prohibition is different
from that of a petition for certiorari, we ruled that there was forum
shopping because the reliefs sought were the same — to restrain
a government official from implementing the same order.
In like manner, it does not matter that the apparent purpose of
the administrative complaint (the source of the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case) is distinct from that
of the Petition for Certiorari (the source of the present petition).
The controlling consideration is that they are both geared
towards achieving the same goal: the inhibition of Judge
Manalastas from hearing the civil case.
The petitioner cannot hide under the cloak of characterization
and labels to escape from the consequences of his actions. If we
allow this, the evil sought to be prevented by the rule against
forum shopping would result.
We remind the petitioner and his lawyer that forum shopping
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to
degrade the administration of justice, to wreak havoc upon
orderly juridical procedure, and to add to the congestion of
the already burdened dockets of the courts.50chanrobleslaw
Further, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to foster
candor and transparency between lawyers and their clients in
appearing before the courts — to promote the orderly
administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the
other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims
to prevent the embarrassing possibility of two or more courts or
agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the
same issue.51chanrobleslaw
Judge Manalastas's Decision to Continue Hearing the Case
was Not Improper
Although we hold that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping
for reasons already explained, we nevertheless consider the
issue of Judge Manalastas's refusal to inhibit from hearing the
case to finally settle the matter.
First, Judge Manalastas's inhibition from the civil case
is discretionary. The grounds relied upon by the petitioner do not
fall under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court which enumerates the grounds for compulsory inhibition.
We have held that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the
case.52chanrobleslaw
Second, bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough, in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence, to overcome the
presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or
favor.53 Nothing on record shows that the petitioner ever
submitted evidence of bias and prejudice.
Villamor's claims that Judge Manalastas's impartiality was
allegedly compromised because (1) she and the respondent
stood as godparents to a child of a common friend, and (2) that
her husband was a partner of a law firm which represented a
client whose claim against the petitioner was similar to the
respondent's, do not suffice to overthrow the presumption that
Judge Manalastas will dispense justice according to law and
evidence without fear or favor.
Because this act is discretionary, Judge Manalastas is in the best
196
position to determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit
from the case; thus, her decision to hear the case, in the higher
interest of justice, equity, and public interest, should be
respected.
While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial, and independent in handling the case,
this right must be weighed with her duty to decide cases without
fear or pressure.54chanrobleslaw
In these lights, we see no reason to reverse Judge Manalastas's
decision to proceed with hearing the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the January 31, 2006 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.SP No. 91940.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B.
SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the proper remedy to challenge a trial court''s declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the
Philippines1(Family Code).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assails the October 24,
2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No.
04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
Factual Antecedents
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose)
filed a Petition5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, Netchie S.7 Sareñogon
8
(Netchie). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the
Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed
the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general
circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in
the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the
Petition.9 Trial then followed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis
Occidental in 1991,11 They later became sweethearts and on
August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and wife for a
month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie
went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months, he
did not receive any communication from Netchie. 14 He likewise
had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried
to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had
allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. 16 He returned home
after his contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie''s
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was.18 Because of these, he had to presume
that his wife Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition
before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant
to Article 41 of the Family Code.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose''s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel
Sareñogon, and by Netchie''s aunt, Consuelo Sande. 21 These
two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the
Philippines for separate destinations abroad. 22These two added
that they had no information regarding Netchie''s
location.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Regional Trial
In its Decision24 dated January 31,2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-
08, the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of
evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article
41 of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to
conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. 26 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring respondent presumptively dead for
purposes of remarriage of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On April 19,2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the
CA via a Petition for Certiorari28, under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the
Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
CA perceived no error at all in the RTC''s judgment granting
Jose''s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his
wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic''s
appeal sought to correct or review the RTC''s alleged
misappreciation of evidence which could not translate into excess
or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of
discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused the
publication of the Order setting the case for initial hearing. 31 The
CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to
correct a lower court''s evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of
judgment, which are correctible by an appeal," 32 The
CAthendisposed of the case in this
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issues
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION
BECAUSE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I This
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC''S
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65,
ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD
HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE
IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS
PROVISION OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING
HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A
"WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT''S ABSENT
WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner''s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
Court the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an
RTC''s immediately final and executory Decision on a
presumptive death.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose''s alleged
efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-
founded belief that the latter is probably dead. 37 It maintains that
even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate
Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the
relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police,
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present
any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found. 39 It also
contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events,
occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make
a comprehensive search for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the
plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the
propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the
Family Code for the purpose of terminating their
marriage.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically
assert that he wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively
dead because he intends to get married again, an essential
premise of Article 41 of the Family
Code.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent''s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic''s
Petition because the latter''s petition is erected upon the ground
that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on
record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or
significance; and that such a ground does not avail in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose
also contends that the Republic should have instead filed a
motion for reconsideration44 of the RTC''s Decision of January
31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore
submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
granting his petition because it even dutifully complied with the
publication requirement.45 He moreover argues that to sustain the
present petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make
inroads into judicial territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial
court''s factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as
these were arrived after due
deliberation.47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court''s Ruling
Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the proper remedy to question the RTC''s Decision in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that
the RTC''s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive
death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately
final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain
a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment. 49 Concurring in
the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban
further therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge
the RTC Decision was to institute a petition forcertiorari under
Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule
45.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
197
 already dead
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v.
Tango:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted
Jose''s Petition. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
thereon, subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural two years shall be sufficient.
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
rules. summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
(Emphasis supplied.) absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a
well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
requisites for the declaration of presumptive
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final death:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
and executory.
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a years,or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
trial court''s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. absentee is dead; and,
Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
even if the Court''s original jurisdiction to issue a writ declaration of presumptive death of the
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals absentee.58 (Underscoring supplied)
in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, x x x52 (Citation
that in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that
omitted; Underscoring supplied)
the -
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the]
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave
general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would]
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the
not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that
Decision of the C A, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter
Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement
of the Rules of Court."53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a due
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of
to ascertain not only the absent spouse''s whereabouts but, more
the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is
with the CA to question the RTCs Decision declaring the
already dead.
presumptive death of Marina B.
Narceda.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
Above all, this Court''s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56
made it
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It
crystal clear that the OSG properly availed of a petition
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTCs Order therein
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To
declaring Jerry Cantor as presumptively dead.
be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs Decision.
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). 59 (Emphasis
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the
omitted; underscoring supplied)
Family Code is complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded
to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is belief that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:

198
 determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie''s parents while he was two years (and what those years were), and naming the
still out of the country, but did not reach them as they had particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities
allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental; that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he
interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead
because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated
information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie''s relatives October 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No.
and friends; 04158-MN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent''s
Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is
(3) Jose''s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, accordingly DISMISSED.
hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose''s
older brother, and by Netchie''s aunt, both of whom testified that SO ORDERED.
he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only
for one month and that after this, there had been no information
as to Netchie''s whereabouts.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60
this Court held
Manila
that the present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely
conducted a "passive search" because she simply made FIRST DIVISION
unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and
friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1)
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
when there is failure to present the persons from whom the
vs.
present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-
spouse''s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
failure to report the missing spouse''s purported disappearance
or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the present
spouse''s evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the
latter was indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent DECISION
or rigorous requirement has been marked out
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxx [T]he Court fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in

nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict
standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should
ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is
met. xxx
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the State''s policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as
the family''s foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage
should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. xxx
xxx [I]t has not escaped this Court''s attention that the strict
standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need
only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has
consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a
denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly
put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases
under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations
omitted)62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s
finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article
41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief
standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate
the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of
stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from
his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and
relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the
witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly
saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly
missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the
media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-
92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also
assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution 3 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia,
who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior
to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the
marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child
died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the
dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan
for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote
letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about
the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being
born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

199
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced
the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition
for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE
AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS
NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage
may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b)
whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they
coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that
despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only
on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4)
years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to
have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a
favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for
bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case
was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction
against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the
bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be
hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing
from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same
bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is,
therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage
on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls
from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by
three men at the premises of the University of the East after his
classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka
Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom
appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who
accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to
marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
200
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at
that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if
threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the
fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel
of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who
were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about
his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his
child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January
1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act
was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his
wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter
by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on
August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of
fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because
it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the
date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the
continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she
declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988,
matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x.
The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw
overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her
confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus,
especially when she herself had presented documentary
evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed
there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery
on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because
the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time.
Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered
prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had
delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in
January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to
any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived
by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the
letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-
examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but
denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the
appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife,
and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-
direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind
and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he
was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm
by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made
the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his
involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation
can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant
of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that
his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation
is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the
validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses
who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed
to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s
fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s
may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable
under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages
for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records
or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely
said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the
baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of
fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no
reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her
alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral
damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and
the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed,
respondent should have taken the witness stand and should
have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly
suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations
do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. No other person could have proven such
damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori,
she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article
2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need
not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been
agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that
such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before
the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in
addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that
he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral
damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded
unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral
damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to
satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is
not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January
26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition
for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent,
is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary
damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
201
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY,
BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the
community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true
intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of
judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright
the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the
Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria
Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon
Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on
July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with
the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground
that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was
raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in
1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical
student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very
thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They
soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married. 6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not
last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At
home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable
way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in
stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to
Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For
instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller. 9She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her
worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr.
Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything.
At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal
abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified
that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview
with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina
Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated.14Such incapacity is marked by
antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared
to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some
petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that
their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition
for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he
refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King
Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from
converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which
is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and
residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or
rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their
children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed
the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said
there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection
of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings.
This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight
years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this
otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and
possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to
avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any
further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also
fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.
Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house
during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a
witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his
brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some
quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was
nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony. 21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day
Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied
that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and
Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no
other person with them at that time, except their driver. 23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's
findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no
psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29
January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void
from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the
same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor
of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all
the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
202
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment
upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an
Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and
Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of
Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article
36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the
surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint
and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals
that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed,
generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is
reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes
marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man
and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed
into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct
the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55,
par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the
biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is
not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal
heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true
sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him
and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own
family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due
course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment
with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in
excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction
to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his
conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is
hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision
(dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing
the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment.
Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the
decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming
there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or
corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he
claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there
was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the
exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45,
assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve
the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's
exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the
CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from
one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not
be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer
available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v.
Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat,
substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that
while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with
respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to
the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on
equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme
Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time
where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it,
but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed
exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. 35 It has, in
the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks
the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA
instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave
abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage
on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time
that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil
Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the
CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her
for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school
teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month
suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she
is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves
stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant
petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38(Underscoring supplied)
203
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal. 39 The CA
opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or
resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had
substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court
stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse,
not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed
with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked
the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice
to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct
about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the
rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner
Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for
review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an
ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered
the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court
prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great
injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of
the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served
by giving due course to the present petition and treating
petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65,
considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a
marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a
natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that
every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the
merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of
Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel,
Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate
remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to
move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She
also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's
incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of
Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds
the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1)
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in
outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3)
where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions.
Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be
made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests
of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his
case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained
thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is
based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of
his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's
being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is
deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside
on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice
and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present
evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer
for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed
to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which
has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day
in court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require
it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case
involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is
guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence
in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-
Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance
and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words,
the court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to
annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains
of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the
heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no
basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It
went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings,
unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital
obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. 55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition
for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida
attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual
tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the
perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling
the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:
204
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003),
when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently
denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual.
This is the fact that can bededuced from the totality of the
marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people
around him even including his own close friends doubted his
true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp.
73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings,
plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant
did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all
the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those
people but nothing happened after that. There may have been
more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort
filing cases against and be effected by these people and so,
putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the
same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to
either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of
initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end,
only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff,
the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even
got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a
happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their
children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant,
he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like
wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative
in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81,
TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant
taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that
he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that
twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001)
he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips
plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly
discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt
as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of
plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the
game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry
advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and
obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a
very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their
children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference
without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a
homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage
may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59Nowhere in
the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence
that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and
that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. 60 It is the
concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se,
that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment
presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in
giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid,
it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not
among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family
Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated
in the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit,
however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is
actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground
existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed
at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for
clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage"
at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the
suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal
separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to
annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a
blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a
basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity
strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which
is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. 65 In Crutcher
v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous
indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation
so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole
purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they
would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the
Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce
is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned
as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At
most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful
marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced
three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this
onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a
vitiated marital consent was found inVillanueva v. Court of
Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent,
appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a
perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they
coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage
on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his
child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
205
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed
to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not
only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per
se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void
from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basicautonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of
these social institutions against desecration by fabricated
evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly
administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community
property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration
and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid
marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of
the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the
community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath,
the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the
dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property
regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of
the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the petition in the trial court
to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the
petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying
the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S.
Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the
respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight
children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births
are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home
and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25,
1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the
respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and
judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support
pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735.
At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM
Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise
Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the
following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos.
120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta.
Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the
resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building,
pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares
of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-
third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth
(1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise
agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on
June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings
and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of
the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On
June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662.
Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner
was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may be
206
served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to
the petitioner at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff
served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted
service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a
Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a
copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the
complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant
thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on
June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22,
1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at
8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no
appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for
the State and offered no objection to the motion of the
respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted
the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the
respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On
July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition
and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The
clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the
court on July 16, 1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and
Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the municipal
mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the
respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC
of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter
alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by
making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she
was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in
fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at
Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the
petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be
heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable
judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also
alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and
summons on her by substituted service through her married son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore,
Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the
petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the
order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and
void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the
extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further
contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s
finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity.
Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the
RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter
alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B.
Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court
to render Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for
every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in
the absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that
the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that
extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not
availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new
trial, or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said
resolution, appending thereto an amended petition in which she
alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-
year period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could
not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or
estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies were no longer available through no
fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her. 16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court
nullifying her and the respondent’s marriage was null and void for
the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct
an investigation on whether there was collusion between the
parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was
sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit
the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order or
resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two
207
grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on
extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent,
namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in
the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise,
the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the
remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her
own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of
Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the
Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies
were no longer available through no fault of her own. The
petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such
remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely
to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is
guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s
rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license
to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by
subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for
relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She
merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the
trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition
did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because
although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the
remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment,
she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the original petition and denying admission of the amended
petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals
failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition,
that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim
that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No.
NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and
amended petition did not state a cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud,
we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or
final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action,
the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no
fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the
Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were
based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the
failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of
the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint
were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who,
however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original
petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie
meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the
Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that
jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service
of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him
that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to
defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of
the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence
of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person
of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless
he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either
by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her. 27 However, if there
is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on
the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the
summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in
Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of
service should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is
only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating
the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the
summons and complaint and the fact that such effort
failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to
be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is
necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the
usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service
of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized
by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA
and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons
was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was
submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no
statement was made on the impossibility of locating the
defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was
made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no
mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing
at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza,
Las Piñas, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly
residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had
been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father
merely showed him the summons and the complaint and was
made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was
not furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso,
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining
land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as
his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been
residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence
situated on my father’s lot), my father came to see me and then
asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and
the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are
for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of
marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy
of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
208
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in
dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the amended
petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the
merits of the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot but
express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by
the records. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to
file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion
of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public
prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial
court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte
and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper
of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial
court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the
Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid
down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by
the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor,
waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the
rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution
requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-
forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for
annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf
of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between
the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the MARIO SIOCHI, G.R. No. 169900
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if Petitioner,
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or
fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his
opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
- versus -
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The ALFREDO GOZON,
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence,
their preservation is not the concern of the family members WINIFRED GOZON, GIL
alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL
family should stay together must not depend on the whims and REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA
caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers GOZON,
psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or
her marital duties and obligations. Respondents.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.

The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and
x-----------------------
September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET
x
ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No.
59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule G.R. NO. 169977
47 of the Rules of Court, as amended. INTER-DIMENSIONAL
REALTY, Present:
SO ORDERED.
INC.,

Petitioner, CARPIO, J.,

SECOND DIVISION CHAIRPERSON,

BRION,
- versus-
DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, AND
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA
GOZON, PEREZ, JJ.
ALFREDO GOZON, AND

WINIFRED GOZON, Promulgated:

Respondents. MARCH 18, 2010

X----------------------------------------------
----X

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for

review,[1] assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision[2] and the 30
September 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74447.

this case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property)

covered by tct no. 5357.[4] the property is situated inmalabon,
metro manila and is registered in the name of
alfredo gozon (alfredo), married to elvira gozon (elvira).

on 23 december 1991, elvira filed with the cavite city regional trial
court (cavite rtc) a petition for legal separation against her
husband alfredo. on 2 january 1992, elvira filed a notice of lis
pendens, which was then annotated on tct no. 5357.

209
on 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was still
pending, alfredo and mario siochi (mario) entered into an
agreement to buy and sell[5] (agreement) involving the property
for the price of p18 million. among the stipulations in the
agreement were that alfredo would: (1) secure an affidavit from
elvira that the property is alfredos exclusive property and to
annotate the agreement at the back of tct no. 5357; (2) secure
the approval of the cavite rtc to exclude the property from the
legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice
oflis pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on tct no.
5357. however, despite repeated demands from mario, alfredo
failed to comply with these stipulations. after paying the p5 million
earnest money as partialpayment of the purchase price, mario
took possession of the property in september 1993. on 6
september 1993, the agreement was annotated on tct no. 5357.
meanwhile, on 29 june 1994, the cavite rtc rendered a
decision[6] in the legal separation case, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation between petitioner and respondent. accordingly,
petitioner elvira robles gozon is entitled to live separately from
respondent alfredo gozon without dissolution of their marriage
bond. the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby
declared dissolved and liquidated. being the offending spouse,
respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
same is awarded to their child winifred r. gozon whose custody is
awarded to petitioner.
furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their
child winifred r. gozon as her needs arises.
so ordered.[7]
as regards the property, the cavite rtc held that it is deemed
conjugal property.
on 22 august 1994, alfredo executed a deed of donation over the
property in favor of their daughter, winifred gozon (winifred). the
register of deeds of malabon, gil tabije, cancelled tct no. 5357
and issued tct no. m-10508[8] in the name of winifred, without
annotating the agreement and the notice of lis pendens on tct
no. m-10508.
on 26 october 1994, alfredo, by virtue of a special power of
attorney[9] executed in his favor by winifred, sold the property to
inter-dimensional realty, inc. (idri) for p18 million.[10] idri paid
alfredo p18 million, representing full payment for the
property.[11] subsequently, the register of deeds of malabon
cancelled tct no. m-10508 and issuedtct no. m-10976[12] to idri.
mario then filed with the malabon regional trial court (malabon
rtc) a complaint for specific performance and damages,
annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
on 3 april 2001, the malabon rtc rendered a decision, [13] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
01. on the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
210
1.1 the same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 enjoining defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon, inter-
dimensional realty, inc. and gil tabije, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from any
attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of
further alienating or disposing of the subject property;
1.1.2. enjoining defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. from
entering and fencing the property;
1.1.3. enjoining defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon, inter-
dimensional realty, inc. to respect plaintiffs possession of the
property.
02. the agreement to buy and sell dated 31 august 1993,
between plaintiff and defendant alfredo gozon is hereby
approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant elvira
robles-gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal
property subject of this case.
03. the deed of donation dated 22 august 1994, entered into by
and between defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon is
hereby nullified and voided.
04. the deed of absolute sale dated 26 october 1994, executed
by defendant winifred gozon, through defendant alfredo gozon, in
favor of defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. is hereby nullified
and voided.
05. defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. is hereby ordered to
deliver its transfer certificate of title no. m-10976 to the register of
deeds of malabon, metro manila.
06. the register of deeds of malabon, metro manila is hereby
ordered to cancel certificate of title nos. 10508 in the name of
winifred gozon and m-10976 in the name of inter-dimensional
realty, inc., and to restore transfer certificate of title no. 5357 in
the name of alfredo gozon, married to elvira robles with the
agreement to buy and sell dated 31 august 1993 fully annotated
therein is hereby ordered.
07. defendant alfredo gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a deed
of absolute sale in favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided
share in the subject property and to comply with all the
requirements for registering such deed.
08. ordering defendant elvira robles-gozon to sit with plaintiff to
agree on the selling price of her undivided one-half share in the
subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a deed of
absolute sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply
with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of this decision.
09. thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant alfredo
gozon the balance of four million pesos (p4,000,000.00) in his
one-half undivided share in the property to be set off by the
award of damages in plaintiffs favor.
10. plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant elvira robles-
gozon the price they had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half
undivided share in the subject property.
11. defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon and gil tabije are
hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
following:
11.1 two million pesos (p2,000,000.00) as actual and
compensatory damages;
11.2 one million pesos (p1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 five hundred thousand pesos (p500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
11.4 four hundred thousand pesos (p400,000.00) as attorneys
fees; and
11.5 one hundred thousand pesos (p100,000.00) as litigation
expenses.
11.6 the above awards are subject to set off of plaintiffs
obligation in paragraph 9 hereof.
12. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
ordered to pay inter-dimensional realty, inc. jointly and severally
the following:
12.1 eighteen million pesos (p18,000,000.00) which constitute
the amount the former received from the latter pursuant to their
deed of absolute sale dated 26 october 1994, with legal interest
therefrom;
12.2 one million pesos (p1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
12.3 five hundred thousand pesos (p500,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and
12.4 one hundred thousand pesos (p100,000.00) as attorneys
fees.
13. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
ordered to pay costs of suit.
so ordered.[14]
on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the malabon rtcs
decision with modification. the dispositive portion of the court of
appeals decision dated 7 july 2005 reads:
wherefore, premises considered, the assailed decision dated
april 3, 2001 of the rtc, branch 74, malabon is hereby affirmed
with modifications, as follows:
1. the sale of the subject land by defendant alfredo gozon to
plaintiff-appellant siochi is declared null and void for the following
reasons:
a) the conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-
appellee elvira gozon;
b) defendant alfredo gozons one-half () undivided share has
been forfeited in favor of his daughter, defendant winifred gozon,
by virtue of the decision in the legal separation case rendered by
the rtc, branch 16, cavite;
2. defendant alfredo gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-
appellant siochi the amount of p5 million which the latter paid as
earnest money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;
3. defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon and gil tabije are
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant siochi jointly and
severally, the following:
a) p100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) p100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) p50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
d) p20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) the awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby
ordered deleted for lack of basis.
4. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
ordered to pay defendant-appellant idri jointly and severally the
following:
a) p100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) p100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) p50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
211
defendant winifred gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of
defendant alfredo gozon was awarded, is hereby given the option
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject
land.
the rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
so ordered.[15]
only mario and idri appealed the decision of the court of appeals.
in his petition, mario alleges that the agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn.
since elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale,
mario prays for the court to direct alfredo and elvira to execute a
deed of absolute sale over the property upon his payment of p9
million to elvira.
on the other hand, idri alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and
for value. thus, idri prays that the court should uphold the validity
of idris tct no. m-10976 over the property.
we find the petitions without merit.
this case involves the conjugal property of alfredo and elvira.
since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity
of the family code, the applicable law is the family code. article
124 of the family code provides:
art. 124. the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. in case
of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. these powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. in
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. however, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors. (emphasis supplied)
in this case, alfredo was the sole administrator of the property
because elvira, with whom alfredo was separated in fact, was
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. however, as sole administrator of the property, alfredo
still cannot sell the property without the written consent of elvira
or the authority of the court. without such consent or authority,
the sale is void.[16] the absence of the consent of one of the
spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the
sale.[17] even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written
consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.[18] the
agreement entered into by alfredo and mario was without the
written consent of elvira. thus, the agreement is entirely void. as
regards marios contention that the agreement is a continuing
offer which may be perfected by elviras acceptance before the
offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by alfredo to winifred and then sold to idri clearly
indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
however, we disagree with the finding of the court of appeals that
the one-half undivided share of alfredo in the property was
already forfeited in favor of his daughter winifred, based on the
ruling of the cavite rtc in the legal separation case. the court of
appeals misconstrued the ruling of the cavite rtc that alfredo,
being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net
profits and the same is awarded to winifred.
the cavite rtc ruling finds support in the following provisions of the
family code:
art. 63. the decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
with regard to idri, we agree with the court of appeals in holding
that idri is not a buyer in good faith. as found by the rtc malabon
and the court of appeals, idri had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person
to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property.
the representative of idri testified that he knew about the
existence of the notice of lis pendens on tct no. 5357 and the
legal separation case filed before the cavite rtc. thus, idri could
not feign ignorance of the cavite rtc decision declaring the
property as conjugal.
furthermore, if idri made further inquiries, it would have known
that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly
irregular. under section 77 of presidential decree no. 1529,[19] the
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the
court, or (b) by the register of deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused the registration of the lis pendens. in this case,
the lis pendens was cancelled by the register of deeds upon the
request of alfredo. there was no court order for the cancellation of
the lis pendens. neither did elvira, the party who caused the
registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its
cancellation.

(1) the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each

other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; besides, had idri been more prudent before buying the property,
it would have discovered that alfredos donation of the property to
(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
winifred was without the consent of elvira. under article 125[20] of
shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse
the family code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one
shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by
spouse without the consent of the other spouse.clearly, idri was
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
not a buyer in good faith.
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article
43(2);

(3) the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of article 213 of this
code; and
the offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession. moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of
the malabon rtc for the reimbursement of the p18 million paid by
idri for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in
the dispositive portion of the court of appeals decision.
wherefore, we deny the petitions. we affirm the 7 july 2005
decision of the court of appeals in ca-g.r. cv no. 74447 with the
followingmodifications:

art. 43. the termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding article shall produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default
of children, the innocent spouse; (emphasis supplied)
(1) we delete the portions regarding the forfeiture of
alfredo gozons one-half undivided share in favor of
winifred gozon and the grant of option to winifred gozon whether
or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) we order alfredo gozon and winifred gozon to pay inter-
dimensional realty, inc. jointly and severally the eighteen million
pesos (p18,000,000) which was the amount paid by inter-
dimensional realty, inc. for the property, with legal interest
computed from the finality of this decision.
so ordered.

thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that

the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the Republic of the Philippines
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. it is only alfredos Supreme Court
share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of winifred.
Manila
article 102(4) of the family code provides that [f]or purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
article 43, no. (2) and 63, no. (2), the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
SECOND DIVISION
market value at the time of its dissolution. clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of winifred is not alfredos share in the conjugal

212
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556

Petitioner, Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao
Present: shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent
spouse.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

Further, except for the personal and real properties already
- versus - BRION, foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
PEREZ,

SERENO, and 1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
REYES, JJ. 2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. 3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO,
PETCHIE C. QUIAO, 4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
represented by their mother
Promulgated: 5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters
RITA QUIAO,
July 4, 2012 located in Tungao, Butuan City;
Respondents.
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
----x
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;

DECISION 8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;

REYES, J.: shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and

[petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.

The family is the basic and the most important institution of

society. It is in the family where children are born and molded
either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers [Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the
in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message
they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not
shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of
separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
properties. [P]5,000.00[.]
The Case

This case comes before us via Petition for Review SO ORDERED.[5]

on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order [2] dated January 8,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In
lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining
the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within
legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule
of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the on Legal Separation.[6]
provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.

On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for

Antecedent Facts execution[7] which the trial court granted in its Order dated
December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita)

filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).[3]Subsequently, the RTC rendered a hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the
Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
which provides:

SO ORDERED.[8]
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of
plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B.
Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution[9] which reads as follows:
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately
from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.

213
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the
[petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums
stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your
lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine
Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to
satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command
you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you
make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are
enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full
in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.[10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the
petitioner paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00,
representing the following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the
conjugal share;
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC
a Motion for Clarification,[12]asking the RTC to define the term Net
Profits Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC
issued an Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the
phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties
of each [of the] spouse and the debts. [14] The Order further held
that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.[15] The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff
intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the
payments of the debts for only separate properties of the
defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has
none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the
Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[17] on September 8,
214
2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order[18] dated
November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still
consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply
wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit
earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby
ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of
forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to
be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the
Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
2007,[22] the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted
the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order
dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order
dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on
February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION
OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND
WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF
EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN
1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF
FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS
ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN
THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the
applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the
respondents have called our attention to the fact that the
Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the
Motion for Clarification was filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to
resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October
10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can
clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed
on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would be
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.[26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also
apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals
bycertiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.[27] In other words, a party litigant may file his
notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of
the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-
day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration
makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October
10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration
nor a notice of appeal.On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days
had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the
respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or
after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of
execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially
executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had
lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net
profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept
on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10,
2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue
until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at
the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial
courts decision has become final and executory. A judgment
becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to
appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such
215
period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate
unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a
judgment that became final.[28]
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void
judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be
disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of
the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said
that a void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality
and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation. [29] But
what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does
a judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had
no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties or both.[30] In other words, a court,
which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void
judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a
void judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a
case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369
confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city,
the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among
others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and
property relations of the husband and wife or those living
together.[32] The Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the
petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. [34] In the instant
case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in
Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of
filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over
the respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering
that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were
served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that
the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January
9, 2001.[35] Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the
questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the
persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005
judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was
rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such,
the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification
is meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.[36] In fact, we have ruled that for [as]
long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed
or corrected only by appeal.[37] Granting without admitting that the
RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the
petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the
reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do
this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's
decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What
we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and
nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be
disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already
become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since
he cohabited with a woman who is not his wife;[38]
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of
respondent Rita;[39]
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; [40]
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership;[41]
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's
custody;[42]
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession;[43]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made in the will of the innocent spouse;[44]
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal
partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family
Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether
acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved;[45]
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal
properties while they were living together;[46]
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must
be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was
the one who took charge of the administration of these
properties;[48]
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to
matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the
conjugal liabilities totalingP503,862.10 shall be charged to the
income generated by these properties;[49]
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether
the petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share
for the support of the family;[50]
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article
129(7);[51]
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any
encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the
petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's
legitime;[52]
216
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children;[53] and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the
sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses
of P5,000.00.[54]
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated
October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the
enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case
since the parties' property relation is governed by thesystem
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held
that Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We
agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property
relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and
the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at
the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was
the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they
did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. [55] Article 119
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what
governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the
respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this
property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. [57]
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and
the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable
law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code
[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other law.[58]
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the
trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to
Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been
impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired
vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being
owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family
Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of
authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same
impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the
property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code,
the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife.[60]Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties
covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested
right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation
of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the
Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of
Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive
application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's
vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is
written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and
explained vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do
not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected
against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto
the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA
Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon.
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
217
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.[64] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived
of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in
her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to
her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant
to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the
petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions
of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership
profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be
awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or
industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the
separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not
apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be
entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no
basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code,
his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he
is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and
after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence,
the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under
the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-
standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of
the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that,
after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in
its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this
case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. [70] The petitioner did
not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus,
the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's
decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us
from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because
final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor
reversed by this Court.[71]
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code
clearly applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision
has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all
the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture
authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the
computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the
absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable
law as to the property relations between the parties and the
applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier
discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the
property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation
and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net
profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code,
since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article
63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.[72] Thus,
without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of
the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where
lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the
processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the
absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
218
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community,
the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage
(except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form
the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass
is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally
or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of
the value each one may have originally owned. [73]
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of
marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute
community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if
the community's properties are insufficient, the separate
properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be
delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute
community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the
husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution.[74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires
that we first find the market value of the properties at the time of
the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value
of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the
absolute community and this result to the net assets or net
remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from
which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of
marriage, which then results to the net profits.[75]
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant
case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband
and wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining
properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of
the absolute community constitutes the market value at
dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were
legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable
for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and
obligations will be subtracted from the market value at
dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid
from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the
net remainder or net asset.And from such net asset/remainder of
the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market
value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting
totality constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate
properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the net
profits. However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial
court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his
children.Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which
should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both
parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any
property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership
Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code
applies in the instant casefor purposes only of defining net
profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute
community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided
for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the
provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.[76] From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under
the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the
liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited
to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of
his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be
paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit
of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous
event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if
any.
219
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in
this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such
majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the
liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their
separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found
that the couple has no separate properties when they
married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal
properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located
in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to
the assets of the conjugal partnership;[81] and if the community is
enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either
spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their
respective owners shall be made.[82]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the
debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation
of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective
separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not
sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with
their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. [83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of
the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of
them.[84] In the instant case,since it was already established by
the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties,[85] there is nothing to return to any of them. The
listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or
their respective heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children,
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances,
the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we
cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above,
the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City
is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7,
2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER
and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, respondents. Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and
SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no.
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. [2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture
and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court
or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." [3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause.[4] It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person.[5]
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of
the Court of Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the
application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as
the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio[9] is to annul
that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda
K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda
and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of
extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30)
years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
220
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in
Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely:
Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52);
Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and
Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the
United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in
Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of
200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and
instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents [11]refused
petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon
petitioners manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner
and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland
Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and
Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to
allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio
and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors
thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal
thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued
be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED
DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful
restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein
jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial
of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.[15] Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was
no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing
or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing
them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of
Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having
answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the
court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to
make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices
he made may not appeal to some of his family members but
these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have
no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right
to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with
the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion
of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not
involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a
wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of
any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the
petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies
the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation
rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA
VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS
C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
221
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593,
declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the
late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent
resolution[3] denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak
Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square
meters.[4] After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980,
Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana,
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in
which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of
the property to Francisco.[5] On June 27, 1916, Francisco
registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.[6]
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, [7] the latters cousin,
Luzviminda Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a
widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside.[9]
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said
Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room,[10] while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of Francisco,
claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his
mistress.[12] On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper
who could enter the masters bedroom only when the old man
asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for
her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.[13]
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only
Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. [14] Cirila testified that she
was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old
widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still
walk with her assistance at that time;[15] and that his health
eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden. [16]Erlinda
Tabancura testified that Franciscos sole source of income
consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets. [17] He did
not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he
provided her family with food and lodging.[18]
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco
executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150
square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted
the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger
portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that
the donation was being made in consideration of the faithful
services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10)
years. The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. [19] and
later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.[20]
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In
1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a market
value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter
vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who
are the decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her
favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of
the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based
on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of one Cirila Comille. The documents were
(1) an application for a business permit to operate as real estate
lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the
signature Cirila Comille;[22] (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real
estate lessor with a health certificate showing the signature Cirila
Comille in black ink;[23] and (3) the death certificate of the
decedent with the signature Cirila A. Comille written in black
ink.[24] The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the
late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book
No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic
T. Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and
lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days
after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum
of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on
June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As already
stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion
was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila;
(2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirilas use of
Franciscos surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case
mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Franciscos common-
law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed
by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the
common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not correct and
is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of
facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by
the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally
incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts
and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence
from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504;
Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not
in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102
Phil. 577, 584.[26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject
only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
222
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals
based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the
general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term cohabitation or living
together as husband and wife means not only residing under one
roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.Cohabitation, of
course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested
in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is thepublic assumption by
a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together
as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as
such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together,
even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.[29] In this jurisdiction,
this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law
relationship the stipulations between the parties, [30] a conviction
of concubinage,[31] or the existence of illegitimate children.[32]
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila
admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a
long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage
and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very
least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told her
that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila
and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the
surname Comille. As previously stated, these are an application
for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, [33] a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,[34] and the death certificate of Francisco.[35] These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Franciscos common-
law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last
name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in
Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy,
RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of
Francisco. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from
Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver-employee, but Franciscos common law
spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under
the law.[36] It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco
and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would
thus lead to the conclusion that she was Franciscos common-law
spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.