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RULE 76
2. ACAIN vs.IAC
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the RTC of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the
will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, on
the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores
and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a translation in English
submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents
2. The will provided that all his shares from those he earned jointly with his wife shall be given to Segundo
Acain, and in case Segundo predeceases him, all the share shall be given to his children.
3. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
Constantino as the petitioner in this special proceeding.
4. Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson
Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity
to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
5. Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
6. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain .
7. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari for the
review of respondent Court's decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondents(Virginia) have been pretirited.
HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited . Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does
not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line, however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner . Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that
she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow
were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence,
this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance . The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any
other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. No legacies nor
devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to
petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the
opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
2. Whether on not Petitioner have legal interest in the estate of the deceased?(Rule 76 Who may petition for
allowance of a will)
HELD:
NONE. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor.Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called
upon to receive At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will
left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
3.HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN vs. SALAS
FACTS:
1. Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, diedwith neither descendants nor ascendants. She executed a
last will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as
executor to serve without bond.
2. Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu for the probate of Remedios' last will
and testament. The court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
3. On 10 August 1972, the private respondents (Concepcion and Maria), who are sisters of the deceased,
did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate
(sic) of the Will" wherein they expressly manifested, with their "full knowledge and consent that . . . they
have no objection of (sic) the allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo," and
that they have "no objection to the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus
Fran."
4. No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.
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5. On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will and
appointing petitioner Fran as executor thereof. The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite
the expiration of the period therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate.
6. Petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; copies thereof were furnished each of the private
respondents.
7. Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the
devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion
M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for the court's approval. Said legatees and devisees submitted
certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of
hearing, and state that they had no objection to its approval.
8. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court declared that the parties(signers of the project
of partition) therein as the only heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing
the administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings
closed
9. Thereafter, CFI CEBU Branch VIII was converted to Juvenile and domestic Relations Court, the court was
officially transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as Branch VIII.
10. Private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order of partition of 10 September 1973, in said
motion, they ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the
allowance of the will.
11. Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued an Order setting for hearing the said
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration .
12. On 25 March 1980, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus to Reconsider the 26 February
1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, but the respondent Judge denied it for lack of merit
13. Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain respondent Judge from reopening
the case.
14. In their voluminous Comments and Opposition to the petition and Supplemental Petition, 21 private
respondents not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in their Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration, they also squarely raise for the first time the following issues. Some of the issues are(a)
The probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since petitioner Jesus Fran failed to submit
to the court the original of the will.(b) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as
petitioner Jesus Fran did not attach it to the petition; what was attached was only the English translation
of the will.xxxx
15. Respondent Judge issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void,
and converting the same into an intestate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that the original copy of the will be presented for the court to acquire jurisdiction
for the allowance of the will.
HELD:
Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
Private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To
Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally state that they have no objection to the allowance of
the will.
In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is normally an implementation
of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings.
Private respondents claim that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition because only the
English translation of the will — and not a copy of the same — was attached to the petition; The Court already
ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. "The original of said document
[the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonpresentation of said original and the
acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof."
The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein
regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed.
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus
motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the
rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued the order
approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their conformity through their respective
certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
Private respondents' contention that the order approving the Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is
null and void because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of hearing and that they were not notified
of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification dated 5 September 1973, private respondent Concepcion
M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of the Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the above-
entitled proceeding, and that she has no objection to the approval of the said Project of Partition."
The instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED.
4. DE GUZMAN VS. ANGELES
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Manolito de Guzman, before the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila.
2. Private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) — vehicles registered under the
name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman.
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3. The lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the deputy
sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the private respondent.
4. The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt of the order within which
to file his opposition to the motion for a writ of possession.
5. In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."
6. The aforesaid motion was set for hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same order, the lower court directed
that all parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner.
7. In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed
as special administratrix
8. The lower court issued another order date June 8, 1987, which granted the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Assistance" filed by Petitioner-Special Administratrix Elaine de Guzman for appointment of Deputy
Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora together with some military men and/or policemen to assist
her in preserving the estate of Manolito de Guzman, the motion is granted.
9. The petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject
vehicles on the ground that they were his personal properties.
10. In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels for both parties, the June
8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect that the order "must be merely to take and preserve assets
admittedly belonging to the estate, but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third
persons."
11. The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be his own.
12. Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders dated June 5, 1987 and June
8, 1987.
13. A TRO was issued enjoining the respondent court(RTC) from enforcing the two questioned orders. In
another resolution dated October 28, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for the
administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate
of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but the
determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of administration
is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the
decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner
provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition
after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's
jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have
an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should
be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be
deprived of his right to property without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void
and subject to annulment.

ISSUE:
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be
given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties
pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent haste in issuing the questioned
orders, states:
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Santos v. Castillo, we ruled that before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate
of a will and the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the
10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the honest conviction that it would be
residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor
to the best interest of the estate without unduly prejudicing any interested party or third
named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.
person. Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have prejudiced the estate for the properties
may be lost, wasted or dissipated in the meantime. (Rollo, p. 86)
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon
the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the petition had
xxx xxx xxx
alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
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This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the
respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it could
have caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of Court.
All interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the Petition
(P850,240.80) could have participated in the proceedings especially so, because the respondent immediately filed
a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix.
A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to
care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. The petitioner as creditor
of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be
the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It
is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator
was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable
delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 of
Makati are hereby set aside. The case is ordered remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with
previous notice to all interested parties as required by law.
MARAVILLA v MARAVILLA
G.R. NO. L-23225 FEB. 27, 1971
FACTS: Digna Maravilla died testate leaving an extensive estate. Her husband, Herminio Maravilla, submitted
the deceased’s will for probate. The will was typewritten in Spanish language, consisting of 5 pages, including the
page on which the attestation clause was completed. The signature of the testatrix appears at the logical end of
the will on page 4 and at the left margin of all other pages. At the bottom and at the left margin of all 5 pages
appear the signatures of Timoteo Hernaez, Aquilino Mansueto and Mariano Buenaflor, attesting witnesses. The
paging of the will is handwritten in words. On the lower half of the 3 rd page, before the name Concepcion P.
Maravilla is the typewritten word “hermana” which was crossed out and over it was handwritten the word
“cunada” bearing the initials D.M. During the probate proceedings, only 1 of the 3 attesting witnesses was present
because the other 2 had already died. Pedro, Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed Maravilla, opposed the probate
of the will on the ground that such was not executed in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Code. RTC
eventually denied probate of the will.
ISSUE: W/N the will must be probated.
RULING: YES. The trial court’s conclusion is far-fetched, fanciful and unwarranted. It was but natural that witness
Mansueto should be positive about his own signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be less positive
about Digna Maravilla’s signature since he could not be closely acquainted with the same: for aught the record
shows, the signing of the will was the only occasion he saw her sign; he had no opportunity to study her signature
before or after the execution of the will. Furthermore, he witnessed Digna’s signing not less than fourteen years
previously. To demand that in identifying Digna’s signature Mansueto should display positiveness equal to the
certainty shown by him in recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of the reasonable. A will may be allowed even
if some witnesses not remember having attested it, if other evidence satisfactorily show due execution and that
failure of witness to identify his signature does not bar probate. That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together
with the testatrix and the lawyer, sat next to one another around one table when the will was signed is clearly
established by the uncontradicted testimony of both attorney Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that detail
proves beyond doubt that each one of the parties concerned did sign in the presence of all the others. It should
be remembered, in this connection, that the test is not whether a witness did see the signing of the will but
whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do so. We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to
the effect that the testament was duly executed by a qualified testatrix and competent witnesses, in conformity
with the statutory requirements.
DE JESUS v DE JESUS, JR.
G.R. NO. 38338 JAN. 28, 1985
FACTS: After the death of Sps. Andres and Bibiana De Jesus, a special proceeding for the settlement of the
latter’s estate was filed by Simeon Roxas, brother of Bibiana. He was appointed as administrator. After such
appointment, he delivered to the court a document which purports to be the holographic will of Bibiana which he
found written on a notebook. The will was dated “Feb./61”. During the hearing,the children of Bibiana testified
that the letter dated “Feb./61 is the holographic will of their deceased mother and that they recognize the
handwriting and signature of their mother. They further testified that their mother understood English, the
language in which the holographic will was written. Luz Henson filed an opposition to probate on the ground that
the will was not executed in accordance with the law. RTC allowed probate of the will. Luz filed an MR and
contended that the alleged holographic will was not dated as required by Art. 810 of the CC that the will should
contain the day, month and year of its execution. RTC reconsidered its decision and disallowed the will.
ISSUE: W/N the date Feb./61 is a valid compliance with Art. 810 of the CC.
RULING: YES. We should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the
purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy. The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator
expressed in his last will and testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than that
which the law can make. he prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard
against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege. If a Will has
been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud
in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate. If the testator, in executing his Will,
attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or
purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator. The
object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
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avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. As a general rule, the "date"
in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at
bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle
of substantial compliance.
KALAW v RELOVA
G.R. NO. L-40207 SEPT. 28, 1984
FACTS: Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole of his deceased sister Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition before CFI
Lipa City for the probate of the deceased’s holographic will. The latter, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, sister
of testatrix, as her sole heir. Hence, Rosa opposed the probate of the will alleging that it contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by the
CC. RTC denied probate of the will.
ISSUE: W/N the holographic will, as first written, must be given effect.
RULING: NO. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at
most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when as in this case, the
holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir
with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in
the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because
she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
1. JOSE RIVERA vs. IAC
1. Venancio Rivera married to Maria Jocson died; Jose claiming to be only surviving legitimate son of Venancio,
filed Pet. for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate; opposed by Adelaido, who denied
that Jose was the son of Venancio latter being his father and did not die intestate but in fact left 2 holographic
wills.
2. Adelaido filed, w/ RTC Angeles City, Pet. for probate of wills opposed by Jose; 2 cases were consolidated;
Adelaido appointed as special administrator
3. RTC infav. of Adelaido; Jose Rivera not son of decedent but of different Venancio married to Maria Vital; wills
admitted to probate
4. IAC affirmed RTC
5. Jose’s Cont- presented marriage cert. of Venancio and Maria Vital, his baptismal cert, and testimony of Domingo
that Jose is indeed son; Jose testified that Adelaido considered him half-brother and kissed his hand as sign of
respect and that Adelaido & siblings were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio w/ Maria Jocson
6. Adelaido’s Cont- could not present his parents' marriage cert. because it’s destroyed when town burned on
war,; submitted own Birth Cert., baptismal cert. of deceased; Atty. Regalado affirmed that he knew deceased and
the
ISSUE: W/n probate should be admitted= YES
SC: 1. Adelaido could still rely on presumption of marriage, since it’s not denied that Venancio and Jocson lived
together as husband and wife for many years, begetting 7 children in all during that time.
2. Though Jose presented his parents' marriage cert., Venancio was described therein as son of Florencio.
Presumably, he was not the same Venancio described inbaptismal cert., as son of Magno; even if baptismal cert.
is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation it may be considered to determine his real identity; no evidence
that Venancio's father was called either Magno/Florencio; what’s more likely is that 2/more pesons may live at
same time and bear same name, even in same community.
3. if it’s true that he was the legitimate son of Venancio, why Jose did not assert his right as such when his father
was still alive; If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, no reason why Venancio did not help
son and instead left Jose to fend for himself as such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand
- Maria Vital’s attitude is less incomprehensible; if she’s legitimate wife she should object when her husband
abandoned her and founded another family by another woman; unnatural for lawful wife to say nothing if she’s
abandoned for another woman; not filed complaint for bigamy/concubinage against Venancio and Jocson; she was
not even presented at RTC
-Having alleged that Jocson's marriage to Venancio was null and void, Jose had burden of proof
4. IAC not erred that Venancio who married Jocson not same person who married Vital, Jose's legitimate mother,
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5. IAC considered wills valid because it found them be written, dated and signed by testator himself in accord. w/
Art. 810 of NCC; no necessity of presenting 3 witnesses required under Art. 811 because authenticity of wills had
not questioned.
- existence & authenticity of wills were questioned by Jose but flaw is that Jose is not son of Venancio whose estate
is in question. Hence, being mere stranger, no personality to contest wills and his opposition not have legal effect
of requiring 3 witnesses; testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Jr., who authenticated wills as having been written
and signed by their father, was sufficient
2. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL vs.EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY et al
1. Resps., as devisees and legatees of holographic will of deceased Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, filed w/ the RTC
Misamis Oriental, Pet. for probate of holographic will of deceased
2. Pet. filed opposition- will was forged; third hand of interested party than "true hand" of Matilde executed will.
3. Resps presented (6) witnesses and documentary evidence;
4. Pet. filed demurrer- resps. failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for probate
5. RTC infav. of Pet.- granted the Demurer
6. Resps. filed appeal- reiterating witnesses: a.) Neri- Clerk of Court of CFI Misamis, documents presented bear
signature of deceased for comparison of handwriting of the testatrix; b.) Senon- election registrar of CDO,
produced and identify voter's affid. of decedent; c.) Binanay- deceased was her aunt, and lived w/ her for (11) yrs,
acquired familiarity w/ deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals;
d.) Fiscal Waga- handled all documents signed by deceased; e.)Vedad- employee of DENR, familiar w/signature of
deceased; f.)Calugay- lived w/ deceased since birth, and was adopted by deceased, familiar w/ signature
-will written in Visayan translated in English
7. CA infav. of Resps- even if genuineness of will were contested, Art.811(requirement for the probate of a
contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator) is permissive; Resps. & other witnesses testified that handwriting and signature
in will were of testator herself w/c is unrebutted;
ISSUE: w/n CA is correct that Art. 811 is permissive= NO. It’s mandatory
SC: 1. "shall" connotes mandatory order.
-Rationale: give effect to wishes of deceased and evil is possibility that unscrupulous individuals for their benefit
will employ means to defeat the wishes of testator
2. not all witnesses presented by resps. testified explicitly that they were familiar w/ handwriting of testator
- Neri- merely identified record of Spec. Pro.; not presented to declare explicitly that sign. appearing in will was
that deceased; Senon- voter's affidavit not even produced as no longer available; Binanay- what she saw were pre-
prepared receipts & letters of deceased, w/c she either mailed or gave to her tenants; did not declare that she saw
deceased sign it, will not found in personal belongings of deceased but in possession of Binanay who kept said fact
from Pets who are the legally adopted children of deceased, such actions put in issue her motive of keeping will a
secret to Pets. and revealing it only after the death of deceased; Calugay- only reason why she was familiar w/
handwriting of deceased was because she lived w/ her since birth; never declared that she saw deceased write
note/ sign docu.; Fiscal Waga- not certain
3. SC cannot eliminate possibility of false document being adjudged as will of testator, w/c is why if holographic
will is contested, law requires 3 witnesses to declare that will was in the handwriting of deceased; will not in the
personal belongings of deceased but w/ one resps., who kept it even before death of the deceased. In the
testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or 5 years before death
of deceased
4. no opportunity for expert to compare signature and handwriting of deceased w/ other documents; only chance
at comparison was during cross-exam. of Ms. Binanay when lawyer of Pets. asked Ms. Binanay to compare
documents w/c contained signature of deceased w/ that of will and she’s not handwriting expert; Even former
lawyer of deceased expressed doubts as to authenticity of signature in holographic will
5. visual exam. of will convince us that strokes are diff. when compared w/ other documents written by testator;
signature of testator in some of disposition not readable; there were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on
will.
6. Comparing the signature in holographic will and the signatures in documents such as application letter for
pasture permit and a letter, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes,
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain
that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased
3. SPS. ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO VS. CA & CLEMENTE SAND
1. Annie Sand left will w/c named as devisees: Pets, Resp, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe
Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., & their children.
2. Pet. instituted Spec Pro for allowance of Annie's will alleging she’s of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud
3. Resp. opposed Pet.-neither testament's body nor signature was in Annie’s handwriting; it contained alterations,
corrections not duly signed by Annie; procured by Pet thru improper pressure and undue influence.
-Pet. also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. As regards disposition of house and lot in Cabadbaran Agusan del Norte
claiming that said property not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
 7
4. RTC infav. of Pet; admitted holographic will to probate; it must decide only question of identity of will, its due
execution and testamentary capacity of testatrix, no reason for disallowance of will; no evidence that will is diff.
from will actually executed; only objections are that will not written in handwriting of testatrix w/c refers to due
execution, not to identity of will; no other will was alleged to be executed by testatrix; Pets. satisfactorily shown
that will was written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of testatrix; (3) witnesses were presented and
identified handwriting; Clemente testified that testatrix was completely in her sound mind around time will in
question was executed by the testatrix; testatrix even identified Lot No. and square meters of lots
5. CA infav. of Sand; reversed RTC; Pet. for probate dismissed; will did not comply w/ Arts 813 and 814 NCC; certain
dispositions in will were either unsigned&undated, or signed but not dated; erasures, alterations and cancellations
not authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: W/n CA is correct in dismissing the Petr. For Probate= NO.
SC: 1. Rule 76, Sec.9- grounds for disallowance of will: a) not executed and attested;b.) testator was insane, or
mentally incapable to make will, at its execution;c.) executed under duress, influence of fear, or threats;d.)
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;e.)
signature was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that instrument should be his will at the time of
fixing it; the same as Art. 839 of NCC; lists are exclusive;
2. CA erred since object of solemnities surrounding execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity; not the object to
restrain and curtail exercise of right to make a will.
3. For probating non-holographic wills, formal solemnities include subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment
requirements under Arts. 805 and 806 of NCC; for holographic wills, what assures authenticity is requirement that
they be totally autographic or handwritten by testator himself, under Art. 810
4. Art. 813 - affects the validity of dispositions contained in holographic will, but not its probate. If testator fails to
sign and date some of dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. but not render
whole testament void.
5. holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance w/ Art. 814; unless
unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on date of holographic will or on testator's
signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself as lack of authentication will only result in disallowance
of such changes.
6. requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in Arts. 813 and 814
separate from that necessary conditions for validity of holographic will under Art.810, since only Art. 810 and not
Arts. 813 and 814 are essential to probate of a holographic will.
7. CA is correct that decedent could not validly dispose of house and lot in its entirety
-GR: courts in probate limited to pass only upon extrinsic validity of will sought to be probated.
EXCPTN: courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions
of the will.
-decedent herself indubitably stated in her will that Cabadbaran property is in name of her late father, John H.
Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety); Hence she cannot
validly dispose of whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
PALAGANAS VS. PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144
January 26, 2011
Facts :
1. On November 8, 2001 Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and
childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother Sergio as
the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
2. Another brother of Ruperta, Ernesto, filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate
of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
3. Petitioners Manuel Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s
will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the US where she executed it. They further argued
that it is invalid for having been executed under duress.
4. Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions
in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their
deposition, which it granted.
5. RTC admitted the probate of the will. Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously
probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
Held:
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as
yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
 8
the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the ROC provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed
by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of
a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
VDA. DE PEREZ VS ZOTICO
Facts:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents thereof,
established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. Cunanan executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife all the remainder of his real and personal property at the time of his death wheresoever
situated. In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren
with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Four days later, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate which were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also
asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of
a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. RTC issued an order directing the issuance of letters of special administration
to the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that the Philippine Life Insurance be directed to deliver the proceeds in the
amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and
their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion. Counsel for the Philippine American
Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that it had delivered to petitioner the proceeds of the
life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook in
savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates.
Atty. Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the Cunanan heirs. He manifested that before receiving
petitioner's motion, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and they prayed for deferment
of the hearing on the motions. Petitioner argued that the Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the
late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and therefore, they had no legal or proprietary interests to protect and no right to
intervene; and that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan were executed in accordance
with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with
Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code. Court granted the petitioner’s motion. Petitioner filed MR which
was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the will of the spouses Cunanan is valid.
Held:
Yes. The wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, proof that both wills conform
with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent
procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the
probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the
benefit of a third person. In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills
contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature,
practical considerations dictate their joint probate.
JOHANNES VS. HARVEY
 9

FACTS: of First Instance appointing an administrator of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable.
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes died intestate in Singapore. She was survived by his husband, B.E. Johannes, the
brothers, Frederick and Alfred, and the sister, Ida. They are all resident of Singapore except Alfred who lives in
Manila. The Singapore heirs joined in asking that the letters of the administration be granted by the Supreme Court
of the Singapore to the husband. The husband was named the administrator of the property of the deceased wife, POLLY CAYETANO vs.HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS
which was locally situated within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. It would seem
FACTS:
that the husband is entitled to the whole of the state of his wife if she die intestate, to the exclusion of any other
of kin. The brother Alfred was appointed administrator of the Manila estate of the deceased consisting of
 Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving petitioner Hermogenes Campos and private respondent Nenita,
P109,732.55. This sum, it appears, was on deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of guardianship
Remedios and Marieta as the surviving heirs.
proceedings for the late Carmen, which were finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian.
 Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication- whereby
It was alleged that the judge in CFI Manila acted with grave abuse of discretion when Alfred D’ Almeida was
he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased.
appointed as the administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in the Philippines, and that an administration
in this jurisdiction is unnecessary. Accordingly, they pray that the appointment of Alfred D’ Almeida be annulled  Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased allegedly executed in the
and to issue an order directing the Judge of CFI Manila to have placed to the credit of B.E. Johannes as United States and for her appointment as administratrix
administrator of the estate of Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late Carmen D’ Almeida Johannes.
The respondents contend that the respondent judge has not acted in excess of the jurisdiction duly conferred upon  Nenita alleged
and exercised by him in the manner provided by law, and that an order appointing an administrator is a final and
appealable order.  that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
ISSUE:
 that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister at Malate, Manila;
W/N CFI acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Alfred as administrator.
 the testatrix made her last will according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo
HELD: Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;

No. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in the foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile is
termed the principal administration, any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. A grant of
administration does not proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administration appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property
to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among
his heirs. It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator is to be
appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else. This preference has particularly
force under Spanish law precedents. The Code of Civil Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion
of the court to determine, for it may be found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the
responsibility. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domiciliary representative, if he applies
therefore, or to his nominee, or attorney, but in the absence of express statutory requirement the court may in its
discretion appoint some other person. Pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court
 that her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
 that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed
 there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to distribute the properties of the estate
located in the Philippines.
 An opposition was filed by petitioner alleging that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions
are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition.
 Respondent judge issued an order allowing to probate the will.
 Manifestation was filed by the petitioner confirming the withdrawal of his opposition.
 10
 Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief.
 It was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
 Petitioner filed Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in
support thereof.
 MR-DENIED
 Respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit.
 Hence, this petition.
(Petitioner died and left a will appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix, therefore, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by an
undisputed foreigner.
HELD: NEGATIVE
This contention is without merit.
Art. 1039.Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2)
and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that
what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for
relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should
have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when
his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. Furthermore, such
request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion
at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not
a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Petition hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of LEON vs.
MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
 Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in New York City leaving a will which was
duly probated in the Surrogate's Court of New York County and of which James Ross, Sr., James Madison
Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The proceedings were closed.
The will contained this residuary clause:
After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I give all of my remaining estate to
Mercedes de Leon, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects to be delivered to her for her use and profit; the moneys,
securities and other valuable property, not personal effects, to be held in trust for her benefit by my executors, at
their absolute discretion, to be administered for her permanent benefit in whatever way they may consider most
advantageous in the circumstances existing. Since the said Mercedes de Leon is not of sound judgment, and
discretion in the handling of money, it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her
current needs, except as my executors in their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount available
for this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their discretion may do so. And I
attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action of my executors upon their discretion in this matter
be questioned by anyone whatsoever.
 James Madison Ross was appointed trustee by the New York Country.
 Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. in Canada.The contract stipulates for
a monthly payment to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime, with the proviso that in the event of her death,
the residue, if any, of the capital sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or his successor
as trustee. Mercedes de Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the
Insurance Company's Manila Office.
 11
 Mercedes de Leon presented Butler's will for probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and secured
the appointment of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as administratrix
 (James Madison Ross and Ewald E. Selph had expressly declined appointment as executors "on the
ground that the probate proceedings of the above estate were terminated by the Surrogate's Court of
the County of New York, New York City, U. S. A., and that there are no properties of the estate left to be
administered.")
 The administratrix filed the motion which was denied.
 The administration of Butler's estate granted in New York was the principal or domiciliary administration
while the administration taken out in the Philippines is ancillary.
 However, the distinction serves only to distinguish one administration from the other, for the two
proceedings are separate and independent.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MANILA COURT HAS AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO THEASSETS INVOLVED.
HELD:NEGATIVE
The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within
the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power
over property in another state or country. This principle is specifically embodied in section 4 of Rule 77 of the Rules
of Court:
Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue,
if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate
court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada
is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the
company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the
annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the
funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.
Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of butler's estate and is
beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract
duly authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's
assumed obligation, which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the
proceeds of the sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the
annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary
executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the
amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.
In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the administratrix's motion is
defined in section 7 of Rule 88.
The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants the latter to account for, nor did
the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust for the administratrix. In other words, the administratrix
is a complete stranger to the subject of the motion and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject
of the motion, we incline to believe, is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in complete
disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract
which the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction with the trustee.
The appealed order therefore is affirmed.
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR. vs.JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
 Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will, Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon his death,
Atty. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
 Oscar Casa died intestate. The firm of Aquino entered their appearance as counsel of Casa, Jr., who
claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative.
 Probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance.
 Court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator estate of Oscar.
 Aquino filed a pleading of Appointment of Administrator praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be
designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.
 Considering that FEDERICO CASA, JR., is the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate
of the will and is most competent to assume the responsibilities and the duties of the ADMINISTRATOR.
 Epifanio San Juan filed a Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or
Insufficient.He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as
the representative of the estate in the case.
 12

 Aquino stated that the heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate. He also claimed that the court is enjoined to
require the representative to appear before the court and be substituted within the prescribed period.
 RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan.
 The court also held that is no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute
for the deceased devisee.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of
the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases
in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been
appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then
wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated.

 MR was filed but was DENIED. The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to
 2nd MR but also DENIED.
unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has
in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already
 When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial court, he filed, on July 23, 2004, a
an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all
3rd motion for reconsideration thereof. DENIED
the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not
 San Juan, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed
court. at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the
heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)
 CA dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA and
resolved to deny the motion of petitioner. The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate,
because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee
 Hence this petition for review on certiorari. of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar
Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.Said
ISSUE: Whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa. heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.

HELD: NEGATIVE Petition is DENIED.

The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Death of party. – After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian
ad litem for the minor heirs.

The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased
without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal
representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the
appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.