BANADA,LORENZ M.

BSME

ARTICLE III: Bill of Rights Summary

SECTION 1: Right to LIFE, LIBERTY and PROPERTY and Equal protection of the laws

Tenorio Vs Manila Railroad Co.

FACTS:
Defendant company took possession of and occupied small parcel of land without the
express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is
a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings.

ISSUE:
W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his
land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings
instituted by Defendant Company.

HELD:
As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings
will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common-law modes
of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must be at least
substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. In the absence of proof of a substantial
compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly
entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered
as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory
on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant Company having unlawfully
taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon
rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire
tract, and recover damages for its full value.

SECTION 2: Warrant of Arrest, Search and Seizures, Probable Cause, Warrantless Arrest

LA CHEMISE LACOSTE V. FERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. L-63796-97)

FACTS:
Petitioner La Chemise Lacoste is a foreign corporation and the actual owner of the
trademarks ‘Lacoste,’ ‘Chemise Lacoste,’ and ‘Crocodile Device’ used on clothing and other
goods that are sold in many parts of the world. Herein respondent Hemadas& Co., a domestic
firm, applied and was granted registration of the mark ‘Chemise Lacoste and Crocodile Device’
for its garment products. Sometime later, petitioner applied for the registration of its mark
‘Crocodile Device’ and ‘Lacoste’ but was opposed by herein respondent. Later, petitioner filed a
letter-complaint of unfair competition before the NBI which led to the issuance of search
warrants and the seizure of goods of respondent Hemadas. Respondent moved to quash the
warrants alleging that its trademark was different from petitioner’s trademark. Respondent court
ruled to set aside the warrants and to return the seized goods.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s trademark is a well-known mark protected under the Paris
Convention.
Ruling:
YES. In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for
unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover
recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties.
Pursuant to this obligation, the Ministry of Trade issued a memorandum addressed to the
Director of the Patents Office directing the latter to reject all pending applications for Philippine
registration of signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other than its original
owners or users. The conflicting claims over internationally known trademarks involve such
name brands as Lacoste, et. al. It is further directed that, in cases where warranted, Philippine
registrants of such trademarks should be asked to surrender their certificates of registration, if
any, to avoid suits for damages and other legal action by the trademarks’ foreign or local owners
or original users.

SECTION 3: The Privacy of communication

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,

ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITAREODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF
THECOMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. JusticeBrandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that
we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz :
(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner needstronger
barriers against further erosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instantpetition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and theheads
of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-AgencyCoordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE:
Won the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

RULING:
YES

RATIONALE:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issuesrelating to the
standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest touphold and that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

SECTION 4: Freedom of Speech; Right to a Free Press; Freedom of Assembly; the Right
of Petition
Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to
compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on
Nov 16, 1947. The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”.
However, the respondent refusedto issue such permit because he found “that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing uponprevious utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remainsbitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government,
and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.”Respondent based his refusal to the
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose;
or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec.
1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.

HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal
rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are
not absolute. They canbe regulated under the state’s police power that they should not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community
or society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the
City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion
by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the
second construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. It is tobe noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places
and not for theassembly itself.The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Fear of serious injurycannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free menfrom the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonableground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable groundto believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one .The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in serious
injury to the state.
SECTION 5: The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession &worship, w/o
discrimination

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S.
No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

HELD:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate day

SECTION 6: The liberty of abode and the right to travel

Jovito Salonga vs Rolando Hermoso

FACTS:
 During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against Rolando
Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a certificate of eligibility
to travel in favor of Salonga.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.

HELD:
No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso did issue and
did not deny Salonga’s request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
the Right to Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance
facilitate the erosion of human rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost
care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right
to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance – this is to avoid such similar cases
to face the Court which needlessly expire the Court’s effort and time.

SECTION 7: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized

Mirasol vs. DPWH

FACTS:
On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access
highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and
South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO
215.

ISSUE:
Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all motorized
vehicles “created equal”?

HELD:
DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to
administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to
regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not
possess in the first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable
classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other
light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive.
Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to
justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of
motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car,
a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle
is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

SECTION 8: The Right to Form Union.

Jacinto vs. CA

FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between
the period September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with
the mass actions then staged; and on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño
immediately issued a return-to-work order. They were administratively charged with gross
misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-
work directives; unjustified abandonment of teaching posts; non-observance of Civil Service
law, rules and regulations; non-compliance with reasonable office rules and regulations; and
incurring unauthorized absences without leave, etc.

ISSUE:
Were the public school teachers penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble
peacefully and to petition the government for redress of grievances?

HELD:
Improper Exercise of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and to Petition for a Redress of
Grievances. There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition
the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations
for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. Although
the Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express provision granting them the
right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso
that its exercise shall be done in accordance with law.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the
non-holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period.

SECTION 9: Right to Just Compensation

Case Example: Epifanio Gomez vs Paulina Cristobal

FACTS:
Epifanio Gomez owns two parcels of land located in the Jabay, Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite and a lot located in town of Bacoor, Cavite. He sold the property with Pacto de Retro to
Luis Yangco, redeemable in five years. The period to redeem expired but Yangco extended it.
Gomez approached BibianoBanas , a relative, to secure a loan. The latter only agreed if
Gomez’s brother Marcelino and sister Telesfora would also be responsible for the loan.
On 12 August 1907, Marcelino and Telesfora entered into a “private partnership in participation”
for the purpose of redeeming the property from Yangco. Epifanio was present when said
agreement was discussed and assented to. The capital consisted of P7000, of which P1500
came from Marcelino, and P5500 from Telesfora. The agreement provided that the property
redeemed will be placed in the name of Marcelino and Telesfora, the income, rent, and produce
of the property would go to the two and that the property shall be returned to their brother as
soon as the capital employed have been covered. Epifanio should also manifest good behavior
in the opinion of Marcelino and Telesfora.
More than a year later, Epifanio Gomez dies leaving Paulina Cristobal and their four children.
Meanwhile, Marcelino Gomez continued to possess the property, improved it, and earned
income from it. He acquired exclusive rights over it when Telesfora conveyed her interest to
him. He sold the property with pacto de retro to Banas, redeemable within five years. On April 1,
1918, he redeemed the property from Banas.
Subsequently, Paulina and children filed action to recover property from Marcelino. They
claimed that the capital had been covered by the property’s income, hence, the same should be
returned to them. The lower court granted their petition. Marcelino appealed. Hence the present
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether there was acceptance by Epifanio of the trust agreement.

HELD:
Yes. Contrary to defendant’s claim that the agreement was kept secret from Epifanio, the
testimony of Banas stated that Gomez was present when the arrangement for the repurchase of
the property was discussed. Banas even told Epifanio to be thankful that the latter was able to
recover the property from Yangco. Defendants also claim that because Epifanio had not
accepted the donation in a public document, the same is unenforceable. This is untenable.
Epifanio need not accept in accordance with formalities of donations. The court said that the
partnership agreement should be viewed as an express trust, not as an intended donation.

THUS:
Heirs of Epifanio entitled to recover the property.

SECTION 10: Non-Impairment Clause

Case Example: United States vs Luis Toribio

Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually
sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that
the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would
be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held
under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.”
http://www.uberdigests.info/2010/11/united-states-vs-luis-toribio/

SECTION 11: Free Access to Court

SECTION 12: Right of Person under Custodial Investigation

Case Example: United States vs Luis Toribio

Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually
sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that
the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would
be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held
under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.”
http://www.uberdigests.info/2010/11/united-states-vs-luis-toribio/

SECTION 13: The Right to Bail & Against Excessive Bail

Case Example: PABLO FELICIANO v. CFI JUDGE LADISLAO PASICOLAN

FACTS
Feliciano, upon learning that an amended information charging him and 17 others
of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued,
went into hiding. Without surrendering himself, he filed a motion through his lawyer in which he
asks that the court fix at 10k the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. The
Provincial Fiscal opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing was premature as Feliciano
had not yet been arrested. CFI Judge Pasicolan dismissed Feliciano’s motion on the ground
that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit
him to bail."Feliciano contends that the Constitution provides that “All persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong.” It is further averred that the phrase "all persons” has been
interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so
charged with any criminal offense." Therefore, mandamus lies to compel Judge Pasicolan to do
so.

ISSUE & HOLDING

WON Feliciano is entitled to admission to bail. NO. Feliciano is a free man; therefore, he is
not entitled to admission to bail.

RATIO
Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security required and given for the release of
a person who is in custody of the law. There is no question as to the soundness of the rule
invoked by Feliciano, but it is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission
to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
http://lawcasedigestbank.blogspot.com/2012/09/feliciano-v-pasicolan.html

SECTION 14: Rights of the Accused (the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial)

SECTION 15: The Writ of the Habeas Corpus

SECTION 16: The right to a speedy disposition of the cases

SECTION 17: The right against self-incrimination

SECTION 18: The Right to political beliefs and aspirations

SECTION 19: The prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment

SECTION 20: Non- Imprisonment for debts

SECTION 21: Right against double jeopardy

Section 22: Ex post facto law and bill of attainder